Opposition Brief — Sandroff v. United States

INDEX

Page

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_ Statutes, regulations, and rules involved-_------.------------- 2

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CITATIONS

Cases:

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3 Se F. MEMUOTEND, GON APs TR Bbw ccwncecbacneenncucda 11

4 Glasser v. United States, 315 U. 8. 60.--..-.------------ 8

4 Hyde v. United States, 225 U. 8. 347........------------ 11

4 Sandroff v. United States, 158 F. 2d 623__...-.-..------ 3, 8, 10

4 Thornton v. United States, 271 U. 8. 414._-..--.--------- 8

3 United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F. 2d 229, certio-

g Se GUNG A OE, Oa wind vnnicrgncscecesennanssod 16

4 United States v. Karavias, 170 F. 2d 968____--.--------- 17

F. Williamson v. United States, 207 U. 8S. 425__-...--------- 8

3 Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U. 8. 77_...------------- 8

_ Btatutes:

m Criminal Code, Sec. 37, 18 U. S. C. [1940 ed.] 88__------- 2,18

a Emergency Price Control Act of January 30, 1942, c. 26,

a 56 Stat. 23, as amended, 56 Stat. 767; 57 Stat. 566:

4 Pl MibinncusksacbaiWendeeekkuabecsscecuiesecase 18

4 a. is sisal ialhid anna pee apiiedicmih 19

% PA Dbiskektinnadasdsubsanknenes pithnueeksken 19

4 id ko cdinn ineadublinbenananedeas casi 3, 19

3 Judicial Code, Sec. 42, 28 U. S. C. [1940 ed.} 103_.._.---- 11, 18

4 Maximum Price Regulation No. 30, as amended, 7 Fed.

3 Reg. 9732; 8 F. R. 13049:

EE RE Ee UD nbkcecoccnactuasactecucdqndcasuse 3, 6, 19

i Re iian at che GLEE AEARA RCE REED RRRR A ROE 20

SAR OE) SUR canckschbeecesxpeankckeannackne 6, 20

Rules:

tN Se eee re eee 10

rn: 2 oe COUR, nga chicdcnatchincceeesuadae 16, 17, 20

868032—50—1

Gnthe Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OcroBER TERM, 1949

No. 470

Arvin E. SANDROFF AND THOMAS PaPEeR STOCK

CoMPANY, A CORPORATION, PETITIONERS

Vv.

UnitTep States oF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (R. 239-

248) is reported at 174 F. 2d 1014.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was en-

tered on June 1, 1949 (R. 239), and a petition

for rehearing was denied on October 13, 1949 (R.

255). On November 10, 1949, Mr. Justice Reed

extended the time for filing a petition for a writ

of certiorari to and including December 1, 1949

(R. 255), and the petition was filed on that date.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

(1)

2

28 U. S. C. 1254 (1). See also Rules 37 (b) (2)

and 45 (a), F. R. Crim. P.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the indictment charged and the

proof established a conspiracy to make and keep

false records of transactions in commercially

packed wastepaper in violation of the Emergency

Price Control Act of 1942 and the applicable

regulations thereunder, and whether the trial

court’s instructions properly defined the offense

charged.

2. Whether the overt acts alleged and proved

to have been committed in the trial district were

overt acts in furtherance of the object of the

conspiracy.

3. Whether the trial judge’s charge to the jury

was unfair and prejudicial to petitioners.

4. Whether the trial court in imposing sen-

tence acted contrary to Rule 32 of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure.

STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND RULES INVOLVED

These are set forth in the Appendix, infra,

pp. 18-21.

STATEMENT

Petitioners Sandroff and Thomas Paper Stock

Company, a corporation (hereafter called the

Thomas Company), were indicted under Section

37 of the Criminal Code (18 U. 8. C. [1940 ed.]

