Amicus Curiae Brief — Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-797

THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY,

a division of

KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS, INC.,

Appellant,

v.

PAT L. TORNILLO, JR.,

Appellee.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of Florida

MOTFION-FOR-LEAVE-TO FILE-BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS |

National Association of Broadcasters

1771 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

202-293-3560

JOHN B. SUMMERS

Counsel

BRENDA L. FOX

February 28, 1974 Of Counsel

<<

ASS DUPLICATORS, INC.—1732 Eye Strest, N.W.—Washington, 0.C.—298-6537

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-797

THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY,

a division of «

KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS, INC.,

Appellant,

v.

PAT L. TORNILLO, JR,,

Appellee.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of Florida

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS

The National Association of Broadcasters (hereinafter NAB)

moves pursuant to Rule 42 of this Court for leave to file a

brief amicus curiae in the above entitled proceeding. NAB has

received written permission to file such a brief from both parties

to this case.

NAB is a non-profit association of radio and television broad-

cast stations and networks. As of February 20, 1974, NAB's

membership included 2,366 AM radio stations, 1,473 FM radio

stations, 529 television stations and all nationwide commercial

2

broadcast networks. The objective of the NAB, according

to its by-laws:

. . . Shall be to foster and promote the de-

velopment of the arts of aural and visual

broadcasting in all its forms; to protect its

members in every lawful and proper manner

from injustices and unjust exactions; to do

all things necessary and proper to encourage

and promote customs and practices which

will strengthen and maintain the broadcast-

ing industry to the end that it may best

serve the public.

All communications media share a common interest in

the presence of substantial threats to the unfettered ex-

ercise of freedom of the press. The Florida statute in

question in this case presents such an assault, for in the

name of "fairness" it represents a severe restraint upon

the exercise of journalistic editorial discretion by news-

paper publishers. Thus, in keeping with the above-stated

objectives, the NAB herein seeks to protect its members

from the potential ramifications and ‘chilling effect" of

government encroachments upon the press.

NAB respectfully submits that in addition to its mutual

interests with newspapers in this case, the broadcaster has

other concerns in the outcome of this matter which would

not be adequately represented by Appellant. In particular, the

broadcast media are now beset with an administratively

conceived and judicially supported fairness doctrine. It is

likely that some discussion of this doctrine will emerge in

the course of this proceeding. Thus, NAB is concerned

that in determining the rights of newspapers and the con-

stitutionality of the Florida "right to reply" statute, the

1 See, e.g, Appellant’s Jurisdictional Statement at 20-27.

3

theoretical grounds upon which the fairness doctrine is

based will come into issue.2_ NAB is of the opinion that

judicial comments at this time will affect significantly the

interests of commercial broadcasters to the extent that such

comments may affect the fairness doctrine.

WHEREFORE, in view of the significance of this matter,

the NAB respectfully requests that it be granted leave to

file the annexed brief amicus curiae in the above entitled

proceeding.

Respectfully submitted,

National Association of Broadcasters

1771 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

202-293-3560

JOHN B. SUMMERS

Counsel

BRENDA L. FOX

February 28, 1974 Of Counsel

2 The continued validity of the doctrine may be in question, see,

e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc, v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm.,

412 U.S. 94, 148-70 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).

INTEREST OF AMICUS .

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .

ARGUMENT

I. IMPOSITION OF A RIGHT OF REPLY

STATUTE FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES

IMPAIRS THE EXERCISE OF FIRST

AMENDMENT RIGHTS BY IMPOSING

A PRIOR RESTRAINT UPON THE PRESS .

ll. THE FLORIDA STATUTE IS CONSTITU-

TIONALLY INFIRM AND THE COURT

NEED NOT AND SHOULD NOT BASE

ITS RULING ON A REVISITATION all

ITS RED LION DECISION .

CONCLUSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .

AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases:

Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co.,

440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971) .

Avins v. Rutgers, State University of New —

385 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1967) .

Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,

372 U.S. 58 (1963)

- -|@

15

16

(ii)

~~

Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C.,

473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972). . . 2... . 11, 12, 13

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.

