Amicus Curiae Brief — Geduldig v. Aiello

ee

2.

>a

Page

interest of the Amici Curiae 2

— 10

Siveis: Case Should Be Dieaieed as Moot Titobir

as It Concerns Appellees Aiello, Armendariz

and Johnson 10

Il.

The Statute Challenged Here Is Valid if It

Meets the Standards Enunciated in Reed v.

Reed and Cleveland Board of Education v.

LeFleur 14

A. The Statute Challenged Here Does Not

Deny the Equal Protection of the Laws

if the Classification It Creates Is Reason-

able, Not Arbitrary and Has a Fair and

Substantial Relation to the Object of the

Legislation 14

B. The Statute Challenged Here Does Not

Deny Due Process of Law if the Classi-

fication It Creates Does Not Needlessly,

Arbitrarily or Capriciously Impinge Upon

Constitutional Liberties 22

Il.

Denial of Maternity Benefits Under the Califor-

nia Unemployment Insurance Code Is a Rea-

Normal Gestation and Delivery Is Not a Sick-

ness or Injury 25

ii.

IV.

The Exclusion of Maternity Benefits From Dis-

ability Insurance Coverage Is _ Rationally

Based, Free From Invidious Discrimination,

Serves a Legitimate Governmental Pur-

Age’ TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

ae Cases Page

Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F.Supp. 792 (N.D.Cal:

4973) 10, 41

Boyee v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 402

(DDC. 1972) 21

avo v. Board of Education of City of Chicago,

“445 FSupp. 155 (N.D.IIL 1972) .......... 15, 19, 20

Clark vy. California Employment Stabilization Com-

“mission, 166 Cal.App.2d 326, 332 P.2d. 716

(1958) 11, 26, 44, 45

Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 42

US.L.W. 4186 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974) ....14, 22, 23

24, 31, 33, 35, 47

Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 474

F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973), rewd, Cleveland

Board of Education v. La Fleur, 42 U.S.L.W. .

4186 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974) 33, 34

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ..35, 37

40, 47

Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S.

412 (1972) 13

Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d

1115 (D.C.Cir. 1973) 21

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) ..18, 22

Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) ..... 14

Green v. Waterford Board of Education, 473. F.2d

629 (2d Cir. 1973) 15

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) duiesecnealagl 14

Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.

1968), cert. den. 393 U.S. 982 (1968) _....15, 16

19, 22

tien v. Hutt, No. 42826 (Wash. December 20,

; 1973) 23

Page

Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) ....37, 4

41, 47

Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Civil Action

No. 15681 (N.D.Ga. Dec. 31, 1973) -........ 31, 33

New York State Department of Social Services v.

Dublino, 41 U.S.L.W. 5047 (U.S. June 21,

1973) 40, 41, 47

Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)

18

Rafford v. Randle Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc.,

348 F.Supp. 316 (S.D.Fla. 1972) 20, 21

Reed v. ‘Reed, 404 US. xg dei. 2} Gt eee 14, 16

18, 20, 22, 34, 35, 47

Rentzer v. California Unemployment Insurance Ap-

peals Board, 32 Cal.App.3d 604, 108 Cal-Rptr.

336 (1973) 11, 13, 26, 45

Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) -...... 0

v. San Antonio Independent School Dis-

trict, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 15

Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission, 459

F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409 US.

1107 (1973) 15

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)

Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372

(9th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded, 409

U.S. 1071 (1973) 15

Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 409 U.S. 1071

(1973), vacating and remanding, 460 F.2d 1372 |

(9th Cir. 1971)

13

United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) ....... @

—-

Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., Civil Ac

tion No. 72-169 (W.D.Pa. Jan..9, 1974) .

Statutes Page

Labor Code § 3201

California Unemployment Insurance Code

"§ 2601 (West, 1972) 25, 35

California Unemployment Insurance Code

a 2626 (West, 1972) -............... 10, 11, 12, 13, 26

California Unemployment Insurance Code :

'§ 2626, ch. 1026, § 2 (1973), 6 Deering’s Cali-

fornia Codes Annotated, Advance Legislative

“Service, pp. 1936-1937 12, 19, 21

24, 25, 34, 35, 43, 47

California Unemployment Insurance Code

§ 2626.2, ch. 1026, § 3 (1973), 6 Deering’s

California Codes Annotated, Advance Legislative

- Service, p. 1937, 1973 12, 19, 21

24, 34, 35, 47

California Unemployment Insurance Code

-§ 100 (West, 1972) 46

California Unemployment Insurance Code

§ 2708 (West, 1972) 25

California Unemployment Insurance Code

§ 3251 (West, 1972) 2

California Unemployment Insurance Code

§ 3254 (West, 1972) 2, 3, 5

California Unemployment Insurance Code

$ 3260 (West, 1972) 4

California Welfare and Institutions Code

$§ 11200 (West, 1972) .. 46

California Welfare and Institutions Code

§§ 12000 (West, 1972) 46

vi.

