Petition for Writ of Certiorari — City of Detroit v. Murray Corp.
Supreme Court brief1955
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Supreme Court of the Uni
OCTOBER TERM, 1955
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CITY OF DETROIT,
a Michigan Municipal Corporation, and
COUNTY OF WAYNE,
a Michigan Constitutional Body Corporate,
Petitioners and Defendants,
vs.
THE MURRAY CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
a Delaware Corporation,
Respondent and Plaintiff
and
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor
—
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH — IT
an
APPENDIX
a re
CITY OF DETROIT, a Michigan
Municipal Corporation,
By PAUL T. DWYER,
Its Corporation Counsel, and
JAMES H. LEE,
Assistant Corporation Counsel,
and
COUNTY OF WAYNE, a Michigan
Constitutional Body Corporate,
By GERALD K. O'BRIEN,
Prosecuting Attorney, and
ALBERT E. CHAMPNEY,
Of Counsel,
Petitioners and Defendants.
SUBJECT INDEX
Opinion of Court TeleW, 0... cc cwcascccccccesenass
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pummtiems Prememeed occ cecesccccncceess
Statutes, Federal Regulations, ete..............
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Reasons for Allowance of Writ...................
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CITATIONS OF AUTHORITIES
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238............
mat porte Qubrim, SET UW. G. Benn cs cc ccccaccnnspaces
Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S.
BOD wusaihiechinkedsaewishhukshiedaegyeavkes
Rickert Rice Mills v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110........
United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240...
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. 8. 258
Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579. ..........
ST ry SOT Ce RL EF eR SN TTR ER RSE a
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1955
CITY OF DETROIT,
a Michigan Municipal Corporation, and
COUNTY OF WAYNE,
a Michigan Constitutional Body Corporate,
Petitioners and Defendants,
vs.
THE MURRAY CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
a Delaware Corporation,
Respondent and Plaintiff
and
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor
a Se
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT
and
APPENDIX
—— >
To the Honorable the Chief Justice and the Associate Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Come now the City of Detroit, a Michigan municipal cor-
poration, and County of Wayne, a Michigan Constitutional
Body Corporate, petitioners and defendants in the above
entitled consolidated action and hereby move the Court
to grant its writ of certiorari based on the following:
CUR 34 Ga QL OI PONIES EELS OI NE LN EPS LO OE HN
to
A.
This application for writ of certiorari is filed to obtain
relief at the hands of the Supreme Court from determina-
tion of Hon. Thomas P. Thornton, District Judge, for the
_ Eastern District of Michigan, in the above entitled con-
solidated action, wherein the United States is an interven-
ing party, a copy of the opinion being hereto appended
(20a), which is not yet reported in the Federal Reports.*
B.
GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION IS INVOKED
(i) On June 29, 1955, pursuant to said opinion, an
Order granting motion of the plaintiff for summary judg-
ment was signed and entered. On the same date also signed
and entered were:
(a) A judgment for plaintiff against defendant,
City of Detroit, in the first half of 1952 tax case for
$33,857.48, plus the sum of $4,876.49, as interest, with
interest thereon at the rate of five percent per annum
from date of entry thereof.
(b) A judgment for plaintiff against defendant,
City of Detroit, in the second half case for $33,857.48,
plus the sum of $4,157.02, as interest, with interest
theeron at the rate of five percent per annum from
date of entry thereof.
*For compliance with Rule 21 (1), the original files containing all
proceedings, depositions and exhibits in these cases have been transmitted
to the Clerk of this Court in lieu of a transcript of record, pursuant to an
order to that effect entered Sept. 14, 1955 by Hon. Chase C. Simons, Chief
United States Circuit Judge, Sixth Circuit.
3
(c) A judgment for plaintiff against defendant,
County of Wayne, for $12,572.66, plus the sum of
$1,543.64, us interest, with interest thereon at the rate
of five percent per annum from date of entry thereof.
(ii) That within the time provided by Court Rule,
Notices of Appeal were filed by the respective defendants
and entered on July 27, 1955, in each of said cases, to the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cireuit. That upon the
filing of Supersedeas Bond in each of said cases as re-
quired by Court Rule, Orders Staying Proceedings were
duly signed and entered by Hon. Arthur A. Koscinski, Dis-
trict Judge, for and in the absence of Hon. Thomas P.
Thornton.
Thereupon by stipulation of the respective parties,
Orders for Consolidation of the several actions for presen-
tation and hearing of appeals taken by said defendants
were signed and entered on July 29, 1955. On the same
day, also on stipulation, an Order for extending the time
for filing record on appeal and docketing appeal to and in-
cluding Sept. 30, 1955 was signed and entered.
On Sept. 8, 1955, steps to file the record on appeal and
docket the Appeal in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit were jointly taken by the respective
defendants and the required fee paid.
(iii) See. 1254 of the 1948 Revised Judicial Code (Title
28 U.S. C. A. $1254) confers on the Supreme Court juris-
diction to review the judgments in question in this con-
solidated appeal by writ of certiorari:
**(1254) Cases in the Courts of appeal may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following
methods:
A aitaraceteseinictcelelndeiilaani ie ESIC SSR SII URAL NRE
+
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the peti-
tion of any party to any civil or criminal case, before
or after rendition of judgment or decree;’’
Sec. 2101 of said Code as amended May 24, 1949 ¢ 139
$106, 63 Stat. 104 (Title 82 U. S. C. A. §2101) provides:
**(e) Any other appeal or any writ of certiorari
intended to bring any judgment or decree in a civil
action, suit or proceeding before the Supreme Court
for review shall be taken or applied for within
ninety days after the entry of such judgment or
decree. A justice of the Supreme Court, for good
cause shown, may extend the time for applying for
a writ of certiorari for a period not exceeding sixty
days.’’
; **(e) An application to the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari to review a case before judgment
has been rendered in the court of appeals may be
made at any time before judgment.”’
C.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The plaintiff in this action is a Delaware corporation
with its principal office in the City of Detroit, Wayne
County, Michigan. On Court Order, leave was given to
the United States to intervene in the case on Feb. 4, 1954.
However, no relief was awarded it by the District Court’s
judgments.
The defendants are City of Detroit, a municipal corpora-
tion, and County of Wayne, a Michigan constitutional
body corporate, from whom plaintiff corporation seeks
refund of 1952 city and county personal property taxes
levied under State law and paid by it under protest on
these alleged grounds:
5
(i) That the Detroit Board of Assessors included
property of the United States Government in its assess-
ment of personal property of plaintiff corporation in
the City of Detroit for 1952;
(ii) That said property claimed to be improperly
assessed was exempt from taxation by the City of De-
troit by virtue of the Constitution and laws of the
United States and by virtue of the Constitution and
laws of the State of Michigan.
(iii) That the entire tax levied thereon by the City
of Detroit for the year 1952 was illegal and void be-
cause of such error in assesment of the personal prop-
erty of plaintiff corporation.
These contentions stem from the imposition of an assess-
ment for the purpose of collecting a non-discriminatory
ad valorem tax on personal property acquired and being
processed by an independent contractor (plaintiff corpo-
ration) in the City of Detroit under a sub-contract for
eventual delivery to prime contractors and by the latter
to the United States Air Force under separate prime con-
tracts.
The broad question raised by plaintiff corporation and
the Government is whether the taxes in question were based
on assessment of property owned by the United States
Government on Jan. 1, 1952, being the assessment date
prescribed by Michigan law.
More specifically defendants submit the following as
questions presented for review:
(i) Whether inclusion of partial payment and
transfer of title clauses used in such contracts were in
conformance with or in violation of federal statutes.
—_ TEA ne nt i i ir a se : ee ; CPST ae
6
(ii) Whether inclusion of partial payment and
transfer of title clauses would operate to defeat an ad
valorem tax on personal property in the hands of an
independent sub-contractor.
(iii) Whether the partial payment and passage of
title clauses were included in the subcontract for any
other reason than financial security for partial pay-
ments?
(iv) Whether statutory authority existed for the
Government contracting officers themselves or by dele-
gation for the prime contractor to include in the sub-
contracts the provisions for partial payments and for
passage of title from the sub-contractor to the Govern-
ment.
(v) Whether plaintiff corporation is the real party
in interest as required by Rule 17(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(vi) Whether the District Court Judge failed to
take into account and give due weight to all the stipu-
lated and undisputed facts (which show a course of
conduct and dealing with the property in question in-
consistent with the claim of absolute title in the Gov-
ernment).
