U.S.-European Relations in the 118th Congress

Updated May 29, 2024

U.S.-European Relations in the 118th Congress

An Evolving Relationship

Since the end of World War II, the United States and

Europe have forged a wide-ranging partnership. Often

termed the transatlantic relationship, the U.S.-European

partnership encompasses the 32-member North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO), relations with the 27-member

European Union (EU), and extensive bilateral political and

economic ties. Despite periodic tensions over the past 75

years, U.S. and European policymakers generally have

valued NATO, the EU, and the broader relationship as

serving their respective geostrategic and economic interests.

During the Trump Administration, U.S.-European relations

were strained by President Trump’s strident criticism of

NATO, the EU, and key European countries, as well as by

policy divisions on a range of issues, including relations

with China and Iran, tariffs and other trade issues, climate

change, and managing the COVID-19 pandemic.

European officials welcomed Biden Administration efforts

to decrease tensions, and U.S.-European cooperation has

strengthened since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. At

the same time, some foreign policy and trade differences

persist. The 118th Congress has considered or may continue

to evaluate U.S. interests in Europe, the future of NATO,

implications of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, and

prospects for U.S.-European cooperation on regional and

global challenges, including China.

Transatlantic Relations and U.S. Interests

U.S. policymakers for decades have regarded both NATO

and the EU as crucial to maintaining peace and stability in

Europe and stymieing big-power competition that cost over

500,000 American lives in two world wars. The United

States spearheaded NATO’s creation in 1949 and

encouraged the European integration project from its

inception in the 1950s. During the Cold War, NATO and

the European project were considered essential to deterring

the Soviet threat. With strong U.S. support, NATO and the

EU have enlarged since the 1990s.

The U.S. and European economies are deeply intertwined.

U.S. data indicates that the transatlantic economy—made

up of the United States, the 27 EU members, and the nonEU countries of the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, and

Switzerland—typically generates around $6 trillion per year

in foreign affiliate sales and directly employs up to 10

million workers in total. The United States and the EU are

each other’s largest overall trade and investment partners.

Officials and experts on both sides of the Atlantic assess

that U.S. leadership of NATO and cooperation with the EU

has helped foster democratic and prosperous European

allies that, in turn, have bolstered U.S. foreign and security

policies and the multilateral trading system. U.S. and

European officials have worked together on many common

challenges—from promoting stability in various regions

(including the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Africa) to

countering terrorism and cybercrime to addressing Russia’s

first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Historically, U.S.-EU

cooperation was a driving force in liberalizing world trade.

Additionally, the well-honed habits of U.S.-European

political, military, and intelligence cooperation are unique

and cannot be easily replicated with other international

actors. U.S. engagement in Europe also helps limit Russian,

Chinese, or other possible malign influences.

At the same time, U.S. concerns exist about aspects of the

transatlantic relationship. Despite ongoing overall U.S.

support for NATO (including in Congress), successive U.S.

Administrations have called for more European defense

spending and some Members have supported and urged all

allies to meet NATO’s agreed defense spending guidelines.

U.S. officials have long regarded certain EU regulatory

approaches and other policies as barriers to trade. President

Trump was particularly forceful in calling for greater

European defense spending and in criticizing EU trade

practices as unfair and damaging to U.S. interests.

Biden Administration Policies and War in Ukraine

Upon entering office in 2021, President Biden expressed

strong U.S. support for NATO and its Article 5 mutual

defense commitment and pledged to work with the EU and

European governments on common global concerns. Biden

Administration officials viewed cooperation with European

democracies as key to countering challenges posed by

China, Russia, and other authoritarian governments.

European leaders welcomed the renewed U.S. commitment

to multilateralism exemplified by President Biden’s

decisions to rejoin the World Health Organization and the

Paris Agreement on combating climate change. At the same

time, some tensions remained and new controversies

emerged, including in relation to the U.S. troop withdrawal

from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Australia-UKU.S. security pact for the Indo-Pacific (known as AUKUS)

announced in September 2021.

Since 2022, Russia’s war against Ukraine has dominated

the transatlantic agenda. The Biden Administration, NATO,

the EU, and nearly all European governments strongly

condemn Russia’s actions, steadfastly support Ukraine’s

territorial integrity, and have been providing military and

economic aid to Ukraine. The United States and many

NATO allies have increased military deployments to

Central and Eastern Europe to deter further Russian

aggression and reinforce the alliance’s defense posture. The

Biden Administration and House and Senate majorities also

welcomed decisions by Finland and Sweden to seek NATO

membership. (Finland joined NATO in April 2023 and

Sweden in March 2024.)

The United States, the EU, the UK, and other allies have

cooperated extensively on imposing sanctions on Russia

https://crsreports.congress.gov

U.S.-European Relations in the 118th Congress

and are considering options for using immobilized Russian

sovereign assets to support Ukraine. Biden Administration

officials have worked to help boost liquefied natural gas

shipments to the EU, as part of U.S. efforts to help the EU

reduce its dependency on Russian energy imports. At times,

both U.S. and EU funding for Ukraine has faced political

hurdles and periodic delays. Transatlantic differences could

arise as U.S. and European officials begin to consider

requirements for future peace negotiations or how to

manage relations with Russia in the longer term.