Page

California Welfare and Institutions Code

§§ 12500 (West, 1972) 46

Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-. 32

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 415(b)(3) 15

Constituti

Amendment 10, 16, 34, 3%

Miscellaneous

California Department of Social Welfare

Manual ef Policies and Procedures,

44-213.3 46

California Senate Journal, June 23, 1946 -....... 3

J. McKinlay, The Sick Role—Iliness and

Pregnancy, 6 Social Sci. & Medimine 561

(1972) 27, 28, 29, 31

Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant, Appendix C.. 13

Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant,

Appendix D 13, 27

Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant,

Appendix E 13

Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant,

Appendix I 11]

N. Sinai, Disability Compensation for the

Disabled Sick (1949) 3

Rules

Rules of Supreme Court of the United States, Rule

42 1

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1973

No. 73-640

DWIGHT GEDULDIG,

‘ Appellant,

vs.

CAROLYN AIELLO, individually and on behalf of all others

_ Appellant,

we ‘“

AUGUSTINA D. ARMENDARIZ, ELIZABETH B. JOHN-

SON, JACQUELINE JARAMILLO, individually and on

-- behalf of all other women similarly situated,

Consolidated Cases on Appeal From the United States District

Court for the Northern District of California.

| Bei of Merchants and Manatactarers Association, |

et al., as Amici Curiae.

“This Brief Amici Curiae in support of the position

of the Appellant is filed with the consent of all par-

ties," as provided in Rule 42 of the Rules of this

ome

Interest of the Amici Curiae.

the Federated Employers of the Bay Area (hereinafter

the “Associations”) are organizations representing the

interests of employers and groups of employers in the

State of California. The Associations each represent

the interests of hundreds of employers of varying sizes

and in diverse industries. Some member employers have

as few as one employee;’ others employ many thoe

sands.

Southern California Edison Company, Union Oi

Company of California, and Pacific Mutual Life Insur-

ance Company (hereinafter the “Employers”) are em-

ployers within the State of California, and as such, are

subject to the disability insurance provisions of the Cal

ifornia Unemployment Insurance Code (hereinafter

sometimes referred to as the “Code”).

Section 3251 of the California Unemployment Inser-

ance Code provides that where an employer or th

one filed pursuant to jon 3255, as to which he

that there is at least one employee in and ail

following exist:

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ig .

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must find that the voluntary plan will provide greater

benefits to covered employees than they would receive

through. the State Disability Fund and that a majority

of the persons employed by the employer in California

or a majority of the persons employed at one of the -

employer’s business establishments in the State has

consented to the plan. The Director must also find that

the employer has agreed to make any payroll deduc-

tions required by the plan.

Section 3260 of the California Unemployment Insur-

ance Code permits an employer to assume all or part

of the expense of providing the disability insurance coy-

erage afforded by the voluntary plan. While the em

ployer is permitted to make deductions from employeey

wages to finance the plan, the amount of such de

ductions may not be higher than the deductions the

employees would pay if they were paying contributions

to the Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund

administered by the State.

Each of the Employers, and many of the companies

represented by the Associations, maintains an ap

proved voluntary plan of disability insurance. Many

California employers pay all or most of the costs of

such voluntary plans. Many voluntary plans are part of

comprehensive health and welfare programs main-

tained for the benefit of the employees, and such

health and welfare programs are often established by |

collective bargaining contracts between the employer

and one or more labor unions. The employer's mait-

tenance of benefits under such a voluntary plan may

be compelled by the collective bargaining contract. Fur

ther, the collective bargaining contract may require the

employer to pay all or part of the cost of disability

insurance under the voluntary plan, or it may forbid

ae

tions even where such contributions could otherwise be

jacreased pursuant to the provisions of the California

Upemployment Insurance Code. Therefore, the em-

ployer may be unable to discontinue its voluntary plan

of to increase its employees’ contributions to the plan

the plan increase far beyond the levels foreseen at the

time of negotiating the collective bargaining contract.

Since, pursuant to Section 3254 of the Code, the

benefits provided by each voluntary plan must be great-

ef-than those provided by the State Disability Fund,

‘voluntary plans of disability insurance will be required

to provide maternity benefits if the state program is re-

quired to provide such benefits. The Employers and

the Associations have a substantial interest in seeing

are held to a fiscally responsible level because, as bene-

fits rise, the expenses of employers who pay all or part

of the costs of their voluntary plans may also rise. |

_ Southern California Edison Company (hereinafter

“Edison”) employs more than 13,000 persons in Cali-

fornia, and it maintains a voluntary plan which is part

of a comprehensive, integrated health and welfare pro-

gram. The program includes retirement benefits, group

pendents, and a stock purchase plan as well as the

voluntary plan of disability insurance. Edison’s disabil-

ity insurance plan provides benefits far in excess of

‘those mandated by the California Unemployment In-

surance Code." In 1972 the total cost of Edison’s dis-

oP :

'. "Employees with less than 6 months of seniority with Edison

‘seetive a weekly benefit while disabled of 110 percent of the

ee (This footnote is continued on next page)

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dil

ability insurance plan was $5,431,653, ‘and employee

contributions to the plan amounted to $1,036,283 of

In 1972, 13 Edison employees terminated their em

ployment due to pregnancy, and another 31 employees

By 1973 the cost of Edison’s voluntary plan had risen

to approximately $6,150,000, and employee contribu

tions to the plan amounted to approximately $1,150,

000 or 18.7 percent of the total cost.

employees who took pregnancy leave, 22 terminated

their employment at the conclusion of the leave of ab

about 19.07 percent of the total cost of the program.

took leaves of absence due to pregnancy.‘ Of the 31

sence,® and only 9 returned to work. The average

length of the leaves of absence was 4.8 months. if

Edison’s disability insurance program had afforded ma

a it it

Ui

poe meat eet ane

He

hik a

i

ng: FR

@ the program would have been increased by approxi-

mately $127,000. If the average length of leaves of

absence due to pregnancy increased to 6 months,‘ the

additional cost to the program for the 44 pregnancies

would have been approximately $150,000.

