Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) and Military Ranges

February 24, 2021

Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) and Military Ranges

For as long as aerial warfare has existed, the continual

expansion of offensive air and missile weapons capabilities

has led militaries to develop commensurate defensive

capabilities. These “air defense systems” (also called “air

and missile defense” (AMD) systems) provide surveillance,

tracking, command and control, and weapons delivery

capabilities to battlefield commanders. Historically, AMD

systems were independently operated and managed by each

military service. Gradually, they became more connected,

and today several of these systems can communicate and

operate collectively. This is basis for the concept of an

integrated air defense system, or IADS. According to the

Department of Defense (DOD), an “IADS is not a formal

system in itself, but the aggregate of Service / functional

component and agency AMD systems.”

What is a Modern IADS?

Potential adversaries like Iran, Russia, and China have

identified airpower as a primary U.S. advantage in military

operations. As a result, several of these nations have

developed sophisticated IADS to counter U.S. military

capabilities. This includes networking multiple types of

ground–based radars (e.g., long-range surveillance radar,

engagement radar) with mobile command posts and air and

space-based capabilities to provide a larger, and more

comprehensive, picture of the battlespace (Figure 1). This

creates a challenge for U.S. forces because there is no

single sensor or missile to neutralize, but rather a

distributed network to contend with.

Figure 1. How a Modern IADS Functions

Considered part of what DOD terms “defensive counterair”

(DCA), an IADS’ purpose is to protect military assets and

vital locations from aerial threats. Conversely, countering

an enemy’s IADS by destroying, suppressing, or otherwise

neutralizing their system is part of what DOD defines as

“offensive counterair” (OCA). The U.S. military tests and

trains to effectively employ an IADS as well as counter an

enemy’s IADS. Training for and conducting DCA and

OCA activities typically requires a significant amount of air

and ground space, along with access to, and control of, the

associated electromagnetic spectrum (see CRS In Focus

IF11155, Defense Primer: Military Use of the

Electromagnetic Spectrum, by John R. Hoehn).

Military “ranges”—defined under 10 U.S.C. §101(e)—that

support IADS generally correspond to large-scale ranges

used for aviation training. These ranges have the required

land, defined airspace (called a “military operations area”

or MOA), and when necessary sea space, available to

employ multiple AMD systems.

DOD states that several of these ranges are now regularly

operating at full capacity to support numerous types of

military units from across the joint force (e.g., aviation

units, marine amphibious forces, special operations forces).

At some locations, non-DOD federal agencies and coalition

partners also make use of these ranges. This has presented a

capacity challenge for the Military Services who schedule

and manage range use. Further exacerbating the issue, DOD

asserts that recent technology increases in IADS

capabilities have necessitated an increase in testing and

training space (i.e., range size). This has led DOD to

request from Congress expansion of, and in some cases

additional access to, certain ranges that could support

“modern IADS” testing and training—along with several

other readiness requirements.

Congress faces the issue of addressing DOD’s request for

additional range space and access at certain locations, as

DOD seeks to fully train for advances in IADS.

Source: Adapted from Royal United Services Institute for Defence and

Security Studies report titled “Modern Russian and Chinese Integrated

Air Defence Systems,” January 2020.

Additionally, advances in U.S. and foreign technologies—

particularly in microelectronics and processing power—

have significantly increased the ranges IADS are able to

surveil, track, and engage targets. These are the “modern

IADS” capabilities U.S. forces employ; they are also the

modern IADS threats U.S. forces face.

Selected Foreign IADS Capabilities

For over 10 years, Russia and China have developed

sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems in an

attempt to prevent U.S. forces from accessing certain areas

and regions. Capabilities of A2/AD systems—which

include IADS—continue to increase, consequently

increasing the distance from which U.S. forces must operate

to avoid detection and potential harm.

One of the most challenging foreign IADS capabilities that

U.S. forces may encounter is the Russian developed S-400

missile system (SA-21 Growler). This weapons system uses

radars with ranges of up to 400 kilometers (~250 miles),

paired with missiles that can reach similar distances. An

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Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) and Military Ranges

adversary would not necessarily launch a missile to its

maximum range to engage a target, but this capacity allows

for additional maneuverability within 250 miles to more

effectively engage targets.

