Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Stern v. Gillman
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the
November Term, 19
No. O 93
y<
—_
WILLIAM GILLMAN, JACK GILLMAN, and
LASZLO WENCZEL, etc.,
Respondents,
—vs—
WILLIAM STERN,
Petitioner.
PETITION OF WILLIAM STERN FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
MICHAEL HALPERIN,
Attorney for Petitioner, William Stern.
Honey L. BuRKITT, j
Of Counsel.
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INDEX
PAGE
Petition of William Stern for a Writ of Certiorari to
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 1
Summary and short statement of the matter in-
VORVOG: .i053 See te ee ek errr ee ees ee 1
Opinions of the Courts below .....-...s.seccee §&
ee QUIRIOGE PIOUS Fas ciciicisccseiaeccs 3
Reasons relied upon for the grant of a Writ of Cer-
UEC N RI coe sc So ewe Rae ae 2 Ge WO wR ls 9
Brief in support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari .... 13
Opinions of the Courts below .......... Sages oe
ORI a5 55.5 a Ros 0s eR Ledeen ened
WORE Sc osceRe ees ReHEAS ORR RES neewek ieee wk: ae
Specification of errors ............ (‘inmikeveaenee, See 3
RUE: 0. GIRS ook cin theececvectanense “SO
PIR) i Saar eT OPa wNRS pe e e e
I. Can a patentee, in his patent, instruct how to
do something, lay down essential requirements how
that something be done, and, despite admitted fatai
fallacy and description inoperative for the purposes
enumerated in the patent, be sustained in a monop-
oly for that which he did not describe or require? 16
II. Is it non-analogous use to blow thread
through a machine that blows sand or paint, where
no change whatsoever is even made in the structure
of the prior patent art machine to adapt the
machine for that purpose? ........ ry ova oe
Ill. Is there non-analogous use where, during
prosecution of the application, the patentee himself
ii
PAGE
acquiesced in, and cancetled claims in response to
rejection, where the whole essence of the rejection
was just that, the analogy between use of material
such as sand or asbestos and thread? .......... *
IV. Is an admitted use, commenced long prior to
any date upon which the patentee relies, known to
many parties, extensive, and continuing even at the
date of the trial, to be held no bar to a patent
merely because the user did not show his machine
to every Tom, Dick and Harry, and especially did
not show it or tell of it to his competitors, includ-
ing plaintiffs? .............-..56-- SE er ee ee
V. Is the rule of Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. Vv.
General Electric Company, 246 Fed. 695, Certiorari
denied 246 U. 8. 659, that a use known to more than
one person, extensive and in great industrial use, a
bar to a patent regardless of safeguards by the user
to keep information from his competitors, to be
discarded for this case? ....... NLR range ee
VI. Is the ancient doctrine of necessary equit-
able conduct on the part of a plaintiff as a suitor
in a court of equity to be discarded completely, and
are plaintiffs to be countenanced in a court of equity
even when they have made active, unequivocal mis-
representations regarding decrees of Court bearing
on the suit patent? ............ Peet eee bvkisior ius
Defendant’s Exhibit M ........ eet OER
VII. Is defendant who succeeds in establishing
the invalidity of the suit patent, and acts of unfair
24
25
29
30
31
ili
PAGE
dealing by plaintiffs with such patent, to the in-
jury of the business of defendant, to be denied his
costs and his injunction and accounting for dam-
ages, merely because he might have infringed if
there had been a patent to infringe? ............ 33
Defendant shoul€ recover costs .......... 33
IN 6 5 A eS Votes eee he bed eee Kae 34
a Te rere Tes Tr er eT eer eee ree ee 35
Table of Cases Cited
Opinion of Circuit Court of Appeals, page , Record;
114 Fed. (2d) 28; 46 USPQ 430 .............. 5, 13
Opinion of District Court, page 299, Record; 44 USPQ
ME TEC EE OCP ILE CT eee eT ETE TERT E ETE 0, 13
Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. American Tri-Ergon
CE. OF Og Des ek ek Sa eb is vaneses 10, 14
Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. American Tri-Ergon
bo ee ey ee ee oe 18, 23
American Ball Co. vy. Federal Cartridge Corp., et al.
Vien oan We - va: Fo ab oe) Sere 33
American Lava Co., et al. v. Steward, et al. (C. C. A.
Oa), Ree OR, Filly CFSE ovis scien es see seein 18
Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham & Straus, Ine.
