The Iran-Iraq War: Implications for U.S. Policy

Order Code IB84016

NORTHERN RENTUCKY UNlVERSfTI

LIBRARY

T H E I R A N - I R A Q WAR:

I M P L I C A T I O N S F O R U.S.

POLICY

(ARCHIVED--10/14/87)

U P D A T E D 10/14/87

BY

R i c h a r d M.

Preece

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

Congressional Research Service

1014

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ISSUE DEFINITION

The Iran-Iraq conflict a t its present state has become a war of attrition

with neither side capable of achieving a decisive military victory

over the

other in the short term.

U.S.

policy concerns currently a r e threefold:

first, that Iraq, despite moves to sustain its economic and military

capacities, ultimately might suffer a destabilizing defeat to the detriment

of U.S. interests i n the Persian Gulf region; second, that future instability

in Iran could open opportunities for Soviet exploitation; and third, that the

conflict might expand beyond

its present

confines to threaten friendly

regional states and the availability of their vast petroleum

resources.

As

international efforts at mediation between the combatants continue to

founder, these concerns raise policy questions of marked

interest for the

Congress.

To date, the United States has maintained an official neutral

stance in the war.

Since 1 9 8 3 , the Administration

overtly moved

toward

closer relations with Iraq, thereby

generating debate over the potential

interests i n

effects of a policy "tilt" upon shorter- and longer-tern U.S.

the Gulf.

Congressional inquiries resulting from revelations in November

1986 of secret U.S. arms Sales to Iran, however, suggest that a U.S.

policy

reappraisal toward Iran had begun i n late 1 9 8 4 , thereby

raising questions

regarding U.S. C O n s i ~ t e n C y and credibility i n the region.

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

I.

U.S.

Interests and Policy Options

A.

Introduction.

For the United

States, the political, economic and

strategic significance of the Persian Gulf, located half

the globe from

American shores, derives primarily

from the region's petroleum

resources

(more than half the world's proven crude oil reserves).

The region is also

of its major

of importance as a key strategic crossroads, and because

commercial relations with the United States and its allies.

-

Fundamental U.S. interests in the Gulf include: continued assured access

to the region's oil resources for the Western

industrialized

countries and

Japan; maintenance of regional stability and the territorial and politicai

integrity of littoral states; continued use of the region's communications,

land, sea and air routes, and transit

facilities;

maintenance

and

strengthening of economic ties with regional states; and prevention

of the

in particular, the Soviet

establishment by a n external adversary power

of a predominant political or military presence in the region.

An

Union

associated interest, stemming from the U.S.

commitment to Israel's survival,

is seeking support from regional states for a basic American policy goal of

resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict which affects virtually

every

issue of

major U.S. concern i n the Middle East.

--

--

B.

Iran. The United States has a continuing interest in the maintenance

of Iran's territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty a s a strategic buffer

between the Soviet Union and the Gulf.

Geographically

and demographically,

Iran retains a natural preeminence in the Gulf

region.

Strategically, the

country dominates the northern approaches to the Middle East.

Iran's s i z e ,

location, vulnerability and common border with

the. Soviet Union

give it

significance in superpower competition.

Direct or indirect extension

of

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Soviet influence or Control over Iran would constitute a major threat to the

security of the Gulf region and its enormous petroleum

resources.

Future

instability i n Iran could lead t o national disintegration, thereby opening

opportunities for an upsurge i n Soviet influence or the establishment of a

pro-Soviet client regime, with even the potential for Soviet invasion.

The United States also has a n interest i n preventing

Iranian Islamic

revolutionary or military expansionism in the Gulf region.

An

Iranian

whegemony'p over the Gulf oil-producing states could decisively

change the

world oil market.

This interest in containing a strengthening of Iran's

regional position i n many respects conflicts with the U.S.

interest i n a n

Iran sufficiently strong to resist Soviet power and control and to oppose,

for its own Islamic revolutionary reasons, the expansion of Soviet power

southwards.

Iranian Islamic expansionism carries

the

potential

for

destabilizing the Gulf

region, jeopardizing oil

supplies,

lines

of

communication and friendly Arab

governments.

These

two,

sometimes

contradictory, interests would suggest, therefore, a careful balance between

Soviet-Iranian and Iranian-Arab problems in U.S. policy decisions.

C.

Iraq. . The preservation of Iraq's sovereignty is currently in the U.S.

interest.

Iraq occupies a strategic position in the region, bordering on

in addition to Iran -- Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

Some

observers consider that Iraq is important to short-term U.S.

interests in

that it protects the vulnerable oil-producing Gulf Arab states from Iranian

military power and coercion and restrains Iranian subversive ambitions..

The

installation o f a Shi'ite revolutionary government i n Baghdad, should Iraq

collapse, would raise the potential for the formation of an Iranian-Syrian

axis which would threaten not only the Gulf region but also Israel, Jordan

and Lebanon and U.S. interests in the Eastern Keaiterranean.

--

D.

Gulf Stability. The United States and its allies possess a n important

interest in stability in the Gulf region.

Successful mediation

efforts

culminating in a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement to the conflict

between Iran and Iraq would appear to be compatible with this interest.

An

escalation of the Iran-Iraq war, whether initiated by either side, raises the

distinct possibility for wider involvement, both regional and external, that

would without doubt affect the region's oil production, prices and exports.

Such a crisis could engender superpower confrontationE.

U.S. Policy Options:

To Tilt or Not To Tilt? From the beginning

of

the conflict, there has been considerable debate over U.S. policy toward Iran

and Iraq.

Some observers have contended that the U.S. course of neutrality

has rendered U.S.

policy on the war impotent.

They reportedly

called

for

options that would

"tilt" the United

States toward

Iraq.

Others have

perceived that, should Iraq seriously damage Iran's oil export capabilities,

Thus,

Iran will likely respond with actions that could widen the conflict.

it is essential, in this view, that regional countries and other interested

to

parties make a concerted effort to bring pressure on the two belligerents

exercise restraint.

Should there be an escalation of

the war, the entire

Gulf could become embroiled with obvious regional and worldwide implications,

including spillover effects on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Western

economies, and the potential for superpower confrontation.

Those favoring a "tilt" in U.S. policy toward Iraq have considered that

the short-term interests of the United States and its allies would be

served

by helping preserve Iraq's sovereignty and preventing the installation of a

Shi'ite revolutionary government in Baghdad.