*Union Oil Company of California (hereinafter “Un-

jon”) employs approximately 5,700 persons in the State.

Union’s voluntary plan of disability insurance is part

of an integrated plan of health and welfare benefits

imadequate to support the plan if maternity benefits

were also provided. For the two-year period from 1972

through 1973, Union’s disability program cost approxi-

silinae

leave during 1972 and 1973 had been eligible for

maternity benefits under Union’s disability program,

the cost of the program would have been increased by

approximately $234,361 or about 24.5 percent.

Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company (hereinafter

“Pacific Mutual”) employs approximately 1,500 per.

sons in California. Pacific Mutual's voluntary plan of

tual’s voluntary plan of disability insurance cost $124,

571 during the two-year period from 1972 through

gi Soe

5 9.

Sete

dee to pregnancy and 16 other employees took leaves

‘of absence due to pregnancy. The average pregnancy

feave of absence was 3.2 months. If the 42 women

who took leaves of absence or terminated their em-

ployment due to pregnancy during 1972 and 1973

had been entitled to maternity benefits under Pacific

Mutual’s voluntary plan of disability insurance, $42,-

806, or about 34.4 percent, would have been added

to the cost of the program.” et

signed to protect workers against sickness and injury

may constitutionally exclude provision of maternity

benefits for normal, uncomplicated pregnancies.

lnenin would ferosee the costs of their Goabiiky insurance plaes

do not take into consideration the increased cost which could

SaaS

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Dackrnty tesctis sft contrivoting Whic’ i say, fonds ¥

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ceaDeics

ARGUMENT.

I.

This Case Should Be Dismissed as Moot Insofar as it

Concerns Appellees Aiello, Armendariz and Jom

son.

Former Section 2626 of the California Unemploy-

ment Insurance Code provided that disability benefits

were not available for injury or illness caused by or

arising in connection with pregnancy prior to 28 days

after the termination of such pregnancy.” The Dis

trict Court held that the third sentence of this provision

deprived appellees of the equal protection of the laws

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con

stitution of the United States. Aiello v. Hansen, 359

F.Supp. 792 (N.D.Cal. 1973). Appellant was enjoined

from refusing to grant disability insurance benefits on

account of the third sentence of Section 2626 and in

structed to reconsider the applications of each of the

appellees and grant them such benefits as they would

have been entitled to receive without regard for that

Armendariz suffered a miscarriage. While this case was

1 § 2626. What ‘disability_or ‘disabled’ includes |

California Unemp. Ins. Code § 2626 (West, 1972).

ee

eetintser ¥. California Unemployment Insurance Ap-

pels Board, 32 Cal.App.3d 604, 108 Cal-Rptr. 336

“Petitioner Rentzer had suffered an ectopic preg-

fancy and, as a result, had been unable to work for six

weeks. When, pursuant to the third sentence of former

Section 2626, she was denied benefits for the first 28

former Section 2626 of the Code should apply only

to maternity benefits, that is, benefits for normal, up-

changes. As a result, women otherwise eligible for dis-

“om, 166 Cal App 24 326, 332 P.2d Pod 6 (1958). See hoe

woes, infra.

= one

of. Appellant, Appendix I at 49-50. Appellees Aiello,

Armendariz and Johnson each received full di

pregnancy. :

On. October 1, 1973, Assembly Bill 809 was signed

into law; it became effective on January 1, 1974”

3 = —13—

‘=Appelices Aiello, Armendariz and Johnson and all

others similarly situated were, due to the decision of

the California Court of Appeal in Rentzer, made eligi-

ble for full disability benefits prior to the rendering

of the District Court decision in the instant case. Subse-

quent to the Rentzer decision the Department of Hu-

man Resources Development provided administratively

for the payment of such benefits to persons’ such as

Appellees Aiello, Armendariz and Johnson, and each

of said Appellees was fully compensated for her injury.

Finally, such benefits are now expressly provided to

such persons by statute. Therefore, Appellees Aiello,

Armendariz and Johnson and other women similarly

situated have no interest in the continuation of this

case in this Court. Having obtained eligibility for full

disability benefits and having received such benefits,

their cases have become moot and should be remanded

to the District Court for dismissal. Diffenderfer v. Cen-

tral Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412 (1972). If not dis-

missed, these cases should be vacated and remanded

for consideration of the mootness issue. Struck v. Secre-

tary of Defense, 409 U.S. 1071 (1973), vacating and

remanding, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1971).”

iniclilleies

employment Insurance Code, an insurance program

designed only to assist ill and injured workers. The

District Court failed to realize the crucial distinction

ee ee ny bee

Colitetale: dichinn:uht-to-cnpnetennine fits under

its disability insurance program. The remainder of this

of that decision of the California State Legislature.

IL.

The Statute Challenged Here Is Valid if It Meets the

Standards Enunciated in Reed v. Reed’‘ and Cleve

land Board of Education v. LaFleur.”

