Military Manpower Policy and the All-Volunteer Force

MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER

FORCE

(ARCHIVED--09/01/81)

ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER I B 7 7 0 3 2

AUTHOR:

Goldich, Robert L.

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

T H E LIBRARY OF C O N G R E S S

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH S E R V I C E

MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM

DATE ORIGINATED 04/06/77

DATE UPDATED 09/01/81

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION C A L L 287-5700

0127

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ISSUE DEFINITION

Between the actual end of the draft in December 1972 and late 1 9 7 6 , the

level of controversy about

the

All-Volunteer

Force

(AVF)

dropped

considerably. In early 1977, however, concerns were voiced in the Congress,

the press, the Department of Defense (DOD), and elsewhere about the ability

of the AVF as currently recruited and managed to provide sufficient military

manpower of needed quality a t reasonable cost. These concerns rose sharply

beginning in 1979, and public debate over military manpower issues has

continued to occupy a prominent position i n the media and in government sines

then. This revived debate on military manpower policy has been stimulated by

perceived growth in Soviet military power and

general

internationdl

instability, as well a s problems in meeting DOD-established quantitative ana

qualitative requirements for the active and reserve components of the Arrnea

Forces. T o assist i n enabling the All-Volunteer Force to be rapidly

augmented with draftees i n time of war or national emergency, standby draf*

registration began in July 1980. Other options are also being discussed:

a

major modification of military recruiting and manpower management policies to

attract and retain more volunteers; and a possible return t o actual peacetima

conscription.

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 1968-1975

Disenchantment with the Southeast Asia conflict coupled with traditional

American antipathy to conscription resulted in i n c r e a s i n g ' pressure in the

(AVF).

late 1960s to abolish the draft and establish a n All-Volunteer Force

in February 1 9 6 9 , soon after assuming office, President Nixon appointed a

commission chaired by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates to examine the

subject. In February 1970 the Gates commission recommended that the country

complete the transition t o a n AVF by July 1 , 1971.

Though President Nixon

accepted the goal of a n All-Volunteer Force in principle, the pressures of

the Vietnam War and the need for a more orderly transition to a n AVF

necessitated deferral of the target date from July 1 , 1971, to July 1 , 1973..

Actual inductions of men into the Armed Forces ended on Dec. 3 1 , 1972, and on

June 30, 1973, with certain minor exceptions, the authority of the President

to induct men into the Armed Forces expired.

Standby draft registration

continued until April 1 9 7 5 , when it was terminated by executive order of

President Ford.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING U.S.

MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT POLICIES

U.S. military manpower procurement policies are based on

strategic assumptions and broad national security policies.

a

variety

03

The principal manpower-intensive military emergency involving U.S.

forces

which is discussed in official DOD literature is a major war with the Soviet

Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the North

Atlantic, with ancillary air and naval action worldwide.

DOD has asserted

that such a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict would involve exceptionally intense

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combat resulting in high casualties, and would require the mobilization of

U.S. civilian industry and manpower to continue the conflict as long a s

necessary.

Such a war would require massive

manpower

mobilization,

particularly to meet ground force requirements for replacements and force

expansion.

This DOD scenario for a U.S./Soviet war i n Europe has been challenged,

however, principally by persons who feel that such a conflict would quickly

lead to a strategic nuclear exchange between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.,

and that

such an exchange would be so catastrophic for both sides a s to render a

conventional and/or tactical nuclear campaign in Europe irrelevant.

These

challenges have in turn been countered by those who argue that

(1) .a

conventional and/or tactical nuclear war in Europe need not automatically

escalate to the strategic nuclear level or (2) with proper active and passive

defensive measures, strategic nuclear war, if i t does occur, need not result

in the total destruction of the major combatants' warmaking capability and

economic infrastructure.

Using this scenario as a starting point, a

current military manpower policies:

series

of

assumptions

shape

1. The United States needs large conventional forces to permit responses

and Soviet

to threats without resorting to strategic nuclear war (both U.S.

conventional forces have tactical nuclear capabilities).

Most American

analysts consider conventional military power to be a more credible deterren.t

and a more controllable military instrument than nuclear forces.

2. The United States faces a long-term

challenge from the presence af

large Soviet conventional forces in Europe and the USSR that are configured

to pose a direct threat to NATO forces in Europe, the Mediterranean, and th-e

North Atlantic, and t o U.S. national interests elsewhere in the world.

3 . Current active duty strength of approximately 2.1 million, backed up by

combat-ready and responsive Reserve components, is a t best an absolute

minimum with which to meet initial U.S.

national security commitments

worldwide, and i n f a c t may be inadequate. The Reagan Administration plans to

expand active duty military strength to approximately 2.3

million over t&e

next several years to meet what i t regards a s minimum requirements to man it-s

expanded force structure.

4. Major military manpower assets would be furnished by our NATO allies in

the event of a conflict in Europe.

5. The manpower requirements for any contingencies more limited

full-scale U.S./Soviet

conflict would be less than those for the

contingency.

than :a

broader

6. Any military action anywhere i n the world other than a comparatively

minor show of force would almost certainly require the augmentation of active

duty forces with Reserves and/or draftees.

Since 1 9 7 2 the basic strategy of policies designed to provide adequate

military manpower to meet anticipated contingencies has been that of manning

both the active and Reserve forces with volunteers in peacetime, with a

responsive standby draft system theoretically capable of quick reactivation

to provide manpower needed for a n emergency.

The active, Reserve, and draftee military manpower requirements

discussed

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in this Issue Brief are generated by the aforementioned DOD scenario and

general national security policies. Acceptance of this scenario and these

policies for analytical purposes in this Issue Brief does not imply either

agreement or disagreement with them.

MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT ISSUES

This issue brief discusses quantitative and qualitative trends in active

force and Selected Reserve strengths and recruiting, and then notes proposed

methods of dealing with active force and Selected Reserve recruiting problems

within the context of an All-Volunteer Force. The report then addresses the

role of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of the Armed Forces in military

manpower mobilization, current and projected IRR strengths and requirements,

and possible ways of insuring adequate IRR force levels.

Issues relating to

maintenance of a standby draft system are discussed.

Finally, alternatives

relating to the reinstitution of peacetime conscription for both the active

and Reserve forces are examined.

ACTIVE FORCE RECRUITING AND STRENGTH RESULTS, FY73-PRESENT

The active Armed Forces faced numerous quantitative and qualitative

(See tables appended to this issue

recruiting problems during FY73 fnd FY74.

brief.)

Adequate numbers of volunteers were barely obtained.

Recruit

quality was comparatively poor, resulting in legislative action

that

temporarily restricted for FY74 the percentage of recruits with substandard

intelligence or education that could be enlisted

(Department of Defense

Appropriation Act, 1974, sec. 718; P.L. 93-238, approved Jan. 2, 1974; 87

Stat. 1041).

During the latter half of FY74, FY75, and the first half of

FY76, active force recruiting improved greatly. A nationwide recession and

consequent rise in unemployment, a continuing decline in authorized force

levels, and the passage of enlistment bonus legislation all contributed to

this improvement. Quantitative goals were met with ease and the quality of

incoming recruits increased to the point that the services were able to

substantially raise their minimum quality standards for enlistment.

However, some clecline in the rate of unemployment, the stabilization of

active duty military strength at approximately 2.1 million, and (according to

DOD) congressional reductions in recruiting funds and manpower resulted in

During FY78-80, the services

increasing recruiting difficulties in FY76-77.

struggled to meet qualitative and quantitative goals, helped periodically by

lowered quality standards and higher unemployment rates. All four services

failed to meet their recruiting objectives during FY79, the first such

across-the-board shortfall since the AVF began on Jan. 1 , 1973.

FY80

recruiting objectives were met because of increased unemployment and lower

recruiting standards. FY81 first-half results were the most encouraging in

several years for reasons not yet clear but which may include major increases

in military compensation during 1980, the psychological spur of

the

resumption of draft registration, and increased recruiting resources.

QUALITY PROBLEMS

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It appears that faulty intelligence testing methodology and procedures

caused DOD to radically underestimate the number and

proportion

of

In April

below-average mental category personnel enlisted during FY76-80.

anpo power, Reserve Affairs, and

1980 the Assistant Secretary of Defense

Logistics) testified that serious errors had been made in calibrating

intelligence recruit test scores. In July 1980, DQD released a report which

stated that the actual proportion of Mental Category IV recruits (the lowest

category currently acceptable for enlistment into the Armed Forces) during

FY79 was much higher than previously stated figures, and that the actual

proportion of Mental Category 111 recruits (average intelligence level) was

much lower. The proportions of Mental Category I and I1 (superior and above

average intelligence) were apparently recorded somewhat more accurately by

the old tests; DOD found fewer drastic errors in their case.

further

analysis revealed that recruits enlisted from the second half of FY76

(January-June 1976) through FY80 were tested incorrectly, and that the

proportions of recruits in Mental Category IV for these 4 1/2 years was

radically higher than previously stated by DOD, especially in the Army.

This

would appear to confirm impressionistic reports by officers and NCOs

hitherto discounted by DOD and especially the Office of the Secretary of

Defense

that recruit quality declined drastically in the late 1970s.

A

new test designed to correct the faulty procedures went into effect for

recruits enlisted in FY81 and later.

--

--

The first half of FY81 showed that recruit quality as measured by mental

category had improved markedly over FY76-FY80 figures. The use of the new

mental test, however, requires caution in excessive optimism about these

results. It is probably too early to tell whether the new test is free of

the problems that its introduction was intended to correct.

Due to congressional concern over the quality of All-Volunteer

Force

(P.L.

recruits, section 302 of the FY81 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act

96-342), as amended by section 9 , P.L. 96-584, Military Pay and Allowances

Benefits Act of 1980, placed statutory restrictions on enlistment quality for

the first time since FY74. These were as follows:

-- No more than 35% of Army male nonprior service enlistees

during FY81 can be non-high-school graduates.

-- No more than 25% of DOD enlistees during FY81 and FY82

can be in Mental Category IV.

-- No more than 20% of DOD enlistees during FY83 can be in

Mental Category IV.

Also, the Secretary of Defense is required to report to the Armed Services

Committees of the House and Senate at the end of each quarter of FY81 on

whether the mental category limitations have had a negative impact on combat

readiness.

--

--

one officially rejected by DOD

that the

There is a concern

proportion of blacks in the All-Volunteer Force which is much higher than of

the U.S. population as a whole, could have problematic social and political

consequences. Other observers feel that the Armed Forces, and the Army and

Marine Corps in particular, have become highly unrepresentative of general

American social indicators such as education, income level, and urban/rural

origins. DOD and DOD-funded contract studies reject these assertions or

regard the trends as irrelevant if they acknowledge them.

