Petitioners Reply Brief — Bell v. Hood

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

- Q@CTOBER TERM, 1945

No. 344

ARTHUR L. BELL ‘ET AL.,

US.

R.B. HOOD EF AL.

ae

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES Cie

OF APPEALS FOR THE NEN TRE CIROCUT

|

PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF

Reussenn KE. Parsoss,

. A. 1. Wry,

~

Conusel for Petitioners.

INDEX

Suspskcot Ixpex

Petitioners’ reply brief

Petitioners’ reply to respondents’ statement

Reply to respondents” akguiment

Tasie or Cases Crrep

Gully v. Furst National Bank, 299 U.S. 109

: Ickes v. For, 300 U.S. 82

Mine Safety Appliances Company %. Forrestal;

L. Ed. 165

Pu rlo Rico Vv. Risse / & ('o., JSS U’. S. 476

Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605

Rury v. Gandy, 12 F. (2d) 620

Taylor v. De Hart, 22 F. (2d) 206

U.S. 548

U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 286 UL S. 402

Viles v. Symes, 129 F. (2828, 317 US. 711

Sratrupes Cirep

California Civil Cor seetion 3274

Coustitution Of the United States, Fourth

ment

United States Code: ~

Title 5, Section 300(a) —

Title 18, Section 555(0)

Title 18, Section 651

Tithe 2X, Section 41(1) 4

Title 28, Section BO

Title 31, Sectiow224(b)

—2696

Teavas and Ne w Orleans Radroad v. Broth: rhood, 2s1

Amend-

LL v4 v

>}

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

| OCTOBER TERM, 1945

No. 344

ARTHUR L. BELL ET AL.,

Petitioners,

is.

R. BL. HOOD ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORART TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COUT

OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF -

t, Petitioners’ Reply to Respondents’ Statement

1. The respondents’ statement is posited largely, not

on the allegations contained in the petitioners’ complaint

which, the trial court ruled, tailed to disclose jurisdiction

(R. 151, but on affidavits and counter-aflidavits’ submitted

to the trial court In connection with a motion for saminarys

judgment made by the respondents (R. 42). These affi

davits, and the portions of: the respondents” statement

relying upon the affidavits, should be ignored by this Court

- for the following reasons: |

(a) Neither the District Court (R. 151) nor the Cireuit

Court below (R. 11,°168) based their ruling upon the aft.

> ’

davits, nor even considered them. Their deelsions wer

arrived at solely upon a consideration of the recitals «

tained in the complaint, which comp ylaint the courts bel

respectively, ruled, did not state a cause of action conferri:

jurisdic tion upon the trial court. No reference is made

either court below to the affidavits @&s the basis for their

decisions. Cf. Opinion of Distriet Court (Re 145); Opi

of Circuit Court (R. 168).

(b) The evidence submitted by the respondents, in =

port of their motion for summary judgment, constitut

defensive material, which under the respondents

Tee

theory, nav not’ be considere d in ‘determining the jiri<di

pad

tion of the District Court (Cf. Brief for Respondent, p. 24

Accordingly, this Court should ignore all portions ot

respondents? statement relying upon factual material

pearing in the Reeord, other than thase set forth in

petitioners’ complaint.) Aceordingly, if this Court

itsel@ to an appraisal-of the Import of the recitals Ln

petitionérs’ complaint, it will readily find itself in acco:

with the «observation of the Cireuit. Court below

m\

There can be‘no question but that the cornplawit state

strong eases, and if the allegations have any foundatio:

truth, the plaintiffs’ legal rights have been ruthies-

violated’? (R. 173). (Italies Ours. )

. The references in the respondents’ —

‘the ruling of the trial court in. the case of Bel) vi

States, now pending on appeal in the, ae "treult. Court

Appeals (Bell v. United States; 9°C. C. A. No. 19452).

'The petitioners’ complaint appears in the Keeord at pp. 2-30,

page references in the Respondents’ Brief to the Reeord from pp 3t-l5+

are referenees to affidavits and ecounter-affidavits; these should not

considered by this Court. e

.

;

iy

mS

ev

.

the occasion. of the trial of the petjtioners on eriminal

charges, are similarly out of place in the instant proceed.

ings. The trial court below rejected the respondents” cot.

tention that the ruling of the trial judge in the criminal

case Was res judicata in the instant case (R. 157). From.

this ruling the respondents have neither taken, nor prose-

euted, any appeal. |

The reason fer the respondents’ thus venturing into tield-

jars the Record in this case is not clear.

Nor does the relevaney of the respondents” reference to

the petitioners’ conviction upen charges of conspiracy te

commit ‘tsedition’’ appear, for this Court ha; ruled often

enough that the constitutional guarantee against unredson-

‘ble searches and seizures protect the guilty as well a- the

‘inndcent ; -

2

eck | Amendment forbids every neorens that

is Meenas aa Is construed liberally to safeguard

the right of privacy. * ° ° Its protection exte als t

offenders as ‘to the law ahiding,”” U.S. v. tk COVTTZ.

285 U.S: 452, 464.

II. Reply to Respondents’ Argument

1. The right of the petitioners to sue is not derived from

local or common law, exclusively, as suggested by, the re

spondents. By -virtue of the express, euarantees of the

Fourth Amendment, the right to be free from unre arsonable

searches and seizures, formerly a gener ral right arising out

ef general or common law, became a specific feder: al’

stitutional right expressly protected by the federal Con:

stitution. It is forthe vindication of that expressly: vouc hi

safed federal constitution: al right, that the petitioners files

their conipli aint in the federal District Court helow, T That the

common law buttresses their rights, does not undermine its

federal constitutional support and express Steder al sanction.

