Bulgaria: An Overview
Congressional research reportMay 21, 2024
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Bulgaria: An Overview
After decades of single-party communist rule and a difficult
transition period in the 1990s, Bulgaria joined NATO in
2004 and the European Union (EU) in 2007. Bulgaria’s
Black Sea location and NATO and EU memberships make
it an important U.S. partner. Members of Congress may
monitor several issues in Bulgaria with implications for the
U.S.-Bulgaria strategic partnership, including energy
security, military modernization, building resilience to
external authoritarian influence, and combating corruption
and organized crime. Prolonged political instability in
Bulgaria may have implications for U.S. interests. Bulgaria
is scheduled to hold a snap parliamentary election on June
9, 2024—its sixth parliamentary election since April
2021—alongside elections to the European Parliament.
President Radev, who appointed the caretaker governments
that presided over Bulgaria for much of the past three years.
Ahead of the June 9, 2024, election, voter intention polls
suggest the next parliament also could be fragmented.
GERB currently leads polls with around 26% support,
followed by PP-DB (17%), DPS (15%), Revival (14%),
BSP (9%), and smaller parties.
Figure 1. Bulgaria at a Glance
Domestic Overview
Under Bulgaria’s parliamentary system, the prime minister
leads the government, which exercises executive power.
The directly elected president is the head of state and
commander in chief. President Rumen Radev was reelected
to a second term in 2021 with backing from the Bulgarian
Socialist Party (BSP), which is considered to have a more
pro-Russian orientation. Dimitar Glavchev was appointed
to lead a caretaker government in April 2024.
Acting Prime Minister Glavchev’s caretaker government
was preceded by the pro-Western government of Prime
Minister Nikolai Denkov, which comprised two blocs:
Denkov’s We Continue the Change and Democratic
Bulgaria (PP-DB), and Citizens for European Development
of Bulgaria-Union of Democratic Forces (GERB-SDS).
That government collapsed less than a year into its mandate
when the post of prime minister was due to rotate from
Denkov to a GERB designee. The Denkov government’s
priorities had included finalizing adoption of the euro as
Bulgaria’s currency, joining the EU’s Schengen area of free
movement, and countering Russian influence, particularly
in Bulgaria’s security and energy sectors.
Bulgaria has experienced a prolonged period of political
instability in recent years. A wave of anti-corruption
protests in 2020 and 2021 weakened then-Prime Minister
Boyko Borisov and his political party, GERB, which had
led successive governments for most of the preceding 12
years. GERB and BPS, the two largest parties in the 2010s,
lost some support to parties that ran on anti-corruption
platforms, such as DB and PP, as well as the populist There
Is Such a People (ITN) and the pro-Russian Revival. The
Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS), which is mostly
backed by ethnic Turkish voters, has had stable support.
Polarization and close election results have complicated
stable governance. GERB and PP-DB were the top finishers
in recent elections and share pro-Western platforms, yet
relations between the two blocs are fraught. Some analysts
assess that prolonged instability has politically strengthened
Source: CRS figure using CIA World Factbook and IMF data.
Corruption, Organized Crime, and the Rule of Law
Corruption, organized crime, and rule-of-law challenges
intensified during Bulgaria’s transition in the 1990s. Citing
concern that these issues had not been resolved when
Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, Brussels continued to
monitor reforms through the Cooperation and Verification
Mechanism (CVM). The CVM closed in late 2023, when
the EU assessed that Bulgaria met benchmarks in judicial
reform and in combating corruption and organized crime.
Some observers assess that corruption and organized crime
remain significant barriers to good governance and
economic growth. Bulgaria is consistently among the worstscored EU member states in Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index. The U.S. State Department’s
2023 Investment Climate Statement for Bulgaria asserts
that “high-level corruption, particularly in public
procurement, remains a serious concern.” The Biden
Administration has imposed sanctions on several prominent
Bulgarians for corruption (see below).
Economy
The World Bank classifies Bulgaria as an upper-middleincome country. Bulgaria’s strategic location, relatively low
business costs, and EU membership have attracted
investment in such areas as information technology and the
automotive industry. Gross domestic product (GDP)
contracted by nearly 4% in 2020 but grew by 7.7% in 2021.
Growth slowed to 3.9% in 2022 and 1.9% in 2023, due in
part to the economic impacts of Russia’s war on Ukraine.
Bulgaria is to receive €6.2 billion in EU COVID-19
recovery and resilience grants and loans.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Bulgaria: An Overview
Bulgaria is among the poorest EU member states, although
living conditions improved alongside EU integration.
Barriers to growth include infrastructure deficiencies,
corruption, and an unpredictable legal environment.
Demographic decline also poses a challenge; peaking at
nearly 9 million in the 1980s, the population is now
estimated at 6.4 million.
Foreign and Security Policy
Closely aligned with the Soviet Union during the Cold War,
Bulgaria adopted a Euro-Atlantic foreign policy in the
1990s. Alongside Bulgaria’s EU and NATO integration,
Bulgarian leaders generally sought to preserve good
relations with Russia. Pro-Russian sentiment and
ambivalent views of NATO persist among certain political
parties and segments of Bulgarian society. Some analysts
assess that Bulgaria’s corruption challenges, weak media
climate, and energy dependency have exposed the country
to Russian influence and hybrid threats.
