Amicus Curiae Brief — Cort v. Ash

INDEX

Page

I IN oo 1

Interest of the United States 2

Statutes involved 3

I PRES 6

Summary of argument ae

Argument 10

I. The broad power of Congress to regu-

late federal elections to prevent their

corruption authorizes a prohibition

upon corporate political expenditures

from general corporate funds _..____. 12

II. The limitations upon corporate political

contributions in 18 U.S.C. 610 are con-

stitutional because they are a reason-

able method of protecting the electoral

process 19

A. The statute does not violate the

constitutional rights of corpora-

tions, their officers, or their share- ~

holders _ 19

1, The First Amendment Tights

of shareholders _ 24

2. The First Amendment rights

of corporate officers 25

3. The First Amendment ina

OF Corporetete 20 26

B. Section 610 is neither unconstitu-

tionally overbroad nor unconstitu-

tionally vague 30

It

Argument—Continued Page

C. Section 610 does not deny equal

protection in violation of the Fifth

Amendment os)

Conclusion 36

CITATIONS

Cases: ;

American Civil Liberties Union v. Jen-

nings, 366 F. Supp. 1041, probable ju-

risdiction noted sub nom. Staats v.

American Civil Liberties Union, 417

U.S. 944 3

Associated Press v. National Labor Rela-

tions Board, 301 U.S. 108 28

Associated Press v. United States, 326

US. 1 25

Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342

U.S. 337 32-33

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601__. 31

Burroughs and Cannon v. United States,

290 U.S. 534 12, 18, 14, 19

Civil Service Commission v. Letter Car-

riers, 413 U.S. 548 14, 29, 31, 34

Clarke, Ex parte, 100 U.S. 399 12

Curtis, Ex parte, 106 U.S. 371 _..____. 14

Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369,

certiorari denied, 320 U.S. 788 14

Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. North-

' western Iron and Metal Company, 335

US. 525 28

Lorain Journal Company v. United States,

342 US. 148 28

Cases—Continued Page

National Association for the Advance-

ment of Colored People v. Button, 371

U.S. 415 30

National Labor Relations Board v. Vir-

ginia Electric and Power Company, 314

U.S. 469 28

Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service

Commission, 330 U.S. 127 : 14

Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S.

557 28

Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 783 __-...- 31

Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 . 28

Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061__.. 3

Pipefitters v. United States, 407 US.

385 11, 20, 21

Siebold, Ex parte, 100 U.S. 371 _... 12

Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 874 ___ 35

United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330

U.S. 75 13, 14

United States v. Automobile Workers, 352

U.S. 567 11,15, 16, 19

United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 ___. 11

United States v. Congress of Industrial

Organizations, 335 U.S. 106 .._...11, 18, 28

United States v. Finance Committee To

Re-Elect The President, C.A.D.C., No.

73-1918, decided December 2, 1974 ie 3

United States v. Harriss, 347 US. 612_.14, 33, 34

United States v. Maryland Savings-Share

Insurance Corp., 400 U.S. 4 35

United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S.

632 28, 36

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367__. 27, 32

Casée—Continued Page

United States v. Painters Local Union

No. 481, 79 F. Supp. 516, reversed on

other grounds, 172 F.2d 854 _._...__.. 11

United States v. Petrillo, 3832 U.S. 1 32, 35

United States v. Thayer, 209 U.S. 39__. 14

United States v. United States Brewers’

Association, 239 Fed. 163 11

United States v. Wurzbach, 280 USS.

396 14, 34

Yarbrough, Ex parte, 110 U.S. 651 12

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S, 37 _...__. 27

Constitution and statutes:

United States Constitution: >.

ii © i a 12

Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 18 12 P

vee Sh tome Ba 13

First Amendment passim .

Fourth Amendment 28

Fifth Amendment 28, 35, 36

Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,

43 Stat. 1070, 241 et seq. 13,17

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,

Title II, Sec. 205, 86 Stat. 10, 18 U.S.C.

(Supp. II) 610 : passim

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,

Title I, 86 Stat. 3, et seqg., 47 U.S.C.

(Supp. II) 801, et seg. 18

Hatch Act, 53 Stat. 1147 17

Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,

61 Stat. 136 18

Public Law 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263, et seg. 18

34 Stat. 864-865 16

Vv

Constitution and statutes—Continued

36 Stat. 822 _-

OP

40 Stat. 1013 2 Re

54 Stat. 767 -

wee ee

Miscellaneous:

40 Cong. Rec. 96

41 Cong. Rec. 22

65 Cong. Rec. 9507-9508 __.___..

06. Come. Bee Sree

Hearings before the House Committee on

the Election of the President, 59th

Cong., Ist Sess. - 23-24, 25

25

16

15

17

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

No. 73-1908

STEWART S. Cort, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

RICHARD A. ASH

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UN ITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

4

QUESTION PRESENTED

The United States will discuss the following ques-

tion:

Whether 18 U.S.C. 610, which regulates political

contributions in connection with federal elections

made by corporations,* violates the First Amendment

1 Although Section 610 pertains to both corporations and

labor unions, for the purposes of this brief we discuss its

applicability to corporations only.

2

or denies corporations or their stockholders equal pro-

tection.

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

One of the issues petitioners raise is the constitu-

tionality of 18 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 610, recently re-

enacted and amended in Title II of the Federal Elec-

tion Campaign Act of 1971, which prohibits corpora-

tions and labor unions from making contributions

and expenditures from general funds in connection

with any federal election. It. provides criminal pen-

alties of up to $5000 in fines for corporations and

labor organizations that violate its provisions, and

up to $1000 and one year imprisonment for officers

or directors who consent to the prohibited contribu-

tions or expenditures.

