Petition for Rehearing — Pelley v. Matthews

Supreme Court of the Anited States

October Term, 1947

No. 350

Wituiam Dupvey PELLEY,

Petitioner,

Vv.

W. Bruce Matruews, Unirep States MarsHat,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

We rely, for the purpose of this petition, upon the case

of Sunal v. Large, 91 L. Ed. 1561, 1562, 1563—being cases

numbered 535 and 840, combined, and decided by this Court

June 23, 1947.

This language of the Court appears to make our case.

“The First Judiciary Act empowered the courts of

the United States to issue writs of habeas corpus.

Section 14 of the Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat.

73, 81, c. 20. Since the scope of the writ was not de-

fined by Congress, it carried its common law implica-

tions. The writ was greatly enlarged after the Civil

War by the Act of February 5, 1867. 14 Stat. 385, c. 27.

(For legislation dealing with habeas corpus see note

in 18 F. 68.) It was no longer limited to searching

the face of a judgment of a court of competent juris-

diction. It was available to cut through forms and go

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‘to the very tissue of the structure,’ Mr. Justice

Holmes in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 345, 346,

59 L. ed. 969, 986, 987, 35 S. Ct. 582, though it was

certainly not to be invoked merely as a substitute for

an available appeal. But what is ‘form’ and what is

the ‘tissue of the structure,’ and when is a writ sought

in fact as a substitute for an appeal in a practical view

of the administration of justice, are questions to which

our decisions give dubious and confused answers. |

think it is fair to say that the scope of habeas corpus

in the federal courts is an untidy area of our law that

calls for much more systematic consideration than it

has thus far received.

“The extent to which this Court has left itself un-

hampered, by not drawing sharp jurisdictional lines,

is indicated by the following very tentative classifica-

tion of categories in which habeas corpus has not been

deemed beyond the power of federal courts to enter-

tain:

**(1) Conviction by a federal court which had no

jurisdiction either over the person or of the offense.

See Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. (U.S.) 198, 2038, 7 L. ed.

650, 653; Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 28, 23 L. ed.

787, 788. But the writ is discretionary and may not

issue even though if an opportunity were allowed such

want of jurisdiction might be established. See Toy

Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U. 8. 542, 53 L. ed. 644, 29 S. Ct.

416, and Rodman v. Pothier, 264 U. S. 399, 68 L. ed.

759, 44S. Ct. 360. And compare Re Mayfield, 141 U.S.

107, 35 L. ed. 635, 11 S. Ct. 939, with Re Blackbird

(C. C.) 66 FP. 541.

“«(2) Conviction under unconstitutional statute.

ix parte Virginia 100 U. 8. 389, 343, 25 L. ed. 676, 678;

Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 25 L. ed. 717; Ex parte

Curtis, 106 U. S. 371, 27 L. ed, 282, 18. Ct. 381; Ex

parte Yarbrough, 110 U. 5. 651; 28 L. ed. 274, 4S. Ct.

152. The writ was denied in each ease, but the Court

passed on the constitutionality of the statute. Here to

the availability of the writ will depend on the cir-

cumstances of the case, particularly the stage in the

criminal proceedings at which the writ is sought.

Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U. S. 245, 57 L. ed. 497, 33 8. Ct.

Pi

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240; Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219, 59 L. ed. 203, 35

S. Ct. 54. Compare Glasgow Vv. Moyer, 225 U. 8. 420,

56 L. ed. 1147, 32 S. Ct. 753, with Re Gregory, 219 U.S.

210, 55 L. ed. 184, 31 S. Ct. 143. See also Re Lincoln,

902 U.S. 178, 50 L. ed. 984, 26 5. Ct. 602.

««(3) Violation by federal courts of specific consti- "

tutional rights: (a) double jeopardy. Compare Ex

parte Bigelow, 118 U. S. 328, 28 L. ed. 1005, 5 5. Ct.

542, with Re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 30 L. ed. 658, 7 S. Ct.

596, and Re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 33 L. ed. 118, 9S. Ct.

672; (b) self-crimination. Writ granted as to a wit-

ness held in contempt, though apparently not as to a

defendant restrained on charge of crime. Compare

Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 35 L. ed. 1110,

12S. Ct. 195, 3 Inters. Com. 816, and Ex parte Irvine

(Cc. C.) 74 F. 954 (Taft, Cireuit Judge), with Re

Moran, 203 U. S. 96, 51 L. ed. 105, 27 S. Ct. 25; (¢) no

indietment by grand jury. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S.

417, 29 L. ed. 89, 5S. Ct. 935. Also Ex parte Bain, 121

U.S. 1, 30 L. ed. 849, 7 5. C(t. 781. As to denial of con-

ctitutional rights in State courts, Moore v. Dempsey,

261 U.S. 86, 67 L. ed. 548, 43 8. Ct. 265.

(4) Due regard for harmonious Nation-State re-

lations, need to avoid friction and maintain balance.

See Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. G04, 26 L. ed. 861;

Re Ayers, 123 U. 5. 443, 31 L. ed, 216, 8 5. Ct. 164;

Re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 31 L. ed. 402, 8S. Ct. 482;

ERASE AE IAI ANP SEN ELE IPO ENE LIES ELAN TT SIE

Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 88 L. ed. 455, 59 5. B

Ct. 442. Compare Re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 37 L. ed. §

689, 13S. Ct. 785; Re Swan, 150 U. S. 637, 37 L. ed. f

1207, 14.8. Ct. 225; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 52 i

L. ed. 714, 28 8. Ct. 441, 18 L. R. A. N.S. 932, 14 Ann. :

Cas. 764. Availability of other remedies is here an im- ;

portant factor. Similarly as to State interference :

with federal officers, prompt relief may be deemed é

necessary. Ohio vy. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, 48 L. ed. :

699, 19 S. Ct. 453. See also Re Neagle (Cunningham .

vy. Neagle), 1385 U. S. 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 S. Ct. 658; .

Hunter v. Wood, 209 U. 8. 205, 92 L. ed. 747, 28 S. Ct. é.

472. :

‘““(5) Insufficiency of indictments is not open on

habeas corpus; it may be in removal cases, In View

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of the hardship to the individual and the inadequacy |

of other remedies. Compare Tinsley v. Treat, 205

U. S. 20, 51 L. ed. 689, 27 S. Ct. 430; also Hyde y.

Shine, 199 U. S. 62, 50 L. ed. 90, 25 S. Ct. 760. Com-

pare also the extradition cases. Benson v. McMahon,

127 U. S. 457, 32 L. ed. 234, 8 S. Ct. 1240; Ornelas vy,

Ruiz, 161 U. S. 502, 40 L. ed. 787; 16 S. Ct. 689;

Bryant v. United States, 167 U. S. 104, 42 L. ed. 94,

17S. Ct. 744.

‘*(6) Defects in jury panel, in trial procedure, ex-

clusion or insufficiency of evidence, are rarely held

ground for relief on habeas corpus. But when no other

remedy was available and the error appeared flagrant,

there have been instances of relief. See Tinsley y.

Treat, 205 U. S. 20, 51 L. ed. 689, 27 S. Ct. 430. Com-

pare Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 30 L. ed. 849, 7S. Ct.

781.

‘*(7) Legality of sentence or conditions of confine-

ment. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. (U. 8S.) 163, 21 L. ed.

872; Re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242, 38 L. ed. 149, 14S. Ct.

323.

**(8) Contempt cases. Ex parte Hudgings, 249

U. S. 378, 384, 63 L. ed. 656, 39 S. Ct. 337, 11 A. L. R.

333. Compare, Re Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 33 L. ed. 150,

9S. Ct. 699, and Re Cuddy, 131 U. S. 280, 33 L. ed. |

154, 9S. Ct. 708. But when appeal is sufficient remedy,

see Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 68 L. ed. 293, 44 S. Ct.

103, and Judge Learned Hand’s dissenting opinion in

the Craig ease (C. C. A. 2d) 282 F. 138, 155. |

‘*Perhaps it is well that a writ the historie purpose

of which is to furnish ‘a swift and imperative remedy |

in all eases of illegal restraint,’ see Lord Birkenhead,

Ld. Ch., Secretary of State v. O’Brien [1923] A. C.

(Eng.) 603, 609—H. L., should be left fluid and free

from the definiteness appropriate to ordinary jurisdic-

tional doctrines. But if we are to leave the law per-

taining to habeas corpus in the unsystematized condi-

tion in which we find it, then I believe it is true of

both cases what Judge Learned Hand said of the Ku-

lick Case, that the writ is necessary ‘to prevent a com-

plete miscarriage of justice.’ 157 F. 2d 811, 813. If

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the justification need be no more definite than the ex-

istence of ‘exceptional circumstances,’ Bowen v. John-

ston, 306 U. S. 19, 27, 83 L. ed. 455, 461, 59 S. Ct. 442,

the reasons for allowing the writs in these cases are

more compelling than were those in Bowen v. John-

ston, where there merely appeared ‘to be uncertainty

and confusion . . . whether offenses within the...

National Park are triable in the state or federal

courts.’ For the reasons set forth in Judge Hand’s

opinion, it ‘would pass all fair demands upon Kulick’s

diligence to conclude him because of his failure to ap-

peal.’ 157 F. 2d at 813.”’

I, T. Emmett McKenzie, counsel for petitioner, do hereby

certify that this petition is not filed for purposes of delay,

and is filed in good faith.

After careful consideration I am entirely unable to

clearly understand why the original petition was not

granted, under the Court’s ruling in Sunal v. Large,

supra,

T. Eumetrr McKenzir,

Columbian Building,

Washington, D. C.,

Counsel for Petitioner.

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