Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Gorum v. Loudenslager
Supreme Court brief1947
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
LT SE Ee ET NY
INDEX
Susyect Inpex
Page
Petition for writ of certiorari..................... 1
RESERPINE Beery iae meee tes ame 1
Opinion of the court below.................... 2
Summary statement of the matter involved. .... 2
Jurisdiction of this Court.................... 11
ora wesc heehee om 12
Reasons relied on for the allowance of the writ. . 15
NI a is atric fs Saas 4 hbbeond Ors 19
ES Gee PE ree ry Pen ree eee 21
Opinion of the court below ................... 21
I i I eo ok ces ps nencd 21
Specifications of error to be urged............. 21
Summary of the argument ................... 22
EE Wace Wek Gh ee be ase etek. aekanavneds 26
Cases Crrep
Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87................. 24, 30
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U.S.
RE Dh gatos eae s PLES OSE 6% G45.6:2 12, 24, 26, 30, 31, 32
Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290.................. 23, 28
Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 .................... 26, 33
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. 8S. v. Pool, 145 S. W.
a ek at ea ie wha <5 23, 28
Gates v. Mortgage Loan & Inv. Agency, 139 S. W.
Ey ee i ke ae ba KNEE 24, 30, 31
mene v. arenes, Ger U. GAL... .. «ce 26
Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 661................. 26, 33
Irvan v. Bounds, 170 S. W. (2d) 674............... 23, 29
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 4380,
12, 23, 26, 28, 32, 33
Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Co., 82 S. W. (2d) 909. . 23, 29
Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268....... 26
Olmstead v. Olmstead, 216 U.S. 386................ 26, 33
Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343.......... 26, 32
——-8164
ii INDEX
Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449...............-.. 23, 28
Rutherford v. Tobin Quarries, 82 S. W. (2d) 918,
23, 24, 26, 29, 30
State ex rel. v. Fulbright, 169 S. W. (2d) 59,
23, 24, 26, 29, 30
U.S. v. California & Oregon L. Co., 192 U.S. 355... . 26, 32
Werlein v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 390............-. 26, 33
Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287.. 12, 26
Wisconsin v. Pellican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265.......-.. 26, 33
Constitution oF Unirep States CiTEeD
Section IV, Article 1, Constitution of the United
scale Go 1, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27
Statute CrTep
Laws Arkansas 1939, Act 319, Sec. 25 (a)........... 23, 28
SUPREME COUNT OF THE UNITED. STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1946
No. 575
JACK GORUM anp NATIONAL MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY,
vs.
RUBY 0. LOUDENSLAGER ann CHARLOTTE
LOUDENSLAGER
Petitioners,
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States:
Come now Jack Gorum and National Mutual Casualty
Company and respectfully petition this Honorable Court
to grant a writ of certiorari to review the opinion and
judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri en banc,
rendered and entered on the 10th day of June, 1946, in the
case lately pending in said Supreme Court of Missouri en
banc styled Ruby O. Loudenslager and Charlotte Louden-
slager, respondents, vs. Jack Gorum and National Mutual
Casualty Company, appellants, being Cause No, 39532 of
lm
a
2
the causes on the docket of said Supreme Court of Missouri
en bane, said judgment and opinion affirming the judgment
of the Circuit Court of Cedar County, Missouri, which said
Circuit Court judgment affirmed the award of the Missouri
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, in the sum of
$9,521.00, in favor of respondents and against petitioners
(R. 234 C, D, E) which said judgment of the Supreme
Court of Missouri en banc became final on the 8th day of
July, 1946, by the overuling by that Court of petitioners’
motion for rehearing (R. 255).
Opinion of the Court Below
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri en banc
in said cause of Ruby O. Loudenslager and Charlotte Lou-
denslager, respondents, vs. Jack Gorum and National Mutual
Casualty Company, appellants, which petitioners here seek
to have reviewed, is reported in 195 S. W. (2d) at page 498,
and appears on page 246 to page 253 of the transcript of
the printed record filed herewith. Said opinion has not yet
been published in the official State Reports.
Summary Statement of the Matter Involved
This proceeding was commenced by the filing of a claim
for compensation before the Missouri Workmen’s Compen-
sation Commission by Ruby O. Loudenslager for herself and
on behalf of her minor daughter, Charlotte Loudenslager,
on the 17th day of December, 1941, seeking an award of
compensation under the Missouri Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Act on account of the death of R. Guy Loudenslager
on the theory that he was an employee of Jack Gorum
under a contract of hire entered into in the State of Mis-
souri (R. 2-6). R. Guy Loudenslager was the husband
of Ruby O. Loudenslager and the father of Charlotte Lou-
denslager (R. 4).
3
Petitioner Jack Gorum was engaged in the trucking busi-
ness under the name of Arkansas Traveler Truck Lines, at
Bentonville, Arkansas (R. 3). Petitioner National Mutual
Casualty Company carried workmen’s compensation insur-
ance on Jack Gorum’s employees in the State of Arkansas.
R. Guy Loudenslager owned a refrigerated tractor trailer
truck, which he was using to haul freight for Jack Gorum
under a contract, whereby he was paid a percentage of the
gross freight charges for the freight he hauled (R. 101,
154). Jack Gorum’s operations extended into Missouri
through Arkansas and into Mississippi and Louisiana
(R. 99-100).
On June 18th, 1941, R. Guy Loudenslager was driving his
truck north on U. S. Highway 65, just outside of Pine Bluff,
in the State of Arkansas, returning from a trip to Missis-
sippi, hauling freight under contract with Jack Gorum (R.
234.D). His truck collided with another truck on the high-
way and R. Guy Loudenslager sustained injuries from
which he died the following day at Pine Bluff, Arkansas
(R. 234 D).
On July 23rd, 1941, Ruby O. Loudenslager filed a claim
for herself and on behalf of her minor daughter, Charlotte
Loudenslager, respondents herein, before the Arkansas
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, to recover com-
pensation under the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation
Act on account of the death of R. Guy Loudenslager, on
the ground that he was an employee under a contract of
hire with Jack Gorum and died as a result of accidental in-
juries arising out of and in the course of his employment—
Employer’s and Insurer’s Ex. 1 (R. 22, 297). This claim
was heard before the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation
Commission on December 15th, 16th, and 17th, 1941, and was
at that time continued until January 12th, 1942, for further
hearing, at the request of claimants (R. 26). On January
2m
4
12th, 1942, said proceeding was continued to January 24th,
1942—Claimants’ Exhibit C (R. 29, 262). The cause was
taken as submitted and an award was entered February
16th, 1942—Employer’s and Insurer’s Exhibit 1 (R. 22,
290-297).