A. The Statute Challenged Here Does Not Deny the Equi

Protection of the Laws if the Classification It Creates i

Reasonable, Not Arbitrary and Has a Fair and Substanéal

Relafion to the Object of the Legisiation.

Legislation based upon suspect classifications or con-

cerning fundamental interests is subject to strict jud-

cial scrutiny and will be found to deny the equal pro

tection of the laws unless it can be shown that such

legislation is necessitated by a compelling governmental

interest. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-

372 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).

es eit ee ee ee

4404 US. 71 (1971). See pages 16-18, infra. :

1542 US.L.W. 4186 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974). See pages 2%

infra. 3

neyo

BS

lll.

ite edad catia mabiele Be

upheld unless it is shown that the legislation bears no

rational relationship to a legitimate governmental pur-

pose. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School

District, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

Recent decisions both of this Court and of the lower

valid if they are reasonable, nonarbitrary, and rest

upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-

stantial relation to the object of the legislation. See

Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission, 459 F.

2d 32, 40-41 (Sth Cir. 1972); Green v. Waterford

Board of Education, 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973);

Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th

Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded, 409 US. 1071

(1973); Bravo v. Board of Education of City of Chi-

cago, 345 F.Supp. 155 (N.D_Iil. 1972).

In Gruenwald vy. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.

1968), cert. den. 393 U.S. 982 (1968), the plaintiff, a

male, challenged as unconstitutional a portion of the

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3). com-

plained that, due to the statutory scheme of computing

benefits, he received only $80.50 per month while a

woman with a history of equal earnings would receive

ee ee ee eee ene Be eeenee

orision, stnting-

“It is only the uvihoigs Gietrlastantion? or the

classification which is ‘patently arbitrary [and]

utterly lacking in rational justification’ which is

barred by either the ‘due process’ or ‘equal pro-

1 tection’ clauses. * * *

_ “There is here a reasonable relationship be-

tween the objective sought by the classification,

saints

which is to reduce the disparity between the eco

nomic and physical capabilities of a man and 4

woman—and the means used to achieve that ob

jective in affording to women more favorable

benefit computations. ‘There is, moreover, nothing

._- arbitrary or unreasonable about the application of

the principle underlying the statutory differences in

the computations for men and women. Notwith

standing the favorable treatment granted to women

in computing their benefits, the average monthly

- payments to men retiring at age 62 still exceeds

those awarded women retiring at that age. * * *

“[T he trend of authority makes it clear that the

variation in amounts of retirement benefits based

upon differences in the attributes of men and

women is constitutionally valid. * * *”

Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591, 592

593.

as sexually discriminatory is violative of the Equal Pro-

tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only 7

such legislation creates arbitrary, unreasonable classi-

fications which do not have a fair and substantial re-

lation to the object of the legislation. Reed v. Reed,

404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, this Court invalidated

an Idaho statute which gave mandatory preference for

appointment as administrator of a decedent’s estate to

a male applicant over an equally qualified female ap

plicant. Referring to the standard of review required

_ by the Equal Protection Clause, the Court said:

“In applying that clause, this Court has consis

tently recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment

does not deny to States the power to treat differ

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«ent classes of persons in different ways. Barbier v

-» Connolly, 113 US 27, 28 L Ed 923,5S@

357 (1885); Lindsley v Natural Carbonic Gas

Co., 220 US 61, 55 L. Ed. 369, 31 S Ct. 337

_ (1911); Railway Express Agency v New York,

336 US 106, 93 L Ed. 533, 69 S Ct 463 (1949);

“McDonald v Board of Election Commissioners,

394 US 802, 22 L Ed 2d 739, 89 S Ct 1404

~ (1969). The Equal Protection Clause of that

amendment does, however, deny to States the

power to legislate that different treatment be ac-

- corded to persons placed by a statute into differ-

ent classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated

to the objective of that statute. A classification

‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest

upon some ground of difference having a fair and

substantial relation to the object of the legislation,

so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall

be treated alike.’ Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,

253 US 412, 415, 64 L Ed 989, 990, 40 S Ct 560

(1920). The question presented by this case, then,

is whether a difference in the sex of competing

applicants for letters of administration bears a

rational relationship to a state objective that is

sought to be advanced by the operation of §§ 15-

312 and 15-314.

s+ + = 8

“The objective of § 15-312 clearly is to establish

degrees of entitlement of various classes of persons

in accordance with their varying degrees and kinds

of relationship to the imtestate. Regardless of their

sex, persons within any one of the enumerated

~~ Classes of that section are similarly situated with

respect to that objective. By providing dissimilar

aan

—18—

treatment for men and women who are thus sim:

larly situated, the challenged section violates the

Equal Protection Clause. [Citation omitted. ]”

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77.

Thus, in Reed, a case involving a statute which provid.

ed dissimilar treatment for males and females who were

similarly situated, this Court found it unnecessary to

apply the strict scrutiny required where suspect classifi.