In the present case, a shareholder of Bethlehem

Steel Corporation alleged that the directors of Bethle-

hem had violated Section 610, and sought injunctive

relief and compensatory and punitive damages on

behalf of Bethlehem, asserting that the statute pro-

vides an implied private cause of action. One of the

defenses asserted by the directors was that Section

610 is unconstitutional.* If the Court reaches that

issue (see infra, pp. 10-11), its determination would

have a significant impact upon the United States

with respect to prosecutions under this provision and

The United States takes no position on the other major

question in this case: whether there is a private right of

action for violation of Section 610.

83

perhaps with respect to its efforts to enforce other

federal campaign financing laws. See e.g., United

States v. Finance Committee To Re-Elect The Presi-

dent, C.A.D.C., No. 78-1918, decided December 2,

1974; Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061 (8.D.

N.Y.) ; American Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings,

366 F. Supp. 1041 (D. D.C.), probable jurisdiction

noted sub nom. Staats v. American Civil Liberties

Union, 417 U.S. 944.°

STATUTES INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. 610 provides:

Contributions or expenditures by national banks,

corporations or labor organizations. .

It is unlawful for any national bank, or any

corporation organized by authority of any law

of Congress, to make a contribution or expendi-

ture in connection with any election to any politi-

cal office, or in connection with any primary

election or political convention or caucus held

. to select candidates for any political office, or for

any corporation whatever, or any labor organiza-

tion to make a contribution or expenditure in

connection with any election at which Presi-

8 The Pichler and Finance Committee cases involve attacks

upon the campaign contribution reporting provisions of Title

III of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.

(Supp. II) 431-441). Staats, currently before the Court,

focuses upon Title I of the same Act (47 U.S.C. (Supp. II)

801-805), which regulates campaign spending for communica-

tions media advertisement. Section 610 was amended as

part of Title II of the Act (18 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 610).

4

dential and Vice Presidential electors or a Sena-

tor or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resi-

dent Commissioner to Congress are to be voted

for, or in connection with any primary election

or political convention or caucus held to select

candidates for any of the foregoing offices or

for any candidate, political committee, or other

person to accept or: receive any contribution

prohibited by this section.

Every corporation or labor organization which

makes any contribution or expenditure in viola-

tion of this section shall be fined not more than

$5,000; and every officer or director of any cor-

poration, or officer of any labor organization,

who consents to any contribution or expenditure

by the corporation or labor organization, as the

case may be, and any person who accepts or

receives any cuntribution, in violation of this

section, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or,

imprisoned not more than one year, or both;

and if the violation was willful, shall be fined

not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more

than two years, or both.

_ For the purposes of this section “labor organ-

ization” means any organization of any kind, or

any agency or employee representation committee

or plan, in which employees participate and

which exist for the purpose, in whole or in part,

of dealing with employers concerning grievances,

labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of

employment, or conditions of work.

Section 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act

of 1971, 86 Stat. 10, amended Section 610 by adding

5

at the end of that section the following paragraph

(18 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 610):

As used in this section, th: phrase “contribu-

tion or expenditure” shall include any direct or

indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, de-

posit, or gift of money, or any services, or any-

thing of value (except a loan of money by a

national or State bank made in accordance with

the applicable banking laws and regulations and

in the ordinary course of business) to any can-

didate, campaign committee, or political party or ~

organization, in connection with any election to

any of the offices referred to in this section; but

shall not include communications by a corpora-

tion to its stockholders and their families or by

a labor organization to its members and their

families on any subject; non-partisan registra-

tion and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a cor-

poration aimed at its stockholders and their fami-

lies, or by a labor organization aimed at its

members and their families; the establishment,

administration, and solicitation of contributions

to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for

political purposes by a corporation or labor orga-

nization: Provided, That it shall be unlawful for

such. a fund to make a contribution or expendi-

ture by utilizing money or anything of value

secured by physical force, job discrimination,

financial reprisals, or the threat of force, job dis-

crimination, or financial reprisal; or by dues,

fees, or other monies required as a condition of

membership in a labor organization or as a con-

dition of employment, or by monies obtained in

any commercial transaction.

6

STATEMENT

Respondent, a shareholder of Bethlehem Steel Cor-

poration (“Bethlehem”), instituted this suit against

Bethlehem’s directors shortly before the 1972 presi-

dential election, both individually and derivatively on

behalf of ‘the corporation. He alleges that the direc-

tors violated 18 U.S.C. 610 by using Bethlehem’s

general corporate funds “to influence the United

States electorate to help bring about a Republican

Party victory” in the election (A. 8, 11).*

The suit was induced by an advertisement paid for

by Bethlehem which appeared in many national maga-

zines and whose basic theme, respondent averred,

constituted an endorsement of the 1972 Republican

Party candidate (A. 21). While the advertisement

did not mention any candidate by name, it criticized

the “careless rhetoric and accusations that are be-

ing thrown around” in the. presidential campaign,

“their main target being the business community,”

and referred disapprovingly to a statement “made by

a political candidate” (A. 31). The advertisement

also indicated that upon request Bethlehem would

send the text of the speech given by the Chairman of

the Board of Bethlehem (A. 32), from which the

advertisement was derived. The full speech made sev-

eral other disapproving references to “a prominent

presidential candidate” and a “campaign based on

cynicism and mistrust” (A. 32).

+“A” refers to petitioners’ Appendix; “Br.” refers to

petitioners’ brief.

7

In its opinion denying respondent's motion for a

temporary restraining order (A. 19), the district

court held that since the Department of Justice had

exclusive authority to enforce Section 610, no private

cause of action could be implied (350 F. Supp. 227,

281; A. 52-53), and that the advertisement did not

constitute an expenditure prohibited by Section 610

because the advertisement did not mention any can-

didates specifically by name. The court considered

it unnecessary to resolve the defendants’ First

Amendment challenges to the provision.

Petitioners subsequently filed a motion for sum-

mary judgment in the district court (A. 79), which

was granted without opinion (A. 87). The court of

appeals reversed (496 F.2d 416; A. 92), holding that. ,

there is a private cause of action for violation of

Section 610, and the proscription in Section 610 ap-

plies to any expenditure made with a “partisan pur-~

pose,” that is, made “for the purpose of influencing

someone’s election to federal office” (496 F.2d at 425;

A. 106), even though it did not expressly mention a

candidate by name. .

