Petition for Writ of Certiorari — George R. Cooke Co. v. Maki
Supreme Court brief1942
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SUBJECT INDEX
Page
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. .....<.0ccceseees 1-10
I. Summary Statement of Matter Involved.... 2-5
If. Basis of Jurisdiction to Review............ 5
TEE, CRON S ROMUNNON oo u's is w bak aap weeds 5-7
IV. Reasons Relied Upon for the Allowance of
SE SEU Ai cobb ee tech She eee oP ee res tas 7-10
Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari.. 11-27
eh ON Ns. oko oe bees hee tiled 11
CPUOUIE OT PUTIMIOIOR, oo ce rehab ieswctet ess 12
Concise Statement of Case................506- 12-13
ee ee ere rer ey pe rr 13
PO RC ere Tr ey ree ee me 14-26
Bummary of Arqamett. .3 6.5 066056080055% 14
Point I1—In the absence of a controlling Fed-
eral statute, a Federal District Court
should apply the law of the state where
such court is sitting in so far as limita-
tions of actions are concerned........... 15
Point II—The Minnesota Statute of Limita-
tions relied upon by the respondent is a
general statute of limitations and not a
special statute dealing with the existence
of a cause of action and the decision of the
Cireuit Court of Appeals to the contrary
is in conflict with the applicable loeal de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
and the Supreme Court of Michigan..... 16-19
Point I11I—Even if the Minnesota Statute of
Limitations relied upon by the respondent
were such a special statute affecting sub-
Le STR ERLE SERRE aT
Nn PE alah SL ABA OL eS RRR TE NRT RSS RNS
stantive rights as held by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, still suit could not be
brought in Michigan after the expiration
of the time provided for in the applicable
section of the general Michigan Statute of
Limitations and the holding of the Cireuit
Court of Appeals to the contrary is in con-
flict with the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court of the State of Michigan. .
Point I[V—The decision of the Cireuit Court
of Appeals in this case in respect to the
applicability of the Michigan Limitations
Statute is in conflict with the decision of
other Circuit Courts of Appeal..........
OER RSENE ARNE MARE or atten At Ne
Appendix 1—Mason’s Minnesota Statutes of 1927,
Ne be a habeascunnd chase suns viernes’
Appendix 2—Compiled Laws of Michigan 1929, See-
tion 13976, as amended by Public Acts No. 21—
SEES EE EE En PPO A ae ERE
Appendix 3—Mason’s Minnesota Statutes of 1927,
So. Se a Aeneas whwin shun cee’ waele's
INDEX TO CASES CITED
Bement v. Railway Co., 194 Mich. 64; 160 N. W. 424..
8, 9, 18, 23
Blackburn v. Blackburn, 124 Mich. 190; 82 N. W. 835
Brunswick Terminal Co. v. National Bank of Balti-
more, Se Ped. Gio. (C. ©. A. 4)... ccc ccccces
Buzzn v. Muncey Cartage Co., 248 Mich. 64; 226 N.
Se aid eels e ek ohne koe CA Cu did sd W cewek
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610, 39 L. Ed. 280. .
Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co. v. Best, 20 Fed.
wupe. G0 (1. ©. SD. N. ¥. 1997)... ...........
Page
19-23
23-26
27
29
30-31
yx
8, 22
SETI TETRIS POM LR IOS TE
Beato RAS
iii
Page
Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 48 L. Ed. 1067......... 26
Dexter v. Edmands, 89 F. 467 (C. C., D. Mass. 1898) 8,19
Gorman v. Circuit Judge, 27 Mich. 138.............. 8, 21
Griffin v. MeCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 85 L. Ed. 1481..... 12, 15
1893), certiorari denied 189 U.S. 514.......... 9, 23
In re Daniel’s Estate, 208 Minn. 420; 294 N. W. 465..
1, 17,33
Keep v. National Tube 0, 154 Ped, 10-0 25
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. 8.
sete doa acon Eos, PTE Ee 12
Kozisek v. Brigham, 169 Minn. 07; 210 N. W. 622 8, 16
Negaubauer v. Great Northern R. R. Co., 92 Minn.
