Persian Gulf War: Defense-Policy Implications for Congress

91-421 F

Persian Gulf War:

Defense-Policy Implications

for Congress

Ronald O’Rourke, Coordinator

Specialist in National Defense

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

May 15, 1991

Congressional Research Service * The Library of Congress

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PERSIAN GULF WAR: DEFENSE-POLICY

IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS

SUMMARY

The Persian Gulf War will influence congressional views on U.S. defense

policy for many years. In considering the defense-policy implications of the Gulf

War, a major task for Congress is to determine in what ways the Gulf War is an

indicator for future conflicts involving U.S. military forces, and in what ways it

is an anomalous case unlikely to be repeated.

The Gulf War has led some Members to question whether US. military

force structure should be reduced as much .as called for under the

Administration’s proposed FY1992-FY1997 defense plan. The war appears to

have reinforced support for high-tech weapons. The performance of the Patriot

antimissile system is being cited as a new argument for developing strategic and

theater ballistic missile defenses, The war demonstrated the growing

importance of space systems to the U.S. military.

The Airland Battle doctrine, which influences Army and Air Force budgets,

appears to have been validated by the conflict, though there is an issue as to

how severely the war tested this doctrine. The success of airpower in the war

has led some to argue that the United States in the future should rely more on

airpower to defend its interests. Some argue the war showed the need for newgeneration stealthy aircraft; others argue that it showed that new-generation

aircraft can be safely deferred. The war has increased interest in developing

new measures to prevent ground troops from being attacked by friendly aircraft.

This conflict increased interest in strengthening U.S. defenses against

chemical and biological warfare. Amphibious forces were not tested, but their

threat tied down a disproportionately larger enemy coastal defense force.

Associated naval operations demonstrated the limits of current U.S. naval

mineclearing capabilities, particularly in shallower waters.

The war highlighted the importance of special operations forces (SOF) in

US. military operations. Many observers view U.S. intelligence support for the

war as effective, but others have noted deficiencies in that support. The war

strengthened an emerging consensus that U.S. strategic sealift capability needs

to be improved,

The war appears to have validated many aspects of U.S. policy regarding

reserve forces, but may lead to a reassessment of the reserve roundout combat

brigades, It highlighted issues regarding women, minorities, and parents in the

military. The war appears to have validated the wartime value of the

Goldwater-Nichols act reorganizing the Defense Department. In the wake of the

war, members of the military reform movement may need to reassess some of

their views, but can argue that others were validated.

The war highlighted the U.S. defense industrial base’s growing dependence

on foreign-made components. The war may lead to changes in U.S. and foreign

policies on exports of weapons and military technology to the Third World.

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CONTRIBUTORS

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

Richard A. Best, Jr.

Steven R, Bowman

David F. Burrelli

Bert Cooper

Stephen Daggett

Robert L. Goldich

Steven A, Hildreth

Shirley Kan

Jonathan Medalia

Ronald O’Rourke

Gary J. Pagliano

James P. Wootten

Science Policy Research Division

Michael E. Davey

John D, Moteff

Marcia S. Smith

Library Services Division

Sherry B. Shapiro

”

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ......c cece cece reece ee neeeees 1

PURPOSE AND SCOPE ..... cscs cece ec e eres eee ee ee eevens 1

PERSIAN GULF WAR: MODEL OR ANOMALY? .....ccseeeeees 2

DEFENSE BUDGET AND THE SIZE OF THE FORCE ...........08. 3

HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WARFARE ..... ccc eee ece ence eesenevenes 5

HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WEAPONRY ..... ccc cececeeceveececes 5

FUTURE OF DOD’s SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS . 7

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND SDI .... ccc cece cece eee 8

MILITARY SPACE SYSTEMS ..... ccs ceseereceecnecncevens 10

AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE ...c cece eee ce eee ee eee eeeeenes 13

AIRPOWER ves secscccecncscvveveveves TESTER ee 15

RELIANCE ON AIRPOWER .... cc cece cece een cet eeeeeeenes 15

NEXT-GENERATION VS, EXISTING TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 17

LAND- VS, SEA-BASED AIRPOWER ... cess ceceeeeneneees 19

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND "FRIENDLY FIRE" ..... 0.0 cee eee 21

STRATEGIC BOMBERS .... cc ccceceeeeveceeeeeeesreeeens 23

AIR-LAUNCHED MUNITIONS ... cc cece cece cece eee eneeeeeas 25

SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES ...... 0c. ceseceeeeeeees 27

GROUND FORCES vw. cscs cern cee ee reese cee eceneenes vevecee Ol

NEED FOR GROUND FORCES .......c ccc ccc eee e ec evnveees 31

MIX OF HEAVY AND LIGHT GROUND FORCES ....ceeeeuees 33

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS ROLES AND MISSIONS ......... 35

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ......c.seeeeeeeee 37

NAVAL FORCES vices ccc c cece cress eee reset ee ee ee eeeneeens 41

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE ... cece cece cree eee e ee ee ee enenens 41

MINE WARFARE oo. cece cece crete cence teen eee eeeneeeane 48

SURFACE COMBATANTS AND ATTACK SUBMARINES ....... 45

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES .... cece cece eee ete een ee ee eeene 49

INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ASSESSMENT ..... 0. cc cece eneuas 51

INTELLIGENCE ISSUES 0... ccc c steer ccc e eee e eet eeeeens 51

THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS 5... .ce cece ere eneeenens 53

1,00) 5) 8 0) i Wh Qa 55

AIRLIFT icc e sete terre tere e cence erate e seen eeeens 55

iS) 0720 5) 0 Mc a 57

ORGANIZATIONAL/PERSONNEL 3... .s ccc c cece eee e eee eeneues 61

RELIANCE ON THE RESERVES ..... ccc eeeeceeeeceneuveas 61

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY ........ceeeeee een eee eeetaees 63

MINORITIES IN THE MILITARY ...... ccc cece cece eee enees 64

FAMILIES IN THE MILITARY ........ cc cece c cece e ence nena 65

TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Continued

DOD ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND. ..............00e cues 66

MILITARY REFORM MOVEMENT ...... 0... cece cee e cece eeaes 69

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE ...... 0... cece scence eee eeeeees 71

ARMS SALES AND TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS .............000e0e 73

ARMS SALES 2.0... ... cece cece e cece eter ene eneneeeees 73

TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS ....... 0. cece eset eee eee e ee eaeee 75

PERSIAN GULF WAR: DEFENSE-POLICY

IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

As the biggest U.S. military operation since Vietnam, the Persian Gulf War

will influence congressional views on U.S. defense policy for many years. The

war, moreover, occurred at a critical moment for U.S. defense policymakers: The

conflict took place just as the Administration was presenting to Congress its

proposed FY1992 defense budget and FY1992-FY1997 defense plan, which are

intended to reshape the U.S. military for the post-Cold War era.

The Defense Department is now attempting to identify the military lessons

of the war, and many other individuals and organizations are doing the same.

This report is distinguished from these efforts by its focus on defense-policy

issues of interest to Congress that are now being viewed with fresh perspectives

afforded by the Gulf War. It is not strictly a “lessons-learned" report: The

emphasis is on identifying and framing policy issues rather than on providing

final "lessons" of the war, which in many cases ‘have yet to be determined. Some

of the issues covered in the report grew directly out of the experience of the war.

Most of the issues covered in the report, however, predate the Gulf War, and in

these instances the aim of the report is to show how war may have altered the

debates on these issues.

Given constraints on length, not every potential defense-policy issue of

interest to Congress could be covered, But an attempt was made to cover a wide

range of issues, with a particular focus on choices that might have to be made

between competing defense programs in an era of declining defense funding.

