El Salvador: Policy Issues for the 98th Congress

EL SALVADOR:

POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 98TH CONGRESS

ISSUE

BRIEF NUKBER IB83051

AUTHOR:

K. Larry Storrs

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

KAJOR ISSUES SYSTEX

DATE ORIGINATED 02/18/83

DATE UPDATED 12/05/63

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700

1205

CRS- 1

ISSUE DEFINITION

Since 1 9 8 1 President Reagan has requested increasing a m o u n t s of military

and economic a?d to assist two embattled

Salvadoran governments in

he

struggle a g a i n s t leftist guerrillas.

While Congress has generally

supported

rhe Administration's requests for economic a i d , it h a s regularly cut military

assistance t o El Salvador and has made t h e a i d contingent upon a

semi-annual

Presidential certification that human r i g h t s a r e improving in the country..

reprogramning of FY83

T h i s year President Reagan proposed a $ 6 C i ill ion

militaryaid

for the country and a l s o requested

$50 million

i n FY63

supplemental military assisrance for El Salvador.

For F Y 8 4 he requested

$86.3 million in military aid for the country.

(See chart a t end of paper

for details. )

Administration supporters stress the need to support t h e interim Magana

government in order to prevent the coming to power

f o a communist-style

government t h a t would pose a security threat to the region. C r i t i c s , fearing

that the United States might be drawn i n t o a Vietnam-type quagmire i n support

of a n unpopular regime, a r g u e that the United States should seek a political

solution to t h e conflict through negotiations without placing undue emphasis

upon military means.

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

The Background and Policy Analysis

organizes i n t h e following'manner:

section

of

this

issue

brief

is

Congressional Options

1. Terminate Military Aid to E l Salvador

2. Increase Pressure on the Salvadoran Government

by Tightening the Requirements of t h e Aid Conditions

3. Modify the Conditions to Require the Salvadoran

Government t o Negotiate with t h e RDR-FMLN

4. Strengthen t h e Congressional R o l e by Adding a

Legislative Veto t o the Conditions

5. Expand U.S. Aid and Support for the Salvadoran

Government

Congressional a c t i o n i n 1983

(U.S.

Economic and

Appended t o this issue brief a r e a t a b l e

Assistance t o El Salvador:

FY79-FY84) a n d a map of El Salvador.

Military

BACKGROUND

Congress i s n o w reassessing U.S.

policy

toward the current Salvadoran

government i n light of more than .two y e a r s of a c t i v e U.S.

s u p p o r t for

civilian-military juntas i n El Salvador a g a i n s t leftist guerrillas.

When junior military officers overthrew the government of General Carlos

Humberto R o m e r o i n October 1 9 7 9 and set u p a civilian-military

junta that

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UPDATE-12/05/83

promised fundamental r e f o r m s , the Carter A d ~ ~ i n i s t r a t i o welcomed

n

the change.

T h e Romero government was viewed a s a continuation

of the military-elite

alliance that had controlled Salvadoran politics

for more than 3 0 y e a r s ,

partly by repressing emerging opposition forces and partly

by manipulating

by a

the results cf the 1 9 7 2 ' and 1 9 7 7 elections to prevent a victory

coalition of parties dominated by Christian Democrats asserting a need

for

reforms.

in early 1 9 6 0 , followihg the collapse of the first junta, t h e military

made a pact with the Christian Democratic Party and

shortly thereafter t h e

resulting civilian-military junta launched extensive reforms, including a

land reform and a banking reform.

S y Karch of 1 9 8 0 , h o w e v e r , important

civilian elements, including the social democratic National Revolutionary

the Christian Democratic P a r t y , had

Kovement (Mh'R) and the left wing of

resigned from the g o v e r n m e ~ t ,charging that he junta was unable co control

h short time l a t e r , these

moderate l e f t groups

security f o r c e repression.

joined f o r c e s with the militant

l e f t "popular organizations" of workers,

peasants, a n d students to create the Democratic Revolutionary Front

(FDR).

The FDR then join.ed with the Farabundo Marti Rational Liberation Front (FMLN)

guerrillas i n the e f f o r t to topple the U.S.-supported junta h e a d e d , in l a t e

1 9 8 0 , by Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte.

The Carter Administration suspended aid to El Salvador in December 1 9 8 0 ,

fcllowing the murder of f o u r American nuns near San Salvador.

It resumed and

increased aid in mid-January

1 9 8 1 , when

the FMLN guerrillas launched a

S 0 - ~ a l l e 8 "final offensive" that seemed to threater: the collapse of t h e

Salvadoran government.

T h e Reagan Administration

subsequently increased

military and economic aid to the Duarte-led junta and

sent a b o u t 5 0 U.S.

military a d v i s e r s t o train the Salvadoran armed f o r c e s in counter-insurgency

methods.

While the guerrilla's heraldee "final Offensive"

f a i l e d , renewed

a t t a c k s . o n b r i d g e s , - . t h e electrical

s y s t e m , a.nd the. 1'1,lopango air base

demonstrated their continuing capability These successes prompted the Reagan

Admipistratior, to provi'de $55 million in emergency military

aid in early

1962.

'

By the summer of 1 9 8 1 , the FDR-FKLN, with support from Mexico and F r a n c e ,

called for a negotiated political settlement t o t h e conflict.

The Duarte

government rejected negotiations, a n d , instead, a t U.S.

u r g i n g , called cn

a l l duly constituted parties to participate in junta-held e l e c t i o n s in March

1 9 8 2 for a constituent assembly that would form a temporary g o v e r n m e n t , write

a new Constitution, and establish ground rules f o r f u t u r e elections.

sought to disrupt t h e

While leftwing groups refused to participate and

e l e c t i o n s , a massive turnout of nearly 1.5 million voters cast ballots on

March 2 8 , 1982.

I n these elections, a coalition of rightwing parties jointly

The

won 60% of t h e vote to insure control of the Constituent Asembly.

Christian D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y (PDC), running on a campaign of

continuation of

the junta's reforms, emerged a s the single largest party, with

over 40% of

the vote, but seemed likely to be excluded from a meaningful r o l e in t h e

provisional government.

After weeks of delicate discussions, the Constitutent Assembly elected

Alvaro Alfredo Magana, a political

centrist supported by

t h e Salvadoran

military, a s the interim President of the Government of National Unity which

included P D C participation.

Three vice presidents representing the major

political parties were a l s o elected.

After weeks of negotiations t h e parties represented in the

Government

of

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Natiorial Unity signed a basic program of action called the Pact of Apaneca in

August 1962. This called for the creation of three c ~ m m i s s i o n s :

(1) a

Political Commission to set the rcles for definitive national elections,

(2)

a Human Rights Commission to monitor human rights p e r f o r m a n c e , and

(3) a

P e a c e Comrr,ission to promote peace in the c o u n t r y , possibly throu.gh talks with

the Salvadoran guerrillas.

Simultaneously, the newly

elected Constitutent

Assembly was to complete action on a n e w constitution.

By the end of 1 9 8 3 the Magana-led government was receiving mixed

reviews.

T h e Political Commission, a f t e r announcing elections f o r December 1 9 8 3 , was

forced to postpone i t s plans when the Constituent Assembly

f e l l behind

schedule.