Revitalizing U.S.-EU economic ties has been another Biden

Administration priority. In 2021, the United States and the

EU reached interim agreements to address disputes over

civil aircraft subsidies and on U.S. steel and aluminum

tariffs imposed on the EU. Also in 2021, the United States

and the EU launched a new Trade and Technology Council

(TTC) to focus on issues such as emerging technologies,

supply chain security, and digital governance. The Biden

Administration views the TTC, in part, as a vehicle to work

with the EU on issues posed by China and other nonmarket

economies; TTC meetings also have discussed U.S.-EU

export controls and other sanctions on Russia. Additionally,

the Biden Administration concluded a new commercial data

transfer arrangement with the EU to replace the Privacy

Shield framework (which the EU’s top court invalidated in

2020 for not meeting EU data protection standards).

U.S. tax credits for the purchase of electric vehicles and

other clean energy subsidies in P.L. 117-169 (commonly

known as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, or IRA)

sparked new trade frictions. The EU contended that some

IRA measures could discriminate against EU firms and

breach multilateral trade rules. Since March 2023, U.S. and

EU officials have been negotiating a critical minerals

agreement (CMA) to facilitate EU access to certain IRA tax

credits for electric vehicles. U.S.-UK CMA negotiations

also have been ongoing since June 2023. Some in Congress

question the Administration’s pursuit of CMAs as executive

agreements without formal congressional approval. Some

U.S. stakeholders and Members also voice concern that new

EU digital rules could unfairly target U.S. technology firms.

Managing relations with China and addressing the IsraelHamas conflict may test U.S.-EU relations as well. EU

views on China in recent years have come to mirror more

closely U.S. concerns about China’s political and economic

influence. At the same time, some EU officials and national

governments appear wary about U.S.-China tensions and

reluctant to antagonize a major economic partner. As for

Hamas’s October 2023 attacks on Israel and the ensuing

conflict in the Gaza Strip, the Biden Administration and the

EU have affirmed Israel’s right to defend itself “in line with

international law.” President Biden and EU leaders also

have expressed increasing concern about the humanitarian

crisis in Gaza. U.S. and EU officials have cooperated on

some aspects of the conflict—for example, establishing a

maritime humanitarian aid corridor for Gaza—but divisions

within the EU and some differences in U.S.-European

perspectives may complicate policy coordination.

European concerns also exist about whether and to what

extent the United States will remain a reliable international

partner. Some European policymakers have long argued

that Europe must be better prepared to address future

challenges in Europe and beyond, and to do so on its own if

necessary. For other Europeans, Russia’s war against

Ukraine has reinforced the importance of the transatlantic

partnership and its combined political and economic clout.

Issues for Congress

Potential areas in transatlantic relations for deliberation in

the 118th Congress include the following:

• Russia’s War Against Ukraine. Congress may assess

U.S.-European cooperation on Ukraine, including

assistance to Ukraine and the degree of U.S.-European

burden sharing. Congress also may be interested in

examining the conflict’s implications for transatlantic

security and defense relations, energy policies, and

Ukraine’s aspirations to join both NATO and the EU.

• NATO. NATO’s 2023 Vilnius Summit and 2022

strategic concept identified Russia as the most

significant threat to allied security; emphasized NATO’s

collective defense role; and addressed other challenges

facing the alliance, including China, disruptive

technologies, terrorism, and climate change. Congress

may examine these issues and future U.S. goals for

NATO in light of the alliance’s 75th anniversary and the

July 2024 Washington Summit. Congress also may

assess the extent of the U.S. force posture in Europe and

allied efforts to increase defense spending.

• U.S.-EU Agenda. In addition to U.S.-EU efforts on

Ukraine and Russia, Congress may assess Biden

Administration efforts to negotiate a CMA and to work

with the EU on clean energy, digital and technology

policies, and trade issues through the TTC and other

initiatives. Congress also may consider how issues

facing the EU—including the June 2024 European

Parliament elections and EU foreign policy and defense

ambitions—could affect U.S.-EU relations.

• UK Relations. Congress may review the implications of

Brexit—the UK’s 2020 withdrawal as an EU member—

for U.S. relations and for the Northern Ireland peace

process. Some in the House and Senate support a future

U.S.-UK free trade agreement (FTA); the Biden

Administration is working on a CMA and other trade

issues with the UK but has not resumed comprehensive

FTA negotiations begun by the Trump Administration.

• China. The Biden Administration has continued a U.S.EU dialogue on China (initiated by the Trump

Administration), launched U.S.-EU consultations on the

Indo-Pacific, sought to address economic and other

concerns about China through the TTC, and urged

NATO to address the security implications of China’s

rise and closer China-Russia relations. Congress may

consider possibilities for U.S.-European policy

coordination toward China and potential obstacles.

Also see CRS Report RS21372, The European Union:

Questions and Answers; CRS In Focus IF10931, U.S.-EU

Trade and Economic Relations; and CRS In Focus

IF12575, U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council:

Background and Issues.

Kristin Archick, Specialist in European Affairs

https://crsreports.congress.gov

IF12302

U.S.-European Relations in the 118th Congress

Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to

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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12302 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED