India-U.S.: Major Arms Transfers and Military Exercises
Congressional research reportMar 10, 2026
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India-U.S.: Major Arms Transfers and Military Exercises
In October 2025, India’s defense minister—in the course of
inking a third 10-year defense framework agreement with
the United States—called defense “the major pillar” of
bilateral ties. The latest pact, meant to strengthen
“interoperability across all domains, including land, sea, air,
space, and cyberspace,” is described by the Pentagon as
“the most ambitious and wide-ranging [bilateral] document
yet.” In the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2026 (P.L. 119-60), Congress called for “broadening
United States engagement with India, including through the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” (“Quad”), to “advance
shared interests in a free and open Indo-Pacific region” and
to “enable greater cooperation on maritime security.”
Since 2008, defense trade has emerged as a key aspect of
the U.S.-India partnership, and bilateral military exercises
across all services are now routine. The U.S. Congress
designated India a “Major Defense Partner” in 2016,
conveying certain defense trade and security cooperation
privileges. U.S.-India security relations became a highprofile aspect of U.S. Asia policy during the first Trump
Administration. The Biden Administration launched new
technology-sharing and defense coproduction initiatives
with India that the second Trump Administration is building
upon. Legislation in the 118th Congress would have
enhanced India’s eligibility for arms sales. The 119 th
Congress may wish to consider adjusting U.S. laws and
regulations to shape U.S.-India defense trade. Arms sales to
and collaboration on advanced defense technologies with
India may require congressional approval.
From 2016 to 2020, the United States and India concluded
several “enabling” defense cooperation accords which in
many cases provide the legal framework for an intensified
defense partnership, including a Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA); a
Communications, Compatibility, and Security Agreement
(COMCASA); and a Basic Exchange and Cooperation
Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA). In 2018,
the United States elevated India to Strategic Trade
Authorization Tier 1, allowing it to receive license-free
access to some military and dual-use technologies regulated
by the Commerce Department. In 2019, the two countries
inked an Industrial Security Annex to enable transfers of
classified technology between private entities. In 2024, the
governments concluded a Security of Supply Arrangement
(SOSA) to facilitate defense industrial collaboration.
Negotiations on a Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP)
agreement began in 2023. Many analysts contend that an
RDP is needed to gain full SOSA benefits.
Major Arms Transfers
According to Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) data, India has been the world’s leading
importer of major arms (by value) since 1950, with
purchases of nearly $140 billion through 2025. For the
period 2008-2025, India accounted for 10% of global arms
imports—$51.8 billion worth—well ahead of #2 Saudi
Arabia. India’s current defense arsenal is heavily stocked
with Russian-supplied equipment. Since 2008, about 59%
of India’s defense imports (by value) have come from
Russia; other top suppliers include France (12%), the
United States (10%), and Israel (9.5%). The U.S.
government has actively encouraged India to reduce its
dependence on Russian-origin defense articles, and India’s
suppliers are becoming more diverse: for the period 20212025, 40% of India’s imports came from Russia.
Prior to 2008, U.S.-India defense trade was relatively
limited, involving modest U.S. sales of naval helicopters
and counterbattery radars in the mid-2000s. In 2007, the
United States also provided India with an amphibious
transport dock ship under the U.S. Excess Defense Articles
program. The combined value of these three deals was
roughly $233 million. India has since contracted for at least
$25 billion worth of U.S.-origin defense articles, purchasing
items through the Foreign Military Sales and the Direct
Commercial Sales processes. Major U.S. deliveries since
2008 include transport and maritime aircraft; transport,
maritime, and attack helicopters; anti-ship missiles; and
howitzers, among others. India is now the largest operator
of C-17 Globemaster heavy transport and P-8I Poseidon
maritime patrol aircraft outside of the United States.
In 2023, India approved procurement of 31 armed MQ-9B
SeaGuardian and SkyGuardian uncrewed aerial vehicles
(UAVs) for about $4 billion; deliveries are set to begin in
2029. In 2025, India signed a five-year sustainment package
for its Seahawk helicopters; the estimated $946 million deal
would upgrade its anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capabilities. India in 2025 ordered an additional 113 F404
engines for indigenously produced combat aircraft for about
$1 billion, and Delhi reportedly will procure another six P8I aircraft (~$3 billion). Other proposed sales include ASW
sonobuoys (~$251 million), Maritime Domain Awareness
equipment (~$131 million), Javelin anti-armor missile
systems (~$46 million), MK 54 torpedoes (~$175 million),
and Excalibur guided artillery rounds (~$47 million). The
United States also offers India advanced combat aircraft
such the F-21 Fighting Falcon, the F/A-18 Super Hornet,
and potentially the fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II.
The United States and India launched a Defense
Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X) in 2023 to expand
technology and defense industrial cooperation; this was
redubbed INDUS Innovation in 2025. At the time, General
Electric proposed to jointly produce—with technology
transfer—its advanced F414 jet engine in India. Discussions
on coproduction of Stryker infantry combat vehicles and
Javelin anti-tank missiles are ongoing.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
India-U.S.: Major Arms Transfers and Military Exercises
Major U.S. Arms Purchases, 2000-2025
(Deliveries completed unless otherwise noted.)
