Israel-Iran Conflict, U.S. Strikes, and Ceasefire

Updated June 26, 2025

Israel-Iran Conflict, U.S. Strikes, and Ceasefire

On June 13, 2025, Israel began a major military operation

against Iran, including air strikes and reported covert action.

Iran retaliated by launching waves of ballistic missiles

against Israel. See Figure 1 and Figure 2 for maps

depicting strikes on both countries. Israel has procured most

of its fighter aircraft and large munitions from U.S.

suppliers, financed to date by nearly $4 billion of U.S. aid

annually.

On June 22, the United States carried out strikes against

three key Iranian nuclear sites (see Figure 1), including a

deep underground uranium enrichment facility at Fordow.

Israeli officials reportedly may have sought direct U.S.

involvement in targeting certain Iranian nuclear facilities

with specific “bunker buster” bombs and aircraft (the

United States used GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator

weapons and B-2 Spirit bombers in its air strikes). In a

notification to Congress that President Donald Trump said

was “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” (P.L. 93148), President Trump stated the strike “was taken to

advance vital United States national interests, and in

collective self-defense of our ally, Israel, by eliminating

Iran’s nuclear program.”

Figure 1. Reported Strikes on Iran

regarding the impact on Fordow and other sites may remain

unclear. The whereabouts of Iran’s uranium stockpiles

appear uncertain. It is unclear how the strikes may affect

Iran’s technical capabilities. It is also unclear whether the

strikes may have altered Iran’s political decision-making

regarding its nuclear program and aspirations toward

weaponization.

Figure 2. Reported Strikes on Israel & the West Bank

Source: CRS, adapted from CNN (citing Reuters and CNN analysis

of social media), as of June 24, 2025.

Notes: All areas and notations are approximate.

Source: CRS, adapted from CNN (citing The Institute for the Study

of War with AEI’s Critical Threats Project, U.S. President Donald

Trump, International Atomic Energy Agency), as of June 24, 2025.

Notes: All areas and notations are approximate.

Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe has

stated that some intelligence indicates “several key Iranian

nuclear facilities were destroyed and would have to be

rebuilt over the course of years.” An Iranian official

observed that “our nuclear installations have been badly

damaged.” The director general of the International Atomic

Energy Agency said that “very significant damage is

expected to have occurred” at Fordow. Broader details

Some Members of Congress expressed support for Israel’s

military actions and called its operations “understandable

and justified.” Some have expressed support for H.Res. 521

in favor of U.S. assistance for Israel. Others called the

Israeli strikes “alarming” and “reckless.” Some introduced

resolutions or legislation (S.J.Res. 59, H.Con.Res. 38, S.

2087) emphasizing the role of Congress in authorizing the

use of U.S. force. A range of opinions surrounded the U.S.

strikes as well, with some Members praising them, and

some expressing concern that the strikes raise risks of

broader conflict, may not have been as effective as initially

asserted, or were based on assessments or decisions that did

not sufficiently involve Congress.

On June 23, Iran fired ballistic missiles at Al Udeid Air

Base in Qatar, in what may have been a largely symbolic

retaliation; no U.S. casualties were reported. Hours later,

President Trump announced that Israel and Iran would end

hostilities on June 24. After some additional salvos, Israel

and Iran indicated intentions to comply with the ceasefire,

but reserved the right to defend themselves. President

Trump said another U.S. strike could happen if Iran

resumed uranium enrichment.

Israeli attacks reportedly degraded several Iranian military,

government, and energy facilities, among other targets in

Iran, and killed a number of high-level Iranian military and

government officials and nuclear scientists. Reports

indicate that Israel may have destroyed a significant portion

of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers. Strikes and other

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Israel-Iran Conflict, U.S. Strikes, and Ceasefire

attacks by Israel and Iran have reportedly killed over 600

people in Iran and 29 in Israel.

Historical Background

During Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s tenure

after 2009, Israel has threatened multiple times to act

militarily to destroy or set back Iran’s nuclear program.

Israel, which for decades has reportedly maintained a

nuclear arsenal but has not officially acknowledged it, has

taken preemptive action against nuclear programs in the

region—destroying an Iraqi facility in 1981 and a Syrian

one in 2007. In the 2010s, Israel, reportedly with U.S. help

in at least one instance, apparently executed a number of

covert actions against Iranian facilities and personnel to

disrupt and delay the program. Alongside U.S. sanctions on

Iranian oil exports, the Obama Administration led

international efforts to reach a 2015 agreement (Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA), which placed

new physical constraints, as well as inspection and

monitoring provisions, on Iran’s nuclear program. In 2018,

President Trump (with strong support from Netanyahu)

ended U.S. participation in the JCPOA, citing what he

described as the accord’s defects, and increased sanctions

on Iran. Approximately a year later, Iran began nuclear

activities that exceeded JCPOA-stated limits.

Hamas-led attacks on Israel in 2023 were followed by

broader regional conflict between Israel and Iran’s “axis of

resistance.” Direct clashes between Israel and Iran in April

and October 2024 and Israel’s large-scale degradation of

Hezbollah (a key Iranian ally) in Lebanon prompted serious

discussion in Israel about whether and when to act against

Iran’s nuclear program. Having seemingly mostly

neutralized Hezbollah’s missile threat and ostensibly

weakened Iran’s air defenses and ballistic missile

production capacity, Israeli leaders reportedly explored

plans, including with U.S. officials, to strike Iran’s nuclear

program amid increasingly public discussion in Iran of the

once-taboo subject of weaponization. Some of President

Trump’s public comments discouraged attacks while U.S.

officials engaged in diplomacy with Iran after April 2025.

Issues Facing Congress

The conflict with Iran and subsequent events have

implications for U.S. Middle East policy. Congress may

consider whether or not to take action concerning military

assistance, arms sales, sanctions, defense appropriations,

authorization of or limitations on use of military force,

diplomacy and negotiated agreements, or oversight of the

Administration’s past and ongoing policies and programs.

Resumption of conflict and/or follow-on diplomacy. It is

unclear under what conditions Israel or Iran might resume

their conflict or enhance the truce’s durability. Israel’s

leaders are likely to monitor developments in relation to

Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile arsenal, support for

armed groups in the region, and other activities that might

pose threats to Israeli citizens, strategic assets, and interests.

During the June conflict, Israel struck various targets in a

way that could be interpreted as an effort to pressure or

weaken the Islamic Republic regime, and reportedly

considered targeting Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali

Khamenei. Prime Minister Netanyahu also said during the

conflict that regime change was a possible outcome. On

June 24, Netanyahu said that Israel had removed the threat

of annihilation by nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

In considering military and diplomatic options, Iranian

leaders may assess their regime’s residual strength, as well

as the capabilities Iran and its regional allies maintain to

threaten Israel, U.S. assets and personnel based in the

region, other U.S. partners, and the flow of energy

commerce through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s nuclear

program, military assets, political leadership, economy, and

infrastructure all took blows during the conflict. While Iran

might seek to avoid additional conflict for the time being, it

is unclear which of the following is more likely, or whether

both may occur at some point: (a) Iranian diplomatic

concessions with respect to its nuclear program or other

strategic capabilities, to avoid further strikes or reach a

deal; and/or (b) Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear weapon

or otherwise bolster its capacity to deter or threaten Israel,

the United States and other potential adversaries.

U.S. officials and lawmakers may assess the benefits and

drawbacks of various diplomatic, military, and economic

options. These could include efforts to incline Israel, Iran,

and other regional actors toward certain outcomes—

regarding both the issues underlying the June conflict, and

potentially related matters with respect to broader regional

order and stability—such as:

• newly agreed limits on Iran’s nuclear program, military

activities, or regional relationships;

• a possible ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and hostageprisoner exchange between Israel and Hamas; and

• arrangements aimed at establishing stability and/or

potential diplomatic normalization involving Israel,

Palestinian actors, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Saudi

Arabia, and other regional countries.

It is uncertain whether Russia and the People’s Republic of

China (PRC) may be willing to support multilateral

diplomacy and/or increase political, economic, or military

support to Iran. Neither Russia nor the PRC appears to have

directly involved itself in the conflict on Iran’s behalf.

Russia and Iran engage in various types of strategic

partnership. The PRC reportedly buys some 90% of Iran’s

oil exports, which are about 14% of the PRC’s oil imports.

U.S. security assistance for Israel. U.S. officials and

lawmakers may receive requests from Israeli counterparts

for additional military aid and/or expedited arms transfers,

including to help replenish aerial munitions and missile

defense interceptors. As the conflict entered its second

week, reports surfaced of Israeli interceptor scarcity. U.S.Israel discussions and congressional deliberations over arms

sales and aid authorizations and appropriations may

influence and be influenced by various factors, such as:

• U.S.-Israel cooperative efforts to develop more costeffective solutions to counter missiles and drones; and

• assessments of and possible updates to U.S.-Israel

security cooperation arrangements, including bilateral

agreements and joint or coordinated military action.

Clayton Thomas, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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IF13032

Israel-Iran Conflict, U.S. Strikes, and Ceasefire

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