Petition for Writ of Certiorari — California v. United States

SUBJECT INDEX

Opinions below

PAGE

Jurisdiction

Questions presented

Statutes involved

Statement

Specification of errors to be urged

Reasons for granting the writ

Conclusion

Appendix. Pertinent statutory provisions

App. p. 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases PAGE

Adams v. United States, 319 U. S. 312, 63 S. Ct. 1122, 87 L.

Ed. 1221 és ‘ 13

Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439, 49 S. Ct. 227, 73

L. Ed. 447 15

Atkinson v. State Tax Comm., 156 Ore. 461, @ P. 24 161... 16

Brooke v. State, 155 Ala. 78, 46 So. 491 . 16

Collins v. Yosemite Park and Curry Company, 304 U. S. 518,

58 S. Ct. 1009, 82 L. Ed. 1502... 16, 18

Fort Leavenworth Railroad v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 5 S. Ct. 995,

29 L. Ed. 264 15

James v. Dravo Contracting Company, 302 U. S. 134, 58 S. Ct.

208, 82 L. Ed. 155 14

Johnson v. Morrill, 20 Cal. 2d 446, 126 P. 2d 873 16

LaDuke v. Melin, 45 N. D. 349, 177 N. W. 673 16

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Linthicum, 183 Atl.

531 16

Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S. 399, 16 S. Ct. 837, 40 L, Ed. 1015 15

Silas Mason Company, Inc. v. State Tax Comm. of the State

of Washington, 302 U. S. 186, 58 S. Ct. 233, 82 L. Ed. 187.... 15

United States v. Tully, 140 Fed. 899. 16

Valley County v. Thomas, 109 Mont. 345, 97 P. OE PR icin “16

STATUTES

Act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stats. 651)

Act of October 9, 1940, Sec. 1 (54 Stats. 1083) 5

Act of October 9, 1940, Sec. 2 (54 Stats. 1083)

United States Code, Title 16, Sec. 47e 17

United States Code, Title 16, Sec. 45a 17

United States Code, Title 16, Sec. 51 17

United States Code, Title 16, Sec. 78 4

United States Code, Title 16, Sec. 80.

United States Code, Title 16, Sec.

United States Code, Title 16, Sec.

United States Code, Title 16, Sec.

United States Code, Title 16, Sec.

United States Code, Title 16, Sec.

United States Code, Title 16, Sec.

United States Code, Title 16, Sec.

United States Code, Title 16, Sec.

United States Code, Title 16, Sec.

United States Code, Title 16, Sec.

United States Code, Title 16, Sec.

United States Code, Title 16, Sec.

United States Code, Title 18, Sec.

United States Code, Title 28, Sec.

United States Code, Title 40, Sec.

80a. 5, 11

16le 17

167a 17

192b 17

243 17

25la 17

261 17

343b ... 17

403h-11 17

404c-11 17

424b 17

471d 4

7, Subd. 3 3, 10, 12, 16

1254(1) 2

255 3, 9, 13, 16, 17

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1951.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA and Harry THEODORE PETERSEN,

IpA PETERSEN, CLAYTON LEON DAIGLE and AZILE

Caro, DalIcLe, Individually and as a co-partnership

doing business as “The Lodge,”

Petitioners,

US.

UnITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The State of California, and Harry Theodore Petersen,

Ida Petersen, Clayton Leon Daigle and Azile Carol Daigle,

individually and as a co-partnership doing business as

“The Lodge,” pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue to

review the Judgment entered in this case on August 2,

1951, by the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit affirming a judgment of the District Court

holding that the United States has exclusive jurisdiction

of a village on private property within the confines of a

national park.

a ee

Opinions Below.

The opinion of the District Court is reported in 91

Fed. Supp. 209. The opinion of the Court of Appeals

[R. 90-96] has not yet been reported.

Jurisdiction.

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

August 2, 1951. [R.97.] The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under 28 U. S. C. 1254(1).

