Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — United States v. Albert & Harrison, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1947

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Inthe Supreme Gaurt of the Winited States

OcToBER TERM, 1946

No. 1075

THE UNITED STATES, PETITIONER

Vv.

ALBERT & HARRISON, INCORPORATED

PETITION FOR A WRiT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT

OF CLAIMS

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United

States, prays that a writ of certiorari issue to re-

view the judgment of the Court of Claims of the

United States entered in the above-entitled case

on December 2, 1946.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Claims (R. 18-21)

is reported at 68 F. Supp. 732.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Claims was en-

tered on December 2, 1946 (R. 22). The juris-

diction of this Court is invoked under Section 3

(b) of the Act of February 13, 1925, as amended.

41)

am

2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a bidder was coerced into entering

into a Government contract where, after being in-

formed of the award of the contract, he seeks to

withdraw his bid as unduly low because of alleg-

edly misleading drawings but nevertheless signs the

contract because of a threat to enforce the bid

bond.

2. Whether, after signing the contract in the

above circumstances am completing performance,

the contractor may recover as extras certain work

required by the contract.’

STATUTE AND CONTRACT PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent provisions of the Davis Bacon

Act (Act of August 30, 1935, 49 Stat. 1011) and

of the contract and specifications here involved

are set forth in the Appendix, infra, pp. 16-23.

STATEMENT

The facts as found by the court below may be

summarized as follows:

1 Should a writ of certiorari be granted, the Government

reserves the right to submit argument on the additional ques-

tion whether the determination of the Secretary of Labor of

prevailing wage rates as the minimum below which the con-

tractor may not pay is a representation to the contractor that

he will not be required to pay more, so that when the Secre-

tary determines a higher minimum wage rate for the area

generally but does not increase the rate fixed in the contract,

and the contractor pays the higher rate to his employees after

a dispute to which the Government is not a party, the Gov-

ernment is liable for the difference between the contract and ~

higher rate.

3

On April 23, 1941, Albert & Harrison, In-

corporated (contractor) entered into a contract

with the United States, acting through the

Ordnance Department, United States Army, for

the renovation of Buildings M-4, N-5, and L-3

at the Raritan Arsenal, Metuchen, New Jersey,

in accordance with certain specifications, sched-

ules and drawings which were made part of the

contract (R. 7). The work was completed by

July 5, 1941, and the contractor has been paid the

contract price, as adjusted for change orders,

except for the deduction of $950 as liquidated

damages for delay (R. 7). On December 10,

1941, contractor filed with the contracting officer

a claim for additional brickwork and for the

difference in bricklayers’ wages, which claim was

rejected on March 6, 1942 (R. 17). Subse-

quently, on June 29, 1942, the Secretary of War

and on April 8, 1943, the General Accounting

Office rejected the claim (R. 17-18). Suit was

thereafter brought in the court below to recover

for (1) alleged additional brickwork, (2) in-

creased costs on bricklayers’ wages and (3) re-

mission of liquidated damages. Judgment for

$19,766.95 was entered for contractor on all three

claims.”

* The United States does not seek review of, nor does it in-

tend to argue, if a writ of certiorari is granted, the propriety

of that portion of the judgment below relating to the remis-

sion of $950 liquidated damages.

a

4

1. Alleged Addittonal Brickwork.—Specifica-

tion S-C 1, Appendix, infra, p. 21, and Article 1

of the contract, Appendix, infra, p. 16, stated that

the brickwork on the buildings was to be done in

accordance with the drawings.’ The drawing of

the two buildings M4 and L-3 (D-197) indicates

fourteen large doors in the east and west wall

of each building, and bears the notation parallel

to the exterior wall line:

Replace existing doors, east and west

walls with brick and doors as indicated.

On this drawing there is also an elevation indi-

eating a portion or bay of outside walls contain-

ing one door. There are seven of these bays

shown in each wall. On each side of the door

in this ‘‘Typical Bay,” there appears the word

“Brick” in very light letters. The light letter-

ing of the word indicates that the existing wall is

brick. The area is not heavily hatched in as

showing new work.