(vii) Whether the District Court Judge gave to de-
fendants all the favorable inferences to which they
were entitled from the undisputed facts submitted on
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
(viii) Whether the subject assessed property is
entitled to exemption from a non-discriminatory ad
valorem local property tax even if title is held to
have passed to the Government by virtue of the ques-
tioned contract provisions?
EL RAE ES ETL LL OS INGE ORES A IY GE At EE SSE AAT nS aR De ee —
7
D.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Statutory provisions connected with the issues are re-
ferred to below. Being too lengthy to set forth here in
full, the pertinent text appears in the appendix attached
hereto beginning at p. 7a.
Armed Procurement Act of 1947, Public Law of
80th Congress, 41 U. S. C. A. See. 151 et seq.
R. S. 3648, 31 U. S. C. A. 529
34 U.S. C. A. Sec. 582
41 U.S. C. A. See. 255
50 U.S. C. See. 611 App.
See. 211.1 C. L. Mich. 1948
See. 440.26 C. L. Mich. 1948
See. 566.137 C. L. Mich. 1948
E.
STATEMENT OF FACTS IN THE CASE
The matter here presented involves an appeal from a con-
solidated action* by plaintiff to recover personal property
ad valorem taxes levied by defendants based on a common
assessment as of Jan. 1, 1952 upon personal property in
plaintiff’s possession in its plant at Detroit, Michigan, pro-
cured and being processed for parts and components of air-
eraft and aircraft engines to be delivered to Kaiser Manu-
facturing Company and to Curtiss-Wright Corporation re-
spectively. The latter were prime contractors with the
*Action No. 12108 was filed Sept. 9, 1952 to recover the first half of
the City of Detroit 1952 taxes; Action No. 12482 was filed Feb. 11, 1953
to recover the second half of the City of Detroit 1952 taxes; Action No.
12483 was filed Feb. 1, 1953 to recover the 1952 County of Wayne taxes.
Se ee ae
8
United States Air Force and were engaged in the manu-
facture of airplanes for the United States Air Force.*
Subsequent to the execution of the respective letter sub-
contracts, the prime letter contracts were amended to pro-
vide for inclusion and made applicable to such sub-con-
tracts the language providing for partial payments prior
to delivery on work in progress substantially as found in
APR 5-407.2 (1) which is too lengthy to cite here and may
be found in the appendix attached hereto (p. 1a).
Requests were made by plaintiff to the respective prime
contractors and payments were thereafter received from
Kaiser in the aggregate amount of $163,949.20 on Oct.
12, 1951, seven months following execution of its letter
subcontract and from Wright in the amount of $510,827.67
on Dee. 31, 1951 eight months following execution of its
letter subcontract. These payments were subsequently
used by prime contractors as a basis for their own respec-
tive requests for partial payments from the Government.
*Plaintiff’s sub-contract with Kaiser consisted of a letter of intent
executed March 23, 1951 for the manufacture of certain parts and sub-
assemblies therein specified, amended Aug. 15, 1951 and again on Oct. 4,
1951, under Kaiser’s letter Prime Contract No. AF 33(038)-18481 with
the United States Government entered into Dec. 20, 1950 and subse-
quently amended.
Plaintiff's other sub-contract with Wright was likewise a letter of
intent executed April 19, 1951 for the manufacture of certain parts and
subassemblies therein specified, amended on May 24, 1951, under Wright's
Prime Contract No. AF 33(038)-181382 with the United States Govern-
ment entered into Dec. 12, 1950 and subsequently amended.
The letter prime contract between Wright and the latter referred to
a so-called Basic Agreement No. 1 and made it a part of the contract
between them. Superseding definitive sub-contracts and prime contracts
were not agreed upon nor made effective until after the assessment date
here in question.
9
The Government inspection of goods and checking of
plaintiff’s procedures was carried on to effect a clear-
ance for the prime contractor under its prime contract.
Otherwise the Air Force had no direct supervision over
plaintiff sub-contractor with respect to its costs.
According to the letter contracts involved here, the only
reimbursement to plaintiff during the period to Jan. 1,
1952 was for its costs to the extent set forth. No profit
was provided for until prices would be agreed upon in a
definitive contract, the first prices being retroactive to the
beginning of performance under the letter sub-contract.
Plaintiff included the amount of the 1952 taxes, here
sought to be recovered, as an element of burden in comput-
ing costs submitted for forward price redetermination and
retrospectively as to goods completed and delivered prior
to the date of the first price redetermination. In the same
way the prime contractors included the redetermined prices
(which involved negotiating on all cost items of which
taxes was but one of many) to the extent paid as part of
their costs submitted to the United States Air Force
(Stipulation II (5)). (See also Deposition Record pp.
101-117).
In this connection we quote from p. 108 of said deposition
of Mark I. Sammon, Assistant Treasurer of plaintiff :
**We have collected—I can’t say we have collected
all of it (1952 taxes) and I can’t say we haven’t. As
it would enter the inventory if the inventory were
completely liquidated, yes. If the inventory as it is
were not completely liquidated, I don’t know what
portion would he left.’’
POS CNET
10
No supplies or subassemblies (end products made by
plaintiff) had been completed, inspected or delivered to
either of the prime contractors by plaintiff under said
letter subcontracts prior to Jan. 1, 1952 and all materials,
supplies and such uncompleted items as were on hand
on assessment day were subjected to the assessment being
chailenged.
Such assessed property was identifiable prior to Jan. 1,
1952 by tagging, labeling or by segregation, all according
to such letter sub-contract by number and description.
Also it was segregated from other personal property owned
and used by plaintiff in connection with its automotive
and other operations.
Plaintiff’s aircraft operations were separated from its
automotive and other operations and under the supervi-
sion of a separate division manager and supervisory staff.
The agreed upon dollar valuation of personal property
so assessed on Jan. 1, 1952 is $2,043,670.00. The claim
of plaintiff against defendant City is in the sum of $67,-
714.96 and against defendant County in the sum of $12,-
572.66, exclusive of interest from the date same was paid
under protest prior to commencement of the several actions
herein.
On March 11, 1954, the consolidated action was heard and
submitted before Hon. Thomas P. Thornton, District
Judge, on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment filed
Jan. 6, 1954.
Between these two dates depositions were taken at de-
fendants’ request, records of plaintiff Murray were ex-
amined and stipulations were prepared, executed and filed
to the end that the matter could be submitted to the Court
upon undisputed facts for his determination as a matter
of law based upon the pleadings, stipulations, depositions
and exhibits.
% oe z red Layee a ah kh ae o yor yee . .. o
LLG LDL LOL BEVIN PIU EE Ny OLNEY RLF EER DN RITE OR IE ARCO PAO NE 2 WN IN =
ety a) RIPHTASY Sle te Cth.
11
Defendants’ Exhibit 3 consisted of a portion of the de-
fendant City’s personal property assessment roll, the line
applicable to the subject property containing the notation
“subject to prior rights of Federal Government.”’
WHAT THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE
1. Tools already owned and furnished by the United
States Government to plaintiff under a separate facility
contract were not assessed and therefore are not involved..
2. Tools completed by plaintiff under the sub-contracts
prior to Jan. 1, 1952 were not assessed and are not a sub-
ject of this suit.
3. The tax involved here is not a privilege or specific
tax but an ad valorem non-discriminatory property tax.
4. The tax does not include any assessment against real
estate.
5. No claim is made that the tax imposed a lien on the
subject property in conflict with any prior rights of the
Government.
F,
The matter does not involve the judgment of a State
Court.
G.
BASIS FOR ORIGINAL FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in the District Court is invoked by plaintiff
on 28 United States Code, Sections 1331 and 1332 respec-
tively.
(a) The controversy arises under the Constitution and
laws of the United States and the amount involved
PEL ENN ENE REEL IN FL NY AREER MANNY INR ER SEH ATONE NER ERIN OEE sv cg
12
exceeds the sum of $3,000.00, exclusive of interest
and costs.
(b) The controversy is between citizens of different
States and the amount involved exceeds the statu-
tory minimum.
ARGUMENT
Reasons for Allowance of Writ
1. As already indicated, the action was determined in
the District Court on plaintiff’s motion for summary judg-
ment. All parties cooperated in an attempt to present
the case on undisputed facts in the form of depositions,
stipulations and exhibits which together with the pleadings
would permit a determination as a matter of law. There
are therefore no questions of fact for this Court to consider.
All that was reserved by the respective parties in con-
nection with the stipulations was the right to argue the
weight or materiality or interpretation of the agreed facts.
