Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations

Order Code IB10027

CRS Issue Brief for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military

Operations

Updated July 8, 2003

Steve Bowman

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS

SUMMARY

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Background

Military Operations

The Air Campaign

Ground Force Operations — KFOR (Operation Joint Guardian)

Military-Technical Agreement (MTA)

KFOR Operations

Albanian Insurgency – Presevo Valley and Macedonia

Presevo Valley

Macedonia

Costs of Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian

Congressional Appropriations

LEGISLATION

FOR ADDITIONAL READING

CRS Reports

World Wide Web Sites

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Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations

SUMMARY

With the failure of the Rambouillet peace

talks and violence against ethnic Albanian

civilians escalating, on March 24, 1999

NATO began Operation Allied Force airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo.

In all, NATO aircraft flew over 37,000 sorties

in the 78-day air campaign. At the end of the

campaign about 1,100 aircraft were participating, with the United States contributing about

725. Of the total aircraft, about 535 were

strike aircraft, (U.S. 323/Allied 213). Thirteen

of NATO’s 19 nations contributed aircraft to

the operation, with 8 nations’ aircraft flying

combat missions. The only NATO fatalities in

Operation Allied Force were two U.S. Apache

helicopter pilots killed in a training accident in

Albania.

With the air campaign escalating, on

June 4, 1999, Yugoslavia accepted a peace

proposal devised at a G-8 summit, and on

June 8, signed a military-technical agreement

with NATO officials providing for the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo

and turning military control of the province

over to NATO’s peacekeeping forces (KFOR).

On June 10, 1999, the U.N. Security Council

Resolution 1244 endorsed the peace settlement and “an international security presence

with substantial NATO participation.”

Dubbed Operation Joint Guardian,

KFOR totals about 30,000 in Kosovo, The

United States has about 2,500 troops in Kosovo and 1,000 troops in near-by countries

providing support to operations in both Koso-

Congressional Research Service

vo and Bosnia. The U.S. has suffered no

casualties from hostile action.

Albanian insurgencies in southern Serbia

and Macedonia led NATO to permit the reintroduction of the Yugoslav army into the

Ground Safety Zone around Kosovo, and

increase efforts to seal the Kosovo border.

Subsequently the Presavo Valley insurgents

signed an amnesty agreement with the Serb

government. In Macedonia, the Albanian

nationalists and the government have reached

an agreement that would grant many of the

insurgents’ demands for equal political status,

pending parliamentary approval. NATO

troops have assisted in the voluntary collection the nationalists’ arms, and will continue

to maintain a small operation (450) dubbed

Allied Harmony to monitor the peace agreement. The European Union assumed command of this mission on April 1, 2003.

Congressional concerns have focused on

the impact of Balkan operations on overall

military readiness, and whether there has been

an equitable distribution of responsibilities

among the NATO allies or if the United States

needs to participate in KFOR at all. Congress

has appropriated approximately $8.63 billion

for Kosovo operations through FY2003. In

keeping with congressional direction, costs for

Balkan peacekeeping operations after FY2002

are no longer separately budgeted, but rather

are included in the individual armed services

regular operating budgets. For FY2004, DOD

has requested $936 million defense-wide for

Kosovo operations.

˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

On April 1, responsibility for the peace-keeping mission in Macedonia transferred from

NATO to the European Union. The EU force in Macedonia , dubbed Operation Concordia,

will comprise 320 military and 80 civilian personnel, and be under French command.

U.S. troops in Kosovo total about 2,500 representing about 10% of the 25,000 NATO

and non-NATO troops deployed. Other nations contributing large contingents include Italy,

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Background

Once an autonomous province of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo has a 90% ethnic

Albanian population. It nevertheless holds an emotional place in Serbian nationalist

tradition. As part of his nationalist program, Yugoslav President Milosevic revoked

Kosovo’s autonomous status, putting it under control of the Serbian-dominated Belgrade

government. An armed ethnic Albanian resistance movement developed, led by the so-called

Kosovo Liberation Army. The Belgrade government responded in early 1998 with counterinsurgency operations, with Yugoslav military ground units and aircraft destroying villages

and executing civilians suspected of supporting the insurgents.

