Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Ohio Oil Co. v. United States
Supreme Court brief1948
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Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroser Term, 1947.
No. 51 to)
THE OHIO OIL COMPANY, a Corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT.
v W. Hume Everert,
Harotp H. Hearty,
P. O. Box 120,
Casper, Wyoming,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
Jf Counsel:
\ A. M. GEE,
Hau W. Srewarrt,
Carvin A. Brown,
Findlay, Ohio.
THE GUNTHORP. WARREN PRINTING COMPANY, 210 WEST JACKSO™, CHICAGO
INDEX.
Summary Statement of Matter Involved..............
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Specifications of Error to Be Urged.................
Reasons for Granting Petition......................
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Statutes Crrep.
Section 17 of the Oil Lands Leasing Act of February
25, 1920, as amended by Act of August 21, 1935......
Section 2 of the Act of August 21, 1935
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocrosrer Term, 1947.
ENS ae é
THE OHIO OIL COMPANY, a Corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT.
To the Honorable the Chief Justice and Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Petitioner, The Ohio Oil Company, prays for a Writ of
Certiorari requiring that this cause be certified to this
Court for determination.*
*The opinions delivered in the courts below appear: Circuit
Court of Appeals, 10th Cireuit (R. 387): 163 Fed. 2d 633;
District Court of the United States, District »f Wyoming, (R. 24) :
65 Fed. Supp. 991.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE MATTER
INVOLVED.
On August 25, 1920, the Secretary of the Interior, acting
pursuant to authority granted by the Oil Lands Leasing Act
of Feb. 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437, issued a lease, under Section
19 thereof, to petitioner’s assignors, embracing lands in
the Lance Creek Field, Wyoming (R. 301). So far as is
material here, the lease provided for a royalty on all oil
produced of 124%. On November 10, 1937, with the ap-
proval of the Secretary of the Interior, a unit agreement
was entered into by petitioner and other operators of oil
and gas leases in the Lance Creek Field (R. 256). Said
agreement unitized the operations of the parties signatory
thereto and provided, pursuant to the Act of August 21,
1935 (Appendix, p. 11), as to each of the Government leases
covered thereby, including petitioner’s lease, that same
‘‘shall continue in force beyond the 20 years specified in
the lease, and until the termination of said agreement;
oh Gc aee
This case involves royalties due the Government under
said lease for the period from July 1, 1939 to April 1, 1941,
(R. 26) the Government contending that petitioner must
account for royalty oil produced during said period on the
basis of an assumed value of $1.02 per barrel, as fixed and
determined by the Secretary of the Interior (R. 38), rather
than on the basis of 77¢ per barrel, actually received for
said oil by petitioner, which was the only and highest price
obtainable for such oil in the Lance Creek Field and which
was the price for which petitioner was bound to sell 95%
of its oil under written contracts dating back to August 5,
1936 (R. 36).
_—_
3
With the exception of a period of one year during which
royalty oil was received in kind, the Government at all
times prior to May, 1939, accepted without objection, as
payment in full for its royalty under said lease, the amounts
paid to it by petitioner each month, based upon the prices
received by petitioner for the royalty oil (R. 38). In May,
1939, the Secretary of the Interior, proceeding ex parte,
fixed and established, effective July 1, 1939, for the purpose
of computing royalties due the Government on crude oil
produced from Federal land in the Lance Creek Field, a
minimum field price, for such oil of $1.14 per barrel (R. 227).
Petitioner and other operators in the Lance Creek Field
protested this action and in February, 1941 (R. 293) such
minimum field price (effective as of July 1, 1939) was fixed
at $1.02 per barrel by the Secretary under his ruling (R. ,
994) that he ‘‘has authority to fix, for purposes of Govern-
ment royalty computation, a reasonable minimum valuation
for crude oil produced from Federal lands * * *’’ and that
“under the terms of the mineral leasing act, the regula-
tions thereunder and the terms and provisions of the leases
here involved, the authority to fix a reasonable minimum
price for Government royalty oil exists and has been validly
exercised in this case.’? (Emphasis ours unless otherwise
indicated.) Such price so fixed was still 25¢ per barrel
higher than the price of 77¢ per barrel, for which petitioner
had in good faith contracted to sell its oil and which the
undisputed evidence in this case shows was the highest price
received in a fair and open market, not only for the oil
produced from this lease but for all oil produced from the
Lance Creek Field (R. 39-40). The period in controversy
ended April 1, 1941, at which time the Government elected
to receive its royalty oil in kind (R. 37).