The United States can assist in

the prevention of an Iraqi economic collapse through the .export of U.S.

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technological expertise and services, and by loans and guarantees, including

the Export-Import Bank.

They argued that Iraq strategically i s important to

these interests i n that i t protects the vulnerable Gulf oil-producing

states

from Iranian military

power and restrains Iranian subversive ambitions.

Others assert the United States should assist Iraq through non-lethal means,

including satellite intelligence data.

Should

Iraq collapse, wider U.S.

interests i n the Middle East would be threatened.

The advocates of a "tilt" toward Iraq have pointed to the prevailing trend

that, over the long term, a war of attrition favors Iran and that Ayatollah

Khomeini will never negotiate a settlement until

Iraq collapses.

They

contend that the United States needs Iraq for leverage against Syria; if Iraq

collapses, and a Syrian-Iranian axis i s formed, Syria will achieve new

regional predominance, thereby increasing Soviet influence.

Iraq, since

1975, has distanced itself from its formerly close relations with the Soviet

Union; despite recent increases in Soviet military

supplies,

Baghdad

maintains its independence from possible Soviet leverage.

With

respect to

U.S. policy goals in the Middle East, Iraq has indicated its acceptance of

Israel's right to exist and has expelled the Abu Nidal faction.

Iran, on the

other hand is lending support to terrorism through training, financing and

equipping various groups, and Tehran is suspected for its complicity in the

bombings in Lebanon and Kuwait and other incidents of terrorism, including

hostage-taking.

The Khomeini regime's human rights record i s atrocious.

The

strangulation a n d , so long as

greatest danger facing Iraq i s economic

Khomeini remains in power, the war of attrition i s likely to be unrelenting.

The United States and its allies should at a l l costs prevent Iranian success.

Restorian of diplomatic ties with Baghdad in November 1984 would seem to have

underscored this determination.

Those critical of a n Iraqi option reportedly have contended that such a

"tilt" toward Iraq serves no useful purpose.

They consider that Iran, in the

longer-term, is of greater strategic importance to U.S.

interests and

outweighs other short-term considerations. While there are few expectations

for any improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations so long a s the current Tehran

longer-term

regime retains power, a "tilt" toward Iraq tends to &iscourage

moderation i n , and future ties with, Iran.

Iran remains the strategic buffer

between the Soviet Union and the Gulf; closer U.S. relations with Iraq would

tend to draw Iran nearer to the Soviet Union and weaken the nonaligned and

anti-Soviet position held by many i n the Tehran regime.

The United States

should make every effort to establish contracts with receptive elements in

the Iranian leadership.

They argue that such elements could influence a

change in the Khomeini regime's continued refusal to negotiate a n end to the

6-year-old conflict.

Links with moderate factions could

serve a s a hedge

against Soviet designs on Irac, particularly

when

the time comes for a

successor to Ayatollah Khomeini.

In this sense, the renewal of 3.S.-Iraqi

relations has served no useful purpose.

Others Contend that there is no apparent visible role for the United

States to play in the conflict; with limited leverage on either

side, the

United States should remain on the sidelines. Direct U.S. aid to Iraq would

only give Iran more reason to prolong the war.

The costs of potential

U.S.

involvement would be high.

In any case, the current military

stalemate,

which drains the energies and resources of both

the Tehran and Baghdad

regimes, serves U.S. interests and prevents either of them

from threatening

the Gulf Arab states through military aggression or subversion.

The Husayn

regime in Baghdad is no better than the Khomeini regime i n Tehran.

On the

one hand, Iraq has used chemical weapons against

Iranian troops.

On

the

other, Iran has sent waves of children

to clear minefields, has refused

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permission o t the International Red Cross to visit

Iraqi prisoners-of-war,

many of whom reportedly have been subjected to psychological

pressure and

execution.

Iran reportedly has used chemical weapons against i t s Kurdish

dissiclents.

U.S.

involvement could jeopardize delicate mediation

efforts

designed to bring the two belligerents to the bargaining

table, and could

lead to escalation of the war.

Since April 1984, the escalation of the air war against shipping i n the

Gulf and U.S. reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers has generated debate over U.S.

military involvement in the region.

[See CRS Issue Brief 87145, The Persian

Gulf and the U.S. Naval Presence:

Issues for Congress.]

Some caution that

the mission of U.S.

forces must be clearly defined, together with

the

development of a plan and force structure capable of achieving precisely

determined goals.

In any event, any U.S. intervention will face the risk of

appearing to take one side or another.

The Iran-Iraq Conflict

War of Attrition

-- a static

T o date, the Iran-Iraq war has become a war of attrition

conflict since mid-1982 in which the line of battle has not moved more than a

few miles from the common border.

The pattern of operations in general has

become one of periodic Iranian offensives, launched partly in the hope of

breaking through Iraqi lines and partly to wear

down the Iraqi forces.

Tactically, the Iranians have persisted in attacking, using massed

infantry,

but battles have not been fought to decisive conclusions, in large measure

because the Iranians have lacked the equipment and spare parts, firepower,

and logistical support to achieve effectively their objectives or to exploit

breakthroughs.

Neither side has made optimal use of weapons essential.for a

war of maneuver.

Since June 9 , 1 9 8 5 , Iranian ground operations generally

have taken the

form of rapid, small-scale attacks against the Iraqi lines in all three

sectors of the 780-mile front. Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani stated a t the time

"to achieve victory

with as few casualties as

that Iran's intent was

possible;" and Pasdaran Chief of Staff Ali Reza Afshur asserted on June 23

that Khomeini has issued Ifan overall order for a defensive holy war."

In early February 1 9 8 6 , Iraqi units repulsed

Iranian attacks i n the

marshlands north of Basra.

On Feb. 1 0 , Iranian forces crossed

the Shatt

al-Arab southeast of Basra and succeeded in occupying the Iraqi port of

Al-Faw.

Tehran increased pressure on Iraq by opening an attack on Feb. 24 in

the northern sector, in conjunction with dissident Iraqi Kurds and exiled

Shiite units.

The apparent objective was to tie down

Iraqi forces in the

northern and southern extremi'ties of the front, thereby making

Iraq more

vulnerable to a full-scale offensive north of Basra.