2. While this consolidated action involves only $67,-
714.96 claimed of defendant City and $12,572.66 claimed
of defendant County, for the year 1952, plaintiff has simi-
lar actions pending for 1953 and 1954 in the District Court.
Likewise three other local taxpayers represented by
counsel for plaintiff herein have a total of 15 cases pending
in said Court, and 7 other local taxpayers have a total of
19 cases involving the same or similar issues now pending
in the Wayne County Circuit Court awaiting trial.
3. It is respectfully submitted that the District Court
erred in dealing with the issues presented by this action
AE EGE ERE EI PE ILE NE SE EE —
13
and the fundamental constitutional questions involved, with
the result that the Court’s construction of the Armed Serv-
ices Procurement Act of 1947 conflicts with operation of
state tax laws upon which defendants rely for their prin-
cipal revenue. These issues are of vital importance to the
Government and to the defendants here, as it is also to
a number of other State, county and local taxing units from
coast to coast in which similar government contracts have
been placed. Public interest, national and local, requires
that this Court take jurisdiction and authoritatively re-
solve them by reversing the judgments of the District
Court.
4. The present situation is seriously confused both as
to authority for contracting policies of the Defense Depart-
ment of the Nation on the one hand and the taxing proce-
dures and fiscal policies of defendants locally on the other.
Contracts continue to be let with ih« controversial provi-
sions here in issue and assessments have been and are
currently being made by defendant City’s Assessors to
meet the cost of providing necessary local services, fol-
lowed by protests from the taxpayers affected by such
assessments. It is for the additional reason that these ques-
tions are likely to recur that petitioners seek review by this
Court of the judgments rendered against them before
hearing and determination by the Court of Appeals.
5. The predicament of plaintiff and other taxpayers in
a like situation is not to be overlooked. Uncertain of its
rights under its sub-contracts entered into for production
of subassemblies for a prime contractor and its obligations
to pay local ad valorem taxes on personal property ac-
quired and being processed, plaintiff has no choice other
than to pay the taxes under protest and commence separate
suits for their refund in each of the years such taxes are
levied during the life of the sub-contract.
Bes NISRA REPT IES OMT ORE DELS IEG FTA S IR PE EL LLG EE EN PR IN, I
MANA RSICe e Iw sy =e
14
6. It is inescapable that the large number of cases
pending on the docket of the District Court as well as sev-
eral brought by other local taxpayers awaiting trial in the
Wayne County Cireuit Court would be expedited by prompt
settlement by this Court of the important constitutional
questions involved in this case.
SUMMARY
This matter manifests characteristics of others* in which
this Court has seen fit to exercise its discretionary au-
thority to issue a writ of certiorari prior to hearing and
decision by the Court of Appeals. The circumstances re-
cited above demonstrate the following compelling reasons
to grant certiorari and permit briefs on the merits and oral
argument:
1. No serious or difficult questions of fact involved;
2. Pendency of large number of similar actions;
3. Presents important constitutional issues, substan-
tial in nature;
4. Early settlement is needed of questioned official
procedures both on the part of the Government and
local communities ;
5. Taxpayers are entitled to end of confusion.
*This Court, having found such considerations to exist, has granted
the writ before judgment in a number of cases in which the identical
procedure was followed, e. g., United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294
U. S. 240; Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 380;
Rickert Rice Mills v. Fontenot, 297 U. S. 110; Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U. S. 238; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1; United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258; Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579.
oS, Paes EAN AREER YE al ELS BIE LN PL LETHE MOET LOM INES Ga egy yan cay ss on
a
15
EARLY HEARING
An early determination of the ultimate questions pre-
sented by this case is of extreme importance to the plain-
tiff taxpayer, to the Defense Department of the United
States and to the county and city made defendants (peti-
tioners) herein. In addition to the foregoing considera-
tions, there is the pressing practical problem affecting
defendants city and county, that substantial amounts of
tax revenues are involved in these and the other cases now
awaiting trial. Interest is accruing on such taxes paid
under protest thereon at the rate of upwards of $10,000.00
a month, prompting the request that this Court fix an early
date for hearing on the merits following the receipt of the
record and briefs—in the event the foregoing petition is
favorably considered.
— BAGELS MEN RE NEGRO LER ELS REED ISON IRA Rt NES RIN
16
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated it is respectfully prayed:
That this petition for writ of certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit be granted
by this Honorabie Court to the end that this cause may be
reviewed and determined by this Court;
That the matter be set down for early hearing;
That an Order should be issued to preserve the rights
of the parties and stay proceedings in the Court of Ap-
peals, Sixth Cireuit, pending final decision by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
CITY OF DETROIT,
a Michigan Municipal Corporation
By PAUL T. DWYER,
its Corporation Counsel, and
BERT R. SOGGE,
VANCE G. INGALLS,
JULIUS C. PLISKOW,
JAMES H. LEE,
Assistants Corporation Counsel.
COUNTY OF WAYNE,
a Michigan Constitutional Body
Corporate,
By GERALD K. O’BRIEN,
Prosecuting Attorney and
HOBART TAYLOR, JR.,
PHILIP A. McHUGH,
THOMAS J. FOLEY, Jr.,
Assistants Prosecuting Attorney
and
ALBERT E. CHAMPNEY,
Of Counsel.
September 15, 1955.
os na POAT Aa INT ER ALI, OWT PDAS TAS ESET BEEN ENS PE IT TT LY nee
Procurement Regulations la
APPENDIX
Procurement Regulations
5-407.2. Partial Payments.—(1) When payments are
not to exceed 75 percent of the cost of the property—In
those cases where it is contemplated that partial payments
in an amount not to exceed 75 percent of the cost to the
contractor of the property will be made, the contract will
contain the following article:
Partial payments.—Partial payments, which are
hereby defined as payments prior to delivery, on work
in progress for the Government under this contract,
may be made upon the following terms and conditions.
(a) The Contracting Officer may, from time to time,
authorize partial payments to the Contractor upon
property acquired or produced by it for the perform-
ance of this contract: Provided, that such partial pay-
ments shall not exceed 75 per cent of the cost to the
Contractor of the property upon which payment is
made, which cost shall be determined from evidence
submitted by the Contractor and which must be such
as is satisfactory to the Contracting Officer: Provided
further, that in no event shall the total of unliquidated
partial payments (see (c) below) and of unliquidated
advance payments, if any, made under this contract,
exceed 80 percent of the total contract price of supplies
still to be delivered.
(b) Upon the making of any partial payment under
| this contract, title to all parts, materials, inventories,
work in process and non durable tools theretofore ac-
quired or produced by the Contractor for the perform-
ance of this contract, and properly chargeable thereto
2a Procurement Regulations
under sound accounting practice, shall forthwith vest
in the Government; and title to all like property there-
after acquired or produced by the Contractor for the
performance of this contract and properly chargeable
thereto as aforesaid shall vest in the Government forth-
with upon said acquisition or production: Provided,
that nothing herein shall deprive the Contractor of
any further partial or final payments due or to become
due hereunder; or relieve the Contractor of the Gov-
ernment of any of their respective rights or obliga-
tions under this contract.
(ec) In making payment for the supplies furnished
hereunder, there shall be deducted from the contract
price therefor a proportionate amount of the partial
payments theretofore made to the Contractor, under
the authority herein contained.
(d) It is recognized that property (including, with-
out limitation completed supplies, spare parts, draw-
ings, information, partially completed supplies, work
in process, materials, fabricated parts and other things
called for herein) title to which is or may hereafter
become vested in the Government pursuant to this
Article will from time to time be used by or put in
care, custody or possession of the Contractor in connec-
tion with the performance of this contract. The Con-
tractor, either before or after receipt of notice of ter-
mination at the option of the Government, may acquire
or dispose of property to which title is vested in the
Government under this Article, upon terms approved
by the Contracting Officer, provided, that after receipt
of notice of termination, any such property that is a
part of termination inventory may be acquired or dis-
posed of only in accordance with the provisions of the
termination article of this contract and applicable laws
PRETRIAL RET EP ARIE I BOE IE MEER IDS ERY RS RR RON RIEL ORLY ORS IIT LRN GD FET Se RT Ne Pe aL TD —
Procurement Regulations 3a
and regulations. The agreed price (in case of acquisi-
tion by the contractor) or the proceeds received by the
contractor (in case of any other disposition), shall, to
the extent that such price and proceeds do not exceed
the unliquidated balance of partial payments here-
under, be paid or credited to the Government as the
Contracting Officer shall direct; and such unliquidated
balance shall be reduced accordingly. Current produc-
tion scrap may be sold by the Contractor without ap-
proval of the Contracting Officer but the proceeds
will be applied as provided in this paragraph (d), pro-
vided that any such scrap which is a part of termina-
tion inventory may be sold only in accordance with
the provisions of the termination article of this con-
tract and applicable laws-and regulations. Upon liqui-
dation of all partial payments hereunder or upon com-
pletion of deliveries called for by this contract, title
to all property (or the proceeds thereof) which has
not been delivered to and accepted by the Government
under this contract or which has not been incorporated
in supplies delivered to and accepted by the Govern-
ment under this contract and to which title has vested
in the Government under this Article shall vest in the
Contractor.
