Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement

Order Code IB94040

CRS Issue Brief for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations:

Issues of U.S. Military Involvement

Updated May 18, 2006

Nina M. Serafino

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS

SUMMARY

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

The Definitional Problem

Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Missions

Reduced Numbers Serve in Peacekeeping Missions

The Bush Administration’s Policy

Reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo

NATO Peacekeeping and U.S. Operations in Afghanistan

Airlift in Africa

The Extended U.S. Military “Stabilization” Presence in Iraq

Apportioning Responsibilities

Debate over U.S. Military Involvement in Nation-Building

Stability Operations Directive’s Mandates to Improve Military Capabilities

Military Personnel and Contractors

Stability Operations Curricula

Inter-Agency and International Participation in Education and Training

Training Other Nations’ Security Forces

Improving Coordination

Legislation to Improve Civilian Capabilities and Improve Coordination

Civilian Capabilities to Perform Nation Building Tasks

Improving International Capabilities

The Global Peace Operations Initiative

QDR Urges Greater Support

Greater U.S. Support of U.N. Missions Urged by Congressionally-Appointed

Panel

FY2007 Legislation for U.S. Military Education and Training Support for Foreign

Military Forces, and Other Purposes

Military Capabilities Issue: Readiness vs. Adequacy

Assessing and Adjusting U.S. Forces for Stability Missions

Deployment Strains

Force Adjustments for Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations

Debate Over Force Size

Debate over Army Force Structure and Restructuring Proposals

Related 2006 QDR Report Proposals

Command Discretionary Field Funding: FY2007 Legislation

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Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement

SUMMARY

The second session of the 109th Congress

may well face decisions regarding the preparation of U.S. military forces for stability missions, a broad doctrinal term of which a major

subset is peace operations. A November 28,

2005, Department of Defense (DOD) directive

that designates stability operations as “core

missions” of the U.S. military marks a major

shift on the future necessity of performing

peacekeeping and related stability operations

(also known as stabilization and reconstruction operations).

as a “stabilization and reconstruction” operation (which manifests some characteristics of

a peace operation), reinforced the argument.

Thousands of U.S. military personnel

currently serve in or support peacekeeping

operations. The number of troops serving in

U.N. operations has decreased dramatically

since the mid-1990s.

About 28 U.S.

servicemembers are serving in five operations

under U.N. control. In the Balkans, U.S.

troops were largely withdrawn from Bosnia

with the December 2004 withdrawal of the

NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) there.

Some 1,800 remain with the NATO Kosovo

Force (KFOR). About 35,000 more serve in

or support peacekeeping operations in South

Korea, and roughly 700 serve in the Sinai. In

Iraq, some U.S. troops are involved in lowintensity combat while at the same time

performing “nation-building” tasks that have

been undertaken in some peacekeeping

operations, as are a few hundred U.S. troops

in Afghanistan. DOD refers to the latter two

as “stabilization” or “stability” operations.

For over a decade, some Members of

Congress expressed reservations about U.S.

military involvement in peacekeeping operations. The Bush Administration initially

opposed such missions and took steps to

reduce the commitment of U.S. troops to

international peacekeeping. This action reflected a major concern of the 1990s: that

peacekeeping duties had overtaxed the shrinking U.S. military force and were detrimental to

military “readiness” (i.e., the ability of U.S.

troops to defend the nation). Many perceived

these tasks as an inefficient use of U.S. forces,

better left to other nations while the U.S.

military concentrated on operations requiring

high-intensity combat skills. Others thought

that the United States should adjust force size

and structure to accommodate the missions.

With some policymakers and analysts

arguing that the uncertainties of the postSeptember 11 world demand a greater U.S.

commitment to curbing ethnic instability, a

major issue Congress continues to face is

what, if any, adjustments should be made in

order for the U.S. military to perform

peacekeeping and stability missions — in

Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere — with less

strain on the force, particularly the reserves.

Of particular interest is whether the size and

configuration of U.S. forces, especially the

Army, should be further modified. Additional

issues are whether to augment civilian and

international capabilities in order to take on

more of the burden.

The events of September 11, 2001,

brought new concerns to the fore and highlighted the value to U.S. national security of

ensuring stability around the world. The 9/11

Commission report, which cited Afghanistan,

where the Administration has limited U.S.

involvement in peacekeeping and nationbuilding, as a sanctuary for terrorists, pointed

to the dangers of allowing actual and potential

terrorist sanctuaries to exist. In 2003, the

U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, often referred to

Congressional Research Service

˜

The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) version of the National Defense

Authorization Act for FY2007 (otherwise known as the FY2007 Department of Defense

(DOD) authorization act, S. 2766, S.Rept. 109-254, reported May 9) contains various

authorities requested by the Bush Administration to train foreign troops and promote

interoperability with foreign forces. The House version of the bill (H.R. 5122, H.Rept. 109452, as passed May 11) does not contain these provisions. Both versions contain varying

provisions to improve civilian capabilities and civil-military coordination. Both bills provide

for an increase of 30,000 in Army end-strength.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

On November 28, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a directive setting

forth a new DOD policy regarding stability operations, particularly peacekeeping and related

post-conflict operations. In line with the directive, the Administration announced plans on

January 18, 2006, to eliminate six National Guard combat brigades in order to create more

of the support forces deemed necessary for stability operations.

Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05 sets forth a radically new policy

regarding missions known as “stability” operations, a major subset of which are

peacekeeping and other peace operations. The Directive on Military Support for Stability,

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations designates stability operations

as “a core U.S. military mission.” By elevating stability missions to the same priority level

as combat missions, DOD seems to acknowledge expectations that future operations will

regularly include missions to stabilize areas during transitions from war to peace and to assist

with reconstruction during those transitions. For several years, some military officers and

defense analysts have argued that such efforts required the systematic development of

doctrine, training, education, exercises, and planning capabilities to enable the armed forces

to perform those operations proficiently, as well as the reconfiguration and acquisition of

organizations, personnel, facilities, and materiél to support them. The directive catalogues

such needs and calls for the development of specific recommendations to fulfill them.