Section G-C 2 of the specifications, Appendix,

infra, p. 20, advised bidders of the desirability of

visiting the site of the work but contractor pre-

pared its bid without complying with this sugges-

tion (R. 12). On April 23, 1941, contractor was

notified that its bid was accepted (R. 11), and

’There is no question that the drawing of building N-5

(D-198) indicated all existing and proposed openings in the

building; and hence the contractor has not sought any addi-

tional compensation for the brickwork done on that building

(R. 11).

A. S. Harrison, contractor’s secretary and treas-

urer, who had prepared the bid, went to the

arsenal to sign the contract (R. 11). Mr. Har-

rison then noticed that buildings L-3 and M-4

contained 116 doors and openings not shown on

the drawings and of which he had no prior

knowledge (R. 11) although all these openings

could be plainly observed at the site (R. 12).

When informed that all these openings were to

be bricked up, Mr. Harrison stated that the bid

did not include the work of bricking up the open-

ings, and that new bids should be called for (R.

11). The Government’s construction engineer at

the arsenal advised that if contractor failed to

sign the contract and proceed, its bid bond would

be forfeited (R. 11). Mr. Harrison left without

signing, but returned on the following day, at

which time he renewed his request that new bids

be called for (R. 11). This the contracting officer

refused to do, indicating that the drawing D-197

contained the necessary information, including

all doors and work -to be performed, and stating

that contractor must proceed with the work (R.

11). Contractor signed the contract (R. 12),

and on May 5 started the work under oral protest

(R. 12).*

‘Subsequently, contractor received a “Revised Drawing”

D-197 which indicated revision as of May 2, 1941, and showed

clearly 144 openings, including the 116 here involved. This

drawing, contractor contended, was handed to its representa-

tive by the contracting officer’s assistant, but the contracting

officer contended that the drawing was a tracing, unapproved

eo Bate ts NO a a et

6

The court below held that the specifications and

drawings had the effect of misleading contractor

into making a bid which it otherwise would not

have made (R. 20); that enforcement of the bid

bond would expose the contractor to liability to

the Government (R. 20); and accordingly that.

contractor was coerced ‘‘into signing the contract

when the Government had no right to a contract

based on the [contractor’s] bid’’ (R. 20). The

court, Judge Whitaker dissenting, found con-

tractor entitled to recover $17,600 on this claim.

(R. 18).

2. Labor Claim.—In accordance with the Davis

Bacon Act of 1935, Article 28 of the contract,

by him and not connected with contractor’s work (R. 12).

On May 17, 1941, contractor wrote to the commanding officer,

Reritan Arsenal, that it had examined the revised drawing

and requested advice “whether you want us to do this work

and we will submit our proposal to you” (R. 12). In reply,

the contracting officer, on May 19, 1941, advised that drawing

D-197 had not been revised and requested the return of any

copies of that drawing bearing a revision date subsequent

to the date of the contract. On May 21, 1941, contractor

again wrote to the commanding officer :

“In accordance with your instructions, we are proceeding

with the removals of the doors and the bricking up of the

openings under protest.” (R. 12.)

To this, the contracting officer replied on May 24, 1941:

“Receipt of your letter of May 21, 1941, relative to the

renovation of buildings N-5, M-4 and L-3 at this arsenal,

is acknowledged.

“Jt is presumed that the instructions to which you refer

in your letter are my oral directions to you to proceed with

the work as called for in the contract. ‘These instructions

are confirmed and made a matter of record.” (R. 12.)

No appeal was taken at that time from the action of the

_contracting officer expressed in these letters.

oT

7

Appendix, infra, p. 20, and ion S—C 9 of the

specifications, Appendix, infri, “obligated the

contractor to follow a schedule of minimum

wage rates determined by the Secretary of

Labor on October 26, 1940 to be the prevailing

rates of wages for crafts specified to be employed

on this contract. The Secretary had found the rate

of wages for bricklayers to be $1.50 per hour

(R. 14). On April 4, 1941, the Department of

Labor increased the prevailing rate of wages for

bricklayers in the Raritan Arsenal area to $1.75

per hour (R. 14).