I n s t e a d , in late November

the government announced t h a t new

elections would be held in March 1984. With the establishment of the Human

Rights Commission in October 1 9 8 2 , the human rights conditions in the country

initially experienced some improvement.

Civilian d e a t h s attributed to

political violence declined significantly, while disappearances continued a t

a b o u t the same rate a s previous years. Toward the end of 1 9 8 3 , h o w e v e r ,

there Was a resurgence of right-wing death squad activity which was publicly

denounced by U.S. Ambassador Pickering i n a speech on Nov. 2 5 , 1983.

After

President Reagan pocket-vetoed a bill to extend the congressionally mandated

State

human rights conditions on aid to El Salvador on Nov. 3 0 , Secretary of

S h u l t z was quoted a s saying t h a t i t would h a v e been "very difficult" to make

the required certification i n January 1984.

In the first half of 1 9 8 3 the Salvadoran military appeared t o gain the

initiative i n the struggle with the guerrillas.

T h e n u m b e r of U.S.-trained

battalions increased and the Salvadoran Army launched the so-called National

Strategy Plan in San Vicente province.

Through a combination of military

mobility and civil action projects this was to expand government control in

guerrilla strongholds y h i l e t h e Peace Commission

sought to encourage the

guerrillas to participate in 'upcoming' elections.

while

peace' Commission

members met with guerrillas representatives o n several o c c c s i o n s , a t times

facilitated by Central American Envoy Richard Stone, t h e parties were

unable

to c o m e to terms. Guerrilla leaders insisted on the creation of a broad

coalition government prior to participation i n democratic elections, while

the P e a c e Commission was unwilling to discuss anything other than leftist

participation i n government-held elections.

B y ' t h e end of the y e a r , the

guerrillas had shown surprising resiliency, including a n ability

to conduct

significant o f f e n s i v e operations, and the Army was

said t o be unable to

maintain the initiative.

T h e Constitution Assembly continued t o m a k e progress o n completion of a

new constitution, but was unable to a g r e e o n several a r t i c l e s , particularly

those dealing with t h e agrarian reform.

While the Christian Democrats argued

that a Continuation of the reform with payment i n bonds was c r u c i a l to

undercut t h e guerrillas a p p e a l s , . m o r e conservative parties urged

that

expropriation be undertaken only on t h e basis of prior and

complete

Compensation.

T h e lack of consensus on t h i s i s s u e was o n e indication of the

lack of unity within the government that would be resolved only a f t e r the

1 9 8 4 elections.

Congressional Options

A variety of o p t i o n s i s available to Congress in i t s consideration of the

Administration's r e q u e s t for FY84 aid. All of the options, h o w e v e r , i n v o l v e

-'

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UPDATE-L2/05/E3

risks and ~ n one way or another r e q u ~ r e trade-offs among

widely acceFteC

, , options a r e grouped

lntc

C.S. o b ~ e c t ~ v e s .For he sake of C ~ s ~ u s s ~ o rtne

f l v e broaC categories.

Terminate Military Aid to El Salvador

During the 97th C o n g r e s s , a sizable number of

Members

supported

res0lUtions introdu.ced by Representative Studds and Senator Kennedy

to

prohibit military aid and a r m s sales to El Salvador.

They argued

that a

regime that had permitted

30,000 of i t s citizens to be

killed

in

indiSCriminate violence and that %as taken icadequate action in the highly

citizens did not deserve U.S.

publicized cases of the murders

of U.S.

support.

They argued that military aid has only increased the k i l l i n g anC

repression i n the country and has strengthened the role of the military

in

the society.

Believing that many cf the guerrillas' a r m s a r e c a p t u r e d , they

contended that a c u t in U.S. military aid may lead to a reduction i n the

violence in the country. Without open-ended support from the United

States,

:hey

a r g u e d , the Salvadoran government would be forced to deai more

realistically with some of the guerrilla's demands and to implement changes

i n order to prevent a guerrilla victory.

Those w h o now support the terminatior~ of military aid by the 98th Congress

argue that U.S. efforts to encourage reform have been

inadequate, precisely

because powerful Salvadoran elites are convinced the United States wili not

terminate assistanc-e.

Supporters of

this option

tend to f e e l that a

termination of U.S. aid would encourage negotiations betweeR

the government

and the guerrillas.

They foresee a resulting left-of-center

coalition

government t h a t would exclude the more extreme elements of the far l e f t and

the far right. They a r e inclined to believe chat the political a i m s cf the

'Democratic Revolutionary F r o n t , which inclu'des social d'emocrats, clissident

Christian D e m o c r a t s , and independents can successfully be moderated by a more

zccommodating U.S.

policy.

They reject arguments that the Harch

1982

elections demonstrated the weakness of the moderate l e f z since they feel that

the leftist parties had

legitimate reasons to doubt the safety

and

effectiveness of their participation.

Opponents of a terminatioc of U.S.

aid a r g u e that such a c t i o n would

undermine the legitimacy and the defense capability of the Salvadoran

government and lead to a victory by externally-supported Marxist

guerrillas,

many of whom a r e dedicated to totalitarian control of

society.

They cite

numerous historical e x a m p l e s , and especially the Cuban and Nicaraguan c a s e s ,

i n support of their contention that extreme leftists who a r e hostile to the

United States will wrest effective control f r o n more moderace elements if the

opposition movement came to power.

They a r g u e that a termination of American

assistance would undermine the growing authority of the central government

and lead to a significant increase in the l e v e l of violence in t h e country.

Without U.S. l e v e r a g e , they argue that those like President Magana and

Defense Minister Garcia who have supported t h e U.S.-sponsored

r e f o r m s might

be weakened to t h e point where they might be overthrown by

rightwing f o r c e s

i n the military determined to pursue a more aggressive anti-guerrilla

campaign.

If this were to h a p p e n , they feel that the long-range prospects

regime would be

for a guerrilla victory a g a i n s t a reactionary military

significantly increased.

Termination of U.S. aid to El Salvador would

also

have i n j u r i o u s efforts throughout Latin America and

especially

in Central

A m e r i c a , they a r g u e , because moderate leaders cf countries presently facing

Cuban-supported guerrilla insurgency would

have reason to

doubt

the

dependability of t h e United States support in time of need.

CRS- 5

Congress could terminate aid either by a country-specific

legislative

prohibition, or somewhat more gradually by denying any further Administration

funding r e q u e s ~ sfor El Salvador. Any

such termination might

lead to 2

c o n g r e s s i o n a l - e x e c u t i v e ~ c o n t a t i o n t a t i o n , a veto of military

aid l e g i s l a t i o n ,

an^ a major override battle requiring a vote of two-thirds of both Houses.

2. Increase P r e s s u r e on the Salvadoran Government by

Tightening t h e Requirements of the kid Conditions

Proponents of tightened conditions o n U.S. aid to El Salvador f e e l that i t

i s unrealistic to terminate aid to El S a l v a d o r , but a r g u e that stronger

accion must be taken hlith the Salvadoran government to avoid continuing U.S.

support for a government whose actions strengthen guerrilla insurgency.

