Coordination of Federal Efforts to Control Illicit Drug Traffic
Congressional research reportNov 23, 1983
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COORDINATION OF F E D E R A L E F F O R T S TO CONTROL ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFIC
ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB83168
AUTHOR:
Harry Hogan
Government Division
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM
DATE ORIGINATED
DATE UPDATED
CRS- 1
ISSUE DEFINITION
H o w best to coordinate the Federal government's multi-agency
efforts t o
c u r b illicit traffic i n dangerous drugs has o n c e again become a n i s s u e of
major interest to t h e Congress.
Critics of t h e current Administration's
anti-drug program contend that i t l a c k s a n overall strategy a n d . t h a t i t
suffers from t h e a b s e n c e of a central mechanism
f o r t h e formulation of
general policy a s well a s for the broad direction of operations.
A number o f
bills pending i n t h e 9 8 t h Congress a r e designed to remedy t h e perceived
deficiency, through t h e establishment of a n agency with
explicit authority
over the development a n d implementation of a l l Federal g o v e r n m e n t efforts to
control drug traffic.
Frequently described i n t h e press a s "drug c z a r "
proposals, these measures a r e opposed by t h e Reagan Administration
on the
grounds t h a t such a n agency i s unnecessary and would
be potentially
disruptive.
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS
I.
11.
111.
IV.
Immediate Background
Historical Perspective
Alternatives to a D r u g Czar
Summary Discussion
I. Immediate Background
On Jan. 1 4 , 1 9 8 3 , ?resident Reagan exercised a pocket veto o n a n o m n i b u s
crime c o n t r o l bill passed during the closing hours of t h e 9 7 t h Congress.
His
principal objection to t h e measure w a s that i t contained a provision f o r a
so-called "8rUg czar" office, to be known a s the " O f f i c e of t h e Director o f
National a n d International Drug Operations and Policy."
The agency, the
director a n d deputy director of which were to be subject to S e n a t e a p p r o v a l ,
would have been authorized to --(A) d e v e l o p , review, i m p l e m e n t , and enforce U.S.
Government policy with respect to illegal
clrugs;
(B) direct and coordinate a l l U.S. G o v e r n m e n t
efforts to halt the f l o w i n t o , and sale and
use of i l l e g a l drugs within the U.S.;
(C) develop i n concert with other Federal
entities concerned with drug control t h e
budgetary priorities and allocations of
those entities with respect to illegal
d r u g s ; and
(D) coordinate the collection and dissemination
of information necessary to implement U.S.
,!,<t?. r e g - e r t tc i l l $ c s l p - , ' y C . .
.- - - -4 -
---
- 7 ,
"
In connection with t h e drug czar p r o v i s i o n , the P r e s i d e n t ' s memorandum
disapprovai stated:
of
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IB83168
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T h e creation of another layer of bureaucracy
within the Executive Branch would produce friction,
disrupt effective law enforcement, and could threaten
the integrity of criminal investigations and
prosecutions -- the very opposite of w h a t i t s
proponents apparently intend.
--
He contended m o r e o v e r , that "although [ t h e provision's] a i m
with w h i c h
I
i s to promote coordination, this c a n be and i s being
am in full agreement
achieved through existing administrative structures."
--
T h e President's assertion that coordination i s being achieved under t h e
present system i s challenged i n a report recently i s s u e d by the G e n e r a l
Accounting Office.
(Federal D r u g Interdiction Efforts Need
Strong C e n t r a l
Oversight; GGD-83-52; J u n e 1 3 , 1983).
F o c u s i n g on drug i n t e r d i c t i o n , t h e G A O
found t h a t , although the l e v e l of cooperation among t h e principal a g e n c i e s
concerned has been increasing, the
fragmentation
of
authority
and
responsibility "has a certain amount of inefficiency a n d interagency c o n f l i c t
built in."
I n particular, t h e G A O points o u t , "congressional o v e r s i g h t a n d
executive branch resource allocation decisions relative to drug i n t e r d i c t i o n
a r e difficult under these circumstances." Accordingly, t h e agency recommended
that the President ---
-- direct the development of a m o r e definitive
Federal drug strategy that stipulates the
roles of t h e various agencies with drug
enforcement responsibilities and
-- make a clear delegation of responsibility
to o n e individual to oversee F e d e r a l drug
enforcement programs.
Historical Perspective
F o r close to 1 0 0 years the Federal government has been involved i n e f f o r t s
to c u r b the non-therapeutic u s e of dangerous drugs.
Beginning i n 1 8 8 7 , with
enactment of a l a w that f o r b a d e the importation of o p i u m i n t o t h e United
S t a t e s by subjects of the Emperor of C h i n a , a long s e r i e s o f s t a t u t e s hascreated a major F e d e r a l r o l e i n the regulation of drug c o m m e r c e and
in the
enforcemeiit cf restricticns designed to prevent the a b a s e of Crugs.
As a matter of course, the responsibility for administering and enforcing
Federal drug control laws h a s been divided.
S i n c e many
of t h e most
restricted drugs enter t h e country illegally from a b r o a d , the a g e n c i e s
charged with policing the national borders -- the Customs S e r v i c e , t h e C o a s t
Regulation
G u a r d , and the Border P a t r o l -- have a n i m p o r t a n t part t o - play.
of ~ h edomestic drug industry i s the province of bot9 the Drug E n f o r c e m e n i
Administration (DEA) and the Food and Drug A d m i n i s t r a ~ i o n ,whiie in a d d i t i o n
the DEA has authority for t h e investigation 0-f violations invoiving d a n g e r o u s
C!rugs and for iiaison with
foreign law enforcement o f f i c i a l s in matters
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Other a g e n c l e s wlth drug control responslbllitles are: t h e Federal Bureau
of Invest;gat~oii (FBI!; t h e Esreau c f Internaticnal Narcotics Xatterz ~n t h e
S t a t e Department; the FeSeral Av:ac:sr~
Agency; he Incernal Revenue
Service;
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IB83168
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for International Development; the Bureau of Alcohol, T o b a c c o a n d Firearms;
and the D e p a r t m e n t of Agriculture.
Additionally, there i s t h e necessary
participation of the Criminal Division of the Justice D e p a r t m e n t a n d of U.S.
Attorneys.
Especially during t h e past 1 5 y e a r s , t h e level of t h e F e d e r a l commitment
Spending f o r "law
t o Control of drug a b u s e has increased substantially.
i n FY
1 9 6 9 to
enforcement" related to this purpose r o s e from $37 million
approximately $1.05 billion in FY83.