When contractor started work on the contract,

the business agent of the bricklayers’ union

claimed to it that the prevailing wages for brick-

layers for the area of the site was $1.75 per

hour and that the Department of Labor’s rep-

resentatives had sometime in April of 1941 recog-

nized such rate in the area (R. 14). An ar-

rangement was made between contractor and the

bricklayers’ union to submit the question to arbi-

tration (R. 14). After completion of the work,

the arbitrator decided that $1.75 per hour was

the prevailing wage rate for bricklayers in that

area (R. 14).

While conceding that the specifications were

undoubtedly prepared before the new wage scale

was recognized, the court below held that this

new wage scale was set some weeks before the

contract was made, and contractor should have

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8

been advised (R. 20); that although the deter-

mined rate is only a minimum, it is the prevailing

rate which “‘is by hypothesis the rate customarily

paid and the rate at which a contractor could

expect to hire his labor’? (R. 20) ; accordingly, it

held that since ‘“‘the claim of the bricklayers for

$1.75 was based entirely upon the fact that the

prevailing rate as determined by the Secretary

of Labor was, in fact $1.75,” and “the Govern-

ment had represented that it was $1.50” (R. 20-

21), contractor is entitled to recover because of the

misrepresentation (R. 21). It entered judgment

for $1,216.95 on this claim (R. 18).

SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS TO BE URGED

The Court of Claims erred:

(1) In holding that in the circumstances of the

present case the threat to enforce the bid bond

was coercive.

(2) In holding that the contractor after sign-

ing, executing and completely performing the

contract may recover extra compensation for the

alleged additional brickwork.

(3) In holding that the wage rates determined

by the Secretary of Labor were representations

on which the contractor was entitled to rely as

the rates which he could expect to hire labor.

(4) In failing to hold that under the instant

contract contractor was not required to pay more

than the wage rates determined therein.

er

(5) In holding that the Secretary’s determina-

tion of minimum rates for the Raritan area at

a level higher than those determined in the

instant contract was cause for imposing liability

on the United States for contractor’s increased

labor cost.

(6) In entering judgment for respondent on

the two claims here involved.

1. The holding of the court below permitting

the contractor to recover its costs for bricking up

the 116 doors in controversy, on the theory that

the threat to enforce the bid bond coerced it into

signing the contract and hence entitled it to

recover extras in excess of the contract price,

is not only unsound but conflicts with the decision

of the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia in Board of Trustees, etc. v. O. D. Wil-

son Co., 133 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C.), and is

inconsistent with the court below’s earlier deci-

sion in Massman Construction Co. v. United

States, 102 C. Cls. 699, certiorari denied, 325

U.S. 866.

In both the Massman and the Wilson cases,

the courts refused to allow recovery for extras to

a contractor who allegedly had discovered the

omission of certain items of cost from his bid

prior to the signing of the contract, but had

signed the contract under threat of enforcement

of his bid bond. In the Massman case, the Court

10

of Claims held that if the District Engineer

reasonably thought that the contractor did not

have the right to be released from its bid bond

without penalty, his refusal voluntarily to release

the contractor was not improper. In the Wilson

case, the Court of Appeals did not regard the

threat to enforce the bid bond as coercive, since

if the contractor had the right to rescind, the

Board of Trustees had no power to make good

its threat. Both these cases are correct since the

question of liability on the bid bond was litigable

(Moffett, Hodgkins, etc. Co. v. Rochester, 178 U.

S. 373), and the courts have consistently held that

where one is entitled to litigate, there is no duress

or unconscionable conduct justifying rescission or

reformation of the transaction allegedly induced

thereby. Hartsville Oil Mill v. United States, 271

U. S. 43; Silliman v. United States, 101 U. 8. 465;

In re Prima Co., 98 F. (2d) 952, 964-966 (C. C. A.

