Defense Research: A Primer on the Department of Defense's Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Program

97-316 SPR

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Defense Research: A Primer on the Department of

Defense’s Research, Development, Test and

Evaluation (RDT&E) Program

Updated July 14, 1999

(name redacted)

Specialist, Science and Technology Policy

Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT

This report describes the basic elements and issues of the Department of Defense's (DOD)

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Program. It defines basic activities

supported by the program, presents budget trends, discusses the management of program, and

describes the infrastructure in which the program is implemented. This report is for staff new

to the area of defense research and for senior staff interested in historical trends. This report

will be updated periodically. For tracking congressional action on the current year’s budget,

the reader is referred to the Issue Brief entitled Defense Research: DOD’s Research,

Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Program, by the same author.

Defense Research: A Primer on the Department of Defense’s

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)

Program

Summary

Over the last 10 years, the country has spent an average of $36 billion a year on

DOD’s RDT&E program. About 80% of that goes toward the development of

specific military systems or system components. Most of the rest, between $7 billion

and $8 billion, goes toward more fundamental research, development, and

demonstrations of sciences and technologies identified as important to military

capabilities and operations (called the Science and Technology program).

Total RDT&E funding for the last 10 years has remained relatively level in

nominal terms. However, when accounting for inflation, RDT&E funding peaked in

FY1987 and declined fairly steadily until FY1997. The decline primarily occurred in

those activities associated with developing specific weapon systems. Science and

Technology funding during that time, although more volatile from year to year, has

kept up with inflation. Maintaining a healthy Science and Technology program is a

continuing concern of Congress.

The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology has been given

the responsibility of overseeing the overall RDT&E budget. Reporting to the

Undersecretary is the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), who

is responsible for overseeing the Science and Technology program. Actual program

management responsibility belongs to the Services and a number of Defense Agencies.

Each Service and Defense Agency has its own process for planning its RDT&E and

Science and Technology investment. The DDR&E is responsible for publishing a

DOD-wide Science and Technology Strategy and Plan.

DOD’s RDT&E budget supports work at universities, private firms, non-profits,

federally financed research and development centers, Service-owned research

facilities, and other federally owned research facilities. DOD currently has over 80

Research and Development facilities and 26 Test and Evaluation Centers.

Some issues that Congress has been addressing and likely will continue to deal

with include: maintaining a healthy Science and Technology (S&T) investment;

accelerating the transition of new technology from the laboratory to the field;

downsizing DOD’s RDT&E infrastructure; and integration with the commercial

sector.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Program Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Budget Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Investment Strategy and Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Other CRS Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Defense Research: A Primer on the Department

of Defense’s Research, Development, Test and

Evaluation (RDT&E) Program

Introduction

This report describes the basic elements and issues of the Department of

Defense’s (DOD) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) program.

Over the last 10 years, the country has spent an average of $36 billion a year on

DOD’s RDT&E program. About 80% of that goes toward the development or

demonstration of specific military systems or system components. Most of the rest,

between $7 billion and $8 billion per year, goes toward more fundamental research,

development, and demonstrations in sciences and technologies identified as important

to military capabilities and operations. Because it represents such a large investment

and supports the development of the nation’s high technology weapons systems, and

the technology base upon which those systems rely, Congress has shown considerable

interest in overseeing DOD’s RDT&E program. And, although its share of the

nation’s overall expenditure on science and technology research and development has

diminished over the years, the program still plays an important role in developing

certain key technologies that impact commercial products and the overall economy.

This report discusses the types of activities supported by the RDT&E program, trends

in the program’s budget, program management, and DOD’s RDT&E infrastructure.

Program Activities

DOD’s RDT&E program is one of the major elements of DOD’s total budget.

Other major elements include Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, and

Procurement. For an introduction to DOD’s overall budget, the reader is referred to

CRS Report RL30002, A Defense Budget Primer (see For Additional Reading). The

RDT&E program supports a wide range of activities; from basic research in science

and engineering (e.g. physics, mathematics, materials, electronics) to the full scale

development of specific weapons systems (e.g., the F-22 fighter or the Comanche

helicopter).