Petitioner refused to pay the difference between 77¢ and
$1.02 per barrel of Government royalty oil produced from
4
its lease during the period from July 1, 1939, to and includ.
ing March 31, 1941, which amounted to $9,186.96 (R. 38-39),
until threat was made in April, 1942, by the Department of
the Interior that unless such payment was forthcoming suit
would be instituted to recover such amount and to cancel
petitioner’s lease (R. 329). Said sum of $9,186.96 was paid
by petitioner to the Government under protest and was
accepted by the Government upon its express agreement
that said money would be deposited in a special trust fund
and ‘‘held in that account pending a final judicial deter-
mination as to the authority of the Secretary of the Interior
to require the payment of the money as royalty due under
the lease,’’ and that ‘‘should it be finally determined judi-
cially that such authority is not vested in the Secretary the
money held in the trust fund account, or so much thereof
as you may be entitled to receive, will be repaid to your
company’’ (R. 299, 300, 381 and 384).
Petitioner thereupon brought the present suit under the
Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505, 28 U.S. C. A. See. 41 (20), in the
District Court of the United States for the District of Wyo-
ming to recover from the United States such sum of
$9,186.96 so paid (R. 1).
A trial was had to the court which resulted in findings of
fact and conclusions of law favorable to petitioner’s posi-
tion (R. 35) and judgment was rendered by the trial court
in favor of petitioner and against the Government for the
above sum (R. 42).
The Government appealed the case to the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit wherein such
judgment was reversed.
The Cireuit Court of Appeéals, in so doing, held, inter
alia, that:
1. ‘The original Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, which
authorized the granting of mineral leases on the public
=
_
5
domain, also blueprinted their terms and conditions.’’
(R. 393.)
2. ‘** * * neither the original Act, nor the lease con-
tract executed in pursuance thereof, purport to author-
ize the Secretary to fix and determine the minimum
value of the royalty oil. On the contrary, the legisla-
tive history of the Act indicates a deliberate purpose
to withhold such power from the Secretary. See Con-
gressional Record Vol. 58, p. 4733-4735, 66th Congress,
9d Session.’’ (R. 394.)
3. ‘** * * in all of his transactions with the lessee,
the Secretary acted for and on behalf of the Govern-
ment in a proprietary capacity, and that his contractual
powers were measured by the basic enabling Act and
amendments thereto.’’ (R. 396.)
4. ‘*We have no doubt of the power of the Secre-
tary, acting in the public interest, to require as a con-
dition to his approval of the unitization and extension
agreement, that all development and operation there-
under should be subject to operating regulations which
were in effect when the agreement was made, * * *.’’
(R. 397.)
5. By entering into the Lance Creek Unit Agree-
ment (R. 256) petitioner agreed to be bound by Section
3(e) of the Oil and Gas Operating Regulations, promul-
gated and approved by the Secretary of the Interior,
effective December 1, 1936, which reads in part as
follows :
‘‘The value of production, for the purpose of
computing royalty, in the discretion of the Secre-
tary * * * may be calculated on the highest price
per barrel, paid or offered * * * at the time of pro-
duction in a fair and open market for the major
portion of like quality oil * * * produced and sold
from the field where the leased lands are situated;
but under no conditions shall the value of any of
said substances for the purpose of computing roy-
alty be deemed to be less than the gross proceeds
accruing to the lessee from the sale therof or less
than such reasonable minimum price as shall be
determined by said Secretary.’’ (R. 396.)
and that said Regulation 3(e) was valid and subsisting
and by its terms authorized the Secretary to determine
the reasonable minimum value of the royalty oil. (R.
397.)
6. ‘** * * the oil in question was sold * * * fora
uniform price of 77¢ per barrel under * * * contract
***?? and ‘** * * that the producers were obligated to
and did sell and deliver approximately sixteen million
barrels of oil thereunder, * * *.’’ (R. 399) and “We
have no doubt of the bona fides of the contract, * * *.”
(R. 400.)