Air
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28 AH-64 Apache combat helicopters
1,456 AGM-114 Hellfire anti-tank missiles
245 Stinger portable surface-to-air missiles
12 APG-78 Longbow combat helicopter radars
15 CH-47 Chinook transport helicopters
13 C-130 Hercules transport aircraft
11 C-17 Globemaster III heavy transport aircraft
2 MQ-9A Reaper UAVs (two-year lease in 2020)
762 JDAM and CBU-97 guided bombs (612 delivered)
212 F404 jet engines (~70 delivered)
Sea
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1 Austin-class amphibious transport dock
24 MH-60R Seahawk naval helicopters (20 delivered)
6 APS-153 maritime aircraft radar (5 delivered)
12 P-8I Poseidon patrol and ASW aircraft
62 MK 54 ASW torpedoes
6 S-61 Sea King ASW helicopters
63 Harpoon anti-ship missiles
24 naval gas turbines (18 delivered)
Land
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12 Firefinder counterbattery radars
145 M-777 towed 155 mm howitzers
1,300 M-982 Excalibur guided artillery shells
145,400 SIG Sauer SIG716 assault rifles
Other bilateral exercises include Vajra Prahar for U.S. and
Indian Special Forces; Tarkash joint counterterrorism
exercises involving U.S. Special Forces and Indian National
Security Guard troops; and Sangam exercises for U.S.
Navy SEALs and India’s Marine Commando Force.
Multilateral Military Exercises
Malabar (Navy): The United States and India inaugurated
Malabar in 1992 as a bilateral naval exercise. Japan joined
in 2014. Australia’s participation began in 2020, bringing
together naval forces from all four of the Quad countries for
the first time since joint HADR operations in 2004.
Malabar’s 29th edition, the sixth to include all Quad navies,
was held near Guam in November 2025.
Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC, Navy): The biennial
RIMPAC reportedly is the world’s largest maritime
exercise. A 29th edition was held near Hawaii in 2024 with
the participation of 29 countries and 40 surface ships.
Milan (Navy): India hosts this biennial Bay of Bengal
exercise, first held in 1994 with the forces of five Southeast
Asian nations. The U.S. Navy first participated in 2022.
The 13th edition in February 2026 was the largest ever with
ships, submarines, aircraft, and personnel from 52 nations.
Other multilateral maritime exercises include Cutlass
Express, sponsored by the Pentagon’s Africa Command; La
Perouse, sponsored by France; and Sea Dragon, an annual
ASW theater exercise. Multilateral air force exercises
include Pitch Black, a biennial low-light warfare exercise
hosted by Australia, and Red Flag, U.S. Air Force aerial
combat exercises held with units from allied and partner
countries several times each year in the United States.
Other Notable Defense Cooperation
Bilateral Military Exercises
Since 2002, the United States and India have been
increasing the scope, complexity, and frequency of
combined military exercises, with an emphasis on maritime
security and interoperability. India now conducts more
exercises and personnel exchanges with the United States
than with any other country. (See italicized names below.)
Yudh Abhyas (Army): The 21st edition of the premier
bilateral ground forces exercise, held in Alaska in
September 2025, included jointly planned and executed
battalion-level tactical maneuvers.
Vajra Prahar (Army Special Forces): U.S. and Indian
Special Forces soldiers have held 16 joint exercises since
2010, and hundreds of U.S. Special Forces soldiers have
attended India’s Counter-Insurgency Jungle Warfare
School. The most recent edition of this platoon-level
exercise was held in India in February-March 2026.
Cope India (Air Force): First held in 2004 as a fighter jet
training exercise, in 2018 the two countries relaunched
these exercises after a nine-year hiatus. Cope India 2025
saw Quad partners Australia and Japan attend as observers.
Tiger Triumph (tri-service): In 2019, U.S. and Indian
forces conducted their first-ever tri-service exercise in the
Bay of Bengal to develop interoperability for large-scale
joint humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) operations. A
fourth iteration was held in April 2025.
India became a full member of the U.S.-commanded,
Bahrain-based Combined Maritime Forces in 2023. This
multinational naval focuses on counter-narcotics, countersmuggling, and counter-piracy. India has received at least
$1 million in U.S. International Military Education and
Training (IMET) funding annually since 2003. U.S. defense
firms have established Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul
(MRO) agreements in India, contributing to the
development of a bilateral defense ecosystem. Since 2023
the U.S. Navy has reached Master Ship Repair Agreements
with Indian firms, allowing U.S. warships to undergo
service at Indian shipyards. In February 2026 the two
governments launched the Autonomous Systems Industry
Alliance for co-development and co-production of
autonomous defense platforms.
Selected Legislation in the 118th Congress
S. 2096 and H.R. 4312 would have enhanced the eligibility of
India for Foreign Military Sales and exports under the Arms
Export Control Act.
Note: Arms purchase listings are sourced to SIPRI with further
inputs from the U.S. Departments of Defense and State.
K. Alan Kronstadt, Specialist in South Asian Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IF12438
India-U.S.: Major Arms Transfers and Military Exercises
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12438 · VERSION 31 · UPDATED
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