Two more recent documents make no mention of any further steps to enhance DOD

capabilities for such operations. The DOD 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report (QDR),

released on February 6, 2006, did not specifically address the issue of post-conflict

operations. (DOD officials state privately, however, that proposals regarding these types of

operations are being considered under the category of “irregular warfare” because of

problems arriving at a consensus on the appropriate terminology for categorizing them.) The

newly released March 2006 National Security Strategy mentions the development of U.S.

civilian and international military capabilities to carry out post-conflict operations, but does

not mention augmenting U.S. military capabilities.

The February 2006 QDR, the document in which senior DOD civilian and military

leaders identify the capabilities and resources needed to carry out a comprehensive defense

strategy, does not specifically mention peacekeeping and post-conflict operations. It does,

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however, endorse the continued changes to “rebalance” active and reserve forces and to

create a “modular” Army, discussed below, that are viewed as facilitating such operations.

It also cites a need for quick preventive actions to deal with conflict and for DOD to be given

the authorities and resources to enhance “partnership capacity” (i.e., the ability of other

nations’ forces to carry out such operations), and makes a few force structure proposals

which may be related to conflict transitions and post-conflict stability operations (see end of

this report). The QDR 2006 report also states that it is “not an end state in itself” but an

interim report which will be subject to “continuous reassessment and improvement with

periodic updates in coming years....” (pp. 1-2)

The U.S. military, particularly the Army, has made many adjustments over the past

several years to enable troops to perform more effectively in peacekeeping operations in

places such as Bosnia and Kosovo. Nevertheless, events in Iraq since the United States

invaded in 2003 have reinforced arguments that still greater efforts must be made to raise the

possibilities for successful transitions. The directive provides the basis for instituting

significant changes and dedicating substantial resources to prepare troops to perform

proficiently in such missions, although the eventual effect on armed services is not known.

The directive calls for changes in a wide variety of areas, some of which could be

implemented in short order, others of which would take considerable time. There are still

areas where the directive lays out policy, but DOD currently is unsure of the steps that it will

take to implement it. DOD may bring to Congress during 2006 and 2007 several requests for

changes in laws, authorities, and regulations necessary to implement the directive and the

QDR, as well as for additional funding.

Questions for the second session of the 109th Congress range from basic (i.e., what is

“peacekeeping” and how does it relate to “stability operations,” “stabilization and

reconstruction,” and “nation-building”?) to strategic (how and when do such efforts serve

U.S. interests?). Practical questions include: What tasks must be performed by the U.S.

military in such operations and which can be delegated to other entities? How should the

U.S. armed forces be resized, reorganized, educated, trained and equipped to perform these

operations effectively without detracting from its ability to perform combat missions? This

issue brief will provide an overview of these issues and references to other sources which

explore them.1

1

Although the costs of peacekeeping assistance and participation are not as salient an issue as in

the 1990s, when the United States participated in or provided substantial military assistance to

several U.N. peacekeeping operations, the incremental costs (i.e., costs over and above the cost of

maintaining, training, and equipping the U.S. military in peacetime) of the larger stability operations

in Iraq and Afghanistan are a continuing concern. This issue brief does not address cost issues. For

more information on incremental costs and attempts to create more efficient methods of funding such

operations, see CRS Report 98-823, Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and

Other Operations: Questions and Answers, by Nina M. Serafino; and CRS Report RL32141,

Funding for Military and Peacekeeping Operations: Recent History and Precedents, by Jeffrey

Chamberlin. For information on the cost of U.N. operations, see CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United

Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by Marjorie Ann Browne.

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The Definitional Problem

Over the past decade and a half, there has been an evolution in the vocabulary used to

refer to activities that are undertaken to maintain, enforce, promote and enhance the

possibilities for peace in unstable environments. “Peacekeeping” has been the traditional

generic term for the operations undertaken for those purposes by the United Nations and

other international organizations, and sometimes ad hoc coalitions of nations or individual

nations. More recently, in an attempt to capture their ambiguity and complexity, and perhaps

also to avoid the stigma of failure attached to peacekeeping, they have become known as

“stabilization and reconstruction” operations, or, more simply, “stability” operations. Use

of any term with the world “peace” created a semantic dilemma, conveying the misleading

impression that an operation is without risk, when in fact, peacekeeping operations can place

soldiers in hostile situations resembling war. As knowledge increased about the conditions

needed to establish peace, operations increasingly included extensive nation-building (or

state-building as some prefer to call it) components to build or reform government structures.

The term “peacekeeping” gained currency in the late 1950s, when U.N. peacekeeping

mostly fit a narrow definition: providing an “interpositional” force to supervise the keeping

of a cease-fire or peace accord that parties in conflict had signed, but it continued to be used

as the range of activities grew. In 1992, the U.N. began to use a broader terminology to

describe the different types of activities in securing and keeping peace. It created the term

“peace enforcement” to describe operations in unstable situations where peacekeepers are

allowed to use force to maintain peace because of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat

to their safety.2 “Peacebuilding” was adopted as a term for activities that are designed to

prevent the resumption or spread of conflict, including disarmament and demobilization of

warring parties, repatriation of refugees, reform and strengthening of government institutions

(including re-creating police or civil defense forces), election-monitoring, and promotion of

political participation and human rights. Organizing and providing security for humanitarian

relief efforts can be a part of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

During the 1990s and early 2000s, the United States participated with significant forces

in several such operations either as part of a U.N. or NATO force or leading a multilateral

coalition force: Bosnia (from 1992-2004), Haiti (1994-1996 and again in 2004), and Somalia

(1992-1994). These were generally referred to by the generic term of “peacekeeping” by

Congress, even though U.S. executive branch agencies replaced “peacekeeping” with “peace

operations” as the generic term.

Recently, such operations have been referred to by an Army doctrinal term “stability

operations” that also encompasses the diverse missions of operations in Afghanistan and

Iraq. This may be a more precise terms for such operations, as many include not only peace

operations (i.e., peacekeeping and peace enforcement), but also related missions such as

humanitarian and civic assistance, counterterrorism, counter-drug, and counter-insurgency

(i.e., foreign internal defense) efforts, all of which also are included under the term “stability

2

(For some analysts, there is virtually no difference between peace enforcement operations and lowintensity conflict, save the existence of a peace plan or agreement that has a degree of local consent.

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operations.”3 Stability operations are sometimes referred to “Phase IV” or “post-conflict”

operations, although reoccurrences of conflict are often possible.