(e) The article of this contract captioned ‘‘Liabil-
ity for Government-furnished Property’? and any
other provision of this contract defining liability for
Government—furnished property shall be inapplicable
to property to which the Government shall have ac-
quired title solely by virtue of the provisions of this
Article. The provisions of this Article shall not re-
lieve the Contractor from risk of loss or destruction
of or damage to property to which title vests in the
Government under the provisions hereof.
“Si DEVEL AR ANNE Ps EN GT RIT ERE CU NEEL Se ALTA ITA RPE LON ER I Me Reseed
4a
rect
NRE EEE TF AY I
Procurement Regulations
(f) If this contract (as heretofore or hereafter
supplemented or amended) contains provision for Ad-
vance Payments, and in addition if at the time any par-
tial payment is to be made to the Contractor under the
provisions of this partial payments article any un-
liquidated balance of advance payments is outstanding,
then notwithstanding any other provision of the Ad-
vance Payments Article of this contract the net
amount, after appropriate deduction for liquidation of
the advance payment, of such partial payment shall
be deposited in the special bank account or accounts
maintained as required by the provisions of the Ad-
vance Payments Article, and shall thereafter be with-
drawn only pursuant to such provisions.
(2) When payments are not to exceed 90 percent of di-
labor and material costs.—In those cases where it is
contemplated that partial payments in an amount not to
exceed 90 percent of the direct labor and material costs
to the contractor will be made, the contract will contain the
following article:
Partial payments.—Partial payments, which are
hereby defined as payments prior to delivery, on work
in progress for the Government under this contract,
may be made upon the following terms and conditions.
(a) The Contracting Officer may, from time to time,
authorize partial payments to the Contractor upon
property acquired or produced by it for the perform-
ance of this contract: Provided, that such partial pay-
ments shall not exceed 90 percent of the direct labor
and direct material costs to the Contractor of the
property upon which payment is made, which costs
shall be determined from evidence submitted by the
Contractor and which must be such as is satisfactory
ois \ "ahic Site sei a Dees SENET rere iN Se A 5.5 NO Ea a RED APM Q OR ats RM
Procurement Regulations 5a
to the Contracting Officer: Provided further, that in
no event shall the total of unliquidated partial pay-
ments (see (c) below) and of unliquidated advance
payments, if any, made under this contract, exceed 80
percent of the contract price of supplies still to be
delivered.
(b) Upon the making of any partial payment under
this contract, title to all parts, materials, inventories,
work in process and non-durable tools theretofore ac-
quired or produced by the Contractor for the perform-
ance of this contract, and properly chargeable thereto
under sound accounting practice, shall forthwith vest
in the Government; and title to all like property there-
after acquired or produced by the Contractor for the
performance of this contract and properly chargeable
thereto as aforesaid shall vest in the Government forth-
with upon said acquisition or production: Provided,
that nothing herein shall deprive the Contractor of any
further partial or final payments due or to become
due hereunder; or relieve the Contractor or the Gov-
ernment of any of their respective rights or obligations
under this contract.
(c) In making payment for the supplies furnished
hereunder, there shall be deducted from the contract
price therefor a proportionate amount of the partial
payments theretofore made to the Contractor, under
the authority herein contained.
(d) Itis recognized that property (including, with-
out limitation, completed supplies, spare parts, draw-
ings, information, partially completed supplies, work
in process, materials, fabricated parts and other things
called for herein) title to which is or may hereafter
become vested in the Government pursuant to this
=) Pl eek ca ae, eal
tes ft
wah tile tit Rh stan Gilt ns
shan
Rll baie
Dede teeneati tate nite stteicnnn~/4
6a
Procurement Regulations
Article will from time to time be used by or put in
the care, custody or possesion of the Contractor in con-
nection with performance of this contract. The Con-
tractor, either before or after receipt of notice of ter-
mination at the option of the Government, may ac-
quire or dispose of property to which title is vested in
the Government under this Article, upon terms ap-
proved by the Contracting Officer, provided, that, after
receipt of notice of termination, any such property that
is a part of termination inventory may be acquired or
disposed of only in accordance with the provisions of
the termination article of this contract and applicable
laws and regulations. The agreed price (in case of
acquisition by the contractor) or the proceeds received
by the Contractor (in case of any other disposition),
shall, to the extent that such price and proceeds do not
exceed the unliquidated balance of partial payments
hereunder, be paid or credited to the Government as
the Contracting Officer shall direct; and such unliqui-
dated balance shall be reduced accordingly. Current
production scrap may be sold by the Contractor with-
out approval of the Contracting Officer but the pro-
ceeds will be applied as provided in this paragraph
(d), provided that any such scrap which is a part of
termination inventory may be sold only in accordance
with the provisions of the termination article of this
contract and applicable laws and regulations. Upon
liquidation of all partial payments hereunder or upon
completion of deliveries called for by this contract, title
to all property (or the proceeds thereof) which has
not been delivered to and accepted by the Government
under this contract or which has not been incorporated
in supplies delivered to and accepted by the Govern-
ment under this contract and to which title has vested
in the Government under this Article, shall vest in the
Contractor.
wail
41 U.S.C. A. 151 7a
(e) The article of this contract captioned ‘‘Liabil-
ity for Government—furnished Property’? and any
other provision of this contract defining liability for
Government-furnished property shall be inapplicable
to property to which the Government shall have ac-
quired title solely by virtue of the provisions of this
Article. The provisions of this Article shall not re-
lieve the Contractor from risk of loss or destruction
of or damage to property to which title vests in the
Government under the provisions hereof.
(f) If this contract (as heretofore or hereafter sup-
plemented or amended) contains provision for Advance
Payments, and in addition if at the time any partial
payment is to be made to the Contractor under the pro-
visions of this partial payments article any unliqui-
dated balance of advance payments is outstanding,
then notwithstanding any other provision of the Ad-
vance Payments Article of this contract the net amount,
after appropriate deduction for liquidation of the ad-
vance payment, of such partial payment shall be de-
posited in the special bank account or accounts main-
tained as required by the provisions of the Advance
Payments Article, and shall thereafter be withdrawn
only pursuant to such provisions.
41 U. S.C. A. 151 (Feb. 19, 1948, c. 65, §2, 62 Stat. 21)
$151. PURCHASES AND CONTRACTS FOR SUP-
PLIES AND SERVICES—(a) APPLICABILITY
TO ALL ARMED SERVICES
The provisions of this chapter shall be made applicable
to all purchases and contracts for supplies or services
made by the Department of the Army, the Department of
the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the United
%e> > a a i a ee
8a ~ 41U0.8.C. A. 151
States Coast Guard, and National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (each being hereinafter called the agency),
for the use of any such agency or otherwise, and to be paid
for from appropriated funds.
(b) It is the declared policy of the Congress that a fair
proportion of the total purchases and contracts for sup-
plies and services for the Government shall be placed with
small business concerns. Whenever it is proposed to make
a contract or purchase in excess of $10,000 by negotiation
and without advertising, pursuant to the authority of para-
graph (7) or (8) of this section, suitable advance publicity,
as determined by the agency head with due regard to the
type of supplies involved and other relevant considerations,
shall be given for a period of at least fifteen days, wherever
practicable, as determined by the agency head.