The intent of the report is to assist Congress in its consideration of the

Administration’s proposed FY1992 defense budget and FY1992-FY1997 defense

plan.

Two other CRS reports deal with closely related matters -- Desert Shield

and Desert Storm Implications for Future U.S, Force Requirements, by John M.

Collins,! and The Persian Gulf War: Preliminary Foreign Policy "Lessons" and

Perceptions, by Mark M. Lowenthal.? Some issues not covered in this report

may be found in these two other works. In addition, a bibliography showing

1 CRS Report 91-361 RCO of April 19, 1991. 30 p.

2 CRS Report 91-260 RCO of March 18, 1991. 12 p.

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additional related CRS Reports and Issue Briefs appears at the end of this

report.

PERSIAN GULF WAR: MODEL OR ANOMALY?

In considering the defense-policy implications of the Gulf War, a major task

for Congress is to determine in what ways the Gulf War is indicative of

characteristics of future conflicts involving U.S. military forces, and in what

ways it is an anomalous case unlikely to be repeated. No two conflicts are

completely alike, and "lessons" properly identified from one conflict can be

misapplied to a subsequent, different conflict. The challenge is to learn from the

most recent war, but at the same time not assume and prepare for its repetition.

With the fading of the Cold War, the focus of U.S. defense planning is

shifting to conflicts in the Third World, and in this important sense, the Gulf

War may yield important insights for future conflicts involving U.S. military

forces. The Gulf War is also seen as a harbinger of the access of potential Third

World adversaries to sophisticated weapons purchased on the international

market.

In other important respects, however, the Gulf War may prove to be an

anomalous case. Analysts have pointed out that in future conflicts, the United

States may not, for example, (1) enjoy the benefits of international cooperation

against the adversary; (2) have anywhere near five months, free from enemy

attack, to deploy its forces, conduct in-theater practice, and perfect its war

plans; (3) enjoy substantial host-nation support, including large amounts of food

and fuel, and use of well-developed bases and ports; and (4) fight in desert

terrain against a large, heavily armed, dug-in ground force. A difference in even

one of these areas could produce a conflict substantially different from the Gulf

War. Recent conflicts in the Third World very different from the Gulf War

include the U.S. military intervention in Panama in 1989 and the U.S. tankerescort operation in the Persian Gulf in 1987-1988. It is also worth noting that

potential U.S. adversaries, observing the Gulf War, will presumably seek ways

to avoid a repetition of Iraq’s experience in the Gulf War.

A future conflict similar to the Gulf War can’t be ruled out. And many of

the defense-policy implications of the Gulf War will prove valuable in preparing

the United States for different kinds of conflicts as well. But the defense-policy

implications of the Gulf War, if applied in an unreflective, wholesale manner,

might actually reduce U.S. readiness for some kinds of potential future conflicts.

The Persian Gulf War has been called by some the first U.S. war of the post-

Cold War era. The challenge for Congress is determine what this might mean

-- and not mean -- for the FY1992 defense budget, the FY1992-FY1997 defense

plan, and future U.S. defense policy.

Prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs

and National Defense Division.

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DEFENSE BUDGET AND THE SIZE OF THE FORCE

What implications might the Persian Gulf War have for plans to cut defense

spending and reduce the size of the force over the next several years?

The Persian Gulf War promises to influence future defense spending by

informing debates on a number of key defense policy issues, including: (1) the

size of the force; (2) the pace of weapons modernization; (8) readiness and

sustainability; and (4) forward deployments.

Size of the Force

Operation Desert Storm occurred just as Secretary of Defense Cheney and

other senior defense officials were presenting to Congress the details of

Administration plans to reduce the size of U.S. military forces, terminate a

number of major weapons programs, close military bases, and restructure U.S,

troop deployments over the next several years in order to adjust long-term

defense plans to the changed international security environment and declining

budgets. The Administration’s plan calls for defense spending to fall by about

20% in real, inflation-adjusted dollars between FY1990 and FY1995, in accord

with a budget compromise negotiated with Congress in October 1990, To

achieve the necessary savings, the Administration is proposing a reduction of

about 20% by FY1995 in the overall size of the force.

In the wake of the Persian Gulf War, some Members of Congress have

questioned whether the planned cutbacks are advisable. Administration officials

acknowledge that it would involve more risk in the future to deploy as large a

force as was sent to the Persian Gulf, since fewer troops would be available to

respond to crises elsewhere on the globe. For the present, however, senior

officials seem disinclined to challenge last fall’s budget accord, and they appear

willing to accept the premise that the erosion of the Soviet threat in Europe

warrants a smaller force. No specific proposals to revise last year’s long-term

budget agreement have yet emerged in Congress.

Two factors could conceivably lead the Administration to argue for some

adjustments in the defense budget caps to accommodate changes entailed by the

Persian Gulf War. First, the Defense Department may have difficulty reducing

the number of personnel as quickly as it had planned before the war. A second

and more substantial problem may arise if the United States decides to maintain

an expanded military presence in the Persian Gulf region. The Administration

does not want to deploy large numbers of ground forces in the area, but an

enhanced naval presence could lead some to argue for smaller cuts in the size

of the Navy, which could have significant effects on the defense budget.

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Pace of Weapons Modernization

In light of budget constraints, the Administration has become increasingly

selective about weapons modernization plans. For the most part, however, it

has elected to continue developing the next generation of weapons while

terminating production of the current generation relatively early. The Persian

Gulf War demonstrated the value of American high-technology weaponry, so one

effect may be to give a boost to new weapons programs by making Congress

more patient with development problems. Some have suggested, however, that

the current generation of weapons worked so well that it may make sense to

forgo some new systems and to proceed slowly with development of others.

Readiness and Sustainability

Some Members of Congress have argued that a much longer warning time

of a major war in Europe should allow the military services to maintain a

"flexible readiness" posture, with some units kept at lower levels of readiness

than other quick reaction troops. The services, however, want to keep all active

duty troops at high levels of readiness, arguing that readiness is difficult and

expensive to restore if allowed to erode. The Persian Gulf War drew on U.S.-

based armored and mechanized forces generally considered to be assigned to

European contingencies, suggesting that high levels of readiness may be

important across a wide spectrum, though perhaps not all, of the force.

The Persian Gulf War, though a massive undertaking, was not nearly as

demanding as the major war in Europe for which the U.S. force posture had

been designed. It is not surprising, then, that few shortages of munitions, spare

parts, or other material appeared. At the same time, planners were reportedly

concerned about the status of some equipment stocks and took steps to step up

production rates of some munitions. Moreover, the rate at which some weapons,

such as Maverick air-to-surface missiles, were used may have been higher than

expected. The war may, therefore, suggest a need to reexamine stockpile goals.

Forward Deployments

Some Members question the high priority that the Administration is giving

to maintaining large force deployments overseas at a time when the Soviet

threat is declining, U.S. forces are shrinking, and basing agreements with host

nations are proving difficult to negotiate. The Gulf War demonstrated that the

United States can deploy large numbers of troops from the United States and

Europe to other regions. Light units deployed initially to the area, however, had

limited capability against armored attack. Moreover, over several years Saudi

Arabia had built a very large military infrastructure capable of absorbing allied

forces, which provided many of the same advantages as a large forward

deployment. Alternatives to forward deployment, therefore, may prove costly.

Prepared by Stephen Daggett, Analyst in National Defense, Foreign Affairs and

National Defense Division.

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HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WARFARE

HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WEAPONRY

What implications might the Persian Gulf War have for future investment

in high-technology combat systems?