Following a massive

buildup of Iranian troops in the Susangerd a r e a , Baghdad

has

been

anticipating an imminent large-scale attack in the central sector.

On April

3 0 , Iraqi ground forces struck across the Iranian border in the sector in an

effort to disrupt Iranian concentrations.

In May Iraqi forces captured

the

border town of Mehran, only to be driven back after six weeks.

During the

night of Aug.

31, Iranian forces attacked in the H a j Omran area in

mountainous terrain; both sides claimed to have inflicted heavy losses on the

other.

On Sept. 1 1 , Iraq reported its forces had

repulsed an

Iranian

Iran launched a

amphibious attack in marshlands in the southern sector.

sizeable attack across the Shatt al-Arab o n Dec. 24 that was thrown back with

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considerable losses after heavy fighting.

On Jan. 6, 1987, Iranian forces conducted a large-scale, 3-pkonged

attack

against Iraqi defense lines protecting the eastern approach'es t o Basra,

advancing up the east side of the Shatt al-Arab to within 6 miles of the

city.

In early February, a series of Iraqi counterattacks appe,ared to have

succeeded in recovering some lost territory.

Casualty

estimates placed

Iranian losses a t 50,000, and Iraqi at about 20,000.

In t h e central sector,

Iran launched a "limited operationw north of Sumar, cla<ming to have

recaptured territory seized by Iraq i n 1980.

Iran renewed i t s attacks near

Basra o n February 23.

In the a i r , the Iraqi air force, with increasing frequency, has struck a t

Iranian economic and industrial targets throughout 1986 and inta 1987.

With

the new round of ground fighting, both sides have resumed a i r , missile, and

artillery attacks on the other's population centers.

Baghdad declared a halt

in air attacks on Iranian cities on February 1 9 , but on February

23,

threatened to renew the raids because of Iranian attacks and

shelling near

Basra.

A feature of the recent Iranian offensives is that the Iranian air force

has been more in evidence, and Iran has improved its air defense systems.

Some observers consider that shipments of U.S.

arms and spare parts

have

contributed to a n improved Iranian performance.

A number of observers consider that the Iranian leadership, armed with the

knowledge that i t cannot lose the war militarily and having

conditioned

its

economy, its people and its foreign policy to the concept of a prolonged

conflict, has decided to continue the war of attrition i n order to bring down

the Iraqi regime of Saddam Husayn.

While the war has impinged strongly on

Iranian national life and casualities have been heavy, fighting has taken

The stepping up of Iraqi air

place a t a distance from the principal cities.

attacks on population centers in early 1 9 8 5 , including Tehran, reportedly had

succeeded in prompting some limited anti-war demonstrations within Iran.

Iran continues to finance its war effort through petroleum

exports which

have ranged between 1.6 million and 2.3 million barrels per

day except for

Iranian

periodic drops a s a result of Iraqi air attacks against tankers and

oil terminals.

Tehran continues to reject a l l attempts a t mediation and

Iraq, on the other hand, has

negotiations for a settlement of the conflict.

faced economic difficulties with its primary oil export terminals having been

destroyed early in the war, its trans-Syrian pipeline

cut off because of

Syria's support for Iran and its hostility toward the Bahgdad regime, and its

remaining pipeline through Turkey facilitating some 1 million

barrels per

day.

Since September 1 9 8 5 , between 300,000 and 500,000 b/d has been exported

through the Saudi port of Yanbu, and some 100,OO.O b/d is trucked to Agaba,

Jordan, and through Turkey.

The current slump in world oil prices has

compounded the problems facing the Iraqi economy, including 1986 repayment

deadlines for deferred debts to overseas creditors.

Some economists estimate

that Baghdad will require $4 billion to $ 8 billion to meet its current

account deficit in 1986.

Such figures do not include the costs of the

conflict (estimated a t $600 million-$1 billion per month)

that are partly

being met by Gulf Arab oil-producing states. With a population

of only a

third of its adversary, Iraq faces greater difficulties than Iran in

sustaining the heavy casualties of a war of attrition, and it has expressed

its willingness to join mediation efforts to end the conflict.

Iraqi President Husayn, on Aug. 3 , 1 9 8 6 , issued an open letter to

Iranian

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leaders calling f o r a mutual withdrawal from occupied territories, a n

agreement not t o interfere in the other's

internal affairs, and a full

Ayatalloh Khomeini rejected the plea,

exchange of prisoners.

On Aug. 7 ,

stating that peace with Iraq now would be "contrary toi Islamw and "compromise

would be worse than war."

At the same time, Iranian news media reported the

movement of the thousands of fresh troops to the f r o n t i n preparation

for a

new offensive.

Khomeini, on Feb. 1 0 , 1987, declared that Iran was engaged i n

"a divine causen which would not cease until final victory.

B. The Air War i n the Gulf. Since Aug. 1 2 , 1982, when Iraqi President

Husayn declared a maritime exclusion zone in the northern Gulf, the Iraqi air

force has been

increasingly active i n

attacking

shipping

and

oil

installations i n that zone.

Iraq's objectives are to prevent or reduce the importation of vital

materials required by Iran for its war effort and to reduce or terminate

Iran's financial means to conduct war through its oil exports.

It should be

noted that until Mar. 2 7 , 1984, Iraq had refrained from striking the Kharg

Island terminal, which handled some 90% of Iran's oil exports.

Iraqi Foreign

Minister Aziz reiterated on May 1 9 his government's intention of continuing

to interdict shipping to and from Kharg Island and

Iran's northern

ports,

emphasizing Iraq's objective of demonstrating to the Tehran regime that "the

elusive war of attrition which they bet on i s not in their interest."

Iraq continued its pattern of periodic attacks on shipping within

the

exclusion z o n e throughout 1 9 8 5 , 1986, and into 1987.

In addition, Iraqi

aircraft made frequent attacks on pumping stations at Gurreh and Ganaveh

supplying Kharq Island.

In July 1985 Baghdad claimed to have carried . o u t

successful raids against Iranian offshore oil fields.

On August 1 5 , several

Iraqi aircraft effectively damaged the T-junction loading pier on the east

side of Kharg Island.

Iraq continued its raids on Kharg into October.

On

Sept. 1 8 , the Sea Island loading pier on the east side of Kharg

sustained

Iran's capabilities to export

heavy damage, thereby temporarily lessening

Oil.