The November 2005 DOD stability operations directive cites the specific tasks of

rebuilding indigenous institutions (including various types of security forces, correctional

facilities, and judicial systems) necessary to stabilize a situation; reviving or building the

private sector, including bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary

infrastructure, and developing representative government institutions as among those tasks

that are performed in stability operations. These tasks are also part of the continuum of

activities that fall under the term “stabilization and reconstruction” (S&R) which also has

been used to describe these complex operations.

Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping

and Related Stability Missions

Reduced Numbers Serve in Peacekeeping Missions

The level of U.S. military participation in peacekeeping is much reduced from the

1990s, if the occupation force in Iraq is excluded. Still, thousands of U.S. military personnel

participate full-time in a variety of activities that fall under the rubric of peacekeeping

operations, most endorsed by the U.N. Very few U.S. military personnel currently serve

under U.N. command. As of April 30, 2006, 28 U.S. military personnel were serving in five

U.N. peacekeeping or related operations. These operations are located in the Middle East

(3 U.S. military observers or “milobs” in the Sinai operation), Georgia (2 milobs),

Ethiopia/Eritrea (7 milobs), Liberia (7 milobs and 5 troops), and Haiti (4 troops). Other U.S.

forces are deployed in unilateral U.S. operations and coalition operations, most undertaken

with U.N. authority. As of the end of 2004, U.S. troops were largely withdrawn from Bosnia

with the December 2, 2004 end of the NATO operation there, but as of April 2006 some 220

U.S. troops supported the European Union operation there as part of NATO’s supporting

headquarters unit. A U.S. peacekeeping contingent, numbering 1,800 as of April 2006,

remains with the 16,800 troop NATO operation in Kosovo, with others supporting them from

Macedonia. (Numbers in Kosovo fluctuate by the hundreds with rotations.) Roughly 700

U.S. troops serve in the Sinai-based coalition Multilateral Force (MFO), which has no U.N.

affiliation. As of April 2006, about 170 U.S. military personnel support the NATO

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

The United States has other troops abroad in operations that are related to, but not

counted as, peacekeeping. Roughly some 35,000 U.S. troops have been serving in South

Korea under bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea agreements and U.N. authority. (Although

technically “peacekeeping,” this deployment has long been treated as a standard U.S. forward

presence mission.) A drawdown is scheduled to reduce the number to 25,000 in 2006. Less

than 100 U.S. troops are attached to the NATO peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan,

3

The other types of operations are security assistance, support to insurgencies, noncombatant

evacuations, arms control and shows of force. For further information on the activities which fall

under each of these types of operations, see Army Field Manual FM-307, Stability Operations and

Support Operations, February 2003.

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providing various forms of U.S. assistance for ISAF peacekeeping. (Some 11,000 U.S.

troops are present in Afghanistan in other roles, however, including a few hundred involved

in nation-building activities. See section on Afghanistan, below.)

The Bush Administration’s Policy

Despite President Bush’s stated dislike for open-ended “nation-building” missions

involving U.S. ground forces during his first presidential campaign, as President he has been

willing to maintain troops in peacekeeping missions to the extent he deems necessary. (For

a discussion of candidate and President Bush’s statements on peacekeeping, see CRS Report

RL31109, NATO: Issues for Congress.) During his Administration, Bush has sought and

achieved substantial reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo and thus far has resisted calls to

provide U.S. troops for the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.

In the wake of the coalition invasion of Iraq, the debate over the appropriate role for the

United States military in activities encompassed by the term peacekeeping has again moved

to the forefront. Although the current military occupation of Iraq falls in a gray area that

defies easy definition, with a level of instability that many define as low-intensity conflict

rather than peace enforcement, many of the activities that the U.S. military has undertaken

there also have been undertaken in past peacekeeping operations. Critics of the Bush

Administration have charged that its disdain for peacekeeping has led it to ignore the lessons

of past operations and to err in its judgment of the number and type of forces necessary in

Iraq, putting the United States and its allies at risk of “losing the peace” there.

Reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Bush Administration sought to minimize

forces in the two NATO Balkans peacekeeping operations through negotiations with U.S.

allies, following established NATO procedures. The U.S. presence in Bosnia dropped

steadily during the Bush Administration from some 4,200 participating in the NATO Bosnia

Stabilization Force (SFOR) at the beginning of 2001 to under 1,000 in 2004. U.S.

participation ended on December 2, 2004, when the European Union assumed responsibility

for the operation. U.S. troops may continue to play some role as NATO continues to support

the EU with intelligence and assistance in apprehending indicted war criminals. (See CRS

Report RS21774, Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO

Transition.) Similarly, the U.S. presence in Kosovo has dropped from some 5,600 involved

in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) in early 2001 to about 1,800 of the total 17,000 KFOR

force from about 36 nations. (These numbers can fluctuate by the hundreds due to rotations.)

In both cases, these reductions have taken place in the context of an overall reduction of

forces serving in the NATO peacekeeping missions.

NATO Peacekeeping and U.S. Operations in Afghanistan. For some time,

the Bush Administration has maintained that no U.S. troops would participate in

peacekeeping operations in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), despite calls

by some analysts for a U.S. role. With some 8,800 troops contributed by about 37 NATO

and non-NATO nations as of May 2005 ([http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628factsheet.htm]), ISAF patrols Kabul and its immediate surrounding areas under a U.N.

Chapter VII authorization and is expanding throughout the country. (NATO assumed

command of ISAF on August 11, 2003, just over 18 months after ISAF was formed in

January 2002 as an ad hoc coalition operation of some 5,000 troops from 18 nations under

British command.) The United States has some 11,000 soldiers deployed in Afghanistan,

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according to DOD, most in continuing combat (hunting Al Qaeda), but others in support,

training, and reconstruction missions. U.S. troops provide some assistance to the ISAF (i.e.,

logistical, intelligence, and quick reaction force support), but they do not engage in ISAF

peacekeeping. U.S. troops do, however, provide training and assistance for the formation of

an Afghani national military force, an activity which some analysts label “nation-building.”