This

could be accomplished by adding n e w conditions for U.S.

aid via t h e

certification requirement.

Central to t h i s position i s the assumption that

greater U.S. pressure would be successful in promoting

reforms and greater

respect for human rights without provoking a right wing c o u p or an outright

r e j e c ~ i o nof U.S. assistance.

Dissatisfied by what they regard a s a n overly

loose

interpretation

by

the

Reagan

Administration

of

the

congressionally-mandated aid conditions, advocates of this approach would

tighten the language of the conditions to require greater compliance with

internationally respected human rights standards.

Even

a

resulting

suspension o r reduction i n U.S. a i d , i n this v i e w , might serve to jolt t h e

Salvadoran government into taking serious actions to i m p r o v e human rights

conditions.

In the e n d , they a r g u e , this would strengthen the government a n C

g i v e it greater public support in the struggle with the guerrillas.

Opponents of this approach emphasize that the Salvadoran government h a s

made impressive progress under difficult circumstances.

They argGe that mare

demanding certification criteria might very well undermine t h e U.S.-supported

moderate elements i n the government a n d t h e military.

They point

out that

Ambassador Hinton's highly critical speech in October 1 9 8 2 provoked

outrage

from a number o f ' s e c t o r s and strengthened the v i e w that U.S.

aid

should b e

rejected s o long a s i t i s accompanied by

significant intervention in t h e

Country's affairs.

Convinced that the r a t e of progress i s about a s great a s

can be expected given t h e political complexity of the s i t u a t i o n , they a r e

f e a r f u l that the result of more rigorous certification criteria might be a

termination of military assistance to El Salvador, which they believe, would

polarize rather than strengthen moderation i n the country, thereby improving

the prospects of radical Marxist forces.

3. Modify the Conditions To Require the Salvadoran Government

to Negotiate with the FDR-FML,N

P r o p o n e n t s of a political solution a r e convinced

that El Salvador will

f a c e a n unending guerrilla conflict in which neither the government nor t h e

guerrillas a r e likely to be victorious unless negotiations a r e attempted.

They would impose a congressionally mandated requirement t h a t the Salvadoran

government accept the offer made by t h e FDR-FMLN i n October 1 9 8 2 to engage i n

unconditional t a l k s to resolve the conflict.

If successful, this approach

would strengthen t h e moderates in both camps and end t h e killing. Presumably

i t would r e s u l t i n a n interim

coalition government or i n some form of

internationally created and supervised interim government that would

create

the c o n d i t i o n s for f u t u r e elections f a i r and equitable by a l l parties.

P r o p o n e n t s of this approach a r g u e that nothing i s to be l o s t by talks between

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the twc parties.

If the ieftist opposition demands an end

to the k i l l i n g s

and other abuses by the security forces, or if =he moderaze and rightist

F a r t i e s insist upon the democratic process and conditions to guarantee

private property, accommodation to these demands will

only enhance the

Sroadly-baseC consensus'that i s necessary for long-term stability.

Opponents OF negotiations a r g u e that it would be a mistake

to negotiate

with violent Narxist-oriented groups that seek to gain a = the bargaining

tabie what they have been unable to win on t h e battlefield or in the March

1 9 8 2 elections.

They a r g u e that the Magana government i s winning -- or at

least holding i t s own i n the war against the guerrillas with limited U.S.

a s s i s t a n c e , but t h a t success i s dependent on resolure opposition to -- not

compromise with - - the guerrillas. They point to the Karch 1982 eleccions a n C

:h€ failure of the "final offensive" in 1 9 8 1 a s evidence c h a t the guerrilias

Co not have the support of the population.

T h e y fear that the Marxist groups

woulC emerge a s the dominant f o r c e in any governing g r o u p brought a b o u t

through n e g o t i a t i o n s , or would resume the war f r o m a strengthened position,

and point to Nicaragua under t h e Sandinistas a s an example of the inevitable

result. They a l s o a r g u e that American

insistence on negotiations would

constitute an extreme intervention i n Salvadoran affairs.

T h e chances for

successful negotiation a r e a l s o much slimmer i n their v i e w , than a r e the

chances of provoking a rightwing coup or even a wider backlash.

4. Strengthen the Congressional Role by Adding a Legislative

Veto to the Conditions

PrOpOnentS of this approach a r e convinced that the Congress should h a v e a n

o'sp3rtUnity tc review the President's certifications a s a way of i n s u r i n g

that t h e executive will take forceful a c t i o n to i n s i s t upon improved

hey

f e e l that the Reagan

pe-rformance by

t h e ~ a l v a d o r a n government.

Administration places such importance o n El Salvador that i t will ccntinue to

Certify Compliance with existing or more r i g o r o u s criteria regardless of

the

a c t u a l situation. T h e r e f o r e , they a r g u e , t h e Congress should have 3 0 d a y s ,

for example, to a p p r o v e or to disapprove t h e Presiaent's certification.

In

the event that t h e Congress disapproved t h e certification, the military

aid

and a r m s sales t o El Salvador would have t o cease. P r o p o n e n t s feel that the

aid conditions will only be taken seriously when both the Administration

and

the Salvadoran government realize that t h e certification i s s u b j e c t to

congressional veto.

*

'

Opponents a r g u e that a legislative

veto

would

involve

Congress

.unnecessarily in t h e day-to-day complexities of Salvadoran

politics.

They

point out that t h e initial proposal for congressionally required 'conditions

on aid to El Salvador contained a legislative veto provision, but that i t was

deleted in committee because of inadequate support and b e c a u s e of P r e s i d e n t

R e a g a n ' s threat to v e t o any legislation containing a legislative veto.

The

inclusion of a legislative veto would r a i s e problems of t h e constitutional

validity of such m e a s u r e s , especially after

the June 1 9 8 3 Supreme C o u r t

legislative veto t o be

decision in I N S vs. Chadha which held a one-house

UnCOnStitUtiOnal. M o r e o v e r , if Congress w i s h e s to terminate aid on g r o u n d s

related to the certification, opponents a r g u e , it has more

direct and

less

COnStitutiOnaliy Contentious means of doing s o by reducing or prohibiting aid

i n t h e foreign aid authorization bills.

-

-

Expand U.S.

Aid and Support for the Salvadoran Government

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UPDATE-12/05/83

Proponents of this view t a k e the position that the United States should do

that a r e facing a g r o ~ i n g

complex of Communist-inspired guerrilla insurgencies ti-,at threaten Central

America.

Maintaining that the Salvadoran government h a s the support of the

people, demonstrated in the recent e l e c t i o n , a g a i n s t externally-supplied

guerrillas, they would f a v o r a n increase in U.S.

aid and

support for the

Magana government to insure i t s survival and ultimate victory.

Some would

a l s o support elimination of the certification requirement on the grounds that

its conditions f o c u s unnecessary criticism upon the government and provide

propaganda ammunition for t h e guerrillas.

As a variation

on this t h e m e ,

Senator Helms has proposed that the U.S. government be required t o report o n

the hunan r i g h t s abuses by t h e guerrillas a s well a s by

the government i n

Crder to p r o v i d e a more balanced perspective on the situaticn.

everything within its ability to defend allies

Other proponents of a d d i ,lonal

c'

U.S. support would permit a n increase i n

the number of U..S. advisers i n El Salvador, and would be willing to have them

participate i n combat operations if that were necessary t o insure government

success.