88), infra, p. 18, for conspiring with Charles

Ginns, Jacob Moss, and Jack Ginns, none of

3

whom were indicted, to commit an offense against

the United States by violating Section 205 (b) of

the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as

amended, infra, p. 19, and Section 1347.10 of Max-

imum Price Regulation No. 30, infra, pp. 19-20

(R. 6-13). It was alleged that between Septem-

ber 25 and November 15, 1943, petitioners and

the co-conspirators conspired that the latter would

keep records of wastepaper sales to petitioners

which would falsely state the price of the paper,

so that they might secure and petitioners might

pay a price for the paper in excess of that per-

mitted by the Emergency Price Control Act and

MPR No. 30 (R. 7, 8).

The evidence at petitioners’ second trial* may

be summarized as follows:

Charles Ginns and his partner, Moss, were

dealers in wastepaper in Detroit, Michigan,

operating under the name of Central Waste Mate-

rials Company (hereafter called the Central Com-

pany) (R. 14, 15). About October 5, 1943,

Charles Ginns received a call from petitioner

Sandroff, the president, ‘‘who dictate[d] the rules’’

of the Thomas Company (R. 124, 125, 107), ask-

ing him to come to Sandroff’s Chicago office be-

cause it would be worth his while (R. 15, 105).

? Petitioners’ convictions on an earlier trial were reversed

for error in restricting the cross-examination of government

witness Charles Ginns in respect of promised or expected

immunity. See R. 240 and Sandroff v. United States, 158

F. 2d 623 (C. A. 6).

4

When Charles Ginns went there with his son

Jack,’ Sandroff said that because of the shortage

of wastepaper he would pay him $10.00 a ton

above the O. P. A. ceiling price for corrugated

paper and $6.00 a ton over ceiling for newspaper.

Sandroff told Ginns to go back to Detroit and

buy paper from all available sources, that the in-

voices should be at the ceiling prices, and that

he would pay cash at the end of each week for the

over-ceiling balance. Charles Ginns_ received

from Sandroff a Thomas Company check for

$1,000 on account, went back to Detroit, and

started buying paper. (R. 16, 17, 105, 106, 107.)

After Crane, one of Sandroff’s salesmen, went

to Detroit to buy paper because Charles Ginns

was not sending enough (R. 21), Charles and

Jack Ginns went to Chicago and complained to

Sandroff, who promised that he would not there-

after send Crane to Detroit (R. 22, 108). At this

meeting, Sandroff had his employee, Mrs. Mc-

Gregor, make up a purchase order for 15 cars

of corrugated paper and 15 cars of newspaper at

ceiling prices (Ex. 2, R. 192-193, 23), but the oral

agreement was reiterated that the balance of the

over-ceiling price would be paid in cash at the

end of the week (R. 23, 24, 109). Charles Ginns

was given a $2,000 advance on this visit (R. 25,

109, 194).

? Jack Ginns bought paper for his father and received 8

one-third commission on business he brought in (R. 64).

eam

5

Charles Ginns testified that his company baled

the paper they bought (R. 14), and that the

shipments to the Thomas Company shown in Ex-

hibits 4 through 12 were of baled paper (R. 37).

He also stated that Sandroff had told him that

it was not necessary to bale the paper, but that

the peddlers could put it directly into the cars

the way they found it (R. 66). Jack Ginns’

testimony was that all the paper sent to the

Thomas Company was baled (R. 123), although

Sandroff had said the paper could be shipped

in any form (R. 117).

The Government’s evidence included a mass of

exhibits of shipping memoranda or invoices with

bills of lading showing that the Central Com-

pany billed the Thomas Company at ceiling

prices (Exs. 4-12, R. 194-195, 34, 35; Exs. 13-21,

R. 196, 35, 36; Exs. 24-34, R. 198-199, 45, 47;

Exs. 35-45, R. 199, 45, 47; Exs. 48-58, R. 200-201,

48, 50; Exs. 59-69, R. 201-202, 48, 50; Exs. 71-77,

R. 202-203, 52; Exs. 78-84, R. 203, 52). The evi-

dence further showed over-ceiling payments in

Chicago by Bert Derdiger, the Thomas Company

office manager,* to Jack Ginns of $1,100 cash on Oc-

tober 18 (R. 111), $1,100 on October 25 (R. 112), and

$650 by check on November 8, 1943 (R. 113, 114).

