Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — Sabin v. Home Owners' Loan Corp.
Supreme Court brief1945
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SE LET EI IG Rae DO ae Te Ee 1
aE Ba de. Ccwncecunubtie 2
SR EE RE eS aera Se 2
I ee oe a eat aac abana 3
I eer a a, Cee teehee ceca Knee Geum e i 3
IR a aay SOS SE EN OS PRIS eg tae aa eS Ft 6
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Re eed cada ie EASE RG ine SORE bee am indmmeaie 9
CITATIONS
Cases:
Sn Wi, OA, BP RU, BE oe oc ee cc ncs cn case chen 7
corey v. crease 21 Cite. TIO... 5 cll 6
Ee eee nee 7
Harper v. Aetna Building & Loan Ass’n, 88 Okla. 128_______ 7
Johnston v. Johnson ,104 Okla. 131_________--__----__-- 6,7
Sabin v. Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, 187 Okla. 504,
certiorari denied, 313 U. 8. 570, rehearing denied, 313 U.S.
601, second petition for certiorari denied, 315 U. S. 800,
rehearing denied, 315 U. 8. 829... .................-.- 3,4
Paeee y. Taewb, at GMA, (O80. occ j
Thompson v. Nickle, 113 Okla. 44. -_...............--.-- 7
Statutes:
12 Okla. Stats. Ann.:
IIc ao cor as ee eo a a ee 9
I SAR Boe ots ee ee ee eee 10
STINE owt oe a oa CAeenae ReAMae 1l
REE AN Aa ae Sea RO Seyret 7, 12
Ynthe Supreme Court of the Winited States
OcToBER Term, 1945
No. 269
Mitton RoE SaBIn AND BEeRTHA FLORENCE SaBIN,
PETITIONERS
v.
Home Owners’ Loan CorpPorRATION, A CoORPORA-
TION; O. K. WetzeL; P. L. Murpuy; A. GARLAND
Marrs, SHERIFF OF TuLsa County, OKLAHOMA;
W.S. Duaarns, Nate Martin, Joan BuRNETT AND
Tom Kiracart, Deputy SHERIFFS OF TULSA
County, OKLAHOMA; CaL CruM, CLERK OF THE
District Court oF Tusa County, OKLAHOMA;
AND JOE Hopases, Doina Business UNDER THE
NAME AND STYLE OF JoE Hopces TRANSFER AND
STORAGE
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED ON A TYPEWRITTEN
RECORD AND ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE HOME OWNERS’ LOAN CORPORATION
IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
OPINIONS BELOW
The district court wrote no opinion in this case
but its instructions to the jury appear at R. 308-318.
(1)
US ae TF ee TAN ORS I Re ES: aad
ea Pa ee ee
2
The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals (R.
399-406) is reported in 147 F. 2d 653. An opinion
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in an earlier and
related phase of this litigation is reported at 187
Okla. 504.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was
rendered on February 21, 1945 (R. 407), and a pe-
tition for rehearing was denied on Marck 19, 1945
(R. 435). The time within which a petition for a
writ of certiorari might be filed was extended by Mr.
Justice Rutledge until July 19, 1945, and, on July 13,
1945, Mr. Justice Black granted a further extension
until July 28, 1945. The petition for a writ of
certiorari was filed on July 27, 1945. The jurisdic-
tion of this Court is invoked under Section 240(a)
of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of
February 13, 1925.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
. 1. Whether petitioners may collaterally attack the
“validity of a deed issued to the Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation, pursuant to the order of a state court,
on the ground that, at the time of the issuance of the
_deed, execution was stayed.
2. Whether an alias writ of assistance, under which
the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation was put in
possession of property which was the subject of a
mortgage foreclosure suit, was void because it issued
.out of the state trial court while a petition to recall
the mandate was pending in the state appellate court.
sents TEN ten tae Be BONNE ROE ae
3
STATUTES INVOLVED
The pertinent provisions of the Oklahoma statutes
are set out in the Appendix, infra, pp. 9-12.