The RDT&E budget is accordingly sub-divided into 7 separate activities: basic

research, applied research, advanced technology development, demonstration and

validation, engineering manufacturing development, management support, and

operational systems development. These 7 activities are designated as 6.1 through

6.7. A description of each is given in Figure 1.

CRS-2

Figure 1 RDT&E Activities

6.1 Basic Research: Supports research

that produces new knowledge in a

scientific or technological area of

interest to the military. Areas include

atmospheric and space sciences, ocean

sciences, biological and medical

sciences, chemistry, cognitive and

neural sciences, computer sciences,

electronics,

materials

science,

mathematics,

mechanics,

ocean

sciences, physics, and terrestrial

sciences. For example, basic research

may study the electronic effects of

infrared radiation on a certain class of

materials.

6.2 Applied Research: Supports the

exploratory development and initial

maturation of new technologies for

specific military application (or further

developing existing technology for new

military applications). An example

would be studying the feasibility of

integrating infrared detecting materials

and electronics for night vision. Any

hardware development would be

primarily to demonstrate the capability

of the technology to meet a military

need in a simulated or laboratory

environment.

6.4 Demonstration and Validation:

Supports the initial development and

demonstration of a product designed

specifically to meet an agreed upon set of

performance standards associated with a

validated operational need. Dem/Val, as it

is often called, supports a formal acquisition

program and typically involves a

competition among different designs.

6.5 Engineering & Manufacturing

Development: Supports the continued

development and refinement of a

specifically designed product that has

demonstrated it can meet performance

requirements and development of the

necessary manufacturing processes needed

to build that product.

6.6 Management Support: Supports the

overhead costs associated with managing

the RDT&E activities and running facilities.

6.7 Operational Systems Development:

Supports the continued improvement and

upgrading of products already in

production.

6.3

Advanced

Technology

Development: Supports larger scale

hardware development and integration

and experiments that can demonstrate

capability in more operationally

realistic settings. An example might be

equipping soldiers taking part in a

training operation with a new prototype

night vision goggle.

Funding for 6.1 and 6.2 activities constitute what is called DOD’s Technology

Base program and is often referred to as the “seed corn” of DOD’s technological

capabilities. It is here where new technologies and their potential for military

application are explored and developed (sometimes over long periods of time). A

number of the technologies utilized with such great effect during the Gulf War (e.g.

laser guided bombs, stealth, cruise missiles, night vision) can trace their origins to

Technology Base programs initiated in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Advanced technology development (6.3) activities are meant to help technology

make the transition from the laboratory to the field. Among these activities are

Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs, conducted by the Services

CRS-3

individually for relatively unique Service needs) and Advanced Concept Technology

Demonstrations (ACTDs, managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in

cooperation with one or more of the Services for needs associated with joint

operations). Taken together, these first three activities (6.1-6.3) constitute what is

called DOD’s Science and Technology (S&T) program. The S&T program does

not support development in a formal acquisition program, although as one goes from

6.1 to 6.3, the connection to a specific military operational capability becomes more

important and apparent.

Funding for 6.4, 6.5 and 6.7 activities does support a formal acquisition program

where a specific new product (or product upgrade) is designed and developed to meet

a certified military requirement. The lion’s share of the RDT&E budget goes toward

support of these activities. The acquisition process is discussed later in this report.

Budget Trends

RDT&E funding for the last 10 years has remained relatively flat in nominal

terms. However, when accounting for inflation, RDT&E funding peaked in FY1987

and declined fairly steadily until FY1997 (see Figure 2). The steep increase in total

RDT&E funding during the early part of the 1980s was the result of increased support

for the development a specific new weapon systems associated with the Reagan

Administration’s military build-up. The decline in total RDT&E since the last half of

the 1980s is the result of a slowing down in the development of specific new weapon

systems. The decline in spending was initially in concert with other efforts to control

federal budget deficits and then, later, continued in response to the break-up of the

Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Figure 2 Total RDT&E Funding

50000

millions $

40000

30000

20000

10000

0

1955

1965

1975

fiscal year

current $

1985

2000$

1995

CRS-4

Beginning in the Carter Administration, funding for Science and Technology

programs also grew, but at a slower rate (see Figure 3). With the end of the Cold

War, Congress became concerned that a drop in near-term weapons development

might adversely impact DOD’s long term ability to develop new weapons systems.