Figure 2. Example Range Overlay of a Peer IADS

The Chinese HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system, and its

naval variant the HHQ-9 series, pose similar challenges. It’s

reported that these systems were developed in China and

have radar ranges of up to 200 kilometers (~125 miles) with

missile ranges of around 125 kilometers (~78 miles). China

also has been improving versions of the HQ-9, such as the

HQ-19 ballistic missile interceptor, intended to reach

targets up to 3000 kilometers (~1865 miles).

Selected DOD Programs Linked to IADS

DOD has developed a number of capabilities that support

and counter IADS. These include “stealth” (i.e., low

observable) technology, long-range missiles, and radar

jamming equipment. Examples of air-based platforms and

weapons systems that include IADS technologies are:

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F-35 Lightning II

EA-18 Growler (incl. “Next Generation Jammer”)

B-2 Spirit

AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile

AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile

The Army and Marine Corps also maintain a number of

ground-based platforms and systems used in U.S. IADS,

such as the Avenger Air Defense System. They also have

begun developing long-range precision fires to support the

Joint force in countering adversary IADS. These include the

strategic long-range cannon and the precision strike missile.

IADS Range Requirements

The Air Force states that modern combat operations are

characterized by a wide battlespace that includes a

simulated IADS, incorporating early warning radars,

strategic and tactical surface-to-air missile systems, fixed

military-type targets, and friendly ground forces postured

against organized enemy military ground forces.

Source: U.S. Air Force, Final Legislative Environmental Impact

Statement (FLEIS), Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) Land

Withdrawal, October 2018.

Note: Figure is theoretical and not representative of any Air Force

land withdrawal request included as part of the 2018 NTTR FLEIS.

Considerations for Congress

Annual defense authorization and appropriations acts,

including the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and

Related Agencies Appropriations Act, provide opportunities

for Congress to fund and shape defense programs for both

IADS and military ranges. Enacting federal real property

transactions (e.g., land conveyances, exchanges, transfers)

and setting the terms for federal land withdrawals are also

actions Congress could take to address those IADS-related

range challenges DOD has reported.

 Land Withdrawals. A periodically recurring role of

Replicating this setting at military ranges for the testing and

training of IADS requires a certain amount of assets and

infrastructure (e.g., buildings, vehicles, aircraft, sensors), as

well as the space to position and maneuver those assets to

match modern capabilities. An example of the extent of a

“peer IADS” with a size and configuration that reflects “an

actual relevant geopolitical area that the U.S. warfighter

might engage” is provided in Figure 2. The sheer size of

this theoretical example—paired with existing range

configurations and land use restrictions—suggests that

DOD may be limited in its ability to test and train today’s

IADS at military ranges.

Congress is to assess the need for, and set the terms of,

federal land withdrawals (see CRS Report R46657,

Withdrawal of Federal Lands: Analysis of a Common

Legislated Withdrawal Provision, by Carol Hardy

Vincent and Erin H. Ward). This includes renewing

expiring land withdrawals—a process which can involve

redefining the spatial boundaries of withdrawn lands.

 Technological Advancement and Virtual Training.

Advancements in IADS’ capabilities increase the

physical space required to fully conduct live training. At

the same time, technological advancements in

virtual/mixed training environments (e.g., Live, Virtual,

Constructive (LVC) technology) allow, to a certain

degree, virtual training space to substitute for physical

space. Congress may request DOD examine the extent

to which virtual training environments could potentially

reduce physical space requirements for IADS training.

CRS Products

Other Resources

CRS Report R46463, U.S. Army Short-Range Air Defense Force

Structure and Selected Programs: Background and Issues for

Congress, by Andrew Feickert

CRS Report R44572, U.S. Airborne Electronic Attack Programs:

Background and Issues for Congress, by John R. Hoehn

Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats

Department of Defense 2019 Missile Defense Review

John R. Hoehn, Analyst in Military Capabilities and

Programs

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Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) and Military Ranges

IF11771

G. James Herrera, Analyst in U.S. Defense Readiness and

Infrastructure

Disclaimer

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