Opposition Brief — Hurley v. Lowe

INDEX.

Page

CoUNTER-STATEMENT OF CASE .... 21... ccc ccc ccccceee 1

Dy 06.5 Wend U sa etin Une c 4s voverbaawea banshee 3

A. The Question Involved Here Has Been Settled

6 ai a én ceed ca benk tebe RdOk ws 3

B. Deputy Commissioner’s Findings Were Proper.. 5

1. Deputy Commissioner’s findings were rooted

hs cia h hn akan AWdhe am aeehse os 6

2. Deputy Commissioner’s findings were in ac-

eer eee e ore Tt ee ee ee 7

C. The Decision of the Court of Appeals did not Vio-

late the Provisions of the Administrative Proce-

a Be 14

ek a acs wath oh nak ae wee ele & Gk ck ck 14

STATUTES CITED.

Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation

Act of March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, 33, U.S. C. A.,

ne oe UNE Gal eicben cis es kaw ens 2

Act of May 17, 1928, 45 Stat. 600, District of Columbia

Code, 1940 Edition, Section 36-501 et seq......... 2

Administrative Procedure Act (Act of June 11, 1946,

C. 324, Section 10, 60 Stat. 243,5 U.S. C. A. 1009) 14

CASES CITED.

Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U. S. 287, 90 L. Ed. 7

EE eee he pe ee eee ee ee eee 5

Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 330 U. S.

i een aan hak eh ra iwa a xe0 be we babe veea ed 3, 5, 8

seewea v. Bensom, 206 U. &. BB... we eee cc cc ene 4

Davidson v. Pansy Waist Co., 240 N. Y. 584, 148 N. E.

he ea Ein da as a ein cae nae eR oe 11

Dvyniek v. Buffalo Courier Express Co., 296 N. Y. 361,

PES ca ida vine de eens seb eenbes'ceke ca 8

a

Page

ii Index Continued.

Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp. Vv. Hoage, 63

App. D. C. 53, 69 F. 2d 227 (1934).....-.------+.- 11

Gibb Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 31 Cal. A.

441, 160 P. 857 (1916).....-.-.-- eee e eee eee nee 11

Gumbrill v. General Motors Corp., et al., 216 Minn. 351,

13 N. W. 2d 16 (1944).....---- eee ence essences 12

Johnson v. Smith, 263 N. Y. 10, 188 N. KE. 140 (1983)... 11

L’Hote v. Crowell, 286 U. S. 528.....-----+.+++2 ees 4

Lunde v. Congoleum Nairn, Inc., 211 Minn. 487,1 N. W.

Dd GOG (1942) 2... eee reece cece seen sete teens 10, 12

Scott Tobacco Co. v. Cooper, 258 Ky. 795, 81 S. W. 2d

GOB (IDES) oo. c cons esse ene secs cen nsscecsseres 11

Souza’s Case, 316 Mass. 332, 55 N. BE. 2d 611 (1944).... 11

Sullivan v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 79 Utah 317,

10 P. 2d 924 (19382)... 22. e creer cere eee e cree 8, 12

Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, :

198 Ga. 786, 32 S. E. 2d 816 (1945).........----- 11 :

Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North Carolina, 288

U. S. 162 (1938). ...... eee eee e eee neces eee e ees 4 .

Wynn v. Southern Surety Co., 26 S. W. 2d 691 (Texas

Civil App. 1980) .... 0... ee ee cece cere ere ee cee: 11 :

eg ror a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1947.

No. 751.

Emity V. Huruey, and Barsara Ann Huruey, Mary CarTu-

ERINE Hurtey and Emity Louise Huruey, Infants, by

Emiy V. Hurtey, Their Mother, natural guardian and

next friend, Petitioners,

Vv.

SamueL S. Lowe, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Em-

ployees’ Compensation, Federal Security Agency,

FeLpMAN, KirreLue, CAMPBELL and Ewrne, and GLope

Inpemnity Company, a corporation, Respondents.

—

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT GLOBE INDEMNITY COM.

PANY IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT

OF CERTIORARI.

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The complete facts upon which this case depends are suc-

cinctly set forth in the ‘‘Stipulation of Facts’? (R. 6-7) and |

the ‘‘Supplemental Stipulation’? (R. 7-8). It was upon

these stipulations that the Deputy Commissioner based

his ‘‘Findings of Fact’? (R. 9-11).