The Arkansas Award
The award was entered on the merits of said claim by the
Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission, finding
that R. Guy Loudenslager was not an employee of Jack
Gorum and that he was an independent contractor, and
finding that the contract under which he was working at the
time of his injury was entered into in the State of Arkansas
—Employer’s and Insurer’s Exhibit 1 (R. 22, 290, 296).
Compensation was denied because claimants (respondents
herein) failed to prove that deceased was an employee
under a contract of hire. Compensation was not denied on
the ground that the Arkansas Compensation Law afforded
no remedy.
No appeal was taken from this award of the Arkansas
Workmen’s Compensation Commission—Employer’s and
Insurer’s Exhibit 1 (R. 22, 306), and the award became final
and conclusive between the parties in the State of Arkansas
thirty days thereafter—Section 25 (a) of Act No. 319, Acts
of the General Assembly for the year 1939, State of Arkan-
sas (R. 14, 19).
Thereupon, on February 5th, 1942, petitioner Jack
Gorum in his answer to the claim for compensation filed
before the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commis-
sion, pleaded, alleging that all of the issues before the Mis-
souri Workmen’s Compensation Commission had been
finally adjudicated by the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Commission (R. 7-9).
On May 17th, 1943, petitioner National Mutual Casualty
Company, in an amended answer filed before the Missouri
————
5
Workmen’s Compensation Commission to the claim for
compensation of Ruby O. Loudenslager and Charlotte .
Loudenslager, pleaded the final adjudication and award by
the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission of
the issues presented in the claim filed before the Missouri
Workmen’s Compensation Commission (R. 9, 10-11). The
claim before the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Com-
mission was heard on February 22nd, 23rd, and 24th, 1944,
at Jopiin, Missouri, by a Referee of the Missouri Work-
men’s Compensation Commission (R. 12). Petitioners,
Jack Gorum and the National Mutual Casualty Company,
introduced a duly authenticated copy of the record of the
Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission in evi-
dence, showing the final award of that Commission, Em-
ployer’s and Insurer’s Exhibit 1 (R. 22, 290-307).
The Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Law was intro-
duced in evidence hefore the Missouri Workmen’s Com-
pensation Commission (R. 14, 15-21). That law provides:
‘Sec. 2. Definitions. As used in this chapter
(a) ‘Employer’ means any individual, partnership,
association or corporation carrying on any employment
. *** toa
(b) ‘Employee’ means any person, including a minor,
whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, in the service
of an employer under any contract of hire or appren-
ticeship, written or oral, express or implied * * *
(R. 14, 15).
(c) ‘Employment’ means every employment carried
on in the state in which five or more employees are
regularly employed in the same business or establish-
ment, except (1) domestic service, (2) agricultural
farm labor, (3) institutions maintained and operated
as public charities, (4) the State of Arkansas and each
of the political subdivisions thereof, (5) any person
engaged in the vending, selling or offering for sale or
6
delivering directly to the general public, any news-
papers, magazines, or periodicals * * * (R. 14, 15).
(f) ‘Injury’ and ‘Personal Injury’ shall mean acci-
dental injury or death arising out of and in the course
ofempluyment * ° *°’’ (R. 14, 15).
Section 3 provides that every employ er and em-
ployee, unless specifically exempted, is wanenss to the
provisions of the Act (R. 14, 16).
Section 4 provides that the remedy granted to an em-
ployee under the Act is exclusive of all other rights and
remedies of such employee (R. 14, 16).
Section 5 provides that every employer subject to the
Act shall secure compensation to his employees for dis-
ability or death from injury arising out of and in the
course of the employment (R. 14, 16).
Section 15 (c) (3) provides for payment of compen-
sation for death to the widow and children (R. 14, 17).
Section 25 ‘‘Review of Compensation Order. (a) A
compensation order shall become effective when filed in
the office of the commission as provided in Section 23,
and, unless reversed or modified on appeal as provided
in sub-division (b) of this Section, shall become final at
the expiration of the 30th day thereafter’’ (R. 14, 19).
The Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Law (Sec. 3689-
3766 R. S. Mo. 1939) provides:
Section 3690 provides that every employer and em-
ployee, unless otherwise provided, shall be conclusively
presumed to nave elected to accept the provisions of
the compensation law, unless prior to the accident he
shall have filed with the Commission a written notice of
rejection of the law.
Section 3691 provides that if both employer and em-
ployee shall accept the provisions of the law, the em-
ployer shall be liable to furnish compensation for
personal injury or death of the employee by accident
| aa
7
arising out of and in the course of his employment, and
provides that the remedy is exclusive of all other
remedies.
Section 3694 (a) defines an employer as ‘“Every
person, partnership, association, corporation, trustee,
receiver, the legal representatives of a deceased em-
ployer, using the service of another for pay * * *”
Section 3695 (a) defines an employee as ‘«Every
person in the service of an employer, * * * under any
contract of hipe, express or implied, oral or written,
or under any appointment or election * * *”?
Section 3709 (d) provides for compensation to the
widow of an employee who dies as a result of accidental
injuries arising out of and in the course of his em-
ployment.
Section 3700 (b) provides compensation for injuries
or death occurring outside Missouri under a contract
of employment made in Missouri unless the contract
shall otherwise provide.
The Missouri Law covers independent contractors en-
gaged on or about the premises of the employer, Sec. 3698
R. S. Mo. 1939, but excludes independent contractors who
are engaged in driving trucks on public highways not under
the control of the employer (See Brief 33). The Arkansas
Law cover only employees (See Brief 30).
The Missouri Award
At the conclusion of the hearing on February 24th, 1944,
the Referee of the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Com-
mission took the case as submitted (R. 232), and entered an
award on the 8th day of March, 1944, finding that R. Guy
Loudenslager was an employee of Jack Gorum under a
contract of employment made in the State of Missouri, and
awarded claimants compensation in the sum of $9,521.00
(R. 232 A, B, C).
ee
8
‘Thereupon Jack Gorum, on March 10th, 1944, duly filed his
application for review (R. 234 A), and National Mutual Cas-
ualty Company, on March 14th, 1944, duly filed its applica-
tion for review (R. 234 B), and said proceeding was taken as
submitted on review on March 10th and March 14th, 1944,
by the full Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission
(R. 234), and said Missouri Workmen’s Compensation
Commission entered a final award on August 11th, 1944, find-
ing that the deceased R. Guy Loudenslager was an employee
of Jack Gorum and that the contract of employment was
entered into in the State of Missouri, and awarded claim-
ants compensation in the sum of $9,521.00 (R. 234C, D,
235).
