Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Goduto v. Illinois

‘* f SeP 22 194]

JAMES R. BRUWNISG, Clerk

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1961

No. 4 3 ¢ |

Leonard D. Goputo AND NATHAN FRIEDMAN,

Petitioners,

VS.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

to the Supreme Court of Illinois

Ropert KARMEL

33 North LaSalle Street

Chicago 2, Illinois |

S. G. LippMAn

DeSales Building

Washington 6, D. C.

Tim L. BorNstEIN

1741 DeSales Street, N.W.

Washington 6, D. C.

Attorneys for Petitioners.

ARATE PIO: MINIT LT A LENE ITE,

Press or Byron S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

<P,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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ene 1

Re er er ee ee rrr :

i i necks whe dn ou eO a me sea 4

dawn skew ea duewen ones +

Reasons for Allowance of Writ ................000- S

(¢) The State Court’s Assertion of Jurisdiction Over

=)

(9)

(6)

Union Activities Subject to Regulation By the

Labor Manegement Relations Act Is in Direet

Conflict With Decisions of This Court ........

The Decision of the TIlinois Supreme Court

Establishes a Major Exception to the Preemp-

tion Doctrine Which Seriously Threatens the

Establishment of a Uniform Labor Poliey ......

The Instant Case Raises Important Questions

Concerning Construction and Interpretation of

the Trespass Aspect of the Fairlawn Decision ..

The Decision of the Illinois Supreme Court Is in

Direct Conflict With a Decision of the Supreme

Court of the State of Washington ............

The Deeision of the State Court, Will Remove

a Vital Area of Labor Relations From the

Exelusive Regulation of the National Labor

Ne en ek wade

The Decision of the Illinois Supreme Court

Seriously Threatens the Exercise of Free Speech

RN S456 Suc winudwuekucke wie sun

| RR i: elite 6 SUPER ag NO a

Appendix:

A. Opinion of the Supreme Court of Tllinois, 21 TI.

EE as + Shee tA SETS een Ry ae

13

14

il

Table of Contents Continued

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats,

ee oo are ere re ae 8, 9, 10, 13, 14

Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union, Local No. 1207, 363

Sa ee eat ibe Fore i el a op 14, 15

Goldstone v. Payne, 94 F. 2d 855, cert. den., 504

ee RG 2) oe ee a a he ee ae res 12

Giuss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1.28, 9, 10

Labor Board v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105

. 123 .16

Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 ..............! 18 1)

M.C.& LL. M. Railway Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 579, 384.12

Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 238, 244 .............. 12

San Diego Building Trades Council v. ns 359

ig eget eae woe. eee mis » 9, 10, 1

STATUTES:

First Amendment to the Constitution of the United

ID a te abt eee eee te eee a. ¢

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the

Be ESSERE RA are els CLO Noy tea ene 4,7

Se Bee a I RED fic dd koe cc eRe ew ea de 1

Ilinois Criminal Trespass Statute, Chapter 38, See-

tion 565, Illinois Revised Statute, 1959 2.0.2.0... 2 ¢

Section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act of

Se 2 eS | ee ee eae a 14, 35

Section 8(a)(1) of the Labor Management Relations

Aet of 1987, 20 UBC. § T98ia}(i) ...... (cs ea

IN THE

renee Court of the Anited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1961

No.

LEONARD IT). GopuTo AND NATHAN FRIEDMAN,

Petitioners,

VS.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

to the Supreme Court of Dlinois

_—

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois is

reported at 21 Ill. 2d 605, and is attached hereto as

Appendix <A.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Thnois was

filed and entered of record on April 26, 1961. The

order of this Court extending the time within which to

file a petition for Writ of Certiorari to September 25,

1961, was entered July 17, 1961. The jurisdiction of

this Court is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).

9

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a state court has jurisdiction to apply its

eriminal trespass laws to labor union organizers who

are engaged in conduct subject to regulation by the

National Labor Relations Board solely because the

union has not filed unfair labor practice charges

against the employer who has denied the union access

to a customer parking lot.

2. Whether a state court has jurisdiction to apply

its criminal trespass laws to labor union organizers

who are engaged in conduct subject to regulation by

the National Labor Relations Board until such time as

there has been a **determination”’ by the Board of the

union organizers’ right to enter the employer's cus-

tomer parking lot.

3. Whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution proteet the right of

labor union organizers to distribute handbills to em-

plovees on a privately owned parking lot whieh is un-

enclosed and generally open to the public.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The Ilhnois Criminal Trespass Statute, Chapter 38,

Section 565, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1959, to wit:

‘‘Whoever is about to enter unlawfully upon the

enclosed or unenclosed land of another and is for-

bidden so to do by the owner or oceupant, or by

his agent or servant, and thereafter enters upon

such land, or whoever is unlawfully upon the en-

closed or unenelosed land of another and is noti-

fied to depart therefrom by the owner, or eceupant,

or by his agent or servant, and neglects or refuses

so to do, or whoever wilfully or unnecessarily or

without right enters any orchard, nursery, garden

or any farm premises or improved farm land of

)

oo

another when a printed or written notice forbid-

ding or prohibiting trespass ip general or in any

detail has been conspicuously posted or exhibited

at the main entrance to such orehard, nursery,

garden, farm premises or farm land, shall be

guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction

- thereof shall be fined not less than five dollars nor

more than fifty dollars.”’

Seetions 7 and 8 of the Labor Management Relations

Act,

and

1947, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 157

29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), to wit:

Section 157. “‘Wamplovees shall have the right to

self-organization, to form, Join, or assist labor or-

ganizations, to bargain collectively through rep-

resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage

in other conéerted activities for the purpose of

collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-

tection, and shall also have the right to refrain

from any or all of such activities except to the

extent that such right may be affected by an agree-

ment requiring membership in a labor organization

as a condition of employment as authorized in see-

tion 158(a) (3) of this title.”’

Section- 758. “*(a). It shall be an unfair labor

practice for an employver—

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-

plovees in the exercise of.the rights guaranteed

in section 157 of this title.”’

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States, to wit:

‘Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-

lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-

cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,

or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably

to assemble, and to petition the Government for a

redress of grievances.”’

4

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-

_ stitution of the United States, to wit:

**All persons born or naturalized m the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and of the State

wherein they reside. No State shall make or en-

force any law which shail abridge the privileges of

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor

shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law; nor deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.”’