Cations or fundamental interests are involved."*

In Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972),

this Court struck down as violative of the Equal Pro

tection Clause a municipal ordinance which made an

- icin dictiantion 1 labor picketing sad

other peaceful picketing. In so doing, the Court ind:

cated that the standard enunciated in Reed is of broad

liability:

“As in all equal protection cases, however, the

crucial question is whether there is an appropriate

governmental interest suitably furthered by the dif-

ferential treatment. See Reed v Reed, 404 US 71,

75-77, 30 L Ed 2d 225, 229, 230, 92 S Ct 251

(1971); Weber v Aetna Casualty Co., 406 US

164, 31 L Ed 2d 768, 92 S Ct 1400 (1972);

Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 335, 31 L Ed

2d 274, 280, 92 S Ct 995 (1972).”

Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95.

Even if sex is held to be a suspect classification whea,

as in Reed and Frontiero, the legislation under review

ie

discriminates between males and females similarly situ-

ated, the compelling state interest test is inappropriate

in the instant case because Sections 2626 and 2626.2

of the California Unemployment Insurance Code do

not create a Classification based on sex. Those sections

do not afford different treatment to women than they

do to men. By treating maternity differently than illness

or injury, they merely create rational, nonarbitrary

classifications among the members of a single sex.”

This distinction was recognized in Bravo v. Board of

Education of City of Chicago, 345 F Supp. 155 (N.D.

Ill. 1972), where the court granted a preliminary injunc-

tion enjoining enforcement of a maternity leave policy

which established rigid periods of mandatory leave for

pregnant school teachers. The court concluded that the

—_

made by the mandatory leave policy as betweea

teachers who are required to stop working during

their sixth and subsequent months of pregnancy

and for two months thereafter, and all other teach-

ers. The second distinction drawn into question is

that made between teachers on maternity leave and

those absent from duty on other types of leaves,

These obviously do not involve criteria that cap

be characterized as suspect. * * * ”

Bravo v. Board of Education of City of Chicago,

345 S.Supp. 155, 157.

Citing Reed, the court concluded that:

“[T]he traditional standard is applicable here,

with the burden upon the plaintiff to show that

the classifications in the Board’s maternity leave

policy are arbitrary and unreasonable and not

based upon grounds of difference having a far

and substantial relation to a legitimate object of

the Board.”

Bravo v. Board of Education of City of Chi-

cago, 345 F.Supp. 155, 157.

In Rafford v. Randle Eastern Ambulance Service,

Inc., 348 F.Supp. 316 (S.D.Fla. 1972), a case involy-

ing a charge of sex discrimination by male employees

discharged due to their unkempt beards and mustaches,

the court held:

“Virtually all Title VII violations fit an equal

protection definition of sex. discrimination—dissim-

ilar treatment for similarly situated men and wom

Sy Os Oe testes be Sales oe,

Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77, . =z

sss ft

wy?

pos. ae

=: “The discharge of pregnant women or bearded

--»» men does not violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964

_» simply because only women become pregnant and

= only men grow beards. In neither instance are

similarly situated persons of the opposite sex fa-

vored. These cases are perhaps more properly con-

"sidered under the rubric of Cooper v. Delta Air

_ Lines, Inc., 274 F.Supp. 781 (E.D.La. 1967),

- that discrimination between different categories

of the same sex is not unlawful discrimination by

sex. This is a case of discrimination in favor of

men who shave off their beards and moustaches.

It does not involve proscribed sex discrimination.”

Rafford v. Randle Eastern Ambulance Service,

Inc., 348 F.Supp. 316, 320.

Accord, Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.

2d 1115 (D.C.Cir. 1973); Boyce vy. Safeway Stores,

Inc., 351 F.Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1972).

_ The portion of the California Unemployment Insur-

maternity benefits shall not be paid under California’s

disability insurance program. Therefore, it denies bene-

fits only to certain members of the female sex. Sections

2626 and 2626.2 of the Code create two classifications

of women: those who have normal pregnancies and

those who do not have normal pregnancies. All women

fancy, normal or abnormal, is a condition unique to

the female sex, Sections 2626 and 2626.2 do not treat

ey fiw

Be AY

~~

not be subjected to the compelling state interest test

even if that test is adopted for cases involving legisla

tion, such as that invalidated in Reed and Frontiero,

ee ene Unie tao oom

in a disparate manner.

B. The Statute Challenged Here Docs Not Deny Dee Precen

of Law if the Classification It Creates Does Not Needlessiy,

Arbitrarily or Capriciously Impinge Upon Constitution

Liberties.

- The exclusion of maternity benefits from coverage

under California’s disability insurance program does

not deny due process of law to pregnant workers. In

Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1968),

cert. den. 393 U.S..982 (1968), the court observed:

Gruenwald vy. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591, 592.

The principles of due process enunciated in Gruen

wald have recently been reiterated by this Court. In

Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 42 US.LM.

4186 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974), this Court held that school *

board regulations which required pregnant teachers to

commence unpaid maternity leave several months before

the expected birth of the child created an irrebuttable

presumption that all pregnant teachers became physical

- ly unable to perform their duties at a prescribed time

“[S}uch rules must not needlessly, arbitrarily, or

capriciously impinge upon this vital area of a

teacher's constitutional liberty. The question be-

fore us in these cases is whether the interests ad-

and Chesterfield County School Boards can justi-

fy the particular procedures they have adopted.”

Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 42

US._L.W. 4186, 4189.

