Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCMN)

Updated January 8, 2026

Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N)

Congress and the executive branch have debated the merits

of a new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile

(SLCM-N) since the weapon was proposed by the first

Trump Administration in 2018. The Biden Administration

proposed cancelling the SLCM-N program following its

2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), a periodic assessment

of U.S. nuclear policy. Congress has provided funding for

the SLCM-N and its warhead; the FY2024 National

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the executive

branch to start up the SLCM-N program.

Background

The Navy first deployed a nuclear-armed sea-launched

cruise missile in the mid-1980s, when it placed the TLAMN—a nuclear-armed version of the Tomahawk land-attack

cruise missile—on surface ships and attack submarines.

With a range of 2,500 kilometers (about 1,550 miles), the

missiles were not included in the limits of U.S.-Soviet arms

control agreements.

In 1991, at the end of the Cold War, President George H.W.

Bush announced that the United States would withdraw all

land-based tactical nuclear weapons (those that could travel

less than 300 miles) from overseas bases and all sea-based

tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships, submarines,

and naval aircraft. The Navy withdrew the TLAM-N

missiles by mid-1992 and eliminated the nuclear mission

for U.S. surface ships, but retained the option to return the

TLAM-N to attack submarines. Some observers

characterized this redeployment ability as demonstrating the

credibility of U.S. defense commitments to allies in Asia.

In 2010, the Obama Administration recommended that the

Navy retire the TLAM-N missiles. The 2010 NPR stated

that “this system serves a redundant purpose,” as it was one

of several weapons the United States could deploy in

support of U.S. allies. The Navy completed the retirement

of these missiles in 2013.

The first Trump Administration reversed this decision,

arguing in the 2018 NPR that a nuclear-armed sea-launched

cruise missile (now known as SLCM-N) would provide the

United States with a “non-strategic regional presence” that

would address the “need for flexible and low-yield

options.” SLCM-N was one of two systems that the 2018

NPR characterized as “modest supplements” that would

“strengthen deterrence” of regional adversaries and assure

U.S. allies. The other 2018 NPR-recommended system was

a low-yield version of the W76 nuclear warhead (known as

the W76-2) for the Trident D5 long-range submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM). The 2018 NPR stated

that the W76-2 was an option for the “near-term,” while

SLCM-N would be an option implemented over “the longer

term.” The Department of Defense (DOD), which is “using

a secondary Department of War designation,” under

Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025,

announced the deployment of the W76-2 in 2020. The Navy

conducted an Analysis of Alternatives on the SLCM-N.

In its FY2022 budget request, the Biden Administration

sought $5.2 million for DOD research and development

work on the SLCM-N. It also requested $10 million for the

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to study

adapting the W80-4 nuclear warhead, intended for the

Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) air-launched cruise

missile, for delivery carried by the SLCM-N. Later, in the

2022 NPR, the Biden Administration proposed cancelling

the SLCM-N, arguing that the missile was “no longer

necessary” because of the W76-2 SLBM’s “deterrence

contribution.” The Navy’s FY2023 budget request

eliminated funding for the SLCM-N, stating that it was

“cost prohibitive and the acquisition schedule would have

delivered capability late to need.”

Current Status

The Biden Administration did not include the SLCM-N in

its FY2023, FY2024, or FY2025 budget requests. The

Administration’s policy statements on the FY2023 and

FY2024 NDAAs asserted that continuing the SLCM-N

program “would divert resources and focus from higher

modernization priorities.” Despite the Administration’s

objections, Congress has provided continued funding for

the missile and the associated warhead (see Table 1).

Table 1. Funding for SLCM-N ($ in millions)

Authorizations and

Appropriations

FY2023

FY2024

FY2025

Authorized for SLCM-N

25.0

190.0

252.0

Appropriated for

SLCM-N

25.0

130.0

n/a

Authorized for SLCM-N

warhead

20.0

70.0

70.0

Appropriated for

SLCM-N warhead

20.0

70.0

n/a

Source: P.L. 117-263; P.L. 118-31; P.L. 117-328; P.L. 118-47; P.L.

118-42; P.L. 118-159.

Section 1640 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) directed

DOD to establish a “major defense acquisition program” for

SLCM-N under the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition and Sustainment (USD A&S), initiate a

program to alter the W80-4 warhead for the SLCM-N, and

“ensure” that the system achieves initial operational

capability (IOC) no later than September 30, 2034.

Then-USD A&S William LaPlante testified in April 2024

that in March 2024 he directed the “Navy to establish a

[SLCM-N] program office and to begin the analysis phase.”

He also stated that the Nuclear Weapons Council, a joint

DOD-NNSA coordination group, was “leading a review of

options to execute the SLCM-N program in a manner that

balances cost, deterrence value, and risk to the [nuclear

modernization] program of record and the Joint Force.”

https://crsreports.congress.gov

Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N)

Section 1627 of the FY2025 NDAA (P.L. 118-159)

provided DOD and NNSA with flexibility to select an

alternative warhead for the SLCM-N; directed the Secretary

of the Navy to establish a “separate, dedicated program

element” for SLCM-N development in the FY2026 budget

request; and limited certain funding unless the Secretary of

the Navy certifies the establishment of a program office.

