Desert Shield and Desert Storm Implications for Future U.S. Force Requirements

91-361 RCO

Desert Shield and Desert Storm

Implications for Future U.S. Force Requirements

John M. Collins

Senior Specialist in National Defense

Office of Senior Specialists

April 19, 1991

Congressionall Reseadh Sierviign one JLilogary of Coingressiigs

oil wa ee ee Se ee ——

The Congressional Research Service works exclusively for the Congress, conducting research, analyzing legislation, and providing information at the request of committees,

Members, and their staffs.

The Service makes such research available, without partisan bias, in many forms

including studies, reports, compilations, digests, and background briefings. Upon

request, CRS assists committees in analyzing legislative proposals and issues, and in

assessing the possible effects of these proposals and their alternatives. The Service’s

senior specialists and subject analysts are also available for personal consultations in

their respective fields of expertise.

DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE U.S. FORCE REQUIREMENTS

SUMMARY

Desert Shield and Desert Storm were spectacular successes by almost

any standards. Postmortem specialists who attempt to extract “lessons learned"

from that experience nevertheless would be well advised to proceed cautiously,

because campaigns against Iraq unfolded under conditions that may not again

pertain.

This preliminary assessment summarizes U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and

Marine Corps performance during the recent war, then relates it to past experience

and potential threats in ways that might help decisionmakers determine the most

suitable characteristics of U.S, armed forces for the rest of this decade. Significant

findings include:

Force reductions now under review should preserve sufficient flexibility

to cope well with a wide range of realistic contingencies, because levels

that cause potential adversaries to question U.S. capabilities could

degrade deterrence and involve the United States in otherwise

preventable wars.

Needs for airlift and sealift forces that can function well under less

favorable conditions in primitive areas seem more pressing than

requirements for larger numbers.

Strategic and tactical intelligence failures can be traced directly to the

shortage of well-qualified, area-oriented human intelligence (HUMINT)

specialists.

Continued needs for division-sized parachute and amphibious assault

capabilities are debatable, because neither has been employed since

World War II.

The rapid proliferation of ballistic missile delivery systems, some with

nuclear and chemical warfare capabilities, indicates the probable need

for expeditious development and deployment of tactical anti-ballistic

missile (TABM) weaponry much superior to Patriot.

The U.S. Navy may no longer be configured to deal best with the most

likely threats, because it still emphasizes abilities to defeat Soviet rivals.

Expeditious programs to develop and deploy advanced tactical aircraft

may be difficult to justify during the impending period of budgetary

constraint, because present models performed magnificently during

Desert Storm.

Redefinition of Army and Marine Corps roles and functions should be

a high priority task, because it would fundamentally affect the future

size, configuration, and capabilities of both Services.

Finally, the study is skeptical of contentions that Desert Shield and Desert

Storm "proved" the permanent ascendancy of any strategy, tactics, or armed

service. Requisite forces and formulas might be quite different at future times

and in dissimilar places.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE ..... ccc cece cece cere ees 1

COMBAT FORCE AVAILABILITY 1... .. ccc ccs cere e ete tence eeans 2

ACTIVE FORCE LEVELS ..... 0 ccc cece cece tee eect n ene ees 2

RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS ......... ccs eee e eres 6

LONG-HAUL TRANSPORTATION ......cccececcceseeeanevecenes 7

AIRLIFT oo. ec cece ence eee e tenet ete eee neene 9

r) O70) 0 ra 10

PREPOSITIONING ... ccc ce cece eee eee e ete eenreeeecene 10

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 20... ccc ccc c cece eect eee e eee eeenee 11

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE 2... cece cece cece eee enn e eee 12

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE .... 0. cece cece cee c cere eer eennes 12

FUSION AND FUTURE NEEDS .......:ceccueeeenceeeeceee 14

FORCIBLE ENTRY FORCES ..... cc ccc cee e ence centre eee tennes 14

PARACHUTE ASSAULT ..... ccc cee cece eee erent eee eenane 15

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT .... ccc cece ete erect e ees 16

FIRST LINE DEFENSES 2... . ccc cee e cece eee reece cere neenees 17

AIR DEFENSES oo... cece cece ee eee eet eee nee e en eees 17

TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES ........0ceeeeees 17

ARMY DIVISIONS 2... . ccc cece reece eee teen enter ene ee tees 20

HEAVY DIVISIONS 2.0... ccc ccc cece cee cece teen eens 20

LIGHT DIVISIONS 2.0... ccc cece eect ee een eee e tena eens 20

MIDDLEWEIGHT DIVISIONS ..... 0. cece cece cece teen eens 21

NAVAL COMBAT CAPABILITIES wo cc cece sec e eect e rece eee e anes 22

TACTICAL AIR COMBAT FORCES ....... cc cece eee e teeter eeenes 23

AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION ... cece cece eee e rere ete eenees 24

AIRCRAFT-CRUISE MISSILE MIX 1... ccc eee eee cent eens 25

MARINE CORPS ROLES AND MISSIONS ......cececeee eee eecnes 26

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ..... ccc cece eect c een eee nee teeter nees 27

QUESTIONABLE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES .......e. ee eees 28

MISSED PSYOP OPPORTUNITIES ..... cece reer ee eeeeenees 29

INTERCONNECTING COMMENTARY . 0... 0c cece eee e teen eens 30

Figure 1 U.S. ACTIVE FORCES FOR DESERT STORM ......eeeeees 4

Figure 2 THE LARGEST FOREIGN ARMED FORCES ..........005. 5

Figure 3 ARMY DIVISION ROUNDOUT OPTIONS ........ 0. ee eeees 8

Figure 4 TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION ......... 19

DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE U.S. FORCE REQUIREMENTS

BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE

Armies are more often ruined by dogmas springing from their

former successes than by the skill of their opponents.

Major General J.F.C. Fuller

"The Tactics of Penetration"

RUSI Journal

November 1914

Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated military strategies, operations,

tactics, and logistics that were brilliantly planned and smoothly implemented.

Armed combat culminated in quick victory with incredibly few U.S. and allied

casualties. Displays of air power and technological proficiency were especially

impressive.!

Postmortem specialists who attempt to extract “lessons learned" from that

experience nevertheless would be well advised to proceed cautiously, because

Desert Shield and Desert Storm unfolded under conditions that may prove to be

exceptions rather than rules. War with Iraq was a classic set piece. Both sides

took 5 1/2 months to prepare for that particular conflict, beginning on August

2, 1990 when Saddam Hussein seized Kuwait. Then President Bush said, "Go!"

It was conventional combat, for which U.S. armed forces are best organized,

trained, and equipped. Technologically inferior opponents occupied static defensive

positions, falsely anticipating frontal assaults similar to those they defeated during

the eight-year war with Iran.? Most were in known locations, exposed to allied

air and missile bombardment. Most remained passive, except for antiaircraft

batteries. Allied airmobile and armored forces, aided by satellite intelligence, thus

were able to maneuver at will on flat, featureless terrain to outflank foes

entrenched in Kuwait. One Marine Corps pilot summarized the situation perfectly

when he quipped, it was "like being in the Super Bowl, but the other team didn’t

show up."®

1¥or a brief discussion of concepts and operations, see "Schwarzkopf: Strategy .

Behind Desert Storm," and "The Persian Gulf War: Schwarzkopf Answers to

Reporters’ Questions," Washington Post, February 28, 1991, p. 35-36.

2Cordesman, Anthony H., The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-87:

Strategic Implications and Policy Options, NY, Jane’s, 1987, 185 p.

‘Stray Voltage," Armed Forces Journal, March 1991, p. 58.