T h e same years s a w the i n i t i a t i o n , o r
significant i n c r e a s e , of Federal programs to reduce t h e demand f o r drugs -through t r e a t m e n t , education and primary prevention.
Given t h e number of agencies chat have i n some way become involved i n drug
Control during recent y e a r s , and t h e inevitable conflicts generated in
consequence, i t would b e surprising if Calls for coordination had
n o t been
sounded previously.
I n d e e d , along with a number of other a p p r o a c h e s , the
in
a
structure
'loverlord" system itself has already been tried
established, i n 1 9 7 1 , by former P r e s i d e n t Richard Nixon.
--
In declaring a "War o n D r u g A b u s e v President Nixon w a s r e s p o n s i b l e for a
number of i n i t i a t i v e s to alleviate t h e problem that w a s a t t h e t i m e causing
such a high d e g r e e of public concern. Among them was t h e creation of t h e
S p e c i a l Action Office f o r Drug Abuse Prevention
(SAODAP)', h e a d e d by a
director which t h e press a t that time labelled " t h e drug czar." P l a c e d i n t h e
Executive O f f i c e of t h e P r e s i d e n t , t h e a g e n c y was authorized to supervise and
b e responsible for a l l Federal drug a b u s e programs
involving prevention,
education, t r e a t m e n t , training and research.
In initial discussions a t t h e W h i t e H o u s e , the Nixon drug c z a r plan had
envisioned t h e inclusion of l a w enforcement functions. within the s c o p e of t h e
-- by
office's concerns.
However, reportedly i t was argued with persuasion
t h e J u s t i c e Department and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous D r u g s -t h a t a director w h o would have t h e necessary
stature in both
the law
enforcement a n d the treatment-prevention communities could n o t be found.
It
w a s further a r g u e d , a l s o with effect, that of these t w o general a r e a s t h e
treatment-prevention s i d e was a t t h a t time i n greater need
o f central
direction.
In 1 9 7 2 , t h e year following P r e s i d e n t i a l establishment of t h e n e w a g e n c y ,
Congress provided a statutory base, f o r a 3-year period, through t h e D r u g
Abuse Office and Treatment Act.
T w o k e y congressional f i n d i n g s noted in the
Ieqislaticn w e r e a s folloks:
T h e effectiveness of efforts by S t a t e and local
governments and by the Federal G o v e r n m e n t to
c o n t r o l a n d treat drug a b u s e i n t h e United States
h a s been hampered by a lack of coordination a m o n g
;he S t a t e s , bet wee^ Sraces and l o c a l i t i e s , a n d
throughout the Federal establlsnment.
Contrcl of drug a S u s e requires t h e development of
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strategy that encompasses both effective l a w
enforcement against illegal drug traffic and
s rekabilitate victirr.~
.effeztive health ~ r ~ g r a r nto
of drug abuse.
IB83168
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~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - 1 1 / 2
Although finding substantial s u p p o r t for t h e addition of l a w enforceme-nt
efforts t o the coordinative jurisdiction of S A O D A P , a f a c t reflected i n t h e
above f i n d i n g s , Congress acceded t o the Administration v i e w t h a t the o f f i c e
should have n o effective power o v e r drug l a w enforcement agencies.
The
exclusion of such authority continued, during the years of
the a g e n c y ' s
operation, to draw criticism.
D e s p i t e the existence of S A O D A P , conflicts and the lack o f . a unified
2 y e a r s after
the
objective continued
i n evidence, and i n 1 9 7 3
coordinating agency had been created -- the National C o m m i s s i o n on Marihuana
and D r u g Abuse could still find that i n S A O D A P ' s designated
sphere o f
operation "the fragmentation of authority threatens to d e f e a t i t s attempt to
organize federal a n d s t a t e activities into a n integrated r e s p o n s e , u n d e r
Clear and understandable policy guidelines."
--
T h e National Commission on Marihuana and D r u g Abuse, established by a n a c t
been given t h e
of Congress and partially appointed by President Nixon, had
o n e o n the c o u n t r y ' s
task of
conducting t w o comprehensive s t u d i e s
marihuana problem a n d what to d o a b o u t it a n d t h e second o n t h e problem
of
drug a b u s e i n general a n d the appropriate n a t i o n a l response.
I n its detailed
report o n t h e general drug problem, the Commission described t h e development,
during t h e preceding f i v e years, o f a
"drug a b u s e i n d u s t r i a l complex" -marked by duplication of effort, uncertainty of direction ' a n d a lack of
interagency coordination.''
Above a l l , the Commission noted t h e emergence o f
a large Federal drug bureaucracy, "displaying the common propensity
of
bureaucratic infrastructures to turn short-term
programs i n t o never-ending
projects."
--
D e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t coordination and a unified policy w e r e still e l u d i n g
the government when t h e ~ a t i o n a lCommission w r o t e i t s r e p o r t , t h e panel g a v e
SAODAP c r e d i t for m a k i n g progress i n that direction.
However, the commission
reCCmmended a far m o r e radical approach to t h e coordination problem than a n y
proposed before or since: the creation of a s i n g l e agency with responsibility
fCr a l l primarily drug-related f u n c t i o n s , both f o r t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of policy
T h e recommendation envisioned t h a t t h e
and f o r a c t u a l day-to-day operations.
agency director would have sub-cabinet rank but would n e v e r t h e l e s s r e p o r t
directly t o the President.
Although supporting t h e concept of a s i n g l e drug control agency -- w i t h
the suggestion that i t b e called t h e Controlled Substances Administration
the National Commission acknowledged two alternatives:
--
(1) that the system in effect a t t h e t i m e might be
continued " i n the hope that SAODAP will more
effectively utilize i t s statutory authority
t o bring s o m e order o u t of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
chaos" o r
(2)
that SAODAP could be retained but given
specifically detailed program a u t h o r i t y a s
well a s t h e budgetary control i t already haC.
authorization
for SAODAF
explred
in
1975.
The
Ford
T h e 3-year
Admlnlstratlon took t h e posltlon t h a t the a g e n c y ' s duratlon
should n o t be
extended.
T h e emergency s ~ t u a t i o c that had
called
fcr tb.e extraoralnary
therefore tke
measure no lonaer e x l s t e d , the Adrnlnlstratlcn rnalntalned, a n 5
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to t h e National Institute o n D r u g Abuse, which had been 'established by t h e
same statute a s SAODAP.
General policy concerning a l l drug matters w e r e to
be developed by several Cabinet committees a s well a s by t h e Strategy Council
o n D r u g Abuse, a l s o created by the SAODAP law.
