Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Thompson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.
Supreme Court brief1958
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Supreme C Court of the -
‘Hnited States ce
OcToBER Trem, 195s.
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282
MARGARETHA THOMPSON,
Petitioner,
J
\
)
a
: *
FIDELITY AND. CASUALTY COMPANY OF
; NEW YORK, a Corporation,
: . Respondent.
Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The. Appellate Court Of The Second District,
® State Of Illinois. ; oie
e
‘7
» ~Bernarp P, Reese, JR.,
de, 501 News Tower Building,
: OTin Rockford, Ilinois, .
“ Attorney. for Petitioner.
é
Midwest Law Printing Co., - 326 N’ Michigan Ave., Chicago.
Telephone: Financial 6-398s
9° -
Ly .
“INDEX.
cs PAGE
Opinions Plow peak hes i ae oe
Jurisdiction rar reo SESE ERS Gk ORR en MOLI R ORR LIS Petters -
x
Statutory P rovisions and Rule ‘s Conferring Juriadie-
tion on I | ae
ited for Review
‘Questions Presented for Review 2000 0. 4
Federal Statutes Regulations and Rules Involved pees 4 :
Statement oO eee ee ange isda Na uewetanen sobatcnrussoccselas 12 .
How Federal Question Raised ie ae unio
“Argument... ee bss Scpea oes ignition vee see 16
ee ee aa heh een Toler eens 24
Appeydix A— i x :
~ Opinion. of Appellate | SER Oe. td EI wla
Appendix Bi
Judgment of Appellate a ee ee la
Appendix (4— s es
Order denying Petition for Leave to Appeal ~......... Ifa é
. ; “4 &,
CITATIONS
Air Transport Association v. Civil Acronauties Board,
St ad cae: Sse RREE Pera yre reek Sonrectinr ane ner sv anINPeC 20
American Airlines, Ine. v. Standard Airlines, Ine. 80 _ 8
Fy PN Ba Ee OOD a sess ccc. ae ;
Jones NX lonal: Bru w\V. Yates, 240 U. ne oth. me), 0
L. de 78, TOT CIMID) ....... ORES IPRS, er ooh neo Soins Se
Lachs ve F id lity & Casujity Cosol New Sr. 506 N.Y.
"O07, TIS NU Ded. 3 4 054) Engrs, Re 21, 22
b Minneapolis St. Paul and S. Ste. Mo Ro Co. ve Rork,
279 US. 410, 73 LL. Ed. 766 (1929) 22. Sees oe ae 24
gil
Mosby v. Mutual Life Insuraner Co. af ey York, 405
Tl. 599, GOT, 82-NLAd 10% (1950), |
‘Northern Pacific : Raikeay Coov. Wall’ 24 es 4. M1,
60 L. kid. 905, 207 (1915). a
Pacitie Northern Airlines v. ‘Alaxka Kistinen, 80,
Supp. 592 (1948) _ os ae _ Si
‘
Paskusz v, Philade tphiia (aru: ualty Ci ‘a, 213 . <. y. 22, 110; /
N.E. 749 (1949) at XY
Personal Industrial Resin rs Vv. rn itizens Bidet ¢ Co. 80
BS 2d 827; 328 (19: sy) nageet
Satterlee y . Matthewson, : I. Id. 458, 468° -- Peters
B80, ATO (E829) PE aE Se
bray v. Fidelity and ©: n<unlt ('o., 16 I. App. 2
sitet cota Pe oe AOR ae I ee LP :
Mnited States . nion Pac ifie Railway Co. M1 TLS.
72, 23 LL. Ed, 224 (487A) POI OO Rare
_ Zim vy. Fuitable Life Insurance Company of r Lowa, fj
Wash. 2d 379, 107 gf zd 921.924 (ISHO)
STATUTES, Runes’ AND REG ULAHONS
Civil Aeronautics Board, Economie Regulations:
Part 291.1 (a), (b), (e); (da) (4) & (: 7, eae, 8
Part 291.2 2 he OR peti ehndaincnastenadanigsBtle sedis gr F_,
if SC. Title 49, Sahe ec r W : Snetion 481 = (ad. 1)
au sasenertnphestinncahuinepiatoaiapabbibascninhenekate4c-Seennaahelaseeh bc. c'he
~ ae:
%. P IN THe ee : ,
Supreme Court of the United. States
fm | sia
OcroBerR TERM, 1958. ‘,
No. 4 Aa,
} 7 7
| _ MARGARETHA THOMP¢ON,
ok a | Petitioner,
Vs,
FIDELITY AND CASUALTY COMPANY OF
' NEW YORK, a Corporation, :
et Respondent.
4 Petition For Writ Of Certiorari -.
To The Appellate Court Of The Second District, es
ies ' State Of Illinois.
oe. ae
OPINIONS BELOW.
(1) The opinion of the
Appellate Court of the Second
District,
State of Illinois, is. reported at 16 IIL.
a t
. . > .
App. 2d
. 2
@
. <—-_
159. The Petitionc r hase filed nite cilhios: we record its
rinted: for the: use (of the, Court; rhelow, as provided+hy
Paragraph 4 of Supreme Court: Hrile’ 21, Wherein the ssaid
opinion is contained and the opinion ‘is ther: fore not ap
pended hereto. ° , a » ‘
al oe
.
"@.
(2) Petitifne herein. was denied leave! to appen il te
r urt, of Hlincis, heing its No. 34839 and no.
h Ais Fendered hy said Court in its de nial
of said’ IPetitien for eax: to Appeal.” cas
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JURISDICTION.
_————
* The Appellate Court. 6f Ilinois” applied
Statute. in defining the liability of th
ity contract. of insurance, and petitio
a Federal
e respondent under
ner was entitled te
its Proper interpretation and corrget application,
(i). The judgment of the Appellate « ‘ourt of the Second
District, State of Hlinois, became final. on Mareéh 6, L958,
by the denial of a petition for rehearing filed by petitioner
herein, or . ,
(ii) _ Phe Judgment of) the Supreme Court of a)
became final on Mav 20, 1958 by its denial of a Petititn (
for Leave to Appeal filed by Petitioner hévein,
(iii) Statutory Provisions and Rules Conferring Juris.
| @ietion on This Court, |
US. rene 2s, Sketion 1257:
or y
“Final judgments or doerees rendered. by the highest
court of a. state in which a decision could be had may
S. be reviewed by the Supreme Coyrt as follows: * * *
(3) * * * where any title, right, privilege. or immunity
ix specially set up or claimed under the Constitution,
- treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority
‘exercised under, the United States.” S$
Rere 19, Sereréme Covrr or rie UNITED States: fa
of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will he
granted only where .there are special and important
reasons therefore, The foltowing, while neither con-
“dA review on writ of certiorari is hot-a matter
-trolling nor fullve meastirinig the court's ‘discretion,
: = es Dy . means
indicate the charatter Of reasdr
sidered :
Is wiikh Will be con
ig ares q : ae
e ‘ ‘“
\ a ere
“ta) Where a sthte court has decided a federal ques
tion of substance not theretofore determined «by this
vourt, or hax-deeided dt in a wirt probably not in ae.
Nord with-applicable decisions of this court.” tie
i =%
ee Mess
: (c)’ | ie
QUESTIONS. PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
lL May the respondent Insurance Company use a Fed.
eral regulatory statute as the entire basis for an airline
trip insurance policy without becoming subject to the |
Federal Court’s interpretation -of that statute?!’ . ine
2. May the respondent insurance company knowingly
use technical language of a Federal regulatory statute so.
as to intentionally mislead. an innocent purchaser?
3B. May an insurance company use a technical Federal
statute which it knows is-the subject of much litigation and
controversy so as to henefit from that controversy without
having that Federal statute hecome.a part of ‘the contract
of insurance, thus creating an ambiguity which -must- be
construed in favor of the insured?
4. May a State Court completely ignore the case [dw
and interpretation surrounding and given to a Federal
statute by the Federal Courts and administrative agencies,
when -that Federal statute. is the very basis of the con-
‘traet of insurance in question, and without said -statite
said policy of Pasuranece could not exist? Pun b ees oye
. 9
| | (d)_
._ The Statute, Economic Relations of the Civil Aero.
nautics Board and Board Regulations Serial Numbers. ©
ee
-
TirLe 49¢USC. Section 425(a): |
“The Authority (Board) is ‘empowered to perform
such acts, te conduct such investigations, to issue and: |.
‘amend such orders, and to make and amend sich
-
° _ oo) .
_ general ‘or special jrules, regulations, and procedure,
pursuant tq and consistent with the provisions of tliis
~/ a , Z c« ” .
«> Act.’ .