In 1998, NATO political leaders turned their attention to the Kosovo region because of

the flow of refugees into Western Europe and Albania (itself destabilized by regional

uprisings in 1997), and concerns about the conflict spilling over into the Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). FYROM, an independent nation bordering Kosovo to the

southeast, also has a large Albanian population alienated from its central government.

In May 1998, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s governing body, directed accelerated

assessment of “a full range of options with the mission of halting or disrupting a systematic

campaign of violent repression in Kosovo.” Options considered included; 1) preventative

deployments in Albania and FYROM to stabilize the borders; 2) declaration of no-fly/no tank

zones in Kosovo and enforcement of them with NATO air forces; 3) direct military

intervention either through airstrikes or ground troops deployments; and 4) peacekeeping

deployments in the event of a political resolution. On June 15, 1998, NATO launched a 6hour overflight of Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Code-named

Determined Falcon, the exercise involved 80 aircraft from 13 NATO air forces (Canada,

Luxembourg, and Iceland not participating), and was conducted from 15 airbases in 5

countries. Twenty-seven U.S. land and carrier-based aircraft took part.

On September 24, 1998, NATO defense ministers authorized an “activation warning”

for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in Kosovo. On October 12, NATO defense

ministers authorized an “activation order,” placing the necessary forces under the NATO

command. The following day, it was announced that U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke had

negotiated an agreement with Serbian leader Milosevic that postponed the threat of airstrikes

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if the Serbian government 1) would reduce its troops and security forces in Kosovo to “precrisis” levels; 2) permit unarmed NATO reconnaissance flights over Kosovo; 3) accede to

an international force of 2,000 unarmed civilian monitors to oversee the ceasefire; and 4)

begin meaningful negotiations towards Kosovar autonomy.

Meaningful negotiations never took place, owing to recalcitrance on both sides, and

sporadic violence continued, with increasing reports of Serbian executions of Albanian

civilians. Concerned over escalating violence, and its possible spread to other areas of the

Balkans, on January 30, 1999, the NATO allies authorized Secretary-General Solana to order

airstrikes anywhere in Yugoslavia, if the warring Serb and Albanian factions had not reached

a peace settlement by February 20.

The “Contact Group,” an informal forum of representatives from the United States, the

United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia dealing with Balkan crises, devised a

framework for a peace settlement. They did not wish to encourage continued fighting for

Kosovar independence, but rather sought a settlement that would restore Kosovo’s autonomy

within Yugoslavia. However, the Serb government did not agree to the framework, the socalled Rambouillet Agreement, and the talks adjourned.

During March 1999, Yugoslav Army and paramilitary Ministry of Interior troops moved

out of garrison in Kosovo in violation of the October agreement, and about 20,000 additional

Serb troops massed at the northern Kosovo border. With violence against ethnic Albanian

civilians escalating, on March 24, NATO began airstrikes against targets in Serbia and

Kosovo. These airstrikes were the first military offensive action undertaken by NATO

without specific U.N. endorsement. U.N. Security Council approval was not sought because

both Russia and China, each with veto power on the Council, continue to oppose the use of

force to resolve the Kosovo crisis. The September 23, 1998 U.N. Security Council resolution,

which called for the immediate withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, did,

however, reference the U.N. Charter’s Article VII, which permits military force to maintain

international security.

NATO defined five conditions for ending it air campaign:

!

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!

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Cessation of Serb operations against the Albanians in Kosovo;

Withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo;

Acceptance of Kosovar democratic self-government;

Acceptance of a NATO-led peacekeeping force; and

Return of Kosovar refugees.