There are also

some indications that recent incidents of recruiting malpractice and fraud

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a r e r e l a t e d , n o t t o i s o l a t e d c a s e s of i n d i v i d u a l s a c t i n g i m p r o p e r l y ,

p r e s s u r e p l a c e d on r e c r u i t e r s t o a c h i e v e r e c r u i t i n g r e s u l t s w h i c h

unattainable.

but

may

to

be

Some o f t h e s e r e c r u i t i n g t r e n d s a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y d o c u m e n t e d i n T a b l e s " A w

showing a c t i v e f o r c e q u a n t i t a t i v e , q u a l i t a t i v e ,

and race/sex

recruiting

war

a n d / o r s t r e n g t h t r e n d s s i n c e FY73 ( d a t a f r o m FY64, t h e l a s t p r e - V i e t n a m

f i s c a l y e a r i n which t h e d r a f t w a s o p e r a t i n g , a r e f u r n i s h e d f o r c o m p a r a t i v e

purposes).

See t a b l e s appended t o t h i s i s s u e b r i e f .

ACTIVE FORCE R E T E N T I O N PROBLEMS

I n a d d i t i o n t o r e c r u i t i n g p r o b l e m s , t h e r e has b e e n i n c r e a s i n g c o n c e r n f o r

of

s k i l l e d o f f i c e r s and noncommissioned o f f i c e r s i n a l l

services,

e s p e c i a l l y t h e Navy a n d M a r i n e C o r p s .

Although

first-term

r e e n l i s t m e n t s h a v e r i s e n u n d e r t h e AVF,

career

(second- and later-term)

r e e n l i s t m e n t s have dropped considerably.

R e e n l i s t m e n t r a t e s of

Navy c a r e e r

e n l i s t e d p e r s o n n e l , f o r e x a m p l e , d r o p p e d f r o m 9 2 % o f t h o s e e l i g i b l e i n FY73

t h e f i r s t y e a r of t h e A l l - V o l u n t e e r F o r c e

t o 6 7 % i n FY8O.

Marine Corps

c a r e e r e n l i s t e d r e t e n t i o n d r o p p e d from 8 2 t o 50% d u r i n g t h e same p e r i o d .

Navy r e t e n t i o n

(See T a b l e " D l " attached t o hard c o p i e s o f t h i s i s s u e b r i e f . )

p r o b l e m s i n p a r t i c u l a r a p p e a r t o b e based i n l a r g e p a r t on d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n

with long

f a m i l y s e p a r a t i o n s r e s u l t i n g from a n i n c r e a s e d f r e q u e n c y of

T h i s i n c r e a s e d o p e r a t i n g tempo, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e Navy,

overseas deployments.

h a s r e s u l t e d f r o m a d e c r e a s e d number o f s h i p s i n t h e F l e e t b e i n g r e q u i r e d

to

o r an increased l e v e l

of

naval deployments

s h o u l d e r t h e same l e v e l

I t has become d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d crews f o r some s h i p s s o t h e y

can

worldwide.

p u t t o s e a a s s c h e d u l e d , o r t o man n e w l y c o m m i s s i o n e c ¶ s h i p s .

the retention

--

--

--

--

T h e r e a r e o t h e r more s p e c i a l i z e d r e c r u i t i n g and r e t e n t i o n p r o b l e m s i n t h e

A l l

s e r v i c e s continue t o have d i f f i c u l t y

m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s as well.

slowly

r e c r u i t i n g and r e t a i n i n g physicians,

although t h i s problem i s

diminishing.

DOD a n t i c i p a t e s t h a t i n c r e a s e d m e d i c a l

o f f i c e r bonuses,

more

c o m p e t i t i v e medical s c h o l a r s h i p s , and a n i n c r e a s e d i n f l o w of g r a d u a t e s of t h e

Uniformed S e r v i c e s U n i v e r s i t y of t h e H e a l t h S c i e n c e s w i l l h e l p a l l e v i a t e t h i s

p r o b l e m by t h e mid-1980s.

The A i r F o r c e ,

Navy,

and Marine Corps have

experienced substantial declines i n p i l o t retention rates.

This

appears t o

be r e l a t e d d i r e c t l y t o i n c r e a s e d h i r i n g b y c i v i l i a n a i r l i n e s t o r e p l a c e t h e

m a s s i v e c o h o r t o f W o r l d War 1 1 - t r a i n e d p i l o t s now r e a c h i n g a i r l i n e r e t i r e m e n t

age.

However, b e c a u s e p i l o t r e t e n t i o n i s r e l a t e d d i r e c t l y t o a i r l i n e h i r i n g

rates, and r e c e n t problems of t h e a i r l i n e i n d u s t r y have reduced p i l o t h i r e s ,

the p i l o t r e t e n t i o n problem i s bottoming o u t and beginning t o

improve.

The

A i r Force i s a l s o having a p a r t i c u l a r problem

i n r e c r u i t i n g and retaining

e n g i n e e r i n g o f f i c e r s i n t h e f a c e of s t i f f c o m p e t i t i o n f o r e n g i n e e r s from t h e

c i v i l i a n s e c t o r , and i s e x p l o r i n g a v a r i e t y of i n c e n t i v e and bonus programs

t o a t t r a c t more c o l l e g e e n g i n e e r i n g m a j o r s .

--

Compensation l e v e l s

b o t h a b s o l u t e a m o u n t s a n d t h e i n c r e a s e s t h a t come

a r e believed t o contribute substantially t o retention

problems.

P a y caps c o u p l e d w i t h i n f l a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o a n O c t o b e r 1 9 7 9 D O D

s t u d y on t h e a d e q u a c y o f m i l i t a r y c o m p e n s a t i o n a n d a n e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s t u d y b y

f o r m e r S e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e M e l v i n L a i r d , h a v e decreased t h e p u r c h a s i n g power

o f m i l i t a r y p a y s i n c e t h e AVF was f i r s t e s t a b l i s h e d .

Other

less tangible

reasons cited f o r decreased c a r e e r r e t e n t i o n include t h e lower q u a l i t y of

j u n i o r e n l i s t e d p e r s o n n e l who c a r e e r i s t s a r e r e q u i r e d t o s u p e r v i s e ; t h e l a c k

o f s u f f i c i e n t l y r i g o r o u s d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o c e d u r e s t h a t c a n be a p p l i e d a g a i n s t

w i t h promotions

--

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substandard performers or malcontents; and deterioration in non-monetary

benefits such a s health care, recreational facilities, and commissary/

exchange services. Lack of public appreciation for the military's

role in

society i s also mentioned.

COSTS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The All-Volunteer Force has resulted in some increased expenditures.

The

most recent cost estimates, contained in Senate Appropriatons Committee

hearings on the FY81 DOD appropriations bill, state that a return t o

conscription

100,000 draftees yearly, presumably those required to

maintain current force levels

would save approximately $370 million in

FY80, assuming current pay levels were maintained.

In its December 3 1 , 1978,

report on the AVF, DOD estimated costs a t between $250 million and $2.5

billion annually- The lower figure is the increased cost resulting from the

AVF excluding the cost of a major 1971 junior enlisted pay raise and

subsequent junior enlisted compensation increases designed to

attract

Volunteers. The larger figure is the increased cost including these junior

enlisted compensation and benefit increases. The same DOD study estimated

that reducing the pay of the junior three enlisted pay grades to minimum wage

levels

(assuming the maintenance of present force levels) would save

approximately $1.3 billion per year.

A General Accounting Office study

released in February 1978 estimated total AVF costs during the FY71-77 period

a s $18.4 billion, and costs for FY73 and each fiscal year thereafter as over

$3 billion.

This figure included Selective Service cost savings, recruiting

costs, enlistment costs and savings, compensation and benefit costs, training

and education costs, recruit attrition, staffing policies and assignment

costs, civilian personnel costs and policy changes, military construction,

and retirement and separation pays.

--

--

Another measure of the cost impact of the AVF that has been suggested is

the potential cost involved in increasing military force levels, if such a n

increase should become necessary.

Such costs could involve either the

increased compensation levels that would be required to attract more

volunteers or the cost of paying an enlarged military force composed

partially of draftees at current, AVF-generated pay rates.

Proponents of the AVF assert that i t is inaccurate to include most of the

costs resulting from the major military pay increases of November 1971 in an

accounting of AVF costs. In support of their assertion, they argue that

(1)

"pay comparability" was a DOD objective long before the draft was eliminated

and (2) the Government is "morally obligedn to pay military personnel wages

comparable with those in the civilian sector regardless of whether the Armed

Forces are manned by draftees or volunteers.

Some observers believe that the costs resulting from increased enlisted

turnover and personnel turbulence and the larger training establishment that

would result from a return to the draft would actually increase manpower

costs, unless first-term enlisted pay were reduced substantially.

See Issue

Brief 79078, Defense Manpower Costs.

PROJECTED ACTIVE FORCE RECRUITING SITUATION IN THE 1980s

As the effects of declining birth rates that began i n the 1960s are felt,

the number of men reaching prime military age (18) each year will decline

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--

a 20% drop.

from approximately 2.1 million in 1979 to 1.7 million in 1987

The Armed Forces will then have to recruit a larger proportion of the

available manpower than at present.

There is a general consensus that given

present military manpower procurement and utilization policies, the services

will not be able to maintain current military manpower strengths in the

1980s. Available manpower will be have to be used more efficiently; more

personnel will have to be retained in service after being enlisted; manpower

requirements will have to be decreased; o r - t h e proportion of the manpower

pool actually recruited will have to be raised. The problem will be greatly

exacerbated by plans to expand the size of the active Armed Forces from 2.1

million to the approximately 2.3 million necessary to man the increased force

structure proposed by the Reagan Administration.

There is a growing body of

opinion which holds that increased quantitative requirements, rather than

problems of manpower quality and career retention, will pose the greatest

threat to the continued viability of the All-Volunteer Force in the 1980s.

SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH AND RECRUITING

The Selected Reserve Components of the Armed Forces provide the sole

available source of trained units for immediate augmentation of the active

Armed Forces upon mobilization.

The Selected Reserve consists of Reservists

in paid Status who are required to perform approximately two weeks of active

duty for training annually and usually one weekend of inactive duty training

("drillw) per month. All members and units of the Selected Reserve are also

members of a larger category of Reserves known a s the Ready Reserve.