In spite of t h e Ford policy, SAODAP never entirely f a d e d away.
In 1 9 7 6 ,
Congress amended the SAODAP statute to establish a successor agency -- t h e
O f f i c e of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP)
o n a scaled-down b a s i s , t h e n e w office
being smaller in s i z e than SAODAP and lacking i t s powerful tool of budget
review.
--
P r e s i d e n t F o r d , w h o was defeated i n 1 9 7 6 i n his bid
f o r re-election,
declined to implement the ODAP amendment.
In March 1 9 7 7 , F o r d ' s successor -P r e s i d e n t Jimmy Carter
filled the vacant ODAP Director position with
Dr.
P e t e r Bourne. Dr. Bourne was confirmed by
the S e n a t e i n l a t e May a n d
installed in o f f i c e i n June. A month l a t e r , President Carter submitted a plan
for t h e reorganization of the Executive Office of t h e P r e s i d e n t , which
T h e plan
(Reorganization
included a provision f o r the a olition of ODAP.
P l a n No. 1 , 1977) w a s n o t disa proved by
Congress, and ODAP w e n t o u t of
e x i s t e n c e in early 1978.
In a l l the successor agency
to SAODAP w a s i n
operation for l i t t l e more than a half-year.
--
3
After ODAP's d e m i s e , however, Dr. Bourne became a presidential a s s i s t a n t
for international health and drug a b u s e a n d , a s s u c h , o v e r s a w t h e operations
of a drug policy unit within t h e Domestic Policy Staff.
After Dr.
Bourne's
r e s i g n a t i o n , in mid-1978, t h e unit was supervised by
t h e former Deputy
Director of 0DAP;Lee
Dogoloff.
T h e Reagan Administration
h a s continued
roughly t h e same a r r a n g e m e n t , and i n J u n e 1 9 8 2 the P r e s i d e n t issued a n
E x e c u t i v e order (No. 12368) officially designating t h e unit the " D r u g A b u s e
P o l i c y 0 f f i c e W , . a n d naming a director (Dr. Carlton Turner) to be
"primarily
r e s p o n s i b l e for a s s i s t i n g the President i n formulating policy .for, a n d i n
coordinating and overseeing, international a s well a s d o m e s t i c drug a b u s e
f u n c t i o n s by all Executive agencies."
Alternatives to a D r u g Czar
If w e a c c e p t t h e proposition t h a t t h e v a r i o u s F e d e r a l drug l a w enforcement
e f f o r t s , o r the d r u g a b u s e prevention and treatment e f f o r t s , .suffer from a
lack of coordinated policies and g o a l s , i s a super-agency
-- i.e., a druq
czar - - the only sclution? Certainly, otl-,er ways of approaching thls problem
have been conceived and tried during the past ten years.
F i r s t , the same legislation that established S A O D A P a l s o created a
Strategy Council, comprised of the department and agency heads w h o had
the
g r e a t e s t interest i n the drug problem, t h e SAODAP d i r e c t o r , a n d other
o f f i c i a l s "as t h e President may
deein appropriate."
T h e mandate o f t h e
C o u n c i l i s to d e v e l o p a
" c o m p r e h e n s i v e , coordinated long-term F e d e r a l
strategy for all drug abuse prevention
functions a n d a l l d r u g traffic
prevention f u n c t i o n s w of any agency of the Federal Government.' T h e strategy
i s to be reviewed and revised a t least o n c e a year.
It i s intended to cover
h ~ t hh r h ~ ey 2 ; i t ~ c
~?;ec5iy7es z r d c > e r a t i c ? z l
~ a t t e r s ;
Certainly
the c 2 s o
could be made that i n the policy-making a r e a , the Strategy Council could
perform much of t h e function of a drug czar.
T h e question i s , a f t e r a
strategy has Seen framed and p r o m u l g a t e d , who will
f o l l o w up?
T h o s e who
s u p p o r t rhe super-agency idea maintain that continual monitoring i s required
,. see ::;a= z s z r a z e g y i s impleRencsC.
,
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(1:cz~':
altkough
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CRS- 6
IE83168
UPDATE-11/23/83
requiring t h e establishment of the Council has never been r e p e a l e d , t h e o n e
Strategy prepared by the Reagan Administration,
for
1982,
involved
participation by government agencies o n l y , without t h e members of t h e public
specified by amendments enacted i n 1976).
The second alternative -- i n t h e law enforcement f i e l d -- i s e m b o d i e d , a t
least partially, by
the D r u g Enforcement Administration
(DEA) itself.
Established by Reorganization P l a n No. 2 of 1 9 7 3 , t h e agency was intended by
President Nixon to be t h e f i n a l answer t o those w h o were c h a r g i n g t h a t
enforcement w a s i n disarray due to inter-agency
rivalries a n d lack of
cooperation.
Absorbing the manpower of t h r e e separate o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a l o n g
with a l l C u s t o m s personnel who specialized i n drug l a w enforcement, D E A w a s
-- by embracing t h e majority of enforcement people within o n e
meant
in
the
"unified
command"
organizational
structure -- to provide a
"counteroffensive" against d r u g abuse.
D e s p i t e thls m o v e , which did n o t
involve t h e narcotics control efforts of t h e State D e p a r t m e n t o r t h e C o a s t
Guard, t h e rivalry problems have c o n t i n u e d , according
to many observers.
Cited most frequently a s the biggest t r o u b l e a r e a i s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between
DEA and Customs.
A l s o , until t h e recent shift within the J u s t i c e D e p a r t m e n t
(Jan. 2 1 , 1982) that g a v e the FBI concurrent jurisdiction with D E A o v e r drug
l a w enforcement, the former agency was i n a c t i v e in the f i e l d , t h u s providing
i t s a g e n t s with little incentive to share intelligence o r o t h e r w i s e cooperate
with their D E A brethren.
T h e third coordinating mechanism that .has been
tried -- by P r e s i d e n t s
The Ford
Nixon, F o r d , a n d Reagan -- i s t h e inter-agency committee.
Administration argued against the extension of SAODA? o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e
agency had achieved i t s purpose a s a n emergency measure and that t h e t i m e had
c o m e to return t o normal institutional s t r u c t u r e a n d procedure.
In a n s w e r t o
the contention that a continued White House-level a g e n c y w a s necessary
to
give t h e anti-drug effort t h e needed
" c l o u t , " Administration
defenders
poicted o u t t h a t if this l i n e were followed with r e s p e c t to every i m p o r t a n t
Federal u n d e r t a k i n g , there would be an overwhelming number of W h i t e H o u s e
agencies.
