U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council: Background and Issues

Updated November 1, 2024

U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council: Background and Issues

The U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) is a

high-level forum between the United States and European

Union (EU) that aims to enhance cooperation on global

technology, economic, and trade issues; promote shared

prosperity and competitiveness; and support democratic,

market-oriented values. Congress has had no formal role in

approving TTC outcomes, and may have an interest in

overseeing and shaping the TTC to a greater extent.

TTC Origins and Context

The United States and EU are each other’s largest trade and

investment partners. Upon entering into office, President

Biden pledged “to repair and revitalize the U.S.-EU

partnership,” which some commentators asserted became

“fraught” during the Trump Administration. To “kick-start”

a “positive agenda” and strengthen trade, investment, and

technological cooperation, the United States and EU

announced the TTC at their June 2021 summit. That same

year, they also reached interim resolutions on some

contentious trade issues, such as the “Boeing-Airbus”

dispute in the World Trade Organization; and U.S. Section

232 steel and aluminum tariffs and EU retaliatory tariffs.

The TTC is led on the U.S. side by the U.S. Trade

Representative (USTR) and Secretaries of Commerce and

State and on the EU side by the Commissioners for Trade

and Competition (the European Commission is the EU’s

executive body). During 2021-2024, the TTC held six

ministerial-level meetings at alternating U.S. and EU

venues. The meetings yielded Joint Statements, except the

fifth ministerial, which yielded separate readouts.

The TTC encompasses 10 working groups, covering topics

such as technology, supply chains, and trade and investment

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groups are chaired by relevant U.S. government agencies

and European Commission departments (e.g., the global

trade challenges working group is led by USTR and the

Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade). Cooperation

includes issue-specific coordination, information sharing,

and dialogue, with input from industry, labor, and other

stakeholders.

The United States and European Union have cast the TTC

as “the key forum for our cooperation on trade and

technology matters.” The TTC has played a key role in

U.S.-EU coordination on export controls in response to

Russia’s war on Ukraine. Other outcomes have involved

areas such as artificial intelligence (AI), supply chains,

digital connectivity and infrastructure, investment

screening, sustainability, non-market concerns (e.g.,

China’s trade practices), and economic coercion.

On some issues (e.g., China’s global influence), the United

States and European Union share concerns but may vary on

appropriate approaches, which may have resulted in limited

TTC responses to these issues. On issues on which the

parties have differed, such as regulation, the partners have

sought to use the TTC to ensure their regulatory approaches

are “mutually reinforcing” and that policies avoid a subsidy

“race to the bottom.”

Table 1. TTC Working Groups

1. Technology standards

2. Climate and clean technology

3. Secure supply chains

4. Information and communications technology and services

(ICTS) security and competitiveness

5. Data governance and technology platform regulation

6. Misuse of technology threatening security and human rights

7. Cooperation on export controls of dual use items

8. Investment screening cooperation

9. Promoting small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) access

to and use of digital technologies

10. Global trade challenges

Source: CRS, based on U.S. Department of State, TTC web page.

Ongoing U.S.-EU trade talks focus on other issues,

including to: address carbon intensity and overcapacity in

the steel and aluminum sectors; and negotiate a critical

minerals agreement to enable EU critical minerals to

qualify towards certain requirements related to electric

vehicle (EV) tax credits in P.L. 117-169 (the Inflation

Reduction Act of 2022, IRA). Most of the issues currently

under consideration at the TTC aim to “update the rules of

the road for the 21st century” (e.g., regulatory cooperation

on new technologies) rather than address ongoing issues in

areas such as the digital economy and agriculture.

Sixth Ministerial and Key Issues

According to a U.S.-EU joint statement on the April 2024

(sixth) ministerial of the TTC, the TTC “has realized

substantial progress and achievements across all

workstreams” since the meetings began. Per their Joint

Statement, TTC outcomes show “[U.S.-EU] enduring ties…

and the importance of maintaining an operational forum for

cooperation on strategic trade and technology issues of

common interest and geopolitical relevance.” The partners

also announced specific outcomes, such as a new dialogue

on AI collaboration, their aim to extend two arrangements

on semiconductor supply chain coordination, and a joint

catalog on “green public procurement” best practices, as

well as plans to engage with stakeholders to learn their

views regarding the TTC’s future. Previously characterized

by Secretary of State Blinken as the “capstone TTC,” the

April 2024 ministerial was the last before the 2024 U.S.

election. It is unclear whether the next Administration

would seek to continue the TTC.

Supply Chains. Through the TTC, the United States and

European Union have sought to identify and address shared

supply chain vulnerabilities, promote diversification efforts,

and establish related research and development priorities in

areas such as semiconductors, solar energy, critical

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U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council: Background and Issues

minerals, and pharmaceuticals. In May 2023, the partners

announced an early warning and monitoring mechanism for

the semiconductors value chain, aiming to anticipate

shortages, alleviate bottlenecks, and outline response

measures. They also announced a transparency mechanism

to share information on semiconductor sector public

support. Per a EU January 2024 ministerial readout, for

example, the United States and EU activated the earlywarning mechanism, and agreed to intensify cooperation on

critical raw material sourcing for semiconductors after

China imposed export controls for gallium and germanium

(key semiconductor inputs) in 2023. The TTC is also

promoting sustainable and responsible supply chains with

strong labor protections. The TTC Trade and Labor

Dialogue (TALD), for example, has convened stakeholders

to address the risk of forced labor in supply chains.

