Opposition Brief — St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States

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CITATIONS

Atwater & Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 188...........

Bleck v. Hivech, 256 U. S. 135... .. .. .. 2... ee eee 6,

Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503................... 6,

Brown v. Wilemon, 139 F. 2d 730, certiorari denied,

a is ibcdanccsoseudbs twas ne casaeeacanys

Gallagher’s Steak House v. Bowles, 142 F. 2a 530, cer-

tiewart denied, S83 U. GB. TO4..... .... 2... eee,

Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269.................

Gray v. Commodity Credit Corp., 63 F. Supp. 386, af-

firmed, 159 F. 2d 243, certiorari denied, 331 U. S. 842. .

Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146....

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81..............

Home Bldg. ¢ L. Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. 8. 398... .....

International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U. 8. 399..

Lichter v. United States, No. 105, Oct. T. 1947, decided

CIEE 5. Ova nek de hGan ein ceaneebesnubienscs

Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States, 55 C. Cis. 310, af-

BERS A eee Tree et Stee

Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502...

Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U. 8. 327......

Royal Holland Lloyd v. United States, 73 C. Cls. 722... .

Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 ....................

Shreveport Engraving Co. v. United States, 143 F. 2d 222,

certiorari denied, 323 U.S. 749... .. 2... 66. oe

Steuart & Bros. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398................ 5,7,

Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. 8. 635............

United States v. Carver, 278 U.S. 294... .. 2... 2... 66...

United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256.................

United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. 8. 373.... 10

United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372......... 10 i

Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U. 8. 138 '

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(1)

Constitution and Statutes:

Constitution of the United States:

Fifth Amendment

Second War Powers Act (54 Stat. 676, as amended by

56 Stat. 177, 50 U.S.C. App. 633, 1152) Section 2(a).. 3,5, 12

Miscellaneous:

Executive Order No. 9125 (7 Fed. Reg. 2719)

O’Brian and Fleischmann, The War Production Board

Administrative Policies and Procedures, 13 Geo. Wash-

M-251 (7 Fed. Reg. 8424)

Schedule 1 to Paragraph (d) (7 Fed. Reg. 8686) . .

No. 74

Sr. Reais Paper CoMPANY, PETITIONER

v.

Tue Unitep STATES

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

COURT OF CLAIMS

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION sELOW

The opinion of the Court of Claims (R. 24-30)

is reported at 76 F. Supp. 831.

. JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Claims was entered

on April 5, 1948 (R. 30). The petition for a writ

of certiorari was filed on June 5, 1948. The juris-

diction of this Court is invoked under Section 3(b)

of the Act of February 13, 1925, as amended.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Schedule No. 1 to Paragraph (d) of

General Preference Order No. M-251, issued by

(1)

2

War Production Board pursuant to the President’s

delegation to it of the allocation power vested in

him by the Second War Powers Act, providing that

no holder of pulpwood in the Puget Sound area

**shall consume, process, or deliver any * * *

pulpwood,”’ constituted a ‘‘taking’’ of petitioner’s

pulpwood plant, located in that area, so as to en-

title petitioner to just compensation under the

Fifth Amendent. *

STATUTE AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent provisions of the Second War

Powers Act (54 Stat. 676, as amended by 56 Stat.

177, 50 U.S.C. App. 633, 1152) ; of WPB General

Preference Order No. M-251 (7 Fed. Reg. 8424) ;

and of Schedule 1 to Paragraph (d) to that Order

(7 Fed. Reg. 8686) are set forth in the Appendix,

infra, pp. 12-19.

STATEMENT

By amended petition filed in the Court of Claims

on January 8, 1948, the St. Regis Paper Company,

1 Petitioner in its formulation of the question presented

attempts to insert into the case the issue whether the United

States should be required to pay just compensation for its

inventory of pulpwood logs which it asserts was also requisi-

tioned (Pet. 14). That question was not raised in the court

below, and we submit, is not presented here. In the complaint

filed below, the sole allegation relative to this inventory of logs

is that petitioner was directed to deliver logs from its inven-

tory to other mills (R. 6). The exhibits supporting this alle-

gation indicate that petitioner was to be paid by the receiving

mill “at regularly established prices and terms (subject to the

regulations of the Office of Price Administration)” (R. 14-16).