The court concluded that Sessile there was a fac-

tual dispute whether the Bethlehem advertisement

was partisan, the district court erred in granting

summary judgment. The court declined to address

petitioners’ contention that Section 610 was unconsti-

tutional, noting that since the district court had not

resolved the issue, it could be reasserted on remand

(496 F.2d at 426; A. 108).

ee

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The statutory scheme in 18 U.S.C. 610 comes

within the broad power of Congress to enact legisla- |

tion aimed at preserving the integrity of the electoral

process, which includes the authority to prevent the

corrupting effect upon politics of unchecked political

spending by corporations. Control over corporate

political spending has been one historical cornerstone

of three-quarters of a century of continued congres-

sional effort to limit the impact of aggregated power

upon politics. Many decisions of this Court have rec-

ognized the legitimacy of that effort.

The means chosen to limit corporate power in the

electoral process, through Section 610, are reason-

ably calculated to fulfill Congress’ legitimate objective

without undue effect upon First Amendment rights.

The restrictions are narrowly drawn: they permit

corporations to make political contributions so long

as the funds have been voluntarily contributed by

shareholders, and they allow corporate officers to

supervise the political funds and decide how they will

be spent. They also permit the corporation to expend

general non-contributed funds for the purpose of

administering and soliciting voluntary contributions.

Section 610 prohibits only the use of general cor-

porate funds in connection with federal elections, be-

cause such expenditures have a disproportionate im-

pact upon the electoral process in that they do not

necessarily reflect the particular political sentiments

of individual investors who are the sources of ‘the

funds. A corporation thereby able to aggregate funds

for political purposes which could not otherwise be

aggregated on a voluntary basis would have political

leverage of a kind unavailable even to organized blocs

of partisan contributors. The net effect of Section

610, therefore, is to eliminate this disproportionality

and assure that corporate political expenditures repre-

sent only those funds voluntarily contributed by share-

holders for avowedly political purposes.

The statutory scheme places no restraint upon the

First Amendment rights of shareholders to express

their political views and associate for political ends.

To the contrary, Section 610 furthers First Amend-

ment interests by protecting the rights of sharehold-

ers whose political views are either in the minority or

_ at odds with the views of corporate officers, since it

prevents the corporation from using general corporate

funds for political purposes. Similarly, Section 610

permits corporate officers free reign to express their

views, so long as they do not draw upon general cor-

porate funds to do so. Moreover, the statutory scheme

only has an incidental effect upon the First Amend-

ment rights of corporate entities.

Nor is the statutory scheme, barring corporate ex-

penditures made from general funds “in connection

with any election,” unconstitutionally overbroad nor

impermissibly vague. Its proscriptions comprehend a

range of corporate conduct which is easily identifi-

able and commonly understood. Any overbreadth is

insubstantial in relation to the unquestionably valid

10

scope of the statute, and the statute is sufficiently

~ definite to give notice of the proscribed conduct.

Finally, contrary to petitioners’ assertion, it is no

violation of equal protection to hold corporations and

labor unions, in Section 610, to a higher standard of

behavior than voluntary associations, partnerships, or

other unincorporated organizations—none of which

poses as great a potential for abuse of the electoral

process. In any event, Congress may act selectively,

and a prohibition within its power directed at a

particular class is not rendered invalid because it ©

does not also: reach every. other class upon which

Congress may constitutionally place similar restric-

tions. .

ARGUMENT

The contention that Section 610 is unconstitutional

was made as a defense to a claim by a shareholder

that the directors of Bethlehem Steel Corporation

violated that section through certain acts done at the

time of the 1972 presidential election. Neither the

district court nor the court of appeals reached the is-

sue; indeed, in declining to do so, the court of appeals

noted that the issue would be open on the remand that

it ordered. The petition for certiorari raised the con-

stitutional issue, and this Court sects the petition

;without limitation.

: Although the issue is thus before the Court, under

this Court’s settled practice of not deciding constitu-

tional questions unless necessary, and particularly

when the lower courts have not reached them, we

——

a

11

believe that there is no occasion for the Court to

reach the question in this case. Indeed, in United

States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, the

Court in a similar situation declined to consider con-

stitutional challenges to Section 610.°

If this Court reaches the constitutional question,

the validity of the restrictions ir. Section 610 upon

corporate campaign expenditures must be evaluated

in light of (1) the broad congressional authority un-

der the Constitution to regulate and control federal

elections, which includes the power to prevent their

corruption by corporate political expenditures, and

(2) the narrow prohibitions of the statutory scheme,

which must, be viewed in relation to the precise abuses

which Congress sought to correct. We shall show that

- Congress has authority to impose limitations upon

corporate political expenditures, and that the restric-

tions in 18 U.S.C. 610 are constitutional.

[+10 bon United States v. Congress of Industrial Organiza-

, 885 U.S. 106, 110, and Pipefitters v. United States, 407

U.S. 385, 399-400, the Court found it unnecessary to reach

the -constitutionality of Section 610 because it was able to

dispose of the cases on non-constitutional grounds. The stat-

ute and its predecessors have been upheld in United States

v. United States Brewers’ Association, 239 Fed. 163 (W.D.

Pa.); United States v. Painters Local Union No. 481, 79 F.

Supp. 516 (D. Conn.), reversed on other grounds, 172 F. 2d

854 (C.A. 2); United States Vv. Bpwle, 482 F. 2d 755 (C.A.

D.C.).

12

I. THE BOARD POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGU-

LATE FEDERAL ELECTIONS TO PREVENT

THEIR CORRUPTION AUTHORIZES A PROHIBI-

TION UPON CORPORATE POLITICAL EXPENDI-

TURES FROM GENERAL CORPORATE FUNDS.

1. Congress has broad power to enact legislation

aimed at preserving the integrity of the electoral

process.* Starting with Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S.