' 8Derdiger admitted that he was instructed regarding the

payments by Sandroff or Mrs. McGregor; that on several

occasions he went to the bank with Jack Ginns and gave him

eash or turned it over to Sandroff; and that the extra money

paid to Jack Ginns was “around from two to three thousand

dollars” (R. 124, 128, 130).

ce

6

On November 1, Charles Ginns received an over-

ceiling payment of $1,150 by check from Sandroff

himself (R. 51, 202).

The jury found both petitioners guilty (R.

189). Petitioner Sandroff was sentenced to

imprisonment for one year and one day and

fined $10,000 and the corporation was also fined

$10,000 (R. 191). The Court of Appeals

affirmed the convictions (R. 239-248).

ARGUMENT

1. Section 1347.10 (b) of MPR No. 30, infra,

pp. 19-20, provided that ‘‘Every person making

purchases or sales of commercially packed waste-

paper shall keep for inspection * * * com-

plete and accurate records of each purchase or

sale of wastepaper showing’’, inter alia, ‘‘(5)

Prices paid or received’’, and Section 1347.11 (a)

(5), infra, p. 20, defined ‘‘commercially packed”’ as

meaning ‘‘packed in machine compressed bales or

by an optional method of packing where such

method is allowed in the definition of a grade.”’

It is not denied that Sandroff and the Ginns

evolved a scheme to falsify the Central Com-

pany’s records of the prices received from the

Thomas Company for wastepaper sold to it.

Petitioners contend, however, that there was.

neither charge nor proof of a conspiracy involv-

ing commercially packed wastepaper; that the

scheme involved only non-commercially packed

paper not covered by Section 1347.10 (b), supra.

7

They also contend that the trial judge failed in

his instructions to explain that petitioners could

be convicted only if the jury found a conspiracy

to falsify records of transactions in commercially

packed paper. (Pet. 11-23.) ,

The indictment, in pertinent part (R. 7-8),

charged that petitioners, ard the co-conspirators

“did unlawfully * * * conspire * * * to

commit an offense against the United States of

America and the laws thereof, that is to say : to vio-

late Par. (b) of Sec. 205 of the Emergency Price

Control Act * * * and Sec. 1347.10 of Maxi-

mum Price Regulation No. 30 * * *; that the

said defendants and said co-conspirators * * *

did unlawfully * * * conspire to maka and

keep false * * * records of proposed waste

paper sales by co-conspirators * * * to de-

fendants * * *; said defendants and said co-

conspirators * * * well knowing that Sec-

tion 1347.10 of said Maximum Price Regulation

Se = =— he || |

persons making purchases and sales of commer-

cially packed waste paper shall keep correct

records of each such purchase andsale * * *;it

being the purpose and plan of the said defendants

and * * * ¢o-conspirators * * * to make

and to keep records of proposed waste paper deal-

ings between [them] that would falsely, inac-

curately and incompletely reflect the record the

particular grade, quantity and price of the waste

868032—50-——-2

8

paper proposed to be purchased by the said de-

fendants from the said co-conspirators * * *

to the end that said co-conspirators * * *

might secure and defendants * * * might

pay a price for waste paper in excess of that

permitted to be paid and received under the said

Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 * * *

and said Maximum Price Regulation No.

30 * * *,”? We submit that the indictment

was sufficient to charge a conspiracy to make and

keep false records of sales of ‘‘commercially

packed waste paper.’’ It expressly referred to

Section 1347.10 of MPR No. 30 and charged

that the conspirators knew of its requirements

in respect of sales of commercially packed waste-

paper. Obviously, the sales and records referred

to in the other parts of this paragraph of the

indictment were sales and records involving such

paper. It is not necessary to use “‘the same de-

gree of detail in an indictment for conspiracy

in stating the object of the conspiracy as if it

were one charging the substantive offense.”’