7), certiorari denied sub nom. Keig v. Harris

Trust & Savings Bank, 305 U. 8S. 658; McKenzie-

Hague Co. v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp.,

73 F. (2d) 78, 83-85 (C. C. A. 8); Dick v. Mare

& Rawolle, 4 F. (2d) 879 (App. D. C.), certiorari

denied, 268 U. S. 688; Williston on Contracts

(Rev. Ed., 1937) § 1606.

These principles, we submit, are controlling in

the present case. As in the Massman case, the

contracting officer reasonably thought that the

contractor had no right to be released without

penalty, and hence his refusal to release the con-

il

tractor was not improper. The specifications de-

scribed the work to be done as follows: “The ren-

ovation of Building — by the replacing of existing

doors with brick, metal doors and sash as in-

dicated.’”” At most, there was an ambiguity as

to what the phrase “‘as indicated” modified. The

contracting officer construed it to modify “brick,

metal doors and sash,” rather than “‘replacing.’’*

In these circumstances, the contracting officer “‘had

the right, and probably the duty, to insist upon

what he, reasonably, thought were the Govern-

ment’s rights”’ (102 C. Cls. at 719).

In the present case, as in the Wilson case, the

contractor chose to sign the contract “under no

mistake, for it then knew all the facts including

its former mistake’’ (133 F. (2d) 400). More-

over, as in the Wilson case, the contractor had

the choice of refusing to sign and litigating its

right to withdraw or of signing the contract and

assuming the risk of not recovering for the al-

leged extras. If, as the court below found, the

contractor had the right to withdraw its bid

(R. 20), it of course, would not have been subject

to any liability on its bid bond and the contracting

officer “‘had no power to make good [his] threat.

[His] denial of the right to rescind did not con-

clude the question. Appellee could litigate it.

*This construction is binding since the specifications

G-C 15, Appendix, infra, pp. 20-21, clearly stated that the

contracting officer shall be the interpreter of the drawings and

the specifications.

ee ae TLE

nee OLLI CEI I

Appellant was equally entitled to litigate it or, as

it did in effect, threaten to litigate it. It follows

that there was no duress. Appellee simply chose

to contract and perform rather than have its right

to rescind judicially determined. It is bound by

the contract and cannot recover in this action.”

(133 F. (2d) at 400.)

The contractor’s execution of the contract ‘‘un-

der oral protest’? (R. 12) because of the mistake

in its bid price adds nothing to its rights. The

contractor, having chosen not to rescind its bid,

conceivably voidable if based on a mistake of

fact (Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed., 1937)

§§ 15, 1626), elected to contract with the Gov-

ernment at its bid price (R. 12) and thus ter-

minated any right to reformation thereof. See

Restatement of Contracts § 431 (comment g);

Williston, supra, § 1528; cf. Restatement of

Restitution § 68. In the Wilson case, where the

contractor likewise signed the contract, ‘‘reserv-

ing all rights arising from its estimator’s mis-

take’? the contractor ‘“‘could not on any theory

contract, perform, collect the full contract price,

and then repudiate the contract and recover as if

there had been none. It could not acquire such

a right by purporting to ‘reserve’ it” (133 F. (2d)

at 399, 400). To allow the contractor relief in

these circumstances would ‘‘be making for the par-

ties the very contract which one of them, the Gov-

ernment, expressly refused to make * * *

13

though requested to do so by the [contractor]”’

(Massman Construction Co. v. United States, 102

C. Cls. at 717).

The court below did not refer to the Wilson

ease, and attempted to distinguish the Massman

ease on the ground that in that case, “the Govern-

ment was in no way at fault or responsible for

the [contractor’s] mistake and the [contractor]

was probably not entitled to withdraw its bid’’