gus Eth oe Rei fans PTO EOE ee 25
Platt v. Wilmot, 118 Fed. 1019 (C. C. A. 2nd C. 1902,
memo. dee.), affirmed 193 U. S. 602 (1904)...... 9, 23
sinsaihtaed heceog OEE Tee ETE EEA 8, 21
Ten Eyek v. Wing, 1 Mich. 40..................... 8, 21
Theroux v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 64 Fed. 84
siaine eaten CECT OO pean See 25
Wilson v. Massengill, 124 F, Cae) Mi nce icaeine: 26
INDEX TO STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES
CITED
Compiled Laws of Michigan, 1929, Section 13976.... 3,19
Judicial Code, Section I Nerecietie otk 5, 12
Mason’s Minnesota Statutes of 1927, Section 4174. . 2
Mason’s Minnesota Statutes of 1927, Section 9191... .4, 6,16
Restatement of Laws, Conflicts of Laws, See. 603... 21, 23
ity A ee een See Mbe i ekae had
DUZBISTAL RT Ge IR MA Sle ne Gi Chee EE LTS
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
| OCTOBER TERM, 1941
GEORGE R. COOKE COMPANY,
Petitioner,
vs.
NICK MAKI,
Respondent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
of the United States:
Your petitioner, George R. Cooke Company, defendant
in the above entitled matter, respectfully shows:
I.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MATTER
INVOLVED
This is a civil action instituted in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, by
Nick Maki, respondent herein, as plaintiff, against George
R. Cooke Company, a Michigan corporation, petitioner
herein, as defendant, to recover for injuries to the person
of the plaintiff.
The jurisdiction of the District Court was based solely
upon diversity of citizenship and the questions involved
arise solely upon the pleadings, to-wit, the Complaints
(R. 4-7, 10-13), the Motion to Dismiss (R. 8) and Objection
to motion to File Amended Amended Complaint (R. 13).
Respondent in his ecoiuplaints alleged that he had been
employed by the petitioner in Minnesota for the period
from August 1934 to May 13, 1935 (R. 4, 10); that the
petitioner owed a duty to the respondent to provide
machinery of a kind and nature to eliminate all foreign
materials from the air in the tunnel where respondent
worked and a duty to keep the said place in condition so
that the air would be free from all foreign substances
(R. 5, 11); that the petitioner was negligent in failing to
provide such machinery and in failing to keep the tunnel
in such condition as to have the air in the tunnel free from
all foreign substances (R. 6, 12); that the petitioner, in
addition to a violation of such duty, had violated Section
4174 of Mason’s Minnesota Statutes of 1927, requiring an
employer to provide in each work room proper and suf-
ficient means of ventilation and to maintain proper and
sufficient ventilation (R. 5, 11), and that ‘‘as a consequence
and proximate result of the defendant’s neglect as afore-
3
said * * *’’ respondent was caused to breathe foreign
materials, causing respondent, on or about December 15,
1936, to become affected with pneumoconiosis and tubercu-
losis and claimed damages therefor in the sum of Twenty-
five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) (R. 6, 12).
The suit was instituted in the District Court for the
Kastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, on July
21, 1939 (R. 1), more than three (3) but less than six (6)
years after the last date of respondent’s employment and
less than three (3) years from the date on which respond-
ent alleged he became ‘‘affected with pneumoconiosis and’
tuberculosis.’’
Petitioner moved to dismiss (R. 8) and objected (R. 13)
to the complaints on the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the com-
plaints failed to state a claim against the petitioner upon
which relief could be granted. The basis of the motion
and objection was, in brief, that the respondent’s cause of
action, if any, accrued on or before May 18, 1935 (the
last date upon which respondent was in the employ of the
petitioner) and not within three (3) years immediately
prior to the commencement of the action and that the
maintenance of such action was barred by the provisions
of Section 13976 of the Compiled Laws of Michigan of
1929, which section provided, among other things, that
actions to recover damages for injuries to person or prop-
erty shall be brought within three (3) years from the time
said action accrued and not afterwards (R. 8-9, 13, 14).
The District Court held that respondent’s claimed cause
of action accrued not later than May 13, 1935 (the last
date upon which respondent was employed by petitioner)
and that more than three (3) years having elapsed from
such date prior to the institution of the suit its mainte-
POSTE
4
nance in a United States District Court, sitting in Michi-
gan, was barred by the Michigan Statute of Limitations
and dismissed the action (R. 3, 15).
Respondent appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, from the Order dismissing the action,
relying upon two grounds—(R. 16)
(1) That the time within which the cause of action
should be commenced was governed by the laws of
the State of Minnesota, relying particularly upon
Section 9191 of Mason’s Minnesota Statutes of
1927, providing a 6-year limitation period;
and
(2) That the respondent’s cause of action did not ac-
erue until December 15, 1936 and hence was not
barred by Section 13976 of the Compiled Laws of
Michigan of 1929, providing a 3-year period.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Order of the
District Court and remanded the case for trial upon its
merits (R. 19), holding that the statute of limitations
applicable in this proceeding was Section 9191, Mason’s
Minnesota Statutes of 1927, that being the statute of the
state in which the cause of action arose, and that prosecu-
tion of the claim was not barred by the applicable Michi-
gan statute (R. 20-24). In view of this holding, the Circuit
Court of Appeals did not pass upon the question of whether
the cause of action accrued on or before the last day of
respondent’s employment by the petitioner or upon the
date upon which respondent alleged the pneumoconiosis
and tuberculosis developed (R. 24) and this question is not
involved in this petition.