Thornton v. United States, 271 U. S. 414, 423.

Certainty, to a common intent, sufficient to iden-

tify the offense which petitioners conspired to

commit was all that was required. Williamson

v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 447, 449. Cf.

Glasser v. United States, 315 U. 8. 60, 66; Wong

Tai v. United States 273 U 8. 77, 81. The Court

of Appeals properly decided on the former ap-

peal (158 F. 2d 623, 624) that ‘‘the indictment

9

was sufficiently well drawn to embrace the essen-

tial elements of the conspiracy charged” and “‘to

apprise adequately the defendants of the charges

required to be met’’.

Petitioners’ contention that the evidence did

not establish a conspiracy to falsify records of

transactions in commercially packed wastepaper

is based upon the testimony of Charles and Jack

Ginns on cross-examination that petitioner Sand-

roff told them they could ship the paper unbaled

just as they received it from peddlers (R. 66,

117; see p. 5, supra). There was no evidence,

however, that Sandroff directed them to ship the

paper in that form. And as a matter of fact

all the paper involved in the conspiracy was

baled (R. 123; see p. 5, supra). Sandroff must

have known of this from the invoices, and he con-

tinued to make or direct payment of the agreed

over-ceiling prices to the Ginns (R. 51, 128).

The fact that there was no direct evidence of

a formal initial agreement specifically embracing

baled wastepaper does not negate the existence of

a conspiracy to falsify the records of transactions

in such paper. The agreement broadly covered

wastepaper and the very testimony of the Ginns

upon which petitioners rely shows that Sandroff

wanted all the paper they could supply, baled or

unbaled. The subsequent acts of the conspirators

in dealing in baled paper also supports the infer-

ence that their agreement was to falsify the Cen-

tral Company’s records of such transactions. The

10

fact that the original agreement also embraced

non-commercially packed paper does not excul-

pate petitioners.

Neither is there any merit in petitioners’ asser-

tion that the trial court’s instructions did not

point out the necessity of a finding that the con-

spiracy contemplated dealings in commercially

packed wastepaper. The record does not show

any objection or exception by petitioners’ counsel

on this score, as required by Rule 30, F. R. Crim.

P., and it is clear in any event that the instruc-

tions sufficiently apprised the jury that the charge

against petitioners involved only a conspiracy to

falsify records of sales of baled paper. On the

prior appeal, the Court of Appeals directed that

on re-trial, ‘‘the court should explain to the jury

the pertinent provisions of the Emergency Price

Control Act and, especially, should the language

of the pertinent portion of Section 1347.10 of

Maximum Price Regulation No. 30 be read and

explained to the jury.’”’ 158 F. 2d at 630. In

complying with this mandate, the trial court in

its instructions read the provisions of Section

1347.10 (R. 156-157) and the definition of com-

mercially packed paper contained in Section

1347.11 (a) (5) (R. 158). He also explained

what baling meant (tbid.). In addition, the

court also read from the indictment the provi-

sions of Section 1347.10 regarding commercially

packed wastepaper (R. 160). We think the Court

of Appeals was right in holding that the trial

ll

court had complied with its directions on the first

appeal and that the “jury was sufficiently in-

formed that the conspiracy charged related essen-

tially to dealings in ‘commercially packed’ waste

paper”? (R. 241).

2. Equally untenable is petitioners’ contention

that the District Court lacked jurisdiction and

yenue because the overt acts committed within the

district were not in furtherance of the conspiracy

(Pet. 23-25). Overt acts I through V alleged

shipments of wastepaper in furtherance of the

conspiracy from Detroit, ‘‘in the Southern Divi-

sion of the Eastern District of Michigan, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court’’,

by co-conspirator Charles Ginns to petitioners

(R. 8-10). Though the conspiracy was formed

in Chicago, it was prosecutable in the Eastern

District of Michigan if overt acts in furtherance

of the conspiracy were committed there. See

Section 42, Judicial Code, 28 U. 8. C. [1940 ed. ]

103, infra, p. 18; Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S.