Congress maintained and even increased slightly funding for Science and Technology.

After three years, however, faced with internal budget trade-offs, Congress was

unable to sustain that level of investment (in real terms). If DOD and Congress seek

to increase support for force modernization in the next few years, 6.4 and 6.5 funding

may increase again, relative to the Science and Technology program.

Figure 3 Total RDT&E vs Total S&T

50000

millions (FY00$)

40000

30000

20000

10000

0

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

fiscal year

Total RDT&E

Total S&T

Figure 4 shows the funding trend for each activity within the Science and

Technology program (6.1 through 6.3). Much of the increase in Science and

Technology spending during the Reagan build-up was concentrated in Advanced

Technology Development (6.3). The big step increase in 6.3 funding beginning in

FY1986 was primarily due to the Strategic Defense Initiative, much of the funding for

which was characterized as Advanced Technology Development. Funding for Basic

Research (6.1) and Applied Research (6.2) has been relatively flat, in constant dollars,

over the last 10 years. The university community, however, has expressed some

concern over the slow erosion of Basic Research from its peak in FY1993. Much of

the funding for Basic Research is spent at universities. While universities, as a whole,

receive a decreasing share of their R&D funds from DOD, DOD does provide a

disproportionate share of funding in certain engineering fields (such as electrical

engineering and materials) and mathematics.

CRS-5

Figure 4 S&T Funding by Activity

7000

6000

millions (FY00$)

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

fiscal year

DOD 6.1

DOD 6.2

DOD6.3

Management

Organization. The Secretary of Defense, through the Undersecretary of

Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USDAT), has overall responsibility for

managing the total RDT&E budget. Reporting to the Undersecretary is the Director

of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) who oversees the S&T program.

While the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) provides guidance and final

approval of the RDT&E program and budget, it is the Service Departments (Army,

Air Force, and Navy) and Defense Agencies that develop the plans and budgets and

implement the RDT&E program. The Defense Agencies that manage significantly

large RDT&E programs include the Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA,

which only supports 6.1-6.3 activities), the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

(BMDO), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense itself (primarily through the

DDR&E). In addition, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the Chemical and

Biological Defense Program, and Special Operations Command manage relatively

large RDT&E programs. Finally, there are the Director of Developmental Test and

Evaluation and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation who receive

RDT&E funds for carrying out their responsibilities for independent and/or joint

testing of new systems. How best to maintain an independent evaluation of new

military systems (independent of the organizations charged with developing those

systems) has been the topic of some debate over the years.

Figure 5 shows the relative share of the total RDT&E budget between Services

and Defense Agencies. Defense Agencies, primarily DARPA and BMDO, but also

CRS-6

OSD, have received an increasing share of the overall RDT&E budget as a result of

their increased spending on S&T. The BMDO also has a significant investment in

Demonstration and Validation (6.4) and Engineering and Manufacturing Development

(6.5) programs. The relative share between the Services partly reflects the relative

costs and complexities of the systems developed. As sophisticated as U.S. Army

tanks have become, a fighter aircraft still costs more.

Figure 5 Total RDT&E by Service (Agencies)

25000

millions (00$)

20000

15000

10000

5000

0

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

fiscal year

Army

Navy

A.F.

Def. Ag.

Investment Strategy and Planning. The following discusses S&T strategy and

planning separately from acquisition strategy and planning. While the two processes

do function somewhat independently of each other, they are intimately related. The

S&T program develops the future generation(s) of technology, while acquisition

programs bring that technology into the next generation of equipment. There is a

time lag between technology development and the ability to get that technology into

the field.

S&T Planning. In 1988, as part of its FY1989 defense authorizations (Section

823, P.L. 100-456), Congress instructed the USDAT to provide it with an annual plan

for developing the technologies that the Office of the Secretary Defense (OSD) felt

were most critical to ensure the long term qualitative superiority of U.S. weapons

systems. The plan is to include the rationale for selecting those technologies,

milestones associated with developing them, budgets allocated to developing them,

and the potential contribution industry and allies could make to their development.

Prior to this, there was no DOD-wide S&T strategy or plan to guide an integrated

approach to technology development among the Services or to provide Congress with

information useful for its oversight function. The first such plan was submitted in

CRS-7

1989. The process for generating the plan and the “look” of the plan has evolved

considerably since then. Figure 6 shows the current process.