2

However, to summarize: Decedent, George F. Hurley,

who was associated with a law firm in the District of Co-

lumbia, was at the time of his death in Boston on a business

trip on behalf of his firm. He spent the night of December

12, 1945 at his parents’ home and on the following even-

ing after his working day was over took them out to dinner

at the Union Oyster House. He left the table of the restau-

rant where they were eating to assist his father, age 81, to

the men’s room. While helping the elderly man down a

flight of steps, decedent slipped and fell, striking his head

and fracturing his skull. He died a few hours later from

the effects of the blow.

His widow and children filed a claim for compensation

under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compen-

sation Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S. C. A. 901, as made

applicable to the District of Columbia, 45 Stat. 600. On the

basis of the stipulations herein (R. 6-8), the Deputy Com-

missioner made ‘‘Findings of Fact’’ (R. 9-11) and con-

eluded :

‘*that the dinner which occasioned deceased’s presence

in the restaurant at the time of his injury was not re-

lated to his employment but was of social character and

that his injury and death was not the result of an ac-

cidental injury which arose out of and in the course of

his employment.’’ (R. 10)

Suit was filed in the District Court of the United States

for the District of Columbia asking a mandatory injunc-

tion to set aside the rejection of claim by the Deputy Com-

missioner and to compel an award to the widow and children

of the decedent. (R.1). Upon motion, (R. 11, 12) the court

entered judgment dismissing the complaint (R. 13). An

appeal was taken from this judgment to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which af-

firmed the judgment of the lower court on March 15, 1948.

(R. 15.)

3

ARGUMENT.

A. The Question Involved Here Has Been Settled by

This Court.

This is not a case in which certiorari should be granted

for it falls definitely outside the rule of this Court defining

appropriate cases in which appeals may be permitted from

the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-

lumbia. The question presented by the petition here has

been settled by this Court and the court below decided this

case in accordance with that rule.

The question of the conclusiveness of the Deputy Com-

missioner’s Findings in Workmen’s Compensation Cases

involved here has been recently considered and conclusively

settled by this court in Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insur-

ance Co., 330 U.S. 469. In that case this court reversed the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-

lumbia, which had set aside the Findings of the Deputy

Commissioner and had substituted its own conclusions as

to the facts and the law. In the present case the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has

given proper effect to that definitive decision. The court

helow correctly concluded on the authority of that decision

that the findings of the Deputy Commissioner in Work-

men’s Compensation cases must ordinarily be considered

conclusive, when it stated:

‘‘The Supreme Court held that the ultimate infer-

ence, whether the accident involved did or did not arise

out of and in the course of employment, was for the

Deputy Commissioner, and said:

‘Even if such an inference be considered more legal

than factual in nature, the reviewing court’s func-

tion is exhausted when it becomes evident that the

Deputy Commissioner’s choice has substantial roots

in the evidence and is not forbidden by the law. * * *

‘* * * Tf there is factual and legal support for that

[the Deputy Commissioner’s] conclusion, our task

is at an end.’ ’’ (R. 17.)

4

The decision of this Court in the Cardillo case was in

reality a restatement of the well-established principle that

the findings of the Deputy Commissioner are conclusive on

courts of review if supported by evidence and not inconsist-

ent with law. This court has repeatedly so held. In Voeh!

v. Indemnity Insurance Company, 288 U. S. 162, 166, this

Court, in reversing the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia which had set aside the Findings of

the Deputy Commissioner and substituted its own conclu-

sions as to the facts and the law, said:

‘*We think there can be no doubt of the power of

Congress to invest the deputy commissioner, as it has

invested him, with authority to determine these ques-

tions (whether the injury arose out of and in the course

of the employment) after proper hearing and upon

sufficient evidence. And where the deputy commis-

sioner, following the course prescribed by the statute,

makes such a determination, his findings of fact sup- |

ported by evidence must be deemed to be conclusive. =|

Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 46, 47; L’Hote v. !

Crowell, 286 U. S. 528.