Hundreds of U.S. troops have been involved since December 2002 in the establishment

and operation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which were designed to create

a secure environment for aid agencies involved in reconstruction work in areas outside

Kabul. Each team includes 60-100 U.S. military personnel (Special Forces and civil affairs

reservists) and civilians. As of April 2006, the United States operates 13 PRTs, one of which

is scheduled to be turned over to the United Kingdom and another to the Netherlands during

the summer of 2006. ISAF involvement in PRTs began on January 6, 2004, when ISAF (by

now under NATO) marked the beginning of its operations outside Kabul by taking over the

German-led PRT in Konduz. (As of the end of May 2005, ISAF ran 8 PRTs and two forward

support bases and planned to take on two more PRTs in the near future.) Although the U.S.

military role in PRTs is not identified as “peacekeeping,” its objectives — enhancing

security, extending the reach of the central government, and facilitating reconstruction — are

similar to those of peacekeeping operations. Some analysts consider it “nation-building.”

Thus far, the PRTs have not proven controversial in Congress, although some humanitarian

organizations have taken issue with them. (For more on PRTs, see CRS Report RL30588,

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, the United States Institute of

Peace’s Special Report 147, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with

International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan, and the section on

nation-building below.)

Airlift in Africa. The United States military occasionally provides airlift assistance

for peacekeeping missions in Africa. For instance, the United States has participated under

NATO in airlifting African Union troops to the AU mission in Darfur, Sudan.

The Extended U.S. Military “Stabilization” Presence in Iraq. U.S. troops in

Iraq are engaged in a wide variety of activities, the most visible of which are

counterinsurgency operations, but some of which are generally classified as peacekeeping

duties. The activities undertaken by U.S. troops varies from area to area, and some

commanders have noted that their troops are doing a mix of both types of operations. (For

more on this presence, see CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations; and CRS

Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance.)

Apportioning Responsibilities

Debate over U.S. Military Involvement in Nation-Building. In the wake of U.S.

military action in Iraq, the question of continued U.S. military involvement has been framed

in terms of whether the U.S. military should do “nation-building,” and if it does, how it

should prepare for it. Like peacekeeping, nation-building is not a precise term, but rather one

that is used for both a concept and a variety of activities. On one level, nation-building is

used to refer to the concept of creating (or a decision to create) a democratic state, often in

a post-conflict situation. The term is also used, however, to refer to any of the range of

activities that militaries or civilians undertake to advance that goal. (A 2003 RAND report,

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America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq, uses the term to encompass the

full range of activities undertaken by the United States, including by its military forces, in

operations that have been variously known as an occupation, peacekeeping, peace

enforcement, and S&R.)

As most often used when referring to the U.S. military, nation-building refers to a range

of activities to assist civilians beyond providing security and humanitarian aid in emergency

situations. These can include projects such as the repair, maintenance, or construction of

economic infrastructure, such as roads, schools, electric grids, and heavy industrial facilities,

and of health infrastructure, such as clinics and hospitals, and water and sewage facilities.

They can also include the provision of a variety of services, such as medical services to

refugee and impoverished populations, and training and assistance to police, the military,

the judiciary, and prison officials as well as other civil administrators.

During the early to mid-1990s, the U.S. military was involved in several peacekeeping

operations with significant nation-building components, especially Somalia and Haiti. In

Somalia, besides assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid, the U.S. led-UNITAF was

engaged in road and bridge building, well-digging, and the establishment of schools and

hospitals. In Haiti, in the absence of civilian personnel, the U.S. military became involved

in revamping the police, judicial, and prison systems as part of their primary task of

establishing security. These two experiences stigmatized peacekeeping and nation-building

for many Members as an inefficient use of military resources.

Nevertheless, some policymakers and analysts assert the need for military involvement

in such tasks, particularly when others are not available to undertake them in the immediate

aftermath of major combat. Nation-building tasks are often viewed as essential elements in

stabilizing post-conflict situations because they provide the physical and organizations

infrastructure populations need to help re-establish normal lives. Such activities are also

viewed as enhancing the legitimacy and extending the presence of weak central governments

as they try to assert control in such situations, and as reassuring local populations of the

friendly intent of foreign military forces. Sometimes, involvement in such activities may

enable armed forces to make more informed judgments about the security situation in an

area. Some analysts view U.S. military nation-building as an essential element in the U.S.

toolkit to respond to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation (p. 367) to use all elements of

national power “to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run....”

In immediate post-conflict situations, or extremely dangerous environments, military

forces may be the only personnel available to perform such tasks. In hostile environments,

armed forces may be needed to provide security for relief workers providing such assistance.

In less problematic circumstances, however, some argue that the use of the military for such

tasks can be detrimental to humanitarian and reconstruction tasks. Such critics feel that the

use of troops for such purposes can detract from a sense of returning normality and

establishment of civilian control. Where military and civilians are delivering assistance in

the same areas, some civilians feel that the military presence confuses the civilian role, and

makes them targets of armed opponents. Because of that, humanitarian groups have

objected to the concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are well

established in Afghanistan and are being set up in Iraq.

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Stability Operations Directive’s Mandates to

Improve Military Capabilities

DOD is beginning to develop specific proposals to implement Directive 3000.05. The

House Armed Services Committee (HASC), in its report accompanying the FY2007 DOD

authorization act (H.R. 5122, H.Rept. 109-452) noted that it was pleased that DOD had

issued the directive and stated its belief that DOD “should integrate, to the greatest extent

possible, SSTR-related requirements across its doctrine, training logistics, organization,

materiel, personnel, and facilities (DTLOM-PF).” HASC directed the Secretary of Defense

to submit to the armed services committees of both chambers an implementation report for

all items, with “a special focus on professional military education and training, including but

not limited to revisions to Academy and War College curricula, if any; training plans at the

service and joint operational levels; the possible creation of SSTR [Stability, Security,

Transition, and Reconstruction] fellowships within the Agency for International

Development or related organizations (including non-governmental organizations); and any

reorganization that will be required to implement the Directive.” The following is a

summary of the directive in key military capability areas.

Military Personnel and Contractors. The directive reflects longstanding

concerns that the U.S. armed services may not possess enough people with the skills

necessary for stability operations, in particular peace operations. The directive calls on the

department to identify the personnel needed for such operations and to develop methods to

recruit, select, and assign current and former DOD personnel with relevant skills. The Under

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is directed to recommend all necessary

changes in laws, authorities, and regulations to accomplish this. In particular, the directive

reflects concern about developing enough foreign area officers, enlisted regional specialists,

civil affairs personnel, military police, engineers, and psychological operations personnel.