Thereupon, on August 22nd, 1944, Jack Gorum and Na-
tional Mutual Casualty Company duly filed their notice of
appeal from the award of the Missouri Workmen’s Compen-
sation Commission to the Circuit Court of Jasper County,
Missouri (R. 236 A) ; and thereafter, on September 5th, 1944,
the Secretary of the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation
Commission transmitted said record, together with certifi-
cate on appeal, to the Circuit Court of Jasper County, at
Joplin, Missouri, and said transcript on appeal was duly
lodged in the Cireuit Court of Jasper County on Septem-
ber 6th, 1944 (R. 236 B, 359). Said cause was duly trans-
ferred from Jasper County to Cedar County, Missouri, be-
cause of the interest of the judges as counsel in said cause
(R. 237).
Thereafter, on the 17th day of November, 1944, said cause
was heard on appeal in the Circuit Court of Cedar County
and an amended judgment entry was made (R. 237-239),
affirming the award of the Missouri Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Commission. Thereafter, on December 19th, 1944, Jack
Gorum and National Mutual Casualty Company filed their
affidavit for appeal, and on the same day and during the
November Term, 1944, of the Circuit Court of Cedar County,
and at the same term at which the judgment had been entered,
—
9
said court made an order granting an appeal to the Supreme
Court of Missouri (R. 1, 2), and fixed the appeal bond at
$15,000.00 (R. 240). Thereafter, on December 23rd, 1944,
the appeal bond was filed and duly approved (R. 240).
Thereafter, on March 13th, 1945, the Circuit Court of
Cedar County made an order extending the time to file the
transcript on appeal in the Supreme Court of Missouri from
March 19th, 1945, to April 19th, 1945 (R. 240), and on April
17th, 1945, said Court entered an order extending the time
to file the transcript on appeal in the Supreme Court from
April 19th, 1945, to June 19th, 1945 (R. 241). It was stipu-
lated between the parties, appellants and respondents, that
certain exhibits would be filed in the Supreme Court of
Missouri under separate cover under Rule 1.05 of the Rules
of the Supreme Court of Missouri (R. 241-2).
The case on appeal was duly assigned to Division 1 of
the Supreme Court of Missouri, and was argued and sub-
mitted to said Court on January 8th, 1946. Thereafter, on
February 11th, 1946, Division 1 of the Supreme Court of
Missouri entered a judgment and filed its opinion affirming
the award of the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Com-
mission (R. 244). On February 26th, 1946, within the time
allowed by Rule 1.19 and 2.02 of the Supreme Court of
Missouri, petitioners filed their motion for rehearing and
to transfer said cause to the Supreme Court of Missouri
en banc. Said motion for rehearing and to transfer to the
Court en banc was overruled on March 11th, 1946, and the
Court, on its own motion, transferred said cause to the Court
en banc, under Section 4 of the Amendment of 1890 to
Article VI of the Constitution of Missouri (Rev. St. Mo.
1939, Vol. 1, p. 127¢), because a Federal question was in-
volved (R. 244). The case was set for argument and was
argued before the Supreme Court of Missouri en banc on
May 23rd, 1946, and was on that day taken by the Court as
submitted. On June 10th, 1946, the Supreme Court of Mis-
rE
10
souri en banc entered its judgment, affirming the award of
the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission and
adopting the opinion of Division 1 of the Supreme Court of
Missouri theretofore filed in said cause (R. 245). On June
22nd, 1946, within the time allowed by Rule 1.19 of said
Court, petitioners filed in said Court their motion for re-
hearing (R. 253), which was by the Court overruled by an
order entered of record on July 8th, 1946 (R. 255).
Opinion of Supreme Court of Missouri
The Supreme Court of Missouri en banc held in its opin-
ion that the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commis-
sion had jurisdiction to make the order refusing compensa-
tion (R. 248), and further held that the award of the Ar-
kansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission was not sub-
ject to collateral attack (R. 248). The Supreme Court of
Missouri held that the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation
Commission was not required to give full faith and credit to
the award of the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Com-
mission because the Arkansas award found that claimants
were not entitled to anything under the Arkansas Act (R.
249), and because the Wokmen’s Compensation Acts of
Missouri and Arkansas are different in many respects and,
therefore, the finding of the Arkansas Commission, that
claimants had no remedy to recover anything for Louden-
slager’s death under the Arkansas Act, does not mean that
they could not be given a remedy therefor by the Missouri
Act (R. 249).
Judgment of Supreme Court of Missouri
The Supreme Court of Missouri entered judgment affirm-
ing the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cedar County,
Missouri (R. 245).
il
Jurisdiction of This Court
The jurisdiction of this Court is based on Section 237 of
the Judicial Code as amended and reformulated by the Act
of February 13th, 1925, C. 229, Section 237, 43 Stat. 937,
Title 28, U. S. C. A., See. 344 (b), providing that it shall be
competent for this Court, by certiorari, to require that there
be certified to it for review and determination any cause
wherein a final judgment or decree has been rendered by
the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had,
where any title, right, privilege, or immunity specially set
up or claimed by either party under the Constitution, or any
treaty or statute, of, or commission held, or authority exer-
cised under, the United States.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri en banc
sought to be reviewed was entered on June 10th, 1946 (R.
245). A motion for rehearing was filed in said Court on
June 22nd, 1946, within the time prescribed by the rules of
the Supreme Court of Missouri (R. 253), and said motion
of petitioners for rehearing of said cause was denied by the
Supreme Court of Missouri en banc on July 8th, 1946 (R.
255), which is the date on which the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Missouri in said cause became final. The
Supreme Court of Missouri en banc was the highest court
of the State of Missouri in which a decision could be had
in said cause, and in said cause petitioners specially set up
and claimed a right under Article IV, Section 1 of the Con-
stitution of the United States— See answers to claim for
compensation (R. 7-11), Brief in Supreme Court of Mis-
souri (R. 244-5), and motion for rehearing (R. 253-5), which
right was denied petitioners by said Supreme Court of
Missouri en banc.
