Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) and U.S. Policy

97-475 F

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR)

and U.S. Policy

Updated September 1, 1998

Steven R. Bowman

Specialist in National Defense

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

(name redacted)

Specialist in International Relations

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

(name redacted)

Specialist in European Affairs

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT

This report provides background and analysis on the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR)

in Bosnia and Hercegovina. After a brief background section, the report details the

composition of the force, its mission, and its cost to the United States. Other sections

discuss Administration policy and Congressional action on SFOR. The report will be

updated as events warrant.

Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) and U.S. Policy

Summary

In December 1995, a NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) was deployed to

Bosnia to enforce the military aspects of the Bosnian peace agreement. President

Clinton said the deployment would last “about one year.” IFOR successfully

completed its main military tasks, but implementation of the civilian aspects of the

accord, for which IFOR did not have direct responsibility, was at best a mixed

success. Faced with the possible collapse of the peace agreement if IFOR pulled out,

on November 15, 1996, President Clinton pledged to keep U.S. troops in Bosnia as

part of a NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) until June 1998. A similar state of

affairs a little over a year later led the President to announce on December 18, 1997

that he had agreed in principle that U.S. forces should participate in a Bosnia

peacekeeping force after the mandate of the current SFOR expired in June 1998.

In a March 1998 certification to Congress, the President proposed that SFOR

not be assigned a fixed end-date, but asserted that the deployment will not be openended. He outlined ten conditions to be met in Bosnia in order for the NATO-led

force to be withdrawn: continuation of the cease-fire; a restructured, re-trained and

re-integrated police; effective judicial reform; dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton

institutions; democratically regulated media and access to independent media; free

and democratic elections with implemented results; free-market reforms, with an

economic program worked out with the International Monetary Fund; phased and

orderly minority refugee returns; a functioning multi-ethnic administration in Brcko;

and full cooperation by the parties with the war crimes tribunal.

The composition of SFOR has varied little since the renewal of its mandate in

June 1998 as Operation Joint Forge. As of July 1998, it comprises forces from 34

countries, totaling approximately 35,000 troops. The U.S. contingent in Bosnia

remains at about 8,300, but by October 1998 it will be reduced to 6,900. One notable

change in the SFOR force structure has been the addition of a 600-man Multinational

Specialized Unit (MSU) to deal with outbreaks of civil violence. SFOR's main

mission remains enforcing the military aspects of the Dayton peace accords, but over

the last year NATO has become increasingly willing to devote resources to

supporting key civil implementation tasks.

After fierce debate, the House and Senate passed separate resolutions in

December 1995 expressing support for the U.S. troops in Bosnia, although not

necessarily for the mission itself. Legislative efforts to bar funds for the deployment

of U.S. troops to Bosnia were narrowly rejected. In the 105th Congress, similar

efforts to bar a U.S. deployment after June 1998 were also rejected, although the FY

1998 defense authorization and appropriations laws contain reporting requirements

that must be fulfilled before an extended deployment may take place. During its

debate on the FY 1999 defense authorization and appropriations bills, the Senate

rejected attempts to force a gradual reduction in U.S. forces in Bosnia, but approved

a sense-of-the-Senate amendment that called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces

"within a reasonable period of time."

Contents

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SFOR Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

SFOR Mission Clarity and “Mission Creep” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

SFOR Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Administration Policy on SFOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Congressional Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Legislation in the 105th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Congressional Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

List of Tables

Table 1. SFOR Units/Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) and

U.S. Policy

Background

After three years of war in Bosnia, on November 21, 1995, the presidents of

Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, as well as representatives of

the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Bosnian Serb Republika

Srpska, initialed a largely U.S.-mediated peace agreement for Bosnia at WrightPatterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio. The final peace agreement was signed

by the parties in Paris on December 14, 1995. In order to enforce the military aspects

of the agreement, the agreement called for a NATO-led implementation force (IFOR)

to be deployed to Bosnia. In a nationally televised address on November 27, 1995,

President Clinton justified dispatching U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of IFOR by

saying U.S. engagement was needed to stop the great suffering caused by the war; to

bring stability in Europe, a region vital to U.S. interests; and to maintain U.S.

leadership in NATO. President Clinton said the deployment would last “about one

year.” Subsequent statements by Administration officials asserted that U.S. forces

would be out of Bosnia by the end of 1996. The United States contributed about

19,000 troops to the approximately 54,000-man force.

On December 15, 1995, the U.N. Security Council authorized the deployment

of IFOR. On the next day, NATO’s North Atlantic Council approved the IFOR

deployment, activating the deployment of the main body of troops. On December 20,

1995, the U.N. force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) transferred its authority to IFOR,

starting the process of implementing the military aspects of the peace agreement.

Over the next year, IFOR successfully completed its main military tasks, which were

to separate the forces on the ground and oversee their demobilization.

However, implementation of the civilian aspects of the accord, for which IFOR

did not have direct responsibility, was at best a mixed success. Civilian aspects of

the accord were coordinated by High Representative Carl Bildt, while various

international bodies were charged with helping to implement aspects of the accord.

It should be noted that the chief responsibility for peace implementation rested with

the Bosnian parties, who showed intransigence on many issues. Freedom of

movement remained limited and very few refugees returned to their homes. Indicted

war criminals remained at large. Elections were held for most levels of government

on September 14, 1996, without violence or other serious incidents. However, many

observers charged that the election campaign was less than free and fair, and some

alleged possible fraud in the vote count. The results consolidated the strength of the

main nationalist parties. Municipal elections, which were to have been held on

September 14, 1996, were postponed by the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) until September 13-14, 1997, due to fraud and

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manipulation of registration procedures, primarily by the Bosnian Serbs, and other

problems. Key Bosnian government institutions were created only in January 1997.

