Russia-North Korea Relations

Russia-North Korea Relations

Updated September 18, 2026

Overview

Since 2022, the Russian Federation (Russia) and the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) have

expanded and deepened their relationship in ways that may

erode U.S. security and interests. During that period, Russian

President Vladimir Putin and DPRK leader Kim Jong-un have

met three times. At a June 2024 summit in Pyongyang, Putin

and Kim signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty,

later ratified by both parties, that includes a commitment to

provide military assistance in the event of an external armed

attack on either country. North Korea has supported Russia’s

military actions in Ukraine—reportedly earning billions of

dollars in the process—by providing thousands of shipping

containers of munitions, supplying ballistic missiles, and

deploying over 10,000 troops to Russia to help expel Ukrainian

forces from Russia’s Kursk region in 2025. U.S. officials have

assessed that by gaining combat experience and by receiving

Russian advanced military technology, North Korea may pose a

greater threat to the United States and its allies.

The Russia-DPRK relationship has implications for issues of

concern to Congress, including battlefield conditions in Ukraine,

the maintenance of sanctions against Russia and North Korea,

and the strength of North Korea’s military and cyber

capabilities. Russian technology transfers, for example, could

improve the ability of North Korean missiles to strike the U.S.

homeland as well as U.S. allies in East Asia. Concurrent

improvements in North Korea’s relations with Russia and the

People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China), along with the

strengthening of Russia-China relations and the expansion of

Russia’s footprint in the Indo-Pacific, compound the challenges

to the United States.

After evidence of the expanded Russia-DPRK partnership first

surfaced, the U.S. government responded by publicly revealing

evidence of weapons transfers, coordinating among selected

allies and partners, and issuing new designations against

individuals and entities that violate U.S. and/or United Nations

Security Council (UNSC) sanctions. The United States also

worked with South Korea and Japan to bolster deterrence and

expand allied efforts to counter North Korea’s sanctions

evasion; the United States and 10 countries formed the

Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) in 2024 to

assess sanctions violations and evasions. The second Trump

Administration has continued the MSMT’s work and has

sanctioned Russia-based DPRK information technology groups

and specialists involved in cyber activities.

Russia’s Changing Approach to North Korea

From 2006 to 2017, Russia (along with China) supported the

adoption of 10 UNSC sanctions resolutions responding to North

Korea’s illicit nuclear weapons and missile programs. These

resolutions broadly restrict trade and engagement with North

Korea, including a ban on imports of DPRK goods in a variety

of sectors. The UNSC resolutions prohibit weapons transfers to

or from North Korea and assistance to North Korea’s ballistic

missile programs, including space or satellite launch activities,

among other transactions. They also prohibit the use of North

Korean labor. In addition to supporting these sanctions, Russia

and China participated in past talks seeking to persuade North

Korea to denuclearize.

Since at least 2022, however, Russia has reversed course.

During 2022 and 2023, Russia and China blocked U.S.-led

efforts at the UNSC to adopt stricter sanctions on North Korea

following DPRK ballistic missile tests. In March 2024, Russia

vetoed a resolution that would have renewed the mandate of a

UN expert panel charged with monitoring sanctions

implementation (China abstained); the panel had documented

North Korea’s sanctions evasion since 2010, including ship-toship transfers of oil and coal in the waters off China and

Russia’s coasts. Moscow’s veto of the panel may have been

taken to limit international monitoring of Russia’s banned trade

and other activities with North Korea.

An Expanding Partnership

Russia-DPRK relations have improved dramatically since

Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That

year, North Korea reportedly began transferring munitions to

Russia. Kim’s 2023 meeting with Putin in Russia was his first

summit with any foreign leader since 2019. Putin’s June 2024

visit to Pyongyang appeared to restore elements of the Soviet

Union-DPRK military alliance, which had lapsed following the

collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Article 3 of the new

bilateral treaty calls for each side to “provide military and other

assistance with all means in its possession without delay” in the

event either side “is put in a state of war by an armed invasion.”

In the treaty, the two sides also pledged to expand cooperation

in scientific fields, including nuclear energy and space

technology. High-level Russian and DPRK officials

subsequently have met in each other’s capitals to develop their

partnership in a range of areas including economics, science,

technology, and culture. In 2026, the two countries opened their

first-ever road bridge over their border.

Benefits for North Korea

According to the U.S. intelligence community’s 2025 annual

threat assessment (ATA), Russia is providing North Korea with

“financial benefit[s], diplomatic support, and defense

cooperation.” According to one estimate, through the end of

2025, North Korea earned between $7.7 and $14.4 billion from

supporting Russia’s war effort, primarily from artillery

deliveries. Russia has been accused of shipping oil to North

Korea above UNSC-permitted levels. Russia reportedly has

unfrozen $9 million in DPRK assets held in the Russian banking

system, is facilitating North Korea’s access to the global

financial system, and hosts DPRK workers possibly in violation

of UNSC sanctions. Russia also has increased food exports to

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Russia-North Korea Relations

North Korea. Putin has said Russia might help North Korea

build and perhaps launch satellites.