Petitioners specially pleaded in their answer to the claim
for compensation, filed before the Missouri Workmen’s Com-
pensation Commission, their right to have the final, con-
on i ily
12
clusive award of the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation
Commission accepted as a final and conclusive determination
of the issues theretofore adjudicated between the same
parties by the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commis-
sion (R. 7-11). Petitioners in their brief in the Supreme
Court of Missouri assigned as error the refusal of the
Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission to give
full faith and credit to the final Arkansas award and the is-
sues adjudicated therein and duly argued said question
before said Court (R. 244-5). The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, in its opinion, held:
‘‘Therefore, we must find that the Arkansas Commis-
sion had jurisdiction to make the order refusing com-
pensation. Nevertheless, we do not think that the
Schendel and Magnolia Petroleum Company cases pro-
hibit the award made herein by the Missouri Commis-
sion. (R. 248) * * * We, therefore, hold that the
Cireuit Court properly affirmed the award of the Mis-
souri Workmen’s Compensation Commission as to the
employer.’’ (R. 251)
The cases thought to sustain the jurisdiction of this Court
are:
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430;
Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U. 8S. 287;
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U.S.
611.
Questions Presented
I
Whether the respondents had one cause of action on ac-
count of the death of R. Guy Loudenslager, which, when
prosecuted to a valid, final, conclusive award between the
parties before the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, would be entitled to full faith and credit under
Se
13
Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States
and the Acts of Congress implementing same, as to all issues
that were adjudicated in the Arkansas proceeding and as to
all issues that could have been adjudicated in that proceed-
ing, when duly pleaded and proven in a second action be-
tween the same parties, seeking an award of compensation
on account of the same death before the Missouri Work-
men’s Compensation Commission, where the Arkansas
Workmen’s Compensation Law and the Missouri Work-
men’s Compensation Law both provided for an award of
compensation to the widow and minor child of an employee
who died as a result of accidental injuries arising out of
and in the course of his employment, and both compensation
laws define an employee as any person in the service of an
employer, under any contract of hire, express or implied,
written or oral, and both compensation laws exclude inde-
pendent contractors driving trucks along public highways,
and where the claim adjudicated by the Arkansas Work-
men’s Compensation Commission was to recover compen-
sation on the ground that deceased was an employee under
a contract of hire, and that he died as a result of accidental
injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment,
in Arkansas, and the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, after a hearing on the merits, found from the
evidence that deceased was not an employee, but was an in-
dependent contractor, and the claim before the Missouri
Workmen’s Compensation Commission was upon the same
ground, to-wit: that deceased was an employee under a con-
tract of hire, and that he died as a result of accidental in-
juries arising out of and in the course of his employment.
II
Whether the findings that deceased was not an employee
under a contract of hire, in a final, conclusive adjudication
by the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
14
having jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter,
brought to recover an award of compensation under the
Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Law on the ground
that deceased was an employee under a contract of hire,
wherein those issues were duly presented by the claim for
compensation and answer thereto filed before said Commis-
sion, and were duly contested and presented to said Com-
mission for decision by the evidence, are entitled to full
faith and credit, under Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitu-
tion of the United States in a subsequent proceeding, be-
tween the same parties, filed before the Missouri Workmen’s
Compensation Commission to recover compensation under
the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Law on account of
the same death on the ground that deceased was an em-
ployee under a contract of hire entered into in the State
of Missouri, where the prior final.award was duly pleaded
and proven in the second action.
III
Whether the fact that the Arkansas Workmen’s Compen-
sation Law and the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Law
differed in many particulars not material to the right to
compensation in question would except the valid, final, con-
clusive award of the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation
Commission from the requirements of full faith and credit
under Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United
States, when duly pleaded and proven in a second action
before the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission
by the same parties, seeking compensation on account of the
same death, and where both claims for compensation were
brought on the ground that the deceased was an employee
under a contract of hire, and the Arkansas Workmen’s
Compensation Commission in the first action held that he
was not and held that he was an independent contractor,
and the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission in
=
15
the second action held that he was an employee, and both
the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Mis-
souri Workmen’s Compensation Act provide for compensa-
tion to a widow and child on account of the death of the em-
ployee as a result of an accidental injury arising out of and
in the course of his employment, and neither the Arkansas
Workmen’s Compensation Act nor the Missouri Workmen’s
Compensation Act authorizes an award of compensation to
an independent contractor driving a truck along a public
highway, as the deceased was in this case.
Reasons Relied On for the Allowance of the Writ
I
Your petitioners believe that the Supreme Court of the
State of Missouri has decided a Federal question of sub-
stance in a way probably not in accord with applicable de-
cisions of this Court.
This Court has stated the rule of res judicata, as it is
applied under Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of
the United States, as follows:
‘‘The effect of a judgment or decree as res judicata
depends upon whether the second action or suit is upon
the same or a different cause of action. If upon the
same cause of action, the judgment, or decree upon the
merits in the first case is an absolute bar to the subse-
quent action or suit between the same parties or those
in privity with them, not only in respect of every mat-
ter which was actually offered and received to sustain
the demand, but also as to every ground of recovery
which might have been presented. But if the second
case be upon a different cause of action, the prior judg-
ment or decree operates as an estoppel only as to mat-
ters actually in issue or points controverted, upon the
determination of which the judgment or decree was
rendered,’’
en ee > ee ORE Crm CameNr eRe > lei
16
The Supreme Court of Missouri held in its opinion that .
the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission had
jursidiction to make the award it did make, and that such
award was not subject to collateral attack, yet said Court
denied full faith and credit to that award.
The claim filed before the Arkansas Workmen’s Com-
pensation Commission and the claim filed before the Mis-
souri Workmen’s Compensation Commission were upon the
same cause of action and were between the same parties.
Under the above rule, the final Arkansas award was res
judicata as to all issues that were adjudicated therein, and
likewise as to all issues that could have been adjudicated
therein. The issue adjudicated by the Arkansas Work-
men’s Compensation Commission was whether the deceased
was an employee or an independent contractor. The Ar-
kansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission found that
he was not an employee and that he was an independent
contractor. The issue before the Missouri Workmen’s
Compensation Commission was the same, to-wit: whether
the deceased was an employee or an independent contractor.
The Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission again
litigated this question and found that the deceased was an
employee. In so doing, the Missouri Workmen’s Com-
pensation Commission violated Article IV, Section 1 of the
Constitution of the United States.