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Future U.S. conflicts, perhaps in mountains, jungles, or swamps, may call

for quite different qualifications than Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The

twofold purpose of this report therefore is to provide some perspectives that might

help Congress to:

¢ Appraise Desert Shield and Desert Storm experience

¢ Correlate results with future U.S. force requirements

This preliminary assessment relates performance throughout the recent war

(August 1990-February 1991) with past U.S. conflicts and potential future threats

to put U.S. force requirements in perspective. It impartially questions proposed

reductions in some categories and proposed increases in others, with particular

attention to the continued value of assets that saw little action, remained unused,

or appeared to be malemployed. The report also speculates about abilities of the

US. military establishment to cope successfully with problems if situations had

developed less advantageously. What if Iraqi forces had overrun Saudi Arabian

ports and airfields before the U.S. vanguard arrived? What if a contingency had

erupted in Korea during Desert Storm? What if Iraqi SCUDs had struck in salvos

instead of single shots? Presentations cover overarching subjects first, followed

by service-specific topics, but treatment throughout emphasizes

interrelationships. 4

COMBAT FORCE AVAILABILITY

The peacetime configuration of U.S. armed services strongly influenced

options open to the United States and its allies during the confrontation with

Iraq. The total inventory determined how many active combat forces of what

type theoretically could assist Central Command (CENTCOM) in the Middle East,

given competing commitments elsewhere. Readiness determined how rapidly

reserve component forces could supplement the active establishment.

ACTIVE FORCE LEVELS

The active U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, which total slightly

more than 2 million uniformed personnel, comprised the world’s third largest

military establishment just before Iraq seized Kuwait. Desert Shield and Desert

4This document is designed to compliment two other CRS reports: Collins,

John M., New Directions for National Defense, July 6, 1990, 29 p. and O’Rourke,

Ronald, et al, Persian Gulf War: Defense Policy Implications for Congress,

forthcoming.

5Only the Soviet Union and China maintain larger active military

establishments than the United States (about 4.5 million and 3 million

respectively, includinginternal security troops). The Military Balance, 1990-1991,

London, Brassey’s for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn

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Storm nevertheless absorbed 40 percent or more of key U.S. combat forces (Figure

1), including an armored corps and seven air wings assigned to U.S, European

Command. U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets furnished six carrier battle groups

and two battleship groups. The Department of Defense (DOD) could not establish

unit rotation policies for U.S, elements in the Middle East, because U.S.-based

replacements with comparable capabilities were too few.® Abilities to cope with

a second sizable contingency that adversely affected U.S. security interests, such

as conflict in Korea, were much abridged beginning in August 1990, and remained

so for several months after Desert Storm subsided.

Several retrenchment proposals are open for deliberation.’ The Secretary

of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, have presented

Congress a "six-year package that ... reduces U.S, military capability and force

structure by very, very significant amounts." Defense spending, according to their

plan, would contract to 3.6 percent of the U.S. gross national product by 1995-96.

The DOD budget thereafter would fund an active force of 521,000 fewer military

personnel (a 25 percent cut), 12 Army divisions vice 18, 26 tactical fighter

squadrons instead of 36, and 150 fewer battle force ships rather than the 600

once envisaged.®

The residue must possess deterrent and defense capabilities that correlate

well with present and projected threats to compelling U.S. interests. The Secretary

of Defense and U.S. commanders-in-chief around the world identify few serious

threats, but some indicators nevertheless may bear additional scrutiny before force

level decisions become final. Five countries with large armed forces, listed on

Figure 2, are long-time U.S, adversaries who still make neighboring U.S. friends

nervous (North Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Iran, plus Syria, an unanticipated U.S.

ally during Desert Storm). The Soviet Union and China are question marks that

likewise cause some queasiness.

1990, 245 p.

8Maze, Rick, "How Long Can Troops Hang on in the Desert?", Army Times,

December 17, 1990, p. 16; Willis, Grant, "New Call-up Kills Troop Rotations," Army

Times, November 26, 1990, p.6.

‘Meeting New National Security Needs: Options for U.S, Military Forces in

the 1990s, Washington, Congressional Budget Office, February 1990, 50 p.;

Kaufman, William W., Glasnost, Perestroika, and U.S. Defense Spending,

Washington, Brookings Institution, 1990, 85 p.; Restructuring the U.S. Military:

Defense Needs in the 21st Century, A report by Defense Budget Task Force of the

Committee for National Security and the Defense Budget Project, Washington,

March 1990, 27 p.

8Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen Colin

Powell Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, Washington,

Reuters Transcript, February 7, 1991, p. 6, 8, 10.

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Figure 1

U.S. ACTIVE FORCES FOR DESERT STORM

Total Desert Storm Percent

Inventory! Deployments? of Total

Army

Divisions 18 8 44%

Separate Brigades 25%

Separate Regiments 2 66%

Navy

Carrier Battle Groups® 14 6 43%

Carrier Aircraft 375 51%

Fleet Air Defense* (22) 260

Attack*® (41) 466

Battleship Groups® 4 50%

Attack Submarines 99 71%

Mine Warfare’ 12 2 18%

Air Force

Bombers** (18) 189 (8) 23%

Fighter/attack‘ (65) 1594 (82) 40%

Marine Corps

Divisions 3 2 66%

Air Wings** (3) 355 (2) 66%

Total Personnel 2,020,000 540,000 27%

1 Collins, John M. and Dianne E, Rennack, U.S./Soviet Military Balance; Statistical Trends,

oe fr nN DO mh &

1980-1989 (As of January 1, 1990), Washington, Congressional Research Service, August 6,

1990.

Bowman, Steven R., Persian Gulf War: Summary of U.S. and Non-U.S. Forces, Washington,

Congressional Research Service, February 11, 1991.

One aircraft carrier per group, plus escorts.

Numbers in parentheses indicate squadrons.

Total inventory includes 176 dual-purpose FA-18 Hornets.

One battleship per group, plus escorts.

Five MSO and MCM, 7 MSC. Two more reserve MSCs deployed.

Fifty-six F-111 (1 squadron) and 26 B-52G (2 squadrons) deployed.

Total inventory includes 156 dual-purpose FA-18 Hornets.

CRS-5

Figure 2

THE LARGEST FOREIGN ARMED FORCES

1 million 500 Thousand 250 Thousand

or more or more or more

Soviet 4.5 | S, Korea 750 | Egypt 450

Union

China 3.0 | Pakistan 550 | Ethiopia 438

India 13 | Iran 504 | Syria 404

N. Korea 1.1 | Iraq 500? | Taiwan 370

Vietnam 1.0 Brazil 324

Indonesia 2838

Thailand 283

Japan 249

Source: The Military Balance, 1990-1991, London, Brassey’s for the

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn, 1990.

Not many potential predators, large or small, seem eager to risk retaliation

like that against Iraq. Kim Il Sung, for example, may never find a more propitious

time to invade the Republic of Korea, but took no advantage of U.S. preoccupation

with Persian Gulf operations. Appearances, however, may be deceptive. Two

of the last three major wars erupted abruptly and unpredictably (Korea, 1950;

Iraq, 1990). U.S. military involvement in Vietnam expanded on short notice after

mid-1965. Future U.S, force requirements may be equally unforeseen. Aggressors,

moreover, may increasingly instigate small, exceedingly complex wars that avoid

risks associated with mid- and high-intensity conflicts, yet achieve important

objectives that undermine American interests. The U.S. record in such imbroglios

is unimpressive.®

No one can calculate future needs exactly, but they are not infinitely

adjustable. Force reductions now under review therefore should preserve sufficient

flexibility to cope well with a wide range of realistic contingencies, because levels

that cause potential adversaries to question U.S. capabilities could degrade

deterrence and involve the United States in otherwise preventable wars that would

be costly to win.

°U.S, Congress, House, U.S, Low-Intensity Conflicts, 1899-1990, a study

prepared for the Readiness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,

101st Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, U.S. GPO, September 10, 1990, 284

Pp.

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RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS

Battalions, squadrons, and smaller reserve component combat forces

performed well for the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps during Desert

Storm. Separate Army National Guard (ARNG) brigades did not. So-called "round

out" programs, in effect since 1974, presently affiliate six of them with active duty

divisions that lack one brigade apiece, largely for budgetary reasons. The concept

calls for each designated ARNG brigade to receive arms and equipment compatible

with that of the parent division, train regularly with that division, and be ready

to deploy with it on identical schedules.'° The gap between principle and

practice, however, proved unbridgeable.

DOD called no ARNG brigades during early stages of the crisis, because the

Secretary of Defense and his advisors believed they required considerable postmobilization training to reach an acceptable state of combat readiness.'! The

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) therefore departed for Saudi Arabia in August

1990 with a separate active brigade from Fort Benning, rather than its Georgia

National Guard roundout. A brigade from the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood,

Texas replaced a Mississippi National Guard roundout before the 1st Cavalry

Division sailed somewhat later.”