371, and Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399, this Court

has upheld the authority of Congress to prohibit ac-

tions that directly violate the integrity of the election

process, such as stuffing ballot boxes or failing to re-

turn poll books. In Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S.

651, the Court, in upholding a conviction for beat-

ing a Negro to prevent him from voting in a con-

gressional election, essayed the broad scope of con-

gressional power to safeguard the federal electoral

process, and concluded that: ;

If the recurrence of such acts as these prison-

ers stand convicted of are too common in one

quarter‘of the country, and give omen of danger

from lawless violence, the free use of money in

*The authority over congressional elections stems from

Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, which provides that

“t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for

Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each

State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any

time by Law make or alter such Regulations * *°*.” The

authority to protect presidential elections apparently stems

from the “necessary and proper” clause of the Constitution

(Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 18); see Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 US.

651, 658; Burroughs and Cannon Vv. United States, 290 U.S.

534, 545.

=

a

13

elections, arising from the vast growth of recent

wealth in other quarters, presents equal cause

for anxiety.

If the government of the United States has

* * * no authority to provide against these

evils, * * * then, indeed, is the country * * *

at the mercy of the combinations of those who

respect no right but brute force, on the one

hand, and unprincipled corruptionists on the

other. [Jd. at 667; emphasis added.]

In Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290

U.S. 534, the Court upheld the constitutionality of

the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat.

1070, 2 U.S.C. 241 et seg., which limited the amounts

candidates for congressional elections could spend and

required the disclosure of contributions to and ex-

penditures by political committees, as applied to the

election of presidential and vice presidential electors.

In rejecting the contention that the Act could not be

applied to that election because under Article II, Sec-

tion 1 of the Constitution only the States, but not

Congress, could thus regulate presidential elections,

the Court said (290 U.S. -at 545): :

To say that Congress is without power to pass

appropriate legislation to safeguard [a Presi-

dential] election from the improper use of money

_to influence the result is to deny to the nation

in a vital particular power of self protection.

In United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 US.

75, 78, the Court sustained the congressional power

to forbid any employee of the federal executive

branch from “taking ‘any active part in political

14

management or political campaigns.’” The Mitchell

decision was based on Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371,

in which “[t]he right to contribute money through

fellow employees * * * was held not to be protected

by any constitutional provision.” 330 U.S. at 97.

See also United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396;

Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.

548.

The Court has also sanctioned congressional au-

thority to regulate the political activity of individuals

and organizations who are employed by state gov-

ernments but paid from federal funds, Oklahoma

v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S.

127; who are on federal premises, United States v.

Thayer, 209 U.S. 39; or who receive or solicit con-

tributions for the purpose of influencing legislation,

United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612; see also,

Egan v. United States, 187 F.2d 369 (C.A. 8), cer-

tiorari denied, 320 U.S. 788 (employees of organiza-

tion chartered or regulated by federal law).

The power of Congress to safeguard “the integrity

of [the] basic governmental process [of elections]”

(United States v. Harriss, supra, 347 U.S. at 625),

includes the power to control corporate political

spending. Uncontrolled corporate political expendi-

ture would entail as much an “improper use of money

to influence the result” (Burroughs and Cannon,

supra, 290 U.S. at 545) of an election-as the use of

funds for corrupt purposes. Fifty years ago, during

the debates on the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of

15

' 1925, Senator Robinson stated (65 Cong. Rec. 9507-

9508) :

Many believe that when an individual or as-

sociation of individuals makes large contribu-

tions for the purpose of aiding candidates of po-

litical parties in winning the elections, they ex-

pect, and sometimes demand, and occasionally, at

least, receive, consideration by the beneficiaries

of their contributions which not infrequently is

harmful to the general public interest. It is

unquestionably an evil which ought to be dealt

with, and dealt with intelligently and effectively.

These problems are no less serious today.than they

were in 1925. Large corporations have access to funds

far beyond the financial resources of most individuals.

Were these organizations free to use their resources

_ for political purposes without limitation, there would

be a serious danger of corrupting the electoral process.

2. The restriction upon the political power and

influence of corporations in Seetion 610 has been

one cornerstone of Congress’ continuing “concern for

elections ‘free from the power of money’” (United

States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 575).

The history of congressional action “to protect the

political process from what it deemed to be the

corroding effect of money employed in elections by

aggregated power” (id. at 582; emphasis supplied)

began almost three quarters of a century ago. Presi-

dent Roosevelt’s 1906 message to Congress recom-

mended as the first item of congressional action a

law prohibiting political contributions by corpora-

16

tions. 41 Cong. Rec. 22. Shortly thereafter, in 1907,

Congress provided:

That it shall be unlawful for any national bank,

or any corporation organized by authority of

any laws of Congress, to make a money contribu-

tion in connection with any election to any

political office. It shall also be unlawful for any’

corporation whatever to make a money con-

tribution in connection with any election at

which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors

or a Representative in Congress is to be voted

for or any election by any State legislature of a

United States Senator. [34 Stat. 864-865.]

As this Court indicated, the aim of this statute “was

not merely to prevent the subversion of the integrity

of the electoral process. Its underlying philosophy

was to sustain the active, alert responsibility of the

individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct

of government” (Automobile Workers, supra, 352

U.S. at 575). -

Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted a publicity

law that required committees attempting to influence

the results of congressional elections in two or more

states to report all contributions and disbursements

and to identify contributors and recipients of sub-

stantial sums. 36 Stat. 822. In 1911 Congress en-

acted the first limitations on spending for congres- |

sional campaigns, which also prohibited candidates

from promising employment for the purpose of ob-

taining support. 87 Stat, 25. In - Congress made

17

it unlawful either to offer or to solicit anything of

value to influence voting. 40 Stat. 1013.

The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat.