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners, labor union representatives, were con-

vieted by the Municipal Court of Chicago of criminal

trespass for distributing union leaflets to employees of

Sears Roebuck & Co., (hereinafter referred to as

‘*Sears’’) on a customer parking lot leased by the

company. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court,

the conviction was affirmed.

Sears 1s a nationwide retail department store and

mail order chain. The store in question is located in

the City of Chicago. It was stipulated by the parties

that the store’s annual retail sales exceed $500,000.00

per vear, a portion of which includes the sale of mer-

chandise emanating from points outside of the State

of Illinois. It was further stipulated that the company

is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the

Labor Management Relation Act (R-4-5).’ .

Adjacent to the sture 1s a paved, unenclosed area

used as a customer parking lot (R-14). The store, to-

1 All record references are to the pages of the Consolidated Ab-

stract of Records found on page 5 of the transcript of proceedings.

a)

vether with the parking lot, eecupres an area bounded

on three sides by publie streets and on the fourth side

by railroad tracks. There are five driveway entrances

to the parking lot from the streets (R12).

One entrance to the store adjoins the parking lot:

the other store entrance adjoins the public sidewalk.

In order te use the parking lot entrance to the store,

it ix necessary to enter upon and cross the parking lot

(R-14).) The parking Jot entrance to the store is the

only entrance used by emplovees prior to 9:30 ALM.,

the time the store is open for business. Similarly, this

entrance is the only one used by emplovees at the close

of the business day (R-12).

Approximately 430) emplovees work at the store

(R-14).) The emplovees are not distinguishable from

the general pubhie by uniform or identity. badge

(R-13). When reporting to work they enter the park-

Ing lot from all directions, and up to 7o% of them enter

by automobile (R-14-16).

On March 11, 1959, at 8 A.M., petitioners entered the

parking lot for the sole purpose of distributing union

leaflets to emplovees as they reported to work. (R-16).

Inasmuch as the parking lot entrance to the store was

the only one used by the emplovees, petitioners sta-

tioned themselves on the parking lot about 15 feet from

this entrance (R-6), and thereupon proceeded to dis-

tribute leaflets to the employees as they approached

the store entrance.

The leaflet distribution was the union’s initial at-

tempt to communicate with emplovees of the particu.

lar Sears store. The leaticts were addressed to the

employees, urged union organization and informed the

emplovees of the wuon’s desire to help them obtain bet-

6

ter wages and working conditions (R-19). Attached

to the leaflet was a questionnaire pertaining to

employees’. wages, hours and working conditions

(R-20-21).

At about 8:30 A.M. on the day in question, while

petitioners were distributing leaflets to the employees,

they were approached by the Operating Superintendent

of the store. The Operating Superintendent examined

the leaflet handed to him, and, after establishirg that

it was being distributed by a labor organization, in-

formed petitioners that they were on Sears’ property

and asked them to leave the parking lot (R-13). Pe-

titioners declined to leave, asserting a legal right to

remain on the parking lot. Thereupon the Operating

Superintendent called the police and caused petition-

ers’ arrest (R-11).

During the course of the trial, petitioners offered io

prove that the names and addresses of employees were

unknown and unavailable; that only through leaflet

distribution would the union be able to initiate an

organizing campaign at the store; that, until the union

established through this initial contact some communi-

cation with employees and secured therefrom the names

and addresses of employees, it was in no position to

proceed with organizing activities off the premises in

question (R-23). Further, the union offered to prove

that members of the general public frequently used the

parking Jot without objections, as a convenient short

cut between two streets (R-17).

During the course of the trial, petitioners urged by

oral argument and in briefs to the trial court that

petitioners were exercising rights of free speech and

press guaranteed by the federal and State constitutions

and were exercising rights protected by the Labor

Matagement Relation Act. and for this latter reason

urged that the state court had been divested of juris:

diction (R-24). .

On October 29, 1959, the trial court) found pe-

titioners guilty under the State Trespass Statute and

fined each petitioner $25.00 and costs (R-f: 24-28).

From this order, petitioners appealed to the Supreme

Court of Llinois.

In affirming the order of the trial court, the THliois

Supreme Court ruled directly on the constitutional

and jurisdictional questions raised by petitioners, Con:

cerning the issue of state jurisdiction, the Tlinois Su

preme Court recognized that the matter of solicitation

by non-employvee organizers on Company property is an

activity regulated by the N.LAR.B. under the Labor

Management Relation Act, as amended, and that under

certain circumstances such solicitation is protected by

Section 7, which guarantees employees the right of

self organization, and that interference therewith is

prohibited by Section 8, which condemns such inter-

ference as an unfair labor practice.

Further, the Hlinois Supreme Court recognized that

it must abstain from regulation of: activity which 1s

potentially protected by Section 7 or prohibited by

Section 8. Nevertheless, it held that it had authority to

find petitioners guilty of criminal trespass because

petitioners had failed to seek from the National Labor

Relations Board a ‘tdetermination”’ of their right to be

on the customer parking lot.

Concerning the issue of freedom of speech and press,

the Tlinois Supreme Court ruled that the First and

Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution

8

did not give the petitioners the right to remain on the

parking lot after they had been ordered to leave. In

substance, the Illinois high court concluded that prop-

erty rights occupy a preferred position in competition

with the right of free speech. In this regard, the Court

distinguished Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, on the

sole ground that Marsh involved solicitation in a com-

pany town.

REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF WRIT

1. The State Court’s Assertion of Jurisdiction Over Union Activi-

ties Subject to Regulation by the Labor Management Rela-

tions Act Is in Direct Conflict With Decisicns of This Court.

Noting the decisions of this Court in National Labor

Relations Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S.

105, and the long line of preemption case culminating

with San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,

359 U.S. 236, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized

that solicitation of employees on company property is

arguably subject to exclusive federal regulation under

the Labor Management Relations Act, and recited the

salient legal principles which should have required it

to decline jurisdiction. However, troubled by the fact

that only petitioners could apply to the Labor Board

for a ‘‘determination”’ of their right to be on company

property, the state court asserted its jurisdiction in

this case solely because of the failure of petitioners to

pursue the Labor Board remedy.

The novel and astounding theory of jurisdiction,

advanced without benefit of case or statutory authority,

is in direct conflict with governing decisions of this

Court, Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S.

1, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats,

Inc., 353 U.S. 20, and San Diego Building Trades

9

Council vy. Garmon, 399 U.S. 236. The Illinois Court

asserted state court jurisdiction because it found un-

palatable the fact that it could be deprived of jurisdie-

tion while at the same time the Labor Board’s

jurisdiction might remain unexercised because of the

failure of petitioners to file charges with the federal

‘agency. The state court decision is nothing more than

the ‘*no-man’s land’? argument rejected by this Court

in Guss and Fairlawn. These cases declare that the

states may not infringe upon the area of industrial re-

lations covered by the Act merely because the jurisdic-

tion of the Labor Board -has) gone unexerecised.

“* * * the failure of the Board to define the legal sig-

nifiennce under the Act of a particular activity does

not give the States the power to act."? San Diego

Building Trades v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246.

In Guss and Fatrlawn the Board voluntarily refused

to exercise its own jurisdiction, while in the instant

case petitioners did not affirmatively invoke the

Board's jurisdiction. The decision of the Ilnois Su-

preme Court apparently believed that this difference

was one of substance which warranted the exercise of

state court jurisdiction. Garmon, Guss and Fairlawn

are simply coutrary to this view. This Court has ob-

served that the Board may fail to act for a variety of

reasons.” However, the concern of this Court has not

been with the mechanics of invoking the Board’s juris-

diction or the reasons why the Board has failed or

refused to assert its jurisdiction. This Court has

2** However, the Board may also fail to determine the status of

the disputed conduct by declining to assert jurisdiction, or by

refusal of the General Counsel to file a charge, or by adopting

some other disposition which does not define the nature of the

activity with unclouded legal significanee.’’ San Diego Building

Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245-246.

10

focused on the problem of the potential conflict in-

herent in coneurrent federal and state regulation of

labor relations in commerce. ‘*The governing considl-

eration is that to allow the States to control activities

that are potentially subject to federal regulation in-

volves too great a danger of conflict with national labor

policy.’’ San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon, 359

U.S. 236, 246. In keeping with this principle, the rea-

son why the Board has failed to act can be of no conse-

quence. The danger of conflict is at least equally

great where the legal significance of the conduct re-

mains undefined beeause the Board’s jurisdiction was

not invoked as in cases where the Board voluntarily

declines jurisdiction.*

While the state court decision appears to be based on

the failure of petitioners to invoke the Board’s juris-

diction, the fact is that the decision goes much further.

It asserts the state courts’ right to act in this field pend-

ing a Board ‘‘determination”’’ of the issues. If the

state court’s concern was limited to the failure of peti-

tioners to file unfair labor practice charges, presum-

ably petitioners could have gained re-entry to the

parking lot by the simple act of filing such charges.

However, as we read the state court’s decision, it re-

quires petitioners not only to file unfair charges but

also to stay off the employer’s property until such time

3If anything, the danger of conflict may be said to be greater in

the instant case because the Board’s jurisdiction merely lies dor-

mant, subject to being invoked at any time. Thus, the state could

conviet a union organizer of criminal trespass only to have the

Board subsequently declare the right to communicate on employer

property. In @uss and Fairlawn the pre-anneneced jurisdictional

standards of the Board precluded a determination of the legal

significance of the conduct in question.

11

as the Board determines its right to be there. This is

implicit in the following statement of the Court:

‘After they had learned that the company did not

want them on the lot and warned them that the

police would be ealled, they still insisted they had

a right to be there. At this pouit they could have

left and applied to the National Labor Relations

Board for a determination of their right to be on

the property.’” (Appendix 7a.)

The Illinois Court candidly posed the question as

follows:

‘‘This presents the question of whether our State

courts can apply the criminal trespass statute with-

out a prior determination by the Board of whether

the no-solicitation rule is valid and whether it is

being fairly applied.’”’ (Appendix Ta.) (Em-

phasis added. )

The state court decision is patently erroneous not

only because it is predicated upon the union’s failure to

invoke federal jurisdiction but also because it stands

for the proposition that the state has jurisdiction over

conduct subject to federal regulation until such time as

the Labor Board determines the legal significance of

the conduct. This latter proposition is independent of

the question of whether or not the Board’s jurisdiction

has been or will be invoked and conflicts directly with

decisions of this Court.

The holding of the state court that it was vested with

jurisdiction, because of the course of conduct followed

bv petitioners, strikes at the very heart of federal pre-

emption. The cornerstone of the doctrine is the Board’s

exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of indus-

trial relations in commerce. The decision of the Ili-

nois court is flatly inconsistent with the federal pre-

i

emption doctrine because the Illinois court held that

the N.L.R.B.’s exclusive jurisdiction may be affected

by the decision of petitioners as to whether they will

invoke federal jurisdiction. Clearly, subject matter

jurisdiction may not be conferred upon a court by the

conduct of the parties. M,C. & L. M. Railway Co. v.

Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 3884; Mitchell vo Maurer, 293 U.S.

238, 244; Goldstone v. Payne, 94 F. 2d 855, cert. den.,

304 U.S. 585.

2. The Decision of the Illinois Supreme Court Establishes a Major

Exception to the Preemption Doctrine Which Seriously

Threatens the Establishment of a Uniform Labor Policy.

For the first time a state court has asserted jurisdic:

tion over federally regulated conduct solely because of

the failure of a party to pursue the Labor Board

remedy. Not a single decision of this Court supports

the state court’s jurisdictional theory. The [linois

Supreme Court has carved out a major exception to the

preemption doctrine of this Court. As stated above,

the jurisdictional theory of the Illinois Court should be

* rejected as contrary to the prior decisions of this Court.

If this Court had intended to create such an important

exception to the preemption doctrine, it would have

done so.

The state court decision, while framed in the factual

context of solicitation on employer property, tran-

scends even this vital issue, and extends to a multitude

of situations in which a union is engaged in activities

protected by Section 7 of the Act. In all such cases, the

jurisdiction of the Board may be invoked only by a

union’s filing charges complaining of interference with

protected activity. Under the state court's theory, this

fact would give rise to state jurisdiction over the pro-

tected activity if the union failed to file charges. The

I)

right to strike, the right to bargain collectively and the -

right of self-organization would come under state regu-

lation if the decision of the Hlinois Supreme Court is

net reversed,

Seldom has a state court decision so dramatically

challenged the exelusive role of the National Labor

Relations Board. The fact that the case is one of first

Impression, having a far reaching effeet upon federal

jurisdiction over labor relations, warrants allowance

of the petition for writ of certiorari.

3. The Instant Case Raises Important Questions Concerning

Construction and Interpretation of the Trespass Aspect of

the Fairlawn Decision.