Finding that the school boards’ regulations denied preg-

nant teachers the due process of law, the Court held:

_.%in Hanson v. Hutt, No. 42826 (Wash., Dec. 20, 1973),

_ fhe Washington Supreme Court held violative of the Equal

(This footnote is continued on next page)

—~-24—

. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 42

US.L.W. 4186, 4190, 4191.

Thus, the exclusion of maternity benefits from coverage

under California’s disability insurance program does not

deny due process of law if it bears a rational relation-

ship to a valid state interest and does not needlessly,

and 2626.2 do not needlessly, arbitrarily or capricious-

ly- impinge upon any area of constitutional: liberty nor

do they create-any irrebuttable presumptions which pe-

nalize women for choosing to bear a child. Those sec-

tions merely create a classification of a type which

—25—

Nas Ill.

_ employment Insurance Code Is a Reasonable, Non-

- » and Delivery Is Not a Sickness or Injury.

»-Section 2601 of the California Unemployment In-

surance Code states that the purpose of the Code is to

compensate “in part” for the wages lost by individuals

unemployed by “sickness or injury.” Similarly, Section

2626 defines “disability” to include “both mental or

physical illness and mental or physical injury.””

~ Under California’s disability insurance program,

benefits are provided for legitimate sickness or injury,

—26— 3

The California courts have recognized the distinc.

for the sick and injured. In Clark v. California Employ.

ment Stabilization Commission, 166 Cal.App.2d 326,

332 P.2d 716 (1958), plaintiff attacked former Sec.

tion 2626 of the California Unemployment Insurance

Code claiming that that provision subjected her to an

arbitrary classification, deprived her of the equal pro-

tection of the laws, and denied her due process of law.

The court upheld Section 2626 stating:

“The purpose of the unemployment disability pro-

gram is to afford relief to employees sustaining

loss of wages on account of illness, and not to con-

fer maternity benefits. * * *

“Also, it should be noted that the statute con-

fines relief to loss on account of illness or injury.

ss”

Clark v. California Employment Stabilization

Commission, 166 Cal.App.2d 326, 332 P.2d

716, 719.

In Rentzer,™ the court again recognized the distinc-

tion between maternity benefits and benefits of the type

which California’s disability insurance program was

designed to provide. The court based its holding that

oe Sree ee eee 2 Sey Eels eo

fact het,

. Rentzer’s disability was not an ordinary

ssulhcilee Mehta tig saeetoatite ora

recuperation from sotmal. gettetion and dcliver,

sss”

Rentzer v. California Dnsiielcsiiend tana

Appeals Board, 32 Cal.App.2d 604, 601,

108 Cal.Rptr. 336. se

*1See page 11, supra. . o

ee —27—

Judge Williams, in his dissent from the District

Court's denial of Appellant’s Motion to Reconsider and

Set Aside Summary Judgment, noted that pregnancy

cannot be considered a sickness or injury:

_ “If the majority looks upon a normal, healthy

pregnancy as a mental or physical illness or in-

jury, then I believe it has gone a long way in es-

tablishing a more offensive stereotype than any

previously feared by plaintiffs. If the majority has

chosen imstead to characterize pregnancy as a

‘physical or mental condition’ (§ 2626, second sen-

tence, emphasis added) having nothing to do with

injury or illness, it does so only by ignoring the

obvious coloring of the definition of ‘condition’

lent by the ‘injury’ and ‘illness’ language of the

first sentence. And if this is the court’s holding,

then it has bestowed upon women workers in

California a maternity insurance program never

Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant, Appen-

dix D at 33.

The distinction between maternity and sickness or in-

jury is consistent with medical opinion and with the

way in which our society views the condition of preg-

nancy. In J. McKinlay, The Sick Role—lIliness and

Pregnancy, 6 Social Sci. & Medicine 561 (1972),

the author concludes that normal pregnancy, consisting

“resulting obstetric or delivery complications”, is not an

illness and is not considered as such in American so-

—23— | |

ciety. Mr. McKinlay first notes that pregnancy is, un-

like illness, a normal condition because:

“Firstly, pregnancy can be considered statistical __

ly normal in that most of the population of pos

sible conceivers at some time (usually several

times) are in this state. One cannot claim that iF

nesses, like cancer, coronary thrombosis or pnev-

monia, are ‘normal in this sense. Most of the

population at risk do not develop heart and res.

piratory conditions or become afflicted with can-

cer. Indeed, if they did, these states would most

likely be considered as ‘facts of life’ or ‘natural

vicissitudes’ (as is pregnancy) rather than as il

ness conditions.

“Secondly, pregnancy can quite reasonably be

considered ‘normal’ in the sense that it is a

. mecessary biological function for the survival of

~ the species. Its importance is manifest in the fact

that society mobilizes financial and manpower re-

sources to ensure that those who are in this state

do not develop complications and become sick.

Illness can never be viewed in the same way as a

in some forms it can even jeopardize survival.

“Thirdly, pregnancy can be considered ‘normaf

because it is often thought to be a desirable state

of affairs. For instance, one often congratulates

a women [sic] when one finds out that she és

‘expecting’. On the other hand, women who

not conceive are often considered to be in some

ways abnormal and sanctions, often in the form

of stigma, are applied. ;

—29...