II
The terms of the contract under which R. Guy Louden-
slager was working on June 18th, 1941, constituted him an
employee of Jack Gorum or an independent contractor
doing work for Jack Gorum. This issue was presented to
the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission by the
claim of respondents and by the answer of petitioners. The
issue was duly adjudicated by the Arkansas Workmen’s
ee
.
17
Compensation Commission, and the final, conclusive award
of the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission
adjudicating this issue was specially pleaded in the answer
of Jack Gorum and the National Mutual Casualty Company
to the claim for compensation filed before the Missouri
Workmen’s Compensation Commission. A duly authenti-
cated copy of the record of the Arkansas Workmen’s Com-
pensation Commission was introduced in evidence before
the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Peti-
tioners submit that Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution
of the United States, as construed by this Court, required
the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission to give
full faith and credit to this adjudicated issue and to ac-
cept the finding of the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation
Commission as conclusively establishing the relationship
created by the contract under which deceased was working,
and prevented the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation
Commission from again litigating this issue and finding
that R. Guy Loudenslager was an employee under a con-
tract of hire with Jack Gorum.
Ill
Your petitioners believe that the Supreme Court of the
State of Missouri en banc has decided a Federal question
of substance not theretofore determined by this Court, in
this, that the Supreme Court of Missouri en banc has ruled
in its judgment and opinion that the valid, final, conclusive
award of the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Com-
mission is excepted from the requirements of full faith and
credit under Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the
United States and the Acts of Congress implementing same,
because the award of the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Commission denied respondents a recovery and be-
cause there are many differences between the Arkansas
TT
18
Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Missouri Work-
men’s Compensation Act, although these differences are
not found to be pertinent or material to the claim for com-
pensation here involved.
It is believed that this Court should determine what judg-
ments and records of one state are excepted from the
requirements of full faith and credit when pleaded in a
second action in another state. This Court does not seem
to have ever excepted a money judgment or award from the
requirements of full faith and credit, and the decisions of
this Court seem to establish that no judgment or record of
one state will be excepted from the requirements of full faith
and credit unless the enforcement of that judgment or rece-
ord in another state will create a serious conflict with the
policy of such other state. The enforcement of the final, con-
clusive award of the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation
Commission in the State of Missouri will work no conflict
with the policy of the State of Missouri. This is true be-
cause both the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Act and
the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Act apply precisely
the same to the right of respondents to compensation on ac-
count of the death of R. Guy Loudenslager. Both the Ar-
kansas and the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Acts pro-
vide for an award of compensation to the widow and minor
child of a deceased employee who dies as a result of acci-
dental injuries arising out of and in the course of his em-
ployment, and that was the theory upon which both the
Arkansas and Missouri compensation claims were prose-
cuted. The Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Law and
the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Law likewise do
not provide for compensation on account of the death of an
independent contractor driving a truck along a public high-
way, as R. Guy Loudenslager was doing in this case, and it
appears from the record in this case that respondents sought
the same remedy in the proceeding before the Missouri
a
19
Workmen’s Compensation Commission which they had
under the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Law in the
proceeding theretofore adjudicated before the Arkansas
Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Under the facts
found by the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commis-
sion, no award of compensation could be made under the
Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Law; and likewise,
under the findings made by the Missouri Workmen’s Com-
pensation Commission, compensation would be awarded
under the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Law.
Your petitioners believe that the question involved in
this case is one of substance because the judgment and
opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri denies your
petitioners a Federal right. The petitioners specially
pleaded their right to have the final, conclusive award of
the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission given
full faith and credit in the subsequent action before the
Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission under
Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United
States. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri
denies your petitioners this right.
Your petitioners believe that the question involved is of
importance and should be determined by this Court be-
cause it is believed that orderly procedure requires that
a cause of action or an issue duly adjudicated by a tribunal
having jurisdiction should be conclusive in a second action
| between the same parties and should not be again litigated
in a subsequent action.
| Prayer
Wuererore, petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari
be issued by this Court directed to the Supreme Court of
Missouri to the end that said opinion and judgment of the
Supreme Court of Missouri en banc, in said cause of Ruby
ee
20
O. Loudenslager and Charlotte Loudenslager, respondents,
vs. Jack Gorum and National Mutual Casualty Company,
appellants, No. 39,532, be reviewed by this Court, as pro-
vided by law, and that upon such review said judgment be
reversed, and that petitioners have such other relief as to
this Court may seem appropriate.
JoserH N. Hassett,
Attorney for Petitioners,
412 Paul Brown Bldg.,
St. Louis 1, Mo.
21
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
Opinion of the Court Below
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri in said
cause of Ruby O. Loudenslager and Charlotte Louden-
slager, (claimants) respondents, vs. Jack Gorum and Na-
tional Mutual Casualty Company, (employer and insurer)
appellants, which petitioners here seek to have reviewed,
is reported in 195 S. W. (2d) 498, and appears on pages
246 to 253 of the transcript of the printed record filed
herewith. Said opinion has not yet been published in the
official State Reports.
Statement of the Case
The essential facts of the case are fully stated in the
petition for writ of certiorari, and in the interest of brevity
are not repeated here. Reference will be made to such
facts on the points involved in the course of the argument
which follows.
Specifications of Error to Be Urged
The Supreme Court of Missouri en banc, in its said
opinion in said cause, erred:
1. In holding and deciding that the Missouri Workmen’s
Compensation Commission was not required to give full
faith and credit, under Article IV, Section 1 of the Con-
stitution of the United States, to the final, conclusive award
of the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission in
a subsequent case on the same cause of action between the
same parties.
2. In holding that the findings of the Arkansas Work-
men’s Compensation Commission on matters in issue, on
22
the determination of which the Arkansas award was ren-
dered, were not conclusive between the same parties in the
subsequent Missouri proceeding.
3. In holding that the award of the Arkansas Workmen’s
Compensation Commission was excepted from the require-
ments of Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the
United States, because the Arkansas award denied com-
pensation and there was some difference in the Arkansas
law and the Missouri law.
Summary of the Argument
I
The respondents filed a claim for compensation before
the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission, seek-
ing an award of compensation on account of the death of
R. Guy Loudenslager. That proceeding was prosecuted
to a final, conclusive award between the parties in Arkansas.