These specialities have long been noted as having insufficient personnel to meet the demands

of the dozen years. The Defense Science Board Task Force charged with examining needed

changes for Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD, as its September 2005 report

is named, recommended that DOD develop special recruiting strategies, “targeted at midcareer, 35-45 year old professionals, with the skills actually needed for stability operations”

to recruit suitable Civil Affairs officers.

Certain points of the directive also suggest that DOD may wish to depend on contractors

for any additional personnel needed in stability operations. In addition to the mandate

mentioned above that would bring former DOD personnel into the mix of persons

participating in stability operations, the directive mandates a check for adequate oversight

of contracts in stability operations and in the ability of U.S. commanders in foreign countries

to obtain contract support quickly. The DSB Task Force on institutionalizing stability

operations labeled the private sector as DOD’s “fifth force provider” for stability operations

(in addition to the four branches of the armed services) and recommended that DOD design

a new institution that would effectively use the private sector in stability operations.

Stability Operations Curricula. The directive calls on DOD to ensure that military

schools and training centers incorporate stability operations curricula in joint and individual

service education and training programs at all levels. It particularly calls for developing and

incorporating instruction for foreign language capabilities and regional area expertise,

including “long-term immersion in foreign societies.” It would also broaden the exposure

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of military personnel to U.S. and international civilians with whom they would work in

stability operations by providing them with tours of duty in other U.S. agencies, international

organizations, and non-governmental organizations.

Inter-Agency and International Participation in Education and Training.

Responding to calls to enhance the ability of the wide variety of participants in stability

operations to work together, the directive provides a number of ways to incorporate military

personnel and civilians of many backgrounds in education and training courses, including

personnel from U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces,

international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and members of the private

sector in stability operations planning, training, and exercises. It also proposes that DOD

ensure that instructors and students from elsewhere in the U.S. government be able to receive

or provide instruction in stability operations at military schools.

Training Other Nations’ Security Forces. The directive also calls for DOD to

support the development of other countries’ security forces in order to ensure security

domestically and to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere. This includes helping

such forces, including police forces, develop “the training, structure, processes, and doctrine

necessary to train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign forces in a range of security

sectors....” The Senate has introduced legislation regarding this point, as a floor amendment

to the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006, which is now

in conference. DOD objects to the amendment as adopted, preferring an earlier version

which gave it greater flexibility and leadership for train and equip activities.

Improving Coordination. The directive calls for the creation of “a stability

operations center to coordinate operations research, education and training, and lessonslearned.” The U.S. military has two institutions currently devoted exclusively to such

operations, neither of which serves a coordinating function: the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and

Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at Carlisle Barracks, PA, and the Naval Post-Graduate

School’s Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Study (CSRS). PKSOI assists with

the development of Army doctrine at the strategic (i.e., the leadership and planning) and

operational levels, and helps the Army’s senior leadership develop operational concepts. It

works with the UN, U.S. government interagency groups, inter-service groups, and foreign

militaries ([http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pksoi/]).

CSRS’s mission,

according to its website, is “to educate the full spectrum of actors” involved in S&R

activities through educational, research, and outreach activities

([http://www.nps.edu/CSRS/]).

Legislation to Improve Civilian Capabilities and Improve

Coordination

Civilian Capabilities to Perform Nation Building Tasks. Several proposals to

build civilian capabilities to perform nation-building tasks, especially rule of law tasks, in

peacekeeping operations have been advanced. No legislation was passed in the 108th

Congress despite the introduction of three bills, but some of the proposed ideas were taken

into consideration in the State Department’s establishment, in July 2004, of a new Office of

the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). S/CRS’ function is to

develop mechanisms to enhance civilian capabilities, and to improve inter-agency

coordination in planning and conducting S&R operations. (For further details on S/CRS and

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relevant legislation, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions:

Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities.)

Defense analysts and military experts have provided much of the impetus for the

concept of developing civilian capabilities for S&R missions. The DSB’s summer 2004

study entitled Transition to and from Hostilities supported the development of civilian

capabilities. According to the unclassified version published in December 2004, the study

described the S&R mission as “inescapable, its importance irrefutable” and argued that both

DOD and the Department of State need to augment S&R capabilities and to develop “an

extraordinarily close working relationship.” In addition, the study found that the State

Department needs “to develop a capacity for operational planning [that] it does not currently

possess” and to develop “a more robust capacity to execute such plans.” (pp 38-39. The

report can be accessed through the DSB website [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb].) The followup September 2005 DSB study on institutionalizing stability operations expressed concern

that S/CRS “is not getting anywhere near the level of resources and authority needed.” If

DOD actions in critical areas where there is an overlap between DOD and civilian

responsibilities “are not complemented by growth of capabilities in other agencies, the

overall U.S. ability to conduct successful stability operations will be far less than it should

be.” (pp. 5-6.) The February 2006 QDR stated that DOD will support “substantially

increased resources” for S/CRS and for the establishment of a Civilian Reserve Corps and

a conflict response fund. (p 86)

The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), in its report accompanying the FY2006

DOD authorization bill (S. 1042, S.Rept. 109-69), commended DOD’s “active support of and

cooperation with” S/CRS and urged DOD “to continue to deepen its coordination with the

Department of State on planning for and participating in post-conflict stability operations and

reconstruction efforts. The conference version of the National Defense Authorization Act

for FY2006 (H.R. 1815, P.L. 109-163) provided authority to transfer up to $100 million in

defense articles, services, training or other support to the Department of State and other

federal agencies for reconstruction, security or stabilization assistance. The Administration

had requested $200 million for a State Department Conflict Response Fund for such

purposes, but neither authority nor funding was provided in non-military legislation.

According to a DOD official, this authority is intended to support S/CRS in carrying out

possible activities

FY2007 Legislation. The House version of the FY2007 DOD authorization bill (S.

5122) contains a provision (Section 1034) requiring the President to submit to Congress by

February 1, 2007, a report identifying the interagency capabilities needed to achieve 21st

century national security goals and objectives. The president is to formulate specific

legislative proposals for improving interagency coordination.

