Federal Aviation Administration Oversight of Boeing

December 5, 2024

Federal Aviation Administration Oversight of Boeing

Commercial air travel is one of the safest forms of

transportation, and fatal crashes are extremely rare.

Between 2013 and 2022, U.S. air carriers flew more than

175 million cumulative flight hours and experienced six

fatal crashes resulting in 15 total fatalities. The

International Air Transport Association found that global

airline safety performance improved by 61% over the past

decade. Although design flaws and manufacturing defects

have seldom played a significant role in commercial

aviation crashes, two fatal mishaps and additional serious

incidents involving Boeing airplanes have brought its

design and manufacturing processes under global scrutiny.

As the sole producer of large transport airplanes in the

United States, Boeing is a major focus of Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) oversight. In the wake of these

events, FAA has increased oversight and inspections of

Boeing aircraft development and manufacturing, and

Congress has scrutinized both Boeing and FAA. Some

ongoing challenges to effective FAA oversight of Boeing

include production pressures spurred by continued global

demand; the complexity of a distributed and diverse supply

network; challenges at FAA to recruit, retain, and train its

inspector workforce; and heavy reliance on delegated

aircraft design and production certification functions.

Boeing Commercial Airplanes

Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA) is a business unit of

the Boeing Company, a global aerospace conglomerate.

BCA employs about 48,000 workers, primarily at facilities

in Washington State and South Carolina. Boeing produces a

number of commercial airliners, including the narrow-body

737 and three wide-bodies: the 767, 777, and 787

Dreamliner. In 2023, it ended production of the iconic 747

jumbo jet. More than 10,000 Boeing jetliners are in service

around the world, and more than 5,400 of its airplanes are

currently on order. In 2023, Boeing delivered 528 airplanes,

a 10% increase over 2022. However, production caps

imposed by FAA in early 2024 amid concerns over quality

assurance along with a 2-month machinist strike have

slowed deliveries by about 20%, compared with 2023.

Long-standing Safety Concerns

For over a decade, FAA has been raising concerns about

Boeing aircraft. In 2015, Boeing entered into a settlement

agreement with FAA following multiple failures to take

corrective actions regarding observed deficiencies in quality

assurance. As part of the agreement, Boeing committed to

implementing a Safety Management System (SMS),

adopting a regulatory compliance plan, and stepping up

audits and verification processes to oversee suppliers and

component parts. Despite these actions, concerns over the

quality and safety of Boeing airplanes and the adequacy of

FAA oversight of Boeing design and manufacturing

practices have persisted. These concerns have primarily

focused on Boeing’s two most modern commercial

airplanes: the Boeing 737 Max and the Boeing 787

Dreamliner.

Trouble with the Max

The 737 is considered Boeing’s narrow-body stalwart.

Boeing has delivered almost twelve thousand 737s since the

model’s initial introduction in 1967. The most recent

iteration, the Boeing 737 Max, made its debut in 2016,

offering more quiet, fuel-efficient engines and other

performance improvements. However, two catastrophic

passenger airline crashes overseas—Lion Air Flight 610 on

October 29, 2018, and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on

March 10, 2019—led to a 20-month worldwide grounding

of all 737 Max airplanes and halted deliveries until

November 2020. Broader concerns over the certification of

the 737 Max prompted intense scrutiny of FAA’s

delegation of certification responsibilities to Boeing,

culminating in legislation requiring sweeping reforms to the

aircraft certification process and FAA’s oversight of aircraft

manufacturers and their certification units. The 2020

Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act

(Division V of P.L. 116-260) required FAA to reform

policies and practices related to aircraft certification and

mandated industry-wide implementation of FAA-approved

SMS programs.

On January 5, 2024, a Boeing 737 Max airplane operated

by Alaska Airlines experienced an in-flight separation of a

door plug, a covering for an emergency exit opening that is

installed when a door is not required. Following the mishap,

which caused some injuries and no fatalities, FAA launched

an investigation of Boeing manufacturing processes and

ordered a comprehensive audit of the 737 Max production

lines and supply chain to evaluate compliance with FAAmandated quality procedures.

A February 2024 incident, where the rudder controls of a

United Airlines Boeing 737 Max became stuck during

landing at Newark Liberty Airport, prompted a National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation. NTSB

found that incorrectly assembled rudder actuator bearings in

an automated control unit are susceptible to freezing,

possibly limiting rudder movement in cold weather. A

similar incident involving an Aeromexico 737 Max in

March 2023 prompted Boeing to issue a notice to operators.

In September 2024, NTSB urged FAA and Boeing to take

immediate corrective action. In October 2024, FAA issued

a safety alert advising operators of affected aircraft to carry

out rudder system checks before landing and to follow

stuck-rudder procedures if a jam is suspected.

Boeing had previously experienced rudder system issues

with its 737 jets. In the 1990s, design flaws in 737 rudder

control systems resulted in two fatal crashes in the United

States. NTSB concluded that under certain conditions,

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Federal Aviation Administration Oversight of Boeing

faulty rudder control units could jam, potentially causing an

in-flight loss of control. On the basis of these findings, FAA

ordered additional maintenance inspections and ultimately

mandated the replacement of rudder control systems on all

affected Boeing 737s in 2002.