TIrTLe HUSC Sepenapren IV., Sreriox 481 (2)(d-by tr);
(a) “No air carrier shall engage in any, air trans. -
portation unless there fs in force a- certificate issued
by the Authority (Board) authorizing such air car -
rier to engage in such transportation: Provided, That
if an air varrier is engaged. in’ such transportation
on the daté of the. enactment of this Act (June ar
- 1938), such air carrier Auay continue so to engave
between the same terminal >and intermediate points.
for one hundred and twenty days after said date, and
thereafter until sueli time as the Authority (Board)
shall pass apon an. application for a certificate for.
such transportation if within said on? hundred and
twenty days such air carrier files such ‘pplication as
*. provided. herein.” (d21) “The Author ty (Board)
shall issue a certificate authorizing the whole or any
part of the transportation covered by the application,
if it finds that -the applicant is fit, willing. and ahle
to perform such transportation. roperly, and to con.
form to the provisions of this St (0) 401-403, 421,
422, 424-427, 451-460, 48) 459, AS64965, SUL S24:
991-560, 581, SRL, 601.603, 621-623, O41-049, GTL GST,
701-705, 711-722 of. this title) and the rules, regula
tions, and requirements of the Authority (Board)
hereunder, and that such transportation. is required by
the publie corivermenée and necessity; otherwise such
~ application shall de denied.” +
(tf) *Kaeh certificate issued under’ this section shall
specify the terminal points and intermediate points,
° if any, between which the air carrier js authorized to
engage in air transportation and the service to) he
rendered; and there shall be attached to the eNxerfise
” of, the privileges granted by the certifieate, or anid jl
went therete, Such reasonable terins, eoniditions, aut
limitations as the public interest may recuire, No cer y
tificate issued under this section to engage in: foreier/
air transportation shall, insofar aus the operation j-
* '
“
i * niet Aarts ze mee.
| BS to take place. withput tlie: United States,” designate
. the tertpinal. and intermediate points only. inséfar
as the: Authority (Board) shail deem ‘practicafile, and
, otherwise shall designate oniy the general route or
. a routes’ to be followed. Any air-carrier holding a cer-
tificate for foreign air transportation: shall be
authorized to-handlesand transport mail of countries °
_ other than the United Statesg No term, eondithngor” .
limitation of a ‘certificate shail ‘restrict the righit®ar
an air carrier to add to or ‘change sehedules, July”
ment, accommodations, and facilities for perforpdie the
authorized, transportation and service as demands of
the. public shall require. No air carrier shallhe deeined
to have violated Pny term, condition, or limitation of
‘its certificate. by Iding, or. taking. off during an
emergéney at a point not named in its certificate or
by operating in- an emergency, under regulations
which may be prescribed: by the AuthorifFR§ Board),
between. terminal and intermediate points }ther than’
loxe-specified in its certifieate. Any air carrier may’
make charter trips, or perform—any_ other special
“service, without’ regard te the points named init
certificate, under regulations preseribed by the Au,‘
thority (Board).’? se
. . : c F : ee te
Titty 49, USC. Suspcnapter- IV, Sectiox 496, (a)thys -
vfa) “The Authority (Board) may from time to lime
establish such just and reasenable classifications or
groups of airg@pkjers for the purposes of: this title
(** 481-485, Hoof ghis title) as the nature of |
the services performed by such air ‘carriers. shal! re”
{- quire; and such just and reasonable rules, and recu-
lations, pursnant to and consistent with the provi
sions of this title, to he observed by each. sneh “¢lass
or group, as the/ Authority (Board) finds mecessaty
in the publie interest.” ear Roe
J tb) Oe The Authority (Bord), from time to
time and te the extent necessary, aay (except. as
provided in ‘paragraph (2) of this sabseetion) exenipt
“Front the ‘requirementsapf this etitle TS 481-485, 450.
$96 of this tithe) ora Provision thereof, or auy rul,
Cet eevee zs |
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regulation, term, condition, or limitation prescribed)
thereunder, any air carrier or class of air carriers, |
if it finds that- the enforcement’ of this title or such — .
provision, or such rule, regulation, term, condition,
or limitation is or would be an ufidue burden on such’. |
air carrier or class of air carriers by reason of the
>. limited extént of, or unusual circumstances affecting, -,
the operations of: such air carrier or Class of vair
carriers and ix not in-the publie interest.”
Civin AERONAUTICS Boarp, Kcoxnomic *REGULATIONS Parr
“1.1 (a), (hb). WR) 1) & (2) : en
“6 2911 Definitigh—(a) ° Irregular air carrier, The 8
term Jirregular Air carrier means amy air carrier.
which (1 @dires Iv engages in air fransportation, (2)
doesnot hold jv certificate publie convenience and
necessity undfr section ‘400% of the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1958, Jas amended, antl (33) does not operate 4
or hold out fo the publie exists or by eourse of
conduct that/it dperates, one or more aircraft between
designatedyMoints, or within a designated point, regu:
larly, 6 with a reasonable degree of regularity, upon
whit L aircraftit-accep s for transportation, for com-
pensation or. hire,- such) members ofthe public as
apply therefor such property as the publie offers.
~ No air earrier shall be deemed +o he an irrecular-aire——
carrier unless the ar transportation services. offered
and performed by it are of’ such infrequenéy as to »
preclude. an implication of a uniform pattern or norma!
consistency of operation hetween, or Within, sucti
designated points. acter :
(b) . Point: The term “point” as used in this part
shalf mean any airport. or place where aireraft niay.-
he landed or taken off, including the area within a 25-
mile.radius of such‘airport or place. - ,
(¢) Agreement. The: term “agreement”, as used in
this part, shall mean any oral or written agreenient,®
contract stnderstogdine, or arrangement, and any
amendment, revision, inodifieation, renewal, extension,
~ caneelRition oF termination thereof,
iat i
fs
. 7
.
|
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Part DO, (a): $e | 4
ADOPTED BY RerGuLarion Seria No, ER-136,- 1
RR.
7769, . | hal ae
example, although its serv ives are operated irregularly,
ee fp ue ae eee
Pea
a = agent. The term ticket’ figent” as used
this SO, shall mean any person, whether suc
ees is another air carrier?or is acting as a ticket
agent, travel agent, travel bureau, broker, forwanter,
“Or ‘otherWise (other than a bona tide regular ene
ploye of the direct air carrier concerned), who for
compensation or profit:
(1) Solicits, obtains, receives; or furtiiches dtigectly
or indirectly passengers or groups: of passengers for
transportation Hpon aircraft of an irregular Ur eur,
rier, or ;
“(2)) Procures or arranges for air trafspertation of
passengers or groups ‘of: passengers upon aireratt of
Such an air carrier by chagter, lease, or “ny other
arrangement,”
e
**$ 2OL2 Classification (a) there is liereby established
a classification of noncertifieated air carriers to be
designated as ‘‘ingegular air carriers”
is
ae . i :
THE FOLLOWING INTERPRETATION OF Parr 2OL. was
‘Examples eof irregular air transportation within the
meaning of Part 291. For the guidance of irregular
air carriers and other interested parties the Board
liere, sets forth atnumber of illustrative examples of
Ir ‘and regular service. All irregwar air car-
riers should study -these_examples, for the Beard ex-
pects to use them as standards to-apply_to the opera-
tions of such carriers, i
It should be noted that all of the illustrations included
here refer only to detual operations. Such operation
indicate a course of conduct constituting the holding
out of regular or irregular service, as the case may be.
* The holding out of regular service may also be browight |.
about by means other thaf actual operations Fei
Ae
a carrier ay be holding out regular service by reas: a
of the nature and extenttof its advertising and tralie
i
ae
&
on,
solicitation efforts, In other words, an irregular air *
carrier is not immune from enforcement action if its
. Actual operations are irregular but all the circum:
stances surrounding its business show that the car.
rier is holding out regular service,
The illustrations included | represent application of
“the principles announced in Pace Arrways, Ixe.. Tx
~ VESTIGATION, 6 Cap 1061; TRANS- MARINE AlkWays, Ixe.,
INVESTIGATION. OF Activittes, 6 Cap. 1071: and [y-
VESTIGATION OF NONSCHEDULED Services, 6 Cap 1049,
find more particularly of the cease. and = desist
order entered. in ‘the Marrer OF THE NoONeERTIFIED
OPERATIONS oF Trans Carispeas Arp Canco Lines;
Ixc., Order Serial No. 370, adopted Marchgl4, 1947.
(9) An irregular air cartier operates hetween points
A and B, in one direction, on the days of the month
Which appear in brackets on the following calendar:
table: /
8 M ‘a °" OW. a! .aee
(1b) 2 a eS 6 rd
os) ~ 2 ne 13 19
(15) 6. IS a. |
22 23 4 25 5 =o. 2
(29)°- . 30 $l, «:
.
Since these fights ‘are conducted on the same day of
each week, .the service isnot irrefular within the
—__ Meaning of P,irt, 29k Moreover, if over. a period of
_ Weokstoceasional Sunday flight ix omitted. or jx Op-
erated on some of er Ht the week, such minof.
Variations in the genera tern of regulari a 4
not cause the service to bee me an irrestlar staytoe.”