Members

including, therefore, members of the Selected Reserve

of the Ready Reserve

may be called to active duty without their consent in time of war or

national emergency declared by Congress or the President (i.e., congressional

approval is not required); a maximum of 1,000,000 Ready Reserve personnel may

be on active duty on this basis at any one time.

In addition, Selected

Reserve personnel may be called to active duty for up to 9 0 days Without a

deciaration of war or Congressional or Presidential declaration of national

emergency; up to 100,000 Selected Reservists may be on active duty on this

basis a t any one time.

--

--

Selected Reserve strength dropped drastically after the inception of the

Since then, however,

AVF, reaching a low of 788,000 at the end of FY78.

major increases in recruiting and retention incentives and efforts have

assisted in rebuilding Selected Reserve strength to a level of 877,000 as of

Apr. 30, 1981. This compares with 919,000 at the end of FY73, and an FY81

authorized minimum average strength of 850,000, an FY73 authorized average

minimum strength of 977,000, and an FY82 wartime requirement of 1,055,000.

The real problem in maintaining Selected Reserve strength seems to lie as

much in the retention of those enlisted as in recruiting.

Since the

inception of the AVF, the number of nonprior service Reserve enlistees who

joined the Reserves for 6 years (often to avoid being drafted into the active

Armed Forces) has declined, while large numbers of persons with prior active

military service have joined the Reserves, usually for much shorter terms

(often as little as one year).

The turnover rate among prior service

Accordingly, Reserve authorities feel that

enlistees is thus very high.

improvements in retention could do much more to boost Selected Reserve

strength than corresponding increases in recruiting.

The intelligence and educational levels of Selected Reserve male nonprior

service enlistees (the only group for which data are available prior to FY75)

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has declined considerably from pre-AVP bevels; in most cases, the nonprior

service recruit with above-average or superior intelligence and a college

education of the draft era has been replaced by a non-high-school graduate 06

average or below average intelligence. To a certain extent, however, more

mature and better educated prior-service enlistees compensate for this

decline in nsnprior service recruit quality.

These recruiting and strength trends are Statistically documented in

Tables " B v showing Selected Reserve quantitative, qualitative, and race/sex

recruiting or strength trends since FY70.

RECENTLY 1MPLEME.NTED AND PROPOSED ACTIVE FORCE AND RESERVE RECRUITING

RETENTION INCENTIVES

AND

A variety of compensation and benefit in,itiatives were recently enacted as

part of the Military Personnel and Compensation Amendments of 1980 (P.Lo

96-3431, the FH81 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act (P.L. 96-342), and the

Military Pay and Allowances Benefits Act of 1980 (P.L.

96-579).

These

included:

-- An across-the-board 11.7% military pay raise a s of

Oct. 1 , 1980 (this contrasts with the 9.1% pay raise

received by General Schedule Federal civil servants, which

would otherwise have been received by military personnel

as well).

-- Increased levels of enlistment and reenlistment bonus money

and expanded eligibility (in terms of years of service) for

the latter; enlistment bonuses for Selected Reserve personnel

with prior active military service; bonuses for prior-service

personnel who voluntarily affiliate or extend their service with

the Individual Ready Reserve; and bonuses for career aviation

officers extending their active duty.

-- Raising per diem allowances for military personnel traveling

on official business; providing moving expenses for military

personnel who own house trailers or mobile homes; authorizing

family separation allowances for junior enlisted

personnel, and allowing personnel on long field or sea duty

to accumulate leave beyond current limits.

-- Increasing benefits available under CHAMPUS -- the

Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services.

-- Establishing (on a test basis) an educational assistance

program for active duty and Selected Reserve personnel, using

both cash grants and loan repayments, in addition to existing

educational programs, and allowing career personnel to '

transfer entitlement to such benefits to their dependents.

-- Increasing flight pay, hazardous duty pay, Navy

nuclear-power officer bonuses, and special pays; increasing and

restructuring submarine duty and sea pay levels, especially for

career personnel, and authorizing sea pay for officers

as well as enlisted personnel.

CRS- 9

IB77032

UPDATE-09/01/81

-- A u t h o r i z i n g a V a r i a b l e H o u s i n g A l l o w a n c e ( V H A ) t o b e p a i d

t o personnel l i v i n g i n high-housing c o s t a r e a s w i t h i n t h e

United S t a t e s (such allowances a r e a l r e a d y payable f o r personnel

s t a t i o n e d o u t s i d e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ) ; r e m o v i n g l i m i t s on m i l e a g e

a l l o w a n c e s p a y a b l e t o p e r s o n s making a permanent change of

s t a t i o n move.

-- I n c r e a s i n g B a s i c A l l o w a n c e f o r S u b s i s t e n c e by 1 0 % e f f e c t i v e

S e p t . 1, 1 9 8 0 ( i . e . , = b e f o r e - t h e 1 1 . 7 % g e n e r a l p a y r a i s e

m e n t i o n e d a b o v e t o o k p l a c e , p r o v i d i n g a t o t a l BAS i n c r e a s e

of a l m o s t 2 3 % ) .

Most o f

t h e s e i n i t i a t i v e s were d i r e c t e d a t r e t e n t i o n r a t h e r

than

f i r s t - t e r m r e c r u i t i n g , and most d i d n o t d i r e c t l y a d d r e s s t h e major o v e r a l l

g a p between m i l i t a r y a n d c i v i l i a n compensation which d e v e l o p e d a f t e r t h e

mid-1970s.

These i n c e n t i v e s , a n t i c i p a t i o n of

t h e i r enactment, and t h e

indication t h a t they provided tangible public and congressional Support f o r

career p e r s o n n e l h a v e a l l h a d p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s o n c a r e e r r e t e n t i o n .

Overall

DoD c a r e e r e n l i s t e d r e t e n t i o n was u p i n FY80 c o m p a r e d t o FY79, a n d e v e n

Navy c a r e e r e n l i s t e d

h i g h e r i n t h e f i r s t q u a r t e r of F Y 8 1 t h a n i n FY80.

r e t e n t i o n has r e c o v e r e d f r o m a l o w o f 6 2 % i n FY79 t o 7 3 % d u r i n g t h e f i r s t

h a l f o f FY81; M a r i n e C o r p s c a r e e r e n l i s t e d r e t e n t i o n r e b o u n d e d f r o m 5 2 % i n

Army a n d A i r F o r c e

FY79 a n d 5 0 % i n FY80 t o 7 4 % i n t h e f i r s t h a l f o f FY81.

c a r e e r e n l i s t e d r e t e n t i o n r a t e s h a v e a l s o i n c r e a s e d f r o m FY79 l o w s .

(See

T a b l e "DW appended t o t h i s i s s u e b r i e f . )

F u r t h e r m a j o r i n c r e a s e s i n r e c r u i t i n g a n d r e t e n t i o n i n c e n t i v e s were

p r o p o s e d b y t h e R e a g a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n March 1 9 8 1 a s p a r t o f

i t s major

i n c r e a s e s i n t h e FY82 d e f e n s e b u d g e t o r i g i n a l l y p r o p o s e d by t h e C a r t e r

T h e s e a r e t a r g e t e d on f i r s t - t e r m r e c r u i t i n g a s much, i f

not

Administration.

more s o , t h a n c a r e e r r e t e n t i o n ,

and apparently a r e designed t o d i r e c t l y

improve t h e q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y of r e c r u i t s through r e s t o r i n g almost f u l l

c o m p a r a b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n compensation across-the-board.

These

but highly

i n c e n t i v e s a n d m e a s u r e s (some of w h i c h h a v e o n l y a n i n d i r e c t ,

i m p o r t a n t , impact on r e c r u i t i n g a n d r e t e n t i o n ) i n c l u d e :

-- A 5 . 3 % a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d m i l i t a r y p a y r a i s e e f f e c t i v e J u l y 1,

1 9 8 1 , p l u s a 9.1% a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d r a i s e e f f e c t i v e O c t . 1, 1 9 8 1 .

Together w i t h t h e 11.7% g e n e r a l pay r a i s e of O c t . I , 1980, these

t h r e e i n c r e a s e s w o u l d r e p r e s e n t a jump o f o v e r 2 8 % i n R e g u l a r

M i l i t a r y Compensation i n 1 2 months.

( I t appears unlikely that

Congress w i l l approve t h e J u l y i n c r e a s e , b u t t h e J u l y and October

p a y r a i s e s may b e c o m b i n e d i n t o o n e 1 4 . 4 % r a i s e a s o f O c t . 1,

1981. )

-- I n c r e a s e d f u n d i n g f o r r e c r u i t i n g a n d a d v e r t i s i n g p r o g r a m s

and personnel.

When i n f l a t i o n i s t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t , t h e r e h a s

been a s u b s t a n t i a l d e c l i n e i n r e a l p u r c h a s i n g power d e v o t e d t o

r e c r u i t i n g s i n c e t h e mid-1970s.

-- I m p r o v e d t r a i n i n g , l i v i n g , a n d work e n v i r o n m e n t s t o r a i s e

morale and motivation.

T h i s i n v o l v e s f u n d i n g more a c t i v i t i e s

i n t h e f i e l d and a t sea; b u i l d i n g a n d r e n o v a t i n g b a c h e l o r a n d

married l i v i n g q u a r t e r s ; a n d r e p l e n i s h i n g s p a r e p a r t s s t o c k s

and upgarding f a c i l i t i e s .

S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e W e i n b e r g e r h a s recommended t h a t t h e f i r s t $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 of

a m i l i t a r y member's p a y b e e x e m p t f r o m F e d e r a l i n c o m e t a x e s a s a r e c r u i t i n g

and retention incentive.

The advantages of this proposal are held to

include:

(1) the lack of expense to the defense budget per se; and

(2) the

increased effect i t would have on persons in higher tax brackets, improving

the attractiveness of a military career and the rewards for lengthly military

(1) possible adverse

service. Some of the disadvantages are described as:

public reaction against the military receiving special tax consideration; ( 2 )

alleged unfairness to junior enlisted personnel (who now pay little or no

Federal income tax Bue to the extent to which the tax is aimed toward persons

(3) the consequent lack of impact:

on junior

with higher incomes); and

enlisted recruiting and retention.

Some military manpower analysts believe that some options still remain

with which to improve active force and/or Selected Reserve recruiting within

the context of a n All-Volunteer Force. These observers feel that while the

DOD has worked hard to make the AVF successful, the potential

for

improvements in military manpower utilization and recruiting is still

substantial. They also assert that given the major social and political

controversies that would accompany serious proposals for a return to the

draft, all possible efforts should be made to keep military service

voluntary.