Democratic National Committee,

412 US. 94 (1973) . ... . . 3,4, 5, 6, 7,9, 10, 11

Mills v. Alabama,

384 US. 214 (1966) . . . . 2... . . ws. 5,6

Near v. Minnesota,

203 US..GT ISS) 5... ck ee 4 EE Kw 4

New York Times Co. v. United States,

WS US PISCE eS 4

Organization for a Better Austin v. aaa

402 US. (1971). . . . eee ws 4

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,

395 US. 367 (1969) . . . . . . . . . 2,7, 8,9,

10, 11, 12, 14, 15

Tomillo v. The Miami Herald Publishing Co.,

3B Fie, Supp. SO (1973). 2. wk ww we ee ee B

Constitution and Statutes:

United States Constitution, First Amendment

passim

Florida Statutes, section 104.38 . . . . . . . . . passim

Miscellaneous:

Ervin, Congressicnal Record ae of = ed.

Nov. 14, 1973) . . . . : oe = 13, 14

Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (1970). . 6

Mott, American Journalism (1962) . . . . . .... 3

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-797

THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY,

a division of

KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS, INC.,

. Appellant,

v.

PAT L. TORNILLO, JR.,

Appellee.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of Florida

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS

INTEREST OF AMICUS

The National Association of Broadcasters (hereinafter NAB)

submits this brief amicus curiae in support of the Appellant

herein. The interest of amicus NAB has been stated in full

in the accompanying Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus

Curiae.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

NAB adopts the Statement of the Case as set forth in

Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at pages 5-7

2

NAB submits that the Florida ''right to reply"’ statute,

Section 104.38, which requires newspapers to publish, with-

out charge, replies of political candidates who they criti-

cized during election campaigns, does violate freedom of

the press as guaranteed by the First Amendment. Thus,

NAB respectfully urges this Court to reverse the decision

of the Supreme Court of Florida and thereby eradicate

the severe restraints upon the exercise of journalistic dis-

cretion and its abridgement of a free press as imposed

by the constitutionally infirm "right of reply" statute.

In its review of the Florida statute, however, NAB urges

the Court to render its decision within the confines of

the First Amendment, without effecting further solidifica-

tion of its 1969 decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. y.

F.C.C.! wherein it established the constitutionality of the

so-called fairness doctrine as applied to broadcast licensees

by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Red

Lion has come under increasing question and if it is to

be revisited, it should be in a case involving application

of the fairness doctrine to a broadcast station — not in a

case involving the constitutional validity of a state statute

encroaching upon the First Amendment rights of a news-

paper.

ARGUMENT

I. IMPOSITION OF A RIGHT OF REPLY STATUTE

FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES IMPAIRS THE

EXERCISE OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS BY

IMPOSING A PRIOR RESTRAINT UPON THE

PRESS.

By its decision, the Supreme Court of Florida would have

us forsake the First Amendment in order to preserve the

1 395 U.S. 367 (1969).

3

values it represents. Thus, it describes the "right of re-

ply" statute as: :

. in the interest of all the people, pro-

vides that candidates for public office under

certain prescribed circumstances shall have a

right of reply, a right of expression. It does

not deny to the owner of the instruments of

the newspaper industry any right of expression.

The statute assures, and does not abridge, the

right of expression which the First Amendment

guarantees.”

Even such "‘assurances,"' if the Florida statute be viewed

as such, are, nevertheless, circumspect under the scope of

the First Amendment:

"In our early history one view was that

the publisher must open his columns ‘to any

and all controversialists, especially if paid for

it.''' Mott, American Journalism, 55 (1962)

[quoting Benjamin Franklin].

"Franklin disagreed, declaring that his news-

paper was not a stagecoach, with seats for every-

one; he offered to print pamphlets for private

distribution, but refused to fill his paper with

private altercations."" /bid. (citation omitted).

And that philosophy, according to Justice Douglas, ‘be-

came implicit in the First Amendment.'* An affirmative

2 Torillo v. The Miami Herald Publishing Co., 38 Fla. Supp. 80

ve (1973) as reproduced in Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at app.