(C. ©. A. Ba}, TO Ped. (2a) 641, 649 .......... 11, 32
Ball & Socket Co. v. Kraetzer, 150 U. S. 111, 116-
OS SEES ES pe Par ee Fears reer 9, 14,18
The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U. 8. 275 ........5000%> 27
Barber vy. Otis Motor Sales Co. (C. C. A. 2d), 271 Fed.
TEE ga 2s Bos PEN REN REE OSS ASO Oi 20
tage te a eee Meee nt a ee ea
a Le re CSE
iv
PAGE
E. W. Bliss Co. vy. Southern Can Co., 251 Fed. 903 .... 10
Paul Boynton Co. vy. Morris Chute Co., et al. (C. C. A.
3rd), 87 Fed. 225, 226, 227, i 18
Brady Brass Co. vy. Ajax Metal Co. (C. C. A. 3rd), 160
SCP etre rr ee ee 2 te ee ee 19
Bromley Bros. Carpet Co. v. Stewart, et al. (C. C. E. D.
Pa.), 51 Fed. 912, 916 .......- cece cree cece eeees 26
Brush v. Condit, 132 U. S. 39, 49 0.2... eee eee eee cee 28
Busell Trimmer Co. vy. Stevens, 187 U.S. 423, 433, 435.. 19
Cadwell, et al. vy. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 13 Fed.
(DA) OBB, 488 onc c cc cee reece crenecsoresorces 17
Carbice Corp. of America vy. American Patents Develop-
ment Corp., et al, 288 U.S. 420, 421 ...----- 10, 14, 82
Clisby, et al. v. Reese (C. C. A. 7th), 88 Fed. 645, 647.. 29
Coffin vy. Ogden, 18 Wall. (85 U.S.) 120, 124-125 .... 27
Concrete Appliances Co. et al. v. Meinken, et al. (C. C. A.
6th), 262 Fed. 958, QGO-9G1 2... ccc cecrccecccces 22
Corona Cord Tire Co. vy. Dovan Chemical Corp., 276
U. S. 358, 382, 388, 384-885 2... eee eee eee eee 26, 27, 29
C. B. Cottrell & Sons Co. vy. Claybourn Process Corpora-
tion (D. C. E. D. Wise.), 17 Fed. (2d) 279, 7... @
Dryfoos v. Wiese, 124 U.S. BE cx av Eve sian ee news oes 24
Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co., Inc. v. Greenawalt
(C. C. A. 2d), 27 Fed. (2d) 823, BOD cis savieawss 22
E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co. (C. C. A.
7th), 88 Fed. (2d) 852, 853, certiorari denied 300
ht 2 Lerner ee. eee eT es tee 34
Electrie Storage Battery Co. v. Gould Storage Battery
Co. (C. C. A. 2d), 158 Fed. 610, Sl: 5 Sarr 18
Equitable Asphalt Maintenance Co. vy. Parker-Washing-
ton Co. (D. C. W. D. Mo. W. D.), 197 Fed. 920,
ER POL ery UE TTT TER eee SS Oto 20
PLE RLS FIN
PAGE
Gardner Sign Co. v. Claude Neon Lights, Inc., et al.
(D.C. W. D. Pa.), 836 Fed. (2d) 827 ....---- +e 33
Gayler, et al. v. Wilder, 51 U. S. 477, 496 ......-..... 27
Gerosa vy. Apco Mfg. Co. (Cc. C. A. Ist), 299 Fed. 19,
LC CURE EN ORD EREES ESP REET OAS ETS ROMS 33
Hall v. MacNeale, 107 U.S. 90, 97 2.6. e eee eee eee 28
Haslem y. Pittsburgh Plate-Glass Co. (C. ©, W. D. Pa.),
GS Wedd: STO, GRE oink ain sc bs coev ed ec ston staens 26
iookless Fastener Co. v. G. E. Prentice Mfg. Co.
ic. C. A. 2d), 68 Fed. (2d) 848, 851 2... eee eee 25
Keystone Driller Co. v. Jeneral Exeavator Co., et al.,
29) U.S. 240, on certiorari from 64 Fed. (2d) 39 14,32
Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co. v. Leman, et al., 13
Wd: DA) TOE i cid vce cece ewedesceneenseaeees 34
Leman vy. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 34
M. & B. Mfg. Co. v. Munk, ef al. (CG. C. A. 2d), 77 Fed.
(Pad BBL, BOS cc ccceccnadwsecsacseneteasesesnee 22
Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. vy. General Electric Company
(D. CN. D. Ohio), 231 Fed. 183, affirmed 246 Fed.