Opponents of further U.S. military aid a r g u e that t h e current emphasis o n

economic a s s i s t a n c e i s more likely than increases i n military aid to promote

t h e k i n d s o,f reforms that will undermine support for t h e guerrillas.

Since

greater U.S. military involvement could both

strengthen the FMLN argument

that they a r e fighting against American

imperialism while undermining

domestic American support for U.S. p o l i c y , opponents would closely limit the

number of U.S. advisers and would continue to insist that these advisers

renain out of com.bat areas.

Opponents of a larger U.S.

military advisory

r o l e stress t h e Vietnam p r e c e d e n t , arguing that in that c a s e increased U.S.

advisers failed to halt 2 crumbling political-military s i t u a t i o n , discredited

a weak g o v e r n m e n t , and in the f a c e of imminent defeat of t h e government, led

to 'the f a t e f u l introduction of U.S.

gr'ound forces.

S o m e doubt t h a t , short

of heavy, d i r e c t U.S. combat i n t e r v e n t i o n , the Salvadoran insurgency can be

defeated by the inept current government.

Congressional Action in 1 9 8 3

On the $60 million reprogramming of FY83 military a i d

While the Senate Appropriations

Committee approved

the $60 million

reprogramming with conditions, subsequent action by

t h e Senate Foreign

Relations C o m m i t t e e and the House Appropriations C o m m i t t e e permitted

the

Administration to reprogram only $ 3 0 million of the requested amount.

T h e S e n a t e Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee o n Foreign Operations

reprogramming o n

approved o n Mar. 2 3 , 1983 by a vote of 7-2 the $ 6 0 million

the condition t h a t the number of U.S. advisers be limited to 55, that n e w

efforts be m a d e to improve t h e Salvadoran judicial s y s t e m , and that the

administration t a k e the initiative to bring about unconditional

discussions

between the Salvadoran government and i t s adversaries.

T h e S e n a t e Foreign Relations Committee, after

lengthy negotiations t o

arrive at a

consensus position, approved only

$30

million

of

the

While the letter to Secretary of State

reprogramming o n Mar. 24, 1983.

S h u l t z did n o t explicitly place conditions on t h e a i d , t h e Committee

expressed i t s belief that " t h e United States should u s e i t s good offices to

CRS- 2

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UFDhTE-12/03/63

encourage a n unconditional dialogue amonq all parties. to the conflict i n Ei

Salvador in the hope of achieving a political resolution," that U.S. nilitary

advisers should be limited ro 5 5 , that any rraining of t h e Salvadoran

military should be conducted i n the Ucited S t a t e s , and

that far-reaching

reforms of the Salvadoran judicial system were necessary for Continued ,U.S.

support.

T h e House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on F o r e i g n Operations

voted 7 to 5 on Apr. 2 6 , 1 9 6 3 , to a p p r o v e $ 3 0 million

of the proposed

$60

million reprogramming on the condition that the administration appoint a

special envoy to facilitate negotiations i n the Central. American region.

On tne request for $ 5 0 m l l l ~ o n in FY63 supplemental nllicary assistance

T h e Conference compromise on the FY83 Supplemenzal Appropriations

Bill

(H.R. 3069) Which was passed and became law (P.L. 98-63)'in l a t e , J u l y 1 9 8 3

split the difference between the House and Senate and provided $ 2 5 million in

military aid appropriations for El Salvador.

T h e S e n a t e , following t h e

recommendation of the Senate Appropriations C o m m i t t e e , had a p p r o v e d the f u l l

amount of $ 5 0 m i l l i o n , while the House bill, following action by the Foreign

Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee t o defer action

on military aid ro El Salvador, contained n o f u n d s for EL Salvador.

I f committee-recommended bills to authorize the supplemental military

aid

were to be p a s s e d , the available f u n 3 s would

be s t

,111

"

l e s s than the

appropriated amount mentioned above.

The House Foreign Affairs Comrr~ittee had

approved only $8.7 million of the requested amount ( H - R e p t . 9 8 - 1 9 2 on H.R.

$20 million

2992) while the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had approved

( ' S - ~ e p t .9 8 - 1 4 6 on S. 1347) with certain conditions.

Language i n P.'L.. 98-63

provides that funds for foreign assistance may not . b e oSligated until the

enactment of authorizinq legislation or until Sept. 1 5 , 1 9 8 3 , whichever comes

first.

On economic and military aid for F Y 6 4

While n o final action was taken by

either House on foreign

aid

authorizations for F Y 8 4 , the foreign a f f a i r s committees generally approved

the Administration's r e q u e s ~for developmental assistance and

for Economic

Support F u n d s for El Salvador, but approved less than the $86.3

miilion

in

military

aid which

t h e Administration requested for t h e country.

1n

a d d i t i o n , t h e committees attached even tighter conditions on t h e aid than

previously existed. T h e House Foreign Affairs

Committee i n i t s report

( H - R e p t . 9 8 - 1 9 2 on H.R. 2992) limited military aid to $05 m i l l i o n for F Y 8 4

and F Y 8 5 , of which $ 1 5 million could be used only for medical f a c i l i t i e s and

supplies. After limiting the number of U.S.

advisers to 5 5 a n d precluding

the P r e s i d e n t ' s use of special emergency powers aid to El S a l v a d o r , t h e

Committee-recommended conditions would permit the provision

of aid to El

Salvador only if t h e ' p r e s i d e n t r e p o r t e d , without congressional d i s a p p r o v a l ,

that Salvadoran Government was engaged in good faith in a d i a l o g u e without

preconditions with a l l major parties .to the c o n f l i c t , and was a c t i n g to carry

out i t s o w n program to improve conditions in the country.

98-146 o n

T h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n , R e l a t i o n s Committee in i t s report (S.Rept.

S. 1347) recommended a limit of $76.3 million in military aid t o El S a l v a d o r ,

CRS- 9

IBE305i

UPDATE-~~/O~/~~

$ 2 0 million of which i s to be usee solely for training Salvadoran troops in

t h e United Stares. The Committee limited t h e number of U.S. advisers i n El

exteneed

the present

requirement for

semi-annual

Salvador to 5 5 and

Certifications by the President on Salvadoran Government efforts to i m p r o v e

human rights conditions'in the country.

Lacking a foreign aid authorization m e a s u r e , assistance to El Salvador was

set by a n omnibus Continuing Resolution (F.L. 9 8 - 1 5 1 , H.J.Res. 413) which vas

passed by Congress o n Nov. 1 2 a n C signed by t h e President o n Nov.

1 4 , 1983.

T h i s measure provided that not more than $64.8 million i n military a s s i s t a n c e

may b e provided to El Salvador.

it further provided that not more than 70%

of military aid may be expended until Salvadoran authorities have brought the

accused to trial in xhe case of the U.S. n u n s murdered in December 1 9 6 0 , and

that noc more than 9 3 % of this aid may be expended uncil President certifies

that the Salvadoran government i s continuing t o make progress in implementing

t h e land reform progrart decreed in ):arch and April 1980.