In Farrlawn, a question was presented to this Court

as to whether an Ohio state court had jurisdiction te

enjoin conduct in violation of an Ohio trespass law,

This Court held:

“Whether a state may frame and enforce an in-

junction aimed narrowly at a trespass of this sort

is a question that is not here.”

The case at bar raises the question of the proper

construction to be given the trespass phase of the Farr

lawneases Did this Court intend that a state decision

limited exelusively to the issue off trespass would re-

ceive its approval, and is the instant case so limited /

We submit that under the authority of Labor Board

Vv. Babeock and Wileor Co., 331 U.S. 105, the states may

*The Illinois Supreme Court construed Farrlawa as reserving

the ‘‘question of whether a State may enforce a no-trespass rule

where no effort has been made te invoke the jurisdiction of the

National Labor Relations Bourd.* ( Eiiphasis supphed.: This is

a plain misstatement of the case. The Court's refusal te pass on

the trespass question was completely unrelated to the failure of

the union to file charges.

id

not regulate solicitation of employees on employer

property, through enforcement of state trespass laws,

even though the state action is technically based only

' on trespass grounds. In any event, it is obvious that

in the instant case the state action reaches not only the

matter of trespass but also conduct subject to exclusive

federal regulation under the Act.

No matter how sincerely the Illinois Court professed

not to be deciding federal questions, the fact is that its

decision has this precise effect. The trespass issue is

inseparably interwoven with rights under Section 7

and prohibited conduct under Section 8 of the Act. As

the Illinois Court recognized, if solicitation on com-

pany property is protected under the Act, then the ‘‘act

of trespass is justified by the necessity to preserve the

freedom to solicit for union organization.’’- By hold-

ing petitioners guilty of trespass, the State Court has

prejudged this question. We do not believe | at this

Court intended such a result when it declinea .0 pass

on the trespass issue in the Fairlawn case.

_ 4 The Decision of the Ilincis Supreme Court Is in Direct Con-

flict With a Decision of the Supreme Court of the State of

Washington.

The instant case is the first decision of a state court

of last resort dealing with the preemption and constitu-

tional aspects of labor communication on emplover

property. Recently, on July 20, 1961, a second deci-

sion in this field was rendered by the Supreme Court of

the State of Washington, Freeman v. Retail Clerks

Unton, Local No. 1207, 363 P.2d 803. The Washington

case involves the precise jurisdictional and constitu-

tional issues found in the case at bar. In the Washing-

ton case, the Union was picketing a store located in a

shopping center, and the owners of the shopping center

property sought to enjoin the Union from: trespassing

on their property. Relying on the decision of this

Court in Garmon, the Washington Supreme Court ¢on-

cluded that it was without jurisdiction because the con-

troversy was subject to exclusive federal regulation

under Sections 7 and 8 of the Labor Management Rela-

tions Act.

On the question of Jurisdiction, the Washington case

and the case at bar present no material factuel ditfer-

ences. Both cases involve the use of private property

for the purpose of engaging in conduct regulated by

the Act. In neither case was the jurisdiction of the

Labor Board formally invoked. Thus,,on the same

legal issue, in substantially similar factual back-

grounds, two state courts have reached totally incon-

sistent conclusions concerning their jurisdiction. The

conflicting opinions of the Tl}inois and Washington

Supreme Courts on this vital issue are further reason

why the petition of certiorari s iould be granted in the

Instant case.

5. The Decision of the State Court Will Remove a Vital Area of

Labor Relations from the Exclusive Regulation of the National

Labor Relations Board.

In the last several vears this country has witnessed

a revolutionary relocation of ret.ul stores from down-

town locations on public streets ard sidewalks to subur-

ban property surrounded by privately owned customer

parking areas and separated fron the public streets.

In some cases, such as in Freenan ve Retail Clerks

Union, 363 P.2d 803, these parking facilities are shared

by several employers and have been termed ‘‘shopping

centers."” In other cases, as in the case at bar, parking

facilities are limited to a single employer. In both sit-

uations, parking areas have eliminated the publie side-

16

walk as the point of access to the employees’ place of

employment and have created a buffer between the

employees and those who would communicate with

them regarding vital public issues.” The public side-

walk, the traditionai place for the expression of views

and the dissemination of information on issues of

privileged constitutional status, is rapidly being re-

placed by the privately owned customer parking area.

As more and more retail establishments are removed

from the publie streets and sidewalks, the problem of

communicating with employees intensifies. Countless

thousands of retail employees are today separated from

union organizers by private property in the form of the

customer parking lot. The extent to which the cus-

tomer parking lot will or will not act as a barrier to

self-organization is a problem of great magnitude

which should not be removed from the exclusive area

of Board regulation.

In Labor Board v. Babcock and Wileor Co., 351 U.S.

105, 112, this Court explained that the solicitation of

employees on employer property *‘is not a problem of

always open or always closed doors for union organiza-

tion on company property.’” The Court recognized

that the problem was one of reaching an accommoda-

tion between organization rights and property rights,

and the Court concluded that ‘‘the determination of

the proper adjustments rests with the Board.’’' The

decision of the State Court removes this authority from

the Board.

5 While several entrances to the Sears store front on public side-

walks, the record shows that at the time emplovees entered and

departed the store they used the customer parking lot entrance

exclusively, and that this entrance could be reached only by

crossing the parking lot (R-12-14).

7

6. The Decision of the Illinois Supreme Court. Seriously Threatens

the Exercise of Free Speech and Press.

Petitioners entered the quasi-public customer park-

ing lot for the sole purpose of disseminating the mes-

sage of organized labor, under circumstances which

made the parking lot the only feasible area for efiective

communicationn They conducted themselves in an or:

derly and peaceful manner and in ne way did) they

Interfere with use of the customer parking lot or op-

eration of the emplover’s business. ‘The assertion of

private property rights, which caused their arrest and

subsequent conviction for criminal trespass, was

plainly of the most techmical nature and was net oa

Ineans of protecting legitimate property rights and

Interests but was a device to frustrate self-organization

among the employees.” In this context the Hlinois

Supreme Court flathy ruled that the constitutional

cuarantees of free speech and press do not extend to

the distribution of union leaflets ona privately owned,

customer lot.

It is evident that the state court did not take into

account the quasi-public nature of the customer park-

ing lot and did not assign importance to such questions

as Whether effective emplovee solicitation could take

place off the parking lot, or the extent to which the use

of the parking lot for such purposes would result ina

dislocation of property rights. Ino effect. the state

court concluded that property rights occupy ai pre-

ferred position when in competition with the rights of

free speech and press. Such sacrosanct views of prop-

erty rights are in direct conflict with this Court's deci-

® Significantly, petitioners were not ordered off the property

until after the operating superintendent of the store established

that the leaflet contained a union message (R-13).