-(2). An irregular air carrier operates hetwegn poimé€
Nand B, in, one direction, on the days of the month
whieh appear in’ brackets on the following calendar’
table: . ; ir
>
S M T> W 7 F S
i 1 (2 3 (4) 5 .- 6
7 8 ae ee ‘12 3
14 15: (16)- 17° (18) 19 uD
>: ae (23) 24 (25) ?6 yt |
2s 29 (30) eb :
by flights are conducted’ regularly, twice a week.
. without frequent and extended.definite breaks in serv-
ee and are obviousl¥ not irregular within the mean#ig
of Part 291. Moreover, if over @ period of weeks an | .
occasional flight is omitted, or is operated on some —
other day of the week, such minor variations in tiie
general pattern of regularity would not canse the
service to become an irregular service.
(3) An irregular air carrier.operates between points
A and B, in one direction, on the days of -the-month—
which appear in brackets on the following calendar
table: o* .
S M ee Maa fe S
as eas ae fe 2 3 4
e ae, | tj a ee 10 11
12 [13] 44 =. 1§ «16 WZ. [18]
19 20 21. [22] 93 24 5
[26] 27 28 29 [30]
These flights are conducted at regularly recurring
periods, or substantially regular periods (every 4, 5 or
6 days), and therefore %do_ not achieve infrequeney
and irregularity. of service through frequent and ev-
tended definite breaks in service. Such service is not
irregular within the me; ining of Part 291.
‘\
° . %
=
(4) An «irregular air carrier operates between
points A and*B in one direction, on the days of ‘the
two successive months which, appear in’ brackets on
the followirig calendar table:
S- teas Smee Smee I Ss
se a ey —— cee", ee ~ 9
3 4 (5). ¢€ [7} s 4
i. {11}. {2} 43 14 6 -i6
17 IW (19) [20] oy 23 z
-t [25] Be f2T] ok ty
31 |
ae I [2] a) ao ae
: 7 s ee |. oe | Cen; ae
i4 = - 6. Bs &. 19.4 20,
: >| Te b> 233 “400 [25] 6. 27,
[28] ry 30° 31]
These flights are conducted twice a-week in suecoed.— a
ing weeks without the intervention of other weeks. ot
siinilar periods at irregular. but frequent intervals
during Which no flights are operated, Such service js
not irregular within the meaning of Part DOL, .
(8S). Four large irregular air carriers agree to
utilize the services of a single) ticrket agency, XYZ
Ticket Ageney, ‘Inc., with respect ‘to service between
points A and B, and to furnish to the agent the dates
upon which each will operate between and 1. If tie
flights, considered in combination? of such carriers be.
tween .\ and B reveal a pattern of operations similar.
to those shown’ jn examples. (1) through (7) -ahove, :
the combination of flights constitute regular air trans-
portation and each such carrier is deemed te be eon
. ducting regular operations between A and B.
x
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P)
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. ap ee, .
oa ; = . (e) oe —
ee
——.-— +." STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The respondent issues an ‘airline trip” insurance policy’
from automatic vending: machines, It had such a vending’
machine located at Boeing Airfieid, Seattle, Washington.
on November 19, 1958.
The deceased insured, Sgt. Robert. J. Caruth, hav pur ‘.
chased a ticket for an airline ‘trip aboard a commercial
aircraft operated by Peninsular Air Trans; port, to fly fron
. Seattle, W ashington to Chicago, Hlinois. (Rees 122, Vos.
_of Ree. 40). The airtine trip was scheduled to leave Séatgie,
oe “Washington at_6 200 P.M. on Nove mber 1%, 1h,
The ecunicied Sut. Carutli pyior to his departure ‘on
the airline trip to ‘Chicago, Hlifois, pure hased one ot the
“airline trip’ insurance »poffcies from the respondent's
automatic vending machine lovated at. Boeing Airtield,
Seattle, Washington, the saan point for: the ‘airline
trip in question.
Moments after take off, the huge De 4 airliner erased ;
in flaines thereby. causing the death of Set. Robert J.
Caruth, a passenger,
The beneficiary, | Margaretha Thonipson, reeéived the
airline trip? poliey i the’ mail a few days later, and on
Novenber 25, 1955, notified the respondent of the ins
death, pe | |
The respomlent Te} ied “hy letter af November re Se 1'3.3,
stiiting they were not entirely sure, but they didn "f think
the “insurance polies covered the aifline trip in iettion.
(Pitts Ex. 4, Ree. 172, Abst. of Ree. 49) Respondent sites
.
a ere
the premium ‘would. be. returned “promptly” if it was
deemed to be ‘tin order’? The premium return was finally
offered approximately one month mater » but not accepted
by the petitioner. ~ sag sabres tae
'
Respondent refused) to pay “the polievton. the grounds
that the airline trip in question, wis not’ that of a
“scheduled air catrier” under. the definition of the poliey,
Z as the aire arrier, Peninsular hie Transport, Was licensed
an “irregular ar carrier” by the Civil Aeronautics
‘Board.
Petitioner inion suit on a complaint alleging in
‘the alternative, - as permitted by Section 43, Chapter Ald,
Hinois Revise
W509, that the fight in question
the terms of the policy, or that
sfespondent lad waived
Bright to axsert_ its technical
definition of “scheduled”
Respondent denied this (nm its answer, and set out the
‘definition of “scheduled air arrier”” as defined in the
Federal statutes. To this petitione Hled.a reply. The case
came on for- trial, During. the the triak court was
‘adamant. that the policy coverei airline trip in ques-
tien and said he would. direct a verdict in favor of peti:
toner. The trial court. however, would not let petitioner
put in any evidence on the «juestion of Waive > and estoppel,
“ying if ie had made a mistake. the Upper court wonld
correet it, (Ree, 136, Abst: of Ree, 36)
Judgment of $25,000.00) was entered for petitioner of
a directed: verdict. The Appellate Court reversed with
at remandiag despite petetioner’s insistence that «he
sould be allowed. te put in evidence on Waiver and es.
‘oppel “Phe Supreme Court. of HlineiS refused’ to hear
The question, '
oe
es
—1li—
HOW FEDERAL QUESTION RAISED.
Tie Petitioner in its complaint alleged the aireraft int
question, on which the deceased Sgt. Robert J. Caruth
-embarked on an dirlije trip from Seattle, Washington; to
Chicago, Illinois, and ‘hich. airline trip the deceased
“sought to insure. himself, was in fact schéduled for a deti-
nite time and was? a definitel¥ scheduled airline triyy be
tween named commercial airfields -and therefore a‘ schsAL-
led aircarrier™ within the tetms of the’ poliey. The re-
~ponde nt in its motion to strike, as well as in its anwser
“denied this and set out paragraph 5 of the poliey, which pur-
besa to restrict the usual use,~sense ‘and definition of
‘schednled” to that technical definition of the word “ae ‘Hhed-
ted” Massed by the Civil Aeronautics Board. All other air
Catt according to respondent, “recognized, designated,
censed, or determined by the governine ‘ntal authority saci ing
jurisdiction over civil aviation as being irregular. or non-
scheduled ‘air carriers” are exeluded’ from yerage under
the policy, In support of this, the Respondent offeged, and
it was admitted into evidence, Title 49, U.S.A ", Seetion 481
(a) (hy); Tithe 4, 0 S.C. Section 496 (av) -(b); Civil
Aeronautics Board eadnedie Regulations Part 290.1 and
YUL oad: together with Board Regulation ‘Serial Nur
bers” Which: explain and form apart of said economic
regulations, The trial court, however, entered duedg.
ment for the Petitioner on simple, non-federal cont Pact
with grounds saving in effect. the layman's definition of
“scheduled airline trip should apply and that the tee
ae ai deiimition of the Federal statute: could not apy
sO us to defeat the Petitioner's recovery. The federal (<< 0+
Was framed, however, and the Appellate Court of Plone.
Wr Distriet, reversed the’ tral court on the basic oft ©
te ores ; ae ye
~~ ; q° ‘ /
Federal statute in* which*the policy of: insurance in ques-
tion is actually predicted and issued, and said that without »
-a doubt the technical definition of the statute should
apply. The Appellate Court thérefore reversed the trial
court and denied recovery to the Petitioner because of the
’ s * a
Federal statute, and based on a haphazard and erroneous
mterpretation of the terms of the Federal statute in ques. -
"tion, which is ngt in accord with the Federal court's. inter-
pretation of that statute: : 9
oO
AS a result, because of the Respondent's misuse of a
Federal statute im issuing its policy of insurance, and the
end District Appellate Court of Illinois’ misguided in.
terpretation of that Federal statute, and the Supreme
Court of Illinois’ refusal to furtherYhear the issue by a
denial of the Petitioner’s petition for leave to appeal which
was filed pursuant to Section 75, Chapter 110, Illinois Re-
"vised Statutes, 1957, the Petitioner has been deprived of
under the contract of insurance. ©
$25,000.00, and interest which rightfully belongs to her °
| A
: Normally, ; an insurance policy does not involve a Federal
question. The instant case, how ever, presents a rather nove]
- and unusual situation.