The Opinion of the Cireuit Court of Appeals below, filed
on January 9, 1942, is reported in 124 F. (2d) 663 and will
be found at pages 20-24 of the Transcript of Record filed
5
herewith. The District Court filed no Opinion. The stat-
utes involved, to-wit, the Section of the Minnesota ventila-
tion statute, violation of which is claimed by respondent
(Mason’s Minnesota Statutes of 1927, Section 4174), the
Michigan Statute of Limitations (Compiled Laws of Michi-
gan, 1929, Section 13976) and the Minnesota Statute of
Limitations relied on by respondent (Mason’s Minnesota
Statutes of 1927, Section 9191) are set forth as appendices
1, 2 and 3, respectively, to the brief in support hereof and
filed herewith and will be found on pages 29 to 32.
II.
BASIS OF JURISDICTION TO REVIEW
Jurisdiction is invoked under Section 240(a) of the
Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of February 13,
1925, 43 Stat. 938, 28 U. S. C. 347(a).
The Opinion of the Cireuit Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Cireuit was filed on January 9, 1942 (R. 20) and
the Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversing
the Order of the District Court and remanding the cause
of trial upon its merits was entered on the same day
(R. 19). Petition for Rehearing was filed on February 6,
1942 (R. 25) and denied by the Cireuit Court of Appeals
on February 12, 1942 (R. 37).
Ill.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Two fundamental questions are presented—
(1) In a suit instituted for the recovery of damages
for injuries to the person of the plaintiff, claimed to have
resulted from the failure of the defendant to comply with
a statute of the state where plaintiff was employed, requir-
ing proper and sufficient ventilation, is another separate
eR mar AN rae > , f 5 a 0 LT PN: PGS OE AND DOLE YAR LAA DONT At Ai DONG LA RRA NO
6
and distinct statute of the same state providing that a
large number of different types of actions, including actions
‘‘upon liability created by statute,’’ shall be commenced
within six (6) years, a limitation statute affecting only
actions commenced in such state or does such limitation
statute have extra territorial effect and control the time
within which such suit must be brought in every jurisdic-
tion?
In the instant case respondent relied upon a violation of
the Minnesota ventilation statute (R. 5, 11) and the Circuit
Court of Appeals held that an entirely separate and dis-
tinct statute (sub-section 2 of Section 9191 of Mason’s
Minnesota Statutes of 1927) was not solely remedial in
character but was a substantive part of a newly created
right and controlled the time within which the right might
be enforced wherever brought.
Petitioner contends that the Circuit Court of Appeals
erred in this respect and that the above-mentioned Minne-
sota limitations statute is but a general statute of limita-
tions controlling the remedy in Minnesota but having no
effect outside of Minnesota.
(2) Where such an action is brought in a District Court
sitting in a state other than the state where the cause of
action accrued, the general statute of limitations of which
provides that actions to recover damages for injuries to
persons shall be brought three (3) years from the time
such action accrues and not afterwards, may such action
be maintained if not instituted within three (3) years from
its accrual?
The Cireuit Court of Appeals not only held that the
Minnesota statute was more than a remedial statute and
conditioned the right created, but that it operated in a suit
instituted in the District Court sitting in Michigan to the
exclusion of the applicable Michigan Statute of Limitations.
MES, SRG ELIE, OSI ES RAIL OR
7
Petitioner contends that the Circuit Court of Appeals
erred in this respect—that even though the Minnesota
statute be considered as one *‘conditioning’’ a newly created
right and preventing its enforcement anywhere after the
expiration of the time there mentioned, it does not operate
to the exclusion of the general remedial statute of the
forum and permit an action after the expiration of the
period established in an applicable statute of the forum.
In addition to the two foregoing fundamental questions
one further matter is involved—respondent’s complaints
counted not only on violation of the Minnesota ventilation
statute but also on common law negligence. Even under
the holding of the Cireuit Court of Appeals such an action
was barred and the Order of the District Court should
have been sustained to the extent that it dismisses that
portion of the cause of action based on common law negli-
gence.