Thus, on two separate occasions this court has found it

necessary to reverse the United States Court of Appeals for =|

the District of Columbia because of its refusal to accord

to the findings of the Deputy Commissioner the conclu-

siveness to which they are entitled under the Act on this

very question of whether or not an injury arose out of and

in the course of the employment. Reluctantly, the Court

of Appeals recognizes that this is the law and gives effect

to the decisions of this court in the present case. This

Court can best show its approval of the lower court’s com-

pliance with what has been established as the law by refus-

ing to grant certiorari here. Thus can any possible doubts

of the lower court best be resolved and the clear rule of law

be given finality.

a

5

B. Deputy Commissioner’s Findings Were Proper.

It is evident that in the present case the Deputy Commis-

sioner properly discharged his duty of making the deter-

mination of whether or not the injury arose out of and in the

course of the employment. His findings were rooted in the

facts and in accordance with settled law. This determina-

tion of the scope of employment was here, as in most cases,

a mixed question of law and fact which can only be deter-

mined. by one charged with the duty of drawing inferences

from the evidential facts.

‘‘In determining whether a particular injury arose

out of and in the course of employment, the Deputy

Commissioner must necessarily draw an inference from

what he has found to be the basic facts. The propriety

of that inference, of course, is vital to the validity of

the order subsequently entered. But the scope of ju-

dicial review of that inference is sharply limited by

the foregoing statutory provisions. If supported hy

evidence and not inconsistent with the law, the Deputy

Commissioner’s inference that an injury did or did not

arise out of and in the course of employment is conclu-

sive. No reviewing court can set aside that inference

hecause the opposite one is thought to be more reason-

able; nor can the opposite inference be substituted by

the court because of a belief that the one chosen by the

Deputy Commissioner is factually questionable. [Cit-

ing cases. ]

“It matters not that the basic facts from which the

Deputy Commissioner draws this inference are undis

puted rather than controverted. See Boehm v. Com-

missioner, 326 U. S. 287, 293. It is likewise immaterial

that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences.

The Deputy Commissioner is charged with the duty of

initially selecting the inference which seems most rea-

sonable and his choice, if otherwise sustainable may not

be disturbed by a reviewing court.’’ (Italics supplied)

Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insuranze Co., 330 U. S.

469, 477.

6

1. Deputy Commissioner’s Findings were Rooted in the

Facts.

If the facts in this case were susceptible of various inter-

pretations, the Deprty Commissioner had the obligation

to put upon the stipulated facts that interpretation which

to him seemed most logical; and every reasonable inference

which favors the validity of the findings of the Deputy Com-

missioner should be indulged. In this case his every infer-

ence was based directly on the facts as stipulated between

counsel and indeed the greater part of the findings followed

the stipulation’s almost verbatim. It was stipulated that

the ‘‘dinner .. . was not related to George F’. Hurley’s em-

ployment in any way, but on the contrary, it was a family

reunion of a purely social character.’’ (R. 6.) Surely this

justified the Deputy Commissioner’s finding that ‘‘the din-

ner... was not related to his employment but was of a socia:

character.’’ (R. 10.)

Entirely aside from the limitations on the scope of ju-

dicial review, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed

the appeal because the findings of the Deputy Commissioner

were entirely sound and proper in the first instance. Fac-

tually, the Deputy Commissioner had every reason to infer

that this dinner party was a purely social occasion bearing

no relation to Mr. Hurley’s employment. There was ample

evidence in the Stipulations of Fact (R. 6-8) to support the

belief on the part of the Deputy Commissioner that in mak-

ing a trip to his home town, decedent was combining busi-

ness with pleasure. He had spent the previous night at his

parents’ home. He had only one conference for his firm in

the course of December 13th and that was in the morning.

A telephone call completed his duties for his employer for

the day. His time was his own for the rest of the afternoon

and evening, and not until some time the next day was he

required to be in a not distant Massachusetts town on firm

business. He was not required to be at any particular place

in the interim nor to account to his employer in any way for

his time. And exactly as he would have been in Washing-

_— cea

7

ton at the close of the business day, he was free to come and

go as he chose on any personal business or pleasure. In

fact, undoubtedly he had a great deal more free time that

day than he would have had in Washington in the employ.

ment of his firm. And as he might have done, if his parents

had been in Washington, in his leisure time and out of filial

devotion he took them to a festive reunion at the celebrated

Boston eating place, the Union Oyster House. The Deputy

Commissioner was eminently justified in concluding that

this was a social occasion completely unrelated to deced-

ent’s employment.