Questions Presented.

1. When California ceded to the United States ex-

clusive jurisdiction for the establishment of General Grant

National Park and later for Kings Canyon National Park,

and the acts of cession provided among other things that

“exclusive jurisdiction shall be and the same is hereby

ceded to the United States over and within all of the

territory which is now or may hereafter be included in

those several tracts of land in the State of California

set aside and dedicated for park purposes by the United

States” did such acts of cession affect only lands “set

aside and dedicated for park purposes by the United

States”?

2. Did such acts of cession also affect all property

within the exterior boundary line, even though such prop-

erty had never been dedicated for park purposes, was

not owned or controlled by the United States, was pri-

ro

a

vately owned, and where the state had been exercising

exclusive jurisdiction until this controversy arose?

3. Whether the United States District Court has

jurisdiction under 18 U. S: C. Section 7, subdivision 3,

over an alleged offense of selling alcoholic beverages with-

out a license from the Department of Interior where the

sale is not on “land reserved or acquired for the use of

the United States.”

4. Whether the legal philosophy of the relationship

between the various states and the United States has been

and is that the United States does not acquire exclusive

territorial jurisdiction over any parcel of land (other

than District of Columbia) unless the United States is

the owner of the land in question.

5. Whether the United States may take jurisdiction

from a state under 40 U. S. C., Section 255, if the United

States is not the owner of the land in question as_ pro-

vided by said Section 255.

Statutes Involved.

The pertinent statutory provisions will be found in the

appendix.

*

ost

Statement.

By an Act approved October 1, 1890, Congress re-

served and withdrew “from settlement, occupancy and

sale” and set apart as reserved forest land four sections

of land which, until 1940, comprised General Grant Na-

tional Park. This Act did not affect any bona fide entry

of land made before the effective date of the Act. [R.

71, 26 Stats. 651, 16 U. S. C., §471d.] This Act

did not establish General Grant National Park, but ap-

parently the park was established in the following dec-

ade. (16 U. S. C., §78.) In 1891 the Legislature of

California passed a statute which gave the United States

exclusive jurisdiction over all land ceded or conveyed to

the United States during the time the United States shall

be or remain the owner thereof. (App. p. 1.) In

1919 the Legislature of California passed an act ceding

exclusive jurisdiction to the United States ‘over and with-

in all of the territory which is now or may hereafter be

included in those several tracts of land in the State of

California set aside and dedicated for park purposes by

the United States” for various national parks, including

General Grant National Park. [R. 57.] In 1920 Con-

gress adopted an act providing that full and exclusive

jurisdiction was assumed by the United States over the

territory embraced and included within General Grant

National Park, Yosemite National Park and Sequoia

National Park. [R. 58.] In 1940 Congress established

Kings Canyon National Park and at the same time abol-

ished General Grant National Park, but made it a part

of Kings Canyon National Park and provided that in the

future it would be known as the General Grant grove

section of said park. [R. 59.] In 1943, the Legislature

a

of California ceded to the United States exclusive juris-

diction “over and within all of the territory which is

now or may hereafter be included in those several tracts

of land in the State of California set aside and dedicated

for park purposes by the United States as ‘Kings Can-

yon National Park.’” [R. 59-60.]

The area involved in this proceeding is in an unincor-

porated village which is located in Section 5, Township

14, Range 28 east, Mount Diablo base and meridian.