The Persian Gulf War involved an extensive application of high-technology

weaponry. The list of high-tech systems used is long and varied. Among some

of the more notable are the F-117 stealth light attack plane, cruise missiles, a

variety of air-launched precision guided munitions, the Patriot antitactical

missile, and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)

surveillance aircraft. Initial reports on the performance of these systems have

generally been very positive. Their effectiveness has been credited with

minimizing coalition and civilian casualties, reducing the number of munitions

and missions required to destroy enemy targets, and neutralizing Iraqi

command, control, and communications.

High-tech combat systems, however, present a number of challenges for

military planners, They generally have long, and often troubled, development

periods. Both development and production costs tend to be high. They often

require skilled, highly-trained personnel to operate and maintain them. As

Congress decides upon future investment in high-tech systems, it might

consider: (1) How much need is there for newer, more capable systems? (2)

Was the Persian Gulf War an adequate proving ground for high-tech weaponry?

The Need for Newer, More Capable Weapons

A major issue for Congress in the wake of the Persian Gulf War is whether

U.S. weapons and equipment have attained a sufficient level of technological

superiority that programs to develop newer and more advanced systems can be

canceled or slowed down. Canceling or deferring development of new systems

could have a significant effect on funding requirements for the Defense

Department’s Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) account,

which makes up $35 billion, or about one-seventh, of the overall defense budget.

Some in Congress, viewing what they see as the overwhelming technological

superiority of U.S, and allied forces in the Persian Gulf War, may argue that

projects for some new weapons systems can be safely canceled or deferred in

favor of upgrades to existing systems. They might argue that other projects

should be refocused away from concentrating on greater performance and more

toward achieving lower production and maintenance costs.

Others in Congress, concerned about the proliferation of ever-moreadvanced weapons in the Third World, much of it from Western countries, may

argue that programs for new and more capable high-tech weapon systems should

proceed as planned. Canceling or deferring these new stems, they may argue,

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would reduce or eliminate in future conflicts the U.S. technological edge that

proved so important in the Persian Gulf War.

The Gulf War: An Adequate Proving Ground?

Reports to date suggest that high-tech weapons worked well in the war.

But was the war an adequate proving ground for high-tech weapons, whose

reliability and effectiveness has been questioned by various critics in recent

years?

High-technology advocates maintain that the Gulf War was a challenging

proving ground for the U.S. military’s high-tech weapons. High-tech weapons,

they note, were successfully maintained in harsh field conditions that included

temperature extremes and frequent dust storms. They were used in demanding

night operations, and they had great effect against one of the most sophisticated

military forces the United States could encounter outside the Soviet Union.

Others suggest that the Gulf War was not a severe test of high-technology

systems, and that enthusiasm for them should therefore be tempered. The

relatively flat and open terrain, and the fact that many Iraqi targets were in

fixed positions, they note, made it fairly easy for high-tech weapons to lock on

or be guided to their targets. U.S. forces had months to practice using the

weapons under local conditions, and in the latter stages of the war pilots flying

at higher altitudes could often use them with little fear that the enemy could

effectively shoot back. Moreover, U.S. support personnel were able to repair and

maintain equipment in rear areas free from any concerted enemy attack.

Transportation links from the United States and Europe were also secure from

attack, and Saudi airports and harbors were far superior to those U.S. forces

could hope to encounter in most of the world. These factors did much to

alleviate the heavy logistics burden of high-tech weapons.

Some critics have pointed out that weapon performance reports are still

preliminary, and should be subjected to more detailed examination before firm

conclusions are drawn. One option already proposed is to have an independent

panel or government organization, such as the General Accounting Office or the

National Academy of Sciences, undertake such an effort.

Prepared by Steven R. Bowman, Analyst in National Defense, Foreign Affairs

and National Defense Division.

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FUTURE OF DOD's SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

What implications might the Persian Gulf War have for the future of DOD’s

science and technology programs?

A major issue for Congress in the wake of the Persian Gulf War concerns

future support for the Defense Department’s Science and Technology (S&T)

programs.” Most of the technology contained in today’s advanced U.S. weapons

was developed through investments in S&T programs made in the 1960s and the

1970s. The advanced weapons of the early 21st century will evolve out of

today’s DOD S&T investment. In an era of constrained funding for RDT&E

work, what spending level for S&T programs is appropriate?

Although funding for overall Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

(RDT&E) doubled in real terms during the past decade, DOD’s S&T programs

remained essentially flat. DOD is the only major Federal agency involved in

research and development whose basic research program did not grow in real

terms in the 1980s.

The overall RDT&E budget has declined 14 percent in real terms since

FY1986, and is expected to continue to decline over the next five years. Because

DOD’s S&T programs did not share in the Reagan buildup, some Members of

Congress have expressed a desire for maintaining real increases in S&T funding.

In FY1991, Congress increased the Administration’s request for S&T programs

by 15 percent, while decreasing the Administration’s overall RDT&E request by

2 percent. In FY1992, however, DOD proposes to reduce funding for S&T by 8

5 DOD’s Science and Technology program is considered a subset of DOD’s

overall Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) program and

is characterized as 6.1 (basic research), 6.2 (exploratory technology

development), and 6.8A (advanced technology development), excluding the

Strategic Defense Initiative.

4 For example, powerful phased-array radar and other elements of the

Patriot air defense system (formally deployed in 1984) had their genesis in the

Army’s SAM-D S&T program in the mid-1960s, A single Patriot phased-array

radar can perform more tasks than the seven mechanical radars required by the

Patriot’s two predecessors (the Nike and Hawk air defense systems). The

stealth technology incorporated in the F-117 attack plane can trace its

development back to an S&T program begun in 1959 which later led to the

development of the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft. In the early 1970s, to

discover new ways to avoid the kinds of aircraft losses inflicted by surface-to-air

missiles during the Vietnam War, Lockheed convinced the Air Force to apply the

technology generated in this program to a new attack plane. And the Joint

Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) surveillance plane, which

peered deep behind Iraqi lines to detect and target columns of Iraqi troops in

both day and night, in good weather and bad, evolved out of a Defense Advanced

Projects Research Agency (DARPA) technology demonstration program begun

in the later 1970s.

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percent in real terms from the FY1991 figure, while increasing total RDT&E by

11 percent.

With overall funding for RDT&E constrained, if Congress seeks options for

maximizing the amount allocated to S&T programs, one option would be to

cancel or defer work on major weapons now in development. DOD’s RDT&E

budgets are still dominated by large systems development programs such as the

Air Force’s B-2 stealth bomber, Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), and C-17

transport plane, the Navy’s AX medium attack plane, and the Army’s Light

Helicopter (LH). If DOD and Congress choose to reduce these programs, more

funding could be made available within the RDT&E account for S&T programs.

Many observers, however, are concerned that canceling or deferring new

weapons would threaten U.S. technological superiority in future conflicts (see

entry on High-Technology Weaponry).

Another option would be to increase allied participation in some weapon

development programs and have the allies pay a greater portion of the

development bill for them. Some observers, however, are concerned that greater

allied codevelopment will make the United States too vulnerable to supply

disruptions in time of a conflict (see entry on the Defense Industrial Base).

An alternative approach would be to stabilize or reduce DOD’s S&T budget,

develop dual-use technologies in cooperation with the civilian sector, and use

more civilian technology in new or modified systems. One concern about civilian

products is whether they are rugged enough to withstand a combat

environment. The Gulf War should provide potentially important data on this

issue.

Prepared by John D. Moteff, Analyst in Science and Technology, and Michael E.