Internationally funded reconstruction efforts began to show some results in rebuilding

infrastructure, albeit almost entirely in the Federation, but had not touched off a selfsustaining economic recovery. Although IFOR’s primary responsibility was to assure

the implementation of the military aspects of the peace accord (and by doing so

provide a secure environment in which civilian implementation could take place), it

also aided some civilian implementation efforts directly on a case-by-case basis.

On November 15, 1996, President Clinton announced that the Administration

had agreed in principle to keep U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of a new NATO-led

peacekeeping force for Bosnia. Clinton said the force would remain there until June

1998. He said the mission of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) would be to “prevent

a resumption of hostilities so that economic reconstruction and political

reconciliation can accelerate.” NATO ministers approved the SFOR plan on

December 10, 1996, and the U.N. Security Council authorized the force on December

12, for an 18-month period. SFOR formally took over command from IFOR on

December 20, 1996.

In late 1997, the United States and other countries participating in SFOR found

themselves in much the same dilemma that they faced one year earlier — either pull

out and face the possibility of a resumption of fighting, or remain in Bosnia and

continue a seemingly open-ended commitment. On December 18, 1997, President

Clinton announced that he had agreed in principle that U.S. forces should participate

in a Bosnia peacekeeping force after the mandate of the current SFOR expires in June

1998. He did not set a new departure deadline, but said the force would leave only

when the Bosnian peace process was self-sustaining. In a March 1998 certification

required by the FY 1998 defense authorization and appropriations acts (P.L. 105-85

and 105-56), President Clinton laid out ten benchmarks to measure progress toward

that goal, including a continued cease-fire; police restructuring; an effective judicial

reform program; dismantling of pre-Dayton institutions; a freer media environment;

free and fair elections; free market reforms; an orderly refugee return process; a

functioning multi-ethnic administration in Brcko; and cooperation with the war

crimes tribunal. On June 11, 1998, NATO defense ministers formally approved the

extension of SFOR's mandate. On June 15, 1998, the U.N. Security Council

approved Resolution 1171, which extended SFOR's mandate until June 21, 1999. On

June 20, 1998, SFOR began to operate under its new mandate.

SFOR Overview

The composition of SFOR has varied little since the renewal of its mandate in

June 1998 as Operation Joint Forge. As of July 1998, it comprises forces from 34

countries, totaling approximately 35,000 troops. The U.S. contingent in Bosnia

remains at about 8,300, but by October 1998 it will be reduced to 6,900. This

reduction was agreed to by the NATO allies to try to assuage domestic U.S. political

pressures critical of U.S. ground force participation. There are currently an additional

3,000 U.S. personnel in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy providing support functions for

SFOR. This includes Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps pilots flying air support

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missions from Italy. Though not officially a part of SFOR , the U.S. Sixth Fleet is

on routine station in the Mediterranean, should its resources be required.

Both NATO's Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) Gen. Wesley Clark, and

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Hugh Shelton have argued against

troop reductions below 6,900 at this time, maintaining that greater reductions could

erode effectiveness and place remaining troops at greater risk. NATO military

officials believe a robust and obvious military presence is the most effective way to

forestall a resumption of intra-Bosnia hostilities or attacks on SFOR. SFOR force

requirements will be reviewed every six months, in conjunction with evaluations of

progress in implementing the Dayton Accords, and troop levels may be reduced

depending upon the stability of the region. An independent factor which may

influence NATO decisions on troop levels in Bosnia is the on-going conflict in the

Serbian province of Kosovo. Though Kosovo is not contiguous to Bosnia, and no

effect has been yet seen on events in Bosnia, the conflict nevertheless raises tensions

in the region. SFOR air units have already been used in the NATO airpower

demonstration exercise Vigilant Falcon carried out around Kosovo in June 15, 1998.

Were NATO to decide to take more forceful action in Kosovo, it is unclear what, if

any, role SFOR would play. It is likely, however, that at least the SFOR-dedicated

air units based in Italy would be involved.

Congress remains concerned about the U.S. troop levels in Bosnia, as indicated

by several amendments offered to the DOD FY1999 authorizing and appropriating

legislation. ( See Congressional Concerns). The Senate adopted an amendment,

sponsored by Senators Thurmond and McCain, to S. 2057, the FY1999 DOD

authorizing legislation, requiring by September 30, 1998 a detailed presidential report

on the impact of a phased U.S. reduction of forces to 2,500 by February 2, 2000.1

The U.S. SFOR contingent is called Task Force Eagle and has command of the

Multinational Division North sector headquartered near Tuzla. For the first two years

of Bosnia operations, units stationed in Germany — 1st Armored Division and 1st

Mechanized Infantry Division — provided the core of the U.S. contingent. From

September 1997 to July 1998, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Ft. Polk, LA) was

the command unit. Command was then returned to the 1st Armored Division, which

will be replaced in October by a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (Ft. Hood). The

1 st Cavalry will remain in Bosnia for at least one year, rotating brigades every six

months. Given the open-ended nature of Operation Joint Forge, it has become

necessary to involve stateside Army units to reduce the burden on European-based

units. Other units scheduled to deploy to Bosnia this Fall include elements of: 35th

Armor Regiment, 40th Engineer Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, and

the 11th Aviation Brigade. In addition to these heavy units, there are considerable

military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, and logistical support units

in the U.S. contingent. The proportion of these types of units has increased steadily

since the initial NATO deployment, which consisted primarily of heavy armor and

mechanized forces. This reflects the almost complete lack of armed resistance

1

S. 2057 was subsequently inserted in H.R. 3616, the House version of the DOD FY1999

authorizing legislation, which is currently in House-Senate conference.