Iran's response since mid-May 1984 has been

to attack

shipping sailing

search

from Saudi and other Arab ports in the Western Gulf and to stop and

shipping entering the Gulf and, in some cases, confiscating cargoes reputedly

bound for Iraq.

The cumulative effects of Iraq's gradually escalating air strategy in the

northern Gulf have been threefold: an inhibition upon

shipowners and oil

traders from sailing to northern waters; a rise in marine

insurance rates;

and increases in spot oil prices.

To offset future suspensions of shipments

from the Kharg Island terminal, the Iranian Oil Ministry

has been

loading

crude from its Lavan Islarid terminal (150,000 b/d capacity) and

supertankers

anchored off Sirri Island, near the Strait of Hormuz, replenished by

shuttle

tankers from Kharg.

In late June 1986, Iran opened new floating terminals

off Hengam and Earak islands at the Strait of Hormuz.

On Aug.

1 2 , 1 9 8 6 , Iraqi Mirage F-1 strike aircraft,

armed

with

laser-guided AS-30 air-to-surface missiles and using in-flight refueling, hit

five tankers off Sirri Island in an attack regarded by some observers a s a

significant escalation of the conflict.

Facilities at Lavan

Island were

attacked on Sept. 5. On Nov. 26, Iraq attacked the Larak island transhipment

terminal.

[For recent developments in the Gulf air war, see C R S Issue Brief

87207, The Persian Gulf and the War Powers Debate:

Issue Summary and Review

of Events.]

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C.

Mediation Efforts.

Since the beginning of the conflict i n September

1980, there have been several mediation efforts designed to achieve an end to

the war o n the part of international and regional organizations a s well a s

individual countries.

All such efforts have failed because o f Iran's

insistence that any resolution to the conflict must contain the following

conditions:

the unconditional withdrawal of a l l Iraqi forces from

Iranian

territory; the convening of a n international tribunal to determine the

aggressor; the payment of war reparations (placed by Ayatollah

Khomeini a t

$150 billion); the return of some 100,000 Shi'ites expelled by Iraq; and the

overthrow of Iraqi President Husayn and his leadership.

Many

observers

consider that a negotiated

settlement is unlikely

so long a s Ayatollah

Khomeini, who continues to insist on Iraqi President Husayn's removal from

office, retains power.

Recent statements by

Iranian leaders, however,

shift by

indicate differences as to the conduct of the war and a possible

some away from earlier maximalist positions.

Iraq has expressed

its

willingness to accept a negotiated settlement under the following conditions:

a return to international borders; a n exchange of prisoners; a non-aggression

pact; and a n agreement not to interfere in each country's internal affairs.

I. Chemical Weapons.

Between May 1981 and March 1 9 8 4 , Iran claimed that

Iraq employed chemical weapons against its forces 49 times.

(The use of

chemical weapons was banned under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which both

Iran and Iraq a r e signatories.) The U.S. State Department o n Mar.

5, 1984,

asserted the United States had concluded that "available evidence" indicated

"lethal chemical weapons'' had been used by Iraq during the February fighting

that were "inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations."

On Mar. 2 6 , 1984, an investigation by a n international team of medical and

military specialists undertaken in Iran earlier in March a t the request of

U.N.

Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar i n response to Iranian

without suggesting the

charges of Iraqi use of chemical weapons, concluded

that mustard gas ( b i s - ( 2 - ~ h l o r 0 e t h y l ) - s ~ l f i d e )and a nerve agent

origin

known as Tabun (ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate) had been employed.

The extent to which the chemical agents had been used, however, could not be

determined.

No evidence was found of the presence of mycotoxin.

--

--

Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani announced

on Mar.

2 3 , .L984, that Iran was

committed not to use chemical weapons, but he stated that it possessed

the

capability for manufacturing them. On Mar. 2 7 , Iranian Ambassador

to the

United Nations Said Rajai-Khjorassani warned that if the Security Council

took no action against Iraq for its use of such weapons, Iran would

then be

encouraged to resort to chemical warfare in retaliation, "should we find we

have no other means to stop the ememy."

On Mar. 3 0 , the Security

Council

"stronglyn condemned the use of chemical weapons, but did not name

Iraq as

the guilty party.

3 0 , 1 9 8 4 , the

State Department spokesman John Hughes announced on Mar.

imposition of regulations restricting the export of chemicals to both

Iran

and Iraq that could be used in the production of chemical weapons.

On Apr.

9 , 1 9 8 4 five West European nations

-- West Germany, the United Kingdom,

Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands -- agreed to restrict the export of

substances to Iran and Iraq that could be used to produce chemical weapons.

In April 1985, U.S. intelligence sources, monitoring world markets

i n the

sale of such substances, reportedly concluded that both Iraq and

Iran were

continuing to purchase the chemicals despite the restrictions.

Tehran again charged that Iraq used lethal chemical

weapons

against

its

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forces during the March 1985 offensive.

Secretary of State Shultz condemned

the use of chemical weapons during a meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz

16

o n March 25. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati claimed o n Apr.

that between Mar. 3 and Apr. 9 , there were 33 Iraqi chemical attacks in which

4,000 Iranians were killed or injured.

Velayati was critical over the

failure of the United Nations to take action against Iraq f o r using chemical

weapons, and he asserted that Iran had the capability to retaliate.

The

State Department o n Apr. 2 4 expressed concern that Iran may have developed a n

arsenal of chemical weapons for use against Iraq.

During the February 1986 Iranian offensive in the Al-Faw Peninsula, Tehran

accused Iraq of having used chemical weapons and stated that more than 8 , 0 0 0

of its troops had been affected. The State Department on Feb. 1 9 condemned

Iraq's use of chemical weapons.

U.N. Secretary General d e Cuellar on Mar. 14

released an investigation team's report naming, for the f i r s t time, Iraq's

use of mustard gas and nerve gas, and on Mar. 2 1 , the U.N.

Security Council

condemned the continued use of chemical weapons by Iraq.

On July 1 5 , a

British representative at the Conference on Disarmament in Gen'eva charged

that Iraqi chemical weapons were responsible for about 10,000 casualties and

stated that Iraq appeared to be increasing its capabilities to produce

chemical weapons.

On Jan. 7 , 1 9 8 7 , Iran claimed to have hit a n Iraqi chemical weapons depot

on the western bank of the Shatt al-Arab, during an artillery barage,

releasing a cloud of toxic gas that caused several hundred Iraqi casualties.