347; Brown v. Elliott, 225 U. S. 392; Gayon v.

McCarthy, 252 U. 8. 171.

It is clear that the shipments in question were

overt acts for the purpose of effecting and accom-

plishing the object of the conspiracy to make and

keep false records so that petitioners might pay

over-ceiling prices for wastepaper. Such ship-

ments were indeed the ultimate object of the con-

spiracy, of which falsification of the Central Com-

pany’s records was an integral part. Without

12

them there would have been no occasion for mak-

ing false records, as the conspiracy contemplated.

As the Court of Appeals said, ‘‘The shipments of

paper were essential overt acts to effectuate the

object of the conspiracy”’ (R. 244).

3. Petitioners complain of three short passages

which they have excerpted from the trial court’s

instructions covering 32 pages of the record (R.

150-182). These objections are frivolous.

First, it is urged that the court’s reading of

Section 1 (a) of the Emergency Price Control

Act. (R. 151-152), with its references to ‘‘prof-

iteering, hoarding, manipulation, speculation, and

other disruptive practices’? (R. 151-152), consti-

tuted ‘‘an appeal to the passions and prejudices

of the jury”’ (Pet. 26). This occurred in the

early part of the charge, when the court was

explaining the statute and regulations involved

in the case. At the conclusion of the charge,

after the court had excused the jury to hear ex-

ceptions (R. 182), petitioners’ counsel objected to

this passage, among others (R. 184). When the

jury was recalled to receive further instructions

as the result of the exceptions made by counsel,

the court adverted to its earlier references to the

statute and explained (R. 185) :

Also, the court explained to the jury cer-

tain passages of the Emergency Price Con-

trol Act. The court did that, because the

court felt that a short background of the

act should be given for a better and fuller

13

understanding of the law by the jurors,

and not with any other purpose in view.

There was no further objection on this score

(see R. 186-187) and it is clear from the whole

context that petitioners were not prejudiced as

they claim.

Next, it is contended that petitioners were prej-

udiced by the court’s references in the main

charge to the Ginns as ‘‘co-conspirators” and to

the criminal liability of a person who knowingly

joins an existing conspiracy (Pet. 26-27). When

these instructions were called to the court’s at-

tention at the conclusion of the charge, the court

agreed that the references to ‘‘co-conspirators’”’

should be corrected and that the instructions con-

cerning a person who joins a conspiracy were

inapplicable in this case (R. 182-183). Accord-

ingly, when the jury were recalled, the court

effectively corrected and clarified its earlier in-

structions (R. 184-185):

In the charge of the court to the jury,

the court referred on a number of occa-

sions to the conspirators, or co-conspira-

tors. The court did not intend to have

the jurors understand that the court has

any preconceived notions that the defend-

ants or either of them have already been

stamped by law as conspirators. I should

have said, and I am instructing you now,

that in each instance where I stated, ‘‘co-

conspirators,”’ or, perhaps, ‘‘conspirators,”’

I should have said, “the alleged, the al-

14

leged conspirators,’ or ‘‘alleged co-

conspirafors.”’

In other words, whether or not they

were conspirators, it is for you, the jury

to say, in your verdict, and not for the

court to determine that fact.

I have also stated to you, during the in-

struction, about a person joining a conspir-

acy after it has already been formed. In

other words, whether persons forming con-

spiracy, and then some outsider then comes

in and, knowing the terms of the con-

spiracy, joins the conspiracy, the court’s

attention has been called to the fact that

the indictment in this case does not charge

a situation of that kind. The indictment

charges a conspiracy was formed, a new,

a fresh conspiracy, and so that any instruc-

tions that the court gave to the jurors with

respect to anyone joining an existing con-

spiracy may be eliminated and forgotten,

and only that portion of the instruction

which the court gave you with reference

to two or more persons forming, by agree-

ment, understanding, and so on, a con-

spiracy to violate a law of the United

States, is the portion of the charge that

the court wishes the jurors and instructs

the jurors to keep in their minds in de-

ciding this case.