Furthermore, it must not be overlooked that the act of

eating in a public restaurant was not the proximate

cause of Mr. Hurley’s death. His activity of the moment

was assisting his aged father down the steps. That was

the cause of his death, not any defect of the steps nor any

hazard to which he was subjected by any necessity of eat-

ing in a restaurant. There were no such defects or hazards

and, had George F. Hurley been alone, no injury would

have occurred. It was solely the filial activity which cre-

ated the hazard and brought about the death. Therefore,

from a factual standpoint there was ample evidence for

each of the Deputy’s findings and for the ultimate finding

that the ‘‘injury and death was not the result of an acci-

dental injury which arose out of and in the course of his

employment.’’ —

2. Deputy Commissioner’s Findings were in Accordance

with Law.

The Findings of Fact of the Deputy Commissioner were

not only ‘‘not forbidden by law’? but in full accordance with

the law. The Court of Appeals indicated in its opinion

that it understands the decision of this Court to be that an

appellate court does not have the right to reverse the

Deputy Commissioner in order to apply what it may con-

sider the preferred legal principles when there is no ‘‘formal

principle of law which would invalidate the choice made by

7

the Deputy Commissioner’? (R. 17) quoting Cardillo v.

Liberty Mutual Co., 481-482. The court below was clearly

right in recognizing that this was the rule laid down by this

Court.

But the fact is that not only was the view of the facts

taken by the Deputy Commissioner fully in accord with the

decisions throughout this country, but the principle which

the Court of Appeals would have preferred to substitute

is without any foundation whatsoever and is a completely

novel theory of what the law should be. The Court of Ap-

peals suggests that the law should be that a man who goes

to a place distant from his regular place of employment |

on the business of his employer ‘‘on a specific errand’’ (R.

17) is at all times in the course of his employment so long

as the activity would normally be contemplated by thie

employer. His situation, the Court of Appeals believes, is

not to be compared with the travelling salesman who ‘‘may,

literally, live on the road.”’ ‘‘His situation does not see.)

to be similar to that of one who is sent by his employer

from his fixed place of employment upon a specific errand

elsewhere.’’ (R. 18.)

This is a novel concept. No cases are cited by the Cour

of Appeals to justify this theory, nor are any cases cited

by petitioners for this proposition either in their brief in

the Court of Appeals or in their brief in support of their

petition here. This suggested distinction has not hereto-

fore been entertained by any court nor apparently sug-

gested by any litigant. Indeed, in several cases factually

similar to the present one, compensation was denied al-

though the claimant had been on a special mission for his

employer and was not a travelling salesman. Sullivan v.

Industrial Commission of Utah, 79 Utah 317, 10 P. 2d 924;

Dvyniek v. Buffalo Courier Express Co., 296 N. Y. 361, 73

N. E. 2d 552.

No clear reason is given by the Court of Appeals why

a man on a specific errand should be covered by the statute

during his leisure time while neither the person at leisure

8

9

in the same city as that of his employment nor the travel-

ling salesman at leisure in a distant city should not be so

protected. The Court of Appeals suggests that this one

class should receive exceptional benefits that are denied to

all others.

It asserts that the man on the specific errand should be

considered to be in the course of his employment at all

times so long as he does not indulge in ‘‘any activity which

would not normally be contemplated by the employer as an

incident to the errand.’’ (R. 17.) But why the fact that

' the employer contemplates that the man on the specific

errand should eat and sleep puts such activity in the course

of employment, while the similar contemplation by the em-

ployer that the man in the same town as his employmen:

shall eat and sleep and that the travelling salesman shall eat

and sleep does not have the same effect, is not made clear.

Why a ‘‘family reunion of a purely social character’’ should

be held in the course of employment when indulged in lei-

sure time by a man on a specific errand, while held not in

the course of employment of an employee in his own home

town or of a travelling salesman in a distant city, is not even

suggested much less supported by authority. How the risk

would be any different, or why the coverage should he

greater, as between the several categories, does not appear.

The Court of Appeals did not specify what it considered

would be ‘‘normally contemplated by the employer as in-

cident to the errand’’ (R. 17) but the inference seems to be

that as long as there is no misconduct on the part of the em-

ployee, he is in the course of employment. But surely the

mere contemplation by an employer is not a valid basis for

putting a purely social activity into the course of employ-

ment which would not otherwise be so. Indeed ‘‘contem-

plation’’ would prove a difficult and uncertain test to apply.