Finally, both supporters and opponents of a n AVF believe that

Conscription would provide only indirect, but still important, assistance a t

best in improving the retention of career personnel.

It has been suggested that the resumption of standby draft registration

will act a s a spur to enlistments in the All-Volunteer Force by making the

public more aware of the Armed Forces and of their potential military

obligations a s citizens, and creating the desire to

avoid

eventual

if the draft is actually reimposed

by volunteering for a

conscription

branch of service of one's own choosing.

It is not clear to what extent this

has in fact taken place. Approximately 15% of young men registering have

checked a box on their registration forms indicating a desire to receive

military recruiting information and/or be contacted by military recruiters.

How many of these individuals would otherwise have been interested i n

military service is not known. Some officials, however, have stated that

they believe t h a t , registration has acted as an intangible, and often

subconscious, impetus toward voluntary enlistment, as much by making persons

aware of the possibility of military service as actually pressuring a n

individual to inlist to avoid potential conscription sometime in the future.

--

--

The following suggestions are among those that have been made to improve

active force and Selected Reserve recruiting and retention, or to reduce

military manpower requirements.

(It is essential to note that almost all of

them have, in fact, already been acted upon, in varying degrees and with

varying resource commitments.)

The recommended improvements include:

-- Modifying enlistment terms, including, but not limited to,

(a) shorter enlistment terms or (b) a combination of active force

enlistment with an obligatory period of service in the Selected

Reserve.

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps all began similar

2-year enlistment test programs i n 1979. Indications a r e ,

however, that so far these programs have failed to significantly

increase the total number of enlistments, although they may have

had some impact on raising the quality of enlistees.

-- Modifying minimum physical, mental, or educational standards

for enlistment.

degree. )

(This has already been clone to a considerable

Recruiting more women. The Carter Administration had planned to

increase the total number of women in the Armed Forces to

approximately 254,300 by FY85, or 12.5% of total strength.

However, the military services, particularly the Army, have

recently requested that these goals be reexamined with a view

toward actual and anticipated negative effects on combat readiness

and performance of the increased proportion of women in the Armed

Forces. It appears now that the goals set by the Carter

Administration will be cut back at least somewhat.

see

Issue Brief 79045, Women in the Armed Forces.

-- Decreasing the emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior-service

personnel in the 18-19 year old bracket and attempting to either

recruit more older personnel or raise the proportion of older

career personnel.

-- Converting more military to civilian positions.

This has

already been done, during both the 1960s and 1970s. In addition,

civilian personnel strength has declined substantially, affecting

the important depot and maintenance services that DoD civilians

provide to the military services.

-- Increasing the length of enlistments.

This has also been done;

however., it conflicts with the desire to shorten enlistments

as a recruiting incentive.

-- Decreasing the use of early discharges to separate marginally

undesirable personnel from the Armed Forces and placing heavier

reliance on counseling and military discipline to ensure effective

performance from such individuals while remaining in service.

There has been some progress made in reducing first-term enlisted

attrition, as these early clischarges are called. It is important

however, that too many marginal performers not be retained in

service if they will not or cannot be forced to do their jobs.

(See Table E appended to this issue brief.)

-- Substituting capital (equipment) for labor (military manpower)

wherever possible. This is a largely unexplored area. It could

show great promise for the technically oriented services, less so

for the ground combat forces. However, complex equipment demands

skilled Operators, which are hard to recruit and retain in the

AVF.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

In addition to the active Armed Forces and units of the Selected Reserve,

the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of the Armed Forces is designed to fill

large requirements for previously-trained individual Reservists to

be

promptly available in the event of mobilization. These individual Reservists

are needed to (1) bring undermanned units of the active force and Selected

Reserve to full war strength and ( 2 ) provide trained replacements for

casualties until such time as draftees can be provided by a reactivated

Selective Service System.

'

The IRR consists mostly of personnel who have served on active duty, are

not members of the Selected Reserve, and who have not completed their total

six-yea r military obligation.

IRR personnel are not currently required by

BOD to train periodically, although they are legally obligated to do so if

ord ered

Members of the IRR are also members of the Ready Reserve

(along

wit h S e lected Reserve personnel).

A S such, they also may be called to active

duty without their consent in time of war or national emergency declared by

the Congress or the President, subject to the maximum of 1,000,000 Reaay

Reservists that may be on active duty on such a basis a t any one time.

.

Table "C" , appended to this issue brief, indicates in detail the major

decline in IRR strength that has taken place since FY73; from 1,229,000 to

410,000 as of Apr. 3 0 , 1981.

IRR strength has increased from 356,000 at the

end of FY78 to current levels, and is expected to continue increasing slowly

over the next few years as some suggested policies are implementea.

The projected IRR strengths contrast with estimated IRR mobilization

requirements. An intensive interagency debate on IRR requirements appears to

have been wresolved*v in favor of an accepted IRR shortfall of approximately

300,000 (of which the Army's share is 270,000); however, some analysts

continue to believe that a more accurate estimate of the shortfall is in the

400,000-600,000 range.

In either case, actual IRR strength will remain well

~

the most optimistic

below requirements a t least into the late 1 9 8 0 ~under

estimates.

IRR strength has declined for several reasons. First, large numbers of

Vietnam-era draftees who spent only two years of their total six-year

military obligation on active duty, and the remaining four in the IRR,

completed their six years of service between 1973 and 1976 and left the IRR

pool.

Second, the advent of the AVF resulted in longer active duty terms,

shortening the time remaining out of the total six-year obligation to serve

in the IRR. Third, a greater proportion of active force separatees than

previously is entering the Selected Reserve.

Fourth, longer active duty

enlistment terms and lower active duty military strengths have reduced

recruiting requirements, and hence the number of persons leaving active duty

and entering the IRR.

Without a peacetime draft or a quickly responsive standby Selective

Service System, shortages of IRR personnel would severely affect the ability

of the Armed Forces to fight a major war with the Soviet Union in the

interval between the outbreak of hostilities and the availablility of trained

draftees--now programmed for no earlier than seven months after mobilization.

Even with a standby draft system capable of the most rapid reactivation

considered feasible, four months would elapse between mobilization and the

delivery of trained draftees to the Armed Forces, during which requirements

for trained personnel could only be met by the IRR.

RECENT AND PROPOSED INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO INCREASE IRR STRENGTH

Among actually implemented remedies for increasing IRR strength and

improving IRR mobilization capabilities within an All-Volunteer Force context

are the following:

-- Eliminating automatic transfer from the IRR to the Standby Reserve

after 5 years of obligated military service. While this does not

increase the total IRR/Standby Reserve manpower pool, i t does

increase the size of the more easily mobilizable IRR.

-- Requiring a fixed IRR obligation of all active duty separatees,

regardless of the length of their active duty service. Certain

active and Reserve enlistees who do not complete their full

enlistments are now assigned to the IRR, if they are judged

suitable; formerly, no such personnel were retained in the IRR.)

-- Requiring female military personnel to fulfill an IRR

obligation in the same manner as male personnel.

-- Identifying and designating selected retired military personnel

for recall to active duty upon mobilization.

-- Improving personnel management of pretrained individual reservists

and standby Reservists, with better tracking and location

procedures, more frequent contact, faster moBilization

notification

notification procedures, and peacetime refresher training for IRR

personnel.

-- Reducing the length of active duty enlistments, thus increasing

the proportion of the total six-year obligation spent in the IRR

unless the individual enlisted in the Selected Reserve.

-- Authorizing direct enlistment and reenlistment into the IRR, and

providing bonuses for persons without an IRR obligation to

voluntarily affiliate with the IRR, if they have prior military

service.

A legislative proposal to extend the total military service obligation

beyond the current 6 years has Been considered in DOD and the Congress, but

not acted on.

STANDBY DRAFT CAPABILITIES

According to DOD, a major war with the Soviet Union in Europe or any other

military contingency other than minor, short-term operations would require

the reactivation of the draft to furnish manpower above and beyond that

provided by the active forces, Selected Reserve, and IRR. Draftees would be

required to provide replacements for wartime casualties and activate new

military units needed in an expanded wartime force structure.

92-129,

The Military Selective Service Act Amendments of 1971 (P.L.

approved Sept. 28, 1971) required that after induction authority ceased on

June 30, 1973, the Selective Service System be maintained as "an active

standby organization, with (1) a complete registration and classification

structure capable of immediate operations in the event of a national

emergency, and (2) personnel adequate to reinstitute immediately the full

operation of the system...."

Progressive reductions in funding and manpower

for the standby Selective Service System have substantially reduced its

capabilities and responsiveness since FY73.

Standby registration

and

classification of potential inductees was suspendea by executive order in

April 1975 until resumed in July 1980. DOD estimates i t would require the

System to deliver at least 650,000 personnel to the Armed Forces within 180

days after general mobilization (M+180). A variety of studies by several

Government agencies all agree that before the resumption of

standby

registration in mid-1980, the Selective Service System fell grossly short of

having the capability to meet these requirements.

After taking office in January 1977, President Carter on several occasions

reiterated the opposition of the Ford Administration to standby registration,

as did Carter Administration officials.

In his State of the Union message of

Jan. 23, 1980, however, President Carter changed his policy.

H e announced

that he would send legislation to the Congress which would

(a) provicie

supplemental appropriations for standby draft registration to take place

before mobilization and (b) requlre women as well as men to register.

The

registration legislation approved by the Congress on June 25, 1980, and

signed by the President on June 27 (P.L. 96-282) differed substantially from

the President's proposal. Rather than appropriating new funds, i t authorized

the transfer of approximately $13.3 million from the FY80 DOD budget to that

of the Selective Service System for the purpose of registering males only.

All men born in 1960 were required to register at their local post offices

during the week beginning July 21, 1980, and all men born in 1969 were

required to register during the week beginning July 28.

Selective Service

has stated that by July 1981 92% of all men born i n 1960, 1969, and 1962 had

registered

over 5 million out of 5.5 million eligibles.

Registration is

required of all men born i n 1963 or later upon reaching age 18.

Percentage

figures on compliance with this ongoing registration program a r e not .yet

available. A report and audit of the registration process by the General

Accounting Office, performed in December 1980, stated that the Selective

System's claims as to the success of registration and the level of compliance

were accurate, and praised the System's management of registration.