(c) All purchases and contracts for supplies and serv-
ices shall be made by advertising, as provided in section
152 of this title, except that such purchases and contracts
may be negotiated by the agency head without advertising
if--
(1) determined to be necessary in the public inter-
est during the period of a national emergency de-
clared by the President or by the Congress;
(2) the public exigency will not admit of the delay
incident to advertising;
(3) the aggregate amount involved does not exceed
$1,000;
(4) for personal or professional services;
(5) for any service to be rendered by any university,
college, or other educational institution;
My ee Dao eR ee a ee ee AER Be A ae ge | ee A ROE ase at ahs ates Oe rhe ta it el ly t
41 U. S.C. A, 151 9a
(6) the supplies or services are to be procured and
used outside the limits of the United States and its
possessions ;
(7) for medicines or medical supplies;
(8) for supplies purchased for authorized resale;
(9) for perishable subsistence supplies;
(10) for supplies or services for which it is imprac-
ticable to secure competition;
(11) the agency head determines that the purchase
or contract is for experimental, developmental, or re-
search work, or for the manufacture or furnishing of
supplies for experimentation, development, research,
or test: Provided, That beginning six months after the
effective date of this chapter and at the end of each
six-month period thereafter, there shall be furnished
to the Congress a report setting forth the name of each
contractor with whom a contract has been entered into
pursuant to this subsection since the date of the last
such report, the amount of the contract, and, with due
consideration given to the national security, a descrip-
tion of the work required to be performed thereunder;
(12) for supplies or services as to which the agency
head determines that the character, ingredients, or
components thereof are such that the purchase or con-
tract should not be publicly disclosed;
(13) for equipment which the agency head deter-
mines to be technical equipment, and as to which he
determines that the procurement thereof without ad-
vertising is necessary in order to assure standardiza-
tion of equipment and interchangeability of parts and
that such standardization and interchangeability is
necessary in the public interest;
_ RRIF EL SEV EL RE OME RET RE EE TE I AE LIC. ERO EE RE A ERE
ET SONOS SR REN FNC RIES CE PSY PEERS TOM
|
(14) for supplies of a technical or specialized na-
ture requiring a substantial initial investment or an
extended period of preparation for manufacture, as
determined by the agency head, when he determines
that advertising and competitive bidding may require
duplication of investment or preparation already made,
or will unduly delay procurement of such supplies;
10a 41 U. S.C. A. 151
(15) for supplies or services as to which the agency
head determines that the bid prices after advertising
therefor are not reasonable or have not been indepen-
dently arrived at in open competition: Provided, That
no negotiated purchase or contract may be entered
into under this paragraph after the rejection of all
bids received unless (A) notification of the intention
to negotiate and reasonable opportunity to negotiate
shall have been given by the agency head to each re-
sponsible bidder, (B) the negotiated price is lower
than the lowest rejected bid price of a responsible
bidder, as determined by the agency head, and (C)
such negotiated price is the lowest negotiated price
offered by any responsible supplier;
(16) the agency head determines that it is in the
interest of the national defense that any plant, mine,
or facility or any producer, manufacturer, or other
supplier be made or kept available for furnishing sup-
plies or services in the event of a national emergency,
or that the interest either of industrial mobilization in
case of such an emergency, or of the national defense
in maintaining active engineering, research and de-
velopment are otherwise subserved: Provided, That
beginning six months after the effective date of this
chapter and at the end of each six-month period there-
after, there shall be furnished to the Congress a report
setting forth the name of each contractor with whom a
SA SEO ENS Saree _—
41 U.S.C. A. 152 lla
contract has been entered into pursuant to this subsec-
tion since the date of the last such repor., the amount
of the contract, and, with due consideration given to
the national security, a description of the work re-
quired to be performed thereunder; or
(17) otherwise authorized by law.
(d) If in the opinion of the agency head bids received
after advertising evidence any violation of the anti-trust
laws he shall refer such bids to the Attorney General for
appropriate action.
(e) This section shall not be construed to (A) author-
ize the erection, repair, or furnishing of any public build-
ing or public improvement, but such authorization shall be
required in the same manner as heretofore, or (B) permit
any contract for the construction or repair of buildings,
roads, sidewalks, sewers, mains, or similar items to be
negotiated without advertising as required by section 152
of this title, unless such contract is to be performed outside
the continental United States or unless negotiation of such
contract is authorized by the provisions of paragraphs (1)-
(3), (10)-(12), or (15) of subsection (¢) of this section.
41 U.S. C. A. 152 (Feb. 19, 1948, c. 65, §3, 62 Stat. 22)
§152. ADVERTISEMENTS FOR BIDS; TIME; OPEN-
ING OF BIDS; AWARD OR REJECTION OF
BIDS
Whenever advertising is required—
(a) The advertisement for bids shall be a sufficient time
previous to the purchase or contract, and specifications
and invitations for bids shall permit such full and free
competition as is consistent with the procurement of types
12a 41 U. S.C. A. 153
of suppplies and services necessary to meet the require-
ments of the agency concerned.
(b) All bids shall be publicly opened at the time and
place stated in the advertisement. Award shall be made
with reasonable promptness by written notice to that re-
sponsible bidder whose bid, conforming to the invitation
for bids, will be most advantageous to the Government,
price and other factors considered: Provided, That all bids
may be rejected when the agency head determines that it
is in the public interest so to do.
41 U.S. C. A. 153 (Feb. 19, 1948, c. 65, §4, 62 Stat. 23;
Oct. 31, 1951, c. 652, 65 Stat. 700)
§153. TYPES OF CONTRACTS—(a) DISCRETION OF
AGENCY HEAD: WARRANTY CLAUSE
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
contracts negotiated pursuant to section 151 (c) of this title
may be of any type which in the opinion of the agency head
will promote the best interests of the Government. Every
contract negotiated pursuant to section 151 (c) of this title
shall contain a suitable warranty, as determined by the
agency head, by the contractor that no person or selling
agency has been employed or retained to solicit or secure
such contract upon an agreement or understanding for a
commission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee, ex-
cepting bona fide employees or bona fide established com-
mercial or selling agencies maintained by the contractor for
the purpose of securing business, for the breach or viola-
tion of which warranty the Government shall have the right
to annul such contract without liability or in its diseretion
to deduct from the contract price or consideration the full
amount of such commission, percentage, brokerage, or con-
tingent fee.
ODES LTE PENCE MERLE SEM ERST ! IT OLAS SIT EN RIOR LR RIC
41 U. S.C. A. 153 13a
(b) The cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of con-
tracting shall not be used, and in the case of a cost-plus-a-
fixed-fee contract the fee shall not exceed 10 per centum of
the estimated cost of the contract, exclusive of the fee, as
determined by the agency head at the time of entering into
such contract (except that a fee not in excess of 15 per
centum of such estimated cost is authorized in any such
contract for experimental developmental, or research work
and that a fee inclusive of the contractor’s costs and not in
excess of 6 per centum of the estimated cost, exclusive of
fees, as determined by the agency head at the time of enter-
ing into the contract, of the project to which such fee is
applicable is authorized in contracts for architectural or
engineering services relating to any public works or utility
project). Neither a cost nor a cost-plus-a-fixed fee contract
nor an incentive-type contract shall be used unless the
agency head determines that such method of contracting is
likely to be less costly than other methods or that it is im-
practical to secure supplies or services of the kind or
quality required without the use of a cost or cost-plus-a-
fixed-fee contract or an incentive-type contract. All cost
and cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts shall provide for advance
notification by the contractor to the procuring agency of
any subcontract thereunder on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis
and of any fixed price subcontract or purchase order which
exceeds in dollar amount either $25,000 or 5 per centum of
the total estimated cost of the prime contract; and a procur-
ing agency, through any authorized representative thereof,
shall have the right to inspect the plans and to audit the
books and records of any prime contractor or subcontractor
engaged in the performance of a cost or cost-plus-a-fixed-fee
contract.
(c) All contracts negotiated without advertising pur-
suant to authority contained in this chapter shall include
a clause to the effect that the Comptroller General of the
en ESET LE EEE BES RSH CEI BSAA E CARE Ty RO
14a 41 U.S.C. A. 154
United States or any of his duly authorized representatives
shall until the expiration of three years after final pay-
ment have access to and the right to examine any directly
pertinent books, documents, papers, and records of the con-
tractor or any of his subcontractors engaged in the per-
formance of and involving transactions related to such
contracts or subcontracts.
41 U.S. C. A. 154 (Feb. 19, 1948, c. 65, §5, 62 Stat. 24)
§154. ADVANCE PAYMENTS UNDER NEGOTIATED
CONTRACTS; TERMS
(a) The agency head may make advance payments
under negotiated contracts heretofore or hereafter exe-
cuted in any amount not exceeding the contract price upon
such terms as the parties shall agree: Provided, That ad-
vance payments shall be made only upon adequate security
and if the agency head determines that provision for such
advance payments is in the public interest or in the inter-
est of the national defense and is necessary and appro-
priate in order to procure required supplies or services
under the contract.