Despite greater political fragmentation in Bulgaria in recent
years, its governments have largely supported Ukraine.
Bulgaria has backed EU sanctions against Russia, agreed to
host a multinational NATO battlegroup, expelled dozens of
Russian diplomatic staff on suspicion of espionage, and
provided military aid to Ukraine. Bulgaria also hosts around
72,000 Ukrainian refugees and is seeking to reduce reliance
on Russian energy supplies (see below). Bulgaria’s defense
industry produces artillery ammunition that is compatible
with Ukrainian equipment and reportedly plans to expand
production to include NATO-standard ammunition.
Although measures to support Ukraine generally draw
support in Bulgaria’s parliament, some have been
contentious. In December 2023, for example, parliament
approved the transfer of 100 Soviet-era armored vehicles to
Ukraine, overriding President Radev’s veto. Ukrainian
officials criticized Radev’s position that such transfers
would prolong the conflict.
Black Sea security is a key issue for Bulgaria. Bulgarian
officials have expressed concern about Russia’s ambitions
to “dominate the Black Sea” and security threats stemming
from the war in Ukraine. Since 2022, Bulgaria has
generally welcomed NATO initiatives in the Black Sea
region. Bulgaria hosts an Italian-led NATO multinational
battlegroup and plans to invest in supportive infrastructure.
In early 2024, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey signed an
agreement to cooperate on countering sea mines.
Bulgarian officials have pledged to revive long-delayed
equipment upgrades and enhance defense capabilities.
Bulgaria spent an estimated 1.84% of its GDP on defense in
2023 and plans to meet NATO’s 2% target in 2024. In
2019, Bulgaria agreed to purchase eight F-16 fighter jets
from the United States at an estimated cost of $1.67 billion;
in 2022, it moved to purchase eight additional F-16s. In
2023, parliament approved the purchase of 183 U.S. Stryker
vehicles for an estimated cost of $1.5 billion.
U.S.-Bulgaria Relations
During the 1990s and 2000s, the United States provided
foreign aid and diplomatic support for Bulgaria’s domestic
transition and integration into NATO and the EU. The
United States and Bulgaria maintain good relations.
Members of Congress may assess U.S.-Bulgaria ties in the
context of U.S. policy toward the Black Sea region. Section
1247 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2024 (P.L. 118-31) requires the President to direct the
National Security Council to develop an interagency
strategy with regard to the Black Sea region and Black Sea
states (including Bulgaria) and specifies goals and
objectives under such a strategy.
Security Cooperation
In 2006, the United States and Bulgaria signed a Defense
Cooperation Agreement allowing joint use of four
Bulgarian military facilities. In 2020, the two countries
agreed to a 10-year military cooperation road map. Since
2022, the United States has deployed additional troops and
equipment to Bulgaria and enhanced bilateral cooperation
with Bulgaria on countering disinformation and bolstering
cybersecurity. The United States has provided more than
$260 million in security assistance to Bulgaria since 2018,
with emphasis on military modernization, Black Sea
maritime domain awareness, and cybersecurity.
Sanctions
The Biden Administration has used sanctions to address
corruption in Bulgaria. In June 2021, the Department of the
Treasury sanctioned three Bulgarian individuals and 64
associated entities for corruption under the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (P.L. 114328, Title XII, Subtitle F; as implemented through
Executive Order 13818). In February 2023, Treasury
sanctioned five current and former Bulgarian officials and
five entities for corruption under Global Magnitsky.
Treasury’s press release states that the “diverse profiles and
longstanding prominence in Bulgarian politics [of the
sanctioned persons] illustrate the extent to which corruption
has become entrenched across ministries, parties, and stateowned industries.” The State Department has imposed
travel bans on several Bulgarian officials for corruption
under Section 7031(c) of annual Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations
legislation (P.L. 117-328, Division K, for FY2023).
Energy Cooperation
The United States supports Bulgaria’s steps to end
dependency on Russian nuclear fuel, crude oil, and natural
gas supplies. U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) helped
Bulgaria cope with a gas supply crisis triggered when
Russia’s Gazprom cut deliveries in April 2022. U.S.-backed
regional projects, such as a Greece-Bulgaria interconnector
enabling gas imports from Azerbaijan, and Bulgaria’s stake
in a new LNG terminal in Greece are expected to help
diversify supplies. The U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation has approved financing of up to $365
million for an expansion of Bulgaria’s underground gas
storage facility. In 2023, Bulgaria signed a memorandum of
understanding with U.S. firm Westinghouse on expanding
the country’s sole nuclear power plant. In February 2024,
the United States and Bulgaria signed an intergovernmental
agreement to cooperate on developing Bulgaria’s civil
nuclear power program and clean energy sources.
Sarah E. Garding, Analyst in European Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IF11725
Bulgaria: An Overview
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11725 · VERSION 8 · UPDATED
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