The Iranian media also quoted a n Iranian official as stating that Iran can

now produce its own chemical weapons and may use them against Iraq. On Feb.

23, Tehran claimed Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iranian forces near

Basra, but chemical warfare units had "neutralized the impact of the toxic

gasses."

111. Future Trends i n the Iran-Iraq'war

Iraqi air attacks on Gulf shipping and Iranian threats to blockade the

Gulf have indicated a large element of psychological warfare between the two

belligerents.

Iraq currently possesses a-quantitative and qualitative edge

over Iran i n modern weapons, particularly i n aircraft, armor, a n C artillery.

But prevailing demographic and economic imbalances ultimately appear to favor

Iran. Iran's stated messianic and expansionist goals indicate the present

Tehran regime's ambitions to play a major role in the region.

A 1985 Economist Intelligence Unit study considered the probability

likelihood of four scenarios for a n end to the conflict:

escalation of

(40%) ;

warfare (10%) ; a continuing war of attrition (40%) ; no war, no peace

and a collapse of Iraq (102). The authors suggested that damage inflicted by

war was such that even a n early settlement would have Iraq needing 10 years

to complete reconstruction, and Iran 2 0 years.

They emphasized that both

combatants will be dependent on oil revenues for some time to come, and the

importance of Iran's "ultimate weapon," its numerically superior population.

They warned against underestimating the motives and forces that produced

the

Iranian revolution and upon which Ayatollah Khomeini can still draw.

The Iraqi economy faces increasing difficulties should the current war of

attrition prevail.

Oil revenues, once in excess of $20 billion per y e a r ,

have fallen between $5.3 and $8 billion.

Iraq is dependent on subsidies from

other Arab oil-producers in order to maintain its war effort.

Baghdad i s

confronted with difficult choices in economic priorities as resources and

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manpower are expended i n the conflict.

The capacity of Iraq to prosecute the

war has been severely curtailed by

the fall i n international oil prices

despite its increased export capabilities.

At the beginning

o f 1 9 8 6 , the

Iraqi government appeared to have succeeded i n organizing the economy t o cope

with development priorities, as well a s the war.

By mid-1986,

development

seems to have taken a back seat.

Iraq presently is squeezed more tightly by

acute shortages of foreign exchange, and it continues to request its

suppliers to agree to further debt rescheduling.

Experience gained and lessons learned from the war have improved the

quality and operations of the Iraqi armed forces, and there appears to have

been significant modification i n the command and control structure. With the

acquisition of large quantities of modern military weapons

systems and

equipment, difficulties remain with the technological assimilation in certain

areas and the optimal use of sophisticated systems.

The morale factor i n the

armed forces continues to be of extreme importance.

in October 1985 in

A "massive1' Iranian general mobilization plan began

preparation for a

"final offensive."

Special operations forces

units

reportedly have been deployed along the front, thereby indicating the

possible utilization of new tactics.

Several hundred thousand volunteers and

conscripts, including civil servants and professionals, were added

to the

ranks of the Islamic Republic of Iran Guards Corps (IRIGC -- Pasdaran) and

Basij (militia) units, with large numbers dispatched

to the front.

The

Supreme Defense Council, comprising of senior religious, political and

military leaders, was bolstered and charged with coordinating war policy,

including mobilization and training.

Government departments, nationalized

bazks and industries, and other affiliated organizations were requested i n

l a t e June 1986 to place staffs and resources a t the disposal of the IRIGC.

I n August 1 9 8 6 , Prime Minister Musavi issued guidelines for transforming the

Iranian economy following a cabinet review.

The war effort occupied first

priority i n the official guidelines, with emphasis upon a successful

conclusion of the Iran-Iraq

conflict before March

1987.

Some observers

suggest that Iran needs results quickly.

There have been

reports of

differences within the top levels of Iran's leadership over the conduct of

the war, external mediation efforts, and negotiations for a settlement of the

conflict.

The IRIGC reportedly has been receiving the bulk of new equipment

to the resentment of the regular armed forces.

A large-scale

l'f inai

offensive," possibly through a sequence of attacks along the entire front, i s

expected at any time with the objective of breaking the Iraqi armed forces.

The initial success of Iranian tactics employed i n operations i n late 1986

and early 1 9 8 7 indicate that Tehran has found a key to breaking

through

seemingly impregnable Iraqi barriers.

Amphibious assault appears to have

become something of an Iranian specialty.

Some observers consider a likely Iranian objective to be the isolation or

capture of Basra and the establishment of a revolutionary Shi'ite regime on

Iraqi soil,. Once C O n S ~ l i d a t e d ,Iranian forces would advance to take the

shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala.

Others question

Iranian capabilities,

however, to exploit and sustain an advance in light of

Iran's limited

materiel and logistical resources.

An Iranian attempt to block the Gulf

i s Considered manageable provided

that prompt and effective action is taken to protect shipping and secure the

Strait.

Destruction of oil installations at selected locations in the Gulf

region, on the other hand, carries potentially critical dangers for Western

interests. Western Europe and Japan would be more directly and

immediately

affected. The protection of Gulf oil fields and

installations, because of

their widespread locations and areal extent, would strain available U.S.

allied assets.

and

While a negotiated

settlement appears unlikely i n

the

near-term,

a foregone

indefinite prolongation of the conflict is not necessarily

conclusion.

A number of ongoing factors could combine to undermine the

political will to prosecute the war.

Increased psychological attrition

within the Iraqi political and military leaderships could result i n major

changes.

The effects of the oil price decline on the acquisition of military

equipment and on the domestic economy are increasingly felt by both

sides.

There a r e indications of growing war-weariness i n both Iran and Iraq.

Some

observers suggest that dwindling resources and the war eventually

could

create circumstances for a slowdown in hostilities, a de facto cease-fire,

a n d , eventually, an armistice.

IV. Soviet Interests and Involvement in Iran and Iraq

A leading U.S. policy concern is that the Iran-Iraq conflict will open

opportunities for Soviet exploitation, thereby enabling Moscow to enhance its

position vis-a-vis the United States in the Gulf region.

The nature of the

Soviet threat, however, is subject to wide-ranging

debate and, since the

change of leadership in Moscow, new patterns of Soviet policy a r e emerging.