Those substitutions seemed reasonable after the aforementioned ARNG

brigades entered active service about December 1, 1990, along with one from

Louisiana which was affiliated with the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at

Fort Carson, Colorado. Two-day training sessions per month plus a two-week

summer camp were sufficient for platoons, companies, and probably battalions,

but brigade requirements were too complex. Hardware shortages and mismatched

skills made it impossible to take best advantage of the meager time available.

Radios, for example, were in short supply. Officers and men often filled slots for

which they were ill prepared. Vehicle maintenance, performed mainly by active

forces or civilian contractors in peacetime, became a post-mobilization problem.

Some critical ARNG items, such as computers, were incompatible with those of

parent divisions. Personnel and logistic systems suffered in consequence.’ Most

Annual Defense Department Report, James R. Schlesinger, FY 1975, March

4, 1974, p. 99, 100 and FY 1976, FY 197T, February 5, 1975, p. If-15, 11-43, V-4;

Rumsfield, Donald H., FY 1977, January 27, 1976, p. 131-182.

lINot all agreed at that time. See, for example, Aspin, Les, Beverly Byron,

and G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Jrag, Saudi Arabia, and Reserve Components:

Missing Lessons for a Future Force Structure, Washington, U.S. House of

Representatives, October 16, 1990, 5 p.; Goldich, Robert L., Irag-Kuwait Crisis,

U.S. Reserve Callup and Reliance on the ‘Reserves, Issue Brief IB 90144,

Washington, Congressional Research Service, November 19, 1990, p. 10-12.

12 Ibid.

18 "Can Reserves Do the Job?," U.S. News & World Report, January 28, 1991,

p. 40-41; Scicchitano, J. Paul, "Total Force Policy Takes a Beating," Army Times,

February 25, 1991, p. 12-13; Naylor, Sean and Tom Donnelly," Guard Deployment

CRS-7

observers accordingly believe that the U.S. Army must devise new policies and

procedures if it expects large ARNG elements to dovetail well with active combat

forces on short notice,

Early mobilization of ARNG divisions to reconstitute a rudimentary Army

rotation base in the United States might merit close scrutiny. That practice could

permit six months to a year or more of predeployment training during protracted

contingencies, depending on DOD rotation polices. ARNG divisions on active

duty also could be committed piecemeal in emergency to facilitate unit

replacements, if casualties dangerously depleted the Regular Army before ARNG

post-mobilization preparations were complete.

At least three roundout options are open, as Figure 3 illustrates. Option

1 would replace one active brigade in designated divisions with an ARNG brigade

in a much higher state of peacetime readiness than presently prevails. Option

2 proposes three active brigades in designated divisions, each with one roundout

battalion, which would simplify training requirements. Option 3 recommends

three active brigades with three active battalions apiece. Each battalion contains

one ARNG maneuver company. All three options furnish every designated active

division with nine roundout companies, which are basic combat elements and least

difficult to prepare for action.

Roundout components, in accord with official concepts, should possess arms,

equipment, and procedures that are fully compatible with those of parent divisions.

Roundouts also should be located nearby to simplify continuous supervision by

the division staff and facilitate frequent training with division troops. The 24th

Infantry Division (Mechanized) and its Georgia National Guard roundout brigade

clearly satisfy that criterion. The 1st Cavalry Division in Texas and its roundout

brigade in Mississippi clearly do not. The 5th Division in Colorado and the 6th

Division in Alaska are separated even farther from roundout brigades in Louisiana

and Minnesota respectively.

LONG-HAUL TRANSPORTATION

Long-haul transportation moved forces farther at a faster pace than ever

before during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Elements involved all pressed

to do their best beginning in early August 1990, because it was not clear whether

Iraq would invade Saudi Arabia after seizing Kuwait, and if so how soon.

CENTCOM put fighter/attack aircraft and a brigade-sized tripwire from the 82nd

Airborne Division in place by August 8. Fully-equipped Marines began to bolster

that vanguard the following week; two expeditionary brigades (each about the

size of an Army division) were ashore early in September. The lead brigade of

the 24th Infantry Division (mechanized) debarked about the same time. The first

great surge, which deployed Desert Shield defensive forces, was complete before

the end of October, A second surge from the United States and Western Europe

Decision Postponed," Army Times, February 4, 1991, p. 3.

CRS-8

Figure 3

ARMY DIVISION ROUNDOUT OPTIONS

Option 1 Option 2 Option 3

Brigades per Division

Active 2

Roundout

Battalions per Division

Active 6 6

Roundout

Companies per Division

Active 18 18 18

Roundout 9 9 9

Total Roundouts per

Division

Brigades 1 0 0

Battalions

Companies 9 9

NOTE: Comparisons are based on a notional division with three brigades, each

of which comprises three battalions with three maneuver companies apiece.

CRS-9

deposited U.S. reinforcements for Desert Storm during the next three months.

Routine runs sustained operations thereafter," although no U.S. airlift or sealift

was available to handle a second sizable contingency.

Those impressive feats, however, transpired under nearly perfect

circumstances that future U.S. conflicts may seldom duplicate. Ample time was

available to assemble essential aircraft, ships, and crews then shuttle back and

forth, because no enemy action interrupted the flow of U.S. forces and supplies

aloft, ashore, or afloat while the buildup progressed. Modern seaports and air

terminals were secure and plentiful. Prepositioned stocks were conveniently

located. Allies arrived aboard their own or borrowed transports; some assisted

U.S. movement. Saudi Arabia, the host country, was willing and able to furnish

facilities plus substantial supplies, such as petroleum, fresh water, and food,'®

Future U.S. long-haul transportation requirements should be considered in context

with circumstances that may be less lenient.

AIRLIFT

More than 90 percent of all C-5 and C-141 transports in the U.S. inventory,

active and reserve, ferried personnel, equipment, and supplies to the Persian Gulf,

but they were not enough. Thirty-eight aircraft from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet

(CRAF) hauled two-thirds of the troops and 18 percent of all tonnage during the

first full month (August 7 to September 7, 1990). DOD called more on January

18, 1991. Crew fatigue rather than aircraft availability eventually became the

limiting factor, although extensive, prolonged reliance on CRAF could have caused

problems for some U.S. airlines.'®

No future contingency is likely to require more transoceanic airlift than

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, which involved longer flights to and from the

United States than any other conceivable objective area. Few countries, however,

couple the airport capacity of Saudi Arabia with abilities to construct new

terminals quickly and economically on hard, flat, bare surfaces, Continuing needs

consequently exist for highly reliable passenger carriers and cargo aircraft that

can land on and take off easily with heavy loads from short, improvised strips.

M4 "Behind the Front Lines Is an Unprecedented Sealift," Defense Week, January

30, 1991, p. 3; Garner, David, Operation Desert Shield, a briefing, Washington,

Logistics Management Institute, October 4, 1990, unpaginated; Donovan, Francis

R., "Sealift; Rapid Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis," Vital Speeches ofthe Day,

November 1990, p. 66-68.

15 Prina, L Edgar, "T'wo If by Sea ... Are We Ready?," Army, December 1990,

p. 12-13.

18 Hyde, James C., "MAC Flying Nonstop to Support Desert Storm," Armed

Forces Journal, March 1991, p. 12-14; Phillips, Don, “Cheney Orders Airline Alert,"

Washington Post, January 19, 1990, p. 19; "Gen. Hanford Johnson: Moving a

Billion Pounds to the Middle East," Government Executive, October 1990, p. 68;

Garner, David, Operation Desert Storm.

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SEALIFT

Ships carried more than 90 percent of all material at an unprecedented clip.

