Protecting Against Rogue Drones

Updated September 3, 2020

Protecting Against Rogue Drones

Rules for Unmanned Aircraft

As of September 2020, the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA) had registered about 1.7 million unmanned aircraft

systems (UAS), often referred to as drones. More than 70%

are operated by recreational users. FAA estimates that by

2024, about 2.3 million UAS, including 1.5 million

recreational drones and model aircraft and about 800,000

commercial UAS, will be registered to fly in U.S. airspace.

As the UAS market expands, there may be an increasing

risk that rogue drones that either fail to obey safety rules or

are operated for nefarious purposes could threaten manned

aircraft operations, airports, critical infrastructure facilities,

and high-profile events. These concerns have prompted

Congress to examine options for detecting and interdicting

drones.

The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L.

112-95) mandated that FAA develop a plan to integrate

UAS into the national airspace and promulgate regulations

allowing certain commercial drone operations. In 2016,

FAA issued regulations (14 C.F.R. Part 107) allowing

routine operations of commercial UAS weighing less than

55 pounds so long as they are conducted during daylight

hours, in good visibility, and at low altitude, provided the

drones remain within the operator’s visual line of sight and

away from airports and manned aircraft. FAA may grant

waivers to these restrictions on a case-by-case basis.

UAS flown strictly for noncommercial purposes, including

recreational drones and radio-controlled model aircraft that

can sometimes be much larger than the 55-pound limit for

commercial UAS, were exempted from these rules and,

instead, operate under safety guidelines set by recreational

user groups. Like commercial operators, recreational users

must register with FAA and may do so through an online

registration system. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018

(P.L. 115-254) imposed additional requirements for

hobbyists, limiting recreational drone flights to altitudes

below 400 feet and mandating testing to assess operators’

knowledge of airspace and safety regulations. FAA is in the

process of implementing these testing requirements.

Potential Threats from UAS

These requirements that recreational drones remain at low

altitudes and that operators learn safety rules were imposed

following close calls and collisions with manned aircraft.

Between 2016 and 2019, airline pilots reported, on average,

more than 100 drone sightings per month to FAA, and

social media have transmitted photos and videos taken by

drones in close proximity to airports and passenger

airliners. In September 2017, a hobby drone launched from

a park in Brooklyn, New York, was intentionally flown

beyond its operator’s line of sight and collided with a U.S.

Army Black Hawk helicopter patrolling a temporary no-fly

zone around New York City. The helicopter landed safely,

but the incident damaged the main rotor assembly, where

fragments of the drone were found. The following month, a

drone struck a chartered turboprop near Quebec City,

Canada. That aircraft also was damaged but managed to

land safely. According to National Transportation Safety

Board data, there have been three confirmed collisions

between drones and manned aircraft in the United States so

far, and a similar number of manned aircraft have been

damaged from incidents that plausibly involved UAS.

FAA-sponsored research has found that collisions with

drones weighing eight pounds or less can cause more

structural damage than collisions with birds of similar

weight. Experts fear that a collision between a small drone

and a manned aircraft, or a drone being ingested into a jet

engine, could be catastrophic.

Airport officials have treated drone threats with

considerable caution. In December 2018, hundreds of

flights at London’s Gatwick airport were canceled over a

three-day period after multiple drone sightings near the

runway. Three weeks later, London’s Heathrow airport was

also briefly shut down due to a drone sighting, as was

Newark-Liberty Airport in New Jersey in January 2019.

In addition to careless and reckless drone operations,

homeland security and law enforcement agencies have

uncovered incidents involving drones transporting illegal

drugs across U.S. borders, dropping contraband into prison

yards, and conducting industrial espionage. The Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has warned of an escalating

threat that terrorists and criminal organizations might

launch domestic drone attacks on critical infrastructure

facilities, landmarks, and high-profile mass gatherings,

citing the use of reconnaissance and weaponized drones by

insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. In 2011, the FBI

thwarted a terrorist plot to attack the Pentagon and the U.S.

Capitol with explosives-laden model aircraft.

Controlling the Threat

FAA has encouraged UAS manufacturers to incorporate

technology that could reduce the risk of rogue operations,

such as built-in “geofencing” capabilities that prevent the

drone from entering airspace that is off-limits to UAS.

These systems, however, may not have current information,

as they usually require the operator to keep airspace data up

to date. FAA has also developed the Low Altitude

Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC)

system to disseminate information regarding low-altitude

controlled airspace in the vicinity of airports and to grant

airspace access to certain commercial UAS operations on a

case-by-case basis. In the future, FAA envisions that these

resources will be integrated with “Remote Identification”

capabilities to monitor compliance.

Remote Identification

The FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (P.L.