--

RETURN TO A PEACETIME DRAFT

The quantitative and qualitative recruiting problems

Reserve forces have resulted in considerable discussion

actual peacetime conscription.

of the active and

about returning to

A return to the peacetime draft would insure that the Armed Forces could

procure the quantity and quality of personnel they needed without regard to

the vagaries of the civilian economy or

transient

national

moods.

(1)

Conscription would also serve the political/social/philosophical ends of

levying a requirement on all citizens, if called, to participate in the

common defense and (2) insuring popular involvement in and concern over

national military policies.

It is by no means clear that the reinstitution of the draft would decrease

defense manpower costs.

While recruiting costs could

be

decreased,

utilization and training costs resulting from increased personnel turnover

and turbulence would probably rise. Military compensation costs would drop

only if pay and allowance levels for first-term enlisted personnel were

frozen or reduced.

A return to the draft could conceivably be unpopular.

Some say that the

Vietnam experience a n 8 subsequent clemencies and pardons of draft evaders and

some military deserters have raised doubts about whether young people would

respond to draft calls. In addition, there are political/

philosophical

issues of (1) conscription as a form of involuntary servitude or economic

tax-in-kind and (2) the inequity of selective as opposed to universal or

general conscription.

SELECTION ISSUES

Several alternative methods of selecting draftees have been proposed,

including (1) universal national service with a military option

(including

compulsory registration, c l a s s ~ f i c a t i o n ,and evaluation for national service,

without a compulsory service requirement itself),

(2) universal military

service, and (3) selective service. The proposals for universal service all

have the advantage of being more equitable, and providing both tangible and

intangible benefits to the civilian economy a s a whole, as well as sufficient

trained military manpower to meet any imaginable military contingency..

Universal service would also be more coercive than selective service, would

establish a principle of conscription for non-military purposes, and cauld

produce more trained military manpower than the Armed Forces required or

low-cost civilian labor than the civilian economy needed or could absorb.

Selective service, on the other hand, while it would provide no more military

manpower than that needed, and would rest less lightly on the shoulders ~f

American youth, could also be more inequitable i n that only a few persons

would actually be drafted.

Other issues regarding the selection of draftees include:

-- Possible conscription of women, involving the current debate over

the legal status and sociological implications of equality of

opportunity for women and the roles of men and women in society

and culture.

-- Deferments and exemptions involving various educational,

occupational, marital, physical, and moral categories.

-- Selection mechanisms to be used, involving a choice between a

local and community-based selection apparatus, a s i n the old

Selective Service System, or one nationally administered and

centralized.

UTILIZATION ISSUES

Two broad alternatives have been mentioned for the use of draftees, if

peacetime conscription were revived:

(1) conscription for the active forces,

with a Reserve obligation capable of fulfillment according to an individual's

option, or (2) conscription for the Selected Reserve and/or Individual Ready

Reserve.

A third alternative

would involve conscription for the active

forces with a Reserve option to be fulfilled along mandatory lines, without

a n individual option.

The first alternative would essentially involve a return

to

the

active-Reserve relationship that existed before the termination of the draft

i n 1973. Active force draftees

(and voluntary enlistees) would have a

Reserve obligation after release from active duty which they would fulfill in

the Individual Ready Reserve; the Selected Reserve would consist largely of

nonprior service personnel who enlisted to avoid conscription into the active

forces. Such a system would preserve maximum freedom of choice for the

individual and continue the voluntary and local character of our Reserve

Components.

It would also prevent a n orderly flow of fully trained personnel

into the Reserves (by leaving Reserve enlistment a s a n individual option),

continue the Reserves as a draft-avoidance

route, and prevent the full

integration of the active and Reserve components for purposes of preparation

f o r war.

A d r a f t f o r t h e Selected Reserve and/or Individual

Ready R e s e r v e ,

while

m a i n t a i n i n g a l l - v o l u n t e e r a c t i v e f o r c e s , would a d d r e s s c u r r e n t m a j o r R e s e r v e

a c c o r d i n g t o some

overreacting t o possibly temporary

s h o r t f a l l s without

a n d / o r minor a c t i v e f o r c e s h o r t f a l l s .

Such a R e s e r v e d r a f t would m i n i m i z e

t h e i m p a c t on t h e p e r s o n s d r a f t e d , s i n c e o n l y a r e l a t i v e l y

s h o r t t o u r sf

a c t i v e d u t y ( s e v e r a l months) would h a v e t o be s e r v e d b e f o r e t h e i n d i v i d u a l

remaining.

In

returned t o civilian l i f e , with only a training obligation

a d d i t i o n , t h e w i d e r e x p o s u r e t o m i l i t a r y l i f e g a i n e d by R e s e r v e d r a f t e e s

c o u l d s t i m u l a t e e n l i s t m e n t s i n t h e a c t i v e f o r c e among p e r s o n s who o t h e r w i s e

would n o t h a v e c o n s i d e r e d a c t i v e m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e .

A R e s e r v e d r a f t would n o t

1t would

affect the

d e a l d i r e c t l y w i t h a c t i v e f o r c e r e c r u i t i n g problems.

t r a d i t i o n a l l y voluntary c h a r a c t e r of t h e Reserves.

I t could a l s o

result in

major problems of s k i l l - m a t c h i n g f o r t h e S e l e c t e d Reserve, g i v e n t h e m o b i l i t y

of i n d i v i d u a l R e s e r v i s t s and t h e need

i n t h e c a s e of t h e S e l e c t e d Reserve

t o f i t a Reserve r e c r u i t not j u s t i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r m i l i t a r y u n i t ,

but

into a particular unit i n a particular locality.

--

--

--

--

the

United S t a t e s could adopt t h e t r a d i t i o n a l

Continental

Finally,

European t y p e of i n t e g r a t e d a c t i v e - R e s e r v e

m i l i t a r y manpower p r o c u r e m e n t .

I n d i v i d u a l s w o u l d b e d r a f t e d i n t o t h e a c t i v e f o r c e a n d w o u l d be i n v o l u n t a r i l y

their

a s s i g n e d t o a s p e c i f i c R e s e r v e u n i t upon r e l e a s e from a c t i v e d u t y ;

R e s e r v e t r a i n i n g o b l i g a t i o n s would v a r y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e n e e d s of

the Armed

Forces.

T h e R e s e r v e C o m p o n e n t s w o u l d b e f i l l e d e x c l u s i v e l y by p e r s o n s w i t h

prior military service.

Such a s y s t e m would p r o v i d e a n o r d e r l y ,

manageable

g e n e r a t e l a r g e numbers of

f l o w of t r a i n e d p e r s o n n e l i n t o t h e R e s e r v e s ;

i n d i v i d u a l R e s e r v i s t s a v a i l a b l e f o r u s e upon m o b i l i z a t i o n ;

fully integrate

t h e a c t i v e f o r c e w i t h t h e R e s e r v e C o m p o n e n t s ; a n d r e m o v e d r a f t e v a s i o n as a n

i n c e n t i v e f o r Reserve service.

On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e A m e r i c a n t r a d i t i o n o f

R e s e r v e s e r v i c e a s v o l u n t a r y w o u l d be a b o l i s h e d a n d i n d i v i d u a l o p t i o n s f o r

p e r f o r m i n g m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e w o u l d be s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i m i n i s h e d .

SUMMARY

The a c t i v e Armed F o r c e s a r e e x p e r i e n c i n g q u a n t i t a t i v e a n d q u a l i t a t i v e

r e c r u i t i n g p r o b l e m s ; t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f t h e S e l e c t e d R e s e r v e h a v e b e e n much

T h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e I n d i v i d u a l Ready R e s e r v e and S t a n d b y R e s e r v e i s

greater.

o n l y a f r a c t i o n o f known a n d e s t i m a t e d w a r t i m e r e q u i r e m e n t s .

Retention of

a c t i v e duty c a r e e r m i l i t a r y personnel i s s t i l l a problem, e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e

Navy a n d M a r i n e C o r p s .

Demographic c o n s t r a i n t s W i l l e n s u r e p r o g r e s s i v e l y

i n c r e a s i n g r e c r u i t i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s during t h e l a t e 1970s and t h e 1980s.

The

s t a n d b y S e l e c t i v e S e r v i c e S y s t e m was i n c a p a b l e o f b e i n g a c t i v a t e d i n t i m e t o

meet D O D r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r d r a f t e e s a f t e r g e n e r a l m o b i l i z a t i o n

u n t i l standby

d r a f t r e g i s t r a t i o n w a s resumed i n J u l y 1980.

P r o p o s e d measures t o deal w i t h

these problems while c o n t i n u i n g t o maintain an

All-Volunteer

Force involve

i n c r e a s i g t h e n u m b e r o f e n l i s t m e n t s a n d r e e n l i s t m e n t s i n t h e Armed F o r c e s ,

i n c r e a s i n g t h e s i z e o f t h e a v a i l a b l e manpower p o o l ,

and reducing m i l i t a r y

manpower r e q u i r e m e n t s .

Some p e r s o n s h a v e s u g g e s t e d t h a t a r e t u r n t o

p e a c e t i m e c o n s c r i p t i o n f o r t h e a c t i v e f o r c e s o r R e s e r v e Components w i l l be

n e c e s s a r y t o s o l v e q u a n t i t a t i v e a n d q u a l i t a t i v e manpower p r o b l e m s .

LEGISLATION

H.R. 2614 (Price et al.)

Department of Defense Supplemental Authorization Act, 1981.

Authorizes

the appropriation of additional funds for FY81 for the use of the armed

forces for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat

vehicles and for research, development, test, and evaluation.

Increases the

active duty personnel and strengths of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

Increases the number of reserve component members authorized to serve on

fulltime duty With the Marine Corps Reserve.

Increases the number of

civilian personnel authorized for the Department of Defense. Introduced Mar.

18, 1981; referred to Committee on Armed Services. Reported to House with

amendment (H.Rept. 97-20) Apr. 9 , 1981. Passed House, amended, June 23, in

lieu of S. 694.

S. 694 (Tower, by request, et al.)

Department of Defense Supplemental Authorization Act, 1981.

Authorizes

the appropriation of additional funds for FY81 for the use of the armed

forces for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat

vehicles and for research, development, test, and evaluation.

Increases the

active duty personnel and strengths of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

Increases the number of reserve component members authorized to serve on full

Introduced Mar. 12, 1981; referred

time duty with the Marine Corps Reserve.

to Committee on Armed Services. Reported to Senate with amendment

(S.Rept.

97-35) Apr. 1. Passed Senate, amended, Apr. 7, 1981. Passed House, amended,

June 23; laid on table, with H.R. 2614 passed in lieu.

H.R.