Critics nevertheless question whether “rapid deployment" is a contradiction in

- terms when applied to waterborne transport. Eight fast sealift ships, which steam

at 30 knots or more, took almost a month to deliver the 24th Infantry Division

(Mechanized). The first sailed on August 13, six days after President Bush issued

Desert Shield orders; the last finished unloading on September 10. Most ships,

somewhat slower (15-20 knots) and less well-equipped, took longer. Only 11 of

the first 44 ships requested from the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) reported for

duty on time. The 10 tardiest were 11-20 days late. Seventeen roll-on/roll-off

(RO-RO) ships in the RRF were insufficient. Nineteen charters therefore were

required. Ninety-one of 213 dry cargo ships that supported Desert Shield and

Desert Storm (43 percent) flew foreign flags; crews in some cases had to be

replaced, because they refused to enter the Persian Gulf. Fewer might be available

for future wars.!”

Plans that call for mobility forces able to project U.S. military power

expeditiously to far distant places predate the Carter Doctrine (1980) and the

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, which preceded U.S. Central Command.

Sealift, however, still lags. Essential surge capabilities depend on speedy RO-RO

- and self-sustaining cargo ships that can load quickly and discharge across open

beaches or through primitive ports that lack modern facilities. Eight "fast sealift

ships," the best now available, are converted civilian container carriers. DOD

accordingly might consider spending a larger share of its mobility budget for rapid

deployment sealift. Innovative designs that could double or triple present speeds

would be desirable. Rapid round trips, in turn, would allow fewer ships to

transport requisite loads, and thereby reduce U.S. reliance on the RRF and foreign

flags.

PREPOSITIONING

The initial Desert Shield surge depended heavily on equipment and supplies

prepositioned near the objective area ready for use by U.S. military personnel

delivered by air. Some was ashore in Saudi Arabia and Oman, but most was afloat.

Two maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPS) supported U.S. Marines from

locations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Each contained armored vehicles,

artillery, other unit equipment, and supplies to sustain a Marine Expeditionary

Brigade (MEB) for 30 days. The first of five ships from Diego Garcia reached

Saudi Arabia in mid-August, followed by four ships from Guam. Two full MEBs

were ready for action within three more weeks. Afloat Prepositioning Ships (APS)

17 Q’Rourke, Ronald, Sealift and Operation Desert Shield, Washington,

Congressional Research Service, September 17, 1990, p. 18-20; Donovan, Francis

R., "Sealift: Rapid Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis,” p. 67; “Behind the Front

Lines is an Unprecedented Sealift," p. 3-4; Prina, L. Edgar, "T'wo If by Sea ...,"

p. 14-16.

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at Diego Garcia began to furnish cargo handling equipment, fuel, and other useful

items to early Army and Air Force arrivals.’

Defense Secretary Cheney presently is weighing whether money for more

fast sealift ships "might be better spent buying equipment for a division and

putting it in a key spot."!” Several factors, however, influence such tradeoffs.

Floating warehouses, for example, are susceptible to sabotage, especially by

"frogmen" (techniques and technologies have improved immeasurably since Italian

counterparts of SEALS penetrated British port defenses at Alexandria, Egypt

on December 19, 1941, then planted explosives that put battleships Queen

Elizabeth and Valiant on the harbor bed.)*° Stocks prepositioned ashore may

be tempting missile targets and are worthless if sites selected are remote from

crises that erupt. Modernization and maintenance problems multiply over time,

wherever storage takes place. Not many potential trouble spots offer transport

points as convenient and secure as those in Saudi Arabia, where airlifted personnel

were able to marry quickly with supplies and equipment. The value of

prepositioning, in short, varies considerably with circumstances.”

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Top US. political-military decisionmakers urgently required timely, accurate

strategicintelligence concerning Iraq’s military capabilities and intentions before,

during and after Desert Shield and Desert Storm. U.S. commanders at every level

in all four services required detailed combat intelligence concerning enemy forces

they faced. Collection capabilities limited the amount of information available.

Analytical capabilities limited conclusions drawn therefrom.

18 Q’Rourke, Ronald, Sealift and Operation Desert Shield, p. 16-18; Donovan,

Francis R., "Sealift: Rapid Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis," p. 66-67; Garner,

David, Operation Desert Shield; Prina, L. Edgar, “Two If by Sea ...," p. 20; "Our

Deployment into the Persian Gulf -- Three Views," Army, November 1990, p. 16,

17.

19 Healy, Melissa, "Cheney Would Reduce Reserve Combat Role," Los Angeles

Times, March 14, 1991, p. 1.

20 Piekalkiewicz, Jamusz, Secret Agents, Spies, and Saboteurs, translated by

Francisca Garvey and Nadia Fowler, London, David and Charles, 1969, p. 62-77.

21 Brooke, George M. III and Frederick McCorkle, “Rapid Response Force

Option," Amphibious Warfare Review, Summer 1986, p. 34-40; Newsham, Grant,

"Should MPS Be Armed?," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1987, p. 30; Russell,

James A., "Rapid Deployment Force Ammo Found Too Rusty to Use," Navy News

and Undersea Technology, June 5, 1987, p. 1.

CRS-12

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

The U.S. strategic intelligence community got off to a slow start, largely

because the United States tilted toward Iraq throughout the Iran-Iraq war (1980-

1988) and Iraq later was a low-priority US. interest.”7 Satellite sensors detected

the Iraqi troop buildup that began along Kuwait’s northern border on July 20,

1990, and signal intercepts probably led CIA to predict the August 2 invasion the

day before it occurred,” but neither told how deeply Iraq would drive or how

hard its forces would fight. Estimates predicated primarily on technological

collection subsequently contained large loopholes concerning the overall strength,

disposition, capabilities, limitations, and intentions of Iraqi armed forces. Debates

about Iraq’s abilities to withstand economic embargoes and naval blockades never

were resolved.

Hindsight, for example, reveals that the vaunted Republican Guard was vastly

overrated. Its will to fight was little better than other Iraqi forces. The original

number of mobile SCUD launchers never was resolved (speculation spread from

18 to more than 200). Most knowledgeable observers believed that Iraq lacked

nuclear weapons, but no one was certain and official debates about chemical

warfare capabilities continued after combat ceased.”

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

The U.S. theater-level combat intelligence apparatus for Desert Shield and

Desert Storm initially comprised a few specialists who accompanied General

Schwarzkopf to Saudi Arabia in August 1990.2 Burgeoning capabilities, coupled

with attacks that "blinded" Iraq, however, soon afforded coalition forces decisive

advantages.

Space-based satellite sensors, employed for the first time in a large-scale

conflict, furnished commanders and staff with unprecedented information, often

in near real time. No mountains or vegetation obscured their view, which was

22 Oberdorfer, Don, “Missed Signals in the Middle East," Washington Post

Magazine, March 17, 1991, p. 20-21; "U.S. Intelligence in the Gulf, and Into the

1990s," Security Intelligence Report, February 25, 1991. p. 2.

28 Oberdorfer, Don, "Missed Signals in the Middle East," p. 37-40.

24 General H. Norman Schwarzkopf in television interviews on February 28

and March 28, 1991; Donnelly, Warren H. and Zachary S. Davis, Irag and Nuclear

Weapons. Issue Brief IB90113, Washington, Congressional Research Service,

February 8, 1991, 15 p.; Albright, David and Mark Hibbs, “Iraq and the Bomb:

Were They Even Close?, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1991, p. 16-26;

Atkinson, Rick, "No Chemical Arms Found on Battlefields," Washington Post,

March 7, 1991, p. 1; Tamayo, Juan O., “Along with Debris War Leaves Questions

About Overestimation of Iraqi Might," Baltimore Sun, March 12, 1991, p. 4.

25 "J.S, Intelligence In the Gulf and Into the 1990s," p.3.

CRS-13

crystal clear for the first several months. Sunlight during daylight hours cast

strong shadows that were perfect for photo interpreters. Static targets were easy

to identify and prioritize. Global positioning satellites helped allied land and air

force pinpoint their locations and navigate trackless deserts, Other spacecraft

assisted SCUD alerts and meteorological forecasts.27 Two Joint Surveillance

and Target Attack System (JSTARS) aircraft, plucked from development for Desert

Storm employment, complemented Airborne Warning and Control System

(AWACS) aircraft. The former monitored enemy ground force movement. The

latter looked for Iraqi air attacks that never materialized. Both acquired targets

for allied elements to engage.”’