Section 5 of Township 14 was one of the four original

sections of General Grant National Park. When Kings

Canyon National Park was established, land extending

one-half mile east of Section 5 was added. The area

therefore is within the exterior boundary lines of Kings

Canyon National Park. [R. 55, 71.] The particular

area has never been dedicated and set aside for park

purposes by the United States. [R. 55-57.] The area

in question was not described in Section J] of the Act of

Congress of 1940 establishing Kings Canyon National

Park, wherein a vast tract of specifically described prop-

erty was withdrawn “from settlement, occupancy and

disposal,” and was dedicated and set apart as a public

~ park. (16 U.S. C., §80.) Section 2 of the Act added

certain additional lands, and then provided that, “the

lands formerly within the General Grant National Park,

' California, and particularly described as follows, to-wit:

All of sections 31 and 32, township 13 south, range 28

east, and sections 5 and 6, township 14 south, range 28

east, of the same meridian, are, subject to valid existing

rights, hereby added to and made a part of the Kings

Canyon National Park and such lands shall be known as

the General Grant grove section of the said park.” (16

U. S. C., §80a.)

saute

The Secretary of the Interior gave notice to the Gov-

ernor of California on April 25, 1945, of the acceptance

o* jurisdiction by the United States as follows:

“Notice is hereby given, in accordance with the

provisions of the act of October 9, 1940 (54 Stat.

1083; 40 U. S. C., Sec. 255) that, effective as of

the Ist day of June, 1945, at 12 m., Pacific War

Time, the United States accepts exclusive jurisdic-

tion over all lands now included in Kings Canyon

National Park. These lands are particularly de-

scribed in the act of March 4, 1940 (54 Stat. 41),

establishing the park, and in proclamation No. 2411,

issued by the President of the United States on

June 21, 1940 (54 Stat. 2710; 3 C. F. R., Cum. Supp.,

163), adding certain lands to the park under autho-

rity contained in section 2 of the said act.” [R.

60-61. ]

The petitioners, except the State of California, are

a co-partnership which operates a restaurant and a tav-

ern, known as “The Lodge,” where alcoholic beverages

are sold. [R. 55.] For simplicity in this petition, the

group of petitioners except the State of California, will

be referred to as “petitioners Petersen.” “The Lodge”

is located in Wilsonia Village, which is in section 5,

township 14 south, range 28 east, Mount Diablo Meridian

in the County of Tulare, State of California. [R. 55.]

Wilsonia Village consists of approximately 120 acres

which have been divided into approximately 500 parcels

and contains about 243 homes. This is a part of a tract

ae

of 160 acres which was originally patented on October

15, 1891, to one Daniel M. Perry. [R. 55-57.] Other

than being entirely surrounded by a national park, Wil-

sonia Village is no different than any other unincor-

porated community in California. What governmental

service is required is performed by the county and state.

There is established, pursuant to the laws of the State

of California, a County Fire District. The State Di-

vision of Forestry and the County Fire District maintains

fire fighting equipment at Wilsonia Village. [R. 67.]

Elementary schools have been established and maintained

for residents of Wilsonia Village, one such school having

been conducted on government land until a few years

ago when the enrollment fell below the required mini-

mum. [R. 68.]

On November 26, 1947, the petitioners Petersen ap-

plied to the Department of Interior for a permit to sell

alcoholic beverages at “The Lodge.” The application was

denied on March 3, 19*8. The petitioners Petersen did

not and do not hold any permit from any federal agency

for the sale of liquor. [R. 64.] On April 15, 1948, the

petitioners Petersen applied to the State Board of Equali-

zation of the State of California for a seasonal on-sale

alcoholic beverage license, pursuant to the provisions of

the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of California. A

protest was filed on behalf of the National Park Service

on the ground that the United States claimed exclusive

jurisdiction over private lands in Kings Canyon National

Park. The matter came on for hearing before the Board

-— =

itself, pursuant to notice given to all parties. After con-

sideration thereof, the Board of Equalization issued the

seasonal license on July 22, 1948. The license has been

in effect ever since on a seasonal basis. [R. 64-65.]

Five days later, the Regional Director of the National

Park Service at San Francisco notified the petitioners

Petersen by letter that the National Park Service did not

recognize the jurisdiction of the State Board of Equaliza-

tion either to grant or deny the liquor license, and that

any sale of liquor at “The Lodge” without a permit from

the Park Service would subject the petitioners Petersen

to prosecution. [R. 66.] Over one year later this action

was commenced in the United States District Court for

an injunction to restrain the sale of liquor without a

license. [R. 2-10.] The State of California, by stipula-

tion, intervened as a defendant in the proceeding. [R.