While Moscow has tended to avoid large risks i n the Middle East during the

recent past, nevertheless it continues to perceive that i t has important and

legitimate interests i n the region.

For the Soviet Union, the Persian Gulf lies proximate to its southern

border and Moscow, a s it seeks to increase its influence among regional

countries, cannot remain indifferent to political and military

developments

in the region.

Former Soviet Chairman Leonid Brezhnev acknowledged that the

Gulf was an area of vital Western interests on Dec. 1 0 , 1 9 8 0 , in New Delhi

when he proposed a multilateral agreement for the demilitarization

and

neutralization of the Gulf region.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union

continues

to oppose all U.S.

efforts to defend

those

interests

through

the

establishment of a military presence in the Gulf/Indian Ocean region.

Moscow faces constraints to any policy

initiative aimed a t exploiting

opportunities arising from the Iran-Iraq war.

Because of Iran's

size,

location, population, and common border with the U.S.S.R.,

the Soviets

perceive Iran as strategically more important than Iraq.

Since the Iranian

revolution, Moscow has aimed at normalizing and improving its political

and

economic relations with

Tehran.

But it has avoided any overwhelming

commitment toward supporting Iran lest its ties with Iraq and its standing in

other parts of the Arab world be eroded.

Soviet neutrality in the conflict,

in consequence, has been translated into maintaining a controlled

supply of

arms to both sides.

Soviet relations with Iraq had been good until the mid-1970s when they

began to sour, despite a 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

Iraq

subsequently started to diversify its sources of arms and imported Western -including American -- technology and equipment.

During the first two years

of the Iran-Iraq conflict, Moscow was cool to Iraqi requests for additional

supplies of military equipment and spare parts.

Iraq responded by

executing

or exiling members of the Iraqi Communist Party, and was openly critical of

Soviet interference and actions in the Middle East, particularly its invasion

of Afghanistan.

At the same time, increased trade and other ties between

Iran and the Soviet Union were largely

induced by

Iranian dependence on

Soviet transit routes following the Iraqi capture o f Iran's largest port a t

Khorramshahr.

Iran's considerable economic difficulties led t o barter

arrangements with East European countries and to an influx of large numbers

of Soviet and Eastern bloc exports and. advisers.

Despite the intense anti-Americanism

of the Iranian regime, Soviet

influence does not predominate

i n Tehran.

In fact, the Iranian regime

presently continues to identify the Soviet Union a s another manifestation of

the "satanic f o r c e s w with which its revolution i s struggling in eternal

conflict.

Iran's mistrust of the Soviet Union is bolstered

by historical

experience and by the Tehran regime's policy of nonalignment.

In addition,

Iran opposes the Soviet presence

in Afghanistan

and a i d s the resistance

forces.

the

Relations with Moscow took a turn for the worse in May 1983 with

expulsion of several Soviet diplomats and Tehran's proscription

of the

communist Tudeh Party and two smaller pro-Soviet groups.

The Iraqis were

reinforced with new deliveries of Soviet military

equipment, including

according to newsmedia reports

MIG-25 and MIG-27

aircraft,

Mi-24

helicopter gunships, new supplies of ground-to-ground

missiles, and T-72

tanks.

Iranian President Ali Khamenei warned the Soviet Union on Oct.

7I

1983, against its continuing to supply arms to Iraq.

On Jan.

1 4 , 1984,

Moscow gave notice that Tehran's continued hostility would be certain to harm

Soviet-Iranian trade relations.

Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani on Feb. 26 called

upon the Soviet Union to end its supply of arms and missiles t o Iraq "before

i t i s too late." Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, during his

visit to Japan i n April 1984, stressed the Soviet threat and emphasized

that

H e stated

Iran served a s a barrier to Soviet expansion in the Middle East.

Iran and the

that while faith i n God still formed a common ground between

United States, the Soviet Union, where there was no faith i n G o d , could not

be trusted a t all.

On June 6 , however, the Political Director General of the

Iranian Foreign Ministry, Sayyid Muhammad S a d r , held discussions i n Moscow

with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and other Soviet officials on the war

and economic relations. Moscow

informed visiting

Iranian Deputy Foreign

Minister Hossein Kazempur-Ardebili in early April 1985 that it desired a

negotiated resolution of the conflict.

This message was repeated to visiting

Iranian officials in July 1986.

--

--

Recent Iranian's efforts to improve ties with Moscow reflect political and

military considerations a s well a s economic needs.

Discussions i n Moscow

between Soviet officials a n 8 Iranian Oil Minister Qolam Reza Aqazadeh-Khol in

August 1986 resulted i n agreement to resume natural gas supplies to the

5 , 1986,

Soviet Union.

Moscow subsequently ha,s agreed to support the Aug.

OPEC agreement and cut its oil exports.

Medium- and long-term economic cooperation

talks between

Iraq and the

7 , the

Soviet

Soviet Union were conducted in March 1984; and on Mar.

Atomenergoexport was appointed by Baghdad to identify a site for a planned

nuclear station.

In April, there were growing indications that Moscow was

stepping up military aid to Iraq against a n anticipated

Iranian offensive.

Iraqi President Husayn in early May characterized

Iraq-Soviet relations as

"good," stating his government was "interested in developing this and so are

the Soviets.w

In late August 1 9 8 6 , Soviet Deputy Foreign Affairs

Minister

Vladimir Petrovsky met with President Husayn in Baghdad and reiterated Soviet

support for Iraq's efforts to end the conflict.

The ability of Moscow to influence a post-Khomeini regime in Iran remains

of considerable concern to U.S. planners in light of t h e absence of U.S.

influence in Tehran and the present lack of alternative political leadership

groups to the Islamic Republican Party.

Reportedly, the Soviets a r e

continuing to supply military equipment t o Iran i n a n apparent move to

maintain their options i n the event of a change of leadership i n Tehran.

Moscow also harbors concern over the Iranian revolution's possible future

influence on Soviet Muslims who number close to 50 million.

Regional Effects of the Conflict

Of particular concern to the United States i s the potential for a widening

of the conflict that could increase prospects for destabilizing

the region

and endanger U.S. interests.

From the beginning, the Iran-Iraq war created.

realignments among Arab states and deepened existing cleavages i n the Arab

world.

Indeed, it almost led to armed confrontation between Syria and Jordan

i n late 1980.