W ith. thegrowth of the air industry following World War
“Kec ongress. passed the Civil Ae ronauties Act of. 1938 for
the purpose of regnlating air travel for the protection of
the general public. The Board of ( ivil Aeronautics (here-
inafter referred, to as **Board’’) was —- by Title
49, ELS.C. See. 42 D(a) to promulgate * such rules as it
deemed necessary ‘to effectuate the Act. Title 49, U. S.C. .
See. 481, 496 (a) provided for licensing and classific: ation
OF air” carriers forthe“ pur pose-of this Act®; cas
The Fidelity & Casualty Co. of. New York, respondent
herein, has attempted to convert the air carrier classifica.
tions established by the Board te their own private use
in Insurance contracts, a purpose for which C ongress never
_tintended_ the classific: ation to be used and a purpose for
which they are not’ adaptable: ° | ?
The Board issued Economie Nieitibiens Part 291.1 (a)
.(b) (@) “(d-1) (ds2) and Part 291.2 together With explan-
_ atory Regulation Serial No. ER-136, 13 F.R. 7769} ali of
which are set out in this Petition. There was thr estab-
lished for purpos? of Federal governmeut regulation dit-
ferent classifications of aircratt as well as elaborate tech-
nical data explaining how a-particular classification was
to be determined. Naid classifications included ** Scheduled
Air Carriers’? and *Trregular Air Carriers’’. A different
kind of license was issued to each classification and that
license ‘tonne’ in W ashington, D. C Much litigation de-
veloped and still continues involying the question of ‘when
Is an ‘irregular air carrier’ Violating its license SO as to-
he“ imitating a ‘schedtided air carrier??? The Federal
courts have recognized the Aighly technical -nature of the
“question and as in ‘American Airlines, Inc. v. Standard Air-
lines, Ine., 80 Fed.” Supp. 135, 139 (1948) the Court, said
the question was so highly technical, only the Board haab
the technical knowledge. to determine the ‘answer,
futo this. technical abyss strode the idelity & Casualty
- Company of New York, Responde ‘nts and issued an “air-
line trip’? ‘policy based solely on the aforesaid technical
classification of ‘scheduled air carriers’. The policy . wes
not sold.by a living: salesman, but by an automatic yend-
ing machine, The respondent knew the’ diffic ‘ulty, involved
in determining between the Classifications established hy
the Board, and knew th ey could thereby capitalize upon.
such. confusion by issuigng the so-called ** Airline. trip"
policy in question, entitling it ** Airline Trip Insurance”
stating that only scheduled” air carriers were covered.
As a result, the r respondent has accepted in the. past, as
_it did in the instant case, premiums for which it never in-
te nded to renderva benefit, and will continue to accept sich
“premiums in’ the future avithout the intent to render
hoi ica
Since the insurance poliéy in question is based. entirely
upon ‘and. detined in the light ol a Federal statute, the
~. statute becomes: a. part of the contract and must be in-
Cuded as) though: expressly incorporated therein, 'T his
Means not only. the statute itsel, bul the interpretation
“f that statute as statute S Gre Coustrucd, is
Citing the case of United States vo Union Pacific Rad-
. way Co., OU, i de oe he Bl, 28. ie cos said in Per-
4
poles.
ieudl Indiistrial Bankers v.( ‘itt: ens Budget C 0, , 80 ek. »f
327, 328 (1935):
“We recognize that in “construing: a contract which
“rests upon statute, the statute must be read into the
Contract, and that rules for construing’ statutes are
not those which “apply to the -cotistruction of con-
tracts.”’
In the case of Northern Padtiffc Railway Seulaeny v.
Well, 241 U.S. 87, 91, 60 L. Ed. 905; 907 (1915), the Court
said in holding that a bill of lading issued under a statute
should be interpreted in light of the statute:
“As this Court has often held, the laws in fore at
the tithe and place ofthe ‘making of a contract, and
which affect its validity, performance and enforcement.
enter into and form a part of it, as if they were e Xpress.
ly referred to or incorporated in its terms.”’
What the respondent has thus done, is to put the pur-
chaser of the ‘airline trip” poliey in a position where he
must unknowingly interpret the technical Federal statute
‘creating the classifies ation of air carriers. The Appellate
Court of Illinois says ‘this is a simple matter that ariy-
one should readily be able to determine. The Tinois Ap-
pellate Court says at page 170 of its opinion A Thowpson
v. Fidelity and ( oe 6., 16 TIL App. 2d 159) with refer-
ence to **scheduled”’
“This term wwe a clear-and ¢oncise meaning and.”
when defined by any standard it simply denotes an air
‘arrier Which operates antl holds ifself out to the public -
that it does operate aircraft Betwecen de siquated soil
regularly, or with a reasonable degree of reaularity,
pursuant to a schedule prev iously announced. "* 4 Min.
phasis ours)
The opinion and deeision of the. Hlinois Appellate, Court,
however, is emphatically not in accord with the Board's
View of. the: inte pretation: (See_ the lengthy Regulation
—19—
Serial No. ER-136, 13 FR. 7769 promulgated. by the board,
pg. 7 herein), and isgnot in accord with a single recorded
opinion of the Federal Courts on the subject."For example,
in American, Airlines, Ine. vy. Standard Airlines, hiv... 80)
F. Sapp. 135, 139 (1948) the Court ‘said about the identical
definition used hy the Minoix. Appellate Court:
“What constitutes thic Operation ‘of air flights
‘requarly or with a reasonable degree of veqularity’,
and what constitutes serviee of such intrequeney as
to preclude an implication of a uniform. pattern or
normal consisteney of operation is not defined in the
Economie. Regulation of the Net: the definition was
- Wisely left flexible heeause as the Regulation and the
Explanatoéry. Statement pron ulgated by the Board in
connection therewith show, what would constitute * req-
‘ wlarity’ or ‘a uniform pattern of normal consistency
of operation” might vary with time, place, nature of
flights aud circumstances, Lrrespective of the simplic-
ity or complexity of: the question in’ this particula;
case, if is evident that the question is wf-a kind that
can be a highly techvical one. calling for expert know.
ledge. of the industry, and that: the Board, whieh
phrased and promulgated: the Regulation, and with
Which operational] reports of all irregular air carriers
are regularly filed, *so that it may maintain adequate
supervision * * * with respect to iad opera-_
tion’, is much hetter equipped arid qualified to deter-
mine it than the Court could possibly be.** (Emphasis
supplied) . . a ii
Ta Pacific Northern Airlines v. Alaska Airlines, 80 F.
Supp. 592 (1948)/ the Court said at page 608 of a very)
lengthy and involved decision that while the reneral tenor
and hody of evidence *indiented the detendant did not
advertise or expressly claim” that it operated a scheduled”
service between Anchorave, Alaska, and Seattle, Wash.
ington, “yet in view of all the civeuinstances that conclu-
ston Seems’ unsound.”
s
—v
4
oc
‘
—20—
To jndieate : ioe comple ie ly “devious ‘and une ertain ean
be the definition of what is, and what is not, a ‘*scheduled”’
air carrier, or one purporting to ‘operate regularly, at-
tention is directed to Air Transport Association ¥. Civil
Aeronautics Board, 199 F. 2d 181. The ease involved the
transportation of persons and freight) between Se: attle,
‘Washington and Alaska. One of the airfields involved,
incidentally, was the airfield in question, Boeing. Airfield,
Seattle,. Washington. The airline in question was held
to be Violating its license of operation as an irregular
air carrie r by Holding itself! out through a ticket ageney
as operating a regular schedule. The Court said the prin-
‘cipal was responsible for the representations of its agent,
the ticket agency, and the airline’s license was sus-
pended. . ot
.
Iiven the facts upon achich: the Appellate Court of
Illinois based its erroneous decisién were insufficient in
light of the foregoing Federal -cases -on the subject,. and
particularly since petitioner was not: allowed to put in
any evide ‘nce on that issue, fA
The crux of the matter is tye by the eral of the
Appiliate Court of dllinois, and Yenial of le ave-to appeal
by the Supreme Court -of Illinois, ‘the’ vespondent As ale
lowed to issue an “airline trip” policy based on a Fedéral
statute, and is acknow ledged ‘the right ‘to do so based Upon
the classification of ‘schedule aig carrier’? and * jrresu-
lar air carrier” as used in the Federal statute. The Court
‘has ignored, however, thie intended: tise of the ‘terms
scheduled” and “irregular,” by. the Kederal lewisla-
lures and thei? @xtremely technical application. The Lill
nois Court has tus failed to follow Federal law on the
subject, and” has used the term tise heduled ¥ -in a vacnum.
As-a result, the Illinois’ court. has not ineokpo rated the
entire Federal statute and its interpretation int@#€the con-
° ~
oe ;
=
tt
oy
, .
ane . 4 . 5
tract of insurance as required@by law so to “do. They
should have done so*as prev iously stated. The: poliey of
insurance becomes grossly dtunbiguous when the correct
interpretation of the Federal statute ix applied, and: the
policy’ should be construed in favor of the petitioner and
the judgment of the Trial Court. atfirmed.
ed : |
“The. term “seheduled”? as used in the poliey has two
meanings. One a technival meaning éreated by the Federal
statute, and another the layman's definition of *‘sched-
ed’’, meaning pre-ar ranged time. The Hlinois Court says
there arSQot. two meanings for the term, and that the
term ‘scheduled’? as used in the policy and the Federal
statute is not technical. To. so hold is ‘not just) or
logical, or in accord with Federal decrees and decisions.