Digital Policy and Emerging Technologies. At the

April 2024 ministerial, the United States and EU reaffirmed

their commitment to cooperation on critical and emerging

technologies, such as AI, quantum computing, 6G,

semiconductors, and biotechnology. They also published an

updated version of shared terminology and taxonomy

related to AI. Cooperation on other technology issues is

ongoing. A quantum task force continues to address

outstanding issues necessary to launch joint action

programs such as reciprocity in sharing research.

Differences on issues not explicitly covered in the TTC,

such as the implementation of new EU digital regulations,

may continue to challenge U.S.-EU relations.

Sustainability. Per the April 2024 ministerial statement,

the TTC’s Transatlantic Initiative on Sustainable Trade

(TIST) has advanced joint cooperation to transition to

“climate-neutral” economies in the United States and EU.

TIST has workstreams to support a transatlantic “green”

marketplace that benefits businesses, workers, and

consumers. The United States and EU agreed to continue

efforts under TIST, including on potential avenues for

cooperation on conformity assessments. Other areas of

cooperation on sustainability include clean energy

technology, supply chains, critical minerals, and “green”

public procurement. The partners have sought stakeholder

input on sustainability issues through the TIST and TALD.

Trade and Security. At the April 2024 ministerial, the

United States and European Union reaffirmed their shared

concerns about their “economic security,” focusing on

threats from “economic coercion,” the “weaponization of

economic dependencies,” and non-market policies and

practices. The parties stated their aim of “continuing efforts

to de-risk and diversify” their trade and investment

relations, including in “strategic supply chains,” to counter

such threats. They also stated their intent to continue

coordinating export restrictions against Russia; holding

technical exchanges on inbound investment review;

exchanging information on outbound investment-related

risks; and engaging on non-market risks, noting their

engagement on China’s medical devices sector.

Selected Issues for Congress

Congress may have an interest in the following TTC issues.

Congressional Role. Congress could assess its role in

shaping the TTC’s structure, priorities, and outcomes. It

also could consider whether the TTC’s executive-led

approach limits the durability and enforceability of

outcomes not enacted in U.S. law. Congress also could

consider whether or not to:

• seek a more formal role in consultation or approval of

TTC outcomes (e.g., P.L. 118-31, §6706, expresses the

sense of Congress that the Department of State should

provide regular updates on the TTC to the relevant

congressional committees);

• strengthen reporting requirements (e.g., S.Rept. 118198, notes that the Senate Appropriations Committee

“awaits receipt” of a Commerce-USTR report on the

TTC); or

• add a TTC parliamentary component or use the

Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (between U.S.

House Members and the European Parliament) to shape

the TTC.

Focus Areas. Congress may assess the TTC’s

prioritization of some geopolitical issues (e.g., responses to

Russia’s aggression in Ukraine), compared to other bilateral

trade and technology issues. Some Members and industry

stakeholders have called for the United States to use the

TTC to raise concerns, for example, about the EU’s digital

policies and pursue more regulatory cooperation. One think

tank has proposed that the TTC should “incorporate a trade

agreement framework” that more concretely links

cooperation on technology with advancing common trade

interests. Congress could legislate explicitly on the TTC or

TTC-related issues (e.g., H.R. 6571 directs U.S.

consultations with allies or partners on supply chains).

Effectiveness. Congress may examine whether the TTC is

effective for advancing U.S.-EU trade cooperation and U.S.

competitiveness in EU markets. Some Members and

stakeholders point to the TTC’s creation as evidence of

advances in renewing U.S.-EU trade relations. At the same

time, some Members and stakeholders also call for concrete

deliverables and express concern that “talk” rather than

“action” on difficult issues may cause the TTC to lose

momentum. Others assert that the TTC dialogue process is

important for relationship building and that meaningful

progress may take time, potentially across several

ministerial meetings. Observers are weighing political focus

garnered from regular high-level meetings against the

capacity of working groups to secure technical cooperation

and substantive outcomes at the meetings.

Congress may examine how the TTC relates to other

ongoing U.S.-EU trade engagements and whether other

mechanisms may be leveraged to advance U.S. trade policy

interests. One possibility is to revisit comprehensive U.S.EU free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations and whether or

not the TTC serves as a substitute for an FTA, given that

U.S. and EU political support for an FTA may be limited.

Shayerah I. Akhtar, Specialist in International Trade and

Finance

Andres B. Schwarzenberg, Specialist in International

Trade and Finance

Danielle M. Trachtenberg, Analyst in International Trade

and Finance

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U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council: Background and Issues

IF12575

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