15-16.] Sixty-three other residents, owners of summer

homes in Wilsonia Village, also were permitted to inter-

vene as defendants in the District Court. [R. 56, 68.]

The District Court refused to issue the injunction on

the ground that there was an adequate remedy at law, but

determined that it was a matter where a declaratory judg-

ment could be issued and did render a declaratory judg-

ment in favor of the United States. [R. 74, 75-77.]

The petitioners Petersen and the State of California

appealed to the Circuit Court which affirmed the Judg-

ment of the District Court. [R. 77-78, 97.]

~~

Specification of Errors to Be Urged.

The Court of Appeals erred:

1. In holding that the act of cession of the State of

California in ceding exclusive jurisdiction to the United

States was not limited by its very terms to property “set

aside and dedicated for park purposes by the United

States.”

2. In holding that the Secretary of Interior, contrary

to 54 Stat. 1083, 40 U. S. C., §255, had authority to

and did accept, on behalf of the United States, exclusive

jurisdiction over lands or interests therein which had not

been acquired by the United States and which was not

under his immediate jurisdiction, custody or control.

3. In holding that the State of California has ceded

to the United States and that the United States has ac-

cepted from the State of California the exclusive juris-

diction over that area of privately owned property known

as Wilsonia Village.

4. In holding in effect that the tract of privately

owned land comprising Wilsonia Village “was dedicated

and set apart for park purposes by the United States.”

5. In holding that the United States courts have ter-

ritorial jurisdiction of offenses committed within or on

lands not reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of

the United States.

6. In holding that a liquor license for premises un

privately owned property in Wilsonia Village should be

issued by the National Park Service under regulations of

the Secretary of Interior and not by the State Board of

Equalization of the State of California, pursuant to the

laws of California.

_— on

Reasons for Granting the Writ.

The decisions of the courts below mark a definite re-

versal of the relationship between the States of the Union

and the United States since the establishment of this

government. Until this controversy arose and to the

present time the State of California and the County of

Tulare have exercised such governmental functions and

powers as were necessary in Wilsonia Village. The de-

cisions of the courts below strike down the propriety of

the State of California exercising any governmental func-

tions in Wilsonia Village. The petitioners believe that

these decisions extend by implication the expressed words

of the various acts of the Legislature of California in

ceding jurisdiction to the United States; that the de-

cisions purport to confer territorial jurisdiction upon the

United States District Courts contrary to 18 U. S. C.,

§7, subd. 3; and, that such decisions are contrary to

the legal philosophy not only embodied in the decisions of

this Court, but also in the Acts of Congress on the rela-

tionship between the national government and the various

states, that is, that exclusive jurisdiction is not acquired

by the United States unless the property in question is

owned and controlled by the United States. ‘a

1. In 1919 the Legislature of California enacted a

ceding statute providing that “exclusive jurisdiction shall

be and the same is hereby ceded to the United States over

and within all of the territory which is now or may

hereafter be included in those several tracts of land in

the State of California set aside and dedicated for park

purposes by the United States. . . .” The courts

below have determined that since Wilsonia Village is

within the exterior boundaries of the park that therefore

it is “included within those several tracts of land.”

owiliins

However, the language of the Act of Cession confines the

cession to those several tracts of land set aside and dedi-

cated for park purposes. Wilsonia Village and the par-

ticular property in question has never been dedicated and

set aside for park purposes. Obviously the Legislature

in ceding jurisdiction to the national government was

attempting to conform its action to the action of the na-

tional government in setting aside and dedicating property

for park purposes. Furthermore, the Legislature was

not only looking to the action of the national govern-

ment as it had existed, but also as it might occur in the

future, for it provided that the territory which is now

included and may hereafter be included in those several

tracts set aside and dedicated for purposes. Both the

present cession of jurisdiction and the future cession of

jurisdiction was predicated upon the premise that the

property would be dedicated for park purposes by the

United States.