(b) The terms governing advance payments may in-
clude as security provision for, and upon inclusion of such
provision there shall thereby be created, a lien in favor of
the Government, paramount to all other liens, upon the
supplies contracted for, upon the credit balance in any
special account in which such payments may be deposited
and upon such of the material and other property acquired
for performance of the contract as the parties shall agree.
SEB OE IRE ML ELEN, IL OR OGG ELEY LEE IEE EAN IE ELA REG GARY _—
—
41 U. S.C. A. 255—31 U. 8. C. A. 529 lda
41 U.S. C. A. 255 (June 30, 1949, c. 288, Title III, §305,
63 Stat. 396)
§255. ADVANCE PAYMENTS ON NEGOTIATED
CONTRACTS; GOVERNING TERMS
(a) The agency head may make advance payments
under negotiated contracts heretofore or hereafter exe-
cuted in any amount not exceeding the contract price upon
such terms as the parties shall agree: Provided, That ad-
vance payments shall be made only upon adequate security
and if the agency head determines that provision for such
advance payments is in the public interest or in the inter-
est of the national defense and is necessary and appro-
priate in order to procure required supplies or services
under the contract.
(b) The terms governing advance payments may in-
clude as security provision for, and upon inclusion of such
provision there shall thereby be created, a lien in favor of
the Government, paramount to all other liens, upon the
supplies contracted for, upon the credit balance in any
special account in which such payments may be deposited
and upon such of the material and other property acquired
for performance of the contract as the parties shall agree.
31 U.S. C. A. 529; R. S. §3648; Aug. 2, 1946, c. 744,
60 Stat. 809
§529. ADVANCES OF PUBLIC MONEYS; PROHIBI-
TION AGAINST
No advance of public money shall be made in any case
unless authorized by the appropriation concerned or other
law. And in all cases of contracts for the performance
of any service, or the delivery of articles of any descrip-
LEY PE SLE ELEY PRED TINE PIE I IOC ELE NII IIE ELE LTE LLL ELLIE SEIT EP REAL SLES AEE Ra
l6a 34 U, 8. C. A. 582
tion, for the use of the United States, payment shall not
exceed the value of the service rendered, or of the articles
delivered previously to such payment. It shall, however,
be lawful, under the special direction of the President, to
make such advances to the disbursing officers of the Gov-
ernment as may be necessary to the faithful and prompt
discharge of their respective duties, and to the fulfillment
of the public engagements. The President may also direct
such advances as he may deem necessary and proper, to
persons in the military and naval service employed on
distant stations, where the discharge of the pay and emolu-
ments to which they may be entitled cannot be regularly
effected.
34 U.S. C. A. 582 (Aug. 22, 1911, c. 42, 37 Stat. 32)
§582. PARTIAL PAYMENTS DURING WORK.
The Secretary of the Navy is authorized, in his discre-
tion, to make partial payments from time to time during
the progress of the work under all contracts made under
the Navy Department for public purposes, but not in ex-
cess of the value of work already done; and the contracts
made shall provide for a lien in favor of the Government,
which lien is made paramount to all other liens, upon the
articles or thing contracted for on account of all payments
so made: Provided, That partial payments shall not be
made under such contracts except where stipulated for,
and then only in accordance with contract provisions.
50 U. S.C. A. 611 17a
50 U. S. C. A. 611 (Dec. 18, 1941, c. 593, Title II, §201, 55 Stat.
839; Jan. 12, 1951, c. 1230, §1, 64 Stat. 1257)
§611. WAR CONTRACTS EXEMPT FROM CERTAIN
RESTRICTIONS UPON AUTHORIZATION BY
PRESIDENT
The President may authorize any department or agency
of the Government exercising functions in connection with
the national defense, in accordance with regulations pre-
scribed by the President for the protection of the interests
of the Government, to enter into contracts and into amend-
ments or modifications of contracts heretofore or hereafter
made and to make advance, progress and other payments
thereon, without regard to the provisions of law relating
to the making, performance, amendment, or modification
of contracts whenever he deems such action would facilitate
the prosecution of the war: Provided, That nothing herein
shall be construed to authorize the use of the cost-plus-a-
percentage-of-cost system of contracting; Provided fur-
ther, That nothing herein shall be construed to authorize
‘any contracts in violation of existing law relating to limi-
tation of profits: Provided further, That all acts under
the authority of this section shall be made a matter of pub-
lie record under regulations prescribed by the President
and when deemed by him not to be incompatible with the
public interest: Provided further, That all contracts en-
tered into, amended, or modified pursuant to authority con-
tained in this section shall include a clause to the effect
that the Comptroller General of the United States or any
of his duly authorized representatives shall have access
to and the right to examine any pertinent books, documents,
papers, and records of the contractor or any of his sub-
contractors engaged in the performance of and involving
transactions related to such contracts or subcontracts.
a OPE TIAN FETS POMERAT LRA RI ' Mea PRN
18a Compiled Laws of Michigan 1948
211.1 Compiled Laws Michigan 1948; M. S. A. 7.1
See. 1. That all property, real and personal, within the
jurisdiction of this state, not expressly exempted, shall be
subject to taxation.
440.26 Compiled Laws Michigan 1948; M. S. A. 19.266
See. 26. Creditors’ rights against sold goods in seller’s
possession. Where a person having sold goods continues
in the possession of the goods, or of negotiable documents
of title to the goods and such retention of possession is
fraudulent in fact or is deemed fraudulent under any rule
of law, a creditor or creditors of the seller may treat the
sale as void.
566.137 Compiled Laws Michigan 1948; M. S. A. 26.926
See. 7. Every sale made by a vendor, of goods and chat-
tels in his possession, or under his control, unless the same
be accompanied by an immediate delivery, and be followed
by an actual and continued change of possession of the
things sold, shall be presumed to be fraudulent and void,
as against the creditors of the vendor, or subsequent pur-
chasers in good faith, and shall be conclusive evidence of
fraud, unless it shall be made to appear, on the part of the
persons claiming under such sale or assignment, that the
same was made in good faith, and without any intent to de-
fraud such creditors or purchasers: Provided, however,
That such presumption shall not arise in case a bill of sale
of the goods and chattels conveyed, or a true copy thereof,
shall be filed in the office of the register of deeds of the
county in which the goods or chattels are located and also
where the vendor resides except, in case such vendor is a
non-resident of the state, in which case, such bill of sale or
j
brats one cles FELLING DIE NG RBA EME BTL ERTS SS ICUS PP RAS DEY AIT
Compiled Laws of Michigan 1948 19a
true copy thereof shall be filed in the office of the register
of deeds of the county in which the goods or chattels are
located; and unless either the vendor or purchaser named
in such bill of sale, or some person having knowledge of the
facts, shall before the filing of the same, make and annex
thereto, an affidavit setting forth that the same was given
in good faith and not for the purpose of security or for
defrauding creditors of the vendor or subsequent pur-
chasers: Provided, however, That in case of motor vehicles
and other property, the registration of title to which is
otherwise expressly provided for by statute, such presump-
tion shall not arise if such statutory requirements are com-
plied with. No officer shall receive such instrument or file
same in his office until such affidavit is made and annexed
thereto: Provided, however, That where the original in-
strument bears such affidavit annexed thereto it shall he
sufficient that a copy of such instrument offered for filing
also bears a copy of such affidavit. Every person who shall
knowingly make any false statement in any such affidavit
upon conviction thereof shall be deemed guilty of the crime
of perjury: Provided, That in case the vendor is a corpora-
tion engaged in transporting passengers or freight over
fixed routes or conveying electricity or gas or telephonic or
telegraphic communication it shall be sufficient compliance
with the requirements of this act to file such bill of sale or
copy thereof with the register of deeds of each county
through which the lines or property of the vendor passes.
Copies of such bill of sale may with like effect be filed
in the office of the register of deeds of the county to which
such goods or chattels or any portion thereof may be re-
moved. This provision shall not be construed as altering
or affecting the foregoing requirements as to the office or
offices in which such bill of sale or copy thereof shal] be
filed.
oes a: se de ee
ee
is EE tae MLL OEE ACE NM stg
te
20a Opinion of the District Judge
OPINION
of Hon. Thomas P. Thornton, United States District Judge
(June 23, 1955)
The Murray Corporation, plaintiff herein, brings this
action to recover ad valorem personal property taxes as-
sessed by the City of Detroit, County of Wayne, upon
personal property in the possession of the Murray Cor-
poration, said taxes having been paid by the plaintiff
under protest. The amount assessed by the City was
$67,714.96, and that by the County was $12,572.66. The
United States of America was permitted to intervene be-
cause of the fact that it claimed ownership of the personal
property on which the assessments were made. The per-
sonal property so taxed was in the possession of the
plaintiff under letter subcontracts, under prime letter con-
tracts, for the manufacture of parts and components for
aireraft for the United States Air Force for defense pur-
poses.