There is no allegation that petitioner complied with these

orders, that it was not paid as there directed, or that these

payments were not just compensation. Furthermore, the com-

plaint contains ne prayer for compensation for these logs.

3

the petitioner herein, sought to recover just com-

pensation for an alleged taking of its pulpwood

plant located at Tacoma, Washington (R. 1-23).

The United States demurred (R. 23). The com-

plaint alleged the following:

Petitioner owns a plant located in Tacoma,

Washington, for the manufacture from pulpwood

of approximately 300 tons of bleached and un-

bleached kraft pulp per day (R.1). On October 26,

1942, the day on which the allocation order here in-

volved was issued, and for some years prior thereto,

petitioner was engaged in the business of manu-

facturing and selling bleached and unbleached kraft

pulp, paper and other paper products (R. 1, 2).

On that day, petitioner had at its plant an inventory

of pulpwood logs, which is an essential raw material

to its manufacturing process (R. 2). It also had

a supply of these logs under contract for delivery

for the continued operation of its plant at capacity

production (R. 2).

In October 1942, the War Production Board,

acting under Executive Order 9125 (7 Fed. Reg.

9719) delegating to it the allocation power vested

in the President by Section 2(a) of Title IIT of

the Second War Powers Act, Appendix, infra,

p. 12, issued General Preference Order No. M-251,

Appendix, infra, pp. 12-16, (R. 2-4). That order

stated that the War Production Board was em-

powered to determine areas in which there existed

a shortage of pulpwood required in the national

——

4

defense; to issue orders allocating and directing

the distribution of the supply of pulpwood; and

further to direct that certain persons to be specified

might not consume, process, deliver, or accept de-

livery of such pulpwood (R. 3-4).

On October 26, 1942, the War Production Board

issued Schedule 1 to Paragraph (d) of Order M-

251, determining that there then prevailed in the

Puget Sound Area in the State of Washington, the

area in which petitioner’s plant is located, a short-

age of pulpwood needed for the defense of the

United States (Appendix, infra, pp. 16-19; R. 5,

10-12). The schedule went on to provide that on

and after October 26, 1942, and until the order

should be revoked, no holder of pulpwood in that

area was to ‘‘consume, process, or deliver any such

pulpwood except upon specific authorization or di-

rection’’ of the War Production Board (R. 5, 12).

As a result, petitioner was not allowed to consume

or process pulpwood in its plant from November 1,

1942 to April 1, 1944 (R. 7). Petitioner protested

to the War Production Board against the applica-

tion of this order to it, but its protest was rejected

(R. 6-7). Petitioner accordingly had to shut

down the plant during that period, since the plant

could not be operated, or used for any purpose

other than the manufacture of kraft pulp (R. 2,

7-8).

In its complaint in the court below, petitioner

claimed this order constituted a temporary requisi-

tion of its plant for the use and benefit of the United

5

States, and contended that the Government had

become obligated under the Fifth Amendment to

pay, as just compensation for that taking, the out-

of-pocket expenses it incurred during the shut-

down period, the plant deterioration and deprecia-

tion charges, and the profits it failed to earn during

that period (R. 8-9). The court below, in sustain-

ing the demurrer of the United States (R. 30),

held that petitioner’s allegations failed to establish

that its property had been taken (R. 25-30). Ac-

cordingly, it dismissed the complaint (R. 30).

ARGUMENT

Petitioner does not question that the power to

allocate materials and facilities, which the Con-

gress by Section 2(a) (2) of Title III of the Sec-

ond War Powers Act, Appendix, infra, p. 12,

vested in the President, involves a constitutional

exercise of the war power, or that the delegation of

that power to the War Production Board, the

agency designated by the President to exercise that

phase of the power here involved, was proper. Cf.

Steuart & Bros. v. Bowles, 322 U. 8. 398. Rather,

petitioner’s claim is predicated on the novel theory

that when the War Production Board (and the

various other agencies also designated to exercise

that power in specific phases of the national econ-

omy *) exercised the power to allocate materials

2The War Food Administration, the Petroleum Adminis-

tration for War, and the Office of Price Administration also

allocated scarce materials.

a |

6

in the interests of national defense and security,

these agencies were engaged in requisitioning prop-

erty from private individuals for public use, and

that, therefore, the individuals denied materials by

reason of such allocations to others are entitled to

just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.