Technologically derived intelligence, however, has severe limitations. Satellite

coverage was incomplete, even on clear days, because sensors were not always

overhead. Only Lacrosse, which carries synthetic aperture radar, could see

through clouds that were increasingly worrisome after Desert Storm started.

Reconnaissance aircraft were too few to fill gaps. The distribution system in many

instances was unable to disseminate available data rapidly enough for recipients

to benefit. Post-strike damage assessment thus was far from scientific.” U.S.

and British signal intelligence experts reportedly broke all Iraqi military codes

and routinely monitored radio transmissions, but the dearth of skilled translators

became a bottleneck.” The shortage of Arabic linguists similarly restricted U.S.

abilities to interrogate prisoners of war. Reliance on remotely located Saudi

specialists, who did not always share their findings, was a poor substitute. Special

operations forces had to establish listening posts and patrols deep in hostile

territory, designate targets and collect other useful intelligence, because well

qualified human intelligence (HUMINT) agents were in short supply. They were

28 Smith, Marcia S., Military and Civilian Satellites In Support of Allied Forces

in the Persian Gulf War, Washington, Congressional Research Service, February

27, 1991, 12 p. Presti, Kenneth J., "Desert Storm Tests Warning, Spy Sat

Systems," Washington Technology, February 21, 1991, p. 12; Sawyer, Kathy, "U.S.

Spies in the Sky Focus in on Iraqis," Washington Post, November 25, 1990, p.

A24; Miller, Barry, GPS Proves Its Worth in Operation Desert Storm," Armed

Forces Journal, April 1991, p. 16, 20.

2"Capaccio, Tony, "Air Force’s Eyes in the Sky Alerted Marines at Khafji,

Targeted Convoys," Defense Week, March 18, 1991, p. 7.

28 Broad, William J., "Assessing Damage Can Be Fettered by the Weather and

Pilot Hyperbole," New York Times, January 24, 1991, p. H12; Covault, Craig,

"Recon Satellites Lead Allied Intelligence Effort," Aviation Week & Space

Technology, February 4, 1991, p. 25; "U.S. Intelligence in the Gulf and Into the

1990s, p. 3; Fulgham, David, "Desert Storm Highlights Need for Rapid Tactical

Intelligence," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 11, 1991, p. 8. "U.S.

Struggles to Distribute Satellite Data in Gulf," Defense Daily, November 30, 1990,

p. 339.

29 Adams, James, "SEAL Teams Try to Fill the Intelligence Gap," London

Sunday Times, August 19, 1990, p. 12; "U.S. Intelligence in the Gulf and Into

the 1990s," p. 5.

CRS-14

especially valuable during foul weather, but results suggest that abilities to locate

mobile SCUD missiles were more or less hit or miss.”

FUSION AND FUTURE NEEDS

Slow starts which typified U.S. strategic and tactical intelligence during the

recent conflict with Iraq were scarcely aberrations. Basic intelligence on the tiny

island of Grenada, for example, can best be described as substandard before

Operation Urgent Fury opened in October 1983, despite warning signs that

exceeded a year (U.S. aircraft bombed a misidentified mental hospital).*' Calls

have continued for high performance reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft

that could complement space satellites ever since SR-71 Blackbirds retired from

the active inventory in 1989.52 The lack of HUMINT professionals able to

furnish otherwise unavailable information from high-priority areas has been

obvious for many years. Not all need be U.S. citizens, if the U.S. intelligence

community develops indigenous networks in appropriate countries during

peacetime.

Above all, strategic and tactical intelligence both would benefit from better

integration. Concerted efforts to fuse electronic, signal, communications, photo,

and human intelligence into an integrated whole greater than the sum ofits parts

almost surely would facilitate in-depth, synoptic coverage beyond current

capabilities.

FORCIBLE ENTRY FORCES

There was no need for U.S. armed forces to seize a foothold on well defended

shores at the onset of Desert Shield, because Saddam Hussein instructed his troops

to stop (perhaps temporarily) in Kuwait. The U.S. buildup and subsequent combat

would have developed quite differently if Iraqi invaders had moved immediately

to occupy principal Saudi ports, airfields, and coastal territory as far south as

Dhahran, then consolidate their hold. The closest friends ready to receive Central

50 Gertz, Bill, "U.S. Commandos Steal into Iraq to Spot Mobile Missiles,"

Washington Times, January 25, 1991, p. B1; Healy, Melissa, "Special Forces: U.S.

‘Eyes’ Deep in Enemy Territory," Los Angeles Times, February 28, 1991, p. 1;

“The Spies in the Sand Far Behind the Enemy’s Lines,” U.S. News & World

Report, March 11, 1991, p. 34.

8lAnderson, Jack and Dale Van Atta, "schwarzkopf: Grenada Invasion

Botched," Washington Post, April 11, 1991, p. 11; Cushman, John H., Jr.,

"Pentagon Study Faults Planning on Grenada," New York Times, July 12, 1986,

p. 14.

82 Gertz, Bill, "House Kills Funds to Upgrade 9 Surviving SR-71 Spy Planes,"

Washington Times, June 12, 1987, p. 1. The last aircraft retired two years later.

§"[J.§, Intelligence in the Gulf and Into the 1990s, p. 3.

CRS-15

Command (CENTCOM) contingents in such event would have been the United

Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman. Israel, far to the West, was politically

inappropriate as well as remote. A survey of U.S. forcible entry capabilities thus

seems advisable.

PARACHUTE ASSAULT

Paratroops are organized, trained, and equipped primarily to conduct vertical

assaults, establish lodgments, and control critical terrain until forces moving

overland or across beaches relieve them. Early linkups usually are required,

because airborne units are lightly armed and lack much staying power.

The U.S. Army includes a single airborne division, based at Fort Bragg, North

Carolina, Whether one would have been enough to secure points of entry in Iraqiheld Arabia is debatable (two were on alert throughout the Cuban missile crisis

in 1962.4) One division in any case requires more C-141 aircraft for parachute

assault than reasonably would have been available, given competition by other

rapid deployment requirements. Lengthy delays would have accompanied any

plan to stage division-size operations from the UAE, relying heavily on C-130

transports from the Air Force Reserve and National Guard.

Desert Shield experience, however, does not automatically indicate needs

for more paratroops and supporting airlift. On the contrary, it extends a 45-yearold pattern, which suggests that less might be enough. The last large parachute

assault for forcible entry purposes occurred in Normandy on D-Day, June 6, 1944,

when General Eisenhower employed two U.S. and one British airborne divisions.

The final parachute assault by a full airborne division of any nation for any

purpose was the March 24, 1945 leap across the Rhine.® U.S. regimental- and

brigade-scale drops since then have been few and far between: two during the

Korean War; one in Vietnam (largely for show); and one to spearhead Operation

Just Cause in Panama (1990). Two Ranger battalions also participated. General

Schwarzkopf assigned the 82d Airborne Division no assault missions during Desert

Storm.

U.S. defense decisionmakers, bearing that record in mind, should question

whether one or more airborne divisions coupled with adequate airlift are required

to cope well with present and projected threats. The existing airborne-qualified

ranger regiment, perhaps supplemented by a separate brigade, is one possible

alternative.

“House, Jonathan M., "Joint Operational Problems In the Cuban Missile

Crisis," Parameters, Spring 1991, p. 94-98.

85 Devlin, Gerard M., Paratrooper!, N.Y., St. Martin’s Press, 1979, p. 611-637.

CRS-16

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

Amphibious assault forces are organized, trained, and equipped to establish

beachheads that facilitate rapid buildups by follow-on formations from sea and

air. Suitable landing sites improve prospects for success and lessen the likelihood

of high casualties.

The U.S. Marine Corps contains three active division-wing teams -- commonly

called Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) -- and one in the Marine Corps Reserve.