A 18.

3 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm.,

412 U.S. 94, 152 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).

4 Id.

4

requirement may still constitute a form of censorship and,

more importantly, it may impose a "chilling effect" upon

the free exercise of First Amendment rights.> Consequently,

even an affirmative requirement must overcome the heavy

presumption against its constitutional validity, the same as

would any system of prior restraint of activities protected

by the First Amendment. New York Times Co. v. United

States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); accord, Organization for

a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971), Bantam

Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), Near v. Minn-

esota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

> In Columbia Broadcasting, supra, Justice Douglas, in a footnote

reference, stated:

The monetary and other burdens imposed on the

press by the rights of a criticized person to reply,

like the traditional damage remedy for libel, lead

of course to self-censorship respecting matters of

importance to the public that the First Amendment

denies the Government the power to impose. The

burdens certainly are as onerous as the indirect

restrictions on First Amendment rights which we

have struck down .... In each instance we held

the restriction unconstitutional on the ground that

it discouraged or chilled constitutionally protected

rights of speech, press or association.

Id. at 168, note 18 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

© Quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 719-20 (1931), the

Court in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723

(1971) stated:

"The fact that the liberty of the press may be

abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does

not make any the less necessary the immunity

of the press from previous restraint in dealing

with official misconduct."

5

In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic

National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), this Court held

that there is no right to access to the airwaves which

would require broadcasters to accept paid editorial an-

nouncements. Similarly, in Associates & Aldrich. Co. v.

Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971), the

court held that a newspaper could not be compelled to

accept and print advertising in the exact form submitted.

Yet another alleged right of access was denied in Avins

v. Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151

(3rd Cir. 1967), as the court upheld the refusal of law

review editors to accept a proffered article. These cases

demonstrate that the imposition of an affirmative duty

upon freedom of the press is not likely to be constitu-

tionally valid.

It remains to be determined whether the Florida ''right

of reply'’ statute is capable of overcoming the presumption

against its constitutional validity. NAB suggests that it

cannot. As discussed in Appellant's Jurisdictional State-

ment at 16-20, there are few clear objectives of the stat-

ute. One raises the issue of a state's interest in fair elec-

tions. This Court in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214

(1966), noted that:

Whatever differences may exist about in-

terpretations of the First Amendment, there

is practically universal agreement that a major

purpose of that Amendment was to protect

the free discussion of governmental affairs.

This of course includes discussions of candi-

dates, structures and forms of government,

the manner in which government is operated

or should be operated, and all such matters

relating to political processes .... Suppression

6

of the right of the press to praise or criticize

governmental agents and to clamor and con-

tend for or against change . . . muzzles one of

the very agencies the Framers of our Constitu-

tion thoughtfully and deliberately selected to

improve our society and keep it free. /d. at

218-19.

Thus, the Court invalidated a state criminal statute prohibit-

ing the solicitation of votes on election day.

Another purported objective of the Florida statute is

to counter alleged media concentration and monopoliza-

tion.’ Justice Douglas noted, in Columbia Broadcasting,

supra, that:

Of course there is private censorship in

the newspaper field. But for one publisher

who may suppress a fact, there are many who

will print it. But if the government is the

censor, administrative fiat not freedom of

choice carries the day. /d. at 153 (Douglas,

J., concurring).

7 But see statement by Thomas I. Emerson, a leading First

Amendment scholar:

"|. . any effort to solve the broader problems of

a monopoly press by forcing newspapers to cover

all ‘newsworthy’ events and print all viewpoints,

under the watchful eyes of petty public officials, is

likely to undermine such independence as the press

now shows without achieving any real diversity."

The System of Freedom of Expression (1970), p.

671.

Columbia Broadcasting, supra at 151 (Douglas, J., concurring).

7

Similarly, Justice Stewart noted that:

Even though it would be in the public

interest for the respondents’ advertisements

to be heard, it does not follow that the

publi¢ interest requires every broadcaster

to broadcast them. And it certainly does

not follow that the public interest would

be served by forcing every broadcaster to

accept any particular kind of advertising.