It has not been suggested before as a workable principle and

appears to have been invented for the occasion by the Court

of Appeals.

But even if this nove] theory suggested by the Court of

Appeals should be applied to the instant case, the activity

———ay

10

>

in which the decedent was indulging at the moment and

which caused his injury was not within the rule as laid

down by the Court of Appeals, namely: ‘‘Any activity

which would .. . normally be contemplated by the employer

as incident to the errand, would . . . be in the course of

employment.’’ (Italics supplied.) Taking his parents to

dinner was neither contemplated by his employer nor inci-

dent to his errand; and more particularly the activity of

assisting his aged father to the men’s room, which was

the activity which brought about his death, was in neither

category. Even if eating dinner could be considered within

ithe course of employment it is well settled that it is the

activity of the moment that governs. Lunde v. Congoleuni

Nairn Inc., 211 Minn. 487, 1 N. W. 2d 606. Here the injury

resulted from a risk that only existed because the deceased

had turned aside from his dinner to perform a purely filial

duty that could not have been contemplated by the employer

nor considered as ‘‘incident to the errand.’’ Accordingly,

even if the Deputy Commissioner could have been aware of

and had attempted to apply the Court of Appeals’ novel

theory of the law, his conclusion could only have: been that

the injury to decedent did not occur in the course of his

employment and most certainly did not arise out of his

employment.

But, of course, when the Deputy Commissioner made his

findings in this case, he did not have the benefit of the Court

of Appeals’ novel views of the law and so was obliged to

decide it in accordance with the law as he found it. At that

time no court had held that travelling men were at all times

in the course of employment. Certain typical situations

have been generally held to be covered by the compensation

acts, other have not. While each case must be considered

with reference to its own particular facts, the general pat-

tern of the decisions on this subject may be briefly outlined

as follows:

Injuries incurred while the employee is actually in the

course of his travel, are almost always held compensable.

11

Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp. v. Hoage, 63 App.

D. C. 53, 69 F. 2d 227. When a travelling man stays at a

particular hotel for the purposes of his employer, so as to be

on call at al! times and is injured as a result of a hazard

of the premises, he is also covered by the Act. Souza’s

Case, 316 Mass. 332, 55 N. E. 2d. 611. But where the em-

ployee stays at a hotel of his own choice without being on

call, the weight of authority is that injuries there sustained

are not compensable. Davidson v. Pansy Waist Co., 240

N. Y. 584, 148 N. E. 715; Gibb Steel Co. v. Industrial Com-

mission, 243 Wis. 375, 10 N. W. 2d 130. More specifically,

it is held that a travelling man injured while eating during

leisure time is not covered. In Wynn v. Southern Surety

Co., 26 S. W. 2d 691 (Texas Civil App. 1930), it was said:

‘ce * &

a travelling salesman while eating his meals,

or sleeping at hotels, or attending churches or theatres

or going on private errands for his own pleasure or

profit is not within the contemplation of the Work-

men’s Compensation Act, engaged in his employer’s

business, and an injury received by him while perform-

ing such an act or engaged in such recreation is not

within the purview of the act, received ‘in the course

of his employment’.’’

To the same effect are Johnson v. Smith, 263 N. Y. 10, 188

N. E. 140; Scott Tobacco Co. v. Cooper, 258 Ky. 795, 81 S.

W. 2d 588, Against the great weight of authority there

is only one case in all the reports which allowed recovery

to a travelling salesman for accidental injury received in

connection with eating a meal during leisure hours. That

is the case of Thornton v. Hartjord Accident & Indemnity

Co., 198 Ga. 786, 32 S. E. 2d 816 relied on in petitioner’s

brief at page 14. But even in this case, which is unique, the

court in affirming the action of the local compensation board

indicates that injuries received by an employee while en-

gaged in social activities would not be compensable, saying

at page 819:

—

1Z

‘‘This does not mean that he cannot step aside from

his employment for personal reasons or reasons in no

way connected with his employment, just as might an

ordinary employee working on a schedule of hours at a

fixed location. He might rob a bank; he might engage

in other activities equally conceivable for his own

pleasure and gratification, and ordinarily none of these

acts would be beneficial or incidental to his employment

and would constitute a stepping aside from his employ-

ment.”’