F u r t h e r m o r e , it w a s held that a more effective and a p p r o p r i a t e way
to a c h i e v e coordination was t h e o n e recommended by a special task f o r c e of
the P r e s i d e n t ' s Domestic Council in the f a l l of 1 9 7 5 a n d
subsequently taken
by P r e s i d e n t Ford: creation of a Cabinet C o m m i t t e e o n D r u g Abuse P r e v e n t i o n
T h e members of t h e latter
and a Cabinet C o m m i t t e e o n D r u g L a w Enforcement.
were the Attorney General a n d the Secretaries of t h e Treasury a n d of
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , with t h e D E A Administrator a c t i n g a s Executive Director.
The
t w o committees were modeled
on the C a b i n e t C o m m i t t e e for International
,,,=its C a n t r o l , created by fsrmer
P r e s i d e n t N i p.,,.,
nwhich
the D o n e s t i c
1;aY-n
Council g r o u p evaluated a s having been " q u i t e successful."
Growing o u t of t h e two cabinet committees created by P r e s i d e n t F o r d was
the so-called "Principals Group," comprised of the c h i e f s of t h e operating
a g e n c i e s having the greatest responsibility f o r drug a b u s e control.
The
g r o u p was a t o n e time given high marks f o r resolving confl-icts a n d promoting
(An expanded version
c o o p e r a t i o n , especially among the enforcement agencies.
of the P r i n c i p a l s G r o u p i s still f u n c t i o n i n g , under
~ n e designation
"White
A separste e n t i t y , t h e
House Oversight Working G r o u p I t tmeeting o n c e a month.
law enforcemenk
"Working G r o u p on Dru@ Supply Reduction" i s concern,e",ith
-
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'/
F i n a l l y , :he Reagan Administratior. has established i t s own versions of the
the
cabinet cornnittee:
t h e Cabinet Ccuncil o n Legal P o l i c y , chaired by
Attorney G e n e r a l , and - - in connection with
tPe P r e s i d e n t ' s n e w anti-eruq
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a l s o chaired by t h e Attorney General.
IV. Summary Discussion
T h e argument over t h e drug czar proposals reflects a disagreement over t h e
Value and appropriateness of various k i n d s of government mechanisms.
Neither
side denies t h e need for coordination, both
in policy-making
and i n
operations, although there i s disagreement over t h e degree t o which i t h a s
been achieved by t h e Reagan Administration under t h e present system.
Essentially, t h e opponents of t h e czar concept see i t as' h o s t i l e to t h e
cabinet system of
government.
That
system
allots
authority
and
responsibility
to
various
departments
along
reasonably
coherent
jurisdictional l i n e s , they a r g u e , a n d when a r e a s of responsibility overlap
a s frequently happens
the a p p r o p r i a t e mechanism for a c h i e v i n g coordination
A special " o v e r l o r d w a g e n c y of a n y k i n d
i s o n e o f a n inter-cabinet nature.
depreciates t h e s y s t e m , opponents say.
--
--
On t h e other s i d e , proponents have
been
dissatisfied
with
the
inter-cabinet and inter-agency structures tried i n the past.
W h i l e many
of
them may a g r e e that t h e czar solution d o e s v i o l a t e the l o g i c ' o f t h e c a b i n e t
system, they make the case that t h e drug problem
i s special -- that t h e
dimensions of t h e threat and t h e necessary complexity of t h e government's
response demand a departure from "business a s usual."
T h e y hold that only a n
entity with direct a c c e s s to the P r e s i d e n t -- and o n e w i t h ' budget r e v i e w
authority a s w e l l a s t h e power to influence a c t u a l agency o p e r a t i o n s -- c a n
SUCCeSSfUlly overcome the inherent impediments t o c o o r d i n a t i o n of e f f o r t
a m o n g F e d e r a l agencies.
To what extent d o e s past experience offer guidance for judging
positions?
the
above
Although a p p r a i s a l s made both by Members of Congress and e x e c u t i v e branch
officials a r e a v a i l a b l e , it i s difficult to f o r m a clear i d e a o f the r e s u l t s
of the various a p p r o a c h e s taken.
I n o n e of t h e f e w outsider assessments
of
examined t h e agency f r o m
S A O D A P , a political scientist -- writing i n 1981
t h e a s p e c t of t h e l i g h t i t shed o n styles of P r e s i d e n t i a l management.
While
noting certain early successes, G. Larry Mays pointed to a n e v e n t u a l f a i l u r e
in meeting original expectations (The Special Action Office f o r Drug A b u s e
International
Prevention: Drug Coctrol During the Kixon Administratiori.
T h e reason he cited was a n
J o u r n a l o f Public Administration, v. 3 , 1981).
apparent l o s s of confidence in the agency's d i r e c t o r , Dr.
J e r o m e J a f f e , by
influential presidential aides and t h u s , p r e s u m a b l y , a l s o by t h e President.
--
Crediting P r e s i d e n t Nixon wlth a genulne i n t e r e s t i n the d r u g problem,
Mays noted that Dr. J a f f e r s contact man in the Nlxon Whit-e H o u s e was E g i l
("BuB") K r o g h , a trusted h ~ g n - l e v e l a l d e who could guarafltee t h a t the S A O C A P
dlrector wouid have ready access to he P r e s ~ d e n t . E o w e v e r , Mays
stated,
"after J a f f e e waivered on the matter of replacrng ~ r .[ ~ e r t r a m ]Brown of t h e
National Institute of Mental H e a l t h , Krogh w a s n o longer his c o n t a c t and h e
T . -" C .
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the
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T h l s , Nays concluded, marked "an end to Jaffe's e f f e c t i v e contact
wlth the President and consequently a loss of
influence."
Under
the n e x t
C l r e c t ~ r ,2 o S e r t D u P o r t , the agency was moved physically out of the Executive
O f f ~ C eof = h e Presldent ( E O P ) and located ln R o c k v l l l e , M a r y l a n d , and h-as
"cq=r--7
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process of P r e s i d e n t i a l decision-making.
Professional employees of t h e a g e n c i e s directly responsible for dealing
with t h e drug problem offer varying informal evaluations of SAODAP.