Figure 6. S&T Planning Process

NSTC

National Security

S&T Strategy

Joint Vision

2010

Defense

S&T Strategy

T

A

R

A

Reliance

Basic Research

Plan

Defense Technology

Area Plan

Joint Warfighting

S&T Plan

D

S

T

A

G

Program

Objective

Memoranda

&

Budget

Service/Agency

S&T Plans

The S&T investment strategy and planning process occurs at two levels and in

two directions. At one level, each Service has its own planning and review process

to ensure that its S&T program supports the current and long-term needs of its own

war fighting community. At a higher level, the DDR&E is responsible for ensuring

that the combined S&T programs compliment each other, serve the joint-war fighting

capabilities identified by Joint Chiefs of Staff and the area commanders-in-chiefs (as

stated in Joint Vision 2010 in the figure below) and address the National Security

Science and Technology Strategy generated by the National Science and Technology

Council (also shown in figure below). The DDR&E is also responsible for ensuring

that redundancies and deficiencies in the individual S&T programs of the Services and

agencies are addressed. While war fighting needs are generally defined by the war

fighting community and the S&T community seeks to develop technologies to meet

those needs (top-down), the S&T community also provides the war fighter with new

opportunities as new technologies are conceived and matured (bottom-up).

Inter-Service and Agency coordination is facilitated by the Defense Science and

Technology Reliance project. The Army and Air Force formed Reliance in 1990,

primarily in response to the S&T planning process implemented in 1989. It expanded

to include the Navy, and now includes DARPA, BMDO, the Deputy DDR&E and the

Defense Special Weapons Agency. Reliance is an inter-service/agency forum where

agreements on joint planning, collocation of in-house R&D, and lead-service/agency

assignments are made. Reliance focuses primarily on those areas of common interest

to more than one Service (e.g. aviation, electronics).

CRS-8

Reliance is responsible for developing the three plans listed in the figure above

(the Basic Research Plan, the Defense Technology Area Plans and the Joint War

fighting Science and Technology Plan). These plans lay out basic roadmaps for

achieving certain military capabilities.

To achieve these levels of capability in the time required, specific Defense

Technology Objectives (DTOs) or, in the case of Basic Research, Strategic

Research Objectives (SROs) are identified. Each DTO (SRO) identifies a specific

level of technological advancement or gain in knowledge that will be made, including

estimated dates, funding levels, the RDT&E Program Elements (P.E.s) which will

support that funding, and an explanation of how this effort will impact the war

fighter’s needs. Together over 300 DTOs are identified and account for about 50%

of DOD’s total 6.2 and 6.3 funding. SROs account for about 67% of DOD’s total

basic research funding.

These plans and technology (strategic research) objectives are reviewed by

Technology Area Review and Assessment (TARA) teams. Program modifications or

recommendations are forwarded to the Defense Science and Technology Advisory

Group (DSTAG) chaired by the DDR&E, who then proposes any changes to the

Program Review Group (PRG) which is part of the Defense Resources Board which

prepares DOD’s budget. Any changes approved by the PRG are sent back to the

Service planners in the form of Program Decision Memoranda.

Acquisition Planning. The Deputy Secretary of Defense with the assistance of

the Defense Resources Board, decides whether to acquire a new military system. The

decision is based on military strategy, the mission capabilities needed to carry out that

strategy, the equipment needed to achieve those capabilities and the affordability of

developing and operating that equipment. Once a new acquisition program is begun,

6.4, 6.5 and 6.7 RDT&E funding supports certain phases of that program. A profile

of the acquisition process that is supported by the RDT&E budget is shown in Figure

7. It consists of Phases, separated by Milestone Decisions. These decisions are made

by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), chaired by the USDAT. Work done

during the Phases are managed by the Services or Agencies.