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NATO forces have encountered, and an increasing involvement in the civil

implementation objectives.

Reserve forces and the National Guard continue to play a significant role in

Bosnia, particularly in the Army and the Air Force. About 16,000 Army reservists

and 10,000 Air Force reservists have participated in or supported Bosnia operations.

While most of the Army personnel have been involuntarily activated under the

Presidential Reserve Call-Up Authority (10 USC Sec. 12304), most of the Air Force

personnel have been volunteers.

One notable change in the SFOR force structure has been the addition of the

Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU). Created in response to a U.S. initiative, the

MSU is composed of about 600 paramilitary police . They are to serve as a two

battalion rapid response force to deal with outbreaks of civil violence, thereby

relieving SFOR combat troops of the responsibility of dealing with relatively lowlevel crowd violence. Unlike the existing International Police Task Force, an

unarmed U.N. training/observer group, the MSU is armed with automatic weapons

and light armored vehicles. They are under NATO command and are authorized to

deploy throughout Bosnia. Tactical command of their activities will fall to the

NATO sector headquarters in which they are operating. Currently, Italy and

Argentina are contributing personnel to the MSU, and talks are underway with Spain,

Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Netherlands concerning their

participation in early 1999. The United States is unlikely to contribute to this unit

because it has no comparable paramilitary police forces. Perhaps the most critical

role for the MSU will be working to assist the safe return of refugees to their former

homes. They may also become involved detaining suspected war criminals.

Table 1 shows the troop and combat aircraft contributions of all SFOR

participants.

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Table 1. SFOR Units/Aircraft

(number of personnel)

SFOR Ground Force Units

Albania

1 infantry platoon (40)

Austria

1 transport company (230)

Belgium

1 mechanized infantry battalion

SFOR Combat

Aircraft

3 F-16 fighters

1 transport company

(850)

Bulgaria

1 engineer platoon (30)

Canada

1 mechanized infantry battalion

(1,250)

Czech Republic

1 mechanized infantry battalion (640)

Denmark

1 mechanized infantry battalion (747)

Egypt

1 mechanized infantry battalion (270)

Finland

1 mechanized infantry battalion (270)

France

1 mechanized brigade

10 Mirage fighters

1 airmobile company

8 Jaguar fighters

1 reconnaissance company

8 Jaguar recon

1 military police company

1 engineer battalion

(2,500)

Germany

1 mechanized brigade (2,470)

Greece

1 transport company (230)

Hungary

1 engineer battalion (310)

Iceland

6 medical personnel

Ireland

1 military police company (50)

Italy

1 mechanized infantry brigade(1,600)

Jordan

1 special forces team (10)

Latvia

1 infantry platoon (39)

Lithuania

1 infantry platoon (40)

Luxembourg

1 reconnaissance platoon

1 transport platoon

(36)

14 Tornado recon

6 Tornado fighters

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SFOR Ground Force Units

SFOR Combat

Aircraft

Malaysia

1 mechanized infantry battalion (925)

Morocco

1 mechanized infantry battalion(650)

Netherlands

1 mechanized infantry battalion (1,080)

Norway

1 infantry battalion (615)

Poland

1 mechanized infantry battalion (400)

Portugal

1 airborne infantry battalion (320)

Romania

1 engineer battalion (200)

Russia

1 airborne infantry brigade (1,400)

Spain

1 mechanized infantry brigade (1,550)

Sweden

1 mechanized infantry battalion (510)

Turkey

1 mechanized infantry brigade (1,520)

18 F-16 fighters

United Kingdom

1 armored infantry battalion

12 Jaguar fighters

1 mechanized infantry battalion

2 Jaguar recon

9 F-16 fighters

8 EF-18 fighters

1 armored recon battalion

1 infantry company

1 artillery battalion

1 engineer battalion

1 aviation battalion

(5,000)

United States

1 mechanized infantry brigade

6 F-16 fighters

1 artillery brigade

1 AC-130 gunship

1 military police battalion

3 EC-130

1 aviation brigade

3 EA-6B

1 engineer brigade

1 support brigade

(8,300)

Ukraine

1 mechanized infantry battalion (380)

Source: Department of Defense; NATO AFSOUTH HQ, July 1998

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SFOR Mission Clarity and “Mission Creep”

NATO has delineated the following tasks in the SFOR mission. They have been

endorsed by the Administration, and forwarded to Congress in the President's report on

Bosnia operations, as required by the FY1998 Defense Authorization Act. (House Document

105-223). They are divided into two categories: key military tasks and key supporting

tasks, with latter to be undertaken depending upon available means and capabilities.

Key Military Tasks

Maintaining deterrence of renewed hostilities.

Preventing removal of weapons from cantonment

Maintaining the operation of the Joint Military Commissions

Ensuring force protection, freedom of movement and continued compliance

with the cease-fire and Zones of Separation.

! Monitoring the military components of the Dayton Accords and, if required,

enforcing compliance.

! Controlling the airspace over Bosnia.

! Contributing, within means and capabilities and in a manner similar to SFOR's

previous approach,

to a secure environment within which civil

implementation can continue.

!

!

!

!

Key Supporting Tasks

! Supporting the High Representative

! Supporting phased and orderly returns of refugees by contributing to a safe

and secure environment, but not forcible returning of refugees or undertaking

to guard individual locations.

! Supporting the conduct of elections and the installation of elected officials.

! Supporting the International Police Task Force in assisting local police by

providing back-up support and secure operating environment, but without

undertaking civil police tasks.

! Supporting the High Representative and the OSCE in media reform efforts.

! Supporting the international war crimes tribunal and efforts against war

criminals.