The holding below rejecting that claim is, we sub-

mit, correct and in accord with established prin-

ciples.

1. Although the allocation order here involved

denying petitioner the pulpwood it needed to

operate its plant was only one of hundreds of sim-

ilar allocation orders affecting virtually all phases

of industrial activity and business issued by various

agencies of the Government during World War II,

petitioner recognizes that there are no other cases

in which the contention it advances here has been

sustained (Pet. 28). There is good reason why no

such cases are available, since the situation here in-

volved is governed by the long established rule that

when governmental power, such as the war power

of the Federal Government or the police power of

a state, is legitimately exercised for the public good,

and injury is suffered as an incident thereto, there

is no taking of property for public use compensable

under the Fifth Amendment. Block v. Hirsch, 256

U. S. 135; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503;

Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U. S. 1388; Hamilton v.

Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 155-158;

Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S.

502; United States v. Carver, 278 U.S. 294; Trans-

7

portation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. 8. 635; Morrisdale

Coal Co. v. United States, 55 C. Cls. 310, 316, af-

firmed, 259 U. S. 188; Royal Holland Lloyd v.

United States, 73 C. Cls. 722.

The allocation orders issued during World War

II were designed to effectuate the distribution of

scarce materials and products of all kinds among

competing military and civilian demands and to

insure the prompt, efficient, and adequate flow of

shortage materials to the armed forces, to our allies,

and to the home front. In order to attain these ob-

jectives, it was often imperative to withdraw or

reclaim allocations granted, or to reallocate because

of a changed military situation or a change in

legitimate consumer demands. See Brief for Re-

spondents in Steuart & Bros. v. Bowles, No. 793,

Oct. T., 1943, pp. 18-21; O’Brian and Fleischmann,

The War Production Board Administrative Poli-

cies and Procedures, 13 Geo. Wash. Law Rev. eh

Although these allocation orders affected normal

peacetime activities and resulted in some instances

in very substantial financial losses, such damages

were only incidental to the overall objective of so

organizing our economy as to enable the United

States to ‘‘wage war successfully.”” Home Bldg.

& L. Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 426; H tra-

bayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 93; see

8 Contrary to petitioner’s suggestion (Pet. 29), the authors of

this article did not express the view that the allocation orders

issued by the War Production Board, including the ““M” series

here involved, resulted in a taking of private property for

public use compensable under the Fifth Amendment.

8

Itchter v. United States, No. 105, Oct. T. 1947, de-

cided June 14, 1948. Any financial losses which

ensued were ‘‘damnum absque injuria * * *

private interest has merely come into collision

with a public interest, and has had to yield.’’

Brown v. Wilemon, 139 F. 2d 730, 732 (C.C.A. 5),

certiorari denied, 322 U. S. 748; cf. Gallagher’s

Steak House v. Bowles, 142 F. 2d 530 (C.C.A. 2),

certiorari denied, 322 U. S. 764; Shreveport En-

graving Co. v. United States, 143 F. 2d 222 (C.C.A.

5), certiorari denied, 323 U. S. 749; Gray v.

Commodity Credit Corp., 63 F. Supp. 386, 396

(S. D. Cal.), affirmed, 159 F. 2d 243 (C.C.A. 9),

certiorari denied, 331 U. S. 842; see also, Block v.

Hirsch, supra; Bowles v. Willingham, supra;

Woods v. Miller Co., supra. As was pointed out in

Steuart & Bros. v. Bowles, supra, at 405:

Certainly we could not say that the Presi-

dent would lack the power under this Act to

take away from a wasteful factory and route to

an efficient one a precious supply of material

needed for the manufacture of articles of war.

That power of allocation or rationing might in-

deed be the only way of getting the right equip-

ment to our armed forces in time. From the

point of view of the factory owner from whom

the materials were diverted the action would

be harsh. He would be deprived of an ex-

pected profit. But in times of war the national

interest cannot wait on individual claims to

preference. The waging of war and the con-

trol of its attendant economic problems are

urgent business.