Finally, petitioners assert (Pet. 27-28) that

they were irreparably prejudiced by the trial

judge’s action, in the course of his charge, in

asking petitioners’ counsel if it was correct to

state that counsel had admitted that petitioners

15

“violated the provisions of the Regulation,

as disconnected from any conspiracy, but that

they did not agree and conspire to violate the

Emergency Price Control Law under which the

Regulation was written.”’ Counsel replied:

“That is right, your Honor. We never have

questioned that matter, at all. We freely con-

fessed our responsibility, and at no time have we

challenged that.”” (R. 171.) We are unable to

see how this colloquy placed counsel in a “highly

embarrassing position,” as petitioners argue.

Counsel was only admitting what he had admitted

throughout the trial and what the evidence clearly

showed. Rather than being prejudicial, the

judge’s remarks were a reiteration of his earlier

admonition to the jury (R. 161), which he re-

peated just before he asked counsel the question

complained of, that petitioners “are not charged

with the commission of the crime of violating ‘the

provisions of the Regulation; they are not charged

with that. They are not charged with any viola-

tion of any substantive law, but they are charged

with the violation of the Criminal Conspiracy

Statute, of forming a conspiracy to violate.’’

(R. 170-171.) These instructions and the question

to counsel were clearly designed to impress the jury

that petitioners were not on trial for their ad-

mitted substantive violations of the price ceilings,

but could be convicted only if the jury found that

they had entered into a conspiracy with the

Ginns as alleged in the indictment. In the con-

16

text, the incident was helpful to petitioners, not

harmful.

4. Petitioners’ final contention is that the trial

court failed to observe the requirements of Rule

32, F. R. Crim. P., in imposing sentence (Pet.

28-30).

Immediately after the announcement of the

verdict and the polling of the jury, the court

sentenced petitioners. Then, in the presence of

petitioner Sandroff, the court asked defense coun-

sel if he wished to say anything and counsel

replied, ‘‘Not so far as the verdict of the jury is

concerned.’’ (R. 191.) In these circumstances,

we think it is clear that petitioners were not de-

prived of ‘‘an opportunity to make a statement in

his [their] own behalf and to present any infor-

mation in mitigation of punishment,’’ as provided

by paragraph (a) of Rule 32.*| As the Court of

Appeals said (R. 247):

While it would have been in appropriate

conformity with the above rule had the

district judge asked appellant Sandroff

whether he desired to make a statement,

it would appear from his inaction that

Sandroff did not wish to do so. Though

the judge posed the query, ‘‘ Anything fur-

ther?’’, neither appellant nor his attorney

*See United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F. 2d 229,

234 (C. A. 2), certiorari denied, 279 U. S. 863, decided before

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure went into effect,

holding that the trial judge’s failure to inquire whether the

defendants had any reason why sentence should not be im-

posed was not reversible error.

17

spoke up to the effect that Sandroff wished

to be heard or to present information in

mitigation of punishment. We cannot say

that appellant was not afforded an oppor-

tunity to make a statement. There is

nothing to indicate that he was shut off.

Petitioners have no standing to complain that

there was no presentence investigation and re-

port from the probation service of the court, in

accordance with paragraph (c) (1) of Rule 32.

In the first place, for aught that appears, such

an investigation and report may have been made

at the first trial. In any event, the provisions

of paragraph (c) (1) are not mandatory upon

the district courts, for it expressly provides that

such a report shall be made ‘‘unless the court

otherwise directs.’’ United States v. Karavias,

170 F. 2d 968, 971-972 (C. A. 7).

CONCLUSION

There is no conflict of decisions and the case

presents no question which warrants review by

this Court. It is respectfully submitted that the

petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Puiuie B. Pertman,

| Solicitor General.

ALEXANDER M. CAMPBELL,

Assistant Attorney General.

BERT S. ERDAHL,

Ropert G. Maysack,

Attorneys.

JANUARY 1950.