It ignores the problem a purchaser has of realizing there
are two Mneanings for ‘scheduled’? and ignores the prob-
lem: of separating the ‘real’? frem the imitation under
the Federal statute, thus ignoring the. é@ntire practical as-
pect of the situation. For example, you go into a com--
mercial ticket ageney and buy a ticket tor an airline trip,
from Chicago; Illinois to W: ashington, D.«., aboard a DC .4-
ot Illini Airlines, Ine., leaving. C hicago at 7:00 A.M. With-
out further information, is your airline--trip being made
on a ‘scheduled air earrier’’?
a
~The Federal statutes’ in question together With their in-
_terpre tation should be incarporated in the insurance policy
“in question. As a result, the policy becomes highly techni-
eal and ambiguéus. This tact was recognized in Lachs v.
Fidelity & Casualty’ Co. of New York, 306 NOY. 357, 118
N.K. 2d 455.(1954). There.the highest court of New York
held esse ftially ‘this same policy issued by this same
respondent to be ambiguous. The majority opinion in that
_ fase is thé postion of the petitioner here exactly as. to 7
the ambiguity of the policy in question, particularly’ in
a .
o?
220
P 2 : 7
view of the way the policy is issued from an automatic:
vending machine, tlie subtle use by. the respondent of the
term “airline trip’, and thé fact that the respondent in.
* tended to keep the premaym paid by the decedent- had hi
arrived safely. The New York Court -said in the Lachs
‘ase at page oo9 of 118 NE. (2d) OW). (1954) ;
s Decedent Was invited to -pure ‘hase * Airline Trip In
surance’; she applied for ‘Airline T rip Insurance’; on
the envelope to carry the policy to her daughter, bene
‘ ficiary ; wae * Airline Trip Insurance’ but detouikani
says that was not what decedent: purchased. Shall the
defendant which wrote the potiey he permitted to say
that ‘Airline Trip Insurance’ ‘imeans just what |
choose it to mean’ and therefore a flight of a ‘non. -
‘scheduled? airline is not covered by the poliey."*
‘The eminent Justice J. Cardoza said in Paskusz. vy.
Philadelphia Casualty Co., 218 N.Y. 22,°106 NB. 749
(1949) that insurance -policiés should nat be:
‘‘eouched in language as to the construction of which
- lawyers and courts may honestly differ.’’
In Zinn v. Equitable Life Insurance C ompany of lowa,
‘6 Wash. 2d 379, 107 P. 2d 921, 924°(1940) it was said:
" ” The language of insurance policies is to be inter-
preted in accordance with the Way it would ‘be under-
stood by the average man, rather than in a technical
sense.’? ay :
To the same effect is Mosby v. Mutual Life Tnsuraine
Company of New York, 405 I 599, 607, 92 NUE. 2d 1028
(1950). ,
®,
The -fact that the Petitioner at the outset of this ease
did not base its claim on the Federal statute or that the
. trial court ruled in the Petitioner's favor on non-federal
grounds ‘does not effect thix Court's right to jurisdiction
if it desires..to exereise jurisdiction. Jones National Bank
-po2se similar to the instant ease so. far as logic and basic
reasoning are coneerned, The plaintiff had sued the: de-
fendant bank for dainaves for false. representation of. the
bank’s financial condition. The hank defended on the
“knowingly.’? Judgnient for plaintiff was reversed in the
State Supreme Court on athe pleadings based on the
Federal: ‘statutes use of the word. “‘knowingly’’. The
plaintiff in error petitioned for a writ of error to the
United States Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Hughes said
in delivering the opinion of -the Court: .
“It-is insisted that the writs should be dismissed in
the view that the plaintiff in error sought to enforce
liability upon non-Federal. grounds and that the Fed-
éral question was raised exclusively by the defendant
plaintiff’s ease. The fact. that their petition did not
_Tefer, in terms, to the Federal statute, is not con-
trolling.’’
Alxo:
be a‘ recovery at common lav, independent of the
Federal statute, did ‘not alter the inherent character
of the. actions.’ °° tem a
In Satterlee y. Matthewson, 7 1. Fa. 458, 2. Peters 580,
410 (1829) ;
~*Tt has also been settled that in order to vive
Jurisdiction to this Court under the 25th Section of
v. Yates, 240 U.S. 541, 990, GOL. Ed. 788, 797, (1915) is a
‘grounds that a Federal statute defined the -liabilitv as
‘in error. But this objection ignores the nattne of ‘the -
“The conclusion of ‘the trial court that there could.
——
. : -24-
the Judiciary Act (2d Vol. Laws U.S. 65) it is not «
necessary ‘that the record should state in térms that
an act of Congress. was in point. of fact drawn in °
question. It is sufficierit, if it appears from tlie record
_that an aét of Congress“was applicable to the case,
* and was misconstrued. * * ne | pe
In the “event ‘this ‘Court grants Certiorari, the Writ —
should be-directed .to the’ Appellate ‘Court ‘of Thlinois, 2nd
District) Staté of Tllinois, beeause of Section 75; Chapter
110, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1957. See Minnéapolis’ St.
Paul and 8. Ste, My RCo. vy. Roark, 279 US. 410, 73 L.
Kd. 766. Poe Ss:
CONCLUSION.
~ We say the Appeiiate Court of Illinois denied liability
on an improper interpretation of the Federal statute with
which the Supreme Court of Ilinois agreed, and that the
entire decision rests on a proper interpretation thereof,
The Petitioner should not be deprived of her judgment
in the trial court-because of the impraper applications of
the Federal statute, and then be denied admission to this
-- Court because the case was treated as being of a different —
. Character. In Jones National Bank v. Yates. 240 US. o4t,
551, 60 L.. Kd. 788, 797 (1915) Justice Hughes said:
“Tf the plaintiffs’ cause of action required the sap-
plication of the Federal statute in deiining the Ha.
bility of these directors with respect to the acts
alleged and proved, -the plaintiffs were entitled to its
correct: application. Their jase, as made by their
pleadings and proofs, is nofté be treated as of one
character for the purpose of dismissine it) in the
state court and as.of another sort for the purpose
of denying their right. to complain of the dismissal.
We conclude that this court has jurisdiction: ”
;
)*
From a reading of the Civil Aeronanties Act: together .
with the rules and regulations thereof and cases thereon,
it is apparent the Act is far too technical to be made the
subject and basis of. an insurance policy; particularly as
issued here from ati automatic vending machine, wherein
the purchaser must unknowingly interpret the Ciril Aero
nautics Code, As a result, the policy is technical and-
ambiguous, and should be construed in favor, of the péeti-
tidner insured, and — the one who drew it.
We respectfully pray that the Writ for Certiorari be is-
sued because of the reasons given and the extensive use of
insurance and air trayel in our society today. -The decision
of the Appellate Court of Illinois should be ‘reversed, and
the decision of the trial court reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,
- Bernarp P. Reese, JR,
oa 901 News Tower Building, .
*~" Rockford, Illinois,
' Attorney for Petitioner. . .
—la—
hu, > APPENDIX A.
-/ Opinion of.the Appellate Court of Illinois.
AW HT - .: ee. eet
This issan appeal by the defendant froma ‘sila nten
ctered by. the Cireuit Court ef Wamebage County in the
suri off $25,000.00 in faver of the phaimtitt, Thy ease was
tried before a jury and at the’ conelus lon ot all of the evi-”
dence, the court directed a verdict in faver-ef the plait:
tiff in the sum ot oy UD Gre cand entered jud vient tdpoir
the verdict.
The facts as alleged in plaintiff's coniplaint, briefly
summarized. in substance are as follows: First, that) the
plaintiff. Margaretha Thompson, was the beneficiary under
two. pol: cies of insurance issued by the defendant. fidelity
And Casualty Company cof New? York. ino the stim al
"SIS TOL and $6250.00 respectively, Second, thatt on No-
vernber 17, T54. Robert ve ‘aruth, at that time the tus
~~ bane of the plaintit’, pure Masel the two potiei ies of isu
ance from a vending machine at. the Boeing » ield,
Seattle, Washington. immediately prior te a at ona
plane operated by Peninsular Air ‘Pranspert *Conrpany
-seheciled to leave at 8 0le%elock -PoM,. Third, that the said
Robert Lh. ( ‘aruth: purchased a ticket for an air tine trip
whieh was se heduled tor besive Dive oe badd at S200 of cloek
PM. but. which was delayed aah une WO oveloek midnight.
of November 1H, 155. Fourth, that by the terns of said
insurance polteres, the eecondiact contreet Lotter page ia the
henefiejary the sume ob 2. TOOOLUO die the event af the death
of Robert .L Caruth white ¢ rector dt an mi as woresult of
the air trip. covered: ty the air line tieket. Furth, that" the
anal i
(Opinion)
said aireratt did in fact take off from) Boeing Field at
or about 12:00 0%¢lock midnight ov said date With Robert
J. Caruth as ca passenger. Sixth, that the said) aireratt
crashed on take off and as a result thereof Rohert J.