Figure 7. Acquisition Process

Milestones

I

0

Phase 0

Relevant

RDT&E

Phase 0

Phase I

Phase II

Phase III

II

III

Phase I

Phase II

6.4

6.5

Phase III

6.7

Concept Exploration

Program Definition & Risk Reduction

Engineering & Manufacturing Development

Production, Deployment, Operational

Support

CRS-9

Before an acquisition program can begin, an operational component within one

of the Services (e.g. the Air Force Air Combat Command) must identify a broadly

stated mission need that cannot be satisfied by changes in tactics, doctrine, etc. If the

materiel solution to this need is expensive enough (above a certain threshold), the

Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must

review and approve it. At that point the USDAT reviews the JROC request and

chooses one or more concepts for further study (Milestone 0). Phase 0 (Concept

Evaluation) involves short-term studies evaluating the feasibility of competing

concepts. At the end of Phase 0, the DAB assesses whether a new acquisition

program is warranted and, if so, approves (Milestone I) a baseline acquisition strategy

(which includes budgets, test and evaluation master plans, risk assessments and

mitigation efforts, etc.). A Milestone approval also agrees on what needs to be

demonstrated in the next phase of the program (exit criteria).

At this point, if the Deputy Secretary of Defense approves, a new program is

begun. Phase I (Program Definition and Risk Reduction) will further develop one or

more of the concepts studied in the previous phase, assessing advantages and

disadvantages, and demonstrating prototype equipment if necessary to reduce risks

(uncertainties). The acquisition strategy becomes more clearly defined as does the

specific system requirements. When the exit criterion for Phase I has been met, the

DAB decides whether to continue with one of the concepts (Milestone II). Phase II

(Engineering and Manufacturing Development) translates the most promising concept

into a stable, operational, affordable, and producible design. Also, during this time

the manufacturing and production processes are validated. Once a prototype of the

design demonstrates it can meet the requirements, low rate initial production is

authorized by the DAB. Low rate initial production provides operational components

for operational testing and to establish the initial production capability. At Milestone

III, the DAB approves Phase III (Production, Deployment, and Operational Support).

At this point RDT&E funds decline and Procurement funds take over.

Infrastructure

DOD’s RDT&E program supports work at universities, research institutes,

federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), private firms and

consortia, and at Service RDT&E facilities. Funds flow in different proportions to

different entities depending on the type of activity being funded. A large part of

DOD’s Basic Research program (almost 60%) goes to universities. About 25% goes

to DOD’s own R&D facilities. Most of the 6.2 and 6.3 work is performed in industry

(almost 50%) and at DOD’s own facilities (30%). Just about all of the 6.4, 6.5 and

6.7 funding goes to private firms.

DOD’s RDT&E infrastructure is divided into two groups: research and

development laboratories and test and evaluation centers. Laboratories are DOD

activities (cost centers) that perform one or more of the following activities: science

and technology, engineering development, systems engineering, and engineering

support of deployed materiel. There are over 80 DOD R&D laboratory facilities (e.g

Naval Research Laboratory). Test and Evaluation Centers are facilities and the

surrounding area (i.e. sea, air, ground, space) that are government-owned or

controlled, and which are used to collect T&E data and deliver T&E products (e.g.

CRS-10

reports). There are 26 T&E Centers (e.g. the Army’s White Sands Missile Range).

Each of the Services supports its own R&D laboratories and T&E centers. Each

manages them in its own way. It should be noted that DARPA and BMDO do not

have any R&D laboratories of their own. BMDO does operate the Joint National

Test Facility.

FFRDC’s are not-for-profit organizations which are financed on a sole-source

basis, exclusively or substantially by a federal agency, to perform specific research and

development that the agency cannot do itself or contract from other organizations.

The federal government supports a total of 42 FFRDCs. Each is administered, by

contract, by an industrial firm, university, or other non-profit institution. DOD

supports 12 FFRDCs (at one point DOD supported 39). An example is the Lincoln

Laboratory, managed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and begun in

World War II to develop radar. About 3% of DOD’s total RDT&E budget goes to

FFRDCs.

As mentioned earlier, much of DOD’s 6.1 research is performed by grant or

contract at universities. Much of this is single-investigator research. However, 6.1

funding also goes to support centers of excellence and other “centers” at universities

that take a multi-disciplinary team approach.

Besides providing direct funding to private firms for various research and

development activities, DOD also provides indirect support for private firms’

independent research and development (IR&D). Based on negotiations between

the firm and DOD, DOD will allow firms to count as an expense on its DOD contracts

some share of the research and development the firm does with its own funds (and for

its own purposes). These cost allowances have, in the past, amounted to $2 billion

to $3 billion per year. Congress removed the limits on how much companies could

be reimbursed in the early 1990s as part of Congressional efforts to continue

supporting military R&D during the transition to a post-Cold War environment.