(R. 20). This distinction, we submit, is wholly

lacking in significance. While in the present case

the contractor may not have been wholly re-

sponsible for the situation which arose, it clearly

contributed to it by failing to visit the site and

inspect the work on which it was bidding. More-

over, whether the contractor was coerced into

signing the contract is not determined by fixing

responsibility for the erroneous bid. Finally, if,

as the court below held, the United States were

solely responsible for the alleged error, the denial

of recovery in the present case would appear a

fortiori to follow, for then there could be no

doubt that the contractor could not be held on

its bid bond; there could be no doubt that there

was no economic pressure on it to sign the con-

tract, and hence no justification for finding coer-

cion. Cf. Board of Trustees v. O. D. Wilson Co.,

supra, at 400.

2. The questions here presented are important

and merit review by this Court. In addition to

14

conflicting with the Wilson case, the decision be-

low by permitting bidders to withdraw their bids

without penalty in the present circumstances

vitiates the value of the irrevocable bid bond by

resurrecting the evils which the Government's

present system of sealed bids was designed to

eliminate. If, after the bids have been opened,

the reletting of the contract may be required

where there is any ambiguity in either the draw-

ings or specifications, any subsequent bid could

be expected to be lower than the second bid only,

and not to be the lowest amount for which the

work could be done. If, on the other hand, the

contractor is permitted to sign the contract and

thereafter recover for the alleged extras, the net

effect may very well be that the contract actually

is not let to the lowest responsible bidder, for the

sum of the contract price plus the extras which

the contractor is allowed will frequently be in ex-

cess of the rejected competitive bids. As the

court below recognized in the Massman case, ‘To

make the system work without undue delays and

without the opening of the bids being used un-

fairly to obtain a disclosure of what competitors

are offering, it is necessary that the bids be firm

bids, backed by a guaranteed willingness to sign a

contract at the bid price. To have a set of bids dis-

carded after they are opened and each bidder has -

learned his competitor’s price is a serious matter,

and it should not be permitted except for cogent

reasons’? (102 ©. Cls. at 718-719). No such

cogent reasons, we submit, are here present.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, it is respectfully sub-

mitted that this petition for a writ of certiorari

should be granted.

GerorcE T. Cite

Acting Solicitor General.

AUARY 1947. J

]

eT OF SHE PH

APPENDIX

1. The pertinent provisions of the Davis Bacon

Act, Act of August 30, 1935, 49 Stat. 1011, 40

U. S. C. 276a et seq. follows:

Sec.1. * * * the advertised specifica-

tions for every contract in excess of $2,000,

to which the United States or the District

of Columbia is a party, for construction,

alteration, and/or repair, including paint-

ing and decorating, of public buildings or

public works of the United States or the

District of Columbia within the geograph-

ical limits of the States of the Union or the

District of Columbia, and which requires

or involves the employment of mechanics

and/or laborers shall contain a provision

stating the minimum wages to be paid vari-

ous classes of laborers and mechanics which

shall be based upon the wages that will be

determined by the Secretary of Labor to be

prevailing for the corresponding classes of

laborers and mechanics employed on proj-

ects of a character similar to the contract

work in the city, town, village, or other civil

subdivision of the State in which the work

is to be performed, or in the District of

Columbia if the work is to be performed

there; and every contract based upon these

specifications shall contain a stipulation

that the contractor or his subcontractor

shall pay all mechanics and laborers em-

aren directly upon the site of the work,

unconditionally and not less often than

once a week, and without subsequent de-

(16)

duction or rebate on any account, the full

amounts accrued at time of payment, com-

puted at wage rates not less than those

stated in the advertised specifications, re-

gardless of any contractual relationship

which may be alleged to exist between the

contractor or subcontractor and such labor-

ers and mechanics, and that the scale of

wages to be paid shall be posted by the con-

tractor in a prominent and easily accessible

place at the site of the work; and the

further stipulation that there may be with-

held from the contractor so much of ac-

crued payments as may be considered neces-

sary by the contracting officer to pay to

laborers and mechanics employed by the

contractor or any subcontractor on the

work the difference between the rates of

wages required by the contract to be paid

laborers and mechanics on the work and the

rates of wages received by such laborers and

mechanics and not refunded to the contractor,

subcontractors, or their agents.