Caruth was killed; and that plaintift made proper demans!
hut defendant refused to pray the Stine of $25,000.00.
The answer, As “amended, filed by the defendant ad
mitted: First. that Robert J. Caruth was a passenger on
the Peninsular Atreraft whieh took off from Boeing Field
,at about midnight’ November 17. 1955, and that said) ai
-craft erashied amd eansed Irix leath. Second, that the bene
Nielary gave proper notice and that the defendant refused
to pay. Concerning the allegation that the defendant con
tracted te pay the’ Henefieiary $25,000.00 in the event of,
the death of Robert Jo Caruth, defendant averred that it
did not so coytract but on the contrary, the insuring clause
of the policies limited coverage toa trip taken by the im-
sured “tafter the. purchase of this -poliey con Aireratt
Operated by a Scheduled Air Carrier as defined’* in the
policies add that the definition of an aireratt operated by
a schedufed air carrier did not inchide, and specifically
exgludedy aireratt operated by Peninsular Air Transport.
Plaingtitt tiled a reply to this answer denyimg that. Pen.
insula Air Transport Cenpany Was viet a scheduled air
carrier and denving that Peninsular Air Transport. was
recornized, designated and determined, as an irregular or
hon-seheduled air carrier.” The pleadings set out above
presented the essential issues decided by the trial eourt
Wiiel: are now before this Court for review, . |
Most of the facts were cither admitted in the pleadings.
‘stiptilated duritig the trial or established by. uneentre
verted evidence. The evidence reveats that om Novetidet
—
deere (Opinion)
17, 1955, Robe rt . Caruth was at the Boeing Air Field in
Seattle, Washington. There he purchased, fhrough a vend-
ing Machine, two insurenee policies in the amounts hereto-
iere stated, one at 3:42 o'clock PLM. and the other at: nee i
o'clock PLM. That, thereafter, the said Robert Jl Caruth
purchased a ticket for an air trip, which was sold to him.
through an ageney, and boarded a DC-4 afreraft operated
by Peninsular Air Transp rt Co. which aircraft teok off
‘rom Boeing. Field about seven miles south of Seattle, at
around midnight, crashing on take-off and killing CaPuth
Peninsular Ar Transport Company was in November of
Who, at the time of the occurrence in question, a partner.
ship owned by. William Roy Robinson and Howard Bert
Robinson, having its prineipal operation and mainte Narnnee
hase at. Miami (Fla.) Air Transport, Hangar Now 1. It
operated four aircraft and operated them under a ‘Letter
of Registration from the Civil Aeronautics Board and an
Operating Certificate from the Civil Ae ‘ronauties “Ndmin-
istration under Part 42 of the Civil Air Re ulations, Pen.
istlar Air ‘Pransport Company ‘did not ‘maintain sched-
uied flights, file schedules and tariffs for any regular pas--
senger. service, nor hold itsel! out ‘as , maintaining any”
regular schedule of flights.
The aircraft in question-left. Miami on November 13th,
1955, and flew without passengers to Richmond, Virginia.
It then flew to Tacoma, Washington, under a Military
CAM" Flight. From that point it proceeded without
passengers from Tacoma to Boeing Fiela, Seattle, Wath-
ington, arriving on November 14th, 1955.° The sireratt
Was not at the time-sof the 1 ‘ash, owned, operated or
chartered by the United States, Government. When the
aireraft arrived at Booing there were no flights+ for ‘it.
It left Boeing Field on November 17, 1953 , ona theht that
—4a—.
(Opinion)
Was composed. of 100% military troops, which, however
were andividually ticketed passengers. On this fatal flicht
that left- Seattle on November Ith, the passengers micht
have been under orders, might have been on furloughs.
or. micht have” ‘been enroute for any number of reasons. |
prospective -passenger on this type of flight is given an
weney ticket, whieh is exchanged for a carrier. ticket.
(Peninsular Air Transport sold all of its tickets throuch ’
agencies, Sometimes these tickets stated the. hour of de
parture and sometimes they did not.} Ff oan ageney Wits
unable to sell sufficient tickets to make a pay load, Pen
insular was not obligated to take off and had the preroga-
tive of cancelling: the flight. William Rov Robinson, one
of the partners of Peyinsular Nir Transport Co., testitied
that he believed there was some ‘thing on the ¢ farrier tickht
which stated that it was not a se heduled carrier and to his\
knowledge this was true of Peninsular Air Transport. .
he evidence is contticting as to the exnet time set for
take off. The specific time set for take off. was de laved
ecause of weather. However, the airetatt did in tact take
oft shortly before. midnight. An. irregular air carrier some:
times gets only.a feaw hours’ hoti¢e of a fliht. On the date
of the crash, Peninsular had no regularly se heduled lhights
from Boeing Field to anyother point in the United States.
The routes flown by Peninsular are not exactly the same
as these flown by. scheduled air line ‘S,
Tt is the defendant? s theory that the only issue involved
in this case is Whether the insured was a passenger on al
aireratt operated hy a “scheduled air carrier” as: Ws
in the poliey. Further. it is urged by “the defendant “tha
the undisputed evidence shows that the Insured was net
passenger on an aircraft operated by a scheduled air car:
rer, and the trial court shoul Ihave directed. ave srdivt for
the’ défendant.
>
a a tt
(Option ). :
For a determination of this ease, We quote below the
portions of this poliey pertinent te the’ issues,
Tt commenecs with the following words printed in eam
tals and in type yourhdy te ice the size of the’ordinary type
in the bode of this polices: : |
os DO NOT PURCHASE MOREL TITAN A TOTAL
Ol £62500 PRINCIPAL SUM NOR FOR TRAVES,
ON OTHER THAN SCHEDU LED ATR CARR HERS.
* 8 #99
|
The next sentence reads:
“T hereby apply to Compariv named. below tor
Scheauled Air Carrier’ Trip (Airline Trip) Instirance
* *# #99
The next rns Provision is:
<2. $XAU RING CLAUSE: Ticket) or Pass Re-
quirement. The C onipany will pay the benefits speei-
fied “below jf * * *: the Tnsured suffers loss * * *
\. sustained under circumstances , specified below * * *
after the purchase of this policy on Aircraft Operated
\by a Scheduled) Air Carrier as defined helaw * * *
provided that at the time thate the Insured) sustains
sueh injury he is traveling on a transportation ticket
or pass covering the whole of said airline trip isstied
. to nm, for transportation on an airerats operated by.
a schedwled air carrier.” we
There follows this paragraph, the first clause of which is
printed in hol -face eapitals: and in type double the
_ordinary type: %
; 9
“OO DEFINITION OF ATRORAFT OPERATED.
BY A SCHEDULED ATR CARRIER, The words
*Aireralt Operated by a Scheduled Air Carrier’ as
used in this poliex, mean and are-defined as follows:
(1) aireratt of United\States registry, operated ona
regular, special or. chartered Hight by a scheduled air
clause all appearing on the frst pace of the poliey, '
* —fa—
pein iad J
(Opinion)
carrier holk ling a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity issued by the Civil Aeronauties Board of the
United States of America, or its stleeessor, and: whiel
In accordance therewith files, prints, miadiriterins sre
publishes schedules and tariffs for regular passenger
service between uamed cities at regular and SPO! jee
times, or (2) aireraft of foreien registry opernted
a regular, special or chartered flight by. a schedules!
air carrier holding a certifiente, license or similer av
thorization for schedwed air carrier transportation 6
the country of the aireratt’s registry. and Wwhict "
accordance therewith Niles, prints, maintains ane ph
lishes schedules and tariffs tor reeular passenger sery
ice between named cities at recular and Specifier
times, or (3) aireraft‘ol United’ States registry on
erated ona regular se theduled flight solely within the
boundaries of a State of the | ‘hited States by a sehed
uled. air carrier legally authorized to corduet * sued
operation, and which. files.. prints, maintains and ¥?
lishes, schedules ‘and tariffs for regular passes:
service between named cities solely within the boc
. daries of such State at regglar and specified times.
Specifically exclided = from the above. definition of
‘Aircraft Operated by a Scheduled Air Carrier’ are
any and all aircraft operated by scheduled military
airlines and any and all aireratt ope ii Dw air ear
riers recognized, ‘designated, Heensed or determined
by the governmental authority havi ing jur nile Tien ove’
civil av tation as being irregular Or notiesechedub dua
carriers.’ .