695 (C. C. A. 6th). certiorari denied 246 U. S.
GN eee Arr err ee eee &, 10, 28, 29, 30
Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U. 8. 218, 222,
Be ot OMS EAs 8s LARS a gee eee SRI eS 11, 32
Miller, et al. v. Life Savers, Inc. (C. Cc. A. 2d), 62 Fed.
CDA) GED, DEG ccd cece se ccncanrnretesscaeces 21
Moore y. Cotton Exchange, 270 U. 8. 598, 610 .....--- 33
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Locomotive Engine Safety
Truck Co., 110 U.S. 490, 494 2... eee eee eee eee 19
Pormutit Co. v. Graver Corporation, 284 U. 8. 52, 57-08 7
Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U. 5. 150, A: ree ore eet ee ee 22
A RNID NS Bay Bi AIO TR RS OR
¥
——
'
vi
PAGE
Section 4888, Revised Statutes, 85 U.S. CO. §B8 ss acxs 16
Smith & Griggs Manufacturing Company Vv. Sprague,
123 U. 8. 249, 256 2... cre cceccccscccrccccceres 27
Smyth Mfg. Co. vy. Sheridan, ef al, (C. ©. A. 2nd), 149
Fed. 208, 211, 212 ......--.esseecereecceccecees 21
Stelos Co. vy. Hosiery Motor-Mend Corp., et al., 295 U. 8.
OE DRE os iw tid ease es eae eee new sce ees 9, 14,18
Union Special Mach. Co. v. Quaker City Flour Mills
Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa.), 286 Fed. 246, > eT 28
Western Electric Mfg. Co. vy. Ansonia Brass & Copper
Co., 114 U.S. 447, 452 «0.60 ee eee cere eee 17,18
Worden vy. California Fig Syrup Co., 187 U. 8. 516, 527,
B28, et SEG. .. cere e eee receeeecs Sek pannede nee 11, 32
Zenie Bros. vy. Miskend, et al. (D. C. 8S. D. N. Y.), 10
Fed. Supp. 779, T80 «20... - ee eee cece reer ee reese 34
a2 TE
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
November Term, 1940
No.
& —
> +
WILLIAM GILLMAN, JACK GILLMAN, and
LASZLO WENCZEL, etc.,
Respondents,
WILLIAM STERN,
Petitioner.
y=
~
PETITION OF WILLIAM STERN FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
To the Honorable, The Chief Justice and Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Your petitioner, WILLIAM STERN, respectfully prays
for a Writ of Certiorari to the Cireuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Cireuit, to review the Judgment of that
Court, entered on August 24, 1940. A transcript of the
Record in the case, including the proceedings in said Circuit
Court of Appeals, is furnished herewith in accordance with
the Rules of this Court.
Summary and Short Statement of the Matter Involved.
(1) Letters Patert No. 1,919,674 in suit, for an improve-
ment in what is known in the dress embroidery trade as a
“puffing machine,” were issued on an application by
PERN. ARIE Terai 8 ce WEL A SR ARETE Rg ae bah 6 ae vl Di talen Shae = —
LASZLO WENCZEL, who assigned, before issue, to
STERLING AIRBRUSH CO., which consisted of WEN-
CZEL and WILLIAM GILLMAN, Plaintitfs.
(2) The suit patent never, before this suit, had been
adjudicated, although, in a few previous actions in which
no answers were even filed, consent decrees, waiving all
damages, profits or costs, were entered.
(3) This suit was instituted in the Southern District of
New York against a number of defendants, but Defendant,
WILLIAM STERN, the only one who of record was served,
is the only one ever actively to contest validity or charges
of infringement of the suit patent, or the right of Plaintiffs
to bring any action.
(4) Long prior to WENCZEL’S application filing date,
HANS HAAS made machines, which functioned identically
as the machine of the suit patent, and had structures either
identically the same as or encompassed by the suit patent
claims.
(5) Plaintiffs are concluded by the application filing
date.
(G) HAAS has used his machines since long before the
application, and continuously to the present time.
(7) HAAS has had employees using the machines since
long before the application filing date, has shown the
machines to persons in whom he tried to create an interest
for their exploitation, and has used these machines com-
mercially in his plant in the presence of these persons.