“Tiiness is defined as having two related as-

volve both these aspects at some time. It differs

from illness, however, to the extent that it calls

forth in both the woman, and her significant

ot others, a set of responses which are in many ways

”* different from those elicited with the onset of an

© iiiness. * * *”

J. McKinlay, The Sick Role—Ilness and Preg-

nancy, 6 Social Sci. & Medicine 561, 568.

Having concluded that pregnancy is a normal con-

dition, Mr. McKinlay considers whether it can be con-

sidered an illness and concludes that it cannot:

~ .. “Firstly, can the pregnant women be said to be

-. allowed exemption from the performance of nor-

mal social-role obligations? It seems that it is sel-

dom the case that a woman, by becoming preg-

nant, is automatically relieved of her obligation

to fulfill certain role requirements. Indeed, it is

_ mot uncommon for women, during gestation, to

experience what is termed ‘role overload’—when

too many expectations, all with pressures for per-

formance, converge on one individual at the same

time. By developing or ‘manufacturing’ a symptom

_ 0f set of symptoms (e.g. high blood -pressure,

~~ oedema or nausea) and thus making herself a

~ Candidate for the sick role, a pregnant woman in

» OUF society may attempt to negotiate herself into a

+. Sick role in order to relieve this social pressure.

- 84%

———y

—30—

“Secondly, is the pregnant woman allowed e-

emption from responsibility for her ‘condition’? It

is often the case that a couple actually want a

child and do everything in their power to encour.

age conception. Indeed, unless conception is active

ly discouraged, it is difficult for the woman to

claim that she is not responsible for her condition,

Yet, this exemption from responsibility, accord-

ing to Parsons, is a prerequisite for eligibility for

the sick role. It is precisely because one does not

and continuously expose oneself to

tuberculosis or typhoid, with the intention of con-

tracting the disease, that one is not considered

culpable for one’s state.

“Thirdly, can we claim that the pregnant wom-

“ an inust be motivated to get well? It is usually

assumed that illness is an undesirable state or an

. . ‘{meapacity which, as quickly as possible, must be

“> peversed by some kind of therapeutic action. Im

- plicit in the concept of illness then, is the notion

of cure. It has already been suggestéd that preg-

nancy is often intended and thought to be a desir-

able condition. Seldom do we talk of ‘curing

, nor do we act so as to help a pregnant

: ‘pet well’ The obligation to ‘get well a

soon as possible’ while applicable to undesirable

. illness states, cannot be considered relevant to 3

bteaccernecesoe Car gained ;

“Fourthly, can we claim that the pregnant wom

an is obliged to seek ‘technically competent help’?

There are sometimes severe sanctions applied

" individuals who have an illness condition but who

- do not seek advice from, of cooperate with med

cal experts. In these cases one is usually already

slic

+ ill and decides (or is advised) to see a profession-

~«*-al. These cases are, in other words, curative. The

“women who are pregnant occupy a special posi-

"tion in society and in certain situations fulfil unique

expectations, this normal state cannot be consid-

~ ered an illness, .. .”

J. McKinlay, The Sick Role—lIliness and Preg-

nancy, 6 Social Sci. & Medicine 561, 568-

569, 570.

_* The normality of pregnancy which distinguishes it

from sickness or injury was recognized by Mr. Justice

Powell concurring in this Court’s recent decision in

Cleveland Board of Educdtion v. LaFleur, 42 US.L.W.

4186 (US. Jan. 21, 1974), in which he stated:

_- “[P]regnancy is a normal biological function pos-

a sessing, in the great majority of cases, a fairly well

_ defined term. * * *”

Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 42

US.L.W. 4186, 4192.

Sip tenis of ie nenjocty plait ta: LéP lear (the per-

sonal right to plan one’s family) itself undercuts the

‘Cotention that pregnancy is a disability like sickness

__ ewmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Civil Action No.

49081 (N.D.Ga. Dec. 31, 1973), was a class action

= Sught pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

—_~3j2—

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seg.” The plaintiff

alleged sex discrimination in the effectuation and oper.

ation of defendant’s maternity leave policy. Plaintiff

had been required to begin unpaid maternity leave at

the end of her fifth month of pregnancy, and, while on

such leave, she was not entitled to disability pay, ac-

fendant violated the Civil Rights Act by denying its

pregnant employees disability pay and other employ-

ment benefits while on maternity leave. Holding that

such denial of benefits was not discriminatory on the

i

ull

i Hi

i is

ill

dik

fe

it i

ii

Hil

Beg at

Mell

ett

i

i

HY

il

i

A csitettinin esceipihntden idhinsaeacheaeens

: pregnancy and illness or injury:

of highly qualified laesmldtiis “eae

[sic], gynecologists, hematoligists [sic] and psy-

chiatrists in support of their respective positions.

s+

*¢+t¢ ¢

tims of discrimination because of sex depends on

the definition of pregnancy. After careful consid-

eration of the evidence, including the medical testi-

mony, it must be concluded that pregnancy is

neither a sickness nor a disability. In the first

place, pregnancy is, in most cases, a voluntarily

_ imposed condition and the fact of its existence

__ demonstrates that a woman is quite healthy and

_ normal, since sick is defined as ‘affected with dis-

case; not well or healthy, ill, ailing, indisposed.’