T h e Congress a l s o passed a bill (H.R. 4042) to continue through F Y 8 4 the

that the

1 9 8 1 Conditions requiring the President to certify semi-annualiy

Salvadoran government was improving human

rights conditions

and

was

continuing major political and economic reforms. T h i s measure was killed by

a pocket veto on Nov. 3 0 , 1 9 8 3 , when President Reagan failed to sign t h e bill

i n the required time..

LEGISLATION

P.L. 98-63, H.R. 3'069

T h i s omnibus measure providing

supplemental appropriations for FY83

i n c l u d e s $25 million i n military aid for El S a l v a d o r , exactly half of t h e $ 5 0

million in supplementary f u n d s for .El Salvador which

the Administration

reqaested in Karch

1983.

Following t h e recommendation by

the F o r e i g n

Operations Subcommittee and the f u l l House Appropriations Committee to defer

a c t i o n o n the President's request for supplemental military aid t o Z 1

S a l v a d o r (H.Rept.' 98-207), the bill passed

by the House May

25, 1963,

contained n o f u n d s for El Salvador. T h e bill passed by t h e Senate J u n e 1 6 ,

1 9 8 3 , on t h e other hand, followed the recommendation of che

Senate

Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 98-148) in approving t h e f u l l request for

$50 million.

T h e compromise conference r e p o r t ( H - R e p t . 98-308),

filed July

2 0 , 1 9 8 3 , noted t h e conferees agreement " t h a t not more than $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 shall

be available for El Salvador."

Following t h e resolution of differences on

other i s s u e s , the House and Senate passed t h e bill July 2 9 , 1 9 8 3 , and

the

P r e s i d e n t signed the measure i n t o law July 3 0 , 1983.

P.L. 98-53, H.R. 1 2 7 1

Amends Section 728(e) of the ,International Security and D e v e l o p m e n t

Cooperation Act of 1 9 8 1 (the conditions on a i d to El Salvador which contain a

one-time requirement of demonstrated progress i n t h e cases of murdered

American citizens) to require that the fourth certification may be made only

if t h e President determines that since the third certification the Salvadoran

Government (1) has made good faith efforts to investigate and bring

to

justice all those responsible f o r the murders of the U.S.

nuns and

labor

a d v i s e r s in December 1 9 8 0 and J.anuary 1 9 8 1 ,

(2) has taken a l l reasonable

s t e p s to investigate the January 1 9 8 1 disappearance of

journalist J o h n

S u l l i v a n , and (3) has taken a l l reasonable steps to investigate the kil-ling

of Kichael Kline in October 1982. Congress attached

similar provisions

to

t h e 2nd and 3rd certifications.

With broad s u p p o r t , the measure was passed

i n t h e House 416-2 on J u n e 7 , 1 9 8 3 , and was passed in the S e n a t e on J u n e 2 9 ,

1983.

It became l a w with the President's signature on July 1 5 , 1983.

P.L. 95-151 (E.J.Res. 413)

This

omnibus

Continuing

Resoiution

Raking

further

continuing

appropriations f o r F Y 8 4 provides in part thac not more than $64.8 illio ion

in

military assistance may be provided to El Salvador.

It f u r t h e r provides that

aid

may

be

expended

until

Salvadoran

noc more than 70% of this military

authorities have brought the accused to trail in the c a s e of the U.S.

nuns

this aid

may

be

murdered in December 1 9 8 0 , and that not more than 90% of

expended until the President determines and

certifies

that

the

Salvadoran

government h a s continued to make documented prograss in implementing t h e land

reform program decreed in Garch and April 1980.

Introduced in the House Nov.

1 0 , both houses passed differing versions of = h e bill that

Cay.

Conference

report agreed to Nov. 1 2 ; signed into law (P.L. 96-151) Nov. 1 4 , 1983.

H.R. 4 0 4 2 (Barnes)

Continues i n effect the 1 9 8 1 certification requirements on human

rights

i n El Salvador u n t i l Congress enacts new legislation on t h e subject or

until

Sept. 3 0 , 1 9 8 4 , whichever occurs furst.

Called up

by

committee

discharge,

the bill passed t h e House Sept. 3 0 , and passed

the

Senate

Nov.

1 7 , 1983.

failed

to

President Reagan pocket-vetoed the measure 'Nov. 3 0 , 1 9 8 3 , wher, he

sign the bill within the required time.

X.R. 2 9 9 2 (Zablocki)

International Seccrity and Development Cooperation Act of 1983.

This is

a clean bill reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Kay 1 7 , 1983

( H - R e p t . 98-192) after :he Committee completed markup on Kay 1 2 , 1983.

With

regard to El

S a l v a d o r , it authorizes

$8.7

million

of

the

$ 5 0 million

requested i n the F Y 8 3 supplemental, and it authorizes $65 million in military

assistance (rather than the requested

amount

of

$86.3

million)

anC

$120

million i n Economic Support Funds for ~ ~ ' 8and

4

FY85.

After

limiting

the

number of U.S. ~ i l i t a r yadvisers to 5 5 , and precluding t h e President's use of

special

emergency

powers

to

provide

aid

to

El

Salvador,

the

Committee-recommended conditions would permit the provision

of

aid

to El

Salvador only if t h e Salvadoran Government i s engaged

in

good

faith

in a

dialogue without preconditions with all major parties to t h e c o n f l i c t , and i s

a c t i n g to carry o u t i t s own plans to improve conditions i n t h e country.

Half

of the F Y 8 4 aid and all of the F Y 8 5 aid would be contingent upon Presidential

progress reports d u e 6 and 1 1 months after the start of t h e fiscal year.

S. 1 3 4 7 (Percy)

International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1983.

This is

a clean bill reported by the Senate Foreign Relations C o m m i t t e e on

May - 2 3 ,

1 9 8 3 (S.Rept. 9 8 - 1 4 6 ) , after t h e Committee completed markup on Kay 1 2 , 1983.

With

regard

to El

Salvador, it authorizes

$76.3

million

i n military

assistance for E l Salvador for FY83. and

F Y 8 4 , which

has

the effect

of

authorizing $20 miliion of the requested $ 5 0 million

supplemental

i n FY83.

It places a l i m i t of 5 5 on the number of military a d v i s e r s in El

Salvador,

and i t provides that $ 2 0 million of the military assistance may be used

only

for training in the United States.

In , a d d i t i o n , the Committee

extended

the

present requirement for semi-annual certifications of compliance with certain

conditions i n El Salvador in order to continue providing

assistance

to

the

country.

It a l s o added requirements for reports on

government

efforts

to

improve the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary, and to eliminate

and control right-wing death s q u a d s , and

on

terrorist

activities

by

the

guerrillas.

T h e Senate Appropriations Committee reported o u t this o ~ i g i n a l bill

on

27,

i983,

with

provisions

that

essentially

approved

the

ad mini strati or,'^ request For $86.3 milliori i n military aid for

El

Salvador.

It provided in Section 5 3 1 , h o w e v e r , that 30% of all F Y 8 4 aid to ~ h e country

may not be expended unt,il Salvadoran authorities have brought

those accused

a

in the c a s e of the f o u r murdered American nuns to trial and have

obtained

verdict.