9

Or, again, as this Court said just ‘the other day in

Lichter v. United States, supra (p. 11 of slip

opinion:

In total war it is necessary that a civilian

make sacrifices of his property and profits

with at least the same fortitude as that with

which a drafted soldier makes his traditional

sacrifices of comfort, security and life itself.

9. Petitioner’s claim is also untenable for the

reason that there was no actual taking of any right

in its property. As pointed out by the court below,

there is a complete absence of “any showing that

[petitioner’s] plant did not remain at all times

within its own exclusive ownership, possession,

and control, or that the Government had any

semblance of ownership, possession, or use of the

property’? (R. 29). Accordingly, there was no

actual physical taking of any right in petitioner’s

property, and hence petitioner’s property was not

‘‘taken’’ in the Fifth Amendment sense so as to en-

title it to compensation thereunder. Transporta-

tion Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 642; Gibson V.

United States, 166 U. 8. 269, 275-276; Scranton V.

Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 154-155; Hamilton v. Ken-

tucky Distilleries Co., 951 U. S. 146, 156-157; At-

water & Co. v. United States, 975 U. S. 188, 190-

191.*

4 The various cases cited by petitioner, such as United

States v. Causby, 328 U. 8. 256; Portsmouth Company Vv.

United States, 260 U. S. 327, and International Paper Co. v.

United States, 282 U. S. 399 (Pet. 17-23), are all distinguish-

able since in each of these cases there was an actual taking of

an interest in the plaintiff’s property.

10

Nor is there any substance to petitioner’s further

contention that since Schedule 1 forbade it to con-

sume, process, or deliver any pulpwood and it was

thus compelled to shut down its pulpwood plant,

the plant not being usable for any other purpose

except storage, there was such a destruction of its

“rights to process and consume pulpwood”’ (R. 8)

and to use and operate its plant as to amount to a

‘*taking’’ compensable under the Fifth Amendment

(Pet. 24). For the ‘‘destruction’’ rule applies, as

stated in United States v. General Motors Corp.,

323 U. 8. 373, 378, only when the effects of the gov-

ernmental action short of acquisition of title or

occupancy are so complete as to deprive the owner

of all or most of his interest in the subject matter.

Cf. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372.

Here all that the Government did was to forbid

petitioner to acquire or process pulpwood and this

denial merely resulted in the closing down of peti-

tioner’s plant. Neither all or any part of petition-

er’s plant was destroyed, nor was petitioner’s ex-

clusive possession or occupany thereof disturbed at

any time during the period of the alleged taking.

In these circumstances, there clearly was no such

destruction of petitioner’s plant as to amount to a

‘‘taking’’ compensable under the Fifth Amend-

ment,

11

CONCLUSION

The decision below is clearly correct, and there is

no conflict with any applicable decision of this

Court. The petition for a writ of certiorari should

therefore be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

Pup B. PERLMAN,

Solicitor General.

H. G. Morison,

Assistant Attorney General.

Pau A. SWEENEY,

MELVIN RICHTER,

Attorneys.

JuLY 1948.

12

APPENDIX

1. The Second War Powers Act, 54 Stat. 676,

as amended by 56 Stat. 177, 50 U.S.C. App. 633,

1152, provided in pertinent part:

Sec. 2(a) * *# &# & &

(2) * * * Whenever the President is satis-

fied that the fulfillment of requirements for

the defense of the United States will result in

a shortage in the supply of any material or of

any facilities for defense or for private ac-

count or for export, the President may allocate

such material or facilities in such manner,

upon such conditions and to such extent as he

shall deem necessary or appropriate in the

public interest and to promote the national

defense.

2. General Preference Order No. M-251 of the

War Production Board (7 Fed. Reg. 8424) pro-

vides in pertinent part:

The fulfillment of requirements for the de-

fense of the United States has created in cer-

tain areas and is expected to create in other

areas a shortage in the supply for defense, for

export and for private account, of wood for

pulp and lumber, and has created a shortage

in the supply for defense, for export and for

private account of various materials and facil-

ities required for the production of pulpwood;

and the following order is deemed necessary

and appropriate in the public interest and to

promote national defense:

§ 3113.1 General Preference Order M-251-

(a) Applicability of priorities regulations.