1070, codified and revised this legislation. Section 313

of the Act strengthened the 1907 statute by prdhibit-

ing “contributions” as well as “money contributions,”

extending the prohibition on corporate contributions

to the election to Congress of Delegates and Resident

Commissioners, and penalizing the recipient of any

forbidden contribution as well as the contributor.

Fifteen years later, when Congress extended the

Hatch Act, 53 Stat. 1147, it imposed further limita-

tions upon political contributions: it set a maximum

of $5000 on contributions by a person to any candi-

date or to any committee supporting him, and limited

to $3 million the total expenditures which a political

committee could make in any year. 54 Stat. 767.

In offering these latter provisions, Senator Bankhead

expressed Congress’ continuing concern with the cor-

rupting impact of money on politics (86 Cong. Rec.

2720):

We all know that money is the chief source

of corruption. We all know that large contribu-

tions to political campaigns not only put the

political party under obligation to the large con-

tributors, who demand pay in the way of legis-

lation, but we also know that large sums of

money are used for the purpose of conducting

expensive campaigns through the newspapers and

over the radio; in the publication of all sorts of

literature, true and untrue; and for the purpose

18

of paying the expenses of campaigners sent out 3

into the country to spread propaganda, both

true and untrue.

These restrictions were extended to labor unions

in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (61

Stat. 136, 159-160), to mitigate “the undue and dis-

proportionate influence of labor unions upon federal

elections” and “to preserve the purity of such elec-

tions * * * against the use of aggregated wealth by

union as well as by corporate entities” (United

States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335

U.S. 106, 134).

The problem of controlling the financing of elec-

tions has received Continued attention from Congress

in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (86

Stat. 3, 47 U.S.C. (Supp. IT) 801, et seg.) and the

1974 amendments to that Act (Public Law 93-443,

88 Stat. 1263, et seq.).

In view of Congress’ continuing efforts to limit the

influence of money upon the politica) process, and

the many decisions of this Court which have recog-

nized the legitimacy of those efforts, Congress cer-

tainly has authority to control what has been viewed

for three quarters of a century as a primary source

of election abuse: corporate political contributions.

The only issue is whether the means chosen to con-

trol the abuse arr reasonably calculated to do so,

without undue effect upon First Amendment rights.

“The power of Congress to protect the election of

President and Vice President from corruption being

clear, the choice of means to that end presents a

question primarily addressed to the judgment of Con-

\!

19

gress. If it can be seen that the means adopted are

really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their

necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end,

the closeness of the relationship between the means

adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for

congressional determination alone” (Burroughs and

Cannon, supra, 290 U.S. at 547-548).

As we now show, the restrictions imposed upon cor-

porations by Section 610 comprise an appropriate and

reasonable method for “protect[ing] the political

process from * * * the corroding effect of money em-

ployed in élections by aggregated power” (Automo-

bile Workers, supra, 352 U.S. at 582).

Il. THE LIMITATIONS UPON CORPORATE POLITI-

CAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 18 U.S.C. 610 ARE CON-

STITUTIONAL BECAUSE THEY ARE A REASON-

ABLE METHOD OF PROTECTING THE ELEC-

TORAL PROCESS.

A. The Statute does not violate the Constitutional

Rights of Corporations, their Officers, or their

Shareholders.

Petitioners predicate their constitutional argument

on the proposition that Section 610, as applied, con-

stitutes a “blanket prohibition of contributions and

expenditures by labor unions and corporations” (Br.

61). To the contrary, the limits embodied in Sec-

tion 610..are narrowly drawn and are reasonably

calculated to avoid the specific abuses at which Con-

gress aimed. Rather than constituting “blanket pro-

hibition” on corporate political expenditures, they

merely assure that such political expenditures repre-

20 ¥

sent the voluntary contributions of individual share-

holders.

Section 610 makes it unlawful for any corporation

or any labor union : |

to make a contribution or expenditure in con-

nection with any election at which Presidential

and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or

Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident

Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or

in connection with any primary election or politi-

cal convention or caucus held to select eandidates

for any of the foregoing offices * * *._

In Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 401,

this Court held that this prohibition does not apply

to contributions or expenditures derived from volun-

tarily financed union political funds segregated from

other union funds. The Court also stated in Pipe-

fitters that solicitation by union officials is permissible,

so long as it is conducted under circumstances plainly

indicating that donations are for a political purpose

and that those solicited may decline to contribute

without loss of job or any other reprisal within the

institution’s power. Jd. at 414. Moreover, the Court

construed Section 610 to permit union officials to de-

cide how the monies raised will be spent, and to con-

trol the voluntarily contributed funds. Jd. at 415.

The same principles, we submit, are equally ap-

plicable to corporations. .That is, the statute does not

bar corporate political contributions which represent

funds voluntarily contributed by stockholders for that

21

purpose, nor does it bar corporate officials from so-

liciting stockholders to make such contributions.

Section 205 of the Federal Election Campaign

Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 10, confirmed that “8 610

does not apply to-union and corporate contributions

and expenditures from political funds financed in

some sense by the voluntary donations of employees

[and stockholders]” (Pipefitters, supra, 407 U.S. at

409) by amending Section 610. to include the follow-

ing paragraph:

As used in this section, the phrase “contribu-

tion or expenditure” shall include any direct’ or

indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance,

deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or

anything of value except a loan of money by a

national or State bank made in accordance with

the applicable banking laws and regulations and

in the ordinary course of business) to any candi-

date, campaign committee, or political party or |

organization, in connection with ‘any election to

any of the offices referred to in this section;

but shall not inelude communications by a corpo- |

ation to its stockholders and their families or by ©

| a labor organization to its members and their

families on any subject; non-partisan registra-

tion and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corpo-

ration aimed at its stocksolders and their fami-

lies, or by a labor organization aimed at its

members and their families; the establishment,

administration, and solicitation of contributions

to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for

political purposes by a corporation or labor or-

ganization: Provided, That it shall be unlawful

22

for such a fund to make a contribution or ex-

' penditure by utilizing money or anything of

value secured by physical force, job discrimina-

tion, financial reprisals, or the threat of force,

job discrimination, or financial reprisal; or by

dues, ives, or other monies required as a condi-

tion of membership in a labor organization or as

a condition of employment, or by monies ob-

tained in any commercial transaction. [Empha-

sis supplied.]