Jordan was the most vociferous Arab state in support of

Iraq and that

support took a number of forms, including political advocacy, the opening of

its port at Aqaba for unloading supplies destined for Iraq, .and volunteers to

serve alongside Iraqi forces.

Syria, i n contrast, has effectively supported Iran because of its

hostility toward the Baghdad regime, reflected i n its condemnation of

Iraqi

military moves against Iran.

Syrian motives were interpreted a s being

another manifestation of the rivalry between the two Ba'athist

regimes in

Damascus and Baghdad over the leadership of the Ba'ath and the Arab world.

In addition, the ruling Alawite elite i n Damascus are members of a minority

sect in Syria that i s a n offshoot of Shi'ism.

In late 1985 and early 1 9 8 6 ,

there were signs of deteriorating relations between Iraq and Syria. Attempts

by Jordanian King Husayn to normalize ties between Baghdad

and Damascus in

1986 have thus far lacked suecess, however.

The reaction of other Arab

states to the conflict fell between

the

Jordanian and Syrian positions.

The Gulf Arab

states have lent financial

Iran

support to Iraq (an estimated $ 3 0 + billion) i n its conduct of the war.

repeatedly has countered with strong warnings in efforts to intimidate Gulf

countries and, i n its Arabic broadcasts, has called for the overthrow of

ruling regimes. The formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in May

1 9 8 1 in large measure was catalyzed by the perceived Iranian threat to the

region.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)

and Oman formed the organization a s an economic,

internal

security

cooperation and defense arrangement.

GCC concern for the Iranian threat was

reinforced by an abortive coup in December 1981 in Bahrain organized

by

Iranian-trained and supplied members of the Islamic Front for the Liberation

of .Bahrain. Reaction by GCC member-states to the coup attempt was a decisive

increase in regional diplomatic and economic Support for Iraq.

For the Gulf

states, the position

of continuing to support

Iraq

economically and diplomatically could invite Iranian retaliation against oil

and military installations.

(Kuwait has charged that, between 1981 and 1 9 8 3 ,

Iranian aircraft have attacked its oil installations on three occasions.

In

1986, sabotage damaged Kuwaiti oil facitilies.) Since May 1 9 8 2 , the GCC has

looked to ways for ending the conflict while

seeking to strengthen its

security arrangements.

At a summit meeting in Qatar in November

1 9 8 3 , the

GCC examined options to bolster security of member states and Gulf sea l a n e s ,

a s well as to find an end to the war.

In March and April

1 9 8 4 , there were

indications of a growing conviction among GCC leaders that the war was on the

verge of becoming a wider conflict threatening regional stability.

Following

Iranian air attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers i n mid-May 1 9 8 4 , Kuwait and

At a n

Saudi Arabia placed their air defenses o n a heightened state of alert.

emergency meeting of G C C foreign ministers i n Riyadh o n May 1 7 , Iran was

condemned for its l1aggressions" against their "vital interests."

T h e GCC

called for a n emergency session of the Arab League on May

2 0 "to adopt a

unified Arab stand," and raised the issue in the U.N.

Security Council.

(Resolution 5 2 2 of June 1 , 1984, reaffirmed the right of free navigation to

all ports and and installations of Gulf states not party to the conflict, and

condemned Iranian

attacks

on

commercial

shipping.)

While

seeking

international support, the GCC will face final decisions o n self defense

GCC interest i n a

should Iranian attacks escalate to a highe'r level.

near-term conclusion to the conflict appears to be motivated by economic and

security concerns.

--

Syria, Libya, Algeria, the People's

The so-called Steadfastness Front

Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and the Palestine Liberation Organization

met on May 24, 1982, in Algiers to proclaim that Iran was a friend

(PLO)

of the Arabs and to urge that no Arab state help

Iraq.

While this group

officially declared support for Iran, the level of support has varied

from

Syria's outright condemnation of Iraq to the more neutral and mediative

efforts of the P L O and Algeria.

--

Arab League foreign ministers (with the exception of Syria and Libya) met

1984 and issued

a

i n a n emergency

session i n Baghdad in mid-March

condemnation of Iran's "continuous aggression and its attempts to cross

international borders and occupy Iraq's territories."

They urged

Iran to

abide by resolutions calling for an end to hostilities and to accept

mediation initiatives to end the conflict.

Despite its isolation resulting from the Egyptian-Israeli

peace treaty,

Egypt has been considered in some Arab circles a s a counterweight to Iran

because of its size of population and comparative military

strength.

Iraqi

President Husayn in May 1982 invited Egyptian President Muhammad

Mubarak

to

send troops.

Egypt, since 1981, had been contributing arms and ammunition to

Iraq.

Mubarak declined to dispatch Egyptian forces. But relations between

the two countries have drawn closer.

Iraqi military missions have visited

Cairo since 1982.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali stated on Mar.

26, 1 9 8 4 , a t the conclusion of a visit to Baghdad that his government fully

supported Iraq and would not hesitate to offer any military

aid requested.

Iraqi President Husayn on May 3 called for Egypt's return to the Arab league.

President Mubarak visited Baghdad in March 1 9 8 5 a s a gesture of support for

Iraq.

Since mid-1986, Egypt reportedly has stepped up shipments of

spare

parts and military advisers to Iraq.

Turkey has maintained a neutral stance toward the conflict since its

inception.

When Iran launched its offensive a t the border of northern

Iraq

in July 1983, the Turkish government issued a strong warning to Tehran that

no action should be taken that would be

contrary to Turkey's national

interests, and it expressed the hope that its position would

be well

understood by Iran.

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati responded by

stating that Turkey should not be concerned

about the destruction

of the

Kirkuk-Iskenderun oil pipeline, which is a significant source of income for

Turkey.

The Turks have taken

strong security measures to protect

the

pipeline inside their territory.

They also have been concerned over

Iranian

exploitation of dissident Iraqi Kurdish elements.

In May 1983, October 1 9 8 4 ,

and August 1 9 8 6 , Turkish military

forces launched raids against Kurdish

rebels inside Iraqi territory, apparently with

Iraqi acquiescence.

In

November 1 9 8 4 , Turkey announced agreement with Iran over the prevention

of

activities i n each other's territory that would endanger either's

security.