! Supporting the OSCE, on a case-by-case basis, in implementing the regional

arms control regime contained in the Dayton Accords.

! Supporting the implementation of the Brcko decisions presently in effect

! Contributing to the continued improvement of freedom of movement through

out Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The military tasks remain SFOR 's primary mission, but over the last year NATO has

become increasingly willing to devote resources to the key supporting tasks noted above.

A recently issued mission statement from U.S. Task Force Eagle headquarters announced

it would coordinate civil-military activities in the following areas: rule of law, resettlement

of refugees, enhanced democratization, improvement of public security, economic recovery,

infrastructure repair, and media reform.2 This indicates a potentially much broader sweep

of activities than NATO's commanders were willing to undertake for the early years of

2

Task Force Eagle Home Page, [http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/Mission.htm], September 1,

1998.

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Bosnia operations. Basing a refusal to become involved in incidents of civil violence or the

pursuit of war crimes suspects on what often appeared, to some observers, as a very

conservative interpretation of their mission, NATO commanders focused almost exclusively

on separating and disarming the ethnic faction armies. With these tasks accomplished, and

facing increasing pressure to acknowledge that the Dayton Accords' civil implementation

efforts required a greater level of NATO military support, SFOR commanders began to play

a more active role in 1997. Upon assuming command, NATO SACEUR Gen. Wesley Clark

played a leading role in increasing SFOR's participation in non-military stabilization

activities.

This trend was reinforced when it began to be evident that NATO would not withdraw

its forces with the expiration of the original SFOR mandate in June, 1998. In considering

the extension of the deployment, the question of mission duration was paramount. There

had been considerable criticism of IFOR and SFOR's fixed deadlines, noting that those in

Bosnia who opposed the Accords were encouraged by these withdrawal deadlines to simply

wait it out rather than cooperate. Even strong critics of U.S. “open-ended” commitments

who had supported fixed dates for withdrawal, objected to politically palatable “deadlines”

that then came and were de facto ignored as operations continued under new mandates and

names. In response to these and other criticisms, NATO political leaders decided in June

1998 that SFOR should have no date certain for withdrawal. Rather, its withdrawal would

depend upon the extent of progress made in implementing the Dayton Accords, with specific

benchmarks of progress outlined, and semi-annual force requirement evaluations mandated.

The NATO allies formally approved these benchmarks (See p. 12), and the SFOR

Operation Plan call for SFOR to develop, in coordination with international civilian

agencies, criteria to evaluate progress. In addition, SFOR headquarters is also preparing

estimates of how long it will take to achieve each benchmark. NATO SACEUR, Gen. Wes

Clark expects SFOR to report the criteria and timelines in September. The Administration

has affirmed that it will in turn provide this report to Congress.3 With the decision to tie

length of deployment to the civil implementation of the Dayton Accords, it has become

incumbent upon NATO military commanders to pay greater attention to the “supporting

tasks” — the sooner these are accomplished the sooner SFOR forces will be reduced or

withdrawn. This change has, however, heightened concerns that tying SFOR ’s duration to

successful civil implementation could result in a very lengthy deployment given the

continued animosity among ethnic groups. And, while casualties have been extremely low4,

the financial costs for Bosnia-related operations since 1992 have totaled an estimated $9.4

billion through FY19995, presenting significant challenges to both lawmakers and DOD

officials in a period of budgetary restraint.

The concept of “mission creep” is one that has attracted much attention. The term is

generally accepted to refer to the incremental broadening of mission objectives and the

addition of mission tasks to a point where they move beyond the original purpose of the

operation or deployment. This concern comes to the fore primarily when costs — either in

dollars or U.S. casualties — are significant or when an operation is judged a failure. Often

cited is the experience in Somalia in 1993 where what began as a humanitarian aid escort

mission escalated over time into combat search and capture raids against local faction

3

Goals of the Dayton Agreement, Message from the President of the United States, House

Document 105-292.

4

U.S. forces have had only one fatal casualty attributed to hostile action: a senior enlisted

man who was killed when he picked up a landmine.

5

Department of Defense, Office of the Comptroller. This figure also includes U.S. air and

sea operations conducted in support of United Nations peace-keeping missions prior to

NATO's IFOR/SFOR operations.

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leaders. The highly publicized failure of one of these raids, in which U.S. forces sustained

18 combat fatalities, brought strong criticism of the Administration for allowing such

“mission creep” to occur and led to the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The issue was of less

concern during recent U.S. operations in Haiti, where no armed opposition was encountered

and costs were relatively lower.

While the last two and a half years of NATO operations in Bosnia have seen no

escalation to combat, (indeed IFOR/SFOR have been remarkable for the lack of casualties

attributable to hostile action) the emphasis of SFOR activities has undeniably changed. It

can be argued that SFOR has not experienced “mission creep”, but has simply shifted its

focus from primary to secondary tasks of the original mission statement. Nevertheless, the

types of activities SFOR troops are undertaking and the level of resources dedicated to them

have altered over the last year.

Perhaps the most notable change has been the increased efforts to detain war crimes

suspects. Though approximately 30 suspects remain at large (out of 67 as of April 1998),

British, Dutch, and U.S. troops have been noticeably more active in detaining or capturing

individuals for transfer to the international war crimes tribunal. And, this activity has been

credited with in turn encouraging other suspects to surrender voluntarily. On July 29th,

however, press reports indicated that U.S.-British plans to seize the two most important war

crimes indictees — Former Bosnia Serb President Karadzic and military leader Gen.

Mladic — have been suspended owing to lack of cooperation by French military

commanders, and U.S. commanders concerns about potential civilian and military

casualties.6 There appears, therefore, to be some continued self-limiting by NATO

commanders in this area of activity.