The plaintiff has moved for summary judgment in its
favor, and at the hearing of this motion it was agreed
among the parties that there was no genuine issue of any
material fact, and that a summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, or in favor of the defendants would be in
order.
The Court is not unmindful of the effects of its deci-
sion in this matter. The Court has been advised that
there are many actions in this geographical area that have
been commenced, or are about to be commenced, involving
the issue which we are here called upon to resolve, and
that the aggregate of taxes involved may well be in the
neighborhood of two million dollars.
The parties to this suit have presented oral arguments
followed by the submission of successive briefs totesiing
eA TD CET I A IDE EL
Opinion of the District Judge 2la
seven in number. As previously stated, the factual picture
here presented is undisputed—not so, however, as to its
legal significance. The plaintiff is a letter subcontractor
of the Kaiser Manufacturing Corporation to which a letter
prime contract between the United States Government and
the Kaiser-Fraser Corporation was assigned by mutual
consent. The letter subcontract between the Kaiser Manu-
facturing Corporation and the plaintiff covered the manu-
faeture of specified parts and assemblies required under
the prime contract for the United States Air Force for
nationa! defense. This letter subcontract and its amend-
ments were approved by a Contracting Officer of the
United States Air Force in accordance with the require-
ments of the letter prime contract. Included in the letter
subcontract, by amendment, was the Partial Payment
Clause which is the nub of this controversy. The follow-
ing is the text of said cause:
‘11. Partial payments—Partial payments, which
are hereby defined as payments prior to delivery, on
work in progress for the Government under this
contract, may be made upon the following terms and
conditions.
‘*(a) The Contracting Officer may, from time
to time authorize partial payments to The Murray
Corporation of America (hereinafter called ‘the
Contractor’) upon property acquired or produced
by it for the performance of this contract: Pro-
vided, that such partial payments shall not exceed
90 percent of the cost to the Contractor of the
property upon which payment is made, which cost
shall be determined from evidence submitted by the
Contractor and which must be such as is satisfac-
tory to the Contracting Officer; Provided further,
that in no event shall the total of unliquidated par-
tia! payments (see (c) below) and of unliquidated
partial payments, if any, made under this contract,
— Te AE NN NY RE EES FLITE NDS eS US Ee NS SRS CORRE
22a
Opinion of the District Judge
exceed 80 percent of the contract price of supplies
still to be delivered.
**(b) Upon the making of any partial payment
under this contract, title to all parts, materials,
inventories, work in process and non-durable tools
theretofore acquired or produced by the Contractor
for the performance of this contract, and properly
chargeable hereto under sound accounting practice,
shall forthwith vest in the Government; and title
to all like property thereafter acquired or produced
by the Contractor for the performance of this con-
tract and properly chargeable thereto as aforesaid
shall vest in the Government forthwith upon said
acquisition or production; Provided, that nothing
herein shall deprive the Contractor of any further
partial or final payments due or to become due
hereunder; or relieve the Contractor, Kaiser-Frazer
Corporation, or the Government of any of their re-
spective’ rights or obligations under this contract.
‘*(e) In making payment for the supplies fur-
nished hereunder, there shall be deducted from the
contract price therefor a proportionate amount of
the partial payments theretofore made to the Con-
tractor, under the authority herein contained.
‘*(d) It is recognized that property (including,
without limitation, completed supplies, spare parts,
drawings, information, partially completed sup-
plies, work in process, materials, fabricated parts
and other things called for herein) title to which
is or may hereafter become vested in the Govern-
ment pursuant to this Article will from time to
time be used by or put in the care, custody or pos-
session of the Contractor in connection with the
performance of this contract. The Contractor,
either before or after receipt of notice of termina-
tion at the option of the Government, may acquire
or dispose of property to which title is vested in
the Government under this Article, upon terms ap-
proved by the Contracting Officer, provided, that,
PE Per ae ge ube Ren eh
ee ee iia ot ates) er PEPE eT Tee Bac aii be Ba at
Opinion of the District Judge 23a
after receipt of notice of termination, any such
property that is a part of termination inventory
may be acquired or disposed of only in accordance
with the provisions of the termination article of
this contract and applicable laws and regulations.
The agreed price (in case of acquisition by the
contractor) or the proceeds received by the Con-
tractor (in case of any other disposition), shall, to
the extent that such price and proceeds do not ex-
ceed the unliquidated balance of partial payments
hereunder, be paid or credited to the Government
as the Contracting Officer shall direct; and such
unliquidated balance shall be reduced accordingly.
Current production scrap may be sold by the Con-
tractor without approval of the Contracting Officer
but the proceeds will be applied as provided in this
paragraph (d), provided that any such scrap which
is a part of termination inventory may be sold only
in accordance with the provisions of the termina-
tion article of this contract and applicable laws and
regulations. Upon liquidation of all partial pay-
ments hereunder or upon completion of deliveries
called for by this contract, title to all property (or
the proceeds thereof) which has not been delivered
to and accepted by the Government under this con-
tract or which has not been incorporated in supplies
delivered to and accepted by the Government under
this contract and to which title has vested in the
jovernment under this Article shall vest in the
Contractor.
**(e) The article of this contract captioned
‘Liability for Government-furnished Property’ and
any other provision of this contract defining lia-
bility for Government-furnished property shall be
inapplicable to property to which the Government
shall have acquired title solely by virtue of the
provisions of this Article. The provisions of this
Article shall not relieve the Contractor from risk
of loss or destruction of or damage to property to
which title vests in the Government under the pro-
visions hereof.
24a Opinion of the District Judge
‘*(f) If this contract (as heretofore or here-
after supplemented or amended) contains provision
for Advance Payments, and in addition if at the
time any partial payment is to be made to the Con-
tractor under the provisions of this partial pay-
ments article any unliquidated balance of advance
payments is outstanding, then notwithstanding any
other provision of the Advance Payments Article
of this contract the net amount, after appropriate
deduction for liquidation of the advance payment,
of such partial payment shall be deposited in the
special bank account or accounts maintained as re-
quired by the provisions of the Advance Payments
Article, and shall thereafter be withdrawn only pur-
suant to such provisions.”’
The plaintiff herein was a letter subcontractor also of
the Wright Aeronautical Corporation, later merged with
Curtiss-Wright Corporation, and the same situation pre-
vailed in its relationship to Curtiss-Wright as did with re-
spect to its relationship to the Kaiser Manufacturing Cor-
poration insofar as pertains to the issues with which we
are here concerned—the terms of the Partial Payment
Clause and approval of their inclusion in the letter sub-
contracts by the Contracting Officer of the United States
Air Force.
The assessment date here in question was January 1,
1952. During the calendar year 1951 the plaintiff made
formal written requests at various intervais, and in vary-
ing amounts for payments to it by its two contractors—
Kaiser Manufacturing Corporation and Curtiss-Wright
Corporation—in accordance with the Partial Payment
Clauses contained in the respective letter subcontracts.
Said requests were audited and approved by a Contract-
ing Officer of the United States Air Force. On October
12, 1951, partial payment in the amount of $163,949.20,
TIT IT LEENA AR, ELA RIE OI TINS LER TIT IONE TET
Opinion of the District Judge 25a
representing the aggregate amount of the requests, was
made by the Kaiser Manufacturing Corporation to plain-
tiff, and on December 31, 1951, a payment of $510,827.67
was similarly made by Curtiss-Wright to plaintiff.
The position of the plaintiff is that it has paid taxes
which were unlawfully assessed to it, and that the assess-
ment is illegal and void. Plaintiff contends:
I. The tax assessed is an ad valorem tax assessed upon
the property and not a privelege tax assessed against the
taxpayer.
Il. Property owned by the Federal Government is im-
mune from local aed valorem property tax.
Ili. The question of title under procurement contracts
entered into pursuant to Federal Procurement statutes
and constitutional authority presents a Federal question
for determiaation by Federal courts under Federal law
exclusively, and is in nowise subject to, or controlled by
the law of any state.
IV. Partial payment clauses vesting title in the Fed-
eral Goverrment were fully authorized and effective.
V. Under the partial payment clauses title to the prop-
erty here in question was vested in the United States
Government on assessment day, January 1, 1952. This
was absolute title——not bare lien or security title.