4

4 ©

The respondents misréad Title 28, U. S. Code, See. 4111)

when they, in effect, substitute the word ‘‘create’’ for the

word ‘‘arise.’* The word *‘create’’ is also substituted for

the provision of the statute which contains the phrase

‘arises’? in unfortunate dicta in Gully ve First National

Bank, 399 U.S. 109, 112, and Puerto Rico v. Russel & Co..

288 U.S. 476, 483 (quoted in Respondents’ Brief, p. 16).

Moreover, California common law does not ex pressly

guarantee the citizen freedom from unreasonable seare!

and sgizures ; and no claim has been made by the respond

ents, Nor ean the élaini be made, that California law

protects the citizen of the United States froin unreasonable

searches and seizures, as’ ‘*broadly*’ as does the Fourth

Amendment, and the liberal construction of that Amend

ment given by the federal courts. Thus See. 3274 of the

California Civil Code provides merely :

‘Species of Relief. As a general rule, compensation

is arelief or remedy proy ided By the law Of this st: ut.

for the violation of private rights, and the tneans o!

securing their observance; and specific and preventive

relief may be giyen jin no other cases than those <nect

fied in this part of the Civil Code."’

# This is just a general rule pertaining to-the right to

“rehef generally; it is to be noted that that section of the

California Code: (cited in Respondents’ Brief at p. 17)

expressly =e relief in the California courts to those

specified in the -Cattornia tivil Code,

Also, even if the common or state law of California wer:

adequate, this is no argument against the existence of con-

current jurisdiction in-the Distriet Courts of the United

States under 28 U.S. Code, Sec. 41(1). Thus, even if the

acts of the defendants may be termed ‘torts’? or ‘tres.

passes,’’ as distinguished from direct violations of the con-

stitutionally protected right against unreasonable searches

and séizures, there is jurisdiction in the Federal District

Courts because they have authority to enjoin a threatened

trespass-by federal officers. This seems to be the import of

the ruling of this Court in an opinion by Justice Black just

handed down in Mine Satety Appliances Company . iM,

restal, decided December 10, 1945, and reported in 90 Law.

ed (Adv. Op.) ss 167. In that case, Philadel plia Co. x.

Stimson, 223 USS. 605, is followed, and the Court, in passing,

suggested that sit would be jurisdiction in a United

States District Court where a-complaint sought a court

injunction against ‘ta threatened frespass against any prop

erty in the possession of or belonging tthe appellant.’

(Italics ours.) ;

Furthermore, the Solicitor Generalls statement in reply |

toa question from the Chief Justice, if the course of thie

oral argument, Which statement was to the effect that con

stitutional provisions do not give rise to a cause of action

in the federal courts, unless Congress has implemented a

constitutional provision with express statutory authority

for the filing of a suit in the federal courts, is answered by

the provisions of Title 28, U.S. Code, See. 4101), which

provides that a cause of action may arise from the ‘Con

stitution or laws of the United States,’? and not, as would

he the etfeet of the claim of the Solicitor from: the **Con

stitution aud laws of the United States."’ |

«

?. Moreover, there is no express federal statute cor-

ferring jurisdiction in the federal DistietCourts teen

‘join federal officers from threatened illegal or uneqnstiti

tional conduct; vet the respondents concedy such juyisdic

tion (Responde ts" Briet ,p. 30). lekes ve For, 3h U.S.

8? 95, would, jn any event, seem to be conclusive upon the

jucisdiction ef the federal courts to grant: such ihe puatne

tions. ) Sep also Teras and New Orleans Railroad oe

Brothe rhowd, 281 U.S. 548, 569, to the effect that where a

statutory right is created, the federal District Court- have

jurisdiction, by appropriate process, to enforce that richt,

Ta

,*: .

althoug

diction. It would seem to follow. that

cnaranteed or protected by an express

Federal Constitution, the courts of the

not powerless to enforce such right because

not taken the trouble expressly ta) tn-

courts to aceord such protection,

It would seem that for an illégal seare!

following federal proceedings may |

(1) The agyzrieved person " aN

Attorney (Gieneral if ghe federal o

at bar. Are special agents of the FI

sum net th exceed me yi Md

at SS j oo 3 , , <

(2) The. federal officer may” b

eriminal charge. Ts U.S. Code. Se

ves

H51.

“ : “ry ,

oh} I! the piieesgaa seal ' | = ? ’

-_ thy reefer! } ar ¢ tat a

Mt is CNnreateoeta, ’ Peake j aor '

See Lekesy. f By stapey

: ,6 ¢ : .

(4) A petition mavo be fried ‘

\

~ |

e TeEcove ¥ hie Teparpoersy? \ pigettral 3 “e

j i> OQ i “ F<}

KHwts, SO mS. 4

ae

ry? « e ‘Saeee

(There in nO SNPFCIAL CONZTess ’ ~

‘ — . . a

autherizine the last tWo proceedings

- f y

a 4A “lilt Tar? elegy? aaire's , if

Court. Where Ties 13 76-? cLshittis

, - } ae ey:

of S500) and henee/the fling ef

‘ a , . ‘

E wt La (rr: neral won the Pisdal wate,

reason why, unde

ot es . Ss. Cocke} hi rhage’ neit <p

United States Digtriet Court: jus

; i

for the return eff documents ilega

; ; i

for an immnet oy Preterm Phe seen?

h (Congress has not eXpressis vornte

Ss

“Taylor v. De Hart, 22 F. (2d) 206, was a decision by a

District (Court, ‘

At is offset by the better-reasoned District Court op

ion in Rurgw ve Gandy, 12 FL (2d) G20.

Respectfully submitted,

| | A. L. Wiris,

Resseun BB. Parsons,

Counsel lor Petition is

e

?

(2696)