(8) It was not denied, and, in fact, curiously enough, one
of the arguments presented by Plaintiffs before the Circuit
PEI ILIOOL ALI SOI LLNS ELE RON Bee Ete A gat
ib er OS Se ee ee
3
Court of Appeals for patentability to WENCZEL was, that,
long before WENCZEL’S application filing date, HAAS,
not WENCZEL, had the field of use of these machines
entirely to himself, and, through persons who used the
products of his machines, benefited from a virtual monopoly
until Plaintiffs’ machines came into use.
(9) Prior to the application filing date, others sought to
ascertain the construction of, and to duplicate, the HAAS
machines.
(10) At the time a certain RETHY was experimenting
in view of the known use of the HAAS machines, Plaintiffs,
WILLIAM GILLMAN and LASZLO WENCZEL, were em-
ployed by RETHY.
(11) HAAS had knowledge of and experience with paint
spraying machine or air-brushes, and directly connects his
machines with the known structures of these air-brushes.
(12) Prior art patents show air-brushes and similar de-
vices, which, in every detail, are the structures of the suit
patent claims.
(13) During their employment by RETHY, Plaintiffs,
WILLIAM GILLMAN and LASZLO WENCZEL, also
worked upon air-brushes.
(14) Plaintiffs make no denials of this relationship to
RETHY, or knowledge of the HAAS machine, or direct
contact with the RETHY developments.
(15) WILLIAM GILLMAN, Plaintiff, testified that cer-
tain parts of the machine manufactured under the suit
patent must assume a definite relationship to each other in
order to effect the puffing function for which the machine
4
was designed, and, furthermore, that air must and does flow
backwardly through a certain part called the thread guide
when the machine functions for puffing. But the suit patent
itself states directly the contrary, requiring that the parts
of the machine be arranged in a wholly different relationship,
one in which, by the admission of GILLMAN, the machine
will not puff. The suit patent fails to say anything at all
about the specific relationship of parts required by GILL-
MAN for an operative structure. Furthermore, the suit
patent specifically requires that the arrangement of the
machine parts in the patent is to prevent air from flowing
backwardly through the thread guide.
(16) The structures of the prior patent art machines, and
the structure of the machine of the suit patent insofar as it
is described, function identically to suck material into the
machine and then to blast that material out of the machine.
Whether sand, or paint, or thread be used, the machine
functions identically the same; the suit patent fails to
teach any details of construction, or any relationship of
parts or use different from the arrangement of parts of
the prior patent art, and the uses are entirely analogous.
(17) During prosecution of the application, Plaintiffs
acquiesced in a rejection of claims directed to a puffing
machine upon a reference for a device for blasting asbestos
by means of air into the space between wall partitions, and,
after vigorous prosecution, cancelled the claims; now they
urge that their machine is non-analogous to devices for
blasting sand, paint and such substances which certainly
are analogous to asbestos.
(18) Plaintiffs deliberately made completely false state-
ments in regard to the suit patent in order to interfere with
the business of selling or using puffing machines, including
the business of Defendant.
5
(19) The false statements concerned decrees of Court.
(20) These false statements, in fact, inferred that the
Supreme Court of the United States had passed upon this
suit patent and had granted rights and powers to Plaintitts
in connection with that patent.
(21) Plaintiffs stated specifically that the Court,—not
specifying the Court in the same sentence, but referring
specifically to the Supreme Court of the United States in
that statement, and only the Supreme Court,—had given
Plaintiffs the right to CONFISCATE and DESTROY
(with similar emphasis in the statement) machines held
to be infringements, and had given Plaintiffs the right to
recover damages and profits, costs and disbursements.
(22) The only decrees Plaintiffs ever had obtained were
consent decrees; Plaintiffs never asked for, the decrees never
granted, the right or power to confiscate and destroy
machines; in fact, to obtain those decrees, Plaintiffs waived
all profits, damages, costs, and disbursements.
Opinions of the Courts Below.
(1) The opinion of the District Court (Judge John
W. Clancy) is in the form of findings of fact and conclusions
of law, was filed February 8, 1940, may be found at page .
299 of the Record, and is reported at 44 USPQ 496.
(2) The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges
Learned Hand, Augustus N. Hand and Chase, Judge Learned
Hand writing) was filed August 5, 1940, may be found at
page of the Record, and was reported at 114 Fed.
(2d) 28 and 46 USPQ 430.
(3) The District Court held the suit patent invalid be-
cause of the HAAS prior knowledge and use.
ee Lame ey i
6
(4) The District Court did not comment upon the prior
art patents.