While
many appear to welcome any move that highlights t h e d r u g problem
and that
projects t h e i m a g e o f a higher level of p r i o r i t y , others express t h e d o u b t
t h a t a n y f o r m a l e n t i t y , such a s SAODAP or t h e proposed drug czar o f f i c e , c a n
accomplish what i s intended. According to t h e l a t t e r , t o t h e e x t e n t that
all
of
the
there indeed r e m a i n coordination difficulties -- a f t e r
what i s needed i s not a n e w
consolidating moves of t h e past 1 0 years
overlord office but rather (1) a definite. and
sustained interest i n the
problem o n the part of the President and (2) one high-level P r e s i d e n t i a l a i d e
whc h a s access to t h e P r e s i d e n t , to monitor the o p e r a t i n g ' a g e n c i e s a n d to
bring important conflicts to the President's attention.
One
veteran
enforcement official has commented p r i v a t e i y , "We've already had a d r u g c z a r ,
t h e only kind t h a t w o r k s , and that was Bud KrOgh." (See above.)
--
U l t i m a t e l y , in trying to answer t h e question " D o we need a drug czar?",
t h e Congress i s f a c e d with a
series of additional q u e s t i O n ~ , of both a
theoretical and a pragmatic nature. Is t h e general principle sound? D o e s the
c o n c e p t of a super-agency, which would coordinate and direct a g r o u p o f
operating a g e n c i e s having some common f u n c t i o n , d o violence t o . t h e l o g i c of
Executive Branch departmental structure? Is that structure sacrosanct, o r
d o e s t h e growth of t h e White House Staff a n d the EOP i n d i c a t e that i n many
r e s p e c t s it h a s already been found wanting? T o solve a coordination problem
in a n y a r e a , i s t h e r e a better and more a p p r o p r i a t e a l t e r n a t i v e to Creation
of a
super-agency, such a s the c a b i n e t - c o m m i t t e e o r
other
similar
inter-agency mechanism? Alternatively, have such arrangements been
fruitful
i n the past? Assuming that there a r e indeed exceptional problems t h a t warrant
creation of a super-agency, i s drug a b u s e o n e of them?
Are the present
organizations and arrangements -- the Reagan Administration's Cabinet C o u n c i l
on L e g a l P o l i c y , t h e Organized Crime D r u g Enforcement Task F o r c e P r o g r a m , the
border interdiction task f o r c e program
under t h e direction of t h e Vice
P r e s i d e n t , the D r u g Abuse Policy Office i n t h e E O P , a n d t h e general lead
or
taken by the Attorney General i n the drug enforcement field -- working
not?
Have they been given enough time to demonstrate their potential?
Can
a n y office such a s o n e of those now proposed be successful if the P r e s i d e n t
i n office i s not i n sympathy with the idea? On t h e other h a n d , i s i t n o t t h e
responsibility of Congress t o c r e a t e effective government institutions t h a t
w i l l survive the preferences and style of a particular administration?
'
LEGISLATION
H.R.
3326 (Shaw)
Establishes t h e lCOffice o f t h e Dlrector of Natlonal a n d International D r u g
O p e r a t i o n s and P o l i c y " to ensure (1) t h e development of a natlonal pollcy
b;;tn r e s ~ e c cz o illegal d r k g s , ( ) = h e d ~ r e c t l o n and
coordlriac~on of a -_ -F e d e r a l agencres lnvolved rn the effort to lmpiemenr. such a p o l l c y , a n d
(31
t h a t a single hlgh-level o f f r c l a l , "accountable to t h e Congress a n d
the
American people," will be chargee wzth the responsi5lllty of coordlnatlng the
<
. - - - -- ?- -- a-c-*-.r n h f I _ I m I C _ e c C L T ~ C - -- --- - - - - ,
-' " T ? - " C , 3 T S Y 1 ^ " - -.- respect to the l l l e g a l arug problem.
S p e c l f l e s that there shall be both
a
Dlrector and a D e p u t y Dlrector -- the Dlrector to be appointed by
the
Presiier: from a m o n g the Vlce ?resslCer.t a n 2 the hea2s o f . the e x e c ~ t ~ v f
C e p a r t ~ e n t o of t h e U . S . and the Deputy 32rector also to be appolzted
by
:fie
-'',.V,E s r n z = e . ?rocis-:_
15
r,zcf
3r€cSeE7.:
"LC
F-z";'
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- 7 7 ,
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IB83168
UPDATE-11/23/83
Specifically for the participation of t h e Office i n the development
budgetary priorities and allocations of t h e operative agencies.
H.R.
of
4 0 2 8 (Hughes, S a w y e r , Smith of Fla., a n 8 Gilman)
Reestablishes a n Office of Drug Abuse Policy
(ODAP). i n the Executive
Office of t h e President. Amends the D r u g Abuse P r e v e n t i o n , T r e a t m e n t , a n d
Rehabilitation Act to r e v i s e the authority (still contained i n t h e statute)
of ODAP, to provide for a Deputy Director for D r u g A b u s e Prevention and a
Deputy D i r e c t o r for D r u g Enforcement.
Sets forth authorities for the
Director of t h e o f f i c e , which
include . t h e establishment of policy and
priorities for a l l Federal drug abuse functions and t h e coordination and
oversight of such functions.
Stipulates that the Vice-president may
be
appoidted Director. Among specific powers provided i s r e v i e w of a l l a n n u a l
budgets of departments a n d a g e n c i e s engaged i n d r u g a b u s e functions.
Authorizes appropriations of $500,000 for F Y 8 4 f o r carrying o u t t h e act.
Requires t h e Director t o submit a written report t o C o n g r e s s annually o n t h e
activities conducted under the statute.
H.R. 3 6 6 4 introduced July 2 6 , 1 9 8 3 ;
referred jointly to t h e Committees o n t h e Judiciary and o n Energy a n d
Commerce. H.R. 4 0 2 8 , a clean bill i n l i e u . o f H.R. 3 6 6 4 , introduced Sept.
29;
referred to t h e Committees o n Judiciary a n d on Energy and Commerce.
Ordered
to be reported (amended) by the Judiciary Committee a n d referred to C o m m i t t e e
o n Energy a n d Commerce, Oct. 4.
S. 1 7 8 7 (Biden et al.)
National Narcotids A c t of 1983. Creates a n "Office of th'e Director of
and International Drug Operations and P o l i c y " , t o b e headed by a
Director a n d a Deputy D i r e c t o r who a r e appointed by
t h e P r e s i d e n t , by a n d
with the c o n s e n t of the Senate. Provides that the D i r e c t o r i s a u t h o r i z e d t o
(1) d e v e l o p , review, i m p l e m e n t , and enforce U.S.