One of the more challenging mission areas for both civil and military authorities is the

safe resettlement of refugees in regions of continued ethnic tension. Yet, this task is critical

to the overall success of the Dayton Accords. Even the new mission statement of SFOR

notes limits to the extent to which SFOR will become involved (See Key Supporting Tasks

above). To assist in this task, NATO has created , and placed under SFOR command, the

paramilitary police Multinational Special Unit (MSU). This unit is expected to serve as a

rapid reaction force to deal with incidents of low-level violence and crowd disturbances,

thereby freeing SFOR combat troops from these responsibilities. Though the creation of the

MSU was a U.S. initiative, the United States has no paramilitary police to contribute to the

unit. Consequently, any escalation of MSU activities that occur will not involve U.S.

personnel.

In general, it appears that NATO officials, and U.S. officials in particular, while

accepting some greater responsibilities in civil activities are remaining sensitive to the issue

of “mission creep”. They are likely to have to continue to balance the desire to accelerate

implementation of the Dayton Accords with concerns over increased combat troop

involvement in non-combat roles, particularly within the U.S. Congress.

SFOR Costs

6

“U.S. Cancels Plans for Raid on Bosnia...”,New York Times, July 26, 1998, p. 1; “Hunt

for Karadzic”, Time, August 10, 1998, p. 68.

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Each participating nation in SFOR, including the United States, covers the costs of its

Bosnia-related operations. According to figures supplied by the DoD Comptroller's Office

in March 1998, DoD's incremental costs for IFOR\SFOR were $2.2317 billion in FY 1996

and $2.087 billion in FY 1997, for a total of $4.3192 billion. DoD estimates FY 1998

incremental costs at $1.7976 billion and FY 1999 costs at $1.6659, making a total of $7.782

billion for FY 1996-FY 1999.

Administration Policy on SFOR

Part of the Clinton Administration’s early strategy on the NATO force in Bosnia was

to focus on the force completing its mission within a set time frame. Until the

Implementation Force’s 12-month mission was nearly completed, the Administration

avoided making any firm pronouncements on possible successor missions to IFOR or

possible U.S. participation in such a mission, emphasizing rather IFOR’s scheduled

completion and full withdrawal by the end of 1996. Throughout that year, Administration

officials had reiterated the President’s pledge to keep the U.S. troop commitment to IFOR

to about one year. Administration officials acknowledged the probable need for some sort

of international military presence to remain in Bosnia after IFOR, but would not commit to

a position on U.S. participation.

On November 15, 1996, President Clinton announced that the United States would take

part in a NATO follow-on force in Bosnia. He estimated that the U.S. troop contribution

to the successor SFOR would amount to about 8,500 troops, or less than half the number of

U.S. troops in the original IFOR. He recommended an 18-month mandate for the NATO

force, with further reductions envisaged at six-month review intervals. NATO’s later

decisions formally establishing SFOR upheld these principles. The principal rationale for

continued U.S. military engagement in Bosnia developed by the Administration was that,

notwithstanding the many achievements of IFOR, peace efforts in Bosnia still needed

additional time to consolidate. An outside security force would be able to provide the

stability for economic reconstruction and political reconciliation to continue.

Administration analysts assessed that hostilities were likely to resume in Bosnia after a full

withdrawal of international forces.

At the same time, the Administration rejected a simple extension of IFOR’s mandate.

Instead, it emphasized that IFOR had indeed completed its mission within 12 months and

that the Stabilization Force and its mission were distinct from IFOR. The Administration

differentiated SFOR from IFOR in response to charges that it had broken its promise of

completing IFOR’s mission in 12 months. President Clinton also made the claim that the

SFOR mission was “far more limited” than IFOR’s, thus requiring fewer troops. Plans to

steadily reduce the force’s size indicated that SFOR was expected to do less, rather than

more, than IFOR. As it turned out, NATO refrained from drawing down SFOR force levels

during its 18-month tenure.

Already in early 1997, some Administration officials began to offer predictions that

another successor force may well be required to follow SFOR after June 1998. In contrast,

Defense Secretary William Cohen strenuously emphasized the firmness of the

Administration’s commitment of U.S. troops to SFOR for 18 months only. Secretary Cohen

stated that he would pursue the possibility of having the Europeans develop a post-SFOR

operation.7 Many observers expressed skepticism about this strategy, since no European

power had demonstrated any inclination to lead or even participate in a post-SFOR force

7

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Hearing on the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense

Budget. February 13, 1997.

CRS-11

without the United States. In late 1997, top Administration officials began to lay the

groundwork for an extended U.S. military commitment to Bosnia. In September, National

Security Advisor Samuel Berger reiterated that the United States maintained a significant

stake in Dayton’s success and left open the possibility of a longer-term engagement in

Bosnia. On November 4, President Clinton met with congressional leaders to discuss

progress in Bosnia and the possibility of U.S. participation in a future multilateral force.

On December 18, 1997, in a statement before the press, President Clinton announced

his agreement in principle that U.S. forces would participate in a NATO peacekeeping force

in Bosnia after SFOR’s mandate expired in June 1998. As justification, President Clinton

said that, while progress in Bosnia was “unmistakable,” it was not yet irreversible. A

follow-on force was needed in order to preserve the gains made in the past two years by U.S.

and allied peacekeepers in Bosnia, and to allow further progress toward a self-sustaining

peace to continue. In a major departure from earlier U.S. policy, Clinton stated that the

deadline approach of the earlier forces was wrong and emphasized that the new mission

must be tied to concrete benchmarks, not to a deadline.