Sept.

HEARINGS

U.S.

Conqress.

House.

Commi.ttee on Appropriations.

Subcommittee on

Foreign a s s i s t a n c e and

Foreign Operarions and Related Agencies.

Bearings,

related programs appropriations for i963 -- ?art 1.

9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2nd session.

February and K a r c h , 1962.

Washington,

U.S. Govt. Princ. Off., 1982.

3 0 2 p.

Includes hearings on El Salvador emergency drawdown a n e

overview of the foreign aid a n e security assistance.

-----

Supplemental appropriations for 1982.

P a r t 2.

Hearings,

9 7 t h Congress, 2nd session.

M a y , 1982.

W a s h i n g t o n , U.S.

Govt. Print. Off., 1982.

3 3 9 p.

Includes hearings on El S a l v a d o r , Caribbean Basin I n i t i a t i v e ,

and Security Interests in Latin America.

U.S.

Congress.

House.

Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban

Affairs.

Subcommittee on International T r a d e , Investment and

Monetary Policy.

Oversight hearing on the International Konetary

Fund'loan to El Salvador.

H e a r i n g , 97th C o n g r e s s , 2nd session.

Aug. 1 2 , 1982.

Washington, U.S.. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.

serial No. 97-81. . 7 5 p.

3.S.

Congress.

House.

Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Subcommittee

on Inter-American Affairs.

Foreign assistance legislation for

fiscal year 1 9 6 3 (Part 6 o n security assistance proposals for

Latin America and the Caribbean).

Hearing, 97th C o n g r e s s , 2nd

session.

Apr. 2 1 , 1982.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,

1982. 1 3 2 p.

-----

Presidential certification on El Salvador (Volume I).

Hearings, 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2nd session.

Feb. 2 , 2 3 , 2 5 , a n d

Mar. 2 , 1982.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.

5 2 2 p.

-----

Presidential certification on El Salvador (Volume 11).

Hearings, 9 7 t h Congress, 2nd session on H.J.Res. 494. J u n e 2,

2 2 ; J u l y 2 9 ; Aug. 3 , 1 0 , and 1 7 , 1982.

Washington, U.S. Govt.

Print:Off.,

1982.

543 p.

U.S.

Congress.

Senate.

Committee o n Foreign Relations.

Caribbean Initiative.

H e a r i n g s , 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2nd session

on S. 2237. . M a r . 25 and 3 1 , 1982.

W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1982.

261 p.

-----

Certification concerning military aid to El Salvador.

Hearings, 9 7 t h Congress.

2nd session.

Feb. 8 and Mar. 1 1 , 1982.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.

265 p.

-----

Presidential certifications on conditions in El Salvador.

H e a r i n g , 97tP. C o n g r e s s , 2nd s e s s i o n .

hug. 3 , i962.

2 6 0 F.

-----

U.S. p o l l c y i n t h e W e s z e r n H e m i s p h e r e .

Hearings, 97th

C o n g r e s s , 2 n d s e s s i o n o n S.J.Res. 1 4 4 , S. 2 1 7 9 , S. 2 2 4 3 , S. 2 3 7 0

a n d S.J.Res. 156.

Apr. 1 , 2 0 , 2 7 , 2 8 ; a n d K a y 4 a n d 2 6 , 1 9 6 2 .

W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , 1 3 6 2 .

1 4 1 p.

U.S.

Congress.

Senace.

Committee on F o r e l g n R e l a t i o n s .

Subcommittee o n W e s t e r n Hemisphere A f f a l r s .

Central Amerlca.

H e a r ~ n g s , 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 1 s t a n d 2 n d sessions. D e c . 1 4 , a n d 1 5 ,

19S1; and Feb. 1 , 1982.

W a s h ~ n g t o n ,U.S. Govt. P r l n t . O f f . ,

1962.

141 p.

R Z P O O T S Ah'D

CONGPESSiOKAL DOCUMEKTS

U.S.

Congress.

Senate.

El Salvador:

the United States in the midst

of a maelstrorr - - a r e p o r t t o he C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s

and the Committee on Appropriations [by Senator Claiborne Pell

Joint Committee Print, 97th

a n d S e n a t o r P a t r i c k J. Leahy].

Congress, 2 n C session.

Karch 1982.

W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. G o v t .

P r i n t . Off., 1 9 6 2 .

2 3 p.

-----

R e p o r t o f t h e U.S. o f f i c i a l o b s e r v e r m i s s i o n t o t h e E l S a l v a d o r

C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y e i e c t i o n s of Kar. 2 8 , 1 9 6 2 -- a r e p o r t t o

t h e C o m m i t t e e o n F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s b y S e n a t o r N a n c y L. K a s s e b a u n .

C o m m i t t e e P r i n t , 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2nd s e s s i o n .

November 1982.

W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. Govt. P r i n t . Off., 1 9 8 2 .

4 2 p.

C E R O N O L O G Y OF E V E N T S

11/30/83

-- P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n p o c k e t v e t o e d a b i l l t o c o n t i n u e t h r o u g h

FY84 the certification requirement linking continued

U.S. m i l i t a r y a i d t o p r o g r e s s i n h u m a n r i g h t s p e r f o r m a n c e

in E l S a l v a d o r ' w h e n he failed t o sign the bill within t h e

required time limit.

1lj25/83

- - U.S.

11/18/83

-- T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s r e p o r t e d c l a i m s by l o c a l r e s i d e n t s t h a t

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, in a speech to the American

C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e i n S a n S a l v a d o r , a c c u s e d S a l v a d o r a n

a u t h o r i t i e s of f a i l i n g t o c r a c k d o w n on r i g h t - w i n g d e a t h

s q u a d s , even though individuals responsible f o r the killings

a r e " w e l l k n o w n w t o t h e s e c u r i t y forces.

Salvadoran Army troops rounded u p and killed more than 1 0 0

suspected leftist sympathizers, including women and

children, in three small towns i n northern E l Salvador.

11/13/63

- - U n d e r s e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e F r e d C.

11/12/83

-- T h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t i n . a p r e p a r e d s t a t e m e n t i n d i c a t e d t h a t

Ikle, just back from a

t r i p t o E l S a l v a d o r w h e r e h e r e p o r t e d l y e x p r e s s e d U.S.

concerns about rightwing death squads, was reported in the

W a s h i n g t o n P o s t t o b e u r g i n g i n c r e a s e d U.S. m i l i t a r y

assistance to revive the Salvadoran A r m y ' s struggle with

leftist guerrillas.

the student arrested for the murder of U.S. military adviser

Commander Albert A. Schaufelberger " w a s not involved i n the

crime" and that "his confession was obEaFned under duress."

11/09/63

- - Salvadoran authorities arrested three policemen and a small

landowner and charged them with kidnapping in a pattern

'similar to recent death squad activity.

11/05/83

- - T h e Washington P o s t reported that the Reagan Administration

hopes to set up a large military training center in eastern

E l Salvador where U.S. intructors will g i v e basic training

to 1 , 0 0 0 Salvadcran recruits each month.