G o v e r n m e n t policy
with
respect to illegal drugs; (2) direct and coordinate a l l U.S. ' G o v e r n m e n t
efforts to h a l t the f l o w i n t o , and sale and use of i l l e g a l d r u g s within
the
U.S.; (3) d e v e l o p , in c o n c e r t with
the appropriate governmental e n t i t i e s ,
budgetary priorities a n d allocations relating to c o n t r o l of illegal d r u g s ;
a n d (4) c o o r d i n a t e the collection and dissemination o f information necessary
to implement government policy with r e s p e c t to i l l e g a l drugs.
Authorizes
appropriations of $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 for F Y 8 4 for carrying o u t t h e act.
Introduced
4.
Aug. 4 , 1 9 8 3 ; referred to Judiciary.
R e p o r t e d , without a m e n d m e n t , Aug.
Written r e p o r t filed Oct. 2 5 (S.Rept; 98-278).
(Contents of bill a d d e d b y
floor a m e n d m e n t on Oct. 26, 1 9 8 3 , to H.R. 3 9 5 9 , a supplemental appropriation
b i l l that passed z!-~eS e n a t e 3ct. 27, 19E3.
A ~ ~ e c S m e n CroppeB
t
;n conference.)
pia+ ,,anal
;
HEARINGS
U.S.
Congress.
House.
Committee o n Interstate a n d
F o r e i g n Commerce.
Subcommittee o n Health and t h e
Environment.
Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse a r ~ d
k i c o h o l i s m P r e v e n t i o n , Treatment and R e h a b i i i L a ~ i o n
Act and the D r u g A b u s e Office a n d Treatment Act
authorizations. H e a r i n g , 9 6 t h C o n g r e s s , 1 s t s e s s i o n ,
. . Y.Q. ?C?7.
- , ‘ 0 ~ 0 . l ! ; ~ < $ i ".." - - -" . .
'T.C.
Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 254 p.
n
-
V
Z
Y
,
?-I
Washirrgton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975.
214 p.
----- Drug a b u s e office and treatment amendments of
1978. Hearing, 95th Congress, 2d session, on H.R. 11660.
Apr. 1 0 , 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1978. 220 p.
----- Subcommittee on Public Health and Environment.
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention.
Hearings, 9 2 d Congress, 1 s t sesssion, on H.R. 9 2 6 4 ,
and H.R. 9059. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1971. 4 v.
U.S.
Congress.
House.
Com'mittee on the Judiciary.
Subcommittee on Crime.
Merger of the F B I and the
DEA. Joint hearing before the Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee
97th Congress, 2d session.
on Crime
Mar. 29, 1982. Washington, G.P.O., 1983. 84 p.
...,
U.S.
.
Congress. House.
Select Committee on Narcotics
Abuse and Control. DEA/FBI reorganization.
Hearing, 9 7 t h Congress, 2d session. Mar. 3 0 , 1962.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.
3 8 p.
----Federal d r a g l a w enforcement coordination.
. .
H e a r i n g , 97th Congress, 2C session.' Kar. 23, 1982.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.
8 7 p.
3.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government
Operations.
Drug abuse prevention and control.
Joint hearings before the Subcommittee on Executive
Reorganization and Government Research and the
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations-..,
9 2 d Congress, 1st session, on S. 1 9 4 5 and S. 2097.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971.
6 0 0 p.
U.S.
Congress. Senate.
Committee on Government Operations.
Subcommittee o n Reorganization, Research, and
International Organizations. - Reorganization P l a n
No. 2 of 1973. Hearings, 93d Congress, 1st session.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Frict. 3ff., 1973-:974.
7 v.
U.S.
Congress.
Senate.
Committee on Human Resources.
Drug a b u s e office, prevention, and treatment
amendments of 1978.
Hearing, 95th Congress, 2d s e s s i o n ,
on S. 2916. Apr. 1 9 , 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Frlnt. Of:.,
264 p.
m-?.
U.S.
Congress. Senate. Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare.
Drug aSuse prevention and treatment
L ? " : ! 9 F L- :
.. , 1-75.
U P Z ~ ~ - ? C 0; 4 t ~C F ~ C ~ P C CL ,C ?
s ~ l ~ + i c r .
Mar. 24-25, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1975.
3 4 2 p.
m m
Federal narcotics enforcement; interim report.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 1 9 1 p.
(94th congress, 2d session. senate. ~ e p o r tno. 94-1039)
U.S.
Congress.
Senate.
Committee on Human Resources.
Drug Abuse [office] and Treatment Act -- 1972;
report together with minority views to accompany
S. 525. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979.
73 p.
(96th Congress, 1 s t session.
Senate.
Report no. 96-104)
U.S.
Congress.
Senate.
Committee on. Labor and P u b l i c
Welfare.
Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act
amendments of 1 9 7 5 ; report to accompany S. 1608.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 5 1 p.
(94th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 94-218)
----- D r u g Abuse Office, Control and Treatment Act of
1 9 7 1 ; report to accompany S. 2097.
Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 29 p.
U.S.
Congress.
Senate.
Committee on the Judiciary.
National Narcotics Act of 1983.
Report .... on S. 1787.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983. 6 3 p.
(98th Congress, 1st session. Senate.
Report no. 98-278)
U.S.
President 1965-1969 (Johnson).
Reorganization P l a n
No. 1 of 1 9 6 8 -- creating a n e w Bureau o f ' ~ ~ a r c o t i c s
and Dangerous Drugs. Message from the President of
the United States. Feb. 7 , 1968.
(90th Congress,
2d session. House Doc. 249).
E.S.
President, 1969-1974 (Nixon).
Reorganization Plan
No. 2 of 1 9 7 3 , establishing a Drug Enforcement
Administration.
Message from the President of t h e
United States. Mar. 2 3 , 1973.
(93rd Congress,
1 s t session.
House Doc. 93-69).
U.S.
President, 1977-1981 (Carter).
Reorganization P l a n
No. 1 of 1 9 7 7 , to reorganize the Executive Office
of t h e President.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1977.
(95th Congress, 1st session. H o u s e
Coc. 185).
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
11/15/83
-- T h e drug czar" and drug commission provisions
of the Senate-passed supplemental appropria.tions
biil were dropped by t h e Eouse-Senace conferecce
committee.
10/26/83
-- T h e Senate added the contents of S. 17B7, a
so-called
c z a r " - 2 1 1 , tc 5 . F . ? ? ? a ,
c - ~ n - l o - n n ~ = l
- - - - - - approprlatlons bill that was subsequently passed by
the Senate on Oct. 27. Also added was a proposal to
create a "Commlsslon on Drug 1nterdlct:cc
and
Enforcement.