Issues

Issues that Congress has confronted and may continue to confront, relating to

DOD’s RDT&E budget include:

Maintaining a Healthy Science and Technology Investment: The Science

and Technology program is perceived as imperative to maintaining DOD’s

technological edge over potential adversaries. Investments made here bear fruit later

in the form of more sophisticated equipment and capabilities. However, because

knowledge and information is the primary product at this stage in development

(especially for 6.1 and 6.2 activities), a specific return on investment in the form of

hardware or software is not always immediate. In fact, it is not always clear,

beforehand, whether a new technology will ever prove useful. As a result, there is

always concern within the S&T community that pressures for nearer-term

developments or issues will crowd out the longer term investment associated with

Science and Technology projects. Over the last 10 years, DOD’s S&T investment has

varied widely. But, since FY1993, when it peaked in real terms, it has steadily

declined.

CRS-11

There is no clear objective way to determine how much S&T funding is

appropriate to maintain a healthy technology base and to maintain DOD’s

technological advantage. The FY1999 defense authorization bill (P.L. 105-261, Sec.

214) expressed a sense of Congress that S&T funding should increase 2% above

inflation each year through FY2006. The bill (same section) also called for a report

by the National Research Council to study what level of S&T investment was

appropriate and what the impacts might be of not maintaining that level of funding.

As of the writing of this report, that study has not been initiated. In May 1998, the

Defense Science Board studied this issue by looking at how industry determines how

much to spend on research and development. The Board concluded that industry did

not use a formal process for determining what to spend, but, instead, used a general

rule of a certain percentage of sales. According to the study, technologically dynamic

industries invested up to 3.5% of sales in research (15% of sales in research and

development). Using this rule and equating DOD’s total outlays to sales, the Board

determined that an investment in FY1999 of about $8 billion would be appropriate.

Another issue is the level of basic research supported by the S&T program.

Between FY1993 and FY1998, investment in basic research had slowly eroded in

constant dollars. Much of DOD’s basic research is invested in universities. DOD

basic research investment in universities represents a relatively small share of

universities’ outside funding, but in certain areas, such as materials and electronics

engineering and mathematics, DOD’s investment is a significant source of funds.

Reductions in 6.1 funding generate concern within the university community.

Accelerating the Transition of New Technology: The pace at which new

technology moves from the laboratory to a fielded system has always been of concern,

although the urgency to do so may have subsided with the end of the Cold War.

Scaling technology up in size and integrating it with other technologies can present

problems not identified in the laboratory. Trying to solve these “bugs” in an

acquisition program can delay the program and/or greatly increase the costs of the

program. Therefore, over the years more emphasis has been placed on technology

demonstrations as a way to solve these problems before beginning an acquisition

program. In the last few years, technology demonstrations have also been proposed

as a way to quickly get new technologies into the field, short of a formal acquisition

program. While agreeing on the need for such demonstrations, Congress has been

cautious in support (especially of ACTDs). Even so, technology demonstrations have

increased as a share of the S&T program.

Downsizing Infrastructure: DOD’s downsizing since the end of the Cold War

focused initially on reducing force levels and reducing or delaying the development

of new weapons systems. The next phase of downsizing was directed at trying to

reduce infrastructure across the board. The Base Realignment and Closure

(BRAC) process has been the instrument by which DOD and Congress have agreed

to close bases and other DOD facilities (in what is otherwise a highly politicized

process). Closure and consolidation of defense R&D facilities to the extent they have

occurred, have been a result of the BRAC process. In addition, DOD has been

reducing the RDT&E workforce since FY1992. Reductions are to continue into the

next century, at which point the workforce will have been reduced almost 30% from

FY1992 levels. Additional reductions to the acquisition workforce (which includes

CRS-12

RDT&E personnel) were mandated in the FY1998 Defense Authorizations (P.L. 10585, Section 912).