2970, H.R.

3519 (Price, by request, et al.)

Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982. Authorizes appropriations

for FY82 for the Armed Forces for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval

vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, for research,

development, test, and evaluation, and for operation and maintenance.

Prescribes the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component

and the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and

for civilian personnel of the Department of Defense.

Introduced Apr.

1,

1981; referred to Committee on Armed Services.

Referred Apr.

8 to

Subcommittees on NATO Standardization, Interoperability, and Readiness and on

Research and Development. Clean bill H.R. 3519 reported to the House, with

amendment, from the Committee on Armed Services (H.Rept. 97-71, Part I) May

19;. referred to the Committees on the Judiciary and on Government Operations.

Reported to the House, with amendment, from the Committee on the Judiciary

(H.Rept. 97-71, Part 11) and from the Committee on Government Operations

(H.Rept. 97-71, Part 111) June 12. Considered in House.

H.R.

3380 (Nichols et al.)

Armed Forces Pay Act of 1981. Authorizes a 14.39 increase in basic pay

and in quarters and subsistence allowances for all personnel in the uniformed

services; restores, in current dollars, the relative relationship of military

compensation to pay in the private sector that existed in 1972; provides

certain increases in special pays and bonuses that are designed to assist in

attracting and retaining individuals in critical skills in the uniformed

services; provides certain travel and transportation allowances that are

designed to assist in alleviating hardships and

financial

irritants

occasioned by military service personnel.

Introduced May 1 , 1981; referred

to the Committee on Armed Services. Reported to the House

(H.Rept. 97-109)

May 19; referred to the Committee on Appropriations. Reported to the House

( H - W e p t , 97-109, Part 11) June 11, .

S. 815 (Tower, by request, et al.)

Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982. Authorizes appropriations

for FP82 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat

vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, for research, development, test, and

evaluation, and for operation and maintenance for the Armed Forces, to

prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component of

the Armed Forces and for civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, to

authorize the military training student loads, and for other purposesIntroduced Mar. 26, 1981; referred to Committee on Armed Services; referreel

to Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel.

Reported to the Senate

(S.Repto

97-58), with amendment, May 6. Callea up by unanimous consent i n Senate;

passed the Senate, amended, May 14.

HEARINGS

U.S.

Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations.

Department of Defense appropriations for 1978.

Part 5: Recruiting activities, advanced logistics

systems, testimony of Members of Congress and other

individuals and organizations.

Hearings, 95th Congress,

1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977.

p. 1-197.

U.S.

Congress. House.

Committee on Armed Services.

Military

Department of Defense authorization for appropriations

posture.

for fiscal year 1981... and... Armed Forces Education Assistance

Act of 1980. Part 5 of 6 parts, Military personnel. Hearings,

96th Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,

1980. 8 4 9 p .

U.S.

Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services.

Subcommittee

on Military Personnel. Continuing review of the All-Volunteer

Force. Hearing, 95th Congress, 2 6 session. July 1 1 , 1978.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 2 4 p.

(H.A.S.C.

95-98)

U.S.

Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services.

Subcommittee on Investigations.

Improprieties of U.S.

Army Recruiting Practices.

Hearings, 95th Congress,

1st session. July 30, Sept. 26, 1977. Washington,

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 1 5 2 p.

(H.A.S.C.

95-46)

U.S.

Congress.

Senate. Committee o n Appropriations.

Department of

Defense appropriations, fiscal year 1981. Part 2-Manpower.

Hearings, 96th Congress, 2nd session. Washington, U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1980. 296 p.

..

----- Military draft registration, fiscal years 1980-1981.

96th Congress, 2d session.

Washington, U.S.

Hearings,

Govt. Print. Off.,

----- Department of Defense appropriations for 1981.

Part 1 0 ,

General provisions and language, Guard and Reserve, testimony

of Members of Congress and other interested individuals

and organizations, reprogrammings, FY80. Hearings, 96th

Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,

1980. 1 , 4 9 7 p.

U.S.

Congress.

Senate.

Committee on Armed Services. Department of

Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 1981.

Hearings, 96th Congress, 2nd session. Part 3, Manpower and

personnel.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 725 p.

----- Reinstitution of procedures for registration under the

Military Selective Service Act.

Hearings, 96th Congress,

1st session. Mar. 13, May 21, July 10, 1979. Washington,

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 239 p.

U.S.

Congress.

Senate. Committee on Armed Services.

Subcommi.ttee on Manpower and Personnel. Military

recruiting practices.

Hearings, 95th Congress, 2d session.

Oct. 1 0 , 1 2 , 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,

1979. 317 p.

----- Status of the All-Volunteer Armed Force.

Congress, 26 session. June 20, 1978.

Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 286 p.

----- Recruiting in the United States Army.

Congress, 1st session. Nov. 19, 1979.

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 103 p.

Hearing, 95th

Washington, U.S.

Hearing, 96th

Washington,

----- Costs Of the All-Volunteer Force.

Session.

Feb. 6, 1978.

Hearing, 95th Congress, 26

Washington, U.S. Govt. print. off., 1978.

REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS

U.S.

Congress.

House.

Committee on Appropriations.

Making additional funds available by transfer for the

Selective Service System for 1980; report to accompany

H.J.Res. 521. Apr. 18, 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.

Off., 1980.

(96th Congress, 2nd session. House. Report

no. 96-885)

U.S.

Congress.

House. Committee on Armed Services. Department

of Defense Authorization Act, 1982; report to accompany

H.R. 3519. May 19, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.

Off., 1981. (97th Congress, 1st session. House.

Report no.

97-71, Part I)

U.S.

Congress.

House. Selective Service Reform.

Message from

the President of the United States, transmitting his proposal

for Selective Service reform, together with a draft of

proposed legislation to amend the military Selective Service

Act to allow the registration of both men and women, pursuant

to Section 811 of Public Law 96-107. Feb. 1 2 , 1980.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 6 2 p. (96th

Congress, 2nd session. House. Document no. 96-265)

U.S.

Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Making

additional funds available by transfer for the Selective

Service System for 1980; report to accompany H.J.Res. 521.

May 21, 19800 Washington, U.S. Gsvt. Print. Off., 1980.

(96th Congress, 2nd session. Senate. Report no. 96-789)

U.S.

Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Achieving

America's goals: National Service or the All-Volunteer Armed Force*

February 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977: 121 p .

At head of title:

95th Congress, 1 s t session.

Committee print.

LRS77-2100

----- Authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 1982 for military

procurement, research and development, active duty, selected

reserve, and civilian personnel strengths, civil defense, and

for other purposes; report to accompany S. 815. May 6 , 1981.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980.

(97th

Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 97-58)

----- Requiring reinstitution of registration for certain persons

under the Military Selective Service Act, and for other

purposes; report to accompany S. 109. June 1 9 , 1979.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 46 p.

(96th

Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 96-226)

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

06/25/81

-- The Supreme Court ruled that requiring only men and not

women to register for the draft was constitutional.

01/28/81

-- Secretary of Defense Weinberger, testifying

before the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated

that he felt registration might create "social strains"

in American society due to its being equated with

actual conscription.

Secretary Weinberger reiterated

the opposition of the Reagan Administration t o draft

registration, but stated that neither he nor the

President planned to end it at present.

General David

Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated

his support for registration and strongly criticized

the All-Volunteer Force, stating that while i t still

might be made to work with increased compensation its

overall effect had been pernicious for the military

a s a fighting force.

01/13/81

-- In confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed

Services Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense-designate

Frank C. Carlucci 111 stated that he felt that the

All-Volunteer Force should be given "a little more

time to either prove itself, or demonstrate that it

cannot work."

If it did not work, then he would be

prepared to state so after such a test period.

Mr.

Carlucci also supported continuation of standby draft

registration.

01/05/81

-- Registration of all men born in 1962 began.

12/16/80

-- Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated that a declining

Hereafter, all

men born in 1963 or later will be required to register upon

reaching age 18.

number of young men of military age in the mid-1980s may

force the United States to return to the draft at that time.

-- Registration of men born in 1961 began.

07/21/80 -- Registration of men born in 1960 began.

07/28/80

07/02/80

-- President Carter issued Presidential Proclamation 4771,

ordering the registration of men under the Military

Selective Service Act to begin on July 21, 1980.

06/27/80

-- President Carter signed H.J.Res. 521, authorizing

the transfer of funds from the DOD to the Selective

Service System budget to begin registration, into law

(P.L. 96-282).

06/25/80

-- The House approved the Senate version of H.J.Res. 521,

authorizing the transfer of $13.3 million from the

Department of Defense to the Selective Service System

to begin registration of young men.

06/19/80

-- Admiral Thomas Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations,

stated that the All-Volunteer Force was failing

and publicly advocated a return to the draft.

06/12/80

-- The Senate approved (58-34) H.J.Res.

05/13/80

-- The Senate Appropriations Committee reported H.J.Res.

04/29/80

-- By an 8-4 vote, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee

521, transferring

$13.3 million from DoD to the Selective Service

System for purposes of beginning standby draft

registration. An amendment added in

the Senate Appropriations Committee by Senator

Hatfield requiring that registration forms provide

a space for a registrant to indicate whether or not

he was a conscientious objector was deleted on the

floor of the Senate.

521,

transferring $13.3 million from DOD to Selective Service,

with an amendment by Senator Hatfield requiring that

registration forms include space for a registrant to

indicate if he is a conscientious objector.

on HUD-Independent Agencies approved H.Con.Res.

as passed by the House.

04/22/80

521

-- The House approved 218-188 a House Appropriations

Committee recommendation to transfer $13.3 million

to the Selective Service System in order to begin

standby draft registration of 19- and 20-year-old

males this summer. The vote came on an

amendment to H.J.Res. 521, which originally

provided $4.7 million to upgrade the standby status of

Selective Service short of requiring registration.

04/17/80

-- The House Appropriations Committee voted 26-23 to

transfer $13.3 million from the DOD to the Selective

Service System in order to begin the registration of

males ages 1 9 and 20.

03/09/88

-- The House Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee

voted 8 to 1 to exclude women from President Carter's

draft registration plan.

03/05/80

-- The Administration's request for FY80 supplemental

funds for Selective Service ran into a snag a s

Congress learnea it had exceeded its spending limit

for FY80.

The Administration's money proposal for

registration was frozen until either Congress approved

a third concurrent resolution or other funds were

found in the FY8O budget for transfer

t o Selective Service.

02/27/80

-- The House Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD and

Independent Agencies, on a tie 6-6 vote, defeated

the Administration's request for funds to begin

draft registration.