In 1940, when Congress established Kings Canyon Na-

tional Park (16 U. S. C., §80), it described by metes

and bounds a vast area of property, but not including this

property, and provided that such property is reserved and

withdrawn from “settlement, occupancy, or disposal” un-

der the laws of the United States, and is “dedicated and

set apart as a public park.” The second section of the

act (16 U. S. C., §80a) abolished General Grant Na-

tional Park but provided that the lands formerly in such

park would be known as the General Grant grove section

of Kings Canyon National Park. This section of the

act added certain adjoining lands on the east, extending

the easterly boundary about one-half mile, and provided

that certain lands (generally to the south) could be added

by Presidential Proclamation. This act provided, among

=

other things, that “the lands formerly within the Gen-

eral Grant National Park, California, and particularly

described as follows, to-wit: All of sections 31 and 32,

township 13 south, range 28 east, and sections 5 and 6,

township 14 south, range 28 east, of the same meridian

are, subject to valid existing rights, hereby added to and

made a part of the Kings Canyon National Park and

such lands shall be known as the General Grant grove

section of said park.”

It is plain from the act establishing Kings Canyon

National Park that Congress did not intend to include

Wilsonia Village in such park. The act, in referring to

sections 31 and 32 of township 13, says, “All of sections

31 and 32”; but no such language is found with reference

to sections 5 and 6 of to..nship 14. Furthermore, if it

was the intention of Congress to include Wilsonia Village

in Kings Canyon National Park, there would have been

no occasion to use the words, “subject to valid existing

rights” with reference to sections 5 and 6 of township 14.

It is clear that the acts of Congress and the acts of the

Legislature of California relate only to property dedicated

and set aside for park purposes. This, of necessity limits

the land to government owned land.

2. The courts below have held that the petitioners

Petersen may be prosecuted criminally for conducting their

business without a license issued by the Department of

Interior. In so holding, the courts below have held con-

trary to the specific provisions of Title 18, U. S. Code, §7,

subd. 3, relating to the criminal jurisdiction of the United

=_

States courts. This section provides that the term “spe-

cial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United

States” as used in this title includes:

“3. Any land reserved or acquired for the use of

the United States and under the exclusive or con-

current jurisdiction thereof. ~

None of the property in Wilsonia Village is reserved or

acquired for the use of the United States.

The decision in the instant case is directly contrary to

the case of Adams v. United States, 319 U. S. 312, 63

S. Ct. 1122, 87 L. Ed. 1221. The ultimate question to be

determined was whether Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, was

within the Federal criminal jurisdiction. In that case

the government had acquired title to the land at the time

of the crime, but it had not given notice as required by the

Act of October 9, 1940. (40 U. S. C., §255.) This

Court held that since the government had not accepted

jurisdiction in the manner required by the act, the Fed-

eral court had no jurisdiction over the proceeding. In

the instant case, the government has given notice, but has

not acquired the land.

This act (40 U. S. C., §255) requires the concurrence

of two events before the United States obtains exclusive

jurisdiction: i. ¢., first, the acquisition of the land, and

second, the giving of the required notice. If either step

is omitted, the United States does not acquire exclusive

jurisdiction. The claim of exclusive jurisdiction in Wil-

sonia Village is contrary to the express terms of this act

—the very act that the Secretary of Interior gave notice

under.

3. The legal philosophy of the relationship between

the various states and the national government ever since

— =

the founding of the Union has been that the United States

does not have exclusive jurisdiction to any parcel of land

(other than the District of Columbia) unless the United

States (1) is the owner of the parcel of land involved,

(2) has affirmatively accepted exclusive jurisdiction, and

(3) uses it, directly or indirectly, for a federal purpose.

In James v. Dravo Contracting Company, 302 U. S.