Respondents filed another claim for compensation before
the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission, seek-
ing an award of compensation on account of the death of
R. Guy Loudenslager. Petitioners duly pleaded and proved
the final, conclusive award of the Arkansas Workmen’s
Compensation Commission in the proceeding before the
Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission. The Mis-
souri Workmen’s Compensation Commission refused to ac-
cept the final Arkansas award as conclusive between the
parties and again litigated that issue. The Arkansas Work-
men’s Compensation Commission denied compensation on
the finding that the deceased was not an employee, but was
an independent contractor. The Missouri Workmen’s Com-
pensation Commission entered an award in favor of re-
spondents on the finding that the deceased was an employee.
Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United
States, required that the final, conclusive award of the
en
23
Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission, when
duly pleaded and proven in the subsequent proceeding be-
fore the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
be given full faith and credit. The Missouri Workmen’s
Compensation Commission and the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri denied full faith and credit to the Arkansas award,
and held that the issue could be litigated a second time. In
so ruling, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri
violated Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the
United States.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. 8S. 430, 439,
443, 444, 445.
Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. 8. 449, 454, 455.
Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall 290, 301, 302.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. 8. v. Pool, 145 8S. W.
(2d) 25, 27 (Ark.)
State ex Rel. v. Fulbright, 169 S. W. (2d) 59 (Mo.)
Rutherford v. Tobin Quarries, 82 S. W. (2d) 918, 923
(Mo.)
TIrvan v. Bounds, 170 S. W. (2d) 674, 677 (Ark.)
Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Co., 82 S. W. (2d) 909,
916 (Mo.)
Article IV, Section 1 of the U. S. Constitution.
Act 319 Laws Arkansas 1939, Section 25 (a).
II
Respondents filed a claim for compensation before the
Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission to re-
cover compensation on account of the death of R. Guy
Loudenslager. That proceeding was prosecuted to a final,
conclusive award in Arkansas. Respondents also filed a
proceeding before the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation
Commission to recover on account of the same death.
Petitioners duly pleaded and proved the final, conclusive
i —
ceertn nets CETTE LLP EEO I
24
award of the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Com-
mission in the Missouri proceeding. The Missouri Work-
men’s Compensation Commission and the Supreme Court
of Missouri refused to give full faith and credit to the
final, conclusive Arkansas award; they held the issue
determined in the Arkansas proceeding could be again
litigated. The parties in both proceedings were the same,
and even though the Missouri and Arkansas proceedings
were not upon the same cause of action, Article IV, Section
1 of the Constitution of the United States required the
Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission and the
Supreme Court of Missouri to give full faith and credit
to that award on the matters in issue, upon the determina-
tion of which the Arkansas award was entered. The mat-
ter in issue, upon the determination of which the Arkansas
award was entered, was whether the deceased was an em-
ployee or an independent contractor. The Arkansas Com-
mission found that he was not an employee. The Missouri
Workmen’s Compensation Commission had before it the
same issue, and the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation
Commission found that the deceased was an employee.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. Schendel, 270
U. S. 611, 616, 617;
Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87, 102, 103;
Gates v. Mortgage Loan & Inv. Agency, 139 S. W.
(2d) 19, 23 (Ark.) ;
State ex rel, v. Fulbright, 169 S. W. (2d) 59 (Mo.)
Rutherford v. Tobin Quarries, 82 S. W. (2d) 918, 923.
Article IV, Section 1 of the U. S. Constitution.
Ill
Respondents filed a claim for compensation on account
of the death of R. Guy Loudenslager before the Arkansas
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, which was prose-
| cagpaaaiee oe
ae
25
cuted to a final, conclusive award between the parties in
Arkansas. They filed a second action seeking an award of
compensation on account of the same death before the
Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Peti-
tioners, in their answer before the Missouri Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, duly pleaded the final, conclu-
sive award of the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, and on hearing before the Missouri Work-
men’s Compensation Commission introduced a duly authen-
ticated copy of the final, conclusive award of the Arkansas
Commission. The Missouri Supreme Court, in its opinion,
held that the final, conclusive award of the Arkansas Work-
men’s Compensation Commission was excepted from the
requirements of Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution
of the United States, and that the Missouri Courts did not
have to give it full faith and credit, because the Arkansas
award denied compensation and held that the claimants
were not entitled to compensation under the Arkansas Act,
and because the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Act
and the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Act differed
in many respects, and that the finding of the Arkansas Com-
mission, that the claimants were not entitled to compensa-
tion under the Arkansas Act, does not mean that they
could not be given a remedy therefor by the Missouri Act.
The issue in both proceedings was whether the deceased
was an employee or an independent contractor. The Ar-
kansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission, after hear-
ing, found that he was not an employee. The Missouri
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, after hearing, found
that he was anemployee. Both Acts provided for compensa-
tion to respondents under the facts found by the Missouri
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, and both Acts de-
nied compensation to respondents under the facts found by
the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission.
-
nea
26
Neither Act provided for compensation on account of the
death of an independent contractor.
This Court is the final arbiter of the extent to which full
faith and credit must be given to the judgments of a sister-
state, and likewise as to what judgments may be excepted
from the requirements of full faith and credit. The Ar-
kansas award did not conflict with any public policy of the
State of Missouri and, therefore, Article IV, Section 1 of
the Constitution of the United States required that the
Missouri Courts give full faith and credit to that award.
In attempting to except that award from the requirements
of full faith and credit, the judgment and opinion of the
Supreme Court is brought into conflict and violates Article
IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 480, 438;
Williams v. “tate of North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 302;
Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U. 8. 348, 348;
Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U. 8. 268, 274;
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. Schendel, 270
U. S. 611, 616;
Hood v. McGhee, 237 U.S. 611
Olmstead v. Olmstead, 216 U. S. 386;
U. S. v. California & Oregon L. Co., 192 U. 8. 355;
Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186;
Werlein v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. 390, 398, 399 ;
Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U. S. 661, 666, 685;
Wisconsin v. Pellican Ins. Co., 127 U. 8. 265;
State ex rel. v. Fulbright, 169 S. W. (2d) 59;
Rutherford v. Tobin Quarries, 82 S. W. (2d) 918, 923.
Argument
I
This proceeding grows out of a claim filed December 19th
1941, by respondents before the Missouri Workmen’s Com-
—
27
pensation Commission, seeking an award of compensation
under the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Law on ac-
count of the death of R. Guy Loudenslager.
Prior to filing the Missouri claim, respondents, on July
23rd, 1941, filed a claim for compensation before the Arkan-
sas Workmen’s Compensation Commission, to recover com-
pensation under the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation
Law on account of the same death.