But, on Aug. 27, 1986, Turkish Foreign Minister Vahir Halefoglu reportedly

warned that any Iranian victory resulting in the overthrow of Saddam Husayn

would prompt Turkish seizure of the Mosul and Kirkuk regions i n northern Iraq

which produce a substantial proportion of

Iraqi oil.

H e stated Turkey's

security interests were such that i t could not tolerate a n Iranian satellite

regime as a neighbor that would manipulate the rebellious Kurds.

VI. Evolution of U.S.

Policy toward the Iran-Iraq Conflict.

Until the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Baghdad on Nov. 2 6 ,

Iraq had

1984, official U.S. relations with Iran and Iraq had been limited.

severed diplomatic

relations with

the United States during the

1967

Arab-Israeli war, but both countries had maintained interest sections i n each

other's capitals.

It i s unlikely that renewed official ties will increase

U.S.

leverage over Baghdad.

The United States broke relations with Iran in

April 1980 following the seizure of the American Embassy and its occupants in

Tehran the previous November.

Iran's intense anti-Americanism -- a central

factor in that country's internal political dynamics since its revolution i n

1979

precludes the likelihood of a reestablishment of U.S.Iranian ties so

long as the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) under Ayatollah

Khomeini retains

power.

--

Since mid-1983, U.S. official contacts with Baghdad have increased and led

credence to a n t i l t w toward Iraq in U.S. policy.

On May 2 1 , 1 9 8 4 , the State

main

Department specifically condemned wIranian intransigencew a s the

obstacle to a n end to the Iran-Iraq conflict.

And, on May

3 1 , President

Reagan in a n interview in London noted that Iraq had confined

its attacks

against shipping in the Gulf whereas Iran had attacked

ships belonging

to

neutral nations, and stated that "in time of w a r , the enemy's commerce and

trade is a fair target if you can hurt them economically.

S o , in that sense,

Iraq has not gone beyond bounds, as Iran has done."

Significantly, there continues to exist a n antipathy between Washington

and Tehran as a result of Iranian-inspired Shi'ite terrorist efforts against

U.S.

pers-wnnel and installations in the Middle East.

President Reagan on

July 8 , 1985, denounced Iran a s a terrorist country.

A National Security Council study of October 1983 reportedly had concluded

that U.S. interests would not be served if Iraq were to collapse.

At the

same time, it maintained that there was little the United States could do to

aid I-raq directly.

Iraq's primary needs, in order to sustain its ability to

continue the war, were economic assistance and improvement in the morale of

A s a result of the study, the

Administration

reportedly

its officer corps.

encouraged Gulf Arab states to increase financial support for Iraq and

conducted efforts aimed at limiting the flow of arms from third countries to

Iran.

Iraq was removed from the list of countries supporting international

terrorism in 1982, thereby facilitating sales of certain items of equipment

In December 1 9 8 2 , a sale of

some 6 0 civilian

formerly under restriction.

Hughes helicopters to Baghdad was reported.

Iraq has been granted

credit

guarantees to finance sales of U.S. farm products since December 1982.

Since the hostage cri'sis, Washington has placed

restrictions on trade

ane

between the United States and Iran, with the exception of food products

medical equipment.

Nevertheless, newsmedia reports indicate that trade has

increased, mainly on the basis of American firms trading through their

overseas affiliates with Iranian organizations. But, o n Jan. 23, 1 9 8 4 , the

State Department adaed Iran to the list of countries reportedly supporting

arms

acts of international terrorism. A substantial illegal traffic i n U.S.

reportedly has developed i n which American weapons and spare parts that have

been forwarded to Iran by a variety of routes.

Iraqi officials in 1983 have

claimed that Iran consistently has been receiving large quantities of U.S.

weaponry through non-official sources aond third countries, including South

Korea and Israel, without interference from Washington.

Iraqi Deputy Prime

Minister Ramadan stated in February 1984 that he welcomed indications of !*a

more positive attitude*! by the United States toward the matter.

T h e State

Department in March 1984 designated Ambassador-at-large Richard Fairbanks to

coordinate U.S. efforts i n limiting arms deliveries to Iran from Western

Europe, Israel and friendly Asian states.

Such efforts reportedly had been

partly successful in reducing the flow of spare parts and equipment.

U.S.

concern in August 1986 that Iran might gain the strategic initiative and

psychological advantage in the Conflict reportedly has heightened Americas

diplomatic efforts aimed at reducing international arms deliveries to Iran.

equipment

Within the United States, shipments of replacement parts for U.S.

destined for Iran from American firms have been seized.

Since 1 9 8 4 , more

than 70 persons have been arrested by U.S. authorities.

Following the Iranian attack on the Al-Faw Peninsula i n early 1 9 8 6 , a

State Department spokesman warned Iran that a n expansion of the conflict

interests,

elsewhere i n the Gulf regions would be a major threat t o U.S.

noting that Iran had openly been conducting a campaign to i n t ~ z i d a t emoderate

8 , 1 9 8 6 , that

Gulf Arab states.

Secretary of State Schultz stated on Aug.

the United States and the Soviet Union, i n prelirr,inary talks for the

forthcoming summit meeting, had begun discussing cooperative action toward

hastening the end of the Iran-Iraq conflict.

With the revelation in November 1986 of secret negotiations between

representatives of the Reagan Administration and the Iranian government,

controversy has arisen over specific and broader policy objectives underlying

the U.S initiative. On Nov. 1 3 , President Reagan acknowledged a n 18-month

effort to establish contacts with "moderatew elements in Iran with the

declared objectives of:

(1) restoring relations with a strategically

significant Gulf State;

(2) seeking a n honorable end to the Iran-Iraq

(4)

conflict; (3) eliminating state-sponsored terrorism in the region; and

securing the release of American hostages held in Lebanon by pro-Iranian

Shi'ite groups.

The initiative reflected a reappraisal of U.S. policy toward

Iran that began i n late 1984 but which received less than whole-hearted

support within the executive branch.

The subsequent covert arms sales to

Iran, in conjunction with Israel and private parties, by elements in the

National Security Council violated the official U.S. position of neutrality

in the Iran-Iraq war and contradicted U.S.

policy toward terrorism.

Many

observers contend that the initiative had damaged severely U.S.

credibility

among allies and friendly regional states.

(See Arms Shipments to Iran [ b y ]

Richard M. Preece.

[washington] (periodically updated).

CRS Issue Brief

87022.)