134, 58 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155, the question involved

was whether the Dravo Contracting Company, a Pennsyl-

vania corporation, was liable for a tax to the State of

West Virginia on the gross receipts on a group of con-

tracts with the United States for the construction of

locks and dams in the Kenawha River and Ohio River.

This Court held that the title to the beds of the rivers

were in the state and that although the Federal govern-

ment may have paramount authority for the construction

of the dams and locks, nevertheless the title was in the

state. This Court points out that the transfer of legis-

lative jurisdiction carries with it not only benefits but obli-

gations, and it may be highly desirable in the interests

of both the national government and the state that the

latter should not be entirely ousted from its jurisdiction.

The possible importance of reserving to the state juris-

diction for local purposes which involve no interference

with the governmental functions is being more and more

clear as the activities of the government expand, and large

areas within the states are acquired. The Court con-

cluded that as far as the territorial jurisdiction is con-

cerned, the state had authority to lay the tax with respect

to the activities of the contracting company carried on at

the respective dam sites.

This Court arrived at a similar decision in Silas Mason

Company, Inc. v. State Tax Commission of the State of

sesilliee

Washington, 302 U. S. 186, 58 S. Ct. 233, 82 L. Ed. 187,

which involved an occupation tax of the State of Wash-

ington for work performed in connection with the uild-

ing of Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River.

This fundamental premise that the government must

own the land and use it for the purpose for which it was

acquired has been consistently applied by this Court from

the earliest decisions to the present date. Thus in Fort

Leavenworth Railroad v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 542, 5

S. Ct. 995, 29 L. Ed. 264, it was held that the jurisdiction

granted by a state is necessarily temporary, to be exercised

only so long as the place is continued to be used for the

public purpose for which the property was acquired or

reserved from sale. When the property ceases to be used

for such purpose, the jurisdiction reverts to the state.

In Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S. 399, 16 S. Ct. 837, 40

L. Ed. 1015, this Court held that since the land in ques-

tion was not being used for the purpose for which it was

acquired, that exclusive jurisdiction of the United States

over the land was at least suspended while a lease which

had been made by the government to the City of Brooklyn

remained in force.

In Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439, 49 S.

Ct. 227, 73 L. Ed. 447, private interests under lease from

the government operated a hotel on government owned

land in Hot Springs Military Reservation. The State of

Arkansas had ceded to the United States exclusive juris-

diction over the military reservation which embraced a

small hospital site and a contiguous parcel on which the

hotel was being operated. This court held that the hos-

pital and hotel site were within the jurisdiction of the

United States because of the federal purpose to which

the springs and hospital were devoted; and that they prop-

— a

erly included the hotel, which was operated for the con-

venience of persons seeking the benefit of the springs, and

offered means whereby the public might be aided by sur-

plus water not needed by the hospital. The land was

owned by the government, and although the hotel was

operated privately, it was done so for a federal purpose.

The decisions of the Supreme Courts of the various

states and the lower Federal courts are in harmony with

this principle. These include, United States v. Tully, 140

Fed. 899 (D. Mont.); Valley County v. Thomas, 109

Mont. 345, 97 P. 2d 345; Brooke v. State, 155 Ala. 78,

46 So. 491; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v.

Linthicum, 183 Atl. 531; Atkinson v. State Tax Comm.,

156 Ore. 461, 67 P. 2d 161; Johnson v. Morrill, 20 Cal.

2d 446, 126 P. 2d 873; LaDuke v. Melin, 45 N. D. 349,

177 N. W. 673.

There is no case holding, and it has not been previously

contended, that the United States acquires jurisdiction by

encirclement.