On May 6 1999, at the G-8 economic summit, a another set of principles for a peace

settlement were agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany,

Japan, Canada, Italy, and Russia. Russian acceptance was regarded as a major step forward

in increasing the pressure on Milosevic to accede to NATO demands. These G-8 principles

were:

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!

!

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Immediate end to the violence.

Withdrawal of all Yugoslav military and other security forces.

Deployment of UN- endorsed international civil and security presences.

Interim international administration with U.N. Security Council approval.

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Return of all refugees, and access for aid organizations.

Substantial self-government for Kosovo.

Economic development of the region.

On June 4,1999, the Yugoslav government accepted the provisions of the G-8 peace

plan, and on June 9 NATO and Yugoslav military officials signed a Military-Technical

Agreement (MTA) which provided for the phased withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces form

Kosovo by June 20, 1999, and details the authority of the KFOR commander to enforce the

peace agreement with all means necessary. On June 10 1999, the United Nations Security

Council passed a resolution (No. 2580), endorsing the peace-keeping mission under Chapter

VII of the U.N. Charter, which authorizes the use of force. Also on June 10, NATO

suspended the air campaign upon evidence of Yugoslav forces beginning to withdraw from

Kosovo.

Military Operations

The Air Campaign

On March 24, 1999, NATO began air operations, code-named Operation Allied Force,

against targets primarily in Serbia and Kosovo. DOD defined the mission as attacking the

Yugoslav military infrastructure with the objective of deterring future attacks on Albanian

Kosovars and degrading the ability of Yugoslav forces to carry out these operations. Target

selection focused on airfields, air defense and communication centers, military barracks, and

some equipment production facilities. Attacks then extended to logistical support facilities

and lines of resupply, Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo, and the national electrical and

television systems. In total, NATO aircraft flew over 35,000 sorties (1 aircraft flight), about

one-third of which were strike sorties, launching about 23,000 munitions. Initially, cloudy

weather over Kosovo severely hampered attack aircraft equipped with laser-guided

munitions, and also reduced the ability to locate and target Yugoslav ground units. In

addition to the weather conditions, a strong concern over minimal risk to NATO pilots

dictated that low-level flights to attack ground units not be undertaken until Serb air defenses

had been sufficiently degraded. The desire to avoid any collateral civilian casualties (Serb

or Albanian) also constrained targeting.

NATO HQ acknowledged that the air campaign did not impede the Serb operations to

drive the Albanian population from Kosovo. The inability to stop Serb operations brought

strong criticism of the decision to launch the air campaign while completely ruling out any

use of ground forces. Aside from official NATO and Administration spokesmen, few, if any,

observers believed that air power alone could achieve the desired objectives. Press reports

indicated that NATO political leaders were cautioned of an air campaign’s potential

shortfalls, but believed that domestic public opinion would not support a ground invasion of

Kosovo. It was then perceived as a choice between “do nothing” or proceed with air strikes.

Some also suggested that in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, some advocates have

overemphasized the capabilities of air power, encouraging the belief that ground forces are

no longer as crucial to achieving military objectives.

There was also criticism that “command by committee” hampered NATO military

leaders’ ability to wage an effective, rapidly responsive campaign. Target lists, weapons

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used, and forces deployed were all subject to prior approval by all NATO governments. This

slowed decisionmaking, constrained operations, and sometimes emphasized political over

military considerations. However, NATO officials maintain that SACEUR received all

resources requested, and emphasized that this consensual process was critical to ensuring the

cohesion of the alliance. A more fundamental criticism is that the air campaign’s actual

objective from the start was political, not military — i.e., to bring President Milosevic back

to the bargaining table. This, in turn, contributed to a constrained, incremental approach to

targeting.