The 1971 amendment also excludes from coverage

corporate funds used for “the establishment, admin-

istration, and solicitation of contributions to a sepa-

rate segregated fund * * *.”

Thus, a corporation may use funds for political

purposes which stockholders. voluntarily contributed

and solicit contributions for political purposes from

shareholders and their families. Indeed, the amended

statute expressly permits political communication by

/

a corporation to,its shareholders and their families, |

and non-partisan registration and “get-out-the-vote”

campaigns by a corporation aimed at its shareholders

and their families. oi

The statutory scheme of ‘Section 610 thus permits

extensive political communication by corporations:

corporations may send political advertising to their,

shareholders and solicit them for political etnteibo- ~

- tions; corporations may also communicate their politi- —

cal views to the public at large as long as the com- |

munications are financed from the voluntary contri-

| butions ag individual shareholders. The statute there-

fore is narrowly drawn to avoid the precise evil about

which Congress was concerned—the undue influence

upon the electoral process that the use of general cor-

porate funds is likely to create. |

The constitutional issue is thus a narrow one:

whether a corporation, which is organized for other

than political .irposes, may be barred from making

political contributions and expenditures from its gen-

eral funds.

One of Congress’ concerns about unlimited cor-

porate spending was the disproportionate impact it

would have upon the political process—exceeding the

abilities of any individual or bloc of individuals to

have their voices heard. Corporate political expendi-

tures drawn from general corporate funds have a dis-

proportionate impact simply because such expendi-

tures do not necessarily reflect the political views of

the individual shareholders who are the sources of

the funds. A corporation that was thereby able to

.aggregate funds for political purposes which could

not otherwise be aggregated on a voluntary basis

would have political leverage of a kind unavailable

even to organized blocs of partisan contributors. In-

deed, one reason for the restrictions embodied in

Section 610 was “the feeling that corporate officials

had no moral right to use corporate funds for con-

tribution to political parties without the consent of

the stockholders” (United States v. Congress of In-

dustrial Organizations, supra, 335 U.S. at 113). See

Hearings before the House Committee on the Election

a4

of the President, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. 76; 40 Cong.

Rec. 96.

The net effect of Section 610 is to eliminate this

disproportionality and assure that corporate political

expenditures represent only those funds voluntarily

contributed by shareholders for avowedly political

purposes. The scheme comprises a reasonable means

of limiting undue corporate leverage in the political

process without encroaching upon the First Amend-

ment rights of shareholders or corporate Officers, and

only incidentally affecting the First Amendment

rights of corporations. .

1. The First Amendment Rights of Shareholders.

As noted above, Section 610 permits individual

shareholders to make voluntary political contributions

through the corporation. It therefore imposes no re-

_ straint upon their right to express political views.

Nor does Section 610 restrict the collective voice of

groups of shareholders who share the same political

sentiments. It does not bar the formation of volun-

tary political organizations by shareholders to express

their political views, even by the pooling of money

they voluntarily furnish for the purpose of making

political contributions. Indeed, by preventing the use

of corporate funds to support political candidates

whom some stockholders may oppose, the statute fur-

thers First Amendment interests.

The Amendment rests on the premise “that the

widest possible dissemination of information from

diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the

25

welfare of the public.” Associated Press v. United

States, 326 U.S. 1, 20. In preventing shareholders

from using corporate funds to support candidates

opposed by minority shareholders (and corporate

management from deciding, on behalf of all share-

holders, which candidate to support), the statute

protects, rather than restricts, the First Amendment

freedoms of individual shareholders.

As Congressman Williams of Mississippi com-

mented during the hearings on the original Act of

1907:

[N]o corporation has the right, and no board of

directors of a corporation and no manager of a

corporation has the right, to embezzle the money

belonging to the stockholders of the corporation

and to divert it from its legitimate use to a pur-

pose for which the company was not chartered

by appropriating it to Democratic, Republican,

Populist, Socialist, or any other campaign fund.

[Hearings before the House Committee on the

Election of the President, 59th Cong., Ist Sess.

76; 40 Cong. Rec. 96.]

2. The First Amendment Rights of Corporate Officers.

Section 610 does not abridge the First Amendment

rights of corporate officers to express their political

views. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, Section 610

does not have a “chilling effect” upon the exercise of

those rights (Br. 68), and it does not, as the amicus

maintains, entail a prior restraint designed “to

silence a corporate officer” (Amicus Br. of the

Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 32).

26

Petitioner Cort, the Chairman of the Board of

Bethlehem Steel, was free to speak out against, as he .

put it, the “false statements” and “outrageous accusa-

tions” about the business community made by “a

political candidate” in the 1972 presidential election

(App. 31), and he was free to advertise his message

so long as he did not spend general corporate funds

to do so. He was also free to publish a pamphlet

criticizing the views of “a prominent presidential

candidate” (App. 32), so long as he did not finance

the pamphlet from unsegregated corporate funds.

The sole restriction upon corporate officers in Sec-

tion 610 is that they cannot use for political purposes

unsegregated corporate funds which were not ex-

pressly contributed by shareholders for such purposes.

Section 610 puts corporate officers on the same foot-

ing as everyone else under the First Amendment—

they can make their own political contributions and

expenditures out of their own pockets but cannot

draw upon general corporate funds for that purpose.

3. The First Amendment Rights of Corporations.

As noted above, Section 610 permits corporations

to make political expenditures from a segregated

political fund voluntarily contributed by sharehold-

ers. The statute also permits corporations to estab-

lish and administer such a fund, and to solicit volun-

tary contributions to the fund, even if the cost of ad-

ministering and soliciting derives from general cor-

porate funds. The corporation also may conduct a

_ nonpartisan registration campaign aimed at its share-

27

holders. Beyond these types of political participation,

however, the corporation as an entity may not

venture.