(5) The District Court made no finding upon the in-
complete, misleading and inaccurate disclosure of the suit
patent, and upon the fact that the disclosure was exactly
opposite from the actual construction and use of the machine.
(6) The District Court, observing the conduct of Plain-
tiffs both from the evidence and on the witness stand, found
Plaintiffs to have circulated extensively circulars and cards
which were clearly false and misleading and were given
this character deliberately and intentionally by Plaintiff,
WILLIAM GILLMAN, which was an abuse of such a char-
acter as to merit severe treatment by the Court, and not
entitled to any relief.
(7) The District Court held, because Defendant failed
to give any evidence regarding obtaining legal counsel be-
fore he manufactured machines, he also came into Court
with unclean hands, and, therefore, was entitled to no relief
against the unfair competition of Plaintiffs, and to no costs.
but did not consider that Defendant could not have in-
fringed an invalid patent.
(8) The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court, holding that the HAAS knowledge and use were not
public.
(9) The Cireuit Court of Appeals reached a conclusion
that, even though the suit patent instructed otherwise, and
instructed in a manner by which Plaintiffs admitted the
result could not be attained, still the suit patent was opera-
tive.
(10) The Circuit Court of Appeals said the prior art
patents were not applicable, but did not consider that HAAS
EAI a Naa nancy aera ct rem ert ccnst eae
7
derived his machines from his knowledge of those prior
art machines, and that LASZLO WENCZEL, the patentee,
also had had direct contact with machines from that same
specific prior art long before he filed his application.
(11) The Circuit Court of Appeals found patentable the
discovery of a new use for an old prior patent art structure,
without being able to point out in a single phase wherein any
change had been made in the structures of the prior art
patents to derive the structure of the claims of the suit
patent. The Circuit Court of Appeals said, in this con-
nection, that the devices of the prior art “always worked by
suction. As we have said, WENCZEL’S ‘puffer’ did so too
for as long as the end of the ‘tube 40’ was telescoped within
the inner end of the needle; but not after it was withdrawn,
as it had to be for ‘puffing.’” Yet the patent does not show,
and the Circuit Court of Appeals does not point out in the
patent any requirement, that the parts should ever be with-
drawn from the telescoped relation into this critical rela-
tion where the parts are separated. The claims specify
nothing to adapt the structures only for thread as against
paint, or demonstrate no solution of a problem by the
patentee in converting an air-brush to a puffing machine,
and this after it had to be admitted that HAAS was known
in the trade to have been using air pressure, and an air
stream, and a needle, for forcing thread into a pocket.
(12) The Circuit Court of Appeals said that Plaintiffs
made untrue statements regarding decisions of Court bearing
on the suit patent so as to “give to laymen the impression
of a judicial countenance of the invention which the facts
did not warrant,” but still held the defense of unclean
hands a “scurvy” defense, despite the ancient and accepted
character of the rule, from the English courts of chancery
to the rule obtaining in many decisions of this Court, that
he who comes into court seeking equity must come with clean
8
hands and not himself be guilty of unconscionable conduct
such as false representations regarding the matter in issue,
and especially false representations touching upon decisions
of the courts in that connection.
The Questions Presented.
(1) Can a patentee, in his patent, instruct how to do
something, lay down essential requirements how that some-
thing be done, and, despite admitted fatal fallacy and
description inoperative for the purposes enumerated in the
patent, be sustained in a monopoly for that which he did
not describe or require?
(2) Is it non-analogous use to blow thread through a
machine that blows sand or paint, where no change what-
soever is even made in the structure of the prior patent art
machine to adapt the machine for that purpose?
(3) Is there non-analogous use where, during prosecution
of the application, the patentee himself, after vigorous pro-
test, acquiesced in, and cancelled claims in response to,
rejection where the whole essence of the rejection was just
that the analogy between use of material such as sand or
asbestos and thread?
(4) Is an admitted use, commenced long prior to any
date upon which the patentee relies, seen by many parties
and known generally in the trade, extensive, and continuing
even at the date of the trial, to be held no bar to a patent
merely because the user did not show his machine to every
Tom, Dick and Harry, ane especially did not show it or
tell of it to his competitors, including Plaintiffs?
(5) Is the rule of Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. General
Electric Company, 246 Fed. 695, certiorari denied 246 U. S.
Ses
9
659, that a use known to more than one person, extensive and
in great industrial use, a bar to a patent regardless of safe-
guards by the user to keep information from his competitors,
to be discarded for this case?