Both claims sought an award of compensation on the
ground that R. Guy Loudenslager was an employee under
a contract of hire (R. 3-4, 6). Employer’s and Insurer’s
Exhibit 1 (R. 22, 297). The Arkansas proceeding was
first prosecuted to an award on February 16th, 1942—
Employer’s and Insurer’s Exhibit 1 (R. 22, 290). No ap-
peal was prosecuted from the Arkansas award-—Em-
ployer’s and Insurer’s Exhibit 1 (R. 22, 306), and it be-
came final and conclusive between the parties on March
18th, 1942. See. 25 (a), Act 319 Laws of Arkansas 1939
(R. 14, 19).
The Arkansas award was pleaded in the Missouri pro-
ceeding (R. 7-11), and a duly authenticated copy of the
award and record of the Arkansas Workmen’s Compen-
sation Commission was introduced in evidence (R. 22).
Petitioners claim that it was the duty of the Missouri
Workmen’s Compensation Commission to accept this final
Arkansas award as conclusively establishing the relation-
ship of deceased to petitioner Jack Gorum, under Article
IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States
and the Acts of Congress implementing same. 28 U. S.
C. A., Sec. 688. Regardless of such proof of the final
Arkansas award, the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation
Commission proceeded to again litigate the issue finally
adjudicated by the Arkansas award, and made a finding
contrary to that award (R. 232 A-234 A, 234 C-234 D).
Dee a ee
7
The claims filed in these proceedings show that the
parties were the same (R. 3-4; Employer’s and Insurer’s
Exhibit 1, R. 22, 297). Respondents had one cause of
action on account of the death of R. Guy Loudenslager.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 443, 444, 445.
They could seek their remedy in either Arkansas or Mis-
souri, but having chosen to seek it in Arkansas, where the
award was final and conclusive—Act 319 Laws Ark. 1939,
Sec. 25 (A) (R. 14, 19), the full faith and credit clause
precludes them from again seeking a remedy in Missouri
upon the same ground. Magnolia Petrolewm Co. v. Hunt,
320 U. S. 444.
The rule laid down by the applicable decisions of this
Court, in construing Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitu-
tion of the United States and the Act of Congress imple-
menting same, is that a final, conclusive judgment of one
state, when duly pleaded and proven in a subsequent action,
between the same parties on the same cause of action
brought in another state, must be given the same force and
effect in the second action that it had in the state where
rendered, under the principle of res judicata.
Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 301, 302.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439.
Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. 8S. 449, 454, 455.
28
The award was conclusive and final between the parties
in Arkansas. Act 319 Laws Arkansas 1939, Sec. 25 (b)
(R. 14, 19).
Under the rule of res judicata in the State of Arkansas,
the award conclusively established that deceased was not
an employee. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Pool,
143 S. W. (2d) 25, 27.
The same validity and effect should have been given to
the Arkansas award by the Missouri Workmen’s Compen-
sation Commission.
29
Such validity and effect was denied the Arkansas award
and the issue was again litigated.
The recognition of the Arkansas award by the Missouri
Workmen’s Compensation Commission and the granting
it full faith and credit would not violate or conflict with
any policy of the State of Missouri. This is so because
the award of compensation was denied by the Arkansas
Workmen’s Compensation Commission because it found
deceased was not an employee, but was an independent
contractor—Employer’s and Insurer’s Exhibit 1 (R. 22,
296). The policy of Missouri, as shown by its compensation
law and decisions construing same, is to deny compensation
to independent contractors. State ex rel. v. Fulbright,
169 S. W. (2d) 59; Rutherford v. Tobin Quarries, 82 S. W.
(2d) 918, 923.
Under the facts found by the Arkansas Workmen’s Com-
pensation Commission, neither Missouri nor Arkansas law
provides for compensation. Under the facts found by
the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission, both
Missouri and Arkansas laws provide for compensation to
the widow and child.
It would seem that the only reason why the Missouri
Supreme Court and the Missouri Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Commission were unwilling to grant full faith and
credit to the Arkansas award was because they were not
agreeable to accepting the finding of fact made by the
Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission.
Both Arkansas and Missouri apply the same rule of law
to determine whether a workman is an employee or an
independent contractor. Irvan v. Bounds, 170 S. W. (2d)
674, 677; Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Co., 82 S. W. (2d)
909, 916.
Petitioners submit that the Supreme Court of Missouri
violated Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the
-—
30
United States, and the Act of Congress implementing same,
by denying full faith and credit to the Arkansas award,
and the judgment of said Court should be reversed.
II
However, if it should be thought that the Arkansas pro-
ceeding and the Missouri proceeding were upon different
causes of action, the Arkansas award was nevertheless
entitled to full faith and credit. The parties were the
same—Employer’s and Insurer’s Exhibit 1 (R. 22, 297, 3-4).
The matter in issue, upon the determination of which the
Arkansas award was rendered, was whether the deceased
was an employee or an independent contractor. The
Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission found he
was not an employee—Employer’s and Insurer’s Exhibit 1
22, 296). It found he was an independent contractor.
It denied compensation on a trial on the merits because of
these findings.
If the Arkansas award had been given full faith and
credit and the issues there adjudicated had been accepted
as final and conclusive, no award of compensation could
have been made by the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation
Commission. State ex Rel. v. Fulbright, 169 S. W. (2d) 59;
Rutherford v. Tobin Quarries, 82 S. W. (2d) 918, 923.
This is so because the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation
Law does not provide compensation for the injury or death
of an independent contractor not engaged on or about the
premises of the employer.
The parties being the same, the matters in issue, on the
determination of which the Arkansas award was rendered,
in the first action are conclusive in the second action when
pleaded and proven. Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87,
102, 103; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Schen-
del, 270 U. S. 611, 617; Gates v. Mortgage Loan & Ins.
nt nee Tay
31
Agency, 139 S. W. (2d) 19, 23 (Ark.). Whether deceased
was an employee was the matter in issue, on the determina-
tion of which both the Arkansas and the Missouri awards
were rendered. The issue in both proceedings was the
same. Chicago, R. I. d P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U. S.
616.
Your petitioners, therefore, believe that the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Missouri conflicts with the ap-
plicable decision of this Court and violates Article IV,
Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States.