Davey, Specialist in Science and Technology, Science Policy Research Division.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND SDI

What implications might the Persian Gulf War have for ballistic missile

defenses and SDI?

One of the star performers of the Persian Gulf War was the Patriot

antitactical missile system. As a result of Patriot’s apparent battlefield success

against Iraqi-modified SCUD missiles, the U.S. domestic debate over ballistic

missile defenses (BMD) and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has been

reinvigorated. President George Bush proclaimed that Patriot was "proof

positive that missile defenses work,” and he has refocused the SDI program to

provide protection from limited ballistic missile attacks, whatever their source.

Patriot’s role in Operation Desert Storm brought home three lessons for

ballistic missile defenses in general. First, Patriot’s qualified success as an

effective, albeit limited, BMD offers considerable support for the argument that

missile defenses can work. Second, threats of military retaliation may not be

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sufficient to deter a Third World nation from carrying out missile attacks.

Third, a defense against a missile attack can not rely solely on destroying a

potential enemy’s missiles and launchers on the ground. Despite extensive

intelligence gathering capabilities and numerous optimum opportunities to

attack Iraq’s missiles and launchers, coalition forces could not destroy them all.

The lessons learned from Patriot’s performance in the Gulf War for SDI in

particular are less clear, primarily because the BMD system envisioned in the

SDI would, for three reasons, be technically much more challenging. First,

Patriot uses a warhead to destroy or disable an incoming missile and therefore

does not have to be as accurate as an SDI interceptor, which must destroy its

intended target through direct impact. Second, Patriot missiles encountered

limited attacks by large slow missiles against known targets. An SDI system

would have to be able to defend the United States and its allies from incoming

missiles and smaller, faster warheads with perhaps no warning of where an

attack might occur. Third, while the Patriot system did not have to be perfect

(the low-yield conventional warhead on an Iraqi SCUD did not make it a

militarily significant weapon), a nuclear or chemical warhead would require

incomparably better performance of an SDI system.

Nonetheless, the primary effect of Patriot’s apparent success has been to

inspire a growing belief that the United States should deploy some BMD

capability in order to counter the growing threat from global missile

proliferation. The major policy debate now forming will be over how much BMD

capability should be pursued and whether the United States should continue to

adhere to the ABM Treaty (which limits the United States to 100 ground-based

missile interceptors against strategic ballistic missiles), One option would be to

abandon the ABM Treaty in favor of a large-scale BMD system, as well as deploy

some number of Patriot or Patriot-like antitactical ballistic missiles (ATBMs).

The other option would be to pursue an ABM Treaty compliant BMD system,

and/or deploy some number of Patriot or Patriot-like ATBMs, which are not

constrained by the ABM Treaty.

Generally, traditional advocates of SDI will favor the first path --

deployment of a relatively robust SDI system such as the GPALS (Global

Protection Against Limited Strikes) proposed by the Bush Administration.

GPALS would consist of fewer than 2,000 ground- and space-based interceptors,

and perhaps a few hundred ground- and space-based sensors. The objective of

GPALS would be to provide global ‘protection against accidental or

unauthorized, limited ballistic missile attacks from any quarter on the United

States and its allies, friends, and forces overseas. Combined with deep arms

reductions, GPALS could arguably provide some defense against a Soviet firststrike attack against the United States.

To test and deploy a system such as GPALS, the 1972 ABM Treaty would

have to be abandoned or replaced by some new U.S.-Soviet agreement permitting

testing of space-based weapons and deployment of large-scale ballistic missile

defenses. The Bush Administration has recently begun to argue that given the

events in the Gulf War, the United States should explore seriously the feasibility

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of such defenses, which it acknowledges would involve going beyond the ABM

Treaty. Brent Scowcroft, the President’s National Security Advisor, has also

said that the United States must do everything possible to defend itself against

accidental or unauthorized missile attacks, and that the Administration would

prefer that any changes to the ABM Treaty be done in cooperation with the

Soviet Union.

Others, favoring the second path, are likely to counter that a large-scale

SDI system such as GPALS would be excessive and prohibitively costly. They

will likely argue that the Third World ballistic missile threat is much less

serious than is now perceived, that the threat of a Soviet first-strike is no longer

credible, and that a large-scale SDI system is therefore not warranted. Many of

them, however, will also argue that it would only be prudent to provide some

limited defense of forward-deployed U.S. and allied forces from attack by shortrange ballistic missiles. Such an ATBM system, regardless of the number of

interceptors deployed, would not be constrained by the terms of the ABM

Treaty. Although it does not seem to be a major concern, some might also argue

that an ABM system of 100 ground-based strategic ballistic missile interceptors

should be deployed as a precaution against limited, accidental or unauthorized

Soviet missile launches. Such a system would also be compliant with the terms

of the ABM Treaty.

Prepared by Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs

and National Defense Division.

MILITARY SPACE SYSTEMS

What implications might the Persian Gulf War have for military space

systems?

The Persian Gulf War was the first major military conflict in which the

United States and its allies could utilize a broad array of satellite assets.

Although satellites have played important roles in recent limited military

actions, the last major conflict, Vietnam, occurred too early in the Space Age to

test the utility of space systems to U.S. and allied strategic and tactical

commanders in time of war. In the wake of the Persian Gulf War, Congress may

consider two issues relating to military space systems: (1) In what ways did

military space systems prove valuable in the war effort? (2) What implications

might the war experience have for decisions about the development of new

military space systems?

Contributions of Space Systems in the Persian Gulf War

Satellites are often viewed more as strategic than tactical assets. Their role

as “peacekeepers,” monitoring arms control agreements or giving early warning

of missile launches, are relatively well known, while their use for

communications, weather, and navigation is less visible but equally vital. In the

Persian Gulf War, the full inventory of DOD and intelligence satellites played

CRS-11

a significant role in the strategic conduct of the war, from providing

communications between the National Command Authority and Central

Command, to warning of Scud missile attacks, to watching troop movemenis.®

Their tactical value also was proven during the conduct of the war,

Satellites provided photographic, radar, and electronic intelligence not only to

top military leaders, but reportedly to those in the field, too. Satellite

intelligence formerly was said to be "for generals." Apparently in this case, it

was available, for example, to pilots prior to flying their missions. (See also the

entry on Intelligence Issues.)

DOD’s early warning satellites proved more useful than many expected in

detecting Scud missile launches. The satellites (called the Defense Support

Program) are designed to detect intercontinental ballistic missiles (CBMs) or

submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), rather than shorter range

missiles like the Scud. Nevertheless, the DSP system reportedly was able to

detect Scud launches, transmit the data to the United States for confirmation

and analysis of the impact point, with the resulting information transmitted via

communication satellites to Central Command, all within 5 minutes, leaving 2

minutes to alert those in the impact area,

While early warning of short range missile attacks and some other types of

intelligence can be collected by alternative means (aircraft, for example), only

satellites can provide instantaneous, global communications and navigation.

Perhaps the most publicly praised example of military satellites in support of

the war was the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) of navigation

satellites that allowed air, land and ground forces to precisely determine their

location and to navigate in a largely featureless terrain. NAVSTAR receivers

are also now being installed in some autonomously guided weapons (such as the

Standoff Land Attack Weapon and new versions of the Tomahawk cruise

missile),

The NAVSTAR system is not fully operational (only 15 of a required 18

satellites are in orbit and many of these are from an older test series), and DOD

had to purchase commercial receivers since supplies of special DOD receivers

were not available. Still, the system proved so vital that some troops wrote

home asking relatives to send them receivers (called SLUGGERs). In a sense,

NAVSTAR may have proved one advantage of "dual-use" systems. Though

developed by DOD, NAVSTAR was always intended for use by the civilian sector

and commercial receivers have been available for several years. Thus, DOD was

able to “make do" with the commercial receivers. A potential disadvantage is

that the enemy might also buy commercial receivers and use the system against

the United States. (DOD designed the system so that the most precise data

would be available only to its users, with a less precise capability available to

5 All the information in this section is from open sources. See CRS Report

91-215 SPR, Military and Civilian Satellites in Support of Allied Forces in the

Persian Gulf War by Marcia S. Smith for further information on the sources

used, and on civilian and foreign satellites that supported Desert Storm.

