Biometric Entry-Exit System: Legislative History and Status

August 27, 2020

Biometric Entry-Exit System: Legislative History and Status

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is statutorily

required to develop and implement an automated biometric

(i.e., physical characteristics such as fingerprints, face, or

irises) entry-exit system for foreign nationals (referred to as

aliens in immigration law) traveling into and out of the

United States. The goals of this system are to strengthen

national security and help enforce immigration law without

disrupting the flow of authorized travel and commerce. The

biometric entry system is said to be fully operationalized,

whereas the biometric exit system is still being

implemented.

Legislative History

Since mandating the development of an automated entryexit system in 1996, Congress has amended the system’s

requirements and deadlines on several occasions, including

by adding a biometric component in 2001. A timeline of

related laws includes the following:

September 1996: The Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; P.L. 104208), Section 110, required the Attorney General (AG) to

develop an automated entry-exit system that would collect

records of alien arrivals and departures by September 1998.

October 1998: Two appropriations acts (P.L. 105-259 and

P.L. 105-277) amended Section 110 of IIRIRA to extend

the deadline for implementing the entry-exit system to

October 1998 for airports and to March 2001 for land and

sea ports of entry (POEs).

June 2000: The Immigration and Naturalization Service

Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106215) amended IIRIRA Section 110 to describe the entryexit system in greater detail and imposed new deadlines of

December 2003 for implementation of the entry-exit system

at all U.S. airports and seaports, December 2004 for

implementation at the 50 busiest land POEs as defined by

the AG, and December 2005 for making data from the

system available to immigration officers at all POEs.

October 2000: The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act

(P.L. 106-396), Section 205, required the AG to develop

and implement a fully automated entry-exit system to

collect arrival and departure records for travelers under the

Visa Waiver Program at sea and air POEs by October 2001.

October 2001: The Uniting and Strengthening America by

Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and

Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act; P.L. 107-56),

Section 414, required the AG to implement the IIRIRA

entry-exit system “with all deliberate speed.” The act also

directed the AG, in the development of the system, to focus

on utilization of biometric technology and tamper-resistant

documents. The law also required that the entry-exit system

interface with certain law enforcement databases to identify

individuals who may pose a threat to national security.

May 2002: The Enhanced Border Security and Visa

Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173), Section 302, required

the AG, in developing the integrated entry-exit system at

POEs, to use the technology standard under the PATRIOT

Act, establish an arrival and departure database, and make

all alien admissibility security databases interoperable (i.e.,

able to share data with other databases).

December 2004: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism

Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), Section 7208,

required DHS (which was created in late 2002 and assumed

responsibility for the nation’s entry-exit system) to develop

a plan to accelerate the full implementation of an automated

biometric entry-exit system.

August 2007: The Implementing Recommendations of the

9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), Section 711,

required DHS to establish a biometric exit system to record

the departure of all Visa Waiver Program air travelers by

August 2008.

September 2008: The DHS Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L.

110-329) withheld certain funding for the legacy United

States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology

(US-VISIT) program until DHS planned, piloted, and

reported on a biometric air exit program.

December 2015: The Consolidated Appropriations Act,

2016 (P.L. 114-113) authorized fee increases on L-1 and H1B visas to provide up to $1 billion dollars for DHS to

implement a biometric exit system beginning in FY2017.

Executive Orders

The executive branch has also recently been involved in

influencing the development of a biometric entry-exit

system. Action by the Trump Administration includes the

following:

March 2017: Executive Order 13780, Protecting the Nation

from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, ordered

DHS to “expedite the completion and implementation of a

biometric entry-exit tracking system.”

Biometric Entry System

In December 2006, DHS fully implemented a biometric

entry system for foreign nationals. It is part of the primary

inspection at U.S. POEs. During primary inspection, U.S.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers conduct a

brief interview with travelers, examine travel documents,

and check travelers against the Interagency Border

Inspection System (IBIS), a database of alleged and

convicted criminals . Officers also conduct identity

verification by entering some of the travelers’ biographical

(e.g., passport information) and biometric (e.g., finger scans

and digital photographs) identification into the US-VISIT

system. U.S. citizens are not required to provide biometrics

upon entry to the United States.

https://crsreports.congress.gov

Biometric Entry-Exit System: Legislative History and Status

Biometric Exit System

Unlike the entry system, the biometric exit system has yet

to be fully operationalized. The Government Accountability

Office (GAO) has periodically reported on the “various

longstanding planning, infrastructure, and staffing

challenges” to developing and implementing the biometric

exit system. DHS, and then CBP (which took over the

biometric entry-exit mission in 2013), piloted an array of

programs using various biometric technologies (e.g.,

fingerprints, facial recognition, and iris scans). CBP

determined that facial recognition technology (FRT) was

the optimal approach because it can be performed relatively

quickly and with a relatively high degree of accuracy (see

“Accuracy,” below). Its solution is called the Traveler

Verification Service (TVS), which currently captures

roughly 60% of in-scope travelers (i.e., foreign nationals

aged 14-79) departing the United States via commercial air

carriers. CBP’s goal is to capture 97% of all in-scope

departing commercial air travelers by 2022.