114-190) required FAA to develop standards for the remote

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Protecting Against Rogue Drones

identification of UAS and to coordinate with the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration to develop

technologies for managing UAS traffic. P.L. 115-254

authorized FAA to require remote identification for all

drones, including recreational drones. FAA recently

published a proposed rule that would require all UAS to

transmit location and identification information. This

requirement could necessitate extensive retrofitting or

replacement of existing drones. Educating operators about

compliance and enforcing remote identification

requirements on older UAS could pose significant

challenges to effective implementation.

Detection and Interdiction Technologies

Given the potential threat posed by rogue drones, there is

considerable interest in deploying counter-UAS systems

that can detect and interdict unauthorized unmanned

aircraft. Commercial airports have a particular interest in

drone detection technologies because they have a regulatory

responsibility to inform airlines about airfield conditions

that may adversely affect the safety of flight operations.

U.S. airports and state and local law enforcement agencies

that protect them do not have specific legal authority to

deploy counter-UAS technologies. FAA has warned that

these technologies pose potential risks to manned aircraft

and to surveillance, navigation, and communications signals

used by air traffic control. Moreover, a multiagency legal

advisory published in August 2020 cautioned nonfederal

public and private entities that UAS detection technologies

could run afoul of a wide gamut of federal statutes and

regulations pertaining to privacy and the use of

radiofrequency spectrum, while systems designed to

interdict drones could violate federal laws and regulations

regarding aviation safety and security and prohibitions

against jamming or interfering with radio communications

or impeding navigation through the airspace.

While interdicting drones near airports is particularly

difficult because of potential safety implications, protecting

other facilities and high-profile events may depend on

effective interdiction capabilities to neutralize drone threats.

Available interdiction systems rely primarily on jamming

devices that disrupt flight control signals between the drone

and the controller, but these may not be able to stop fully

autonomous drones and may interfere with air navigation

signals and other radio transmissions. Other techniques

involve systems that transmit signals to spoof drone

guidance systems or take over control of the drone, capture

drones in nets, or disable or destroy drones with lasers.

These technologies are nascent, and may not be as effective

as some manufacturers and advocates may assert. The

absence of standards raises questions about performance

and safety of interdiction technologies, especially near

airports where radiofrequency jamming could impact flight

operations, and mass gatherings where interdiction could

pose a hazard to people on the ground.

Legal Restrictions and Authorities

Certain civil and criminal penalties have been enacted to

punish violations involving UAS, and, in some instances,

unlawful drone flights have been prosecuted. FAA relies

extensively on assistance from federal, state, and local

public safety and law enforcement agencies to investigate

drone-related incidents. P.L. 114-190 directed FAA to

establish procedures for imposing unmanned aircraft

restrictions around critical infrastructure and other sensitive

“fixed site” facilities, including amusement parks, and to set

up a pilot program to detect unmanned aircraft near

airports. P.L. 115-254 expanded the list of eligible fixedsite facility types and also included language explicitly

prohibiting operators from affixing dangerous weapons to

unmanned aircraft.

P.L. 115-254 established criminal penalties for operators of

drones that interfere with firefighting, law enforcement, or

other emergency response to wildfires. It directed the

Department of Transportation to work with the Department

of Defense to streamline the deployment of counter-UAS

technologies and required FAA to establish a pilot program

to assess the use of remote detection and identification

technologies to conduct safety oversight and carry out

enforcement actions against drone operators. P.L. 115-254

also authorized the Department of Justice and the

Department of Homeland Security, including the Coast

Guard, to interdict hostile or unauthorized drones in certain

instances to protect critical infrastructure and designated

high-profile events and mass gatherings (see Figure 1). The

language parallels authorities granted to the Department of

Defense and the Department of Energy in the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (P.L. 114328) to protect certain military and nuclear facilities in the

United States from drones.

Figure 1. Department of Homeland Security

Counter-UAS Authorities

Source: Department of Homeland Security.

While these federal agencies have been granted limited

authority to deploy counter-UAS systems, FAA has issued

stern warnings to event organizers and local authorities that

have deployed such systems of their own accord to protect

high-profile events. Unauthorized use of counter-drone

technologies is potentially in violation of both FAA and

Federal Communications Commission regulations, as well

as federal aviation laws. The National Football League,

which has teamed with FAA to educate fans about drone

restrictions, has urged Congress to extend counter-UAS

authorities to state and local law enforcement in order to

enforce temporary flight restrictions around large sporting

events. In considering such requests, Congress faces

complex trade-offs in weighing the inherent risks of

expanding counter-UAS authorities against the level of

threat posed by rogue drones.

Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy

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IF11550

Protecting Against Rogue Drones

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