10/2€?/63 -- J u d g e Bernando Rauda Murcia ordered f i v e National Guardsmen

to trial for the second time f o r the 1 9 8 0 murders of f o u r

American churchwomen following a reinvestigatior, ordered by

a Salvadoran appeals court.

10/05/63

-- T h e f i v e countries of Cenzral America, i n a

meeting organized by the Contadora g r o u p ,

agreed upon a declaration t h a t outlines i s s u e s

f o r f u t u r e negotiation.

10/03/63

- - T h e State Department condemned increase right-wing

v i o l e n c e , claiming that it undermines centrist

support necessary for democratic .development in

El Salvador.

09/33/83

- - T h e House Foreign Affairs Committee voted

unamimously to extend for o n e year conditions on

'military ,aid to El Salvador which expire a t the

end of fiscal y e a r 1983.

~ 9 / 2 9 / 6 3 -- Salvadoran government o f f i c i a l s met wi.th lefti'st

rebel leaders for the second time in talks.

After

the m e e t i n g , Francisco Q u i n o n e z , the head of t h e

government P e a c e Commission said that further

progress would not be made unless t h e l e f t changed

i t s position.

09/26/83

-- Salvadoran military bombing r u n s i n T e n a n c i n g o ,

21 miles northeast of San S a l v a d o r , killed 5 0

civilians and wounded 25 a f t e r rebels interfered

with th'e radio signals to confuse Air F o r c e Pilots.

Salvadoran Colonel Monterrosa publically regretted

the bombings.

09/24/83

-- T h e New York Times reported that Salvadoran

l e f t i s t s and diplomats have said that the r e b e l

movement h a s gained i n internal unity in t h e

l a s t f e w months.

They a t t r i b u t e this largely to

a n a g r e e m e n t by the Popular Liberation F o r c e s ,

t h e second-largest Salvadoran guerilla g r o u p ,

to submit itself to a centralized military command.

09/09/83

-- Associated P r e s s reporter Arthur Allen l e f t El

Salvador after t h e American embassy s a i d i t could n o

longer a s s u r e h i s safety.

T h e Chief of Intelligence

of the Treasury Police had earlier criticized two

of &.ller.Is articles ~ o ~ c e r n i nthe

g

Salvadoran Security

F o r c e ' s arrest of a suspect in the m u r d e r - o f Lt.

Commander Albert Shaufelberger.

03/C7/83

-- D e f e n s e Secretary Caspar Weinberger visiting the

Salvadorar. Front Lines said the army i s "making

very great progress," but that C o n g r e s s ' s reluctance

to authorize more aid could jeopardize further

progress.

09/05/83

- - R e f e r r ~ n g to che recent meetlng held between

government o f i i c ~ a l sa n t t h e ~ rg u e r ~ l i aopponects

R i c n a r C S t c n e , Specla1 Envoy to Central k m e r ~ c a ,

sald that the Salvadoran government w ~ l lnot accept

azy plan to snare power w ~ t hthe guerillas f l g h t ~ n g ~ t .

09/04/83

- - R e b e l f o r c e s attacked t h e third largest El Salvadoran

city of San Miguel with the strongest mortar barrage

they have y e t fired in the current conflict. T h e

attack w a s the g u e r i l l a s f first major show of f o r c e

since February.

C 9 / ~ 1 / 8 3 - - P e d r o D. Alvarado R i v e r a , a Popular Liberation F r o n t

(FPL) guerilla arrested on August 25, reportedly

claimed responsibility for the murder of U.S.

military a d v i s o r , Navy it. Commander Albert

Schaufelberger 1 1 1 , who w a s killed on Kay 25.

08/30/83

- - U.S.

Special Envoy to Central A m e r i c a , Richard S t o n e ,

met with 'the representatives of the Salvadoran

guerilla movement.

T a l k s were inconclusive; only

promises of further communications were made.

The

Washington Post reported that senior officials on

both sides s e e major barriers to a negotiated settlement.

a

08/29/83

-- In B o g o t a , Columbia, representatives of the

Salvadoran government's P e a c e Commission met with

l e f t wing opposition leaders for the f i r s t time i n

a t t e m p t s to negotiate a settlement of the three-year

old conflict.

06/24/63

- - T h e latest class of Salvadoran governmenr troops

trained by the United States military graduated from

F o r t Benning in Georgia.

08/23/83

-- Italian citizen Vittorio Andretto was killed b y

Salvadoran troops who said he was shot after t h e

pickup truck he was riding in ran through a military

checkpoint.

08/1S/E3

-- President Reagan announced that he will not i n c r e a s e

t h e number of U.S. rniiitary trainers i n El Salvador

beyond t h e presently existing limit of 5 5 .

This

decision came a f e w days after the Pentagon and t h e

State Department reversed their original requests

for a n increase cf a d v i s o r s to 125.

08/16/83

-- T h e El Salvador,an army and t h e Guatemalan government

have denied reports by the Kew Pork Times of August ;4.

"These reports said tnat the t w o countries had agreed

tnat members of El Salvador's 2 4 , 0 0 0 U.S.-backed

army w o u i d . r e c e i v e :raining from Guatemalan counter

insurgency experts a t bases in Guatemala'. In r e t u r n ,

- t h e reports s a i d , Guatemala would be providee with

l i g h t weapons and ammunition from El Sal.vador1s U.S.

supplied arsenal.

08/15/13

- - T h e amnesty program for political prisoners which began

Kay 4 came to a n e n d ; 1 , 1 1 6 people were granted amnesty

urider ~ t .

08/14/83

-- T h e Los Angeles T i m e s reported chat U.S.

08/11/83

- - T h e Washington P o s t reported that twice a s many

advisors in

El Salvador a r e increasingly involved in training

excersises which a r e potentially dangerous.

Salvadoran soldiers were killed i n combat this year

than were i n 1982. Also, t h e casualty count this

year totaled a b o u t one-fifth of E l Salvador's 3 3 , 0 0 0

man military.

08/06/83

-- As a demonstration of President R e a g a n ' s economic

support f o r El S a l v a d o r , Agriculture Secretary

John Block said the country will receive more than

$58 million in n e w U.S. food aid reported the

Washington Post.

For chronology of 1 9 8 2 e v e n t s , request " 1 9 8 2 Chronology" from archived

fssue

"El

Srief 80064. For chro.nology prior to 1 9 8 2 , request CRS Report entitled

Salvador -- From 1 9 3 1 to the March 1 9 8 2 Elections."

AGCITIOKAL .REFERENCE SOURCES

Araujo, Richard. Congress a n d aid to El Salvador.

Heritage F o u n d a r i o n , 1982.

1 4 p.

Washington,

Arnson, Cynthia.

El Salvador - - a revolution confronts the United

States. W a s h i n g t o n , Institute for Policy S t u d i e s , 1982. 1 2 2 p.

F i s h e r , Stewart W.

Human r i g h t s in El Salvador and U.S. foreign

1-38.

policy.

Human rights quarterly, v. 4, spring 1982:

El Salvador after t h e elections.

Gayner, Jeffrey B.

Heritage F o u n d a t i o n , 1982. 1 0 p.

Washington,

G e t t l e m a n , Marvin E., et. al. (eds.) El Salvador:

Central America

in t h e n e w cold war.