Traveler Verification Service

CBP, in partnership with the Transportation Security

Administration, deploys TVS to verify travelers’ identities

utilizing FRT. TVS is a public-private partnership between

the federal government and private airlines, airports, and

cruise lines. CBP envisions that TVS “can replace manual

checks of travel document across the travel continuum” at

air, land, and sea POEs. TVS currently operates in 27

airports, 7 seaports, and 5 land border locations across the

United States, as well as 4 preclearance locations.

A Matching Technology

TVS compares the travelers’ live photograph (e.g., taken by

a gate agent) to a gallery of photographs. The content of

these comparison galleries depends on the travel context.

For air and sea travelers, CBP uses biographic data (e.g.,

gender, date of birth, travel document type and number,

nationality) obtained from flight and ship manifests via the

Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) to gather

all associated facial images from DHS holdings (e.g.,

photographs from U.S. passports, U.S. visas, CBP entry

inspections, and other DHS encounters) into the gallery. For

pedestrians and vehicle travelers, the gallery consists of

photographs of frequent crossers at that POE. TVS provides

a match or no match result within two seconds. In case of a

no match, the traveler’s identity is checked manually by an

agent.

Accuracy

In contrast to other types of FRT that can provide numerous

possible matches (e.g., FRT used by police to generate

potential investigative leads), TVS is a binary (match or no

match) technology. As such, TVS can produce two types of

mistakes: false positives and false negatives. According to

CBP internal analysis, TVS’s false positive rate is .0103%

(it did not report the false negative rate). The accuracy rate

is affected by a number of factors, including the

composition of the gallery against which a face is

compared. Notably, the TVS galleries are relatively small

because they are created for a specific flight, ship, or POE.

pose potentially less of a security risk, though they present

unique challenges. In the event of a non-match, a traveler’s

identity is checked manually, and the technology’s error

can be corrected—although it could delay or disrupt travel.

A December 2019 National Institute of Science and

Technology study found that FRT algorithms’ accuracy

rates can vary by demographic factors such as age, sex, and

race. However, when examining TVS’s accuracy, DHS

reported that “CBP analysis found a negligible effect in

regards to biometric matching based on citizenship, age, or

gender.” (CBP does not collect race/ethnicity data, so it

uses citizenship as a proxy.)

U.S. Citizens’ Ability to Opt-Out

U.S. citizens are allowed to opt-out of biometric exit

participation and can instead undergo manual review of

travel documents. CBP notifies travelers of this option

through physical signs posted at POEs and verbal

announcements. They also provide an FAQ sheet upon

request. In addition, there is information about TVS on

CBP’s website. However, in a letter to DHS, discussed

below, some policymakers expressed concern that CBP

may not provide U.S. citizens with adequate notice about

TVS or explain opt-out procedures clearly.

Data Retention and Security

CBP stores photographs of foreign nationals for 14 days in

the Automated Targeting System (ATS) Unified Passenger

Module (UPAX). After 14 days, photographs are

transmitted to the Automated Biometric Identification

System (IDENT), where they are retained for up to 75

years. In contrast, photographs of U.S. citizens are to be

immediately deleted after the matching process. All

photographs are to be purged from the TVS cloud after 12

hours, regardless of citizenship status.

During the July 2019 and February 2020 House Committee

on Homeland Security hearings about DHS’s use of FRT,

many Members expressed concerns about data security and

liability. In addition, on June 13, 2019, a few days after

CBP announced a breach of data held by one of their

subcontractors, over 20 House Members signed a letter to

then-Acting DHS Secretary McAleenan expressing concern

about CBP’s use of FRT. Among other things, the letter

inquired about the nature of the contracts with private

partners, the legal liability of the private partners, and how

CBP audits partner systems to ensure that they are purging

the photographs consistent with aforementioned timelines.

Issues for Consideration

As the creation of a fully operational biometric entry-exit

system has been mandated by Congress, policymakers may

choose to conduct oversight over the speed and methods by

which DHS and CBP continue to implement the system. Of

particular interest may be the system’s development

timeline, concerns about the accuracy of FRT, and privacy

issues related to the capture and retention of photographs.

Abigail F. Kolker, Analyst in Immigration Policy

False matches pose potential security risks, as they may not

flag a traveler using a false identity. False non-matches

https://crsreports.congress.gov

IF11634

Biometric Entry-Exit System: Legislative History and Status

Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to

congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.

Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has

been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the

United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be

reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include

copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permissio n of the copyright holder if you

wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11634 · VERSION 1 · NEW