Retwee ‘no the Insuring clause and thet above Definite:
following clause: ‘ >
-
“Oo. DEFINITION ANDO DELIMPEPATION oF
COVERAGE. This poties applies sags te suelo pein
* * * (a) while boarding, riding as patssemorer it.
alichting from or coming in contact vith: ean auireract
operated by-a scheduled air earrier as defined below:
,
. ay
—1a-— '
(Opinion )- Mj
or (1) while riding in or om a land conveyance pro-
vided or arranged for © * * by such> scheduled air
carrier *°* *: or (dl) in consequence of exposure as
the result of a foreed landing of, accident to, or dis
Appearance of aireraft operated bw a scheduled air.
ree. ~. -. 52",
Although the law of the State of Washington applies te
the case at har. the plaintif£ and defendant both agree that
it does not differ materially from the law of Hliniois con- ;
cerning the reasons governing Interpretation and const rue-
tionof insurance contracts and contracts in’ general. This
is sO agreed to hy counsel-in their wespective briefs and
both cite principally Tineis authorities and authorities
from other jurisdictions.
The rule of liberal const ruetion of insurance policies in
favor of the insured ninst yield to rules of reasonable eon
struction, and the rule vonstruing ambiguous provisions
strictly evainst the insurer’ will not: permit: perversion of
plain Janguage to create an ambiguity where none in fact
exists. This rule was recognized recently by this court in
Maryland Casualty Company v. Holmsaaard. 10 TIL. App.
“d.. 1, 8, 10, 133 NEL 2.8910, 913, 914, wherein it was
stated: :
olicies should be construed according to the
sense and meaning of the’terms used and it the lan-
guage is clear and unambiguous it Inust be taken in its
plain, ordinary and popular sense. (Cases Cited)
-***°* * Phe rule that ambiguous, lancuage is to be
coustrned most strongly against the insurer does not
authorize a perversion of language or the exercise of
inventive powers: for the purpose of-ereating an ame
sbiguity where none exist. (Case Cited)" '
“4s @ @ P
We have reviewed: the policy in this case and find that
it Contains no inconsistencies or ambicuities.” The poliey
Itself ix legible, sitiply worded and is contained On ote
is
.
- &
° a -Sa—
(Opinion) ;
sheet of “gig” iy nade paper, The poliey in its, simplest
terms agrees, in consideratgon ofa de inite’ premium, to
payvertain benetits for certain eles ore on an air:
It operated by a scheduled air carrier . Previded fur:
- that at the time the iusured sustains such injury or
._ loss ais traveling oma transportation ticket cove ring the
nqole Bi said air line trip issued to him for transportation
on iy, aireratt operated by a se hednled air carrier The
Jefipition of afi aire raft operated by a caheduled air car.
rier’ Lis set aout in paragraph six of the policy quoted
above. (This ldisuigion contains no inconsistencies: and in
not ambiguous. ) "ei
~~
“Ty
The construction, af? ‘the piwvisions. of the poliey is tor |
the court and what is meant by the term **se ‘heduled air
ear ie his & question of law, but whe ther the airplane Was
in fact a ‘*seheduled air carrier ** within the fheaning of
* the policy isa ‘question of tact. Hoi Iusurance Company
of New York v. Mendenhall, 164 IL 458, 49 N.B. 1078:
Yates Vv. Bankers Life and ¢ ‘asnalty Company, 415 [ll. 16.
11 N.B. 2d. 316; Goldstein v. Met ropolitan Life Tusurar ?
Company. old I. App. 168, 57 N. Ki. 2d. 645.
In the case of Latchs ¥. Fidelity’ And Casualty ( ‘om pans
of New York, 306 NY. BH7, 118 N.B. 2d 355, a situation
involving a scheduled air carrier was hetore the court.
In the Lachs ease, supra, the de Jvondant filed al afotion
for a sumnary judgment supporting its motion withealt
-davits. The ‘plaintitt tjled counter ~atfidavits, the motien
aor summary judgment was denied hy the trial court, whieh”
drde was.atfirmed by the ’ppe Late | Mivision and apy alee!
by permission to the C ireuit © ourt of Appeals. The clause
‘for integpretation in the Laehs case was ¢ ‘civilian sched
led air lines ”” as contrasteda with the fermi in the paste
case “schedulddl air carrier. "Phe Nx jority “opitijon, Int
;
Fd
Fy
° < +
ee a
‘ Q.
~@ .—Va—
. 8 (Qpinion)
Lachs ease held that under the New York summary jjudg-
sented, a een, fact Yor determination by a jury
Poxisted., 7The court RA page o. 50 of TIS NUE. 2d said:
Plaintiff clainis that Mian Rite, on aeaie
tained regular, published se ‘hedules of fares and sched-
ules showing passenger ifile rates and that it held
itself out as maintaming regular’ schedules. of flights
and that it: was heensed hy the Civil Aeronautics
ccratt in interstatey overseas and foreign air transpor-
tation: W e think there isa question ol fact presented.”
T here j is no such contention hy the plaintitt in the imstant
ease and there are no cmitlict of facts in the ‘instant case
Such as existed 1 in the Lachs CASO
Plaintitt’s complaint does not allege, rior does plaintiit
contend that Robert J. Caruth was a passenien at the time
‘ot Er
carrier’, but alleges that he was ona sar ‘scheduled ”*
to leave at 8:00 o’clock PLM. Plaintitt’s -theory is) that
“since ‘the plane was to leayg at a pr earranged time, it was
scheduled, within the mez we of the policy. Plaintift con-
tends that the term schedule in the policy has reference to
-the time and gives examples, such as: “a talk is sched-
euled’?, ‘Swe were Scheduled to leave ‘i. “the attack was
| whisdided’s “the parade is scheduled.’ " We cannot @gree
With plaintift’s theory or argument. A pres arranged témne
ean be set for any type, of airplane to take*off, such as a
~ private plane, aonavy plane, an army plane or even today
‘an aiteratt to outer, apaces or the moon, However, such
"prearranged time for take off does net make it a‘ sehed-
led air carrier’. within the meaning of the pote v before
US, © _ %
ment procedure: and the sharp coutlict-of facts there pre-
cand. tickets were ‘sold tor stated gir de of departure,
Board to-carry passyugers and. steight with large ‘aire
Op an aircratt operated by a ‘scheduled aur,
*,
>
~ Scheduled air ‘arrier. Definition number (1) states:
—10a—_ =. ea
Peres (Opmion) ‘. .
The definition of “an aireratt operated by a schedules
air carrier’ is set out in paragraph G6 of the poliey, supru.
Three different types of aireratt are detined as being a
‘*Aireratt of United States registry, operated on 2
regular, special or chartered Hight by a scheduled air
- carrier, holding a Certificate of Publie Convenione
and Necessity issued by the Civil’ Aoronauties Board
of the United States of America, or Its SUECOESSOR, pd”
x Whieh in accordance therewith tiles, prints. pariitarins
a ‘and publishes sehedules ane tarilts tor reetlar passey
ger.service between named Citles at revular ial ee
fied times.’? - - . ; Ris
; ‘ = a
Definition numbers (2) and (3) are not here in cwestion.
i There is nothing ambigtious about the term scheduled air
carrier, This term-has a clear and * concise meaning and
When defined by any standsrad it simply denotes an air ear
rier which operates and holds itsell eutsto the public that
“it does operate aircraft between designated. points ren
larly, or with a reasonable: degree of regularity, “pursuant
to a schedule previously announced, We are not unmind
ful of the fact that words have different meanings a@l «it
‘ferent: significations to different people ‘on different occa
sions or under various and different circumstances, but we F ;
cannot perceive how the term scheduled air Carrier can
have other than one meaning: that heing an ar earriet
whieh Operates aireralt detwoen designated points rest t
larly in accordance with previously AnneUnEeEd sehedules :
-The minority opinion in the. Lachs case lent itself tes P
Nall, COMpre hensive ane well written opinion CONCEr EN f
the interpretation OF scheduled and not-seloduled atti ‘
CAL page S60 of LIS Nwl. 2d it was My stated Ii tt }
ININOTIty opinion: ; ib "
Th Alice's Wonderland, a Word. said” this ty
Dumpty, *mesnus Just what d choose jt te Pavan”. Eas,
oT) eee
*
(Opinion)
ina jurisdiction more mundane, Lido not perceive how
_We may say that theeword ‘se Reduled? can mean ‘non.
se heduled,” hor do DT see haw we hay tala jury that it
‘anesay that an surance pohley whieh in OX press
~ terms applies *oulw” to? ‘scheduled vrlines* can cover
Mishtsby an airline lixted aul selhdese ‘ribed as ‘non.
se hedule a:
There is no evidence in the record that Peninsular Air
Transport © Tompany was a scheduled air carrier holding a
Certificate of Publicé Convenience and Necessity issmed by
the Civil: Aeronautics Board of the United States.- and
Which in accordance therewith files, prints, maintains and
publishes s¢ hedules and taritts for resular passenger se rv.