Id. at 144 (Stewart, J., concurring).

NAB respectfully suggests that the precedents clearly

mandate the invalidation of the Florida statute as an un-

justifiable encroachment upon the exercise of fundamental

First Amendment rights.®

Il. THE FLORIDA STATUTE IS CONSTITUTION-

ALLY INFIRM AND THE COURT NEED NOT

AND SHOULD NOT BASE ITS RULING ON A

REVISITATION OF ITS RED LION DECISION.

Implicit in the Appellant's arguments before the Court,

as evidenced in its Jurisdictional Statement, is a call for

8 What kind of First Amendment would best serve

our needs as we approach the 21st century may be

an open question. But the old fashioned First

Amendment that we have is the Court's only guide-

line; and one hard and fast principle which it an-

nounces is that government shall keep its hands

off the press.

Columbia Broadcasting, supra at 160 (Douglas, J., concurring).

8

the reaffirmation of Red Lion with its distinctions among the

various communications media in terms of First Amend-

ment protections.? NAB submits that this is not the

appropriate factual situation for revisiting that decision.

In the first place, the Florida statute here under review

should be interpreted within the narrow confines of the

First Amendment. As previously discussed, restraints

upon the free exercise of First Amendment rights bear

a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity.

Those which fail to assert a compelling interest capable

of overcoming that presumption are simply void.

A second reason for not revisiting Red Lion is that

the case before the Court involves newspapers and not

the broadcast media. Reliance upon that holding in this

case would serve to solidify Red Lion in the face of a

definite trend away from its holdings. If Red Lion is to

be revisited, it should be within the perspective of a set

of facts applicable to broadcasting and the fairness doc-

trine.

This Court noted in Red Lion that:

There is nothing in the First Amendment

which prevents the Government from requir-

ing a licensee to share his frequency with

others and to conduct himself as a proxy

9 Red Lion, supra at 386.

Although broadcasting is clearly a medium

affected by a First Amendment interest, (cita-

tion omitted) differences in the characteristics

of news media justify differences in the First

Amendment standards applied to them. (foot-

note and citation omitted).

9

or fiduciary with obligations to present those

views and voices which are representative of _

his community and which would otherwise,

by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.

Red Lion, supra at 389.

Despite attempts by some to interpret this language in its

broadest sense, this Court, in Columbia Broadcasting, re-

jected the claim that individuals and groups had a right

to purchase advertising time to comment on public issues:

The licensee policy challenged in this case

is ultimately related to the journalistic role

of a licensee for which it has been given

initial and primary responsibility by Congress.

The licensee's policy against accepting edi-

torial advertising cannot be examined as an

abstract proposition, but must be viewed in

the context of its journalistic role. Colum-

bia Broadcasting, supra at 118 (Burger, C.J.)

More important, as we have noted, Congress

has affirmatively indicated in the Communi-

cations Act that certain journalistic decisions

are for the licensee, subject only to the re-

strictions imposed by evaluation of its over-

all performance under the public interest

standard. /d at 120.

More profoundly, it would be anomalous

for us to hold, in the name of promoting

the constitutional guarantees of free expres-

sion, that the day-to-day editorial decisions

of broadcast licensees are subject to the kind

10

of restraints urged by respondents. To do

so in the name of the First Amendment

would be a contradiction. /d. at 120-121.

Thus, it seems apparent that the possible scope of the

Red Lion decision has been limited by Columbia Broad-

casting. Accordingly, any reliance upon Red Lion in

determining the rights of the parties in the instant case

would necessitate a step backwards in solidifying a decision

which has since become subject to some modification. As

was noted by Justice Stewart:

This Court was persuaded in Red Lion to

accept the Commission's view that a so-called

Fairness Doctrine was required by the unique

electronic limitations of broadcasting, at least

in the then-existing state of the art. Rightly

or wrongly, we there decided that broadcasters’

First Amendment rights were '‘abridgeable."