13

This order and all transactions affected thereby

are subject to all applicable provisions of the

priorities regulations of the War Production

Board, as amended from time to time.

(b) Definitions. For the purpose of this

order:

(1) ‘‘Person’’ means any individual, part-

nership, association, business trust, corpora-

tion, governmental corporation or agency, or

any organized group of persons, whether in-

corporated or not.

(2) ‘*Pulpwood’’ includes wood of any

species and in any form commonly delivered to

a manufacturer of woodpulp for the manufac-

ture of woodpulp, except those species and

forms defined in and subject to the following

orders of the War Production Board: M-186,

M-228, M-229 and M-234.

(3) A “tholder of pulpwood”’ is any person

who holds or accumulates pulpwood for manu-

facture by himself into woodpulp.

(4) To “thold”’ or ‘‘accumulate’’ pulpwood

means to have or obtain control of a supply of

pulpwood whether by production or purchase

directly by the holder, by production or pur-

chase by an affiliate or subsidiary or by one

branch, division or section of a single enter-

prise or by production or purchase by any

other person for delivery to or for the account

of the holder.

=

14

(d) Control of pulpwood in areas of short-

age. Whenever the Director General for

Operations determines that there prevails in

any area a shortage in the supply of any type

or types of pulpwood required for the produc-

tion of materials needed in the public interest

and for national defense, he may issue a sched-

ule defining such area and such type or types of

pulpwood, and may thereupon, according to

the degree of the shortage and the immediacy

of the need, and as specified in such schedule,

(1) Allocate specific quantities of pulpwood

of the type or types defined held or accumu-

lated in such area from and to specific per-

SONS ;

(2) Direct holders of pulpwood in such

area to maintain in their holdings or accumu-

lations of pulpwood of the type or types de-

fined a stated quantity or percentage, either

uniform for all such holders or particular for

any, to be known as a ‘‘Reserve Supply”’,

available for disposition by the Director Gen-

eral for Operations, from which the Director

General for Operations may from time to time

authorize or direct the delivery of specific

quantities to specific persons and/or the manu-

facture of specific quantities into the specific

products, and the Director General for Opera-

tions may in addition from time to time allo-

cate specific quantities of any pulpwood of the

type or types defined held or accumulated in

such area, although not a part of such ‘‘Re-

serve Supply’’, from and to specific persons;

and provide procedures for applying for and

15

granting such authorizations, directions and

_ allocations ;

(3) Direct that no person, or no person of

a specified class, may consume, process, deliver

or accent delivery of any pulpwood of the type

or types defined held or accumulated in such

area except upon specific authorization or di-

rection by the Director General for Operations,

and provide procedures for applying for and

granting such - authorization or direction;

and/or

(4) Limit or prohibit particular uses of

pulpwood of the type or types defined held or

accumulated in such area. In any allocation,

authorization or direction issued by the Di-

rector General for Operations pursuant to

clause (1), (2) or (8) of the foregoing para-

graph, the Director General for Operations

may require the person to whom such alloca-

tion, authorization or direction is issued to

manufacture, from the pulpwood which is the

subject thereof, particular types and quanti-

ties of woodpulp or other wood product or im-

pose upon the use of such pulpwood by such

person any other conditions necessary and

appropriate in the public interest and for

national defense. Such allocations, authoriza-

tions and directions and any conditions at-

tached thereto, and any limitations or prohibi-

tions issued pursuant to clause (4) of the fore-

going paragraph, shall be made to insure the

satisfaction of requirements, direct and in-

direct, for the defense of the United States

and for essential civilian supply, may be made

16

in consideration of the possible dislocation of

labor, the effect of the local shortage on the na-

tional supply of products manufactured from

pulpwood and woodpulp, the problems of

transporting such products into and out of the

area defined, and the necessity of keeping a

plant in operation so that it may be able to

fulfill war orders and essential requirements,

and may be made in the discretion of the Di-

rector General for Operations, without regard

to preference ratings.