Dreamliner Woes

Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner, the company’s most modern

wide-body offering, has also faced quality concerns. Boeing

has delivered more than 1,100 since the 787 first entered

into service in 2011, and no fatal crashes involving this

aircraft type have occurred. However, multiple

whistleblowers have come forward with safety concerns

about 787 assembly in South Carolina. One whistleblower

made allegations of installed defective parts and said that

piles of metal shavings that could damage wiring, as well as

tools and other debris, were often left behind on aircraft.

This whistleblower, who died by suicide in March 2024,

was seeking damages through the legal system for alleged

retaliation by Boeing. Another whistleblower raised

concerns that processes for joining 787 fuselage sections

could damage the aircraft structure and alleged that Boeing

retaliated against him after he alerted FAA. That

whistleblower headlined an April 2024 hearing before the

Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations about an

alleged lax safety culture at Boeing. Boeing maintains that

the whistleblower’s concerns had already been voluntarily

disclosed to FAA and corrective actions were taken, and it

has contested his allegations of retaliation. The

whistleblower cases parallel FAA findings of multiple 787

quality control issues and possible falsification of records.

third-quarter 2024 earnings report, Boeing stated that it has

an order backlog of over 5,400 airplanes, up substantially

from the backlog of about 4,300 airplanes reported in

September 2022. It stated that aircraft deliveries in the first

nine months of 2024 totaled 291 airplanes, compared with

371 for the same period in 2023. Boeing will likely face

persistent production pressures for years to come that could

pose challenges for FAA in effectively monitoring safety

compliance and manufacturing quality assurance, especially

as production restrictions are eased.

Further complicating FAA’s role is that the supply chain of

Boeing airplane component parts is highly distributed and

diverse, stretching from Asia to Europe. Fuselage sections

for the 787 are fabricated in Japan, South Korea, Italy, and

Wichita, KS, prior to being joined during final assembly at

Boeing’s Charleston, SC, plant. Similarly, sections of 737

fuselages are fabricated in Wichita, KS, and shipped by rail

to Renton, WA, for final assembly. Across its product lines,

Boeing relies on over 700 primary suppliers as well as a

network of sub-tier suppliers scattered across the world.

The DOT OIG found that Boeing oversight of suppliers is

limited, and this has, in some instances, allowed for the

introduction of substandard parts. Measures to ensure that

suppliers can produce conforming parts was a significant

element of Boeing’s 2015 settlement agreement, but

concerns have persisted, with documented conformity

failures of 787 parts.

Following the January 2024 Alaska Airlines mishap, FAA

halted any expansion of Boeing 737 Max production,

capping it at the existing post-grounding, post-pandemic

level of 38 deliveries per month, shy of its 50 per month

target. FAA said it will not lift the cap until Boeing

implements a comprehensive action plan to (1) improve

SMS and employee safety reporting programs, (2) simplify

work processes and instructions, (3) enhance supplier

oversight, (4) improve employee training and

communication, and (5) increase internal audits. In May

2024, Boeing released an action plan outlining immediate

steps to improve its production systems and supply chain

quality oversight. However, FAA’s ability to effectively

monitor and evaluate these changes remains in question. An

October 2024 Department of Transportation Office of

Inspector General (DOT OIG) audit found that FAA’s

oversight processes for identifying and rectifying Boeing

production problems were not effective. The audit asserted

that FAA does not use data-driven methods to target

oversight and lacks a tracking system capable of identifying

systematic compliance deficiencies. The DOT OIG also

found that FAA does not sufficiently review design

approvals intended to ensure that aircraft components from

suppliers conform to approved design specifications. It

found that FAA has not assessed the effectiveness of

Boeing’s SMS and has not established criteria for

reinstating its delegated certification functions and units.

The DOT OIG also raised concerns that FAA

manufacturing inspectors focus too heavily on daytime

activities and on processes they are familiar with rather than

basing oversight on systematic evaluations of risk. More

broadly, FAA faces continued challenges in recruiting,

retaining, and training its inspector workforce. Although

FAA is attempting to address these challenges through a

comprehensive aviation safety workforce plan, it could

continue to face hurdles in maintaining a skilled workforce

and providing appropriate resources to effectively oversee

complex organizations such as Boeing. As a result, FAA

plans to continue to rely heavily on delegated authorities,

particularly the Organization Designation Authorization

(ODA) program that tasks dedicated units at companies

such as Boeing to carry out certain testing, evaluation, and

certification functions on FAA’s behalf. The ODA

program, however, came under intense scrutiny during the

2019-2020 grounding of the 737 Max. In 2022, Boeing was

stripped of its delegated authority to issue airworthiness

certification for completed 787 aircraft pending

improvements to quality control and manufacturing

processes. Similarly, after the January 2024 door-plug

mishap on Alaska flight 1282, FAA restricted certain

Boeing 737 ODA functions pending satisfactory

implementation of comprehensive reforms. The FAA

Reauthorization Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-63) mandates annual

ethics training for ODA unit members and requires FAA to

develop a forum for reviewing and sharing ODA best

practices. Assuring trust and conducting effective oversight

of delegated aircraft design and manufacturing activities at

Boeing could remain a persistent challenge for FAA.

Ongoing Challenges

Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy

Increased Scrutiny of Boeing

FAA’s production cap and the machinists strike have

squeezed Boeing’s ability to meet customer demand. In its

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Federal Aviation Administration Oversight of Boeing

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