CRS-12

non-DOD users, but since the commercial sets were the ones in use by DOD this

time, DOD had to permit the commercial sets to receive the more precise data.)

Implications for Development of New Military Space Systems

Two closely related military satellite issues were highlighted by the war: the

utility of satellites at the tactical level, and the need for advanced systems. As

noted, satellites traditionally have been thought of as strategic assets. This view

had been gradually changing prior to the war, but now has taken on added

weight, which may influence decisions about the design of future satellite

systems (such as ensuring that small, portable, jam-resistant ground stations for

communications satellites are widely available).

The Air Force is now developing a new communications satellite system

called MILSTAR (Military Strategic and Tactical Relay) which for years was

focussed on strategic applications, particularly to support the military during a

nuclear war. Congress already has directed DOD to scale back the program and

refocus it on tactical uses, but its high cost will continue to make the program

controversial. The experience of the war may influence Congress’ perception of

the need for and design of the system.

Similarly, DOD was planning to develop a new generation of early warning

satellites (the Advanced Warning System), but it was not included in DOD’s

FY1992 request for budgetary reasons. Congressional debate over whether to

upgrade DSP or invest in a new, more sensitive system to ensure detection of

short range missiles like Scud -- rather than hoping that DSP will turn out to

be capable of the task next time -- could be shaped by the events in the Persian

Gulf.

The widespread use of satellites demonstrated the military’s growing

reliance on them, which may affect views regarding the share of the defense

budget that should be allocated to space systems and whether the United States:

should develop an antisatellite weapon (see CRS Issue Brief 85176).

Prepared by Marcia S. Smith, Specialist in Aerospace Policy, Science Policy

Research Division.

CRS-13

AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE

-

What implications might the Persian Gulf War have for the Army’s Airland

Battle doctrine?

In the early 1980’s the Army adopted a new combat doctrine, called Airland

Battle, which emphasizes close coordination of air and ground forces, seizing the

initiative, rapid maneuver, and attacking the enemy rear area and flanks,

Designed to disrupt and defeat a multi-echeloned Soviet attack on NATO, it also

sought to take advantage of the increased speed and firepower of a new

generation of weapon systems -- the M1 tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, and

Apache attack helicopter.

The Persian Gulf War was the first large-scale employment of the Airland

Battle doctrine. In its wake, Congress may consider four questions relating to

the doctrine and related investment: (1) How severely was the Airland Battle

doctrine tested? (2) What might the war mean for Army helicopter

procurement? (8) Are the logistical demands of the Airland Battle doctrine

overly burdensome? (4) What does the war mean for the Command, Control,

Communication and Intelligence (C°I) systems for Airland Battle?

Severity of Test

In key respects, the war was not a severe test of the Airland Battle

doctrine. Iraq’s air force put up little resistance, and Iraqi ground forces

adopted a static defensive posture in fortified positions, allowing the allies to

freely exploit Airland Battle’s emphasis on initiative (picking the time and place

of attack) and maneuver in their sweeping flank attack through southern Iraq.

Iraqi ground forces fought only sporadically against coalition ground forces

(although this was due in part to disruption of the enemy’s fighting cohesion --

something Airland Battle emphasizes), And the war was of short duration.

Nevertheless, the war provided valuable experience for the Airland Battle

doctrine in helicopters, logistics, and (C*I),

Helicopters

The performance of helicopters, which are integral to successful execution

of Airland Battle, was noteworthy. Serving as independent maneuver elements,

Apache and Kiowa (armed scout) helicopters executed attacks on radar sites,

artillery positions, and troop bunkers. Some have likened the helicopter in this

role to a tank battalion that travels at 170 miles an hour over any terrain.

Blackhawk and Chinook transport helicopters carried elements of the 101st

Division for an air assault deep into Iraqi territory on the first night of the

ground offensive, and provided indispensable logistical support for fast-moving

armored and mechanized units. The role and performance of helicopters in

Army combat doctrine takes on particular significance as Congress considers the

Army’s $38 billion Light Helicopter (LH) modernization program.

CRS-14_

Logistical Support

Greater speed and firepower required a mammoth logistics effort. Fuel

consumption for the M1 tank and other vehicles presented a major challenge.

The Army is now examining ways to reduce fuel consumption, increase

helicopter fuel capacity, and improve long-range battlefield fuel transportation.

U.S. forces handled the logistics demands. But the war was relatively limited

in duration, intensity, and geographical scope. A question therefore remains

whether investment in logistics capabilities has been adequate to meet Airland

Battle’s demands in a longer, wider and more intensely fought campaign.

Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence (C*I)

Army and Air Force joint planning for battlefield coordination and

communications seems to have been effective. Incidents of Air Force planes

accidentally attacking friendly forces involved U.S. Marine and British armored

vehicles, but no U.S. Army units. This may argue for closer training and

coordination between the Air Force and forces it may be called upon to support.

Another key element of Army/Air Force cooperation for Airland Battle was

the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft,

which gave Army field commanders real-time intelligence on enemy troop

movements, and provided targeting data directly to the Army Tactical Missile

(ATACMS) guidance system. JSTARS and ATACMS are still in operational

testing and have been considered for termination owing to the decline of the

Soviet threat. It is likely, however, their performance in the war will ensure

continued investment. Other C*I systems employed in the war were the

NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) that allowed ground troops to

determine their exact location in the desert, and E-3 Airborne Warning and

Control System (AWACS) aircraft, which monitored Iraqi air activity and

coordinated thousands of coalition aircraft daily.

The Army’s new CI equipment generally worked well, but some shortfalls

became apparent. Switching stations for the new Mobile Subscriber Equipment

(MSE) telephone system could not redeploy fast enough to keep up with the

ground offensive, perhaps indicating a need for more stations per division.

There was insufficient means for secure data transmission in the field. The

Army hopes to solve this with the Army Data Distribution System (ADDS), but

this system will not be fielded before 1994, and has experienced funding and

production delays. The new tactical Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio

System (SINCGARS) performed well, but units using SINCGARS’ predecessor

reportedly experienced some difficulties in communicating with SINCGARS-

equipped units. Helicopter operations demonstrated the need for improved

radios for flying “nap-of-the-earth" missions when terrain features impede

communication.

Prepared by Steven R. Bowman, Analyst in National Defense, Foreign Affairs

and National Defense Division.

CRS-15

ATRPOWER

RELIANCE ON AIRPOWER

What implications might the Persian Gulf War have for the issue of reliance

on airpower?

As the defense budget declines, Congress will face difficult choices about

which military capabilities to retain and which to eliminate. One of the primary

choices Congress will face is how much the United States should emphasize

airpower in a downsized U.S. military establishment.

Airpower -- "Global Reach, Global Power"

In the months prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, U.S. proponents of

airpower argued that given the lethality of modern air-launched weapons and

advances in in-flight refueling capabilities, the United States in the post-Cold

War era could rely primarily on airpower to defend its interests. A primary

implication of this view was that the Army would play a more secondary role in

U.S. military planning, and could therefore be reduced substantially (see entry

on Size of the Army).