The subcommittee recommended an

appropriation of $4.3 million to enable Selective

Service to prepare to register, but not to begin it.

02/08/80

-- President Carter requested that the Congress approve

mandatory registration of both men and women for the

draft.

Persons turning age 1 9 and 2 0 in 1980 would

begin registering in the summer of 1980. Those turning 18

i n 1980 would have to register later in 1980,

and in 1981 and thereafter each

person would be required to register upon reaching

their 18th birthday.

The President stated that he had no

intention of modifying current policies or

statutes which bar women from various combat

assignments.

The President reiterated

his position that he saw no need a t the time for a

reinstitution of actual conscription.

01/23/80

-- In his State of the Union message, President Carter

announced that he had "determined that the Selective

Service System must now be revitalized."

He stated

that in February 1980 he would send legislation and

budget proposals to the Congress to begin standby

draft registration to "meet future mobilization needs

rapidly as they arise.''

09/12/79

-- By a recorded vote of 252-163, the full House defeated

a measure proposed by the House Armed Services Committee

i n the FY80 Defense appropriation authorization bill

(H.R. 4040) to begin standby draft registration of

18-year-old males in 1981.

06/11/79

-- The Senate Armed Services Committee voted 12-5

i n favor of S. 109, a s amended, which requires the

President to commence registering 18- to 26-year-oid

males effective Jan. 2, 1980.

05/15/79

-- The House Armed Services Committee approved its version

of the FY8O DOD Appropriation Authorization bill,

requiring the President to commence standby draft

registration on Jan. 1 , 1981, of males who become 1 8

after Dec. 31, 1980.

03/13/79

-- In testimony before the Manpower and Personnel

Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee,

General Bernard W. Rogers, Army Chief of Staff, proposed

resumption of the draft in order to bring the Army

Individual Ready Reserve to war requirements strength.

Later in the same day, Secretary

of the Army Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., issued a statement

directly disagreeing with that of General Rogers.

Secretary Alexander stated that there was no need for a

return to the draft at the present time, and that such

a return would be "unnecessary, unfair, and

counterproductive11 to the Army's interests.

01/29/79

-- Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, in congressional

testimony supporting an upgrading of the standby

Selective Service System, stated that any new legislation

requiring standby draft registration should apply

to young women a s well a s young men.

He did not, however,

endorse the resumption of standby registration.

General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, i n similar congressional testimony, did

endorse the resumption of standby registration, but

stated that the inclusion of women in such registration

(and possible actual conscription) would not fill

actual manpower needs for large numbers of ground

combat replacements for anticipated casualties and

force expansion.

03/18/77

-- Army

Chief of Staff General Bernard W. Rogers stated

that if i t becomes necessary to resume a peacetime

draft, "very serious consideration must be given"

to making women subject to it.

03/01/77

-- President Carter stated that he had no intention a t the

present time of asking the Congress to reinstitute the

draft, but that he would not hesitate to do so if

needed.

The President further stated that if a return t o

the draft were required, he would be inclined to make

it "more comprehensiven than the pre-1973 system.

He

specifically mentioned not allowing draft deferments for

college students.

10/01/76

-- The Selective Service System completed strength reductions

necessary to place it in "deep standbyn status, and thus

incapable of meeting DOD mobilization requirements for

draftees.

01/23/76

-- The annual registration of potential Selective Service

System draftees scheduled for spring 1976 was cancelled.

84/30/75

-- A11 Selective Service System registration and classification

procedures were totally suspended.

11/28/74

-- Under a special early release program, the last draftees

remaining in the Army on other than a voluntary basis

were allowed to separate from the Army up to a month

early.

These men had been drafted during September-December

1972.

86/30/73

-- The legal authority of the President to induct men into

the Armed Forces expired, with certain minor exceptions.

Q1/27/73

-- Upon the signing of the Vietnam peace agreement, the

Department of Defense announced that all involuntary

inductions would cease immediately.

12/31/72

-- What eventually became the last draftees to enter the

Armed Forces were inducted.

09/28/71

-- With the signing of P.L. 92-129 (the 197% amendments to the

Military Selective Service Act) into law, the three-month

gap i n the authority of the President to induct individuals

into the Armed Forces ended and drafting individuals

was legally authorized until June 3 0 , 1973.

06/30/71

-- The authority of the President to induct individuals

into the Armed Forces expired in the middle of debate

on the proposed Military Selective Service A c t amendments

of 1971.

04/23/70

-- President Nixon proposed in a message to Congress that

induction authority be extended until June 30, 1973,

and that thereafter the Armed Forces be mannea solely

by volunteers.

02/20/70

-- The Gates Commission submitted its report witn favorable

recommendations toward creating an All-Volunteer Force.

03/27/69

-- The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed

Force (the Gates Commission) was created.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES

Coffey, Kenneth J.

Strategic implications o f the All-Volunteer

Force: the conventional defense of Central Europe.

Chapel

University of North Carolina press, 1979.

Hill, N.C.:

Military manpower and the all-volunteer

Cooper, Richard V. L.

force.

Report R-1450-ARPA.

Santa Monica, Calif., the

Rand Corporation, Sept. 1977. 4 0 7 p.

All-Volunteer Force and American society.

Keeley, John B., ed.

Charlottesville, Virginia: University press of Virginia, 1978.

Laird, Melvin R.

People, not hardware:

the highest defense

priority.

Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public

Policy Research, 1980.

2 4 p.

Moskos, Charles C. Saving the All-Volunteer Force.

interest, fall 1980: 74-89.

The Public

Moskos, Charles C. and Morris Janowitz. Five years of the

All-Volunteer Force; 1973-1978. Armed Forces and society,

Feb. 1979: 171-218.

The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.

Force The Gates Commission

Off., Feb. 1970. 211 p.

.

Selective Service System.

Semiannual reports of the director of

Washington, U.S. Govt.

selective service, Jan. 1 , 1973-Present.

Print. Off ., 1973-.

U.S.

Congressional Budget Office.

Improving the readiness of the

Army Reserve and National Guard: a framework for

debate. Budget issues paper for fiscal year 1979. Washington,

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., February 1978. 5 8 p.

----- Costs of manning the active-duty military; staff working paper.

Washington, U.S.

Govt. Print. Off., May 1980.

4 7 p.

----- Costs of the National Service Act (H.R. 2206): A Technical

Analysis.

Staff Working Paper.

Off., Dec. 1980. 4 2 p .

Washington, U.S.

Govt. Print.

----- National service programs and their effects on military

manpower and civilian youth problems.

Budget issue paper

for fiscal year 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.

Off., January 1978. 9 3 p.

----- The Selective Service System:

mobilization

capabilities and options for improvement.

Budget issues paper for fiscal year 1980. Washington,

U.S.

Govt. Print. Off., November 1978. 53 p.

U.S.

Defense Manpower Commission.

Defense manpower:

the keystone

of national security. Report to the President and the Congress.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Apr. 1976. 5 1 8 p.

U.S.

Dept. of Defense. Annual Report of Secretary of Defense Harold

Brown, FY82.

Jan. 1 9 , 1981.

Washington, 1981

317 p. +

appendixes.

----- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower,

Reserve Affairs, and Logistics).

America's volunteers:

a report o n the all-volunteer armed forces, Dec. 3 1 , 1978.

Washington, 1978.

390 p.

----- Office of the Deputy Assistant of Defense (Reserve

Affairs).

Reserve compensation system study final

report and supporting papers.

Washington, Department

of Defense, processed, June 30, 1978: 4 vols.

----- Manpower Requirements Report for FY82.

1981 . 231 p.

Washington, February

Manpower requirements report for FY82.

4 0 p.

1981

.

U.S.

Pension

Washington, April

General Accounting Office. Additional cost of the

all-volunteer force. Report to the Congress by the

Comptroller General of the United States.

GAO report

Feb. 6 , 1978.

183 p.

nos. FPCD-78-11, B-157371.

----- Actions to improve parts of the military manpower mobilization

systems a r e underway.

Report to the Honorable Bennet M. Stewa-rt

by the Comptroller Genera1 of the United States.

GAO Report nos.

FPCD-80-58 and B-199333.

July 22, 1980. 14 p.

----- Can the Army and Air Force Reserves support the Active Force

effectively? Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General

of the United States.

GAO report nos. LCD-79-404 and B-146964.

Apr. 25, 1979.

Washington 1979.

173 p.

----- Can the individual Reserves fill mobilization needs?

Report

to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United

States.

GAO report nos. FPCD-79-3, B-148167.

June 28,

1979.

3 4 p.

----- Critical manpower problems restrict the use of National

Guard and Reserve forces.

Report to the Congress by the

Comptroller General of the United States.

GAO report nos.

FPCD-79-58, B-157371.

July 1 1 , 1979.

111 p.

----- Difficulties in selected Army Reserves recruiting under the

All-Volunteer Force.

Report to the Congress by the

Comptroller General of the United States.

GAO report nos.

FPCD-79-71 and B-157371.

Aug. 2 0 , 1979.

Washington 1979.

----- Efficiency of Reserve and Guard training has improved since

1974, but more can be done. Report to the Congress by the

Comptroller General of the United States.

GAO report nos.

FPCD-79-59, B-179230.

July 30, 1979.

71 p.

26 p.

CRS ISSUE BRIEF 77032--MILITARY

MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

TABLES "A"

PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTED RECRUITING OBJECTIVE MET, FY 73-PRESENT

Army

Navy

Marine Corps

A i r Force

DoD T o t a l

ACTUAL AND AUTHORIZED ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY STRENGTHS, I N THOUSANDS FY 64-PRESENT

(AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS I N PARENTHESES)

Army

FY 64

FY 73

FY 77

FY 78

FY 79

FY 8 0

FY 8 1 ( 3 1 May 8 1 )

9 7 3 (NA)

810 ( 8 2 9 )

782 ( 7 8 9 )

772 ( 7 8 7 )

759 ( 7 7 6 )

777 ( 7 7 7 )

774 ( 7 7 5 )

Navy

668 (NA)

565 ( 6 0 2 )

530 ( 5 4 1 )

530 ( 5 3 6 )

524 ( 5 2 4 )

527 ( 5 2 8 )

540 ( 5 3 7 )

Marine Corps

Air Force

DoD T o t a l

190 (NA)

196 ( 1 9 8 )

192 (192)

191 (192)

185 (190)

188 ( 1 8 9 )

186 ( 1 8 8 )

857 (NA)

691 ( 7 0 1 )

571 ( 5 7 1 )

570 ( 5 7 1 )

559 ( 5 6 6 )

558 ( 5 5 8 )

564 ( 5 6 5 )

2 , 6 8 7 (NA)

2,253 (2,330)

2,075 (2,093)

2,062 (2,085)

2,027 (2,056)

2,050 (2,052)

2,065 (2,065)

NONPRIOR SERVICE ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTMENTS, MEN AND WOMEN,

PERCENT H I G H SCHOOL DIPLOMA GRADUATES

Army

FY 6 4

FY 73

FY 77

FY 78

FY 79

FY 8 0

FY 8 1 ( 1 s t H a l f )

Navy

Marine Corps

A i r Force

DoD T o t a l

CRS ISSUE BRIEF 77032--MILITARY

MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

TABLES "A"

( CONTINUED)

BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF NONPRIOR SERVICE ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTMENTS,

MEN AND WOMEN, FY 73-PRESENT

Amy

Navy

Marine Corps

"Includes males only, o t h e r minorities:

( ~ a v yi n c l u d e s b l a c k s o n l y ) .