Without exception it has been held that travelling men in-

dulging in personal or social activities are not in the course

of their employment. As stated in Sullivan v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 79 Utah 317, 10 P. 2d 924:

«“* * * Plaintiff was not necessarily covered by the

Industrial Act every moment of the time he was absent

from Salt Lake City on this business trip. It was evi-

dently intended that he might combine business and

pleasure. It was possible for him to step aside from

his employment and do things not at all connected with

or incidental to his employment. When he left the

train at Poughkeepsie to spend the afternoon and even-

ing with his daughter and her friends, he did step aside

from his employment to indulge in a personal pleasure

wholly disconnected from the business for his employer.

Even if it be considered that he did not step aside from

his employment in choosing to sleep in a hotel at

Poughkeepsie instead of New York City, still we think

it must be held in entertaining his daughter and her

friends at dinner and in taking the short journey where-

in he undertook to accompany them to the college dor-

mitory was a diversion purely personal and in no way

prompted by, or beneficial to the interest of his em-

ployer.’’ (10 P. 2d 925.)

To the same effect are Gumbrill v. General Motors Corp.,

et al., 216 Minn. 351, 13 N. W. 2d 16 (1944) and Lunde v.

Congoleum Nairn, Inc., 211 Minn. 487, 1 N. W. 2d 606

(1942), which hold, in comparable factual situations to the

instant case, that the travelling employee injured in his

leisure time is not covered by compensation acts.

se PR CRSA

Without taking the space to analyze here the various

cases on this subject cited in petitioner’s brief, it can be

stated that almost all those in which recovery was allowed

are properly subsumed under one or more of the classifica-

tions listed above as compensable, e.g. where employee is

actually in course of travel at time of injury or is required

to stop at a particular hotel or eat his meals at a particular

place to be on call for benefit of employer. All petitioners’

cases without exception are clearly distinguishable from

the present case. It can be positively stated, that none of

them holds that an employee, (whether customarily travel-

ling or away from his usual place of employment ona special

mission), is entitled to recover for an injury received while

not actually in course of travel or engaged in any work for

his employer, but after he has reached his particular des-

tination and during leisure time while engaging in some

social activity of his own. In all such cases, where the con-

dition or hazard giving rise to the accidental injury grows

out of the social or personal character of the employee’s

activity at the time, compensation has been invariably and

justly denied.

In deciding as he did, the Deputy Commissioner was

therefore not only making a finding ‘‘not forbidden by law’’

but one which was ‘‘in accordance with the law’’ as almost

universally interpreted. Therefore, the distinction that the

Court of Appeals seeks to make between ‘‘not forbidden by

law’’ and ‘‘in accordance with law’’ is of no importance

here. Whether or not the terms are precisely synonymous

and whichever test be applied to the Deputy Commission-

er’s findings here they clearly meet the requirements of

legal and factual support and should accordingly be consid-

ered conclusive.

13

14

C. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Did Not Violate

the Provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.

To the assertion of petitioners that the Court of Appeals

failed to follow the provisions of the Administrative Pro-

cedure Act respecting judicial review (60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.

C. A. 1009) little need be said. In the first place, peti-

tioners did not invoke the jurisdiction of that Act either in

the District Court or the Court of Appeals. It is

not specified in their brief here in what respect

the court below should have, or failed to give effect

to the provisions of that Act. Section 10 of that

Act, by its terms, provides for judicial review ‘‘ex-

cept so far as statutes preclude judicial review.”’

The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation

Act provides that compensation orders may be set aside by

the courts ‘‘if not in accordance with law.’’ (Sec. 21 (b) 44

Stat. 1436, 33 U.S. C. A. See. 921 (b).) Judicial review was

limited by this clause prior to the enactment of the Admin-

istrative Procedure Act and to this extent review is still

limited under the Act.

CONCLUSION.

This case presents no question requiring review by this

Court. It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the

petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Danie, W. O’Donocuvsr, JR.,

Ross O’DonoGHUE,

Joun J. Leany,

Union Trust Building,

Washington 5, D. C.,

Attorneys for Respondent

Globe Indemnity Company.