Sec. 4. This Act shall not be construed to

supersede or impair any authority other-

wise granted by Federal law to provide for

the establishment of specific wage rates. :

2. The pertinent provisions of the con-

tract follow:

Art. 1. Statement of Work.—The con-

tractor shall furnish the materials, and

perform the work for:

The renovation of Buildings N-5, M4

and L-3, at Raritan Arsenal, Metuchen,

New Jersey, in accordance with Drawings

D-198, D-197, C—164, and C-—165, General

and Special Conditions and Specifications,

in accordance with Contractor’s proposal

dated April 22, 1941, Item one (1) to

three (3) inclusive, and Amendments Nos.

REE FSS TR

18

1 and 2, dated April 18, 1941 and April 21,

1941, respectively.

Item la. Building N-5: The renovation

of Building N-5 by the replacing of the tile

in existing East & West walls with brick.

The brick veneer of the North & South

walls. New metal doors and sash. The

construction of certain office and toilet

space, together with the necessary plumb-

ing, masonry, metal work and glazing.

b. Building M-4: The renovation of

Building M-4 by the replacing of existing

doors with brick, metal doors and sash as

indicated. The brick veneer of the North

and South walls. New metal doors and

and South walls. New metal doors and

sash. The construction of certain office

and toilet space together with the necessary

plumbing, masonry, metal work and

glazing. * * * mie

Art. 2. Specifications and drawings.—

The contractor shall keep on the work a

copy of the drawings and specifications

and shall at all times give the contracting

officer access thereto. Anything mentioned

in the specifications and not shown on the

drawings, or shown on the drawings and

not mentioned in the specifications, shall

be of like effect as if shown or mentioned

in both. In case of difference between

drawings and specifications, the specifica-

tions shall govern. In any case of dis-

erepancy in the figures, drawings, or spec-

19

ifications, the matter shall be immediately

submitted to the contracting officer, with-

out whose decision said di shall

not be adjusted by the contractor, save

only at his own risk and expense. The

contracting officer shall furnish from time

to time such detail drawings and other in-

formation as he may consider necessary,

unless otherwise provided. U com-

pletion of the contract the work shall be

delivered complete and undamaged.

7 ” * * *

Art. 5.* * * Except as otherwise

herein provided, no charge for any extra

work or material will be allowed unless the

same has been ordered in writing by the

contracting officer and the price stated in

such order.

* * * * *

Art. 17. Rate of wages (in -accordance

with the act of August 30, 1935, 49 Stat.

1011 (U. S. Code, title 40, sections 276a

and 276a-1), this article shall apply if the

contract is in excess of $2,000 in amount

and is for the construction, alteration,

and/or repair, including painting and

decorating, of a public building or public

work within the geographical limits of the

States of the Union or the District of

Columbia).

(a) The contractor or his subcontractor

shall pay all mechanics and laborers em-

ployed directly upon the site of the work,

unconditionally and not less often than

once a week, and without subsequent de-

duction or rebate on any account, the full

amounts accrued at time of payment, com-

puted at wage rates not less than those

stated in the os regardless of

any contractual relationship which may

be alleged to exist between the contractor

A ORME EC OO EE LEE LE ONS III

20

or subcontractor and such laborers and me-

chanies; and the scale of wages to be paid

shall be posted by the contractor in a prom-

inent and easily accessible place at the site

of the work The contracting officer shall

have the right to withhold from the con-

tractor so much of accrued payments as

may be considered necessary by the con-

tracting officer to pay to laborers and me-

chanics employed by the contractor or any

subeontractor on the work the difference

between the rates of wages required by the

contract to be paid laborers and mechanics

on the work and the rates of wages re-

ceived by such laborers and mechanics and

not refunded to the contractor, subcon-

tractors, or their agents.