After the air operation, Secretary Cohen, SACEUR Gen. Clark, and the Chairman of

NATO’s Military Committee Gen. Klaus Naumann all recommended that NATO’s decisionmaking processes for conducting a military campaign be examined and, in some way,

streamlined. None, however, offered specific suggestions, noting that any changes made

would have to gain and sustain acceptance by all NATO members. NATO’s current structure

and procedures were created to deal with homeland defense against invasion. Out-of-area

operations like Allied Force present different political constraints and military requirements.

Some have suggested greater delegation of authority to SACEUR, once the alliance has made

the decision to carry out a military operation. However, within an alliance of democracies

which maintains full consensus as a fundamental principle, this approach may not achieve

acceptance. In addressing this issue, Gen. Clark emphasized that, structural reforms aside,

“there has to be a strong political consensus founded on a common perception of military

doctrine to overcome the obstacles we hit in the air campaign”. (Senate Armed Services

Committee hearing, July 20, 1999)

In responding to the critics of the air campaign, Gen. Naumann has noted that NATO

planned for a limited operation from the outset, and made this fact public, while President

Milosevic “planned for a war”. Naumann also observed that NATO threatened military

action, without having a consensus on how it would be carried out, thereby precluding its

military commanders’ use of “overwhelming force from the beginning.” (Defense News,

July 20, 1999)

In the wake of the Yugoslav acceptance of NATO peace conditions, supporters of

reliance upon NATO airpower believe they have been vindicated in their approach. They

emphasize that NATO sustained no combat fatalities in the course of the 78-day campaign,

and that the complete withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo was achieved. The air

campaign’ critics, however, point to the fact that it did not prevent the expulsion of almost

the entire Albanian population of Kosovo.

The Department of Defense Joint Staff provided the following initial statistical

summary of the 78-day air campaign:

Total sorties: 37,200

! U.S.: 23,208 (62%)

! Allies: 13,992 (38%)

Strike sorties: 9,500

! U.S.: 5,035 (53%)

! Allies: 4,465 (47%)

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Intelligence/reconnaissance sorties: 1,200

! U.S.: 948 (79%)

! Allies: 252 (21%)

Support sorties: 26,500

! U.S.: 17,225 (65%)

! Allies: 9,275 (35%)

On October 14, 2000, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton provided the Senate Armed

Services Committee with DOD’s preliminary “lessons learned” observations

[http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/lessons/acw.html]. The final version Report to

Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report was issued January 31, 2000

shortly before the FY2001 budget submission. Among the issues addressed, were the

following:

Parallel U.S. and NATO command and control structures complicated

operational planning and maintenance of unity of command. Disparities

between U.S. capabilities and those of our allies, including precision strike,

mobility, and command, control, and communications capabilities impeded

U.S. ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with NATO allies.

! DoD needs to develop options for earlier and more efficient use of its

reserve forces.

! DoD systems for planning and executing transportation of its forces were

strained by the rapidly evolving requirements.

! The heavy commitment of NATO’s air defense suppression forces indicates

the need to find innovative and affordable ways to exploit our technological

skills in electronic combat.

! Success using the latest generation of air-delivered munitions systems in

Kosovo validates plans to increase inventories.

! Task Force Hawk (U.S. ground troops in Albania) pointed out the need to

regularly experiment with the independent use of key elements of all of our

forces without their usual supporting elements.

! Improved unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) mission planning, improved

processes for interaction between UAV operators and manned aircraft,

frequent and realistic training opportunities, and equipment upgrades for

individual UAVs all would benefit force effectiveness.

! Humanitarian operations highlighted the importance of such resources as

linguists and civil affairs personnel, engineering assets capable of

emergency repair of roads and bridges in very austere environments,

detailed maps, and prepositioned stocks

!