Sixty-four amphibious ships dispersed around the world, however, are able to lift

less than one ata time. Assemblage in the Persian Gulf, coupled with preparation

time, probably would have consumed much more than a month (it took a month

for two unopposed brigades to receive prepositioned equipment®), Shallow

gradients and shoals characterized approaches to the 36-mile Iraqi waterfront,

which consists mainly of mud flats. Kuwaiti beaches bristled with mines and other

manmade obstacles. One Marine Expeditionary Brigade embarked on 34

amphibious ships within easy striking distance posed a threat that pinned many

Iraqi defenders in place, but General Schwarzkopf never ordered an assault. All

other Marines landed at secure sites.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm experience may not be typical, but seaborne

assaults have been scarce since World War II. The last multidivision operation

crossed Okinawa’s beaches on April 1, 1945.°” The 1st Marine Division, minus

one regiment, stormed Inchon, Korea in September 1950. All subsequent

landings, like the one in Grenada (1983), have been much smaller. Decisionmakers

who seek to determine the necessary number of MEFs might bear that lengthy

record in mind and recall that army divisions (3 U.S., 2 British, 1 Canadian)

conducted the most ambitious amphibious assault ever seen: D-Day landings in

Normandy.” Soviet doctrine, which assigns assault operations to a few naval

infantry regiments, may also be relevant; tank and motor rifle divisions aboard

merchant ships expand the footholds they seize.“° A thorough review of roles

and missions perhaps should underpin future Marine Corps force structure (see

subsequent section on that subject).

See footnote 15.

87 Garland, George W. and Thurman R. Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations:

History of the U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Washington,

Historical Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1971, p. 502-527.

38 Appleman, Roy E., South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Washington,

Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1961, p. 488-514.

89 Harrison, Gordan A., Cross-channel Attack: United States Army in World

War II, The European Theater of Operations, Washington, Office of the Chief of

Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1951, p. 190-193, 300-335.

40The Soviet Naval Infantry, Washington, Defense Intelligence Agency, April

1980, p. 23, 34 and Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces, Washington, Defense

Intelligence Agency, 1978, p. 9.

CRS-17

FIRST LINE DEFENSES

Demands for air and missile defenses to protect U.S. and allied command

posts, forces, ports, airfields, and logistic installations arose as soon as Desert

Shield started. An umbrella over civilian population centers and selected oil

installations also enjoyed a high priority. Interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air

missile units accordingly were among the first arrivals. Reinforcements that

phased in later augmented initial capabilities.

AIR DEFENSES

The Iraqi Air Force, with few exceptions, showed little fight. Allied attacks

immobilized most fighter-bombers before they took flight, by cratering runways

and wrecking revetments. No fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters lasted long in

the air except 130 some that fled safely to Iran. U.S, terminal air defenses thus

were scarcely tested.

Such success may be elusive in future conflicts, because some potential

opponents possess impressive tactical air combat capabilities and existing US.

defenses are not well balanced. Ground-based apparatus ideally should comprise

a complementary array of mobile surface-to-air systems, each with unique

characteristics that make it impossible for enemy aircraft and cruise missiles to

elude the envelope of one weapon without becoming vulnerable to others,

regardless of altitudes and angles from which they elect to attack, day or night,

in favorable or foul weather.*!

U.S. point and area defenses are somewhat less synergistic than that model,

and most systems (even Patriot) incorporate 1960s or 1970s technologies, long

since eclipsed. Studies to ascertain what corrective actions (if any) seem

reasonable should start with threat assessments beyond the scope of this

unclassified study. Progress meanwhile remains imperceptible.

TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES

Iraq launched 81 SCUD surface-to-surface missiles at targets in Saudi Arabia,

Israel, and Bahrain during Desert Storm. U.S. Patriot missiles intercepted 42

1Soviet diversity is instructive. See, for example, Zaloga, Steve, "The Soviet

Antidote to NATO Tactical Air," Armed Forces Journal, January 1989, p. 26, 38;

Schneider, Wolfgang "Soviet Army Air Defense: Effectiveness Through Numbers,"

International Defense Review, March 1988, p. 237-241.

421 ussier, Frances M., Army Air Defense for Forward Areas: Strategies and

Costs, Washington, Congressional Budget Office, June 1986, 68 p. Several Current

options and opinions are covered under the rubric "Ground Air Defense" in Defense

News, January 29, 1990, p. 12-14, 16, 18-20, 40.

CRS-18

of them in flight and disregarded others too far off course to do any damage.

Overall performance received high marks.“

Euphoria, however, may be unjustified. Patriot, designed primarily for

terminal defense against aircraft and cruise missiles, displayed only modest antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capabilities.“ The system performed fairly well

against single-warhead, unsophisticated SCUDs, which never were launched in -

salvos that made Patriot engage many targets simultaneously or in rapid

succession (one at a time was the norm, with long intervals between). No SCUD

released decoys to deceive defenders. Twenty-two missed intended marks by large

margins. Nevertheless, intercepts occurred at such short range that debris

sometimes rained down on targets that Patriot tried to protect. Untouched SCUD

warheads seeped through when Patriot hit the missile’s fuel tank instead of its

lethal payload. Patriot never touched the SCUD that killed 28 U.S. military

personnel and wounded 100 in a Dhahran barrack on February 25, 1991.

The rapid proliferation of intermediate-, medium-, and short-range ballistic

missile delivery vehicles and rockets among countries on every populated continent

except Australia suggests that DOD should seriously consider versatile, reliable

ATBM capabilities beyond the capacity of Patriot (Figure 4). Some of those

missiles currently can carry nuclear or chemical warheads. Others may attain

that status in the foreseeable future. Adequate defenses appear quite expensive,

but the value of targets protected should make essential ATBM systems costeffective.*®

48Lenhart, Warren W. and Todd Masse, Persian Gulf War: Iragi SCUD

Ballistic Missile Systems, Washington, Congressional Research Service, February

14, 1991, updated through February 28, p. 10-11; "U.S. Army Patriot Proven in

New Role As Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile Weapon,” Aviation Week & Space

Technology, February 18, 1991, p. 49-51.

44Hildreth, Steven A. and Gary Newsome, Persian Gulf War: Patriot Missile,

Washington, Congressional Research Service, forthcoming; "M1M-104 Patriot/T-16

(JTACMS)/ATM," Forecast International/DMS Market Intelligence Report, June

1990, 6 p.

46Safire, William, "The Great SCUD-Patriot Mystery,"New York Times, March

7, 1991, p. A25; Lenorovitz, Jeffrey M., "Poor Workmanship Discovered in SCUD

-- Missile Fragments," Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 11, 1991, p. 16.

46Nolan, Janne E., Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,

Washington, Brookings Institution, 1991, 209 p.; Shuey, Robert D. et al, Missile

Proliferation Survey of Emerging Missile Forces, Washington, Congressional

Research Service, February 9, 1989, 107 p.; "JDW Interview (with Henry Cooper),"

Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 16, 1991, p. 416.

CRS-19

Figure 4

TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION

Source: Shuey, Robert, Missile Proliferation:

A Discussion of U.S, Objectives and Policy

Options, Washington, Congressional Research

Service, Feb. 21, 1990, p. 3-6, updated orally as

of April 1991.

“PY

CRS-20

ARMY DIVISIONS

Debates about the balance between heavy and light Army divisions began

almost a decade ago. Champions of heavy divisions contend that Desert Storm

confirmed the validity of their cause. Other evidence indicates that compromise

positions may be preferable to either pole.

HEAVY DIVISIONS

U.S. armored and mechanized divisions performed admirably during Desert

Storm. Tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles executed precision maneuvers rapidly

on the open plains (8d Armored Division advanced 120 miles in one night), then

easily defeated the Iraqi Republican Guard in battle. Only 4 of 1,956 M1A1 tanks

and 3 of 2,200 Bradley’s were disabled. Operational readiness rates exceeded 90

percent,*”

Armored and mechanized divisions, which are much heavier than predecessors,

nevertheless would have limited value if the next major contingency occurred in

Korea’s mountainous terrain or in jungles and swamps elsewhere. Many bridges,

even in Europe, refuse to bear great weight (M1A1 tanks tip the scales at 67 tons

combat loaded; the recovery vehicle currently under development weighs almost

70 tons, 13 tons more than the present model). Many roads that lack convenient

bypasses are too narrow for heavy tank traffic. U.S. main battle tanks and

armored fighting vehicles also preclude rapid deployment to meet emergencies.