* * * * *

Art. 28. Rates of wages.—The Act of

Congress (Public No. 403, 74th Congress)

approved August 30, 1935, ‘‘To amend the

Act approved March 3, 1931, relating to the

rates of wages for laborers and mechanics

employed by contractors and subcon-

tractors on public buildings,’’ applies to

this contract. A schedule of minimum

wage rates has been determined by the

Secretary of Labor on October 26, 1940,

to be the prevailing rates of wages for the

crafts specified to be employed under this

contract.

3. The pertinent provisions of the speci-

fications follow:

G-C 2. Visiting site—The bidder should

visit the site and acquaint himself as to

local conditions, availability of water,

electric power, roads, soil conditions, and

the relation of finished grade of the

building to existing grades and the natural

surface of the ground.

21

G-C 15. Interpretation of contract.—

Unless otherwise specifically set forth the

Contractor shall furnish all materials,

labor, ete., vy yd to qenpinte, the work

according to the true intent an i

of the drawings and specifications, of which

intent and meaning the C. O. shall be the

interpreter. Except when otherwise indi-

cated, no local terms of classifications will

be considered in the interpretation of the

contract or the specifications forming a

part thereof.

G-C 27. Discrepancies.—Where no fig-

ures or memoranda are given, the drawings

shall be accurately followed according to

scale. In any case of discrepancy in the

figures on drawings, the matter shall be

immediately submitted to the C. O. without

whose decision said discrepancy shall not

be adjusted by the Contractor, save only

at his risk; and in the settlement of any

complication arising from such adjustment

the Contractor shall bear all extra expense

involved.

In case of difference between drawings

and specifications, the specifications shall

govern.

G-C 33. Extras.—Except as otherwise

herein provided, no charge for any extra

work on material will be allowed unless

the same has been ordered in writing by

the Contracting Officer and the price stated

in such order.

S-C 1. Description of work.—The work

includes the furnishing of material and

equipment and performing all necessary

labor to construct and complete the fol-

lowing :

A. Building N-5.—The renovation of

Building N-5 by the replacing of the tile

in existing East & West walls with 8’

22

brick walls. The brick —— of the

North & South walls. Certain roof repairs.

New metal doors & sash as required. The

construction of certain office and toilet

space together with the necessary plumb-

ing, masonry, metal work, painting &

glazing. Remove old concrete chimney on

north wall.

B. Building M-4.—The renovation of

Building M-4 by the replacing of existing

doors with brick, metal doors & sash as

indicated. The brick veneering of the

North & South walls. Certain roof repairs.

New metal doors & sash where required.

The construction of certain office & toilet

space together with the necessary plumb-

ing, masonry, metal work, painting &

glazing.

C. Building L-3.—The renovation of

Building L-3 by the replacing of existing

doors with brick, metal doors & sash as in-

dicated. The brick veneering of the North

& South walls. Certain roof repairs. New

metal doors & sash where required. The

construction of certain office and toilet

space together with the necessary plumb-

ing, masonry, metal work, painting &

glazing.

At the Raritan Arsenal, Metuchen, New

Jersey, in accordance with the specifications

herein contained; and drawings:

D-198 Bldg. N-5

D-197 Bldg. L-3 & M-4

C-164 Steel Swing Door Details

C-165 Steel Roller Curtain Door

Details

S-C 9. The act of Congress.—( Public

No. 403, 74th Congress) approved August

30, 1935, “To amend the Act approved

March 3, 1931, relating to the rates of

wages for laborers and mechanics employed

Le buildings, "applies to thie projesteomd

c ”’—applies i

in accordance with the sovdion of’ tana

Act the following ule of minimum

wage rates has been determined by The

Secretary of Labor on October 1940,

to be the prevailing rates of wages for the

crafts specified to be employed on the

construction of:

Post Raritan Arsenal.

Qe Pemenestepinininin Middlesex.

State New Jersey

Classification of labor: Rate per hour

. . . e .

Bricklayers_ $1.50

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1947

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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