The limits upon corporate political expenditures

prescribed in Section 610 do not unconstitutionally

restrain the First Amendment rights of corporations.

As this Court stated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37, 51:

Where a statute does not directly abridge free

speech, but—while regulating a subject within

the state’s power—tends to have the incidental

effect of inhibiting First Amendment ‘rights, it

is well settled that the statute can be upheld if

the effect on speech is minor in relation to the

need for control of the conduct and the lack of

alternative means for doing so. [Citations

omitted. }

That standard, equally applicable to the federal

government, is satisfied in the present case. The stat-

ute “is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-

sion” (United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377).

To the contrary, its purpose and effect is to further

free expression by preventing the disproportionate

influence that corporations—as entities apart from

their shareholders and officers—could exert upon the

political process by using general corporate funds to

support particular candidates.

A corporation is subject to much greater regula- |

tion than individuals, and the scope of permissible

governmental control over it is necessarily broader

than it is with regard to individuals. As this Court

28

said in United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632,

651, 652 (dealing with Fourth and Fifth Amend-

ment challenges to the corporate reporting require-

ments of the Federal Trade Commission Act) :

[C]jorporations * * * are endowed with public

attributes. They have a collective impact upon

society, from which they derive the privilege of

acting as artificial entities. The Federal Govern-

ment allows them the privilege of engaging in

interstate commerce. Favor from government

often carry with them an enhanced measure of

regulation.

* * * * x

[T]he disparity between artificial and natural

persons is so significant that differing treat-

ment can rarely be urged as an objection to a

particular construction of a statute.

See also Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S.

557, 561; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168.

This Court repeatedly has upheld over First Amend-

ment objections regulatory schemes which restrict cor-

porate communication so long as they do not dis-

criminate against communications media. See, e.g.,

Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board,

301 U.S. 103; Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. North-

western Iron and Metal Company, 335 U.S. 525;

Lorain Journal Company v. United States, 342 U.S.

148; National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia

Electric and Power Company, 314 U.S. 469.

As noted, Section 610 is not directed against speech

at all. It simply bars corporate political contribu-

tions, whatever their purpose—whether used to pay

29

the rent of a candidate’s office or for a newspaper

advertisement advocating his election. The effect

of the statute upon the corporation’s First Amend-

ment rights is incidental. In view of the strong

public interest in protecting the electoral process

from the corrupting influence of the use of general

corporate funds for political purposes, such _inci-

dential effects do not unconstitutionally abridge the

corporation’s First Amendment rights.

In Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers,

413 U.S. 548, this Court recently upheld under the

First Amendment the constitutionality of the pro-

hibition in the Hatch Act against partisan political

activity by federal employees. The Court’s analysis

and reasoning is equally applicable here. .

The Court first essayed the history of attempts

by Congress to insure “that federal service should

depend upon meritorious performan¢e rather than

political service, and that the political influence of

federal employees on others and on the electoral

process should be limited” (id. at 557). The Court

then held that the “balance [Congress] has so far

struck,” of barring partisan political activity by

government employees while permitting them to par-

ticipate fully in the electoral process, is “sustainable

by the obviously important interests sought to be

served by the limitations on partisan political ac-

tivities now contained in the Hatch Act” (id. at 564).

The Court stated (id. at 567): “[n]either the right

to associate nor the right to participate in political

activities is absolute in any event. * * * Nor are the

management, financing, and conduct of political cam-

30

paigns wholly free from government regulation”

(footnote and citations omitted; emphasis supplied).

Section 610 similarly represents a “sustainable”

balance, consistent with the First Amendment. In-

deed, the Hatch Act—barring federal employees from

ali partisan political activity—entails a far more

onerous restriction than Section 610, which imposes

no restraints upon individuals acting alone or in

groups. It merely restricts political contributions and

expenditures by corporate entities separate and apart

from the shareholders and officers of whom they are

comprised. The Hatch Act, on the other hand, direct-

ly restrains~the-partisan—politieal-_activities_ of indi-

viduals.

B. Section 610 is Neither Unconstitutionally Overbroad

Nor Unconstitutionally Vague.

Contrary to petitioners’ further contentions, Sec-

tion 610 is neither unconstitutionally overbroad on

its face nor unconstitutionally vague. Its proscription

against contributions or expenditures made “in con-

nection with any elections” comprehends a range of

corporate conduct which is easily identifiable and

well understood. The statutory scheme evidences

the “precision of regulation” which this Court has

said to be the “touchstone in an area so closely

touching our most precious freedoms.” National As-

sociation for the Advancement of Colored» People v.

Button, 371 U.S.4415, 488. The statute is a narrow |

prohibition precisely directed against the evil sought

to be avoided—disproportionate corporate influence

31

over elections through political contributions—while

permitting individuals associated with the corpora-

tion fully to exercise their First Amendment rights

of speech and association.

This Court has repeatedly setoneil to strike down a

statute as overbroad on its face where there were a

substantial number of situations to which it could

be validly appli¢d. “Thus, even if there are marginal

applications in which a statute would infringe on

First Amendment values, facial invalidation is in-

appropriate if the ‘remainder of the statute * * ‘*

covers a whole range of easily identifiable and con- —

stitutionally proscribable * * * conduct * * *’”

(Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760, quoting from

Civil, Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, supra,

S. at 580-581). And as the Court

in B rick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, “where

conduct and not merely speech is involved” the over-

breadth must “not only be real, but substantial as

well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legiti-

mate sweep.”

The provision in Section 610 barring contributions

or expenditures made by corporations “in connection

with any election” embraces a clear range of con-

stitutionally proscribable conduct. While there could

be marginal applications infringing upon First

Amendment values—where, ior example, corporate

advertising dealt solely with issues and never im-

pliedly referred to a candidate—such potential over-

breadth is insubstantial in relation to the unques-

tionably valid scope of the statutory scheme.