Policymakers and analysts have raised concerns about the extent

to which Russia-DPRK cooperation is enhancing North Korea’s

military and cyber capabilities. North Korea may have gained

useful information about how its missile systems and its troops

perform on the battlefield. According to the 2026 ATA, “The

benefits that North Korea receives for its support for Russia in

the war against Ukraine have increased North Korean

capabilities. North Korean military forces have gained valuable

combat experience in 21st Century warfare along with

equipment.” U.S. Forces Korea Commander General Xavier

Brunson in 2026 congressional testimony said that North Korea

has made “significant shifts” in its military capabilities as a

result of its upgraded partnership with Russia. Indo-Pacific

Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo testified to Congress in

April 2026 that “North Korea continues to attempt to gain

Russian assistance in developing space launch vehicles, military

satellites, one-way attack drones, missile technology, and

advanced submarine propulsion technology.” The May 2025

MSMT report says that Russia “is believed to have provided

North Korea with air defense equipment and anti-aircraft

missiles, as well as advanced electronic warfare systems.”

Upgrading relations with Russia may have spurred China, with

which Pyongyang has more extensive ties, to focus attention on

its own relationship with North Korea. After not meeting

between 2020 and 2025, Kim and PRC President Xi Jinping

have met twice since September 2025.

Benefits for Russia

Russia’s most immediate benefit from upgrading ties with North

Korea is its ready access to large stockpiles of artillery

ammunition, ballistic missiles, and soldiers and laborers, all of

which have helped supplement Russian reserves and bolstered

Russia’s defense production. In October 2024, North Korea

committed more than 10,000 troops to aid Russia’s war effort.

DPRK troops were involved in combat operations to help Russia

expel Ukrainian forces from Russia’s Kursk region in March

2025, with Russian President Putin calling DPRK troops

“heroes” for their participation. A DPRK memorial built in 2026

for troops killed in action in Russia appears to list over 2,000

names. Ukrainian officials reportedly estimate that several

thousand DPRK engineers and specialists are deployed

supporting the Russian military, including reports of 400 drone

operators. In August 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr

Zelensky warned that North Korea would be deploying 30,00050,000 troops to Russia. Also in August 2026, Ukrainian

intelligence assessed that plans are being finalized for DPRK to

send a missile unit of 90 personnel and at least 120 KN-23 and

KN-24 ballistic missiles. The DPRK KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic

missiles may not be as accurate as equivalent Russian systems

but have a long range and large payload and would provide

increased capabilities to Russian forces given Ukraine’s lack of

air defense interceptors.

In 2024 and 2025, Russia granted over 40,000 North Koreans

education visas that are suspected of being used by Russian

firms to employ DPRK workers, possibly in violation of UNSC

sanctions. Importing North Korean workers has helped Russia

overcome a labor shortage and helped rebuild the Kursk region

following the expulsion of Ukrainian forces in 2025.

Russia may be strengthening ties with North Korea (as well as

China and Iran) partly to compensate for its loss of access to

Western markets and technology. The partnership also may

reflect Russia’s attempt to reassert its role in the Indo-Pacific

region and regain leverage in its relationship with China by

inserting itself as an actor in any negotiations or discussions

regarding North Korea. In 2026, Admiral Paparo testified that

increased mutual support among Russia, North Korea, and

China creates an “interconnected challenge to U.S. national

security and regional stability.”

Issues for Congress

Congress has been at the forefront of efforts to impose and

expand U.S. sanctions in response to North Korea’s nuclear

weapons and missile programs, human rights abuses, and other

illicit activities. Congress has supported sanctions against

Russia for Moscow’s malign activities, including malicious

influence operations, weapons proliferation, human rights

abuses, and the invasion of Ukraine. Congress could review the

Administration’s implementation of sanctions against North

Korea and Russia, as well as efforts to persuade other countries

to enforce multilateral sanctions. S. 1883, introduced in May

2025, would require the executive branch to develop a strategy

to disrupt growing cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and

North Korea. The Ukraine Support Act (H.R. 2913), which

passed the House in June 2026, contains a reporting requirement

and would expand sanctions on Russia-North Korea

cooperation.

Congress could consider examining the U.S. response to DPRK

weapons and personnel transfers to Russia; whether (and if so,

how) such transfers may affect U.S. and allies’ interests in

Europe, the Indo-Pacific region, and elsewhere; and the extent

to which ongoing Russia-DPRK cooperation affects Ukraine’s

security and the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance to

allies. Congress also could assess possible effects of Russia’s

decision to halt implementation of UNSC resolutions on the

Russian and North Korean economies.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

(FY2026 NDAA; P.L. 119-60) requires an assessment of the

impact of the Russia-North Korea alliance (§1241) and requires

multiple agencies to establish, no later than 60 days after the law

passed, working groups on “adversary alignment” among

Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran (§1273). The working

groups’ findings and recommendations are to be compiled in a

report outlining a “strategic approach” to “disrupt, frustrate,

constrain, and prepare for” such cooperation, and the report is to

be submitted to relevant congressional committees no later than

180 days after the working groups were established.

Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European Affairs

Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs

Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation

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Russia-North Korea Relations

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