Ill
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in its opinion, held
that the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission
had jurisdiction and that the Arkansas award was not sub-
ject to collateral attack (R. 248). Yet said Court refused
to give that award full faith and credit (R. 248-9). The
opinion of said Court has excepted the Arkansas award
from the requirements of full faith and credit. The reasons
for excepting this final, conclusive award from the require-
ment of full faith and credit are stated in the opinion to
be because the Arkansas award denied a recovery of com-
pensation, and the Arkansas and Missouri compensation
laws differ in many respects, and the right to compensation
under the Missouri law was not involved in the Arkansas
proceeding, and the right to compensation under the
Arkansas law was not involved in the Missouri proceeding.
It was not held or contended by the Missouri Supreme
Court that the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Law
granted respondents any remedy to recover an award of
compensation which was not also granted respondents in
the Arkansas proceeding under the Arkansas Workmen’s
Compensation Law.
32
It is for this Court to determine the extent to which full
faith and credit must be given to the judgments and rec-
ords of the State of Arkansas by the Courts of Missouri,
as well as to determine what judgments and records shall be
excepted from the requirement of full faith and credit.
Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 302;
Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 274.
It was not thought by this Court, in Chicago, Rock Island
é Pacific Ry. v. Schendel, swpra, that the fact that there
was a difference between the Iowa Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Law and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act would
except the Iowa compensation award from the require-
ments of full faith and credit. Nor was it thought in the
Schendel case that the fact that the right to recover dam-
ages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act was not
involved in the Iowa compensation proceeding, and the
right to recover compensation under the Iowa Compen-
sation Law was not involved in the Minnesota proceeding
brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, cre-
ated any exception to the requirement of full faith and credit
under Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the
United States.
Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United
States and the Act of Congress implementing same have
made it mandatory for the Courts of Missouri to give the
final, conclusive award of the Arkansas Workmen’s Com-
pensation Commission the same force and effect it has in
Arkansas, when pleaded and proven in the Missouri com-
pensation proceeding, under the principle of res judicata.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. 8. 430; Chicago,
R. 1. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611, 616; Riley v.
New York Trust Co., 315 U. S. 343, 348.
Under the principle of res judicata, this Court held, in
U. 8. v. California and Oregon Land Co., 192 U. 8. 355,
that a decree in a former action in favor of defendant, deny-
33
ing affirmative relief, was res judicata in a subsequent
action, and a like ruling was made by this Court in Werlein
v. New Orleans, 177 U. 8. 390, 398, 399.
This Court has not seen fit to except a money judgment in
a civil suit from the requirements of full faith and credit.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 438, although
some exceptions to the requirements of full faith and credit
have been established.
As was observed in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,
320 U. S. 430, the exceptions to the requirements of full
faith and credit have been few and far between.
Those cases which have been established as exceptions
to the requirements of full faith and credit are for the
most part cases where an attempt is made to enforce the
penal laws of one State in the courts of a sister-State, by
use of the requirements of Article IV, Section 1 of the
Constitution of the United States. Wisconsin v. Pellican
Ins. Co., 127 U. 8. 265; Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U. S.
661, 666, 685. Or where the effect of full faith and credit
will be to allow the courts of one State to control the
transfer of real estate located in sister-States. Clarke v.
Clarke, 178 U. 8. 186; Olmstead v. Olmstead, 216 U. S. 386;
Hood v. McGhee, 237 U.S. 611.
Judgments excepted from the requirement of full faith
and credit seem to be limited to such judgments, the enforce-
ment of which will seriously conflict with the policy of the
State in which their enforcement is sought.
In this case it is impossible to harmonize the two awards.
The granting of full faith and credit to the Arkansas award
by the Missouri Courts will not do violence to or conflict
with any policy of the State of Missouri, because Mis-
souri denies compensation to independent contractors.
State ex rel. v. Fulbright, 169 S. W. (2d) 59; Rutherford v.
Tobin Quarries, 82 S. W. (2d) 918, 923.
34
The judgment and opinion of the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri not only conflicts with applicable decisions of this
Court construing Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution
of the United States and the Act of Congress implementing
same, it demonstrates a positive policy to deny full faith and
credit to all compensation awards which deny compensation.
This is true because it will be difficult to find two workmen’s
compensation laws which do not differ in many respects.
This opinion will, if allowed to remain unreversed, stand
as a precedent for the Workmen’s Compensation Commis-
sion of Missouri to deny full faith and credit to all awards
of other States which deny compensation. It will no doubt
be so construed by the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation
Commission and will be so applied thereby, resulting in
the confusion and disrespect for the law which the full faith
and credit provision of the Constitution was adopted to
eliminate.
In Conclusion
In conclusion, your petitioners earnestly urge that the
question here presented does not grow out of any conflict
between the Workmen’s Compensation Law of the State
of Arkansas and the Workmen’s Compensation Law of
the State of Missouri, because both the Arkansas Work-
men’s Compensation Law and the Missouri Workmen’s
Compensation Law provide for an award of compensation
to the widow and child of a deceased employee whose death
results from an accidental injury arising out of and in the
course of his employment, and both Workmen’s Compen-
sation Laws deny an award of compensation for the death
of an independent contractor from accidental injuries
arising out of and in the course of his work while driving
‘ a truck along a public highway, as R. Guy Loudenslager
was doing in this case. Neither does the question here in-
volved arise out of any conflict or difference between the
—
35
public policy of the State of Arkansas and the State of Mis-
souri in reference to granting of compensation to employees.
This is so because it is the policy of both States to deny
compensation to the widow and child of a deceased work-
man under the facts found by the Arkansas Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, and it is the policy of both
States to grant compensation to the widow and child of a
deceased employee under the facts found by the Missouri
Workmen’s Compensation Commission. From this it ap-
pears that the question here results solely from the fact
that the Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Commission
believed from the eviderse, after the hearing on the merits,
that the deceased was not an employee, and because the
Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission refused
to accept that final award as conclusive and again ad-
judicated the same issue. The same rule of law is applied
in both Arkansas and Missouri in determining who is an
employee under the Workmen’s Compensation Laws of
these States. It is not enough that the Courts of Missouri
disagree with the finding of fact by the Arkansas Work-
men’s Compensation Commission to base a denial of full
faith and credit to the final award of the Arkansas Work-
men’s Compensation Commission on that ground.
Your petitioners, therefore, respectfully urge that the
writ of certiorari prayed for should be issued, to the end
that this Court may review the judgment of the Supreme
Court of the State of Missouri in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
Joserx N. Hassert,
Attorney for Petitioners,
412 Paul Brown Bldqg.,
St. Louis 1, Mo.
(8164)
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.