09/15/83
-- T h e House Subcommittee o n Crime approved a clean
a bill to amend T i t l e I1 of the D r u g Abuse O f f i c e
and Treatment Act f o r the purpose of recreating
the Office of Drug Abuse Policy i n t h e Executive
O f f i c e of the President (EoP).
Deputy D i r e c t o r s
both f o r Drug Enforcement and f o r D r u g ~ b u s e
Prevention would be appointed under t h e bill's
provisions.
An amendment accepted i n subcommittee
mark-up would a l l o w the President t o name t h e
Vice President a s Director.
T h e bill was introduced
Sept. 2 9 a s H.R. 4027.
08/04/83
-- An altered version of the Administration o m n i b u s
crime control bill was reported by t h e Senate
Judiciary Committee (S. 1762).
A separate bill
to establish a "drug czar" office w a s a l s o
reported (S. 1787).
03/23/83
-- T h e W h i t e House announced the creation o f a n e w
drug interdiction g r o u p headed by Vice ?resident
Bush.
T h e National Narcotics Border Interdiction
System (NNBIS) was charged with coordinating the
work o f Federal a g e n c i e s that have responsibilities
f o r interdiction of sea-borne, air-borne and
a ~ r ~ s s - b ~ r dimportation
er
of narcotics and other
d a n g e r o u s drugs -- principally t h e Customs S e r v i c e ,
t h e C o a s t Guard ,"and t h e armed ' s'ervices. .
01/14/83
-- President Reagan withheld his a p p r o v a l of
H.R. 3963 (97th Congress), thus exercising a
pocket veto.
H e w a s especially critical of a
provision establishing a "drug c z a r w o f f i c e to
coordinate Federal drug l a w enforcement.
12/20/82
-- A scaled-down version of t h e Violent C r i m e a n d D r u g
Enforcement Improvement Act (H.R. 3 9 6 3 , 9 7 t h
Congress) was cleared for t h e Presid.ent. It
contained provisions for t h e creation of a so-called
"drug czar" o f f i c e t o coordinate F e d e r a l drug
l a w enforcement.
1C/li/E2
- - T 5 e Presieent a r ~ n o u n c e 8 a r,ajor n e w drive
a g a i n s t illicit drug trafficking.
Subsequently
designated the Organized Crime D r u g Enforcement
(OCDE) task f o r c e program, the i n i t i a t i v e
involved creation of 1 2 regional task f o r c e s
for t h e investigation and prosecution of major
trafficking cases.
It was anticipated to .require the hiring of 1 , 2 0 0 cew i n v e s t i g a t o r s
and prosecutors.
06/24/82
-- Ey Executive Order the President established the
nr..rr
p c l l " T- 7
- - 'he
?fflTE
,.=
- - p ^- '---" -' .
-.
P " 3 : c e
" C C - - c
J
Deve1opner.t (EOP) f o r the purpose of performing
the dutles specifled under Tltle I 1 of the D r u g
ASuse Cffzce and Treatrent Act.
Accordlnq to the
~ r d e r ,z h e 3:rectcr
of the Cfflce would be
,- ,... . c r ~ l : :r s s g c ~ s ~ r l:,-s-.. z S S 2 E ---..3
- - - -r.e
f,-,--
A
-
President i n formulating policy f o r , and in
coordinating a n d overseeing, international a s
w e l l a s domestic drug a b u s e functions by a l l
Executive agencies." Dr. Carlton T u r n e r , t h e
President's senior advisor o n drug abuse p o l i c y ,
w a s appointed Director.
01/29/82
-- T h e President announced creation of the C a b i n e t
C o u n c i l on Legal P o l i c y , to b e chaired by t h e
Attorney General.
T h e C o u n c i l w a s charged w i t h
t h e review of matters pertaining to
interdepartmental aspects of l a w enforcement
p o l i c y , with a n initial emphasis on n a r c o t i c s
enforcement and immigration and refugee policy.
Subsequently, t h e Council formed the Working
G r o u p for D r u g Supply R e d u c t i o n , under t h e
chairmanship of the Associate Attorney General.
01/28/82
-- P r e s i d e n t Reagan announced t h e establishment of
a special task f o r c e to combat illicit drug
traffic in S o u t h Florida.
Composed of o f f i c i a l s
from a number of Federal a g e n c i e s , to work with
S t a t e and l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , t h e task f o r c e w a s
placed under t h e direction of Vice President
Bush.
T h e Federal 'Bureau of Investigation w a s - g i v e n
concurrent jurisdiction, with t h e D r u g Enforcement
Administration, over the enforcement of da?gerous
d r u g laws.
Under the n e w a r r a n g e m e n t , t h e D E A i s
required to r e p o r t to the Attorney General through
t h e F B I Director.
01/21/82
A--
07/00/81
-- Dr. Carlton Turner was appointed a s P r e s i d e n t
R e a g a n ' s "senior advisor o n d r u g abuse policy.
03/00/78
-- T h e Office of D r u g Abuse P o l i c y
07/15/77
-- P r e s i d e n t Carter submitted Reorganization
(ODAP) w a s
terminated.
ODAP Director P e t e r Bourne w a s
designated a presidential a s s i s t a n t for
international health and d r u g a b u s e a n d ,
a s s u c h , supervised the operation of a u n i t
of the Dsrnestic Poiicy Staff charge3 with
formulation of policy on matters pertainig to
d r u g abuse.
T h i s arrangement was continued
under his s u c c e s s o r , L e e Dogoloff.
P l a n No. 1 of 1 9 7 7 to Congress.
T h e plan proposed
a reorganizaticn of the Z x e c u t i v e Office of t h e
P r e s i d e n t , o n e a s p e c t of which was abolition
of the Office o f D r u g Abuse Policy.
Strategies would be "revitalized."
04/27/76
-- A presidential "Drug Abuse Message to t h e
Congress" announced the creation of t h e Cabinet
Committee on Drug L a w Enforcement (CCDLE) and
the Cabinet Committee o n D r u g Abuse P r e v e n t i o n ,
Treatment and Rehabilitation (CCDAPTR).
Modeled
o n the Cabinet Committee o n International
Narcotics Control, established by P r e s i d e n t
Nixon (see below), the t w o committees w e r e
charged With t h e development and implementation
of overall Federal strategy and the strengthening
of interagency coordination.
03/19/76
-- Amendments to the Drug A b u s e Office a n d Treatment
Act became law. Among o t h e r t h i n g s , they provided
f o r the establishment of a successor a g e n c y to
S A O D A P , to be known a s t h e Office o'f D r u g Abuse
Policy (ODAP), on a scaled-down basis, t o b e
k n o w n a s t h e Office of D r u g Abuse Policy (ODAP).