1s

sion in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, and is predi-

cated upon the erroneous assertion that Marsh is dis-

tinguishable from the case at bar solely because Marsh

involved solicitation in a company town.

Marsh establishes that ‘ownership docs not always

mean absolute dominion’’, but that the task of the ju-

diciary is to balance the competing rights of private

property and free speech so as to reach an accommoda-

tion between them which will best serve the interests

vf our society. In this balancing process this Court

has declared that First Amendment rights occupy a

preferred position.” Further, the balancing process

requires that due regard be given to the quasi-public

nature of the property. ‘The more an owner, for his

advantage, opens up his property for use by the public

in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed

by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who

use it.” Clearly, it is a distortion of the First Amend-

nent to hold that these principles have meaning only

in Cases Involving company towns.

In each case, whether it involves a company town, a

customer parking lot, a shopping center or some other

form of private property, the following factors must

ic Considered: the limitations imposed upon the enjoy-

ment of free speech and press by reason of the physical

nature of the property: the interference with legiti-

inate property interests which would result from the

exercise of free speech and press on private property ;

the extent to which the property has already been

dedicated to public use; and finally, the social desira-

bility, of the subject matter being communicated.

Which of the two competing rights must be made sub-

servient to the other should depend on the answer ts

these questions and not the physical situs of the com:

petitnom. Dtreetine these questien ste the facets ca cte

case at bar the richt of cree speech aud press -tetidd

prevail for the follow iia reasons:

1. ‘The opportunity fore ffeetive conimtitieation wth

eTiplovees off the customer parking Jest Weis e NTO els

litsaitedk af net totally lacking. The ehiplover chose te

Lint emplovee access te and egress frome the store te

the one entrance Which fronted on the customer pork

ing dot (R-P2). Omiw by statiommig: therisehves teat

this entrance could petitioners be assured of irthig

contact with a significant pumber of the criplovees,

To have attempted distribution of leafiets on the public

streets surrounding the parking lot would have been

futile because of the number of entrances to the park

ing lot (R-12), the fact that many of the cmiplovees

entered the parking lot by auto (R-12-14), and the fact

that none of the emplovees could be identified by badge

or uniform (R-13).0 Sinularly, the use of other medi

of Communication was impossible because petitioners

did not have the names or addresses of any of the em-

plovees (R-23). In short, the customer parking Jot

was the only sultable area for effective communication

with employees.

2) There is not a scintilla of evidence showing even

the slightest prejudice to the property rights of the

emplover, The leaflet distribution was carried out ini

a peaceful and orderiy manner and in ne way iiier-

fered with the use of the parking lot or the operation

of the employer's business. Patently, the case presents

nothing more than a naked assertion of property rights,

unrelated to the protection or preservation of legiti-

Inate Property Iterests.

3. The parking lot was used freely by members of

the general publie (R17). By physical design. prior

pF

usage, and lack of posted restriction, it liad all the ear-

marks of a quasi-public area.

4. Petitioners were attempting to disseminate mifor-

mation leading to employee organization for purposes

of collective bargaining. Petitioners were not engaged

in some academic pursuit of free speech and press but

were seeking to further and promote a goal which Coi-

egress has deemed desirable and has fostered and safe-

enarded through the Labor Management Relations Act.

In summary, applying the balancing process to the

case at bar it must be concluded that the rights of free

speech and press would suffer serious impairment if

property rights prevail, contrasted with the total ab-

sence of real prejudice to property rights if the Con-

stitutional rights of free speech and press prevail.

To conclude, the constitutional issue in this ease

warrants the Court’s attention for a multiplicity of

reasons. The case presents the sensitive problem of re-

solving the conflict between property rights and the

right of the people to enjoy freedom of speech and

press. The state court decision raises the serious ques-

tion of whether Marsh vo Alabama is limited to cases

involving company towns. The state court decision

elevates property rights to virtually absulute status.

The question of free speech and press as it relates to

solicitation of employees on employer property is a

relatively unexplored area of Judicial inquiry. Finally,

because of the increasing number of shopping centers

and customer parking lots, and the consequent dis-

placement of the public sidewalk as the forum for the

dissemination of the message of organized labor, the

decision of the state court will affect the future of self-

organization for millions of employees who, by reason

o

of the location of ther place of emplovinent, are Ise-

lated from contact and communication with labor union

representatives.

A . CONCLUSION

For all the reasons hereinabove set forth, petitioners

respectfully urge that this petition for a Writ) of

Certiorarl be granted.

Ropert KARMEL

33 North LaSalle Street

Chicago 2, Tlineis

S. G. Lippman

DeSales Building

Washington 6, D. ©,

Tim I.. Bornstein

1741 DeSales Street, NW.

Washineton 6, D.C.

Attorneys for Petitioners.

APPENDIX

Nos. 35745-85746 Cons.—Agenda 48—Janvary, 1961.

The People of the State of Illinois, AppeHee v. Leonard 1D.

. Goduto ef al., Appellants.

Mr. Justice Hovse delivered the opinion of the court:

The municipal court of Chicago in separate trials found

defendants Leonard D. Goduto and Nathan Friedman guilty

of criminal trespass and fined each of them $25 and costs,

The two cases have heen consolidated for review in this

court because the same fairly debatable constitutional ques-

tion Was presented to and passed upon by the trial court in

each case. People v. Watkins, 19 Tl 2d 11.

The alleged trespass oeeurred on property leased) by

Scars, Roebuck and Company. The property is adjacent to

a retail store operated by the company and has been paved

for use as a parking lot by employees and customers of the

store. On March 11, 1959, the defendants, who are union

representatives of Loeal 1550, Retail Clerks International

Association, AFL-CTO, entered upon the parking lot for

the sole purpose of distributing union leaflets and question-

naires to employees at the store. Eugene Reuter, operating

superintendent of the store, told the defendants who he was,

informed them that the company did not permit soliciting

on its property without its permission and asked them to

leave the premises. They refused and he again asked them

to leave. They told him they had a legal right to solicit on

the property. He asked them to leave a third time and

warned them that he would eall the police. They still in-

sisted that they had the right to be on the property. Reuter

thereupon ealled the police and defendants were arrested.