But surely this does not mean that those rights

are nonexistent. And even if all else where in

equipoise, and the decision of the issue before

us were finally to rest upon First Amendment

"values" alone, I could not agree with the

Court of Appeals. For if those "values" mean

anything, they should mean at least this: /f

we must choose whether editorial decisions are

to be made in the free judgment of individual

broadcasters, or imposed by bureaucratic fiat,

the choice must be for freedom. Columbia

Broadcasting, supra at 146 (emphasis added).

(Stewart, J., concurring).

NAB further opposes a revisiting of Red Lion at this

time because it is apparent that the fairness doctrine, as

embodied in that case, is likely to come under scrutiny

11

in the future. Justice Douglas, for one, has stated with re-

spect to Red Lion that:

I did not participate in that decision and,

with all respect, would not support it. The

Fairness Doctrine has no place in our First

Amendment regime. Columbia Broadcasting,

supra at 154 (Douglas, J., concurring).

In Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., Chief

Judge Bazelon, in his dissenting opinion, questioned not

only the application of the fairness doctrine to station

WXUR, but also challenged certain of the precepts upon

which the doctrine is founded. Thus, he stated that:

. . . abridgement of individual rights may be

tolerated only when in the long run it en-

hances the right of the public to receive

access to the marketplace of diverse views.

Obviously this requires a delicate balancing:

any harm to private rights must be out-

weighed by benefit to the public. (foot-

note omitted). /d at 66 (Bazelon, C. J.,

dissenting).

In considering the WXUR matter he noted that the im-

position of the fairness doctrine did not serve to enhance

access to the marketplace of diverse views:

WXUR was no doubt devoted to a particu-

lar religious and political philosophy; but

it was also a radio station devoted to speak-

ing out and stirring debate on controversial

issues. (footnote om.) The station was

purchased by Faith Theological Seminary

10 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

12

to propogate a viewpoint which was not

being heard in the greater Philadelphia area.

The record is clear that through its inter-

view and call-in shows it did offer a variety

of opinions on a broad range of public issues;

and that it never refused to lend its broadcast

facilities to spokesmen of conflicting viewpoints.

(footnote om.).

The Commission's strict rendering of fairness

requirements, as developed in its decision, (foot-

note om.) has removed WXUR from the air.

This has deprived the listening public not only

of a viewpoint but also of robust debate on in-

numerable controversial issues. It is beyond

dispute that the public has /ost access to infor-

mation and ideas. /d. at 69 (Bazelon, C.J., dis-

senting).

Recognizing that the fairness doctrine is premised upon

the scarcity of frequencies concept,'! Judge Bazelon sug-

gested that the time was ripe for a thorough review of

the doctrine in light of the current state of broadcast

technology:

Whether in this case the Commission has

simply taken the doctrine too far or applied

it too rigidly, or whether the trouble lies

deeper, cannot be determined without a re-

mand. . . . Do fairness policies truly pro-

mote a marketplace of uninhibited, wide

and robust debate? (footnote om.) It is

11 Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Gov-

ernment is permitted to put restraints on licensees in

favor of others whose views should be expressed on

this unique medium.

Red Lion, supra at 389.

13

proper that this court urge the Commission

to reconsider this case in light of its fairness

hearings; that we encourage the Commission

to draw back and consider whether time and

technology have so eroded the necessity for

governmental imposition of fairness obliga-

tions that the doctrine has come to defeat

its purposes in a variety of circumstances;

that we ask whether an alternative does

not suggest itself — whether, as with printed

press, more freedom for the individual broad-

caster would enhance, rather than retard, the

public's right to a marketplace of ideas. /d.

at 79-80 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).

Moreover, similar concerns have recently been expressed

by Senator Sam Ervin, a leading constitutional authority

and respected member of the United States Senate. Dis-

cussing the same WXUR case, he stated:

The underlying rationale of the fairness

' doctrine is that since broadcasting outlets

are so scarce, they must be regulated to

insure balanced presentations of contro-

versial issues. This is one assumption which

can no longer be accepted without challenge.