S u b s e q u e n t l y , President Ford declined to implement
the legislation and proposed a rescission of
appropriations for t h e proposed agency.
00/00/76
. .
06/30/75
-- T h e House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse
and Control was established, for the purpose
of studying and reviewing, fr.0m.a unified
perspective, the problem of narcotics a b u s e
and i t s control. T h e initial panel included
members from a l l standing committees with
jurisdiction over significant a s p e c t s of drug
a b u s e control.
-- T h e Special Action Office f o r Drug Abuse
Prevention statutory authorization expired.
The
Ford Administration declined to s u p p o r t extension.
00/00/73
-- T h e Alcohol, D r u g Abuse, and Mental Health
Administration (ADAMHA) w a s established i n t h e
Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare -- comprised of three institutes of equal
status: the National Institute of Menzal HealtF.,
t h e National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism, and the National Institute o n Drug
Abuse.
T h e n e w agency w a s subsequently authorized
by statute (Title I1 of P.L. 93-282).
00/00/73
- - T h e D r u g Enforcement Administration w a s established
by R e o r g a n i z a t ~ o n Flan Kc. 2 of 1973. T o create
the new Justice Department a g e n c y , t h e Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous D r u g s was combiged with'
t h e Office f o r Drug Abuse L a w E n f o r c e m e n t , the
~
. - c_ -. - 7
- ;--. c-~ y'tif"~:
~
?12y",-+F?c
- .. - " l L i " C " ." .C. - - , 2- .-. .6- - .-C u s ~ o m sService perscncel principally involved
in drug law enforcement.
'n-
2 - -
those (1) providing statutory backing for t h e
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse P r e v e n t i o n ,
with specific authorities and appropriation
authorizations for three fiscal y e a r s , a t t h e end
of which the agency w a s to be t e r m i n a t e d , , ( 2 )
establishing a Strategy Council, to be appointed
by t h e President, f o r formulation a n d continual
revision of a "comprehensive, coordinated
long-term Federal strategy for a l l drug a b u s e
prevention functions and a l l drug traffic
prevention functions c o n d u c t e d , s p o n s o r e d , o r
supported by any department or a g e n c y of t h e
Federal Government. I'
(3) further expansion of
Federal treatment and prevention g r a n t programs,
including initiation of a program of f o r m u l a
g r a n t s to the S t a t e s , and ( 4 ) establishment of a
National Institute o n D r u g Abuse, within the
National Institute of Mental H e a l t h , to a d m i n i s t e r
a l l programs and authorities of t h e Secretary
of H e a l t h , Education, and Welfare with respect
to d r u g abuse prevention functions.
06/00/71
-- President Richard Nixon appointed Dr. Jerome
.
J a f f e , a psychiatrist, a s a special consultant
to t h e President for narcotics and dangerous
drugs a n d i n a Message to Congress announced
the establishment of t h e Special Action Office
for D r u g Abuse P r e v e n t i o n , located within t h e
Executive Office of t h e President,, to
coordinate and broadly Cirect all F e d e r a l
drug-abuse programs concerned with prevention,
e d u c a t i o n , treatment, rehabilitation, training
and research.
10/15/68
-- T h e President signed P.L.
00/00/68
-- Under Reorganization P l a n No. 1 of 1 9 6 8 , the
90-574, which contained
amendments to the Community Mental Health C e n t e r s
Act establishing the f i r s t program of Federal
grants specifically f o r funding t h e treatment
of narcotic addiction.
.-
E,,
,Leac of Karcstics (Treasury) and t h e S a r e a c
of D r u g Abuse Control (FDA) were combined i n t o
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
i n t h e J u s t i c e Department.
11/00/63
-- T h e President's Advisory Commission o n Narcotic
and D r u g Abuse ("Prettyman C o m m i s s i o n w ) issued
i t s i i n a i repsrt.
A r . 0 ~ 5 recommendations h-as
one that tne Fresident appoint a S p e c i a l
Assistant for Narcotic a n d Drug A b u s e , from t h e
White House s t a f f , to provide continuous a d v i c e
-... 2 - 4
-
2 " i E - = " " -P -
.
-
4 "
3 " , " " h ' " "
.. - -.
. - .. =
attack on drug abuse.
-' - - . - - - r 3 :.e 5
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ADDITIONAL R E F E R E N C E SOURCES
B r o w n , Lawrence S., Jr.
Who's o n first? Anatomy of t h e
Federal response to drug abuse.
J o u r n a l of t h e
National Medical Association, v. 7 3 , no. 2 , 1981:
145-159.
Mays, G. Larry.
T h e Special Action Office f o r D r u g Abuse
Prevention:
drug control during the Nixon Administration.
International journal of public administration, v. 3 ,
1981:
355-372.
U.S.
Comptroller General. Federal drug enforcement:
strong guidance needed (Departments o f J u s t i c e
and t'he Treasury).
[ w a s h i n g t o n ] 1975. (GGD-76-32)
9 1 p.
U.S.
Comptroller General.
F e d e r a l drug interdiction
efforts need strong central oversight.
Report
t o the Congress.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., J u n e 1 3 , 1983.
1 3 6 p. (GAO/GGD-83-52).
U.S.
Domestic Council D r u g Abuse Task Force.
White
A report to t h e President.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975.
1 1 6 p.
. p.aper on d r u g abuse.
U.S.
D r u g Abuse Policy Office.
Federal strategy f o r
prevention o f drug a b u s e a n d drug t r a f f i c k i n g ,
1982.
P r e p a r e d for t h e President pursuant to
the D r u g Abuse Office and Treatment Act of
1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
[ 1 9 8 2 ] 7 5 p.
U.S.
Strategy Council o n D r u g Abuse.
F e d e r a l strategy
for drug a b u s e 'and drug traffic prevention.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1 9 7 3 Published irregularly.
.,L . S .
U.S.
h'aticna; Commission cn Karihuana a n 6 D r u g Abuse.
Drug use i n America:
problem in perspective.
Second report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
481 p.
Off., 1973.
Office of D r u g Abuse Policy. Supply control:
drug l a w enforcement; a n intergency review.
~ W a s k i n g t o n j 1977. 6 1 F. plus appenbices.
----- Border management and interdiction:
interagency review.
an
[ W a s h i n g t o n ] 1977.
5 9 p. plus
? ?- ?- ? ? 5 : ? 9 : .
U.S.
P r e s i d e n t ' s Advisory Commission on Narcotic and
3rug Abcse.
Final report. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. O f f . , 1963. 123 p.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.