They were tried and fonnd guilty of violating section 266

of division T of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957,

chap. 38, par. 565,) which provides: ‘Whoever * * * is

unlawfully upon the enclosed or unenclosed land of another

and is notified to depart therefrom by the owner, or oceu-

2a

pant, or by his agent or servant, and neglects or refuses so

to do, * * * shall be guilty of a misdémeanor * * *.”’

The defendants contend that the trial court had no juris-

diction to convict them of criminal trespass because Con-

gress by the enactment of the National Labor Relations

Act, (49 Stat. 449,) and its extensive amendments, (61

Stat. 186, 29 U.S.C.A. 151 et seq.,) has divested this State

of the power to interfere with the labor activity in which

they were involved by means of a trespass prosecution. We

accept the defendants’ and Attorney General’s view that the

activities of the store in question affect interstate commerce

within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.

We also assume, although the point was not raised, that

we cannot assert jurisdiction under the provisions of sec-

tion 14 of the National Labor Relations Act as amended.

(29 ULS.CLA. 164.) The arguments of the ‘lefendants and

the Attorney General are therefore properly focused on

the question of whether Federal legislation has divested us

of power to deal with the activity here involved by means

of a criminal trespass action.

We recognize that when an activity is protected by see-

tion 7 or prohibited by section 8 of the National Labor Re-

lations Act, the States must abstain from regulation; (/n-

ternational Union, UAW v. O’Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 70 S.

(‘'t. 781; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.

Ct. 161; Weber v. Anheuser Busch, Inc.. 348 U.S. 468, 75

S. Ct. 480; San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,

399 U.S. 236, 79 & Ct. 773;) and when the activity is

arguably subject to section 7 or section 8 of the act, the

States must yield to the primary jurisdiction of the National

Labor Relations Board for a clear determination of the

question. (San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,

399 U.S. 236; Weber v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 348 U.S.

468; Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 77

S. Ct. 598.) Yet State jurisdiction has prevailed where a

labor activity involves violence or incitement to violence.

(Youngdah! v. Rainfatr, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 78 S. Ct. 206;

oat

United Construction Workers, ete. ve Laburnim Const,

Corp. 847 US. 656, 74S. Ct. 883.) And although employers’

property rights are Pinited by the need to protect em-

plovees’ rights under the act ang a determination of this

need is committed primarily to the National Labor Rela-

tions Board, (National Labor Relations Board vo Babcock

& Wileor Co, 301 TUS, 105, 76S. Ct. 678) the Supreme

Court has expressly reserved the question of whether a

State may enforee a no-trespass rule where no effort has

heen made to invoke the jurisdiction of the National Labor

Relations Board. (Awelqamated Meat Cutters, AFL vy.

Fairlawn Meats, Tne. 358 US. 20, 77S. Ct. 604.) > With

these general principles in mind we proceed with an ex-

amination of our right te assert jurisdiction in this ease.

Any unauthorized entry on the land of another or un-

lawfully remaming on the premises of another is a trespass

for which the law provides a eivil remedy. (Checkley vy.

Iinois Central Railroad Co., 257 Wi. 491s Mead ve Pollock,

99 Th App. 151; 52 Am. Jur. Trespass, see. 11.) Tres-

pass Was not a crime at common law, however, unless it was

accompanied by or tended to create a breach of the peace.

(Busick ve Mlinois Central Railroad Co., 201 Wb. App. 633.)

It is apparent therefore that the criminal sanctions of the

common law were not imposed primarily for the protection

of property rights but were imposed for the protection of

public safety. This was a recognition of the fact that tres-

pass ean lead to violence, Indeed the owner or occupant of

and has the right to use any force necessary to remove a

trespasser in situations where there is no time to resort to

the law. (See Prosser, Torts 2d ed. see. 21.) However, the

distinetion between trespasses for which there was only civil

liability and those for which there was also criminal liability

was not made clear by the common law. (52 Am. Jur.,

Trespass, see. 84.) Our legislature in 1874 made certain

acts of trespass punishable as crimes, (Rev. Stat. 1874, p.

348,) thereby removing the uncertainties that existed at

common law.

da

When a person refuses to leave another’s property after

he has been ordered to do so, a threat of violence heecomes

imminent. It was for this reason that the legislature made

this type of trespass subject to criminal prosecution. The

basic purpose of the statute is the prevention of violence or

threats of violence. Of course, it also affords protection to

property rights which is a proper subject for the imposition

of criminal sanctions.

The defendants have made much of the fact that there

was no violence in this ease. We believe, however, that this

was due to the fact that the conipany did not resort to self-

help to remove defendants from the premises. The defend-

ants were on property oceupied by Sears, Roebuck and

Company. The company’s agent believing the defendants

had no right to be on the property ordered them to leave

three times, The defendants believing they had a right to

he there refused to leave. At this point the company called

the police. If the State had not taken charge of the situa-

tion, the company would have had no alternative but to

foreefully remove the defendants. We cannot know the

amount of foree that would have been necessary to remove

them, but the threat of violence in such & situation is im-

minent, See e.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. National Labor

Relations Roard, (7th cir.) 200 F. 2d 575.

In addition to the State’s interest in preserving domestic

peace, the law recognizes the company’s right to protect

its property interests. The leading case on the right of non-

employee union organizers to distribute union literature

on company-owned parking lots is National Labor Relations

Board vy. Babccck & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 76 S. Ct.

679. The court there stated; ‘‘* * * an employer may

validly post his property against non-employees distribution

of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union

through other available channels of communication will en-

able it to reach the employees with its message and if em-

ployer’s notice or order does not discriminate against the

a

union by allowing other distribution.’? Ir these eireum-

stances the court recoznizes the property nterest of the

employer to be superior to the interest of the union in

having a convenient means of communicating with em-

-plovees. The notice or order of the emplover is of little

consequence, however, if it cannot be enforeed.

As we have indicated, the criminal trespass statute does

protect property rights in situations where violence or an

huminent threat of violence.is present. If the eriployer ean-

not avail himself of this statue, which is general in its

application and would be available to him against any other

supposed trespasser, he must resort to self-help, for he ean

obtain no preventive relief under the National Labor Rela-

tions Act. The Supreme Court has stated that when legiti-

mate interests of employees and employers collide, protee-

tion of the employees’ interest under the National Labor

Relations Act is not so absolute as to deny self-help by em-

plovers. (National Labor Relations Board v. Truch Drivers

Local Union No, 449, AFT, 353 U.S. 87, 77 S. Ct. 643.)