“ice between hamed cities at regular and specified tunes, In
Fact, the evidence is without coutlietAhat Peninsular Was a.
non-scheduled air carrier » Wiliam Roy Robinson, a wit.
hess for the defendant,. testified that “Te and his brother
Were partners and the partne rship ope -ated the Peninsular
Air Transport Company with four aireratt operating? un-
der a Letter wot Re vistration from the Civil Aeronauties’
Board and an Oper ‘ating Permit: from the Civil Aeronau-
ties Administr: ation, under Part 42 of the’ Civil Air Reeu-
lations. The Letter of RegistratioSand Operating Certiti-
cate were for the specified type 6f air i ig beat
commonly referred to as a “non-scheduled carrier.” Unde T
tus Certificate, Peninsular Air Transport did not main-
tain scheduled flights nor did it file any Schedules or tar-
ifs for any regular passenger service with the Ciyi] Aero.
auties Authority, nor did it in November, 6f 1955 advertise
or hold itself out as Maintaining auy regular schedule of *
flights. This w itness further testified thi when the air-
eralt arrived at Boeing Field there were no Nights for it.
He had no. partienlar flights in mind for it and st re-
mained in Seattle three or four favs. Mr. Robinson, further
estitiod that as an irregular ‘air Carrier Operator, he
‘
—.
=
-]2a—
(Opinion) ia :
sometimes only got a few hours’ notice that he was going
to have a flight. Sometimes the bids are awarded the d: ay
prior to flight. He further stated, that if after arriving at
Boeing on November 14th an agency would he able to. fake
up a flight from there to Laredo? Texas, he would have
Mown that route. Peninsular Air Transport. sold no tickets
itself, all being sold through agencies. (When these tickets
wre sold they soimetities stated the hour of departure and
sometimes did not.)
At the conclusion al all the evidence both plaintit? and
defendant presented motions for a direeted verdict. The
court directeda verdict in favor of the plaintity and denied
dlefendant’s motion. Where a motion to-direct a verdict is
made at the close of all the evidence, all of the evidence on. -
hoth ernegale Is 4 hee onsidered, Diron v; Smith. Wallace. Shov
Co. 258 TL » MOONE. 265, the question being. Whether
wie of ‘the she nee for both parties makes outa case, Funk.
houser nee Bankers ate Assoctatiqn, 237 Ul. App.
9,
It is not only the powe r nit also the duty of the court te
direct a verdict for plaintiff at the close of all the evidence
When Hie has nade out a case and ne evidence tending to
contre dict it is offered, Marshall Vv. John Grosse Cloths «
Co. 1s Tb 421,56 NK. SOT, or no evidence Jias been pte,
dived by defendant that in any Way constitutes adlefense,
eudependent Oil co Ws - tation VE Fert Dearborn Na
tional Bank, 311 UM. » 142°. 3,8. 458. dn the ease hetore
_ Us the plaintiff has se absolutely to make out a ease
and there is a complete absence inthe record of any evi
de nee fairly tending to prove all of the necessary eloment
ef the plaintitt’ s case. Therefore, the court erred in grat
ing plaintiff's motion fora direc ted verdict at the Close ot
all the evidence,
‘
i ae ~-a---
(Opinion) ;
The quéstion of law presented to the court upon defend.
ant’s motion for a directed verdict at the close af all the
rvidencesis Whether, When all of the evidence js considered,
together with all reasonable inferences from it in its Iest
favorable aspeet to the plaintiff, there is a total failure to
prove a necessary element of the plaintift’s case, Nelson y.
Stut> Chicago Factory: Branch, fue. S41 TN 887, 173 Nuk.
394. We conclude: that there was no evidence in this ease
tending to prove the necessary element of the plaintiff's
ease that Caruth at the time of his death was. a passenger
on an aircratt operated by a scheduled air carrier as de-
ted in the poliey.
Where evidetice of an affirmative defense is offered, as
in this ‘ease, it is proper to direct a‘verdict for the de-
fendant at the close oF all the evidence, Wallner y, Chicago
Consolidated: Traction C'o., PAD TI 1S. 91 NUE, 1053.
~The record hefore us is void of any evidence placing the
insured under the terms of the policy. On the contrary,
the affirmative defense interposed by the defendant that
“the insured was not a passenger on au aircraft operated
by a scheduled air carrier at the time of his death was -
established by ‘uncontradicted evidence. That being the
“ease, the lower court) should have directed a ‘Verdict ‘for
the defendant. |
The judgment. of the Circuit Court of Winnehago Coyn-
ty is reversed, ee >
bats JvupGMeNtT REVERSEN
Crow, Pe J. And Soltisburg, J., Concur.
, Lia—
APPENDIX B.
Judgment of Appellate Court of Illinois.
Uscrkp Strares op AMERICA
State of lines
Appellate Court
Second Distriet. oss: :
At aterm of the Appellate Court, begun and held: at:
Ottawa, on Tuesday, the Ist day cof Qetober, in the year
of our Lord one theusamd nine hundred and. fifty seven,
within and for tie Second Distriet of [limos .
Stconp Divistos. © ,
Present. Honorable DeWitt So Crows Presiding Justice
Honorable Clarence. S. Wright, Justice
Honorable Rov J. Solfisburg, Jr. Dustice
P Paul Vo Wunder, Clerk:
Frances M. Lambert, Sheriff
Be it remembered, That, to wit: On the J4th day,ot Jan
wiry, ALD. 1958, certain proceeslings were had and orders.
made’ and entered of.record py <nid Court, among which
ix the following, viz. : |
‘S No, 11071
Margaretlia Thompson,
Appellee,
vs.
: Fidelity and Casualty’ Company of New York,
i 2 a: . & corporation, , ‘
| . Appellant. :
“Appeal from the Cireuit Court of Winnebago County.
°
-l6a---
On this day came again the: said. parties sy and the Court, .
having dilige ntly examined and inspected as well the rec
ord and proceedings aforesaid, as the matters and thing:
therein’ assigned for error, and being now suftie ‘iently ad
vised of and concerning the’ Premises, are of the cca
that..in the record and proceedings aforesaid, and in tic
rendition of thes judgment aforesaid, there is ces
error, | :
Therefore, it is considered, and orderéd by the Court -
that, for that error, and others inthe record and proceed.
ings aforesaid, the judgment of the ¢ Circuit Court of Winne-
hago’ County in this behalf rendered, be reversed.
And it ixgfurther considered and ordered by-the Court
that the said appellant recover of cand from the said ap-
pellee, its costs, by it inthis behalf expended, to He taxed,
and that it have exee ution therefor,
State of {linois, ° . :
~ Appellate Court,
Second: District —ss,
.
-
I Paut Vv, Wunder, Clerk of the Newiileas ¢ ouek in and
‘tor said) Second Distrie of the State of THinois, and. the
kee ‘per of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify —
that the foregoing is a true full and complete copy of the
Binal Ovder of the said Appellate Court in the above en
‘titled cause, now of record in iy said offiee,
7
n Testimony Whereot, T hereunto set TAY lazaliel
and affix the seal of said Appellate Court,
at Ottawa, this Ith day of August in the
year of our Lord one: thousiind Hine hundred
and titty -eight.
< Paul V.- Wunder
| Clefk of the Appellate C'our
(Seal) 4 . :
Pe)
—
=~}
«
~
‘APPENDIX C. ;
‘Order Denying Petition for Leave. to Appeal.
UNITED Sr. ATES OF Sieeese \
State of Mlinois
Supreme Court--ss.
Atca term of the: Supreme Court, begun and held. in
‘Springfield, on Monday, the twelfth day of May in the vear-
of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight.
within and for the State of -[!linois.
Present Charles H. Davis. Chief Justice
Justice Joseph E. Daily Justice Walter V. Schaefer
Justice George W. Bristow Justice, Harry B. Hershey
Justice Rav 1.- Klingbiel Justice Byron 0. House
-Lathan Castle, Attorney General
Robert G. Miley,- Marshal
Attest: Mrs. Earle Benjamin Searey, Clerk
Be It ‘Rememberd, that, to-wit: on tie 20th day of May,
1998, the same being one of the days of the term of Court
aforesaid, the following proceedings were, by said court,
had and entered of record, to-wit ‘
‘ No. 348: 3y
°
Winantvitnn Thompson,
; Petitioner,
VS.
Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York,
: a corporation,
Bee eis Respondent.
Isa
Petition for Leave.to Appeal from Appellate Court
Second District (id 11071
And now on this day the Court having duly considered
* the Petition for Leave to Appeal herein as Well as the
record and abstract, fled in support thereof, and being now
full? advised swf and concerning the preinises, doth over.
rule the prayer of the petition and denies Leave to Ape
peal herein,
~
And it is further considered by the Court that the said
cream recover of and’ from the said Petitioner costs
by it in this behalf expended, to-he t taxed, and that it have’
eXecution therefor. :
I, Mrs. Karle. Benjamin, Searey,- Clerk of the Supreme
Court of the State of Gaels and keeper of the records,
‘files and Seal thereof, do hereby “certify that the foregoing
ix a true copy of the final order of the said Supreme. Court
in the above entitled cause of record in mysoffice.
In Witness Whe reof, | have hereunto subscribed
tly name and affixed the Seal of said court
this 26th day of May, 195s, =
(Seal) : is ne .
Mrs. Earle Benjamin Searey ~
Clerk,
Supreme Court of the State of ‘Illinois:
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.