STATEMENT
In an action in the District Court of Tulsa County,
Oklahoma, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, on
January 10, 1938, secured a judgment on a note
made by petitioners and were granted an order of
foreclosure on the mortgage securing that note
(R. 34, 331-333). A motion for a new trial was
overruled on February 9, 1938, and, on August 8,
1938, an appeal was taken from this judgment but
no supersedeas bond was filed (R. 35, Sabin v.
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, 187 Okla. 504,
506). In the period that intervened between the
judgment and the perfection of the appeal to the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma, the district court issued
an order of sale (R. 132, 341-342), and the property
was purchased, pursuant to this order, by the
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation. The sale was
confirmed, over the petitioners’ objection, on Sep-
tember 9, 1938. (R. 35, 349-350.) A sheriff’s deed
issued on that date and was delivered (R. 351-352).
Petitioners, having given notice of their intention to
appeal from the order of confirmation, were granted an
extension of time within which to make and serve
case-made and were also granted twenty days within
which to file a supersedeas bond in the amount of
$6500 (R. 350). No such bond was filed, but within
the twenty days, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
—_— REELED IP RL AEN FLOOD LL AIRE LIE II NM ELE NITE IF Ee IE GM ENN SS PH PORES
4
granted petitioners additional time within which to
file a supersedeas bond, and stayed the execution
of the order of the district court until further order of
the supreme court of the State (R. 136, 375). Peti-
tioners, on February 27, 1939, were granted leave to
file, and did file a supersedeas bond in the amount of
$2000, and further proceedings under the foreclosure
judgment were stayed (R. 132, 344-347). The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the foreclosure
judgment and upheld the order confirming the sale
on May 28, 1940. Sabin v. Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation, 187 Okla. 504. A petition for rehearing
was denied on July 16, 1940 (Sabin v. Home Owners
Loan Corporation, 187 Okla. 504), and a petition for
certiorari was denied by this Court. 313 U. 8. 570,
rehearing denied, 312 U. S. 601. The mandate of
the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued to the District
Court of Tulsa County on June 13, 1941 (R. 354).
More than a month after the mandate had been
issued and had been spread on record in the trial
court, an alias writ of assistance was issued (R. 157,
376); by this writ the Sheriff of Tulsa County was
ordered to put the H. O. L. C. in possession of the
property. On July 24, 1941, leave was granted to
the petitioners to file a petition to recall the mandate
and to grant a rehearing, and such petition was filed
(R. 356-359). This petition was denied (R. 385),
and a petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court
was also denied. 315 U. S. 800, rehearing denied,
315 U. S. 829. While the petition asking the Su-
preme Court of Oklahoma to recall its mandate was
—
5
pending, the sheriff, acting through his deputies,
executed the alias writ of assistance by removing the
household furniture, three automobiles, and other
personal property, and by placing the purchaser in
possession (R. 263, 376).
This suit was instituted on July 24, 1943, in the
District Court for Tulsa County, Oklahoma, against
the H. O. L. C.; O. K. Wetzel, an attorney who
represented the H. O. L. C. in the foreclosure pro-
ceedings; P. L. Murphy, an agent of the H. O. L. C.;
Cal Crum, the clerk of the state court who issued the
order of sale (R. 73), a writ of assistance which was
recalled (R. 378), and the alias writ of assistance; the
sheriff and the deputies who took part in executing
the alias writ of assistance; and the owner of the
transfer and storage company that removed the
personal property of the petitioners under the direc-
tion of the sheriff (R. 2-25). Petitioners alleged
that their personal property was removed by the
respondents without any legal right, and that re-
spondents were liable for damages in excess of
$400,000 (R. 2-24). A petition for removal to the
District Court of the United States for the Northern
District of Oklahoma (R. 25-27) was sustained (R.