7. ‘*From the record before us, we are convinced
that the Secretary’s determination of reasonable mini-
mum value of the royalty oil is not unlawful, inequita-
ble, arbitrary and unreasonable, * * *.’’ (R. 401.)
It is petitioner’s contention that the Circuit Court of
Appeals has decided important questions of federal law
which have not been, but should be, settled by this Honor-
able Court. (Supreme Court Rule 38. 5. (b).)
JURISDICTION.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Section
240 (a) of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of
February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 938, 28 U. S. C. A. See.
347 (a). The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals
was entered September 10, 1947, (R. 401); an order was
entered September 18, 1947, extending time for filing peti-
tion for rehearing to and including October 15, 1947, (R.
401) ; Petition for Rehearing was filed October 15, 1947, (R.
422), and was denied October 22, 1947, (R. 423).
—
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.
1. Whether the Secretary of the Interior may, by regu-
lation, create in himself the power to fix and determine the
reasonable minimum value of royalty oil under a lease is-
sued pursuant to the Oil Lands Leasing Act of Feb. 25,
1920, as amended, (41 Stat. 437), where said Act not only
does not purport to grant any such power but the legisla-
tive history thereof indicates a deliberate purpose to with-
hold such power from the Secretary.
2. Whether the Secretary of the Interior may arrogate
unto himself the power to fix and determine the reasonable
minimum value of royalty oil, by requiring Government
lessees to adopt a departmental regulation to that effect as
a part of a unit agreement, which to become effective under
the Oil Lands Leasing Act, as amended, must have his ap-
proval (see p. 11, Appendix) ; and, if so, whether properly
construed, the Lance Creek Unit Agreement (R. 256) incor-
porated therein Section 3(e) of the Oil and Gas Operating
Regulations in effect on December 1, 1936.
3. Whether, if such power to fix and determine the rea-
sonable minimum value of Government royalty oil be con-
ceded, the Secretary of the Interior may validly fix the
value of such oil at $1.02 per barrel regardless of the fact
that the undisputed evidence shows that 77¢ per barrel was
all that was received for it and all other oil from the Lance
Creek Field in bona fide sales in a fair and open market,
and require petitioner to account to the Government on the
basis of such higher figure.
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR TO BE URGED.
1. The Court below erred in failing to hold invalid that
portion of Section 3 (e) of the Oil and Gas Operating Regu-
lations in effect December 1, 1936, which purports to grant
to the Secretary of the Interior the power to fix and deter-
mine the reasonable minimum value of Government royalty
oil.
2. The Court below -» © in holding that the Secretary
of the Interior could ve .y acquire the power to fix and
determine the reasonable minimum value of Government
royalty oil, by requiring as a condition to his approval of
the Lance Creek Unit Agreement that provision therefor be
included in such agreement (R. 397).
3. The Court below erred in holding that by the terms
of the Lance Creek Unit Agreement there was incorporated
therein, by reference, Section 3 (e) of the Oil and Gas
Operating Regulations (R. 397).
4. The Court below erred in failing to hold that the
minimum value of $1.02 per barrel, as fixed and established
by the Secretary of the Interior, was arbitrary and unrea-
sonable as a matter of law and that the sum of $9,186.96 was
illegally exacted from petitioner.
REASONS FOR GRANTING PETITION.
We have here a situation where there is not only no Fed-
eral Statute expressly authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to fix and determine the reasonable minimum value
of Government royalty oil, but the legislative history of the
_
Oi] Lands Leasing Act indicates a deliberate purpose to
withhold such power from the Secretary (Congressional
Record Vol. 58, pp. 4733-4735, 66th Congress, 2d Session).
Yet the Seeretary proceeds in this case to fix and deter-
mine such value basing his right to do so on a regulation he
himself promulgated, In carrying out this asserted power,
he disregarded the actual conditions facing operators in the
Lance Creek Field and required petitioner to account to the
Government for the value of its royalty oil on the basis of
$1.02 per barrel when such oil in a fair and open market
was worth no more than 77¢ per barrel.