The petitioners recognize the principle stated by this

Court in Collins v. Yosemite Park and Curry Company,

304 U. S. 518, 58 S. Ct. 1009, 82 L. Ed. 1502, that the

states of the Union and the national government tmay

make mutually satisfactory arrangements as to jurisdic-

tion of territory within their borders, and thus, in a

most effective way, cooperatively adjust problems flowing

from our dual system of government. But neither this

case nor any of the other decisions of this Court part

from the principle that the United States does not have

exclusive jurisdiction of any parcel of land unless it is

the owner of the parcel of land involved. This is recog-

nized in 18 U. S. Code, §7, subd. 3; in 40 U. S. Code,

§255; and by the numerous acts of Congress establishing

x

the various national parks. The various acts of Congress

establishing national parks authorize the Secretary of

Interior to acquire privately owned land. These statutes

provide that when title to the privately owned land has

been vested in the United States, all of the land described

shall be added to and become part of the particular park

and shall be subject to all laws and regulations applicable

thereto. (16 U. S. C., §47e, 51, 45a, 16le, 167a, 192b,

243, 25la, 261, 343b, 404c-11, 424b, 403h-11.)

4. The United States attempts to claim exclusive

jurisdiction of Wilsonia Village contrary to the expressed

terms of the statute authorizing the United States to

accept jurisdiction. The Secretary of the Interior, by

letter dated April 21, 1945, to the Governor of California,

stated among other things that he was giving notice pur-

suant to 40 U. S. C., §255, that the United States ac-

cepts exclusive jurisdiction over all lands now included in

Kings Canyon National Park. [R. 61.] However, this

statute specifically relates to title to land to be purchased

by the United States and acquisition by the United States

of jurisdiction over such lands. It provides that no

public money shall be expended upon any site or land

purchased by the United States unless certain conditions

are met. The last paragraph of the section provides that

“notwithstanding any other provision of law, the obtain-

ing of exclusive jurisdiction in the United States over

lands or interests therein which have been or shall here-

after be acquired by it shall not be required”; but the

head of any department may “accept or secure from the

State in which any lands or interests therein under his

immediate jurisdiction, custody, or control are situated,

consent to or cession of such jurisdiction, exclusive or

partial, not heretofore obtained” by the filing of a notice

=

of such acceptance. The last sentence provides: ‘Unless

and until the United States has accepted jurisdiction over

lands hereafter to be acquired as aforesaid, it shall be

conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been

accepted.” Thus it will be seen that the Act of Congress

by which the Secretary of the Interior claims to accept

exclusive jurisdiction on behalf of the United States spe-

cifically provides that the land shall be acquired by the

United States. Therefore, it follows, that the United

States did not acquire exclusive jurisdiction of Wilsonia

Village.

It is unfortunate that this proceeding arose over the

issuance of a liquor license. The objection by the Park

Service to its issuance did not relate in any way to the

conduct of the business, to the liquor business itself, to

public welfare or morals, nor to any detriment of any

kind to the national park. If the operation of this busi-

ness is illegal it necessarily follows that the operation of

all other businesses within Wilsonia Village, the grocery

store, the hotel, the barber shop, or whatever else there is,

is likewise illegal. It is pointed out by this Court in

Collins v. Yosemite Park and Curry Company, supra

(304 U. S. 518, 58 S. Ct. 1009, 82 L. Ed. 1502), thag all

business in a national park is carried on by a concession

issued by the Department of the Interior. We believe that

the inaction by the Government for sixty years constitutes

an administrative determination that exclusive jurisdic-

tion was never ceded. If the decision of the courts below

stand, then it has been illegal for the State of California

and the County of Tulare to conduct any of their govern-

mental functions, such as the building of roads, police

protection, fire protection, sanitation, operation of schools,

and the establishment of the County Fire District.

— =

Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons we respectfully submit that

this Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Epmunp G. Brown,

Attorney General of the

State of California,

WALTER L. Bowers,

Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for the Petitioner, State of California.

BAYARD RHONE,

Deputy Attorney General,

Of Counsel.

BERTRAM W. GEARHART,

Attorney for Petitioners, Harry Theodore

Petersen, et al.

ELmorE WINKLER,

Of Counsel.