IV.
REASONS RELIED UPON FOR THE ALLOWANCE
OF THE WRIT
1, The Circuit Court of Appeals in holding that the
Minnesota Statute of Limitations relied upon by the re-
spondent was more than a general statute of limitations
controlling the remedy and had extra territorial effect has
decided an important question of local law in a way in con-
flict with the applicable local decisions.
Such holding appears to be contrary to the law of
Minnesota as indicated in the following decisions of the
Minnesota Supreme Court:
In re Daniel’s Estate, 208 Minn. 420; 294 N. W.
PAG NCL ABR Rb AC HAE yh es CS PEO eI Kite ‘ ‘ oR NaH WIENER MAE IND a NO TA 5 Di PR NN CO a
8
Kozisek v. Brigham, 169 Minn. 57; 210 N. W.
622.
It is also in conflict with the law of Michigan as indi-
cated in—
Bement v. Railway Co., 194 Mich. 64; 160 N. W.
424.
The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals that the
Minnesota statute of limitations was something more than
a remedial statute is also contrary to the holding of the
Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts.
Dexter v. Edmands, 89 F. 467 (C. C., D. Mass.
1898).
2. The Cireuit Court of Appeals in this case in not
giving effect to the controlling statute of limitations of
the forum has decided an important question of local law
in a way in conflict with applicable local law and decisions.
While no Michigan case has been found in which the
facts were precisely the same as the case at bar, it is
respectfully submitted that the holding of the Circuit
Court of Appeals that the applicable Michigan Statute
of Limitations is not controlling is in conflict with the law
of Michigan as indicated by the following decisions of the
Supreme Court of Michigan:
Ten Eyck v. Wing, 1 Mich. 40;
Gorman v. Circuit Judge, 27 Mich. 138;
Shadock v. The Alpine Plank Road Co., 79 Mich.
7; 44. N. W. 158;
Home Life Co. v. Elwell, 111 Mich. 689; 70 N. W.
334;
Blackburn v. Blackburn, 124 Mich. 190; 82 N. W.
835;
9
Bement v. Railway Co., 194 Mich. 64; 160 N. W.
424;
Buzzn v. Muncey Cartage Co., 248 Mich. 64; 226
N. W. 836.
3. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in this
case that the action might be maintained within the time
limited by the law of the state where the cause of action
accrued, even though after the time established by the
limitation statute of the forum is in conflict with the
decisions of other Circuit Courts of Appeal.
In the Second and Seventh Circuits it has been held that,
although a foreign statute of limitations, part of a statu-
tory cause of action, might have the effect of destroying
the cause of action so that the suit thereon might not be
maintained anywhere, such statute does not operate to
extend the time prescribed in an applicable limitation
statute of the forum.
Hutchings v. Lamson, 96 Fed. 720 (C. C. A. 7th C.
1893), certiorari denied 189 U. S. 514;
Platt v. Wilmot, 118 Fed. 1019 (C. C. A. 2nd C.
1902, memo dec.), affirmed 193 U.S. 602 (1904) ;
See also Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co. v.
Best, 20 Fed. Supp. 80 (D. C., S. D., N. Y.
1937).
It is respectfully submitted that the question of the
extra territorial effect of a statute of limitation of the
state in which a cause of action accrues, when different
than a statute of limitations of the state in which the suit
is brought, presents a matter of great general importance
which should be passed upon by this Court and that this
Court should invoke its supervisory jurisdiction in this
respect in view of the conflict between the decision of the
Circuit Court of Appeals in this case and the applicable
10
local decisions of the states of Michigan and Minnesota,
especially in view of the conflict of the decision herein and
that of other Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Wherefore your petitioner prays that a Writ of Cer-
tiorari be issued out of and under the seal of this Court,
directed to the Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, commanding said Court to certify and send to
this Court a full and complete transcript of the record
and of the proceedings in the said Cireuit Court of Appeals
had in the case numbered and entitled on its docket No.
8774—Nick Maki, appellant, v. George R. Cook Company,
a Michigan corporation, appellee, to the end that this
cause may be reviewed and determined by this Court as
provided for by the statutes of the United States; and that
the Judgment herein of the said Circuit Court of Appeals
be reversed by this Honorable Court, and that your peti-
tioner may have such other and further relief as to this
Court may seem proper.
GEORGE R. COOKE COMPANY, Petitioner,
By Thomas H. Adams,
Counsel for Petitioner.
CHARLES E. LEWIS,
HILL, HAMBLEN, ESSERY & LEWIS,
Detroit, Michigan,
Of Counsel for Petitioner.
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