The second Trump Administration did not request

discretionary funding for SLCM-N (program element

0105519N) in the FY2026 Navy budget, assuming $1.92

billion in mandatory funding from FY2025 reconciliation

legislation (P.L. 119-21), commonly referred to as the One

Big Beautiful Bill Act. The FY2026 NNSA request

assumed $272 million in mandatory funding for the

warhead. The FY2025 reconciliation legislation included $2

billion to accelerate work on the missile and $400 million to

accelerate work on the warhead. The FY2026 NDAA (P.L.

119-60) authorized $210 million for the missile and $50

million for the warhead. In Section 1633 of the FY2026

NDAA, Congress also required that DOD and NNSA

provide “a limited number of assets” to “enable limited

operational deployment” “not later than September 2032.”

Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe, Director of the Navy’s

Strategic Systems Programs (SSP), testified in a May 2025

hearing that SSP was working to understand the challenges

of developing and integrating the SLCM-N onto the

Virginia-Class submarine. A May 2025 NNSA document

stated that NNSA plans to use the “W80 warhead family”

for the SLCM-N warhead. In 2025, SSP announced awards

for the development of SLCM-N prototype designs and

awarded contracts to develop the missile’s launcher and

canister. In December 2025, NNSA announced the

completion of a different warhead for the Navy and stated

that staff from that program were “pivoting to focus more

fully on accelerating the SLCM-N program.” In December

2025, the Trump Administration announced the

construction of a new class of guided missile battleships

that, according to the Navy, would be armed with SLCM-N.

Issues in the SLCM-N Debate

Deterrence Credibility and Flexibility of Options

A key issue in the SLCM-N debate is whether adding the

missile to U.S. nuclear forces is necessary to credibly deter

limited nuclear use by adversaries and assure allies in

Europe and the Asia-Pacific that the United States would

protect them from nuclear coercion. The Biden

Administration stated in 2023 that the United States had the

ability in its “current and planned capabilities for deterring

an adversary’s limited nuclear use through conventional

and nuclear armaments.” (See CRS In Focus IF12735, U.S.

Extended Deterrence and Regional Nuclear Capabilities.)

SLCM-N proponents have argued that SLCM-N’s attributes

are different from low-yield capabilities delivered by other

means. They say that aircraft that deliver weapons would

need to either be “generated” (fueled, weapons-loaded, and

flown) from the United States, which takes time, or else

placed in regional bases, where they could be vulnerable to

adversary strikes. SLCM-N proponents also argue that

deploying the missile on surface vessels or attack

submarines provides advantages, such as greater

availability and regional presence, over deploying the W762 SLBM on ballistic missile submarines.

Then-STRATCOM Commander General Anthony Cotton

reportedly wrote in 2023 that “a low-yield, non-ballistic

nuclear capability to deter, assure and respond without

visible generation” could provide the President with

additional signaling and response options in a crisis. In

April 2022 testimony, General Mark Milley, then-Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also expressed support for the

SLCM-N. The 2023 final consensus report of the

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the

United States did not explicitly endorse the SLCM-N, but

called for a prompt system that is “forward deployed or

deployable”; “survivable against preemptive attack without

force generation day-to-day”; possesses “a range of

explosive yield options, including low yield”; and is able to

penetrate adversary integrated air and missile defenses.

Observers have debated whether a U.S. nuclear posture that

includes low-yield capabilities like the SLCM-N and the

W76-2 and demonstrates a willingness to use nuclear

weapons improves deterrence and allied assurance or

increases the risk of nuclear war.

Arms Control

Policymakers have debated the potential role of SLCM-N in

arms control. The 2018 NPR linked the missile to U.S.

concerns about a new missile that Russia has deployed in

violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

(INF) Treaty. Although the United States withdrew from

the treaty in 2018, the 2018 NPR stated that SLCM-N could

provide a treaty-compliant U.S. response to Russia’s

violation and incentivize Russia to engage in arms control

on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In contrast, the 2022 NPR

argued that there is “uncertainty regarding whether SLCMN on its own would provide leverage” in such negotiations.

Russia has rejected negotiations concerning its nonstrategic

nuclear weapons, citing these capabilities as necessary to

offset to U.S. and NATO conventional superiority.

Operational Tradeoffs and Costs

The Biden Administration argued in a July 2023 policy

statement that “deploying SLCM-N on Navy attack

submarines or surface combatants would reduce capacity

for conventional strike munitions, create additional burdens

on naval training, maintenance, and operations, and could

create additional risks to the Navy’s ability to operate in

key regions.” In May 2024 testimony, then-Navy Secretary

Carlos Del Toro expressed concerns about the tactical and

operational tradeoffs and costs of SLCM-N for the Navy.

The 2022 NPR also cited the SLCM-N’s “estimated cost”

as a tradeoff. The Navy stated in 2022 that SLCM-N

cancellation would save $199.2 million in FY2023 and $2.1

billion over the next five years. Then-Secretary of Defense

Lloyd Austin III testified in April 2022 that “the marginal

capability that [the SLCM-N] provides is far outweighed by

the cost.” A July 2023 Congressional Budget Office (CBO)

report estimated the costs of SLCM-N and its warhead at

$10 billion from 2023-2032 “if the program began in

2024.” This amount, the CBO noted, does not include

production costs beyond 2032, or costs for systems

integration, storage, or operations. SLCM-N supporters

argue that the deterrence and assurance benefits of SLCMN outweigh these operational tradeoffs and costs.

Anya L. Fink, Analyst in U.S. Defense Policy

https://crsreports.congress.gov

IF12084

Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N)

Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to

congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.

Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has

been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the

United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be

reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include

copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you

wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12084 · VERSION 14 · UPDATED