MQ-25 Stingray: Background and Issues for Congress

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MQ-25 Stingray: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction

The U.S. Navy is developing a carrier-based uncrewed

aircraft system (UAS) to perform aerial refueling and

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

missions. The MQ-25 Stingray, if the system is fielded as

planned, would be the U.S. Department of Defense’s

(DOD’s) first uncrewed tanker and the Navy’s first carrierbased uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV, or drone). (DOD is

“using a secondary Department of War designation,”

under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025.)

Congress has expressed an interest in the Navy’s efforts to

develop a carrier-based drone and in the future structure of

the carrier air wing.

According to the Navy’s FY2027 budget submission to

Congress, by providing the carrier air wing with a dedicated

aerial tanker, the MQ-25 would extend the effective

operating range of crewed fighter aircraft and reduce the

strain on fighter aircraft modified to provide mid-air

refueling capabilities. In congressional testimony, Navy

officials have further described the Stingray as a

“pathfinder” to what they describe as the “air wing of the

future”—one in which UAVs could potentially conduct

various missions.

For FY2027, the Navy requested $1.75 billion in

discretionary procurement and research, development, test,

and evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the MQ-25. If

approved by Congress, the Navy’s FY2027 request would

fund the procurement of three MQ-25 aircraft and represent

the second year of low-rate initial production (LRIP) of the

aircraft. The MQ-25 program of record currently estimates

a total of 76 aircraft, including 67 operational aircraft and

nine test and developmental aircraft.

Background

In 1999, the Navy and the U.S. Defense Advanced

Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began to develop a

multi-mission, carrier-based uncrewed combat aerial

vehicle (UCAV), a goal Congress supported in the Floyd D.

Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2001 (P.L. 106-398, §220). Over the following decade, the

Navy, DOD, and Congress considered various possible

configurations of a carrier-based combat UAV. These

initiatives resulted in the Unmanned Carrier Launched

Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program, the

requirements for which DOD initially approved in 2011.

In 2016, the Navy shifted the focus of the development of a

carrier-based UAV from combat missions to refueling

missions. According to the Navy, the new aircraft would

relieve the Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters of

having to conduct air-to-air refueling missions, allowing the

Super Hornet fighters to focus on combat missions.

The Navy selected Boeing to produce the Stingray aircraft

in 2018 and awarded the company a fixed-price contract for

the engineering and manufacturing development phase of

the program. A Boeing-owned Stingray demonstrator, the

“T1,” conducted its first flight in 2019 and its first mid-air

refueling of another aircraft in 2021, though it lacked

features of the developmental and production aircraft.

Boeing finished assembling the first developmental MQ-25

aircraft in mid-2025. The Navy conducted the first flight of

a developmental MQ-25 in April 2026 (see Figure 1).

Following the flight, in May 2026, the Navy approved the

start of LRIP. The Navy has estimated that it will continue

flight tests of the MQ-25 until the end of FY2029, later than

initially planned (for more information, see “Schedule”).

Figure 1. MQ-25A Stingray

Source: Jamie Cosgrove, Naval Air Warfare Center.

MQ-25 Stingray

Design

The primary elements of the MQ-25 Stingray program are

the air vehicle and the mission control system and software,

the prime contractors for which are Boeing and Lockheed

Martin, respectively. The Navy is responsible for

integrating these components together and with the ship.

The Navy’s objective for the MQ-25 air vehicle is for the

drone to deliver at least 14,000 pounds of fuel at a distance

of 500 nautical miles (575 miles)—approximately the

capacity of the F/A-18E/F fighters, though less than that of

previous Navy tankers.

Boeing said in 2021 that it would build the MQ-25 at

MidAmerica St. Louis Airport in Mascoutah, IL, and in

2024 the company opened a $200-million production

factory there. Boeing selected the Rolls-Royce AE 3007N

turbofan engine, produced in Indianapolis, IN, to power the

MQ-25. The Stingray will reportedly use the Cobham

https://crsreports.congress.gov

MQ-25 Stingray: Background and Issues for Congress

Aerial Refueling Store, the same equipment used by tankerconfigured F/A-18E/F fighters, for mid-air refueling.

The Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control System

(UMCS, or MD-5) is the planned ground control station for

the MQ-25 Stingray, as well as potentially for future UAVs

that the Navy could integrate into the carrier air wing.

According to the Navy’s FY2027 budget submission, the

UMCS is to consist of the hardware, software, and

networks that allow pilots to plan and conduct flight

missions, including the consoles, beyond line-of-sight

communications, and the Lockheed Martin-developed Multi

Domain Control Capability (MDCX) software. The Navy is

procuring both ship-installed (MD-5C) and shore-based

(MD-5D) versions of the UMCS, as well as a mobile

version (MD-5E) for carriers that do not have the full

control station installed. In 2024, the Navy installed its first

UMCS on the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77); in 2026,

the USS Theodore Rosevelt (CVN 71) became the first fully

operational aircraft carrier compatible with the MQ-25.

Schedule

The DOD Office of Inspector General (DODIG), in a 2023

audit of the MQ-25 program, highlighted the potential risks

associated with the Navy’s development and production

schedule. One risk the DODIG identified was the Navy’s

plan to begin LRIP before the service had completed its

developmental and operational tests of the productionrepresentative MQ-25 aircraft. The DODIG recommended

that the Navy either delay its decision to start LRIP “until

the Program Office conducts sufficient tests and

evaluations,” or update its risk management documentation

for the program. In response, Navy officials said that the

program office had updated its risk assessment and delayed

program milestone decisions.

In 2024, the Navy adopted a new schedule and program

baseline for the MQ-25 that extended the development

phase of the program and postponed key milestones. For

example, under the revised schedule, the Navy postponed

the first flight of the developmental aircraft from 2021 to

2025. (The first flight occurred in April 2026.) According

to DOD’s April 2026 Modernized Selected Acquisition

Report (MSAR) for the MQ-25, the program may face

additional delays; DOD estimated that the MQ-25 could

reach an initial operational capability (IOC) in 2029, four

years after the date initially planned and two years after that

in the revised baseline. The MSAR attributed the delays to

multiple factors, including “production challenges due to

technical risk,” changes to the production schedule, and a

labor strike.

Cost

In the 2026 MSAR for the MQ-25, DOD estimated the total

acquisition cost of the program—including procurement,

RDT&E, and military construction—at $19.4 billion and

the acquisition unit cost at $255.8 million per aircraft. In the

2026 SAR, DOD estimated that life-cycle operations and

sustainment costs would be greater than previously

reported, due in part to revised manpower and fuel cost

calculations, higher maintenance and sustainment costs, and

future RDT&E costs.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO), in its 2026

Weapon Systems Annual Assessment, estimated the total

program cost—excluding military construction—at $16.6

billion and the acquisition unit cost at $218 million, a 4%

increase from GAO’s 2025 estimate. GAO attributed cost

increases in part to Navy efforts to mitigate and replace

obsolete components. The 2026 GAO report identified the

Navy’s plan to begin LRIP before it completed testing the

production-representative aircraft as a potential risk for

future “cost increases and further delays.” GAO also

reported that the Navy had lacked “data showing the actual

costs of building the aircraft” due to the nature of the fixedprice contract for development of the aircraft and that the

program office was “working to obtain better cost data.”

FY2026-Enacted Budget

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2026

(Division A of P.L. 119-75), provided a total of $1.03

billion in procurement and RDT&E funding for the MQ-25

program, $10 million less than requested. Additionally, in

the FY2025 reconciliation law, sometimes known as the

One Big Beautiful Bill Act (P.L. 119-21), Congress

provided $100 million in FY2025 mandatory funding to

“accelerate production of MQ-25 aircraft.”

FY2027 Budget Request

The Navy requested $1.75 billion in discretionary FY2027

procurement and RDT&E funding for the MQ-25 program.

DOD did not request that Congress use the reconciliation

process in 2026 to provide mandatory funding for the MQ25. To date, proposed defense authorization and

appropriations legislation in the House and Senate (H.R.

8800, S. 4784; H.R. 9495) would, if enacted, authorize and

provide the amount of funding requested for the program.

Issues for Congress

Congress may, as part of its oversight of Navy programs,

consider the following issues:

• Whether the Navy has provided Congress with sufficient

information regarding the costs of the MQ-25 program,

as well as unit costs relative to lower-cost alternatives.

• The Navy’s plan for conducting cybersecurity tests of

the software for the air vehicle and for the ground

control station.

• Whether the Navy’s plan to begin LRIP before it

completes the test and evaluation period might result in

additional delays and, if so, the Navy’s plan for

managing the risk of schedule delays.

• The Navy’s plan for managing the impact of potential

technical issues identified during its testing of the test

and developmental aircraft on its production schedule.

• What lessons, if any, the Navy plans to apply from the

MQ-25 program to the development of other, carrierbased UAVs, and whether recent armed conflicts have

affected Navy plans for carrier-based UAV missions.

Daniel M. Gettinger, Analyst in U.S. Defense Policy

IF12972

https://crsreports.congress.gov

MQ-25 Stingray: Background and Issues for Congress

Disclaimer

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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12972 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED

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