(6) Is the ancient doctrine of necessary equitable con-
duct on the part of a plaintiff as a suitor in a court of equity
to be discarded completely, and are plaintiffs to be counte-
nanced in a court of equity even when they have made active,
unequivocal misrepresentations regarding decrees of Court
bearing on the suit patent?
(7) Is Defendant who succeeds in establishing the in-
validity of the suit patent, and acts of unfair dealing by
Plaintiffs with such patent, to the injury of the business of
Defendant, to be denied his costs and his injunction and ac-
counting for damages, merely because he might have in-
fringed if there had been a patent to infringe?
Reasons Relied Upon for the Grant of a Writ of
Certiorari.
The discretionary power of this Court is invoked upon
the following grounds:
(1) Because the Circuit Court of Appeals has held the
patent valid because of something which is not in the
patent, and, in fact, which cannot even be inferred into the
patent because it would be directly contrary to the express
terms of the patent, and, under these circumstances, the
holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals is directly opposite
to the decisions of this Court in Stelos Co. v. Hosiery Motor-
Mend Corp., et al., 295 U. 8. 237; Ball & Socket Co. v. Kraet-
ver, 150 U. 8. 111; and many others.
(2) Because the Circuit Court of Appeals has overruled
the District Court’s finding that knowledge and use of the
Cate
Bese OEE INE IRE LAT LET IRE
DREAIEBLE A WIE ADA AW Sey 2 REA
10
alleged invention of long duration and continuing even at
the time of the trial was anticipation of the suit patent,
because of restrictions interposed against general promulga-
tion of the knowledge and use, despite a statement of the
District Court of “the suspicion attaching even to the
WENCZEL claim to invention of the patent in suit apparent
from the facts found,” where the facts found were that, long
before the application date and while Plaintiffs were em-
ployed by RETHY, the knowledge of the HAAS machine
was brought to the employer of Plaintiffs, and that there-
after the Plaintiffs separated from their employer, where
the holding of the Circuit Court would be directly in con-
flict with Macheth-Erans Glass Co. v. General Electric Com-
pany, 246 Fed. 695, certiorari denied 246 U.S. 659, and PL. W.
Bliss Co. ¥. Southern Can Co., 251 Fed. 903, and, therefore,
requires decision by this Court.
<%) Because of the directly opposite conclusions reached
by the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals on
the question of prior knowledge and use, and unclean hands.
(4) Because the Circuit Court of Appeals has, by its
holding, given a monopoly to a patentee who, by the un-
disturbed findings of fact of the District Court, had been in
direct contact with results of the work of one accredited
with prior knowledge and use, and thus has given a power
to harass the one having the prior knowledge as well as
large number of people, already threatened, as in Carbice
Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp.,
et al., 283 U. S. 420, 421, and Altoona Publix Theatres, Ine.
v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., et al., 293 U. 8. 528.
(5) Because the Circuit Court of Appeals has announced
a new doctrine for monopoly for a newly selected use for an
old appliance, even where no change is made in the appliance
to adapt it for the new use, and where function, operation
11
and result of the apparatus remain the same in the new
relationship, and this in direct opposition to many decisions
of this Court.
(6) Because the Circuit Court of Appeals found the al-
leged new use to be non-analogous to the uses of the patent
art, and ignored the evidence that the patentee had ac-
quiesced as to the analogy of arts when his application was
pending in the Patent Office.
(7) Because the Circuit Court of Appeals has discarded
the doctrine of clean hands for a suitor in equity, particularly
with regard to truthful representations of the subject mat-
ter of the suit, in direct contravention of the decisions of this
Court in Worden v. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U. 8. 516, Manhattan
Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U. 8S. 218, the decision of that
same Circuit Court of Appeals in Art Metal Works, Ine. v.
Abraham & Straus, Inc., 70 Fed. (2d) 641, and many other
cases.
WHEREFORE your Petitioner respectfully prays that a
Writ of Certiorari be issued, under the Seal of this Court,
directed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, commanding said Court to certify and
send to this Court, on a date to be designated, a full and
complete transcript of the Record and all proceedings of the
Circuit Court of Appeals had in this cause, to the end that
this cause may be reviewed and determined by this Court;
that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals be re-
versed; and that Petitioner be granted such other and
further relief as may seem proper.
MICHAEL HALPERIN,
Counsel for Petitioner.
HENRY L. BURKITT,
Of Counsel.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.