On March 4, 1998, President Clinton certified to Congress8 that the presence U.S.

armed forces was required after June 30, 1998, in order to meet U.S. security interests. In

the certification, the President asserted that the United States had major national interests

in peace in Bosnia, that it was in the U.S. interest to see the Dayton agreement implemented

rapidly, and that U.S. forces should continue to participate in the NATO-led force. He

called for the level of U.S. participation to be reduced from 8,500 troops in Bosnia to 6,900

troops. While he proposed that the force not be assigned a fixed end-date or “arbitrary

deadline,” he asserted that the deployment will not be open-ended.

Answering the question of what the exit strategy for U.S. forces was, the President’s

certification outlined ten conditions to be met in Bosnia in order for the NATO-led force to

be withdrawn: continuation of the cease-fire; a restructured, re-trained and re-integrated

police; effective judicial reform; dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions;

democratically regulated media and access to independent media; free and democratic

elections with implemented results; free-market reforms, with an economic program worked

out with the International Monetary Fund; phased and orderly minority refugee returns; a

functioning multi-ethnic administration in Brcko; and full cooperation by the parties with

the war crimes tribunal. On the same day, the President submitted to Congress a request for

emergency supplemental appropriations that included costs for the Bosnia operation: $486.9

million for Fiscal Year 1998, and $1.86 billion for Fiscal Year 1999 (see following section

for further details).

In testimony before Congress in June 1998,9 U.S. envoy Robert Gelbard testified that

SFOR’s presence in Bosnia and role in providing a secure environment remained critical.

According to Gelbard, the secure environment provided by NATO has allowed for

accelerated implementation of many aspects of the peace agreement. It has supported the

ascendance to power of the moderate Bosnian Serb leadership. It has permitted many more

refugees to cross entity lines in order to return to their homes. At the same time,

8

“Certification of U.S. Armed Forces Continued Presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina,”

Message from the President of the United States. March 4, 1998. 105th Congress, 2nd

Session, House Document 105-223. The certification was pursuant to Section 8132 of P.L.

105-56, the Fiscal Year 1998 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, and to Section

1203 of P.L. 105-85, the Fiscal Year 1998 National Defense Authorization Act.

9

105th Congress, 2nd Session, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on NATO

Operations in Bosnia, June 4, 1998. Reuters transcript.

CRS-12

Administration officials contend that SFOR is not itself assigned or involved to any greater

extent with nation-building tasks or police work.

Defense Secretary Cohen and other Administration officials have refrained from giving

any target dates or time schedules for deployment of the NATO-led force. Instead, progress

in achieving the benchmarks (outlined above) are to be reviewed by NATO in order to

“focus efforts, measure progress, and permit steady reduction in force levels.”10 In response

to questions from Members of Congress, Administration officials have also refrained from

publicly assigning target dates for the fulfillment of each of the benchmarks.

Congressional Role

President Clinton’s decision to deploy U.S. forces to the NATO Implementation Force

touched off heated debate in Congress in late 1995. At the time, many Members of

Congress were concerned about the potential for large numbers of U.S. casualties in a

“quagmire.” Many also doubted whether vital U.S. interests were at stake in Bosnia.

President Clinton requested an “expression of support” from the Congress for the Bosnia

deployment. In December 1995, the House of Representatives and the Senate passed

separate resolutions expressing support for U.S. troops being sent to Bosnia. Legislative

efforts to reject the President’s decision by barring funds for the deployment of U.S. troops

to Bosnia were narrowly rejected.11

In 1996, as it became clearer to most observers that a follow-on mission to IFOR would

be required, both Houses of Congress held numerous hearings on the future of U.S. forces

in Bosnia. While all praised the performance of U.S. troops in IFOR, some Members

charged that the Administration was breaking its promise to keep U.S. troops in Bosnia for

one year only. Many Members also criticized the Administration for not consulting with

Congress in a forthright manner on the realistic prospects for a follow-on mission. This time

the Administration did not request an explicit expression of support from Congress for

SFOR. In the end, however, the 104th Congress adjourned before final decisions were made

on SFOR and without any vote on the subject.

Legislation in the 105th Congress

In March 1997, the Administration submitted a request for about $2 billion in

emergency supplemental appropriations and rescissions for FY1997 to cover DoD costs of

contingency operations in Bosnia and elsewhere, and emergency disaster relief in the United

States. The Senate version of the bill (H.R. 1469) barred funding for a U.S. ground

deployment in Bosnia beyond June 30, 1998 and required the President to submit a detailed

report on the costs of the Bosnia deployment, and of other aspects of U.S. policy toward

10

Secretary of Defense Cohen statement before the House National Security Committee,

March 20, 1998.

11

For further information on the congressional debate on IFOR, see U.S. Library of

Congress. Congressional Research Service. Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) and

Stabilization Force (SFOR): Activities of the 104th Congress, by (name redacted). Update

d

January 6, 1997.

CRS-13

Bosnia before funds from the supplemental can be made available. The House version did

not contain these provisions. The measure passed the House on May 15, 1997, and the

Senate on May 16. The House and Senate approved a conference agreement on June 5; the

conference report did not include the funds cut-off for the Bosnia deployment. The

President vetoed the bill on June 9 over policy provisions unrelated to foreign policy. The

President signed the bill without the controversial provisions on June 12 (P.L. 105-18),

providing DoD with $1.9 billion to cover SFOR-related costs. The law required the

President to submit a detailed report on the costs of the Bosnia deployment within 60 days.