32

The phrase “in connection with any election” is

not impermissibly vague. The words define situa-

tions in which corporations might use their resources

to influence the electoral process with as great pre-

cision as the nature of the subject matter permits.

They reach a precise and readily ascertainable type

of conduct, see United States yv. O’Brien, supra, 391

U.S. at 381, and convey a “sufficiently definite warn-

ing as to the proscribed conduct when measured by

common understanding and practices. The Consti-

tution requires no more.” United States v. Petrillo,

882 U.S. 1, 8.

In Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S.

337, the Court noted that because of the necessary

imprecision of language, only a “reasonable degree

of certainty can be demanded” of any — As

it observed:

_Acriminal statute must be sufficiently definite

give notice of the required conduct to one who

ron avoid its penalties, and to guide the judge

in its application and the lawyer in defending

one charged with its violation. But few words

possess the precision of mathematical symbols,

most statutes must deal with untold and unfore-

seen variations in factual situations, and the ~

practical necessities of discharging the business

of government inevitably limit the specificity

with which legislators can spell out prohibitions.

Consequently, no more than a reasonable degree

of certainty can be demanded. Nor is it unfair

to require that one who deliberately goes peril-

33

ously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall

take the risk that he may cross the line. [342

U.S. at $40; footnotes omitted.]

Moreover, “if the general class of offenses to which

the statute is directed is plainly within its terms,

the statute will not be struck down as vague, even

though marginal cases could be put where doubts

might arise” (United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,

618).

Here the statute is clear in prohibiting what was

done in this case—the financing of public advertise-

ments and pamphlets which criticized the views of

one of the major candidates (referred to, but not

named) in the 1972 presidential election. The com-

pany had financed political advertising—a direct “‘ex-

penditure” made “in connection with” a presidential

election. Petitioners were amply warned that their

advertisement and pamphlet critical of a political

candidate in all but name were within the boundary

of proscribable conduct.

Moreover, the phrase “in connection with any elec-

tion” derives meaning from the context in which

it is used and the statutory design. The purpose

of the statutory scheme is to control and limit

corporate influence upon the electoral process. An

expenditure or contribution is made “in connection

with any election” if it is intended and designed

to support or discredit a particular candidicy, that

is, if one of its purposes is to urge and encourage

the electorate to vote in a certain way. The words

are given greater specificity by the remainder of

2S ERD FSC NRO RISA ROCIO

34

the statutory scheme, which exempts non-partisan

registration and “get-out-the-vote” campaigns by a

corporation aimed at its shareholders and any com-

munications by a corporation to its stockholders and

their families.

This Court has upheld, against vagueness chal-

lenges, phrases in other regulatory statutes implicat-

ing First Amendment rights that were no more

definite and specific than the words “in connection

with an election.” See, ¢.g., United States v. Wurz-

bach, 280 U.S. 396 (upholding the provision of the

Federal Corrupt Practices Act prohibiting any per-

son from receiving money “for any political pur-

pose whatever’); and United States v. Harriss,

supra (upholding the provision of the Federal Regu-

lation of Lobbying Act prescribing certain require-

ments for any person who receives money “to be used

principally to aid, or the principal purpose of which

person is to aid” in “influenc[ing] directly or in-

directly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by

the Congress of the United States’).

In Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers,

supra, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the

prohibition in the Hatch Act against federal em-

ployees “taking an active part in political manage-

ment or in political campaigns.” The Court stated,’

in words equally applicable to the instant case (413

U.S. at 577-579) :

There might be quibbles about the meaning of

[language in the statute and regulations]; but

there are limitations in the English language

a

35

with respect to being both specific and manage-

ably brief, and it seems to us that although

the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent

on finding fault at any cost, they are set out

in terms that the ordinary person exercising

ordinary common sense can sufficiently under-

stand and comply with, without sacrifice to the

public interest.

C. Section 610 Does Not Deny Equal Protection in

Violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Petitioners contend ‘that, in singling out corpora-

tions and labor unions, Section 610 denies equal pro-

tection in violation of the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment. Petitioners maintain that Section

610 does not prohibit voluntary associations, partner-

ships or unincorporated organizations from making

political contributions in connection with federal elec-

tions. But as this Court has held, Congress may act

selectively, and a prohibition within its power direct-

ed at a particular class is not rendered invalid be-

cause it does not also reach every other class upon

which Congress may constitutionally place similar

restrictions. United States v. Maryland Savings-

Share Insurance Corp., 400 U.S. 4; United States v.

Petrillo, supra, 332 U.S.°at 8-9; Sproles v. Binford,

286 U.S. 374, 396.

Moreover, it is rational to hold corporations and

labor unions to a different and more stringent stand-

ard than other associations. “Congress may have

considered that the volume or proportion of unincor-

porated business or the relatively small size of in-:

36

dividually owned enterprises * * * made it possible

to omit persons [in such entities] from duties and

penalties imposed on artificial combinations of cap-

ital.” United States v. Morton Salt, supra, 338 U.S. °

at 651. Indeed, 1s we have already stressed, Section

610 does not prohibit shareholder majorities from ex-

pressing their collective political sentiments through

voluntary political organizations. Such voluntary as-

sociations, partnerships or unincorporated organiza-

tions simply do not pose the same possibility of dis-

proportionate influence upon the electoral process as

corporations or labor unions which are able to aggre-

gate funds not otherwise volunteered for political

purposes.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Section 610 is consistent

with the First and Fifth Amendments.

Respectfully submitted.

ROBERT H. BORK,

Solicitor General.

JOHN C. KEENEY,

Acting Assistant Attorney General.

Rosert B. REICH,

Assistant to the Solicitor General.

Pee JEROME M. FEIT,

RoBeRT H. PLAXico,

Attorneys.

FEBRUARY 1975.

He 6. &. coveenment peimtine orrice; 1975 369673 107

eRe ee I an ot ED em OP ee

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