C-5 transports, the only U.S. long-distance cargo aircraft that can carry outsize

loads, normally accommodate just one tank or four Bradleys per sortie. Heavy

divisions consequently must travel largely by sea, a time-consuming process.“

LIGHT DIVISIONS

The U.S. Army’s four light infantry divisions (LID) were conspicuously absent

during Desert Storm, basically because they lacked sufficient firepower, mobility,

and staying power to contribute significantly, unless augmented in many ways.

The 82d Airborne Division, among the first arrivals, was largely relegated to rear

area security roles for similar reasons after the Desert Shield buildup was well

under way.

47Army Weapons Systems Performance in Southwest Asia, Washington, Army

Legislative Liaison Programs Division, March 15, 1991, p. 1-2.

48Segal, David, "Whatever Happened to Rapid Deployment?," Armed Forces

Journal, March 1991, p. 39-40. “Armor Against Fire: The Pendulum Slows,"

Army, July 1987, p. 86-37; Roos, John G., "Seven Years After Fielding, Army Still

Can’t Yank Tanks," Armed Forces Journal, October 1989, p. 90, 92.

CRS-21

How many (if any) light infantry divisions should remain if the active Army

total dwindles to twelve, as Defense Secretary Cheney proposes, is a controversial

issue. The original rationale, which persists, postulates rapid deployment

capabilities, plus utility against comparably equipped forces anywhere in the world

or against heavy divisions under favorable conditions.’® Critics from the

beginning, however, have questioned the combat capabilities of light divisions.

Common complaints contend that LIDs likely would be outgunned by most Third

World adversaries, many of whom possess Soviet arms and equipment (one battery

of eight 155mm howitzers comprises the largest LID artillery); that they are poorly

protected (no armored vehicles and scant air defense); that they are mainly footmobile (only one of nine infantry battalions can be heliborne and one more

motorized at any given time); and that scenarios which call for more than one

LIC are unrealistic.”

MIDDLEWEIGHT DIVISIONS

Some observers, bearing in mind the disadvantages of too many heavy or

light divisions, believe the best future mix might combine heavy armored and

mechanized infantry forces with rapidly deployable, agile, and lethal middleweight divisions that feature tanks and fighting vehicles able to fit into tactical

air transport easily, and preferably tolerate parachute delivery.’ Senior

commanders might form expedient light divisions by temporarily stripping selected

accoutrements and personnel from heavy and middleweight formations to handle

low-intensity threats, then reverse that process when needs cease. U.S. Army

divisions in Vietnam, for example, left most vehicles in motor pools for the

4°Hollingsworth, James F., "The Light Division: Light Enough to Get There--

Mobile Enough to Survive -- Lethal Enough to Win -- We Need It Now," Armed

Forces Journal, October 1983, p. 84-85,88,90; Wickham, John A., Jr., “Light

Divisions’ Effectiveness Will Grow From ’Soldier Power’," Army Times, November

16, 1984, p. 10,12; DuPuy, William E., "The Light Infantry: Indispensable Element

of a Balanced Force," Army, June 1985, p. 26-29, 32-33, 36-37, 39-41.

Senior Army officers have declined to criticize light divisions openly unless

protected by pseudonyms. See, for example, Damon, Sam and Ben Krisler, “Army

of Excellence: A Time to Take Stock," Armed Forces Journal, May 1985, p. 86-87,

90, 92, 94. Other views are typified by Segal, David, “Army Light Division: Are

They Fit to Fight?,” Armed Forces Journal, October 1988, p. 82, 84,86,88.

51Mfetamorphoses are described in Mazarr, Michael J., Light Forces and the

Future of U.S. Military Strategy, Washington, Brassey’s, 1990, p. 121-162. See

also Tusa, Francis, "Increased Firepower Weighs Heavily on Light Armor," Armed

Forces Journal, March 1991, p. 42; Adams, Peter, "Tracked, Wheeled Vehicles to

Share Battlefield," Army Times, November 30, 1987, p. 25,28 and Judith Kohn

Brown, “Marines to Take Lead in Light Tank Program," p. 28; Segal, David,

"Whatever Happened to Rapid Deployment?," p. 39.

CRS-22

duration of that conflict, but would have been ready for Desert Storm - style

operations if required.

NAVAL COMBAT CAPABILITIES

The 7-ship U.S. Middle East Force based at Bahrain was on the spot when -

Desert Shield started. Naval reinforcements augmented that nucleus rapidly.”

Five carrier battle groups enforced the UN - imposed embargo against Iraq, acting

in loose collaboration with ships from 14 other nations. Aircraft from six carriers

participated in combat operations during Desert Storm from stations in the

Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and eastern Mediterranean. Two battleships and perhaps

seven attack submarines launched Tomahawk cruise missiles.” Battleships and

their escorts also furnished naval gunfire support for allied forces and U.S.

Marines near the Kuwaiti coast. Minesweeping deficiencies predictably provided

the only notable disappointments.™

U.S. naval warfare during Desert Storm conformed to a pattern that has

persisted since World War II. The last "blue water" surface battle took place off

Kyushu on April 6-7, 1945. The last enemy warship sunk by a U.S. submarine

was the Japanese destroyer Nokaze near Saigon on February 19, 1945. The last

victim of a U.S. submarine was a merchant ship in the Sea of Japan the following

August.® All subsequent engagements constitute two categories. Representative

ship-against-shore operations include those connected with the Korean War, the

Vietnam War, the Dominican Republican (1965), Lebanon (1983-84), Grenada

(1983), and Libya (1986). All ship-to-ship encounters, excluding Cuban missile

crisis confrontations, were small scale and close to coasts. The North Korean

seizure of USS Pueblo (1968), the Mayaguez incident off Cambodia (1975),

52Bowman, Steven R., Persian Gulf War: Summary of U.S, and Non-U.S.

Forces, Washington, Congressional Research Service, February 11, 1991, p. 5-8.

58Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea

Warfare), in unclassified testimony before The House Armed Services Committee

on March 20, 1991 announced that 13 attack submarines participated in Desert

Storm. Not all were present at one time, however, and some never engaged in

combat, according to amplifying information from his office.

“Schmitt, Eric, "Gulf Is Swept for Mines In The Aftermath of War," New York

Times, March 19, 1991, p. 14; Rumsey, Anne, "Navy Lacks Hunter for Shallow-

Water Mines," Defense Week, March 13, 1989, p. 1,12; Truver, Scott C. and

Jonathan S. Thompson, "Navy Mine Countermeasures: Quo Vadis?," Armed Forces

Journal, April 1987, p. 70,72,74.

55Mforison, Samuel Eliot, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United

States Navy in the Second World War, Boston, Little, Brown, and Co., 1963, p.

509-510, 537-541.

CRS-23

altercations in the Gulf of Sidra (1981, 1989), and Persian Gulf escort duty (1987-

88) are typical.

America’s maritime strategy until quite recently emphasized abilities to deter

and, if need be, defeat the Soviet Navy. U.S, Naval forces are still configured

to perform those tasks, although most authorities, who include the Secretary of

Defense, JCS Chairman, and the Chief of Naval Operations, believe Soviet threats

are much muted."”? Decisionmakers therefore should determine whether basic

changes in composition should accompany proposed naval force reductions. Fewer

carrier escorts and submarines,” for example, might be appropriate in the new

context, if experience since 1945 remains relevant. More mine warfare ships seem

advisable. Attention to underway replenishment ships could increase, if the US.

Navy loses access to forward bases, such as Subic Bay in the Philippines.

TACTICAL AIR COMBAT FORCES

US. tactical air combat power was spectacular during Desert Storm. Army

Apache helicopters fired the first shots when they destroyed two Iraqi early

warning sites in the wee hours of January 17, 1991. Unarmed EF-111s, which

specialize in electronic warfare, widened the corridor into Iraq when they jammed

antiaircraft radars and fire-direction centers."? Bombers, attack aircraft, and

Tomahawk cruise missiles then began the systematic destruction of commandcontrol-communications facilities, military airfields, and air defenses. Resultant

air supremacy, swiftly achieved, thereafter allowed U.S. aircraft to strike at will

from medium altitudes, almost with impunity. SCUD launchers, missile storage

sites, electrical power plants, nuclear development facilities, and chemical/biological

warfare factories were lucrative targets before coalition air forces turned their

56Watkins, James D., "The Maritime Strategy" and John F. Lehman, Jr., "The

600 - Ship Navy," both in The Maritime Strategy, a supplement to the U.S. Naval

Institute Proceedings, January 1986, p. 2-17, 30-40.