Ground Force Operations — KFOR (Operation Joint Guardian)

Because air operations did not stop Serb operations against Kosovar Albanians, public

discussion of NATO ground force intervention was widespread. U.S. and NATO spokesmen

continued to maintain there was no intention to introduce ground troops without “a

permissive environment.” In the latter weeks of the air campaign, the British government

began to push for ground intervention, but was unable to win the support of other alliance

members. Though President Clinton and others publically made the point that no option was

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permanently “off the table”, and NATO HQ re-examined the military requirements for an

invasion of Kosovo and even Serbia, at no time did there appear alliance-wide support of

offensive ground operations. Indeed, several member governments, particularly Greece,

Italy, and Germany were publically adamant in their opposition.

With the Yugoslav acceptance of the peace plan devised by the G-8 and proposed to the

Yugoslav government by Finnish President Ahtisaari, the focus turned to Operation Joint

Guardian, the peace-keeping mission to be undertaken by KFOR. To facilitate this operation,

NATO obtained the Yugoslav acceptance of a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA)

prepared by NATO on June 9, 1999. The following day, the United Nations Security

Council passed a resolution (S/RES/1244) endorsing the peace plan and an “international

security presence” in Kosovo for its enforcement. On the same day, June 10 , NATO

Secretary-General Solana reported that Serb forces were beginning to withdraw from Kosovo

and ordered suspension of the air campaign. On June 17, with the withdrawal of Yugoslav

troops and police complete, NATO officially terminated the air campaign.

KFOR did not begin deploying into Kosovo until June 12, 1999, reportedly waiting to

synchronize its deployment with the withdrawal of Serb forces in order to avoid co-mingling

forces. This delay, however, allowed time for a 200-strong contingent of Russian troops to

leave their SFOR station in Bosnia and occupy the airport in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital.

Reportedly planned by the Russian General Staff, and endorsed by president Yeltsin, to

ensure Russia a high-profile role in KFOR. This action occasioned high-level U.S.-Russian

negotiations. An agreement reached on June 18, 1999 provides for shared control of Pristina

airport operations, with Russian participation in airport ground operations and air operations

under KFOR control. In addition, Russia deploys troops in the U.S., German, and French

sectors. These troops are be under a unified KFOR command, with a Russian general officer

at KFOR HQ. Russia does not have an independent territorial sector as it initially demanded.

NATO refused to grant Russia an independent territorial sector, believing that could be the

first step toward a permanent partitioning of the province. To date, KFOR commanders have

praised the Russian troops for their professionalism.

Military-Technical Agreement (MTA). After some initial recalcitrance, Yugoslav

military officials signed the MTA on June 9, 1999. The MTA affirms the terms of the peace

plan, and provides specific details of its implementation. Some of the main provisions are:

KFOR will deploy and operate without hindrance.

KFOR has the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain

a secure environment, and to carry out its mission, the KFOR commander

has the right to compel the removal or relocation of forces and weapons,

and to order the cessation of any activities that pose a potential threat to

KFOR, its mission, or a third party. Failure to comply will result in military

action, including the use of necessary force.

! KFOR has the right to monitor and inspect all facilities or activities that may

have a police or military capability, or are deemed otherwise relevant to

compliance. The KFOR commander is the “final authority” for the

interpretation of the MTA.

! Air and Ground Safety Zones will extend 25 and 5 kilometers respectively

beyond the borders of Kosovo, and no Yugoslav forces, aside from local

police, may enter these zones without KFOR permission. All Yugoslav

!

!

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military, paramilitary, and police forces will conduct a phased withdrawal

from Kosovo, to be completed by June 20, 1999.

! Yugoslav forces will mark and remove all mines, booby traps, and obstacles

as they withdraw. A subsequent, separate agreement will address the return

of “agreed Yugoslav and Serb personnel.”

KFOR Operations. KFOR command now rotates every six months, and is currently

held by Italian General Fabio Mini. KFOR divided the province into five territorial sectors

under the command of British, German, French, Italian, and U.S. contingents. Other nations’

contingents are assigned to one of these sectors. (For current national contingents, see below)

In early 1999, KFOR nations quietly withdrew troops, reducing KFOR standing

deployment from close to 50,000 to about 37,000 troops in Kosovo and 5,000 support forces

in neighboring countries. . Those nations with notable withdrawals were France, Russia, and

the United Kingdom. The other large contingents, Germany and the United States, remained

relatively constant.