The SASC version of the FY2007 DOD authorization act (S. 2766) contains a provision

(Section 1222) requiring the President to submit to Congress “a plan to establish interagency

operating procedures for federal agencies to plan and conduct stabilization and reconstruction

operations” within six months of enactment. This plan would include a delineation of the

roles, responsibilities, and authorities of federal departments and agencies in stabilization and

reconstruction operations. The SASC bill also contains a requirement (Section 864) for “the

Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Department of State and the heads of other

appropriate agencies,” to develop “an interagency plan for contingency program management

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during combat operations and post-conflict operations.” The plan is to be submitted no later

than one year after enactment. In report language (S.Rept. 109-254), the SASC directed the

Secretary of Defense to conduct a study to develop greater interagency presence in the staffs

of combatant commands: The current presence of civilians in those commands “is usually

limited in number and serves primarily as a liaison from the parent organization....”

Improving International Capabilities

The Global Peace Operations Initiative. The Bush Administration proposed a

five-year, multilateral Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), to prepare other, largely

African, nations to participate in peacekeeping operations. GPOI’s primary goal is to train

and equip some 75,000 military forces, and to develop gendarme forces (also known

constabulary police, i.e., police with military skills) to participate in peacekeeping operations.

The Administration estimated the U.S. cost at $661 million from FY2005-FY2009. For

2005, Congress appropriated some $100 million for GPOI in the Consolidated

Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447). The Bush Administration requested $114

million in State Department funding for GPOI in FY2006; there was no earmarked

appropriation, but the estimated FY2006 allocation is $100.4 million. The FY2007 request

is $102.6 million. (For more information on GPOI and relevant legislation, see CRS Report

RL32773, The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress.)

QDR Urges Greater Support. The February 2006 QDR report stated that DOD

would continue to support initiatives such as GOPI. It specifically mentioned its support for

the African Union’s development of a humanitarian crisis intervention capability. It also

stated DOD “stands ready to increase its assistance” to the U.N. peacekeeping operations

department for doctrine, training, strategic planning, and management. The QDR also states

that DOD supports efforts to develop a NATO stabilization and reconstruction capability and

a European constabulary force. (p 88)

Greater U.S. Support of U.N. Missions Urged by CongressionallyAppointed Panel. While the reduction in U.S. troops involved in peacekeeping, especially

U.N. peacekeeping, from the early 1990s responded to perceptions that peacekeeping

excessively strained U.S. forces without significantly serving U.S. interests, some analysts

continue to argue that greater participation of U.S. forces in U.N. peacekeeping would be

desirable. In June 2005, the Congressionally-mandated Task Force on the U.N., chaired by

former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George

Mitchell, called for greater U.S. support of U.N. operations. The Task Force report

recommended that U.N. Member States should substantially increase the number of trained

and equipped forces for rapid deployment for peace operations and that the Department of

Defense should “prepare options for additional means to support U.N. peace operations with

logistics, capacity-building assistance, and other means” and “for U.S. engagement in peace

operations consistent with U.S. national interests.” It specifically recommended that the

United States “consider upgrading its participation” in the U.N. Stand-by Arrangements

system, through which countries volunteer capabilities for U.N. peace operations. (American

Interests and U.N. Reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations. Washington,

D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, June 2005. Quotes taken from pp. 11, 24 and 97.)

Some military analysts argue that the U.N. does not necessarily need more U.S. troops

to place in field-level observer slots in U.N. missions. What is needed, they say, are staff

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officers at the headquarters command level whose training and mindset enables them to think

proactively about dealing with developing problems. Others believe that U.S. soldiers with

engineering and skills using advanced communications technologies would also be useful.

FY2007 Legislation for U.S. Military Education and Training Support for

Foreign Military Forces, and Other Purposes. The SASC version of the FY2007

DOD authorization act (S. 2766) provides, with some modifications, legislation requested

by DOD for increasing the capacities of foreign military forces through education and

training programs. These are undertaken not only to increase the ability of foreign forces to

take part in operations, but also to increase the “interoperability” (i.e., the ability of military

forces to communicate and otherwise interact effectively in order to avoid losses due to

increased confusion in hostile situations). Section 1206, Authority to Build the Capacity of

Foreign Military and Security Forces, would amend legislation approved in the FY2006

DOD authorization bill (H.R. 1815, P.L. 109-163, signed January 6, 2006) to allow training

of foreign military forces for counterterrorism operations and for military and stability

operations in which U.S. armed forces participate. The Section 1206 amendment would

provide increased flexibility by permitting the Secretary of Defense to approve the training

rather than requiring a presidential order. SASC did not broaden the authority to other

security forces nor raise the amount of funding, as DOD proposed. Section 1206 would

authorize annual expenditures of $200 million ($50 million per geographical combatant

commander) in FY2007 and FY2008 for training purposes.

Two related sections, 1207 (Participation in Multilateral Military Organizations) and

Section 1208 (Interoperability Development and Training) provide new authorities: Section

1207 provides authority to for the Secretary of Defense to assist multilateral Centers of

Excellence with operations and maintenance funds and the provisions of logistics, supplies,

and services, to develop doctrine, education, training and to test new concepts. Section 1208

allows DOD to provide electronic educational materials, along with related technology and

software, for the education and training of military and civilian government personnel of

foreign counties and of internationally recognized non-governmental organizations.

Military Capabilities Issue: Readiness vs. Adequacy

Congressional debate over U.S. military capabilities to perform peacekeeping and

related stability operations has taken two different forms. During the 1990s, critics of the

commitment of U.S. military personnel to peacekeeping operations drove the readiness

debate. As the U.S. military was increasingly called upon to perform peacekeeping and other

non-combat missions — at the same time as it was downsized significantly — many

Members questioned whether U.S. military forces could perform their “core” war-fighting

mission if they engaged extensively in other activities. Opponents of non-combat

commitments, particularly in areas they regarded as irrelevant to key U.S. interests, argued

that they impaired the military’s capability or “readiness” to defend the nation.4 More

4

There were a variety of reasons for declines in the ratings which measured combat readiness in the

1990s, some of which were addressed by changes in military practices: (1) military personnel could

not practice all their combat skills while engaged in peacekeeping operations; (2) in the 1990s, the

U.S. military performed these operations at the same time the armed forces, particularly the army,

(continued...)