The Air Force in particular last year stressed reliance on airpower, and

coined a new slogan -- "Global Reach, Global Power" -- to help disseminate the

theme. In the Air Force view, airpower can project massive U.S. force rapidly

to any location on the globe and pressure enemy "centers of gravity" until U.S,

aims are achieved. In a controversial September 1990 interview that led to his

dismissal as Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Michael Dugan among other things

stressed the prospective value of airpower in defeating Iraq, and suggested that

although coalition ground forces might be needed to reoccupy Kuwait, airpower -

would damage Iraqi forces so extensively that coalition ground forces would be

able to “walk in and not have to fight."

Was Dugan Right?

Coalition ground forces didn’t exactly walk into Kuwait unopposed, but the

surprisingly rapid and completely one-sided nature of the ground campaign

confirmed for many the essential validity of the airpower argument in this case.

The coalition air campaign destroyed much of Iraq’s military equipment and

apparently reduced many Iraqi soldiers’ will to fight. In light of this, many

observers conclude that Dugan’s views were essentially correct. The

effectiveness of airpower, they argue, is especially noteworthy in view of Iraq’s

8 As quoted in Atkinson, Rick. U.S. to Rely on Air Strikes if War Erupts.

Washington Post, Sep. 16, 1990: Al. See also Morrocco, John D. U.S. War

Plan: Air Strikes to Topple Hussein Regime. Aviation Week & Space

Technology, Sep. 24, 1990: 16-18.

CRS-16

extensive air defense system and the fact that the weather in Kuwait and

southern Iraq in the first few days of the air campaign was the worst for that

region in 14 years.

Advantages for Airpower

While it is difficult to contest the success of the coalition air campaign, it

is important to note that the Persian Gulf War was a scenario that in many

ways played to the strengths of airpower. The terrain was relatively flat and

bare, making it hard for targets on the ground to hide from aircraft. Iraq’s air

force did not participate in the war after the first few days, enabling coalition

aircraft to focus on attacking ground targets. Iraq adopted an essentially fixed

defensive strategy, which turned many Iraqi units in the desert into ideal

targets. Saudi Arabia possessed an extensive network of air bases built and

stocked in the 1980s specifically to support an emergency deployment of

hundreds of U.S. and other Western tactical aircraft. Iraq possessed very little

capability to attack either these air bases or U.S. aircraft carriers in the Persian

Gulf and Red Sea. Other coalition members granted overflight rights and

permitted their own air bases to be used for refueling, resupply, and long-range

bombing missions. And U.S. and coalition military leaders had more than five

months to perfect their air campaign plans. In future conflicts, some or most

of these advantages might be lacking, and the potential effectiveness of airpower

could be reduced, perhaps substantially.

Contributions of Other Forces

It should also be noted that other forms of military power played key roles

in the war. Substantial ground forces were considered necessary to help deter

an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. Surface naval forces were critical to enforcing

the economic and military embargo against Iraq. The presence of U.S. Marine

amphibious forces encouraged Iraqi military planners to assign large numbers

of troops to coastal defense positions. A substantial ground offensive was -

deemed necessary to dislodge Iraqi forces from Kuwait. And ground forces are

playing an important role in postwar efforts to secure U.S. and coalition goals

in the region.

The Potential and Limits of Airpower

In many ways, the air campaign fulfilled promises that airpower advocates

have been making for decades regarding the potential for using aircraft to

determine the course of war. At the same time, the war suggested that even in

favorable circumstances there are limits to what airpower can accomplish by

itself. The Air Force and other airpower advocates have avoided the argument

that airpower by itself can do everything. But how much can it do? For

policymakers attempting to determine the future composition of U.S. military

forces, the task is to understand both the potential and the limits of airpower,

CRS-17

and how these can change from one military contingency to the next as a

function of differing geographic, strategic, and political circumstances.

Prepared by Bert Cooper, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs and

National Defense Division.

NEXT-GENERATION VS. EXISTING TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

What implications might the Persian Gulf War have for the issue of

procuring new-generation tactical aircraft us. staying with existing designs?

Congress now faces important decisions on whether to procure a new

generation of tactical aircraft or instead stay with existing aircraft designs. In

the Air Force, the issue is whether to pursue the Advanced Tactical Fighter

(ATF) as the successor to the F-15 fighter. In the Navy, the primary issue is

whether to pursue the AX all-weather medium attack plane as the successor to

the A-6E all-weather medium attack plane.’ The secondary issue is whether to

pursue the Navy version of the ATF (NATF) as the successor to the F-14

fighter. In the Marine Corps, the issue is whether to procure the V-22 tilt-rotor

aircraft as the successor to the Corps’ medium-lift helicopters.® And in the

Army, the issue is whether to pursue the new LH light helicopter as the

successor to the Army’s AH-1 and OH-58 helicopters.

The Administration supports the ATF, the AX, and the LH, but wants to

terminate the NATF and the V-22. Congress has kept the V-22 program alive

in the development stage for two years. In the wake of the Persian Gulf War,

Congress may want to consider the need and urgency for each of these aircraft.

Air-launched standoff weapons can be an important factor in decisions on

aircraft modernization (see entry on Air-Launched Weapons).

ATF and NATF

With a diminished Soviet threat, can the ATF be canceled or deferred?

Those who support canceling or deferring the ATF can note that in the Persian

Gulf War: (1) no F-15s were shot down in air-to-air fighting; (2) F-15s were

responsible for the vast majority of the Iraqi planes shot down by coalition

aircraft; and (8) aircraft shot down by F-15s included export versions of the

French-made Mirage F-1 and Soviet-made MiG-29 fighters -- two of the most

advanced aircraft now on the international market. They might also argue that

improvements to the F-15 or its weapons can keep the F-15 ahead of future

Third World air-to-air threats for some time.

7 The AX is the planned replacement for the A-12, which was to be the

successor to the A-6 until the A-12 program was canceled in January 1991.

® Smaller numbers of V-22s were also planned for the Navy and Air Force.

See also the entry on Special Operations Forces.

CRS-18

ATF supporters can emphasize the importance of maintaining U.S.

technological superiority in fighters as a hedge against the possibility of a

resurgent Soviet military threat that included improved Soviet planes. They can

also argue that the Soviet Union and Western countries in the future will likely

export increasingly advanced planes to the Third World. Lastly, ATF supporters

can argue that the successful use of the stealthy F-117 aircraft in the Persian

Gulf War confirmed the value of stealth in future air operations. The ATF is

designed to be a stealthy fighter, and there are limits to the degree that stealth

features can be backfitted into the F-15.

The Navy and the Air Force in the future will face generally the same

enemy aircraft. If the Navy can suffice with its existing fighter designs to fight

enemy aircraft in the future, then it is not clear why the Air Force needs the

ATF for this purpose. Conversely, if the Air Force needs the ATF to face these

aircraft, then it is not clear how the Navy can suffice with older fighter aircraft

designs. The Navy has suggested that the NATF was terminated mostly due to

budget limits. Supporters of naval aviation may argue that the proposed NATF

termination indicates that naval aviation is underfunded relative to equally

important defense priorities.

AX

In justifying the AX, the Administration emphasizes the need to preserve

the survivability of carrier-based attack planes against future improvements in

air defenses. The Navy has testified that a new attack plane would be several

times as survivable as an upgraded or modified version of an existing airplane.

But older-design aircraft flew tens of thousands of sorties against Iraq’s air

defenses, which were reputedly among the best in the Third World, and loss

rates for these aircraft, while not zero, were quite low. The issue is whether a

major jump in survivability is needed; if not, it might be sufficient to upgrade

or modify the A-6, the F-14, or the F/A-18.