On June 20 1999, NATO announced an agreement with the Kosovo Liberation Army

for its phased disbanding. The presence of armed KLA guerillas has given KFOR some

concerns, and KFOR has disarmed KLA groups that could have presented a threat to

security. In the demilitarization agreement, the KLA agreed to:

Renounce the use of force and comply with KFOR and U.N. Interim Civil

Administration directives. Refrain from hostile or provocative acts,

including reprisals or detentions.

! Acknowledge KFOR’s use of necessary force to ensure compliance.

! Not carry weapons in specified areas.

!

In an attempt to involve former KLA personnel in positive activities, NATO and U.N.

officials agreed to the creation of the Kosovo Corps. NATO and the U.N. intend the 3,000strong organization to be a uniformed civilian force to deal with emergency situations such

as forest fires, search and rescue, and reconstruction. Some KLA leaders see the Kosovo

Corps as the nucleus of a future Kosovo army, a view rejected by NATO and U.N. officials.

Albanian Insurgency – Presevo Valley and Macedonia

Presevo Valley. The Military Technical Agreement between Yugoslavia and NATO

established a 3-mile Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) along the Kosovo-Serbia border within

which no Yugoslav armed forces, and only lightly armed Yugoslav police, were allowed. The

GSZ is outside of Kosovo, and the Military Technical Agreement has no provision for KFOR

to conduct operations in it, though KFOR was to monitor it from the Kosovo border to

ensure no re-entry of Yugoslav forces. In 2000, Albanian nationalists from Kosovo took

advantage of the security vacuum in the GSZ’s Presevo Valley area to train and organize

insurgents among the predominately Albanian population. In late 2000, the first indications

of insurgency came with attacks by the self-proclaimed Liberation Army of Presevo,

Medvedya, and Bujanovac (UCPMB) against the Yugoslav police in the region. KFOR HQ

and U.S. commanders particularly came under criticism for not interdicting the passage of

men and arms across the Kosovo border in their sector. KFOR HQ emphasized that it had

no mandate to conduct operations outside of Kosovo proper, and consequently could not

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intervene against the UCPMB in the Ground Safety Zone. British troops were transferred

from their Central Sector to augment U.S. forces, and to conduct foot patrols in an attempt

to strengthen border controls. In addition, NATO, citing the fall of Milosevic and the

cooperative attitude of the new Kostunica government in Belgrade, negotiated an agreement

for the “conditioned, phased” return of Yugoslav armed forces to the Ground Safety Zone

to fill the security vacuum. Monitored by European Union representatives, limited numbers

of Yugoslav Army personnel have re-emtered the GSZ, though without tanks, armored cars,

artillery, or helicopters, and the insurgents have signed a with the Belgrade government.

Macedonia. Negotiations between the Macedonian government and ethnic Albanian

political representatives have overcome the stumbling blocks regarding the official status of

the Albanian language and the structure of police forces, and a peace agreement has been

reached that would address many of the insurgents concerns. In response, the insurgents

have voluntarily turned over a substantial amount of their weaponry to NATO troops in

Operation Task Force Harvest. In total, 3,875 weapons, including four tanks and armored

personnel carriers were turned in. NATO has agreed to maintain a contingent in Macedonia

to oversee implementation of the peace agreement. Dubbed Task Force Allied Harmony, the

700-strong contingent is currently under German command, and is to be replaced in early

2003 by a European Union military contingent.

Costs of Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian

Within NATO, each nation participating in Operation Allied Force assumed the cost

of its own operations. NATO does not provide estimates of the overall cost of the operation

or of the cost of each member’s contributions. (For individual national cost estimates for

Kosovo operations, see CRS Report RL30398, NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo: a

Preliminary Report.) Individual nations also assume the full cost of the deployments in

support of on-going KFOR operations.