New Y o r k , Grove P r e s s , 1981.

3 9 7 p.

H o r t o n , Scott. T h e utility of Presidential certification of

compliance with United States human rights policy:

t h e c a s e of

El Salvador.

Wisconsin l a w r e v i e w , vol. 1 9 8 2 , no. 5:

825-861.

K r u g e r , Alexander.

El Salvador's Marxist revolution.

Heritage F o u n d a t i o n , Apr. 1 0 , 1981.

1 8 p.

Washington,

KcColm, Bruce R.

El Salvador - - peaceful revolution or armed struqgle?

Kew Y o r k , Freedom H o u s e , 1982.

4 7 p.

Montgomery, Tommie S'Ae. Zevolution ~ r .Ei Salvador -- origins and

e V o l ~ t i o n . a o u l d e r , Westview P r e s s , 1982.

255 p.

-

P r o s t e r m a n , Roy L.

The unmaking of a land reform.

V. 1 8 7 , Aug. 9 , 1982:

21-25.

New republic,

Report o n human rights in El Salvador -- a report t o the Board of

the Americac Clvil Liberties U n i o n , January 19E2.

Washing<on,

Center for National Security S t u d i e s , l9E2.

280 p .

Report on human rights i n El Salvador - - July 2 0 , 1 9 8 2 s u p p l e n e ~ t .

New York, Americas Watch Committee and T h e American Civii

Liberties Union, 1982.

270 p.

Congress and Zi Salvador.

In Congress and foreign

S t o r r s , K. Larry.

policy -- 1981.

Cornnittee P r i n t by Eouse Committee on Foreign

Affairs.

Washingtori, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982:

115-132.

-----

El Salvador - - from 1 3 3 1 to the Karch 1 9 8 2 elections: a

chronological scudy of politics, p a r t i e s , and conflicts.

CRS

R e p o r t , Kar. 2 3 , 1982.

8 2 p.

U.S.

Builc2ing the peace i n Central America [ a

Department of State.

speech by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs T h o m a s

0. Enders].

Washington, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy

no. 4 1 4 , ~ u g .2 0 , 1982.

4 p.

-----

Country reports on human rights practices for 1982.

In Joint

Committee P r i n t by House Committee on Foreign Affairs and S e n a t e

Committee on Foreign Relations.

9 8 t h Congress, 1 s t s e s s i o n ,

February.1983.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963:

490-506.

-----

Communist interference in El Salvador.

W a s h i n g t o n , Bureau of

Public A f f a i r s , Special report no. 8 0 , Feb. 2 3 , 1981.

8 p.

-----

Cuba's renewed support for violence in Latin America.

W a s h i n g t o n , Bureau of Public Affairs, Special r e p o r t no. 9 0 ,

Dec. 1 4 , 1981.

1 2 p.

-----

Report o n the situation in El Salvador with respect to the

subjects covered in s e c t i o n , 7 2 6 ( d ) of the International Security

and Development Cooperation Act of 1 9 8 1 (P.L. 97-113),

Jan. 2 1 , 1983.

W e b r e , Stephen.

J o s e Napoleon Duarte and the Christian Democratic

Party i n Salvadoran politics, 1960-1972.

Baton R o u g e , L o u i s i a n a

S t a t e University P r e s s , 1979.

233 p.

Base 500097 1-72

G U A

P A C I F I C

BOUNDARY REPAESSNTATION IS

NOT NLCESSARILY A U T H O l l T A T I V I

--

O C E A N

Nalional capital

Departamento &pita1

@

0

Departamento boundary

International boundary

88

A-

Road

Railroad

-

-.-

-

EL SALVADOR

FY80

11.4

64.2

5.9

21

149.5.

35.5 6 1

-- - --

44.9

69.1 5 1

-

FY81

128.0 81

192.1

163.0

115.0

.71.1

FY82

Total

105.0

59.9

Adm.

Request

76.0

268.1

226.2

1.0 91 82.0

61.3

75.0

--

-

81.0 1

1 35.0

40.0

71.1

Approved

(P.L. 97-257)

.

Adm

Request

191.2

26.3 101

105.0

59.9

140.0121

91.9 2 1

231.2

318.2

86.3 131

26.3

--

140.0

64.9

Regular FY83

Feb. 1983 Uar. 1983

Approved

Allocated Allocated

(P.L. 97-377) by M m .

by Adm.

50.0

50.0 141

281.8

120.0

75.5

'-

FY 84

Adm.

Requeet

FY83

Suppl.

Include. $5 million provided by President Carter and $20 million provided by President Reagan under the apecia1 emergency drawdown authority of Section

506 of the Foreign Aamimtance Act that doer not require approval of Congress.

Allocated to El Salvador from rupplerental fund8 appropriated for international military training (IHET).

141 $ 5 0 million in MAP grant8 to be reprogrammed from fund8 in pending FY83 Supplemental. This $50 million plur the $60 million mentioned iradiately

above make up the $110 million of new FY83 military aid for El Salvador announced by the President on March 10, 1983.

121 Includes $35 million over the Administration's FY83 request of $105 million which the Administration announced in February 1983 vould b. reprogr.awd.

131 Includes $60 million of reprogramed Fl4S loana announced on March 10, 1983.

-

funds announced at the mame time.

111 Includes $5.1 million of Development Assistance over the Administration'r FY83 request which the Adminiatration indicated in February 1983 would be

reprogrameed. Also include8 $18 million of reprogramed Development Assistance announced in March 1983 a8 well a8 l $9 million i n c r e a m in P.L. 4 8 0

101 The Continuing Appropriations Act for FY83 (P.L. 97-377) set aid at levels appropriated for FY82 unless reprograming procedure8 are utilized. Thir

would not include the $55 million provided in FY82 under the emergency drawdown authority of Section 506.

91

-

-71 Includes $55 million in MP grant8 provided by President Reagan under Section 506 emergency proviaion in February 1982.

-81 Administration request for El Salvador a8 part of Caribbean Basin Initiative.

61

-

-4 1 Includes significant amount.' of aid reprogrammed after the formation of the Salvadoran civilian-military junta in October 1979.

-51 Include. $9.1 million reprogramed for FY80 and $24.9 million reprogrammed for PY81.

aid include. Military A88iatance Program grants, Foreign Military Sales loans, international military training (IIIET), and tranmferm of excerr

-31 Military

defense stocks.

by AID, and i8 generally included in Administration figure8 on economic aeeietance to El Salvador.

-I/ Economic aid includes Development Assistance, P.L. 480 Food for Peace programs, and Peace Corps.

Support Funds (ESP) are quick disbursing, balance of payment8 support funds, provided for security-related rea8onr. While ESP wa8 once called

-21 Economic

"Security Supporting Asairtance," and ir included in Security Assistance, it is listed separately becaure the aid i8 economic in nature, ir adminirterad

TQTAL AID

Military Aid 1 1

?/

-

ESF 2/

9.1

49.2 A /

11.4

Economic Aid

- -

FY79

FY82 Supplemental

(Obligations in millionr of $1

- U . 8 . ECONOWIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR, FY79-FY&

Regular

FY82

(P.L. 97-113)

TABLE 1