The Administration also emphasizes the value of stealth as a contributor

to survivability. No F-117 stealthy light attack planes, it says, were shot down

or even damaged by enemy fire, even though the F-117s carried out many of the

most dangerous attack missions in the war. But attack speed, electronic

jamming, physical protection against enemy fire, standoff weapons, and defense

suppression by cruise missiles also contribute to survivability. Ifa satisfactory

level of survivability can be achieved for an attack plane by combining a lower

degree of stealth with other contributors to survivability, then it might again be

more cost effective to upgrade or modify the A-6, the F-14, or the F/A-18.

V-22

V-22 supporters can argue that the aircraft would have enhanced the

Marine Corps’ amphibious options in the war, and might have reduced Marine

Corps casualties if an amphibious landing had occurred. V-22 supporters can

also argue that the aircraft would have been useful in the war for special

operations, including long-range rescue operations of downed coalition pilots (see

CRS-19

entry on Special Operations Forces), Opponents of the V-22 can argue that the

successful use of medium-lift and other helicopters in the war shows that the

tilt-rotor technology of the V-22 is not a critical need at this time.

LH

The Army’s AH-1 and OH-58 helicopters performed well in the war. But

the war also demonstrated the value of helicopters in the Army’s Airland Battle

doctrine, and the LH was designed with this doctrine in mind. The LH is also

designed to have low maintenance costs. (See entry on Airland Battle Doctrine.)

Prepared by Bert Cooper, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs and

National Defense Division.

LAND- VS. SEA-BASED AIRPOWER

What implications might the Persian Gulf War have for the debate over the

merits of land- us, sea-based airpower?

As defense spending declines and U.S. forces grow smaller, Congress will

face important questions on where certain military capabilities should reside

within the U.S. military. One of these questions concerns the balance of landvs. sea-based aircraft in overall U.S. airpower. The Persian Gulf War occurred

in the midst of a debate over the relative merits of these two forms of airpower

for projecting U.S. power overseas in the post-Cold War era.

The stakes of the debate are high -- the outcome will affect the future

balance of Air Force tactical fighter wings and aircraft carrier battlegroups in

the U.S. military. Given the dominant role of the Air Force in the air campaign,

supporters of carrier-based aviation fear carrier-based aircraft will lose out in

the postwar budget debate. Reflecting this anxiety, there have been allegations

that the Air Force, which planned the air campaign, assigned carrier-based

aircraft to mostly secondary roles and undercounted the number of carrier-based

aircraft sorties.

Base Access and Base Capacity

Advocates of carrier-based aviation emphasize its value for projecting U.S.

power in regions where the United States lacks access to a nearby air base. The

relative freedom of carrier-based aircraft from base access is a major justification

for the expense associated with building and operating the aircraft carrier and

the other ships in the battlegroup. In the months prior to the war, the Navy

and other advocates of carrier-based aircraft had argued that in the post-Cold

War era, with the focus of U.S. defense planning shifting to the Third World,

limits on overseas base access would become a more important issue.

Land-based aircraft supporters acknowledged that the United States lacks

routine base access in many parts of the Third World, but argued that friendly

CRS-20

states would nevertheless open their bases to U'S. aircraft in situations where

their security was clearly at risk. (They also argued that with in-flight

refueling, U.S.-based long-range strategic bombers and even tactical aircraft

could reach any location on the planet, perform their mission, and return home

without any intermediate landings.)

In the case of the Persian Gulf War, advocates of land-based aircraft were

right. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states, as well as U.S. allies in

Europe, opened up their air bases to well over a thousand U.S. aircraft. The

only reported difficulties concerned the basing of B-52 bombers in certain Arab

countries, and it is not clear that this significantly affected the operation.

An issue did arise, however, with respect to base capacity. Saudi Arabia

built a lot of excess capacity into its air base infrastructure in the 1980s

precisely so that many U.S. and Western aircraft could deploy there in an

emergency. In spite of this, there were indications that Saudi and other Gulf

Arab air bases were saturated wingtip to wingtip by coalition aircraft. An offer

by one NATO ally to send a squadron of planes to the Gulf was reportedly

turned down due to lack of basing facilities. Air base saturation may be one

reason why an additional three aircraft carriers were sent to the Gulf region in

November.

In the wake of the Gulf War, advocates of land-based aircraft can argue

that base access is not the problem that some have made it out to be, because

access was obtained when it was important. Advocates of carrier-based aircraft,

however, can argue that access may be granted only in severe crises where the

host government perceives a direct and immediate threat to its security. They

can also argue that base capacity may limit the number of land-based planes

that can be deployed. This could be important in crises that do not involve

Saudi Arabia, which apparently has the most excess air base capacity by far of

any country in the Third World.

Responding to Crises vs. Deterring Them

Advocates of land-based aviation argue that it can more efficiently project

U.S. power in response to overseas crises. Land-based aircraft, they note, can

fly to a crisis area in a matter of hours, as opposed to the days or even weeks

it might take a carrier to reach a distant region. Land-based aircraft, they

argue, can be more easily massed for large-scale, intensive air campaigns. And

land-based aircraft, they argue, are inherently more cost-effective because the

carrier-based aircraft concept requires a substantial up-front investment in the

carrier and its support ships, and because designing an aircraft to make it

' suitable for carrier operations exacts a penalty on the aircraft’s performance in

other respects. :

Advocates of carrier-based aircraft emphasize that only sea-based forces can

maintain a standing deterrent presence in a region where the U.S. lacks routine

access to overseas bases. They argue that since the cost of deterring a war can

be incomparably less than that of fighting one, forward-deployed carrier-based

le

CRS-21

aircraft are very cost effective in terms of their ability to help deter crises from

occurring in the first place.

In the wake of the Gulf War, advocates of land-based aircraft can note that

the first U.S. land-based fighters arrived in Saudi Arabia the day after the

President’s decision to send forces to the area. Land-based aircraft eventually

greatly outnumbered carrier-based aircraft, and carried out the lion’s share of

the air campaign. Advocates of carrier-based aircraft can note that two carriers

arrived within striking distance of Iraq at about the same time as the first landbased fighters, that carrier-based aircraft provided early air cover while the

United States built up its land-based forces, and that carrier-based aircraft

participated strongly in the air campaign. To help deter future Gulf crises, the

United States may maintain an augmented standing naval presence in the

Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region. Maintaining an aircraft carrier continuously

as a part of this force would require 7 or 8 U.S.-based aircraft carriers.

Prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs

and National Defense Division.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND "FRIENDLY FIRE"

What implications might the Persian Gulf War have for the issues

concerning close air support and the associated problem of “friendly fire"

casualties?

The Persian Gulf War came in the midst of a controversy over the future

of the close air support (CAS) mission and the aircraft needed to perform it.

Close air support is the use of aircraft to attack enemy forces in very close

proximity to friendly troops. It requires that aircraft be able to locate, identify,

and destroy enemy targets, without inflicting casualties on friendly forces.

Events of the Persian Gulf War have highlighted a number of questions

concerning CAS; (1) What aircraft should perform close air support? (2)

Should close air support be an Air Force mission? (3) What can be done to

reduce "friendly fire" casualties from close air support?