Although there have been some laboratory consolidations via BRAC, Congress

felt more could be done, especially in regard to cross-servicing (i.e. co-locating the

Services’ RDT&E activity or assigning lead responsibility to a Service in a particular

technology area). Section 277 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1996

(P.L.104-106) required DOD to develop a five-year plan, to be implemented between

FY2001 and FY2005, that would consolidate and restructure its laboratories and

T&E centers further (as much as is practical and possible). The process by which

DOD intended to draw up this plan was called Vision 21. Vision 21 had made some

progress in laying the groundwork for making further consolidations, including the

design of a cost accounting system that would allow the cost of RDT&E to be

compared across Services. However, Vision 21 efforts were later consumed by the

Quadrennial Defense Review process. Draft legislation related specifically to

laboratory and test center consolidation was dropped in favor of a general request for

two more BRAC rounds relating to DOD’s entire infrastructure. Congress has not

been receptive to any more BRAC rounds in this larger context. Congress, however,

continues to encourage the Services to find ways to improve efficiencies and to find

ways to account for costs that will allow comparison across Services (P.L. 105-261,

Sec. 906).

Integration with the Commercial Sector: While DOD’s Science and

Technology program has produced a wide range of sophisticated technologies, in

some technology areas, it has not been able to keep pace with the level of technology

development in the commercial sector. A prime example is microelectronics. While

the semiconductor and integrated circuits were developed with private funds, DOD

(and the space program) provided an early market for the devices and pushed the

subsequent development of those technologies. By the 1970s, however, DOD’s

market share declined significantly and commercial demands pushed new

developments. Soon commercial circuits outperformed circuits made for DOD. At

the urging of Congress, part of the DOD’s articulated S&T strategy has been to

piggy-back on the commercial sector’s technology base efforts where it can. It has

sought to do this primarily by pursuing what it calls dual-use programs. These

programs seek to cooperatively develop technologies of mutual benefit to DOD and

the commercial sector, in a way that will accelerate their use by both.

Dual-use programs differ from core DOD RDT&E programs in that they are

suppose to appeal more to commercially-oriented firms (or even firms that have not

typically worked with DOD in the past), requiring cost-sharing with the private party

(or parties), and contracts are drawn up independent of usual defense contracting

regulations (to make them more palatable to commercially-oriented firms).

Management of dual-use programs have undergone a great deal of evolution since

they were initiated. Currently, each Service manages its own Dual-Use Science and

Technology program with oversight by the DDR&E.

CRS-13

Other CRS Products

CRS Report RL30002, A Defense Budget Primer, by Mary Tyszkiewicz and (name r

edacted).

CRS Report 95-738. The difference Between DOD Programs That Develop DualUse Technologies and DOD’s Dual-Use Technology Development

Programs—A Fact Sheet, by John Moteff.

CRS Report 95-489. DOD’s Federally Funded Research and Development Centers

(FFRDCs), by Michael Davey.

CRS Report 95-322. DOD’s Dual-Use Strategy, by (name redacted).

CRS Report 95-86. DOD’s Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP): Friend or Foe?

by (name redacted)

CRS Issue Brief 89056. Cooperative R&D: Federal Efforts to Promote Industrial

Competitiveness, by Wendy Schact. (Updated regularly)

CRS Report 94-100. DOD Support for University-based Research, by Michael

Davey.

CRS Report 93-1051. DOD’s Independent Research and Development Program:

Changes and Issues, by Michael Davey and Dahlia Stein.

EveryCRSReport.com

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a federal legislative branch agency, housed inside the

Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on

issues that may come before Congress.

EveryCRSReport.com republishes CRS reports that are available to all Congressional staff. The

reports are not classified, and Members of Congress routinely make individual reports available to

the public.

Prior to our republication, we redacted names, phone numbers and email addresses of analysts

who produced the reports. We also added this page to the report. We have not intentionally made

any other changes to any report published on EveryCRSReport.com.

CRS reports, as a work of the United States government, are not subject to copyright protection in

the United States. Any CRS report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without

permission from CRS. However, as a CRS report may include copyrighted images or material from a

third party, you may need to obtain permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or

otherwise use copyrighted material.

Information in a CRS report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public

understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to members of Congress in

connection with CRS' institutional role.

EveryCRSReport.com is not a government website and is not affiliated with CRS. We do not claim

copyright on any CRS report we have republished.