Althouch the employer may use self-help in such a s'tuation

such remedy may be wholly inadequate and it presents a

threat of violence.

On the other hand, the union organizers who feel that

their statutory rights have been invaded by an employer’s

refusal to permit them to enter on its property may secure

relief through the National Labor Relations Board. (See

National Labor Relations Board vy. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,

391 U.S. 105, 76S. Ct. 679.) The Board ean, in a proper

case, order the employer to cease and desist from ‘* prevent-

ing, by ejection, threat of arrest, and arrest, non-emplovee

union organizers from soliciting employees for union mem-

bership’’ on certain portions of the company’s property.

(Marshall Field & Co. vy. National Labor Relations Board,

200 F. 2d 375, 376-77.) This has been the procedure gen-

erally followed by the unions. See e.g., National Labor Re-

lations Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co, (Sth cir.) 222 F. 2d

6a

316; National Labor Relations Board v. Seamprufe, Ine.

(10th cir.) 222 F. 2d $58; National Labor Relations Board

v. Ranco, Inc. (6th cir.) 222 F. 2d 543; National Labor Re-

lations Board vy. Cranston Print Works Co, (4th cir.) 258

F.2d 206; National Labor Relations Board vy. Great Atlantic

& Pacific Tea Co, (oth eir.) 277 F. 2d 759.

We believe that the maintenance of domestie peace and

the absence of any preventive relief for the protection of the

emplover’s property rights is of sufficient importance to

vive our State courts jurisdiction to enforce the criminal

trespass statute under the circumstances of this case.

This brings us to the question of whether the defendants’

act of trespass as defined by the statute was justified or

excused, We recognize that solicitation by nonemployee

union organizers on company property is an activity pro-

tected by section 7, and that interference with this activity

is prohibited by section 8 of the National Labor Relations

Act when it ean be shown that there is no reasonable alter-

native channel of communieation with the employees or

where a valid no-solicitation rule is being unfairly applied.

(Republic Aviation Corp, v. National Labor Relations

Board, 324 U.S. 793, 65 S. Ct. 982: National Labor Re-

lations Board yv, Babcock & Wileor Co., 351 U.S. 105, 76

S. Ct. 679; National Labor Relations Board v. United Steel-

workers of America, CIO, 357 U.S. 357, 78 S. Ct. 1268.)

Under such circumstances the act of trespass is justified by

the reeessity to preserve the freedom to solicit for union

organization.

In the Babcock & Wilcox Co, case, however, the court

pointed out: ‘*This is not a problem of always open or al-

ways closed doors for union organization on company prop-

erty. Organization rights are granted to workers by the

same authority, the National Government, that preserves

property rights. Accommodation between the two must be

obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent

with the maintenance of the other. The employer may not

7a

affirmatively interfere with organization: the union may

not always insist that the employer aid) organization.

* * * The determination of the proper adjustment) rests

with the Board.”* (351 U.S. 105, 112. 76 S. Ct. 679, 684.)

Thus, the determination of whether there are no other

reasonable alternative channels of communication with em-

plovees or the no-solicitation rule is being unfairly applied

is committed primarily to the National Labor Relations

Board, (See National Labor Relations Board vo Track

Drivers Local Union No, 449, AFL, 853 ULS. 87, 77 S.Ct.

643,) and we have no jurisdiction to determine such ques-

tions.

Apparently no effort has been made to invoke the juris-

diction of the National Labor Relations Board in this case.

This presents the question of whether our State courts can

apply the eriminal trespass statute without a prior deter-

mination by the Board of whether the no-solicitation rule

is Valid and whether it is being fairly applied.

There is no indication that a request was ever made of

Sears, Roebuck & Company to use the. parking lot for dis-

tribution of union literature. (Cf. National Labor Relations

Board v. United Steelworkers of America, ClO, 857 U.S.

307, TS S. Ct. 1268.) Apparently the defendants just ap-

peared on Mareh 11, 1959, and began distributing the leaflets

on the parking lot. After they had learned that the com-

pany did not want them on the lot and warned them that the

police would be ealled, they still insisted they had a right

to be there. At this point they eould have left and applied

to the National Labor Relations Board for a determination

of their right to be on the property. (See: National Labor

Relations Board v. Bahcock & Wilco Co. 341 US. 105,

16S. Ct. 679.) They have made no effort, however, to

have the proper forum make a determination of their right

to be on the company’s property but insist that they might

have such a right and that we are therefore without power

to interfere with their conduct. The anomaly of the situa-

Sa

tion is that the Board cannot make such a determination

either, unless the union seeks it and apparently they are not

roing to do so.

We believe that under these circumstances the trial court

had the power to find the defendants guilty of violating the

criminal trespass statute although it had no jurisdiction to

determine whether the trespass was justified under section

7 of the National Labor Relations Act or whether the Com-

pany was committing an unfair labor practice under section

8 of the act by enforcing the no-trespass rule. Congress has

riven union organizers the right to go on company property

under certain circumstances and has provided a procedure

for determining and enforeing this right. The union has

failed to follow the procedure that Congress has provided.

We are unwilling to hold that the State courts are divested

of jurisdiction, not because Congress has preempted the

area, but because of the course the union organizers have

followed.

The defendants also contend that the trial court errone-

onsly convicted them of criminal trespass because they were

‘Vawfully’? upon the premises oceupied by Sears, Roebuck

and Company. They argue that there are no other reason-

able channels of communicating with the employees at the

store in question and therefore the constitutional guarantee

of free speech gives them the right to remain on the prop-

erty after notice to leave.

The defendants ecandidiy point out that this constitu-

tional question has not heretofore been decided by any State

supreme court. The apparent reason for the lack of author-

itv on this question is that solicitation by nonemplovee union

organizers on company property is, under the conditions

here alleged, an activity that may be protected by section 7

of the National Labor Relaiions Act, and interference with

this activity may be prohibited by section 8 of the act. The

unions, as we have heretofore indicated, have generally

pursued the remedy available to them under the act when

9a

they believed their statutory right had been invaded. In this

case, however, jurisdiction of the proper forum for de-

termining defendants rights under the National Labor Re-

lations Act has not been invoked and we must therefore

determine whether they had a right to be on the property

by virtue of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and

free press.

Defendants state that the case that is most analogous to

this one is Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66S. Ct. 276.

There a distributor of religious literature was convicted of

criminal trespass because she remained on the sidewalk of a

company-owned town after she had been warned to leave.

The Supreme Court held that the application of the Ala-

bama trespass statute, under the circumstances of that case,

violated freedom of press and religion guaranteed by the

first and fourteenth amendments.