VI. Equitable arguments advanced by defendants, City
of Detroit and County of Wayne, have been fully and
completely rejected by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
VII. Murray is the real party in interest and the
proper party to bring this action.
RSET UEP TARE Etre gaa PUES? 2 , APPAR
oy
26a Opinion of the District Judge
VIII. There is nothing in the conduct of the parties
inconsistent with the vesting of absolute title, or which
could divest the United States Government of such title.
IX. The taxes were not paid voluntarily, but under
protest.
The United States contends that the assessment was
based on property of the United States and was constitu-
ionally invalid. It reasons that the ownership of the
property was vested in the United States when the assess-
ment was made, said ownership having vested at the time
of the making of partial payments in accordance with the
Partial Payment Clause, which was fully authorized. It
also devotes some of its argument to the proposition that
the Murray Corporation is the real party in interest.
In direct opposition to the contentions of the plaintiff
and to those of the United States, the position of the
City of Detroit is that:
I. The partial payment and transfer of title clause
was not authorized, nor was it in conformance with the
Federal statutes.
II. The inclusion of the above clause would not defeat
an ad valorem tax on personal property in the hands
of an independent subcontractor acquired in the course
of carrying out provisions of a subcontract for defense
production.
III. The course of action and dealing with the prop-
erty was inconsistent with the vesting of absolute title;
the Government, therefore, was given only a lien or title
for security purposes, leaving plaintiff with an equitable
title in said personal property which was still subject to
an ad valorem property tax.
Opinion of the District Judge 27a
The position of the County of Wayne is aligned with
that of the City of Detroit. It contends that the Murray
Corporation is not the real party in interest. It also con-
tends that the Contracting Officer had no authority to au-
thorize the prime contractor to include the Partial Pay-
ment Clause or to include the provision for the passage
of title from the subcontractor to the Government in the
contracts between the prime and the subcontractors. Both
the City and the County stand firm in their conviction as
to the validity of the tax in question,
It is the County of Wayne which urges so strongly the
proposition that plaintiff here is in non-compliance with
Rule 17 (a) F. R. C. P. The City fails to raise this point,
which may or may not be significant. In any event the
theory of the County is that the plaintiff has recovered
the major portion of the taxes paid by passing it on to
the prime contractor, and that plaintiff therefore has sus-
tained no loss and, as a result, has no right to bring this
action. The theory of the plaintiff is that the person hav-
ing the right sought te be enforced, by substantive law,
is the real party in ircerest, and that it is the law of the
State which determines what is the substantive law. Under
Michigan law (M. S. A. 7.97) it is the person paying a tax
such as this who may sue for refund. There is no claim
made by the County that the plaintiff assigned its claim
for the tax refund. It merely claims that because the
amount of such tax was included as an item of plaintiff’s
cost in billing the prime contractor that plaintiff has de-
prived itself of the right to sue for refund. The cases to
this effect cited by the County are inapposite. The Court
is constrained to conclude that the argument of the County
on this issue is specious.
The next point for discussion has to do with the validity
of the inclusion of the Partial Payment Clause in the let-
ee PS LEMPE ATEN
28a Opinion of the District Judge
ter subcontracts. Both County and City contend that the
authority for such procedure was lacking. Before making
any comment upon the merit of this point, it occurs to the |
Court that there is some doubt concerning the propriety
of a collateral attack by a city and a county upon the
validity of a provision in a contract existing between par-
ties to such contract when neither city nor county is it-
self party to said contract, and when the overall picture
is as it is here. Such an issue may well be one that this
Court should decline to resolve. None of the parties to the
prime contract, or to the subeontract, contests the au-
thority of the United States to include the Partial Payment
Clause. It may well be that such authority might be
properly questioned in a direct proceeding by the proper
parties. Be that as it may, we are persuaded that the
Partial Payment Clause herein is not invalid for want
of authority, or for non-conformance with Federal stat-
utes.
The point at issue most strongly debated, and having
the greatest merit, is the effect of the Partial Payment
Clause. There is no disagreement on the proposition that
local government may not tax property owned by the
Federal Government. Whether the personal property here
assessed was owned hy the Federal Government in the
sense that it could not be taxed at a local level is the
issue. A reading of the Partial Payment Clause leaves
no doubt that, upon the making of a partial payment,
title to parts, materials, etce., acquired for the performance
of the contract vests in the United States Government as
does title to all property subsequently acquired for the
performance of the contract.
It is the position of the City of Detroit that the trans-
fer of title upon the making of partial payment is effec-
tive to create a lien, that the title of the United States to
CF Fo Ee Se Ree PEATE IM CE RN aOR
Opinion of the District Judge 29a
the property in question is security title only, and that
plaintiff still remains the beneficial owner. The City cites
numerous eases which it claims support this contention.
In many, analogy is drawn to an equitable mortgage situa-
tion where, although title be transferred, said title is
merely for security purposes, and is treated by the Courts
as such. The City cites 9. R. A. Inc. v. Minnesota, 327
U. S. 558 (1945) as authority for the proposition that
despite the transfer of legal title here, the plaintiff still
retained beneficial interest subject to taxation by the
state. It is not perceived that the holding in this case
supports the City’s position. If the reasoning there used
and quoted in the brief of the City be applied here, the
argument of the City must fail. In that case the United
States had contracted to sell land. The State sought to
tax the realty at a time when the United States still held
legal title. The Court held that it might do so—that the
contract for the purchase of the land transferred the
equity to the vendee and that the vendor, United States,
retained only a legal title as security. The Court also
went on to state that the ‘‘possibility of repossession by
the United States is not enough to block a tax sale in
which the paramount rights of the United States are pro-
tected.”? S. R. A. Inc. v. Minnesota, swpra, 566. In the
instant case the United States is the vendee of the as-
sessed property. It has contracted with the prime con-
tractor for the manufacture of aircraft sub-assemblies for
delivery to it, for use by it, to be paid for by it, and to be
fully and completely owned by it in every sense of the
word ownership. It is submitted that title held for secur-
ity purposes is a title that is intended to be relinquished,
and whose forward look is transfer to a vendee, or re-
transfer to a mortgagor. Such title is temporary in
nature, and it is so regarded by the parties. The City
30a Opinion of the District Judge
offers numerous arguments—all very creditable and well
presented—to the effect that, although bare legal title
passed to the United States, the equitable title remained
in the plaintiff. The brief of the City devotes some time
to a so-called ‘‘course of conduct and dealing with the
property in question inconsistent with the claim of abso-
lute title in the Government.’’ In its printed brief, at
page 50, the City lists ten ‘‘salient facts’’ as illustrative
of the inconsistent course of conduct. In view of the
type of sub-contract here involved, the scope of the opera-
tion, the practical exigencies existent, these ten ‘‘salient
facts’’ are not persuasive when balanced against what is
viewed to be an overriding consideration.
A type of contract whose ultimate purpose is specifica-
tion manufacturing for a purchaser under which title is
to pass before delivery, but after partial payment, appears
to this Court to be a far ery from any customary lien or
security situation. There is no contention here that the
United States is at any time to re-transfer title to the
manufactured product(s) back to the plaintiff once the
plaintiff has performed the necessary conditions. There
is no mere lien here which the United States might fore-
close. Might it be legally said that if the plaintiff failed
to complete the manufacturing that the United States
could not take possession of the property in question and
assign it to another manufacturer for completion?
It was intended by the parties that plaintiff was to
manufacture certain sub-assemblies according to specifica-
tion which would become the property of the purchaser,
United States. The fact of future delivery is not deter-
minative of ownership. The fact of contractual agree-
ment is—such agreement stipulating the time for passage
of title. Why should plain, unambiguous language be dis-
torted so as to convert a legal title holder to a lienor be-
Pe ee ee A Ne toe era ee i Di RT
Opinion of the District Judge Bla
cause persons not party to the contract contend that title
passed prematurely? If a lien situation is to be construed,
it could only be in favor of the plaintiff as to labor and
materials not paid for (without considering for the mo-
ment the legality of a lien on Government property).
In summing up, it appears that the position of the de-
fendants here, in order to be maintained, requires a forced
construction of the contracts involved, whereas a natural
construction does violence to no legal or equitable con-
cepts. It is therefore concluded that summary judgment
should be entered for the plaintiffs, and an order may be
presented accordingly.
Dated at Detroit, Michigan, this 23rd day of June,
A. D. 1955.
THOMAS P. THORNTON (signed),
United States District Judge.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.