Congressional Appropriations. In April 1999, the Administration submitted a

$6.05 billion emergency supplemental appropriation request to cover military operations in

Kosovo and continuing air operations in Southwest Asia during FY1999. On May 18, 1999,

the House approved a House-Senate conference agreement on H.R. 1141, providing $14.9

billion in FY1999 supplemental appropriations. On May 20 1999, the Senate concurred.

It was signed into law (P.L. 106-31) on May 21. Of this, only $10.8 billion was defenserelated, and included funds for items other than Kosovo operations such as a military pay

raise, military construction, training, and equipment/munitions procurement. The

Administration’s funding request assumed offensive military operations against Yugoslavia

through September 1999. With the campaign ending in June, DOD calculated its actual

FY1999 incremental costs to be $3.0 billion, and the remainder of the appropriated

supplemental were re-programmed.

The Administration’s FY2000 budget request contained no funds for combat or

peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. The House Armed Services Committee expressed its

concern that under or unbudgeted contingency operations have diverted funds from “quality

of life, readiness, and modernization” programs. Seeing no funds budgeted for Kosovo

operations in FY2000, and seeking to ensure that incremental Kosovo-related costs would

be dealt with only through specific budgeted accounts or supplemental appropriations, the

Committee inserted a provision in DOD’s authorizing legislation (H.R. 1401) prohibiting

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the use of any funds authorized by the legislation for military operations in Yugoslavia. On

June 9, during consideration on the House floor, Representative Skelton introduced an

amendment removing this provision. Upon receiving written notice from President Clinton

stating that if military readiness were to be harmed by on-going operational requirements,

he would submit a FY2000 budget amendment request, the House agreed (270-155) to

remove the funding prohibition. A $2 billion supplemental appropriation for Kosovo was

subsequently included in the FY2001 Military Construction Act (H.R. 4425;P.L. 106-246).

The FY2001 DOD appropriations legislation (H.R. 4576;P.L.106-259) provided $1.7

billion for Kosovo, as requested.

Beginning with the FY2002 budget, both the Bosnia and Kosovo operations are no

longer funded through the Overseas Contingency Fund, but rather through the individual

service budgets. Consequently, published DOD budget documents do not provide a separate

accounting for these operations. In the FY2002 DOD appropriations conference report (

H.Rept. 107-350), did note that $2.13 billion was appropriated for both Balkan operations,

a reduction without comment of $600 million from the Administration’s request. The DOD

FY2004 budget justification materials for contingency operations notes a request of $936

million for Kosovo operations.

(For more information, see CRS Report RL30505: Appropriations for FY2001: Defense

and CRS Report RL30457: Supplemental Appropriations for FY2000: Plan Colombia,

Kosovo, Foreign Debt Relief, Home Energy Assistance, and Other Initiatives.)

LEGISLATION

H.R. 1588 (Hunter, D. et al.)

To authorize appropriations for FY2004 for military activities of the Department of

Defense, and for military construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal

year 2004, and for other purposes. Introduced Apr. 3, 2003; referred to Committee on Armed

Services.

S. 1050 (Warner, J.W.)

To authorize appropriations for FY2004 for military activities of the Department of

Defense, and for military construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal

year 2004, and for other purposes. Introduced May 13, 2003; referred to Committee on

Armed Services. Passed Senate May 22, amended. Incorporated in H.R. 1588.

FOR ADDITIONAL READING

CRS Reports

CRS Report RL31053, Kosovo and U.S. Policy, by Julie Kim and Steven Woehrel.

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World Wide Web Sites

The following WWW sites provide additional information:

KFOR Headquarters — [http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html]

NATO Headquarters — [http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press.htm]

U.S. European Command — [http://www.eucom.mil]

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