The asserted power, which has been sustained by the
judgment of the Cireuit Court of Appeals, to elect to take
the value of Government royalty oil and to be the sole judge
of the value of that oil, is so drastic and of such far reach-
ing consequences to the many individuals, firms and corpo-
rations holding oil and gas leases on Government lands, in-
cluding petitioner, that final word on the subject should
come from this Honorable Court, which to date has not
passed upon the questions herein presented.
It is respectfully submitted that this petition should be
granted.
W. Hume Everert,
Haroup H. Heaty,
P. O. Box 120,
Jasper, Wyoming,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
Of Counsel :
A. M. Ger,
Hau W. Stewart,
Cavin A. Brown,
Findlay, Ohio.
10
APPENDIX.
It is petitioner’s contention, supported by the trial court
(R. 32) and by the Circuit Court of Appeals (R. 394), that
neither the original Oil Lands Leasing Act (41 Stat. 437)
nor any amendment thereto, has authorized or empowered
the Secretary of the Interior to fix the minimum value or
price of royalty oil; consequently petitioner deems it un-
necessary and improper to set forth such Act herein in its
entirety. It is to be noted that Section 19 of such Act,
under which petitioner’s lease was issued, has never been
amended.
In connection with consideration of Question No. 2 and
Specification of Error No. 2 above, petitioner is quoting
the pertinent portions of Section 17 of said Act as amended
August 21, 1935, c. 599, Sec. 1; 49 Stat. 676; 30 U. S.C. A.
See. 226.
* ” . . *
‘“‘The Secretary of the Interior, for the purpose of
more properly conserving the oil or gas resources of
any area, field, or pool, may require that leases here-
after issued under any section ef this Act be condi-
tioned upon an agreement by the lessee to operate,
under such reasonable cooperative or unit plan for the
development and operation of any such area, field, or
pool as said Secretary may determine to be practicable
and necessary or advisable, which plan shall adequately
protect the rights of all parties in interest, including
the United States:
‘*Leases issued prior to the effective date of this
amendatory Act shall continue in force and effect in
eecordance with the terms of such leases and the laws
ander which issued: Provipep, That any such lease that
ll
has become the subject of a cooperative or unit plan of
development or operation, or other plan for the con-
servation of the oil and gas of a single area, field, or
pool, which plan has the approval of the Secretary of
the Department or Departments having jurisdiction
over the Government lands included in said plan as
necessary or convenient in the public interest, shall
continue in force beyond said period of twenty years
until the termination of such plan; anv Provipep Fur-
tHER, That said Secretary or Secretaries shall report
all leases so continued to Congress at the beginning of
its next regular session after the date of such continu-
ance.
‘“‘Any cooperative or unit plan of development and
operation, which includes lands owned by the United
States, shall contain a provision whereby authority,
limited as therein provided, is vested in the Secretary
of the depariment or departments having jurisdiction
over such land to alter or modify from time to time in
his discretion the rate of prospecting and development
and the quantity and rate of production under said
plan. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized when-
ever he shall deem such action necessary or in the pub-
lic interest, with the consent of lessee, by order to
suspend or modify the drilling or producing require-
ments of any oil and gas lease not subject to such a co-
operative or unit plan, and no lease shall be deemed to
expire by reason of the suspension of production pur-
suant to any such order.
* sd 2 * .
‘Whenever the average daily production of the oil
wells on an entire leasehold or on any tract or portion
thereof segregated for royalty purposes shall not ex-
ceed ten barrels per well per day, or where the cost of
production of oil or gas is such as to render further
production economically impracticable the Secretary of
the Interior, for the purpose of encouraging the great-
est ultimate recovery of oil and in the interest of con-
servation of natural resources, is authorized to reduce
the royalty on future production when in his judgment
12
the wells cannot be successfully operated upon the
alty fixed in the lease. The provision of this paragrap
shall apply to all oil and gas leases issued under thi
Act, including those within an approved cooperati
or unit plan of development and operation.’’
Such Amendatory Act of August 21, 1935, (c. 599, See. g
49 Stat. 679, 30 U. S. C. A. 223a (b)) also provided:
‘*(b) Nothing contained in this Amendatory
shall be construed to affect the validity of oil and
prospecting permits or leases previously issued unda
the authority of the said Act of February 25, 1920, ag
amended, and in existence at the time this amendator
Act becomes effective, or impair any rights or prigi
leges which have accrued under such permits or leases,”
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