3. Schedule 1 to Paragraph (d) of Order No.

M-251 (7 Fed. Reg. 8686) provides:

§ 3113.2 Schedule 1 to paragraph (d) of Gen-

eral Preference Order M-251. Pursuant to

paragraph (d) of General Preference Order

M-251, the Director General for Operations

hereby determines that there prevails in the

following area a shortage in the supply of the

following type(s) of pulpwood required for

the production of materials needed in the pub-

lic interest and for national defense:

Area. That portion of the State of Washing-

ton, known as the Puget Sound area, which is

described as follows: bounded on the West by

the Pacific Ocean, bounded on the north by the

Canadian Border, bounded on the east by the

erest of the Cascade Mountain Range and

bounded on the south by a line having the fol-

lowing course: east from the Pacific Ocean

along north boundary of township 11 to range

line between Townships 7 and 6 East; then

south 3 miles; then east through Range 6 to

ee ee

17

Pacific County line; then south along Pacific

County line to southern boundary of Lewis

County line; then east along southern bound-

ary of Lewis County line through Ranges 5

West and 4 West, and east 3 miles to center

of Range 3 West; then north 3 miles through

Range 3 West; then east through remainder of

Range 3 West and through Range 2 West;

then north on the range line between Range 2

West and Range 1 West to northern boundary

of Township 11; then east along northern

boundary of Township 11 through Range 1

West, Range 1 East, and Range 2 East; then

south 3 miles on range line between Range 2

East and Range 3 East; then east through the

center of townships in Ranges 3, 4 and 5 East ;

then south 3 miles to southern boundary of

Lewis County line; then east on Lewis County

line to the crest of the Cascade Mountain

Range.

Type(s) of pulpwood. All grades and sizes

of pulpwood logs of the following species (ex-

cepting cants, slabs or other sawmill waste) :

(1) True firs of the botanical species: Abies

grandis (white fir), Abies Lasiocarpa (balsam

fir), Abies amabilis (silver fir) and Abies con-

color (white fir).

(2) Sitka spruce of the botanical species:

Picea sitchensis, except those grades of logs

specified by the War Production Board under

General Preference Order M-186 as ‘Sitka

spruce logs, Grades No. 1 and 2 and cants and

flitches of such logs’. General Preference

Kot Dan Rene ee

18

Order M-186 defines ‘‘Grades No. 1 and No. 2,

Sitka spruce logs’’ as such grades as under-

stood in the particular district on August 1,

1941.

(3) Engelmann spruce of the botanical spe-

cies: Picea Engelmannii.

(4) Western Hemlock of the botanical

species, T'suga heterophylla and Tsuga mer-

tenstana, except the log grade specified by the

War Production Board under General Pref-

erence Order M-229 as ‘‘ Western Hemlock air-

craft logs’’. General Preference Order M-229

defines ‘‘Western Hemlock aircraft logs’’ as

‘*Logs of the botanical species of Tsuga mer-

tensiana or Tsuga heterophylla (including

eants and flitches of such logs), which are

produced in those parts of Oregon and Wash-

ington lying west of the crest of the Cascade

Mountain Range, or in Alaska, and which meet

the following specifications:

(i) Are from stands of timber of approxi-

mately 1,200 feet or higher elevation and are

medium to light in weight ;

(ii) Are not less than 26 inches top diameter

and not less than 12 feet long;

(iii) Are of straight grain so that the ma-

jority of the clear lumber can be produced

with a slope of grain not greater than 1 in 15;

(iv) Are free of deep bark seams or other

defects with the clear portion of the log;

gna iane mre crasorarect

19

(v) Have reasonably uniform annual rings,

not fewer than eight to the inch within the

clear portion of the log; and

(vi) Are of a character which will produce

at least 50% No. 2 Clear and Better, or B and

Better Clear lumber’’.

Pursuant to subparagraph (3) of paragraph

(d) of said order, the Director General for

Operations hereby directs that on and after the

day upon which this schedule is issued, and

until this schedule is revoked, no holder of pulp-

wood, as defined in subparagraph (3) of para-

graph (b) of M-251, shall consume, process,

or deliver any such pulpwood except upon

specific authorization or direction by the Di-

rector General for Operations. 4

Application for authorization or direction

to consume, process or transfer such pulpwood

may be submitted on Form PD-556.

TY UV. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1948 7esoes 116