The House-passed version of H.R. 2266, the FY 1998 defense appropriations bill,

barred funding for the deployment of U.S. ground forces to Bosnia after June 1998. The

Senate-passed version of the bill did not contain this provision. The conference report did

not include the fund cut-off. Section 8132 of the conference report, passed by both Houses

on September 25, 1997 and signed by the President on October 8 (P.L. 105- 56), barred

funding for the deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia beyond June 1998, unless the President

certified to the bipartisan leadership of Congress by May 15, 1998 that a continued

deployment is needed to meet the national security interests of the United States. The law

required that the certification include why such a deployment is in the national interest, how

many U.S. troops will be deployed and for what duration, the mission and objectives and

exit strategy for those forces, the cost of the operation and the impact of the deployment on

the morale, retention, and effectiveness of U.S. forces. The section also said that the

President had to submit a supplemental appropriations request for any deployment beyond

June 1998.

The conference report for the FY 1998 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1119)

contained a non-binding provision (Section 1202) that says that "it is the sense of Congress

that United States ground combat forces should not participate in a follow-on force in

Bosnia and Herzegovina after June 1998." The section also said that the United States may

decide to provide support to a follow-on force of European ground troops, under the aegis

of the European Security and Defense Identity or NATO, in "command and control,

intelligence, logistics and, if necessary, a ready reserve force in the region." Section 1203

prohibited funding for the deployment of U.S. ground forces in Bosnia after June 30, 1998,

unless the President certified by May 15, 1998 to the bipartisan leadership of Congress that

a deployment beyond June 1998 is needed to meet U.S. national security interests and that

U.S. forces will not be used as "civil police" in Bosnia. The President was required to

submit a detailed report on an extended Bosnian operation similar to the report required by

the FY1998 defense appropriations law. Other sections required Administration reports on

the activities carried out by U.S. forces in Bosnia; progress toward implementation of the

Bosnia peace accord and steps to be taken to transfer responsibility to a European-led

peacekeeping force. The House approved the conference report on October 28. The Senate

approved the report on November 6, and it was signed by the President on November 18

(P.L. 105-85).

On March 4, 1998, the Administration submitted to Congress a supplemental

appropriations request that included $486.9 million for U.S. military operations in Bosnia

for the last quarter of FY1998. The President requested a budget amendment providing for

$1.8586 billion for U.S. troops in Bosnia for FY 1999. The President also submitted the

certification required by P.L. 105-56.

On March 18, 1998, the House considered H. Con Res. 227, offered by Representative

Tom Campbell. The resolution said that, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, the

Congress directs the President to remove U.S. troops from Bosnia within 60 days unless

Congress approves a resolution authorizing the U.S. troop presence. The resolution was

rejected by a vote of 225-193.

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On March 26, 1998, the Senate completed consideration of S. 1768, an FY1998

supplemental appropriations bill that included $487 million in incremental costs for U.S.

participation in SFOR from July through September 1998. The bill included an amendment

by Senator Levin that "urges" the President to reach an agreement with NATO establishing

as NATO policy the benchmarks for Bosnian peace agreement implementation set out in the

President's certification required by P.L. 105-56. The agreement would also include a

schedule for achieving the benchmarks and a formal process to review any failure to achieve

the benchmarks on schedule. The amendment required the President to submit a report by

June 30 on efforts to reach such an agreement with NATO, and subsequent reports semiannually on progress on achieving the benchmarks. On March 31, 1998, the House passed

its version of the supplemental bill, H.R. 3579, which provides $487 million in incremental

costs for Bosnia. The House bill requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a quarterly

report to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on progress toward achieving

the benchmarks set out in the President's certification. On April 30, 1998, the House

approved the conference agreement for H.R. 3579 by a vote of 241-164. On the same day,

the Senate approved the conference agreement by a vote of 88 to 11. The conference

agreement provided $487 million in incremental costs for U.S. military operations in Bosnia.

It contained both the Levin amendment on NATO benchmarks and a requirement for a semiannual report by the President to Congress on progress toward achieving the benchmarks.

It was signed by the President on May 1 (P.L. 105-174).

In April 1998, the Senate considered a resolution of ratification of the protocols to

the North Atlantic Treaty admitting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO

(Treaty Doc. 105-36). On April 30, the Senate defeated by a vote of 80-20 an amendment

offered by Senator Craig that would have required the enactment of a law specifically

authorizing the continued deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia before the deposit of the

U.S. instrument of ratification (the final step before the protocol enters into force).

On May 21, 1998, the House passed the FY 1999 defense authorization bill (H.R.

3616). Section 1201 limits FY 1999 DoD expenditures for U.S. troops in Bosnia to $1.8586

billion, the amount requested by the Administration. Section 1202 requires the President

to submit a detailed annual report on progress toward implementation of the peace

agreement and on the expected duration of the U.S. deployment to Bosnia. The section also

requires the Secretary of Defense to report on the impact of the U.S. Bosnia deployment on

the capability of U.S. forces to conduct "two nearly simultaneous major theater wars."

On June 26, 1998, the Senate passed its version of the FY 1999 defense

authorization bill (S. 2057). An amendment offered by Senator Byrd and Senator Hutchison

would have required the President to submit a plan to Congress to reduce U.S. forces in

Bosnia to the average level of those deployed by Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy

by February 2000. The President would not be able to appropriate FY 2000 funds for a

higher troop level if Congress passed a joint resolution approving the plan within 30 days

after its submission to Congress. Some Members have objected to mandated U.S. troop

reductions. The amendment was not taken up on the floor of the Senate.