57See Note 4.; also Trost, Carlesle A. H. , "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s,"

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1990, p. 92-97; Collins, John M. and Dianne

E. Rennack, U.S./Soviet Military Balance: Statistical Trends, 1980-1989, (As of

January 1, 1990), Washington, Congressional Research Service, August 6, 1990,

p. 90-123.

58] acy, James L., “Attack Submarines: The Case for Negotiated Reductions,

Arms Control Today, p. 8-12; Keller, John, "Submarine Threat Didn’t Vanish With

the Cold War," Military & Aerospace Electronics, February 1991, p. 11.

Grier, Peter, "U.S. Army Opened Way for Air War," Christian Science

Monitor, March 27, 1991, p. 8; Fulghum, David A,, "EF-111s Jammed Radars to

Open Air War Against Iraq," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 4, 1991,

p. 26.

CRS-24

attention toward the Iraqi Army.” Air-to-air encounters were short and

conclusive: the score was 42-to-0 in favor of allied forces. Ground fire downed

32 U.S. aircraft of all types during 43 days of Desert Storm. Other coalition forces

lost 9. Those figures are phenomenally low, considering a combat sortie rate that

averaged more than 1,000 per day (U.S. Army Air Forces lost 60 B-17 bombers,

each with a crew of 10, during the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid of August 17,

1943 oa 19 percent of the force -- and 60 more on a second raid two months

later).

AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION

Tactical air operations against Iraq continue trends in motion for many years.

Official Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps accounts of air war in Korea and

Vietnam concentrate on bombardment. Air-to-air combat received scant attention

in comparison. Subsequent aerial encounters have been confined to minor

altercations with Libya in 1981 and 1989. Carrier aircraft made substantial

contributions, but land-based squadrons predominated.

Current generation U.S. tactical aircraft far outstripped expectations

throughout the war with Iraq. Readiness rates for all types exceeded those

recorded in peacetime, despite accelerated sortie rates and time aloft.

Expeditious programs to develop and deploy advanced tactical fighters and

6"Schwarzkopf Declares Air Supremacy Over Iraq," Aerospace Daily, January

31, 1991, p. 169; Morrocco, John D., "U.S. Tactics Exploit Advances in Avionics,

Air-to-Surface Weapons," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 18, 1991,

p. 52-53; Bird, Julie, "Horner: Further AF Role in Gulf Not Needed," Air Force

Times, March 18,1991, p. 8.

81"Allies Shoot Down 42 Iraqi Aircraft, 81 Others Destroyed on Ground,"

Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 11, 1991, p. 22; The Army Air Forces

In World War II, Vol. Two, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to

December 1943, Ed. by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, Chicago,

University of Chicago Press, 1949, p. 682-683, 704.

-82See, for example, Futrell, Robert F., The United States Air Forces in Korea,

1950-1953, Rev. Ed., Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1983, 823 p; The

United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973, Ed. by Carl Berger,

Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1977, 365 p.

65"TJ.S. Navy Fighters Down 2 Libya Jets," Facts on File Yearbook, 1989, p.

1-2; "U.S. Navy F-14s Down Two Libyan Jet Fighters,” Facts on File Yearbook,

1981, p. 589-591.

6"Tac Mission Capable Rates Up 7% for War, Even As Sorties Doubled,"

Aerospace Daily, April 2, 1991, p. 9.

CRS-25

improved interdiction aircraft, as presently proposed,” therefore may be difficult

to justify during the impending period of budgetary constraint, unless perceived

threats clearly indicate requirements for immediate and major improvements.

Replacements for SR-71 "spy planes" and close air support aircraft able to perform

well at night and in bad weather might deserve higher priorities.

Future U.S. armed conflicts may not always favor Air Force and Marine

aircraft with adequate bases ashore. Carrier air power sometimes might

predominate, Vertical takeoff and landing capabilities could be more in demand

by tactical air combat forces ashore. The current interservice mix therefore merits

review. Navy officials moreover might reconsider the proportion of shipboard

aircraft dedicated to fleet defense, if they wish to contribute more effectively to

land battles.®

AIRCRAFT-CRUISE MISSILE MIX

Decisionmakers concurrently could reconsider tradeoffs between manned

aircraft and land attack cruise missiles. Tomahawks, for example, demolished

heavily-defended hard targets without endangering air crews during Desert Storm.

Featureless plains imposed no obstacles between launch sites and precisely located

targets. Terrain-following computers, however, might not work so well on short

notice in poorly mapped regions that feature rough topography. Computerized

data also are difficult to update rapidly after initial strikes obliterate landmarks.

Some Tomahawks consequently became confused after bombardment levelled tall

buildings in Baghdad.®* Reusable manned aircraft are much more versatile.

Variable payloads can be tailored for particular targets. Crews can maneuver

§Schine, Eric and Russell Mitchell, "The $75 Billion Question: Whose Fighter

Will Win?" Business Week, April 8, 1991, p. 64; Cooper, Bert H., Jr., Advanced

Tactical Fighter (ATF) Aircraft (Weapons Facts), Issue Brief 1B87111, Washington,

Congressional Research Service, March 21, 1991, 9 p. ;

*Morrocco, John A., "Nighttime CAS to Pose Challenge for Air Units Once

Ground War Begins," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 11, 1991, p.

20-21; Heppenheimer, T.A., “Revealed! March 5 Spy Plane," Popular Science,

November 1988, p. 70-73.

8’Reconfiguration may already be in the offing. See Holzer, Robert, "Navy

to Revamp Carrier Wings,” Defense News, February 25, 1991, p. 4.

68Anderson, Jack and Dale Van Atta, " Confused’ Tomahawks Missed Targets,"

Washington Post, March 27, 1991, p. F11. For a more sanguine view, see

“Tomahawk War Effectiveness Reduces A-X Stealth Requirement," Aerospace Daily,

April 15, 1991, p. 85.

CRS-26

to avoid enemy air defenses, assess situations on-the-spot, and adjust

accordingly.’ Some mix of manned aircraft and land attack missiles thus seems

mandatory.

MARINE CORPS ROLES AND MISSIONS

Two Marine divisions, in concert with other coalition forces, breached Iraqi

barriers on February 24, 1991 and quickly liberated Kuwait. Their performance,

in General Schwarzkopf’s words, was “absolutely superb ... a textbook, and I think

it’ll be studied for many, many years to come as the way to do it." Marine

aviation furnished direct support.

Those admirable actions, however, were remotely related to statutory Marine

Corps roles and missions, which are to organize, train, and equip forces "for service

with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct

of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval

campaign." A DOD directive further stipulates that those duties "do not

contemplate the creation of a second land Army." Marines ashore nevertheless

performed tasks that were indistinguishable from those of the U.S. Army, which

prepares "primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to war on land"

(more specifically to "defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend

land areas.")” First, Marine divisions guarded Saudi Arabian oil installations

and port facilities; second, they defeated Iraqi land forces in Kuwait; third,

they remained in Kuwait as a security contingent after the shooting war ceased.

Marine duplication of Army roles and missions is nothing new. Overlaps

started early in the Twentieth Century with lengthy employments in Haiti, the

Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. Marine Major General John A. Lejeune

commanded a composite Army-Marine division in France during World War I.

Few Marines in Korea or Vietnam ever smelled salt water after the Inchon

6°Tyadeoffs between cruise missiles and tactical aircraft are contained in

Collins, John M., Strategic Nuclear Delivery Systems: How Many? What

Combinations? Washington, Congressional Research Service, October 7, 1974,

p. 52-68.

™Schwarzkopf: Strategy Behind Desert Storm," p. 35.

"Title 10, United States Code, Sections 3062 and 5063; DOD Directive 5100.1:

Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, September

25, 1987, p. 18,16.

72Moore, Molly "U.S. Troops Just Starting to Get Feet on Ground," Washington

Post, August 26, 1990, p. A21.

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