APPENDIX

STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND RULES INVOLVED

Criminal Code, Section 37, 18 U. S. C. [1940

ed.] 88:

If two or more persons conspire either

to commit any offense against the United

States, or to defraud the United States in

any manner or for any purpose, and one or

more of such parties do any act to effect

the object of the conspiracy, each of the

parties to such conspiracy shall be fined

not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not

more than two years, or both.

Judicial Code, Section 42, 28 U. S. C. (1940

ed.) 103:

When any offense against the United

States is begun in one judicial district and

completed in another, it shall be deemed

to have been committed in either, and may

be dealt with, inquired of, tried, deter-

mined, and punished in either district, in

the same manner as if it had been actually

and wholly committed therein.

The Emergency Price Control Act of January

30, 1942, 56 Stat. 23, as amended (56 Stat. 767; 57

Stat. 566) :

SEc. 2 * * *

(g) Regulations, orders, and require-

ments under this Act may contain such pro-

visions as the Administrator deems neces-

sary to prevent the circumvention or eva-

sion thereof [50 U. S. C. App. 902 (g)].

(18)

19

Sec. 4. (a) It shall be unlawful * * *

to do or omit to do any act, in violation of any

regulation or order under section 2, or of

any price schedule effective in accordance

with the provisions of section 206, or of

any regulation, order, or requirement un-

der section 202 (b) or section 205 (f), or

to offer, solicit, attempt, or agree to do any

of the foregoing [50 U.S. C. App. 904 (a)].

Sec. 202 * * *

(b) The Administrator is further author-

ized, by regulation or order, to require any

person who is engaged in the business of

dealing with any commodity * * *

make and keep records and other docu-

ments, and to make reports * * * [50

U.S. C. App. 922 (b)].

Gao, 205 * * *

(b) Any person who willfully violates

any provision of section 4 of this Act, and

any person who makes any statement or

entry false in any material respect in any

document or report required to be kept or

filed under section 2 or section 202, shall,

upon conviction thereof, be subject to a fine

of not more than $5,000, or to imprison-

ment for not more than two years in the

ease of a violation of section 4 (ce) and

for not more than one year in all other

cases, or to both such fine and imprison-

ment * * * [50 U.S. C. App. 925].

Maximum Price Regulation No. 30, 7 F. R.

9732; 8 F. R. 13049:

Sec. 1347.10 * * *

(b) Every person making purchases or

sales of commercially packed wastepaper

shall keep for inspection by the Office of

a

20

Price Administration for so long as the

Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 shall

remain in effect, complete and accurate rec-

ords of each purchase or sale of wastepaper

rh the following:

(1) Date of purchase or sale.

(2) Name and address of the buyer or

seller.

& Grade of wastepaper purchased or

sold.

® Quantity of each grade purchased or

sold.

(5) Prices paid or received.

(6) Warranties, if any, given or received.

Such records shall set forth separately

the f. o. b. point of shipment price, the

origin and destination of the shipment, the

means of transportation used, the amount

of the transportation charge, and any other

amounts paid or received in connection

with such sale.

Sec. 1347.11 Definitions.

(a) When used in this Maximum Price

Regulation No. 30, the term:

- . = * =

(5) “Commercially packed’’ means pack-

ed in machine compressed bales or by an

optional method of packing where such

method is allowed in the definition of a

grade.

Rule 32, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:

(a) Sentence. Sentence shall be im-

posed without unreasonable delay. Pend-

ing sentence the court may commit the

defendant or continue or alter the bail.

Before imposing sentence the court shall

afford the defendant an opportunity to

make a statement in his own behalf and to

21

present any information in mitigation of

punishment.

* * * * *

(ec) Presentence Investigation.

(1) When Made. The probation service

of the court shall make a presentence in-

vestigation and report to the court before

the imposition of sentence or the granting

of probation unless the court otherwise

directs. The report shall not be submitted

to the court or its contents disclosed to

anyone unless the defendant has pleaded

guilty or has been found guilty.

©. S$. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1980