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recently, those who view such missions as a necessary role for U.S. armed forces have

reframed the debate, arguing that the services should be structured and sized to perform such

operations without undue stress on soldiers and units. In addition, they recommend that

readiness ratings encompass the armed forces’ preparedness not only for combat, but also for

stability operations. (The 2005 DSB report on institutionalizing stability operations stated

that the forthcoming Defense Readiness Reporting System could provide the framework for

monitoring readiness in both combat and stability operations, if it were so employed.)

Assessing and Adjusting U.S. Forces for Stability Missions

The military’s ability to perform peacekeeping and related stability operations while

retaining its preparedness to fight wars depends on several factors. Most salient among them

are the size of the force, the numbers of troops devoted to specific tasks (force structure), the

size, length, and frequency of deployments (operational tempo), and opportunities for

training in combat skills while deployed on peacekeeping and related operations.

Deployment Strains. The increased “optempo” demanded by peacekeeping takes

time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training, and can shorten the useful

life of equipment. The “perstempo” problem is regarded as particularly severe for the Army.

For several years, the Army was deploying the same units over and over to peacekeeping

operations, and the pace of deployment was viewed as too demanding, affecting morale by

keeping personnel away from families for too long, and, some argue, affecting recruitment.5

The Army took steps to deal with some of its problems by the realignment and better

management of its resources, as did the Air Force. In recent years, the army addressed

perstempo strains by limiting deployments to six months (although this was overridden by

deployments to Iraq), and including national guard and reserve units among those on the

roster to serve in the Balkans, thus attempting to reduce the optempo of active combat duty

units. The Air Force, beginning in 1999, established Air Expeditionary Units to deploy

4

(...continued)

were reduced substantially; (3) funds for training and equipment were diverted in the past to fund

peacekeeping operations; and (4) units were disrupted by the deployment of an individual or a small

number of individuals. If one looked at the larger readiness problem of the 1990s and early 2000s,

that is the perception that U.S. military personnel were overworked, that military equipment was

in poor shape, that spare parts were in short supply, and that the military could not recruit and retain

needed personnel, the relationship of peacekeeping to readiness was less pronounced, according to

some analysts. Some have argued that the readiness problem was exaggerated or non-existent, given

the successful combat performances of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003.

5

In one of the first publicly-available studies of peacekeeping stresses, in March 1995 the GAO

reported (GAO/NSIAD-95-51) that increased deployments due to peacekeeping together with

reduced force structure taxed certain Navy and Marine Corps units, and “heavily”stressed certain

Army support forces (such as quartermaster and transportation units) and specialized Air Force

aircraft critical to the early stages of an major regional contingency (MRC) to an extent that could

endanger DOD’s ability to respond quickly to an MRC. A July 2000 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-00164) found shortages in forces needed for contingency operations, including active-duty civil affairs

personnel, Navy/Marine Corps land-based EA-6B squadrons, fully- trained and available Air Force

AWACS aircraft crews, and fully-trained U-2 pilots.

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under a predictable rotation system. In some cases, however, these solutions generate other

problems. For instance, the Army’s attempts to relieve the stresses of frequent deployments

on its active forces by deploying reservists may have, some analysts worry, affected Guard

and Reserve personnel recruitment and retention. Some analysts suggest that more resource

management reforms could ease stresses. Others prefer to change force size or structure.

Force Adjustments for Peacekeeping and

Related Stability Operations

The appropriate size and structure for the military depends largely on the types of wars

that it is expected to fight and the range of missions that it is expected to perform. Since the

early 1990s, many defense analysts, military officers, and policymakers have questioned

whether the military, especially the Army, is appropriately sized and structured to perform

all the tasks assigned to it. As the deployment strains, noted in the GAO reports cited above,

became evident, many Members argued that the U.S. military was too small and too stretched

to take on peacekeeping operations. The continued stresses on the force of extended U.S.

presences in stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has intensified this debate. The

November 2005 stability operations directive points to possible increases in the numbers of

certain specialities in high demand in peacekeeping and related stability operations (i.e., civil

affairs officers, foreign area specialists, military police, engineers, and psychological

operations personnel) as mentioned above, but no further changes in size or structure. Others

have urged more extensive changes in the force to better accommodate such missions.

Debate Over Force Size. Concerns that the United States does not have sufficient

military forces to maintain a presence in Iraq and Afghanistan as long as needed, and to carry

out a full range of possible concurrent future missions has given new prominence to the issue

of force size. The size of the U.S. military is controversial in large part because the basic cost

of each added soldier is high, averaging $100,000 per year for an active duty troop, according

to a CBO estimate. In the mid- to late 1990s, some policymakers and military experts

suggested that 520,000 to 540,000 troops would be a more appropriate size for the Army if

it were to prevail in the scenario involving two major theater wars (which was then the

standard for sizing force structure) and also to engage in peacekeeping missions. (For the

14 years after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 through the end of the Cold War in 1989,

the Army had averaged some 778,000, with fluctuations.) Other policymakers would prefer

further cuts in personnel to conserve funds for modernizing equipment and weapons systems.

Beginning in FY2005, Congress has mandated increases in Army end-strength, which

had been set at 480,000 for several years; these increases too may be only temporary. The

September 2005 DSB report on institutionalizing stability operations notes that DOD lacks

“a sizing concept” that would enable the department to prepare “for concurrent domestic

stability operations, foreign stability operations and foreign combat operations; all of which

will call upon some of the same resource base.” (p. 11.) The 2006 QDR report states that

Army end-strength should be stabilized at 482,400 Active and 533,000 reserve component

personnel by FY2011. (p. 43) For FY2007, the House and Senate versions of the National

Defense Authorization bills (H.R. 5122 and S. 2766) would increase the active duty Army

end-strength to 512,400, an increase of 30,000. The legislation would also increase the size

of the Marine Corps by either 5,000 (House) or 10,000 (Senate). (For further information,

see CRS Report RL33405, Defense: FY2007 Authorization and Appropriations, by Stephen

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Daggett, and CRS Report RS21754, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the

United States?, by Edward F. Bruner.)