As of March 1973, there were a total of

7,399 radio stations broadcasting in this

country. This compares with a total of

1,761 daily newspapers in circulation ... .

Most Americans, wherever they are situated,

can receive numerous radio signals, and us-

ually this means they can hear competing

views. In Dr. Mclntire's case, while WXUR

was the sole radio station in Media, Pa., the

town was located in the greater Philadelphia

14

broadcasting area within the range of a my-

riad radio signals. . . . It is safe to say

that the public in the Philadelphia area had

a great variety of "respectable" views to lis-

ten to, but only from WXUR could it hear

challenges to those views. !?

As a remedy to this intolerable situation, Senator Ervin

suggests that the fairness doctrine be operative only where

there is present a scarcity of available radio signals. He

would presume scarcity only in a locality served by less

than four broadcasting signals or where competing views _

are in fact not being aired.'3

The Senator's scheme may never be adopted, but his

concern evidences a growing trend both in the courts, in

the Congress and in the FCC itself that the fairness doc-

trine be subjected to further scrutiny. Accordingly, NAB

respectfully submits that in light of that apparent trend,

the principles of Red Lion respecting application of the

doctrine to broadcasters should not be further encrusted

in precedents set by this Court in the instant case.

12 119 Cong. Rec. (reprint of daily ed. Nov. 14, 1973) at 2.

13 Yq, at 3.

15

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, NAB respectfully urges the

Court to declare the Florida "right of reply" statute un-

constitutional as an abridgement of the First Amendment.

Moreover, we call upon the Court to so rule without re-

affirming its holdings in Red Lion.

Respectfully submitted,

National Association of Broadcasters

1771 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20003

202-293-3560

JOHN B. SUMMERS

Counsel

BRENDA L. FOX

February 28, 1974 Of Counsel

16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of the foregoing Mo-

tion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Ami-

cus Curiae of the National Association of Broadcasters

have been served this day by mail upon each of the

following:

Richard M. Schmidt

Martin J. Gaynes

Ian D. Volner

Cohen & Marks

1920 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Of Counsel for Appellant

Daniel P. S. Paul

James W. Beasley, Jr.

Paul & Thomson

1300 First National Bank Building

Miami, Florida 33131

Counsel for Appellant, The Miami Herald

Publishing Company

Jerome A. Barron

Professor at Law

The National Law Center

George Washington University

720 - 20th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

Counsel for Appellee, Pat L. Tornillo, Jr.

17

Tobias Simon

Tobias, Simon & Elizabeth Du Fresne

Suite 208

1492 South Miami Avenue

Miami, Florida 33130

Counsel for Appellee, Pat L. Tornillo, Jr.

Lawrence E. Walsh

1 Chase Manhattan Plaza

New York, New York 10005

Attorney for Reporters Committee for Freedom

of the Press Legal Defense and Research Fund,

Art Buchwald, Horace G. Davis, Jr., James J.

Kilpatrick, Anthony Lewis, Robert D. Novak,

Carl T. Rowan, Hugh Sidey, Thomas G. Wicker,

and Jules J. Witcover

Kirkland & Ellis

130 E. Randolph Drive

Suite 2800

Chicago, Illinois 60601

Attorneys for Chicago Tribune Co. Gore News-

papers Co. and Sentinel Co.

Patterson, Belknap & Webb

One Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

Attorneys for Dow, Jones & Company, Inc.

Harry A. Inman

1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Attorney for The New York Times Company

18

Townley, Updike, Carter & Rodgers

220 East 42nd Street

New York, New York 10017

Attorneys for New York News, Inc.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher

515 South Flower Street

Los Angeles, California 90071

Counsel for The Times Mirror Company

Wi"iams, Connolly & Califano

100 Hill Building

Washington, D.C. 20006

Attorneys for The Washington Post Company

Melvin L. Wulf

22 East 40th Street

New York, New York 10016

Attorney for American Civil Liberties Union

Arthur B. Hanson

888 Seventeenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

Attorney for The American Newspaper Publish

Association

/s/ Gwendolyn B.

Gwendolyn B.

2 tri