An amendment offered by Senators Strom Thurmond, Carl Levin and Dan Coats

expresses the sense of the Congress that U.S. forces "should not remain in Bosnia and

Herzegovina "indefinitely, in view of the world-wide commitment" of U.S. forces. It says

the President should work with other countries in SFOR to withdraw U.S. forces from

Bosnia "within a reasonable period of time, consistent with the safety of those forces and

the accomplishment of the Stabilization Force's military tasks." It adds that the President

should offer U.S. support in such areas as "command and control, intelligence, logistics and,

if necessary, a ready reserve force in the region." A second-degree amendment, by Senator

John McCain, requires the President to make several reports. One report would assess the

likely impact of a phased reduction of U.S. forces in Bosnia. A second report would discuss

CRS-15

the status and mission of the "NATO force of gendarmes or paramilitary police force" in

Bosnia. The provision also would also require a detailed report each time that the President

seeks funding for the Bosnia mission. The report would outline the "performance objectives

and schedule for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement", as well as the military and

non-military missions of U.S. forces in support of the objectives. The report would discuss

the risks posed to U.S. forces by these missions and their costs. Finally, the report would

include an assessment of the state of planning for the assumption of all military missions

within Bosnia by European forces, with U.S. support in logistics, intelligence and air power.

The Thurmond-Levin-Coats amendment, as modified by the McCain amendment, was

approved by a vote of 90-5.

Senator Robert Smith offered an amendment that would have barred FY 1999

funding for the Bosnia deployment after March 31, 1999, unless Congress votes on a joint

resolution approving the Bosnia deployment. The amendment does not require that the

resolution passes for the money to be released, only that a vote is taken. The amendment

was tabled by a vote of 65-31.

On June 24, 1998, the House passed H.R. 4103, the Fiscal Year 1999 defense

appropriations bill. The House version did not include the President’s request for $1.8586

billion for Department of Defense costs for the Bosnia operation. On July 30, the Senate

passed its version of the bill (S. 2132). The Senate agreed by voice vote to an amendment

offered by Senator Stevens that added $1.8586 billion for an Overseas Contingency

Operations Transfer Fund to pay for the Bosnia mission. The Senate voted 68-31 to table

an amendment by Senator Hutchison to the FY 1999 defense appropriations bill (S. 2132)

that would have required the President to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Bosnia to 6,500

by February 1999 and 5,000 by October 1999. The amendment would have also barred the

use of DoD funds to conduct or provide direct support to law enforcement activities in

Bosnia (except for training or to prevent imminent loss of life); to conduct or provide

support to any activity that would jeopardize the primary military mission of the NATO-led

force in Bosnia; to resettle refugees if the resettlement effort is part of an effort to gain

control of territory allotted to the other entity or exposes U.S. forces to substantial risk; or

to implement any change in the legal status of Bosnian territory without the agreement of

all parties. The Senate approved an amendment by Senator Hutchison expressing the sense

of Congress that "declining defense budgets and expanded missions, including the ongoing,

open-ended commitment of U.S. forces" to Bosnia have eroded the readiness of U.S. forces

to "execute the National Security Strategy of the United States ."

Congressional Debate

President Clinton's announcement in December 1997 that U.S. troops would stay

in Bosnia until a self-sustaining peace takes hold has sparked Congressional debate. Many

Members have expressed concern that U.S. troops are engaged in an open-ended deployment

to Bosnia, with an ever-expanding mandate. They say that the benchmarks laid out by the

Administration are very broad in scope and will take many years to achieve, if they can be

achieved at all. Many Members favor a pullout of U.S. ground troops from Bosnia in the

relatively near future, turning the Bosnia mission over to the U.S.'s European NATO allies,

with the United States providing logistical, intelligence and other support. Many Members

have also expressed concern that the Bosnia mission was absorbing limited DoD funds that

should go toward such areas as research and development, readiness and weapons

procurement.

While most Members have expressed a strong desire to have U.S. ground troops

leave Bosnia in the near future, there is more controversy on how to achieve this goal.

Senator Carl Levin, Senator John Warner and other Members have pushed the

Administration to provide timelines for the achievement of the benchmarks laid out by the

CRS-16

Administration, and have stressed the need for the Administration to press the Europeans

to take over the Bosnia mission within a reasonable amount of time. These ideas were

incorporated in S. 1768, which provided FY 1998 supplemental appropriations for the

Bosnia operation, and S. 2057, the FY 1999 defense authorization bill.

Other Members, while supporting these efforts, express great skepticism about the

concept of the benchmarks, saying it is unlikely that it is unwise to tie the withdrawal of

U.S. troops to benchmarks that cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future, if at all. They

favor stronger measures to compel U.S. troop reductions. These arguments were made by

Senator Byrd and Senator Hutchison during Senate debate on the FY 1999 defense

authorization and appropriations bills. However, during the debate on the FY 1999 defense

authorization bill, Senator Cain said that while he shared the frustration of many Members

with the open-ended nature of the U.S. presence in Bosnia, he believed that it was the role

of the President as Commander-in-Chief and military commanders in the field to set troop

levels in Bosnia, not Congress.

In addition to concerns about the wisdom of Administration policy in Bosnia, some

Members have expressed Constitutional objections to the Bosnia mission, saying that it was

started without explicit Congressional authorization, and should be terminated unless

Congress passes legislation giving specific approval to the Bosnia deployment. This

viewpoint was reflected in H. Con. Res. 227 and the Craig amendment to the ratification of

protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty.

While many Members emphasize their desire to see a pullout of U.S. troops from

Bosnia in the relatively near future, some Members stress the need for a continued U.S.

military presence on the ground to ensure that progress continues. During debate on S.

2057, Senator Joseph Biden said that, while he favored pressure on the U.S.'s European

allies on the issue of the Bosnia mission, it would be a mistake to push for the withdrawal

of U.S. ground troops from Bosnia as long as a NATO-led peacekeeping force remained in

the country, because such a move could undermine U.S. leadership in NATO.

CRS-17

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