Debate over Army Force Structure and Restructuring Proposals. Size is not

the only consideration, and some would argue it is but a secondary consideration, for

providing the capabilities needed for stability operations and relieving stress on the armed

forces. For several years, analysts have advanced proposals to restructure U.S. Army forces

to increase capabilities for peacekeeping and related operations. These proposals would

build on the extensive overhaul that the Army began in 2003 to convert to a “modular force”

and shift some 100,000 positions by 2011.6 For the most part, such proposals have centered

on an increase in the number of personnel in “low-density, high-demand” units (i.e., those

most heavily taxed by peacekeeping), which are now stressed by “stability” operations in

Iraq, and which to this point have been concentrated in the reserve component. These include

civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and military police units. Many of the

proposals involve creating specialized units that are dedicated, at least part time, to preparing

for and deploying to such missions.7 The Army has long rejected proposals for dedicated

peacekeeping forces, primarily on the grounds that it would divert resources from combat

functions. Members of Congress interested in augmenting stabilization personnel may wish

to examine non-military options.

Related 2006 QDR Report Proposals. The 2006 QDR report calls for further

increases in certain specialties. It calls for increasing the number of Special Forces battalions

by one-third starting in FY2007 and expanding psychological operations and civil affairs

units by one-third (3,700 personnel). In another area that may be at least partially related to

conflict transitions and post-conflict operations, it also calls for the establishment of a Marine

Corps Special Operations Command of 2,600 personnel to train foreign military units and

conduct direct action and special reconnaissance.

Command Discretionary Field Funding: FY2007

Legislation

Many think tanks have recommended that Combatant Commanders be provided with

discretionary funds for humanitarian relief and reconstruction to benefit local populations,

based on the model of the Commander’s Emergency Response Programs (CERP) in

Afghanistan and Iraq. Section 1206 (c) of the SASC version of the FY2007 DOD

authorization act (S. 2766) would authorize such funding in FY2007 and FY2008, with an

annual limit of $200,000 per commander.

6

For a full discussion of the modular force, see CRS Report RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular

Redesign: Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.

7

U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute. Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win

Decisively: The Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force. August 2005.

Available through [http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil].

National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy.

Transforming for Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations. April 2004. Accessible through

[http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/home.html].

James Jay Carafano. Post Conflict Operations from Europe to Iraq. Heritage Foundation

Lecture #844. July 13, 2004. p. 8. Accessible through [http://www.heritage.org.].

CRS-15

DOD Incremental Costs of Peacekeeping and Security Contingency Operations, FY1991-FY2005

(Millions of current year dollars)

FY1991FY1995

FY2005

Operation

FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003

FY2004

(Est.)

TOTAL

AREAS OF ONGOING OPERATIONS

Southwest Asia/Iraq

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

38,322.0

52,148.0

56,200.0 146,670.0

Provide Comfort/Northern Watch

773.1

88.9

93.1

136.0

156.4

143.7

148.6

626.2

—

—

Southern Watch/Air Expeditionary Force 1,517.3

576.3

597.3 1,497.2

954.8

755.4

963.5 1,372.4

11,023.7

Desert Strike/Intrinsic Action/Desert Spring

102.7

5.6

13.8

239.8

261.6

Vigilant Warrior

257.7

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

257.7

Desert Thunder (Force Buildup 11/98)

43.5

—

—

—

—

—

—

43.5

Desert Fox (Air Strikes, 12/98)

92.9

—

—

—

—

—

—

92.9

UNIKOM (UN/Iraq Observer Group)

32.4

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

32.4

Total Southwest Asia/Iraq

2,580.5

665.2

793.1 1,638.8 1,261.4 1,138.9 1,373.5 1,372.4

38,948.2

52,148.0

56,200.0 158,120.0

Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF)

15,788.1

9,849.2

11,800.0

37,437.3

Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo)

Balkan Calm (Observer Mission, Pre-Air War)

34.6

—

—

—

—

—

—

34.6

Eagle Eye (Air Verification, 10/98-03/99)

20.3

—

—

—

—

—

—

20.3

Noble Anvil (Air War)

1,891.4

—

—

—

—

—

—

1,891.4

Joint Guardian (KFOR)

1,044.5 1,803.1 1,383.9

938.2

590.4

552.9

693.3

7,006.3

Sustain Hope (Refugee Assistance)

141.6

—

—

—

—

—

—

141.6

Total Kosovo

3,132.4 1,803.1 1,383.9

938.2

590.4

552.9

693.3

9,094.2

Korea Readiness*

160.6

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

160.6

COMPLETED OPERATIONS

Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia)

IFOR/SFOR/Joint Forge

2,231.7 2,087.5 1,792.8 1,431.2 1,381.8 1,213.4

932.9

742.2

667.8

150.7

14,405.1

Other Former Yugoslavia Operations*

784.0

288.3

195.0

169.9

155.4

101.3

79.4

Total Bosnia

784.0

2,520.0 2,282.5 1,962.7 1,586.6 1,483.1 1,292.6

932.9

742.2

667.8

150.7

14,405.1

Totals of Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola,

2,458.2

86.9

—

—

1.5

56.8

—

—

3.1

—

—

2,606.5

Cambodia, Western Sahara, East Timor and

Liberia

GRAND TOTALS

5,983.3

3,272.1 3,075.6 3,601.5 5,981.9 4,481.8 4,050.0 3,243.5 56,072.0

63,217.9

68,844.0 221,823.6

Source: Defense Finance and Accounting System data through FY2002; Office of the Secretary of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates: Justification for Component Contingency Operations

and the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, for FY2003; FY2004, and FY2005 (est) provided by the DOD Comptroller’s Office, June 24, 2005. The FY2005 figures are from the FY2005

Supplemental Request of February 2005 and do not reflect approximately $31.6 billion in other support and related costs applicable to OIF and OEF.

Notes: This chart consists of DOD incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral operations

(including OIF in Iraq and OEF in Afghanistan, which are combat/occupation operations), NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations. U.N. reimbursements are not deducted.

Some totals do not add due to rounding. Other Former Yugoslavia operations include Able Sentry (Macedonia), Deny Flight/Decisive Edge, UNCRO (Zagreb), Sharp Guard (Adriatic). Provide Promise

(humanitarian assistance), Deliberate Forge. Because Korea Readiness has long been considered an on-going peacetime function of U.S. troops, DOD only counts above-normal levels of activity there

crsphpgw

as incremental costs. NA=Not Available.