Despite the fact that certain language in that opinion

concerning the right to use private property for speech,

press and assembly would appear to support defendant's

contention When that language is not read in the light of the

facts of the Warsh case, we believe that the ease ‘‘goes no

further than to say that the public has the same rights of

discussion on the sidewalks of company towns that it has on

the sidewalks of municipalities.’ (National Labor Relations

Board v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S, 226, 242, 69 S. Ct.

Ad, 549 (dissenting opinion).) The present case does not

involve a company town. It is recognized that freedom to

soli for union organization will, under certain cireum-

stancés, require an employer to allow the solicitor to ap-

proach employees on his property, (Nafttonal Labor Rela-

fions Board v. Babcock d& Wileor Co., 851 U.S. 105, 76S.

('t. 679,) but this freedom of solicitation is the result of a

regulatory statute and not a constitutional right. ssee: Pe-

public Aviation Corp, v. Nationet-Labor Relations Board,

B24 U.S. 7938, 65S. Ct. 982, 98s, |

10a

We hold that freedom of speech and press guaranteed to

defendants by the first and fourteenth amendments to the

Federal constitution and by section 4 of article II of our

constitution did not give them the right to remain on the

parking lot after they were ordered to leave,

It is also argued that the People failed to prove that

Sears had the right to exclude defendants from the prop-

erty. It is admitted that Sears is the jiessee of the prop-

erty; that the property is used as a parking lot for cus-

tomers and employees; and that defendants were not

employees or prospective customers but were on the park-

ing lot for the sole purpose of distributing leaflets. We

believe that this a sufficient showing of Sears’s right to

demand that the defendants leave the premises.

Defendants also argue that unlawful entry is the gist

of the erime and that their entry upon the parking lot

was lawful. They were not charged with, or convicted

of, unlawfully entering upon the land of another but were

charged with and found guilty of unlawfully remaining

upen the land of another after they had been ordered

to move. The statute declares such conduct to be a

misdemeanor.

For the foregoing reasons the judgments of the municipal

court of Chicago are affirmed. =

Judgments airmed,

lla

Uxitep Starrs or AMEnICA

State or Thnixors Jo

Supreme Court (=

AT A Tense op TUE Supreme Cover, begun and held in

Springfield, on Monday, the thirteenth day of March in the

vear of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-one,

within and for the State of Thnois,

Present: Warren Ve Sctuarren, Chief Justice

Josepu FE. Dairy, Justice Greener We. Bristow, Justice

Harry B. Wersuey. Justier Ray Lo Krixonien. Justice

Byron O. Tousr, Justice Roy J. Sourissunc. Jin. Justice

Winniam G. Cruark, clfforney General

Rosert G. Mivey, Varshal

Attest: Mes. Earte Bexaanuix Searcy, Clerk

se It RemeMBERED, that to-wit: on the 26th day of April

1961, the same being one of the days in vacation after the

term of Court aforesaid, the following proceedings were hy

said court, had and entered of record, to-wit:

No, 39745

PropLe State oF TLuixots, Appellee

Vs.

Leonxary 1D. Gonvro, also known as Daw Goputo, Appellant

Appeal from Municipal Court City of Chicago 59 M 31504

And now, on this day, this cause having been argued by

counsel, and the Court, having diligently examined and

inspected as well the record and proceedings aforesaid, as

matters and things therein assigned for error, and now,

being sufficiently advised of and concerning the premises

for that it appears to the Court now here, that neither in

the record and proceedings aforesaid, nor in the rendition of

the judement aforesaid. is there anything erroneous, vicious

or defective, and in that record there is no error.

Therefore, it is considered by the Court that the judg-

ment of the Municipal Court of the City of Chicago afore-

ee Be Affirmed incall Things and Stal in Full Force and

Effect, notwithstanding the said matter and things therein

assigned for error,

I Mrs. Farle Benjamin Searea, Clerk of the Supreme

Court of be State of HIinois amt keeper of the records, files

and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a

true copy of the final order of the said Supreme Court in

the above entitled cause of record in my office.

Is Witness Wienstor, TP have herennto subserihed

my name and affixed the Seal of said

court this 16th dav of May, 1961,

~ Mes. Earnie Bex savin Searcy

Clerk,

(Seat) Sapreome Carrtiot th, State of Tilinars,

l2a

Unirep States or AMERICA

State oF Iuurors }

Svpreme Court f§ §&*

At a TERM OF THE SrprREME Cotrt, begun and held in

Springfield, on Monday, the thirteenth day of March in the

year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-one,

within and for the State of Illinois.

Present: Water V. Scnaerer, Chief Justice

Josepn FE. Darry, Justice Grorce W. Bristow, Justice

Harry B. Hersney, Justice Ray |. Kurncsien, Justice

Byron O. Hovse, Justice Roy J. Sourissure, Jr.. Justice

WriuuaM -G. CLark, Attorney General

Rosert G. Mitey, Marshal

Attest: Mrs. Earte Bensamin Searcy, Clerk

Be Ir REMEMBERED, that to-wit: on the 26th day of April

1961, the same being one of the days in vacaticen after the

term of Court aforesaid, the following proceedings were by

said court, had and entered of record, to-wit:

No. 35746

Prope State oF Ivurots, Appellee

vs.

NaTHAN FrrepMax, Appellant

Appeal from Municipal Court City of Chicago 59 M 31505

And now, on this day. this cause having been argued by

counsel, and the Court, having diligently examined and

inspected as well the record and proceedings aforesaid, as

matters and things therein assigned for error, and now,

being sufficiently advised of and coneerning the premises

for that it appears to the Court now here, that neither in

the record and proceedings aforesaid, nor in the rendition of

the judgment aforesaid, is there anything erroneous, vicious

or defective, and in that record there is no error.

Therefore, it is considered by the Court that the jndg-

ment of the Municipal Court of the City of Chicago afore-

said, Be Affirmed in all Thinas and Stand in Full Force and

Effect, notwithstanding the said matter and things therein

assigned for error.

I Mrs. Earle Benjamin Searcy, Clerk of the Suprema

Court of the State of Hlinois and keeper of the records, files

and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the feregoing is a

true copy of the final order of the said Supreme Court in

the above entitled cause of record in my office.

Ix Witsess Wuereor, T have hereunto subseribed

my name and affixed the Seal of said

court this day of a

Clerk,

(SEAL) . Supreme Court of the State of [Mlinois.