32), and that court, at the close of the petitioners’
evidence, dismissed the petition as to Wetzel,
Murphy, and Crum (R. 84). At the conclusion of
all of the evidence, the court directed a verdict on
behalf of the H. O. L. C. (R. 290), and submitted
the case of the other respondents to the jury, but
with reference to matters not here involved (R. 313).
6
The jury found for the respondents (R. 81, 82, 319),
and after a motion for a new trial (R. 86-88) was
overruled (R. 90), judgment was entered against the
petitioners (R. 83-85). The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed (R. 407).
ARGUMENT
1. Petitioners contend that the sheriff's deed to the
H. O. L. C. was void because it was delivered at a
time when the execution of the order of confirmation
had been stayed (Pet. 13-25). Whatever the merits
of petitioners’ view that execution had been stayed
(ef. R. 404-405), it is clear that under the law of
Oklahoma, controlling here, the alleged defect in the
deed will not support the collateral attack on the
H. 0. L. C.’s title and right to possession here
attempted. Christy v. Springs, 11 Okla. 710, 717-
719. While petitioners gave notice of their intention
to appeal the order of confirmation (R. 350), they
do not contend that at the time the deed was exe-
cuted, an appeal had been perfected. Indeed, the
record is barren of any showing as to the time when
the appeal from the order of confirmation was per-
fected (cf. R. 404). Consequently, Johnston v.
Johnson, 104 Okla. 131, particularly relied upon by
petitioners (Pet. 23-24), is inapplicable, for, in that
case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld a collat-
eral attack on the trial court’s possessory order
because it appeared that when the order was issued
an appeal had already been perfected and that the
trial court, therefore, no longer had jurisdiction of the
—
wee
7
cause. The authorities relied on by the court in the
Johnston:case, supra at 133, leave no doubt but that
this was the sole ground for the judgment there
rendered.
2. Petitioners further assert that the alias writ of
assistance, pursuant to which the H. O. L. C. was
put into possession, was void because it issued out of
the Tulsa County district court while a petition to
recall the mandate was pending in the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma (Pet. 25-33). But before the alias
writ of assistance was issued, the mandate of the
Supreme Court had been issued and spread upon the
records of the trial court (see supra, p. 4) and, under
Oklahoma law, it is clear that the trial court had
jurisdiction to make any order or enter any judgment
in the further progress of the cause not inconsistent
with the decision of the Supreme Court. Harper v.
Aetna Building & Loan Ags’n, 88 Okla. 128; Crews v.
Bird, 141 Okla. 143, See also 12 Okla. Stats. Ann. 1941,
Sec. 975, Appendix, infra, pp. 11-12. The jurisdiction
of the trial court is not again divested unless the man-
date is recalled (Brann v. Harris, 173 Okla. 167, 168)
and that was not the case: here.
Indeed, the Supreme Ciourt of Oklahoma has held
that it has no jurisdiction to recall the mandate
unless it clearly appears from the record that it was
issued through fraud, acciident, inadvertence, or mis-
take. Thomas v. Thomas, 27 Okla. 784, 801; see
Thompson v. Nickle, 113; Okla. 44. The denial of
the petition for rehearimg (R. 385) constitutes a
ruling of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, then, that
i
8
it had no jurisdiction over the cause because the
mandate had issued and there was no fraud, accident,
inadvertence, or mistake. The state supreme. court
has “power,” of course, to determine its jurisdiction,
and that determination is controlling here. © Although
they are otherwise distinguishable, cases arising in
éther States or in the federal courts can, for this
reason alone, afford petitioners no aid.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court below is correct and
there is no conflict of decisions. Resolution of the
issues in this case turns entirely on Oklahoma law,
and there is no warrant for further review.
The petition for a writ of certiorari should, there-
fore, be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
Harotp Jupson,
Acting Solicitor General.
' Harotp Les, |
General Counsel,
Ray E. DouGHERTY,
Assistant General Counsel,
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation.
SEPTEMBER 1945.
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