Choosing a CAS Aircraft

Prior to the war, the Air Force was planning to replace the A-10 (the only

Air Force aircraft dedicated to close air support) because it was deemed too

vulnerable to modern air defenses. Congress has urged the Air Force to conduct

competitive testing of candidate CAS aircraft. These included the AV-8B

Harrier, A-10, A-7, and other aircraft "which can reasonably perform the CAS

mission." The Air Force believes, however, that such testing is unnecessary, and

that it would only serve to confirm its decision to modify F-16s for the CAS

mission. Congress’s concerns over the selection of a new CAS aircraft remain

unresolved, and for FY 1991 it deferred funding for modifying F-16s, citing

CRS-22

"major uncertainties concerning ...the future Air Force tactical combat aircraft

force structure."

Based upon the A-10’s excellent performance against Iraqi forces, the Air

Force has decided to retain approximately 150 A-10’s, and upgrade the aircraft’s

night-fighting capabilities: The Air Force believes that the A-10’s performed

well against the minimal Iraqi air defenses, but the modified F-16 remains its

choice in more sophisticated air defense environments. It has once again

requested funds (FY1992 $251.0 million, projected FY1993 $508.2 million) to

modify 350 F-16 aircraft for close air support. Whether Congress will reaffirm

its desire for competitive testing of other aircraft for the mission remains to be

seen.

Whose Mission?

Some have suggested that the CAS mission should be taken from the Air

Force and transferred to the Army. They argue that the Air Force gives higher

priority to other missions (e.g. interdiction, counterair), and that the Army

cannot always depend upon receiving adequate CAS from the Air Force when

needed. They point to the Army’s development of and reliance upon attack

helicopters (AH-64 Apache) as evidence of inadequate support from the Air

Force. Supporters of this view included a provision in the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 that directs the Air Force to begin

transferring A-10 aircraft to the Army. Both the Army and the Air Force

officially assert that the CAS mission should remain with the Air Force, and

want Congress to rescind the A-10 transfer order.

The Persian Gulf War provided little insight into the debate over which

service should have the CAS mission. For one thing, forty days of air attacks

allowed the Air Force to complete many of its other missions before the onset

of the ground war created a need for CAS. The very large number of available

coalition aircraft also reduced the competition between missions for air assets.

Finally, Iraqi resistance was minimal, most targets attacked were not in close

proximity to friendly troops, and the ground offensive was very short in

duration. These factors precluded a severe test of the current CAS mission

structure.

Reducing Friendly Fire Casualties

The Persian Gulf War did point up one inherent problem in performing

close air support -- accidentally inflicting casualties on friendly forces. In two

instances, Air. Force aircraft mistakenly attacked U.S. Marine and British

armored vehicles, resulting in 16 allied deaths. Many observers have pointed

out that given the extraordinary number of attack sorties flown, this is a

relatively low number of "friendly fire" casualties. But the very low number of

combat casualties overall, and the fundamental principle that even one death

from "friendly fire" is too many, have highlighted this problem. Both incidents

occurred at night and involved A-10’s, which do not have night target

acquisition systems -- equipment that Air Force now proposes to provide in A-10

CRS-28

upgrades. With the Army’s growing emphasis upon night and bad weather

combat, it would appear that any CAS aircraft will have to be able to attack

accurately in these environments.

The Army and the Air Force have set up a joint task force to determine

what other measures can be taken to prevent friendly casualties. These may

include a variety of passive measures, such as unique fluorescent identifying

markings, or more active measures, such as development of an electronic

identification system similar to those used between friendly aircraft. It should

be noted, however, that neither "friendly fire" incident involved U.S. Army

troops. Both involved services (U.S. Marines and the British Army) for whom

the Air Force does not usually provide CAS, and whose armored vehicles may

have been unfamiliar, This may argue for joint training with the Air Force-

Marine Corps and allied troops.

Prepared by Steven R, Bowman, Analyst in National Defense, Foreign Affairs

and National Defense Division,

STRATEGIC BOMBERS

What implications might the Persian Gulf War have for procurement of the

B-2 bomber?

Congress faces a decision on whether to procure a fleet of 75 B-2 strategic

bombers as the Administration wants, some lesser number, or no more than the

15 already authorized, The primary justification for the B-2 bomber concerns

its role in the U.S. nuclear war plan. A secondary rationale for the program is

the B-2’s potential value in nonnuclear conflicts such as regional wars and

limited military strikes. In the wake of the Persian Gulf War, Congress

accordingly is considering two new perspectives relating to the B-2 program: (1)

What does the Persian Gulf War say about the need for the B-2 for strategic

nuclear war? (2) What does the war say about the B-2’s potential usefulness

in non-nuclear conflicts?

The Need for the B-2 for Strategic Nuclear War

The Administration’s argument on the need for the B-2 for strategic nuclear war essentially has four parts: (1) The nation’s strategic nuclear force

requires a manned bomber as well as ballistic missiles. (2) The manned bomber

must be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses. (3) The nation’s current frontline strategic nuclear bomber, the B-1B, eventually will not be able to penetrate

Soviet air defenses reliably if the Soviet Union upgrades its air defenses significantly. (4) The B-2, with its high degree of stealth, will be able to reliably

penetrate Soviet air defenses in the future. Of these four points, the Persian

Gulf War may influence thinking on the final three.

CRS-24

Need for Penetrating Bomber

Critics of the B-2 argue that a new penetrating bomber is unnecessary.

They note that B-52s will be able to destroy their assigned targets, including

heavily defended ones, from a distance with cruise missiles. The Persian Gulf

War demonstrated that standoff weapons are accurate and can work well.

Moreover, the B-1B will be able to penetrate to less-defended targets even if the

Soviet Union upgrades its air defenses, it can use short-range attack missiles to

attack heavily defended targets, and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles can also

attack these targets. Critics of the B-2 argue that one mission cited to justify

a penetrating bomber -- finding mobile Soviet ballistic missiles -- is impractical,

as the difficulty that U'S. aircraft experienced in searching for mobile Iraqi Scud

missile launchers appears to confirm. Supporters of the B-2 note that standoff

weapons do not work perfectly, as the war demonstrated, so it is important to

have pilots on the scene to evaluate the need for and effectiveness of an attack.

A multiplicity of means of attacking a target complicates defenses, as the war

shows. Finally, a penetrating bomber can perform rapid bomb-damage

assessment. The Gulf War underscored the importance of this mission and the

difficulty of doing it using satellites alone.

Future Ability of B-1B to Penetrate®

Traq’s air defense system -- composed of mostly Soviet-made weapons tied

together in a Soviet-style air defense network -- was among the most formidable

in the Third World. The very low attrition rate this system inflicted on older

US. aircraft may suggest that the B-1B will be able to penetrate Soviet air

defenses reliably for many years to come. The United States has been honing

its nuclear attack plan for decades, would use nuclear missiles to destroy Soviet

air defenses, and is learning lessons from the war that would enhance bomber

effectiveness. In this view, the B-2 is therefore not needed. On the other hand,

the United States had months to prepare its attack on Iraq’s air-defense system,

was able to commit hundreds of short-range tactical aircraft to that attack, and

benefitted from an Iraqi reluctance to commit its own air force to the battle.

The Soviets, moreover, watched the war closely and are deriving lessons on how

to improve their strategic air defenses. The implications of the war for the

B-1B’s ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses in the future are thus difficult to

assess.

Ability of B-2, a Stealth Plane, to Penetrate

If a penetrating bomber is needed, and if the B-1B will eventually not be

able to reliably penetrate Soviet air defenses, then the Gulf War suggests that

the B-2, as a stealth aircraft, will be better able to penetrate Soviet air defenses.

The Administration has stated that no F-117 stealth attack planes were shot

down or even damaged by enemy fire in the Gulf War, even though F-117s were

used extensively to carry out the most dangerous air attacks. The

® It should be noted that the B-1B force did not participate in the war, in

part because B-1B crews were not trained for conventional bombing missions.

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