A i r Force

DoD

A s i a n American and I n d i a n s

BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTED STRENGTH,

MEN AND WOMEN, END FY 73-PRESENT

Amy

Navy

Marine Corps

A i r Force

DoD

WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY STRENGTH, END FY 73-PRESENT

FY 6 4

FY 73

FY 77

FY 78

FY 79

FY 80

FY 81 ( 2 8 Feb 8 1 )

Amy

Navy

Marine Corps

1.2

2.5

6.6

7.5

7.8

8.9

9.2

1.2

2.2

4.4

4.7

5.4

6.6

6.9

0.8

1.2

2.0

2.6

3 .O

3.6

3.7

A i r Force

DoD

1 .0

2.9

7 .0

8.7

9.4

10.8

11.1

1.1

2.5

5.7

6.6

7.2

8.4

8.6

CRS ISSUE BRIEF 77032--MILITARY

MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

TABLES "A"

( CONTINUED)

NONPRIOR SERVICE ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTMENTS, MEN AND WOMEN, PERCENT I N MENTAL

CATEGORIES I , 11, AND I11 (SUPERIOR, ABOVE AVERAGE, AND AVERAGE INTELLIGENCE)**

Army

Navy

Marine Corps

A i r Force

DoD T o t a l

**All- DoD m e n t a l t e s t s c o r e s f o r FY 1976-1980 were d i s c o v e r e d t o be i n v a l i d .

Recent a n a l y s i s h a s r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e s e s c o r e s s u b s t a n t i a l l y u n d e r s t a t e d t h e

p r o p o r t i o n of r e c r u i t s i n Mental Category I V (below a v e r a g e ) and o v e r s t a t e d t h e

p r o p o r t i o n i n Mental Category I11 ( a v e r a g e ) . The p r o p o r t i o n s of r e c r u i t s i n

Mental Category I and I1 ( s u p e r i o r and. above a v e r a g e ) were a p p a r e n t l y r e c o r d e d

somewhat more a c c u r a t e l y by t h e o r i g i n a l t e s t s ; DoD found l e s s e r r o r i n t h e i r

c a s e . These s c o r e s f o r FY 1976-1980 r e p r e s e n t r e c o m p u t a t i o n s of t h e o r i g i n a l

raw d a t a t o c o r r e c t f o r t h e e r r o r s d i s c o v e r e d . A new t e s t , designed t o avoid

t h e e r r o r s of t h e o l d , was i n t r o d u c e d a t t h e beginning of FY 1981.

CRS ISSUE BRIEF 77032--MILITARY

MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

TABLES "B"

SELECTED RESERVE MILITARY STRENGTHS, END FY 73-PRESENT (IN THOUSANDS)

Army N a t l Army

Guard Reserve

Naval

Reserve

Marine Corps

Reserve

A i r Natl

Guard

A i r Force

Reserve

DoD

Total

FY 64

FY 70

N 73

FY 77

N 78

FY 79

N 80

FY 8 1

(30 Apr

SELECTED RESERVE NONPRIOR SERVICE MALE ENLISTMENTS, PERCENT HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA GRADUATES*

Army N a t l

Guard

Army

Reserve

Naval

Marine Corps

Reserve

Reserve

A i r Natl

Guard

A i r Force

Reserve

DoD

Total

95

68

45

39

38

43

41

SELECTED RESERVE NONPRIOR SERVICE MALE ENLISTMENTS, PERCENT I N MENTAL

CATEGORIES 1-111 (SUPERIOR, ABOVE AVERAGE, AND AVERAGE)

Army Nat'b Army

Guard

Reserve

FY 70

N 73

FY 77*

N 78**

FY 79**

FY 80""

FY 81 ( 1 s t H a l f )

95

69

NA

NA

NA

NA

88

95

88

NA

NA

NA

NA

77

Naval

Reserve

Marine Corps

Reserve

A i r Natl

Guard

A i r Force

Reserve

DoD

Total

100

99

NA

NA

NA

NA

89

98

78

NA

NA

NA

NA

91

99

97

NA

NA

NA

NA

100

98

89

NA

NA

NA

NA

98

95

85

NA

NA

72

73

86

*A s i g n i f i c a n t m i n o r i t y of non-high s c h o o l g r a d u a t e r e c r u i t s a r e i n t h e i r s e n i o r

y e a r of h i g h s c h o o l r a t h e r t h a n d r o p o u t s .

**All DoD mental t e s t s c o r e s f o r FY 1976-1980 were d i s c o v e r e d t o be i n v a l i d . Recent

a n a l y s i s has revealed t h a t these scores s u b s t a n t i a l l y understated the proportion of

r e c r u i t s i n Mental Category I V (below a v e r a g e ) and o v e r s t a t e d t h e p r o p o r t i o n i n Mental

Category I11 ( a v e r a g e ) . The p r o p o r t i o n s of r e c r u i t s i n Mental Category I and I1 ( s u p e r i o r

and above a v e r a g e ) were a p p a r e n t l y r e c o r d e d somewhat more a c c u r a t e l y by t h e o r i g i n a l

t e s t s ; DoD found l e s s e r r o r i n t h e i r c a s e . A new t e s t , designed t o avoid e r r o r s of t h e

o l d , was i n t r o d u c e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of FY 1981. Recomputations of t h e o r i g i n a l raw

d a t a f o r S e l e c t e d Reserve r e c r u i t s i n N 1977-1979 have n o t y e t been completed; o n l y

p a r t i a l r e c o m p u t a t i o n s of t h e t e s t s c o r e s of S e l e c t e d Reserve r e c r u i t s i n FY 1979-1980

are available.

CRS ISSUE BRIEF 77032--MILITARY

MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

TABLES "B"

(CONTINUED)

WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF SELECTED ReSERVE STRENGTH, END FY 71-PRESENT

Army N a t l

Guard

Army

Reserve

Naval

Reserve

M a r i n e Corps

Reserve

Air Natl

Guard

Air Force

Reserve

DoD

Total

FY 71

FY 73

FY 77

FY 78

FY 79

FY 8 0

FY 8 1

( 3 0 Apr

BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH, END FY 71-PRESENT

Army Natl

Guard

FY 71

1.2

FY 73

3.2

FY 77

14.5

16.5

FY 78

FY 79

16.9

FY 8 0

16.7

16.4

FY 8 1

( 3 0 Apr 8 1 )

Army

Reserve

Naval

Reserve

M a r i n e Corps

Reserve

A i r Natl

Guard

A i r Force

Reserve

DoD

Total

2.2

5.6

19.6

21.6

23.3

23.6

23.6

2.0

3.5

5.9

5.9

6.7

7.1

7.5

3.2

12.6

18.0

19.3

20.1

19.9

19.7

1.O

2.0

5.7

6.4

6.8

7.1

7.2

2.8

4.2

11.8

13.2

14.0

14.3

14.3

1.7

4.2

13.8

15.4

1 6 .O

16.3

16.3

CRS ISSUE BRIEF 77032--MILITARY

MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

TABLE "C'@

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE STRENGTHS, END FY 73-PRESENT (IN THOUSANDS)

Army

Navy

M a r i n e Corps

A i r Force

DoD

FY 73

759

FY 77

160

FY 78

177

FY 79

206

21 2

FY 80

FY 8 1

211

( 3 0 Apr 8 1 )

21 7

106

93

86

97

104

116

45

40

59

57

51

137

64

46

44

47

44

1,229

375

356

396

413

410

TABLES "D"

UNADJUSTED FIRST-TERM REENLISTMENT RATES FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL*

( p e r c e n t a g e of t h o s e e l i g i b l e )

Marine

Corps

Army

-

Air

Force

FY 64

FY 73

FY 74

FY 75

28

38

33

39

N 76

21

N 77

33

N 78

36

FY 79

43

FY 80

51

FY 81 ( 1 s t H a l f ) 59

UNADJUSTED CAREER SECOND-TERM AND LATER REELISTMENT RATES FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL*

( p e r c e n t a g e of t h o s e e l i g i b l e )

Army

Navy

Marine

Corps

-

Air

Force

DoD

TX~

FY 64

FY 73

84

63

FY 74

75

FY 75

75

FY 76

71

FY 77

70

FY 78

69

FY 79

66

FY 80

69

FY 81 ( 1 s t H a l f ) 74

* S t a t i s t i c s h e r e do n o t i n c l u d e d r a f t e e s , b u t pre-FY 1976 f i g u r e s

i n c l u d e a s u b s t a n t i a l p r o p o r t i o n of v o l u n t a r y e n l i s t e e s whose o r i g i n a l

e n l i s t m e n t was undoubtedly d r a f t - i n d u c e d .

The "unadjusted" r e e n l i s t m e n t

r a t e i s d e f i n e d a s " t h e r a t i o of t o t a l r e e n l i s t m e n t s o c c u r r i n g i n a

g i v e n p e r i o d t o t o t a l s e p a r a t i o n s of p e r s o n n e l e l i g i b l e t o r e e n l i s t

i n t h e same p e r i o d , e x p r e s s e d a s a percentage."

TABLE "E'@

PERCENTAGE OF ACTIVE DUTY MALI3 FIRST-TERM ENLISTEES WHO FAIL TO

COMPLETE THREE YEARS OF INITIAL SERVICE*

(Based on Year of E n t r y i n t o S e r v i c e )

%.Y.

Marine

Corps

Air

Force

Do D

T

~

These groups have n o t had time t o complete t h e i r f u l l

*Estimated.

t h r e e y e a r s of s e r v i c e .

I