__ Webster’s Third International Dictionary, Un-

____ abridged (1969) at p. 2110. A reasonable ap-

_ proach dictates the holding that pregnancy is not

_ sickness in the usual sense of the word.”

eee Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Civil Action

No. 15681, at pp. 11, 13-A to 14.

the Conti sted. in; Mesmacn, penauamsy to trthax

distinguished from disease by the clement of voluntari-

ness. Judge Haynsworth observed in Cohen v. Chester-

ld County School Board, 474 F.2d 395, 398 (4th

(a, 1973), rev'd on other grounds, Cleveland Board

of} v. LaFleur

a ae Seal copnen ok ws

___. disabilities. In this age of wide use of effective

#42 US.L.W. 4186 (US. Jan. 21, 1974). See p. 22, supra.

—34—

contraceptives, pregnancy is usually voluntary. No

one wishes to come down with mononucleosis or to

break a leg, but a majority of young women do

wish to become pregnant, though they seek to

select the time for Song 0. ee?

“Unlike most illnesses and other disabilities, too,

pregnancy permits one to foresee its culmination

in a period of confinement and to prepare for it.

so

Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 414

F.2d 395, 398.

Since pregnancy is neither a sickness nor an injury, —

pregnant employees and those who have contracted a

sickness or suffered an injury are not similarly situated,

As this Court reiterated in Reed v. Reed.™ the Frual

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does

not deny the states “the power to treat different classes

of persons in different ways.” It merely denies the

states the power “to legislate that different treatment

be accorded to persons. placed by a statute into dif

ferent classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated

to the objective of that statute.”

-Pregnant women are placed into a classification u-

like that of the sick and injured by medical and biologi

cal fact. Sections 2626 and 2626.2 of the Califomia

Unemployment Insurance Code recognize the distinction

between maternity and sickness or injury and differen

tiate only between persons who are not similarly st

uated. Therefore, the denial of maternity benefits under

the disability insurance program is based upon a ree

sonable, nonarbitrary distinction between maternity

and sickness or injury.

See pp. 16-18, supra.

and “rest[s] upon some ground of difference having

a fair and substantial. relation to the object of the leg-

‘ilation.” It further demonstrates that the exclusion of

maternity benefits from California’s disability insurance

program does not deny due process of law. That ex-

clusion satisfies the LaFleur test because it does not

Code are intended to provide partial compensation for

wages lost due to injury or illness. Therefore, this leg-

islation falls within what this Court has characterized

as the area of economics and social welfare.

. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US. 471 (1970),

this Court made clear that states are free in the area

of economics and social welfare to make classifications

#0 long as they are rationally based and free from in-

Vidious discrimination. In Dandridge plaintiffs attacked

the method used by Maryland in administering an as-

pect of its public welfare program. Maryland imposed

1 upper limit on the amount of money any family

‘ould receive under the Aid to Families With Depend-

cy discriminated against large families whose needs ex.

ceeded the upper limit of the welfare program and that

of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court upheld

Maryland’s allocation program stating:

“[H]ere we deal with state regulation in the so.

guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and claimed to

violate the Fourteenth Amendment only because

the regulation results in some disparity in grants

- Of welfare payments to the largest AFDC families

For this Court to approve the invalidation of state

economic or social regulation as ‘overreaching’

would be far too reminiscent of an era when the

Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it

power to- strike down state laws ‘because they

) may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony

with a particular school of thought.’ Williamson

v Lee Optical Co., 348 US 483, 488, 99 L Ed

563, 572, 75 S Ct 461. That era long ago passed

into history. Ferguson v Skrupa, 372 US 726,

10 L Ed 2d 93, 83 S Ct 1028, 95 ALR2d 1347.

“In the area of economics and welfare,

a State does not violate the Equal ion Clause

merely because the classifications made by its laws

are imperfect. If the classification has\some ‘rea

sonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution

simply because the classification ‘is not made with

mathematical nicety or because in practice it re

sults in some inequality.’ Lindsley vy National Car-

bonic Gas Co., 220 US 61, 78, 55 L Ed 368,

377, 31 S Ct 337. ‘The problems of government

. are practical ones and may justify, if they do not

require, rough accommodations—illogical, it a s

ition

. be, and unscientific.’ Metropolis Theatre Co. v

~~. City of Chicago, 228 US 61, 69-70, 57 L Ed

730, 734, 33 S Ct 441. ‘A statutory discrimina-

“tion will not be set aside if any state of facts rea-

>. sonably may be conceived to justify it.” McGowan

_=>-y Maryland, 366 US 420, 426, 6 L Ed 2d 393,

~~ 399, 81 S Ct 1101.

“[W]e can find no basis for applying a different

constitutional standard. * * * And it is a stand-

ard that is true to the principle that the Fourteenth

Amendment gives the federal courts no power to

impose upon the States their views of what con-

stitutes wise economic or social policy.

zs: + +

“[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require

that a State must choose between attacking every

aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem

at all. Lindsley v Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220

US 61, 55 L Ed 369, 31 S Ct 337. It is enough

_ that the State’s action be rationally based and

free from invidious discrimination. The regulation

before us meets that test.

“[T]he Constitution does not empower this Court

to second-guess state officials charged with the dif-

ficult responsibility of allocating limited public

welfare funds among the myriad of potential re-

Ccipients. * * *”

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-487.

Similarly, in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 US. 535

(1972), plaintiffs attacked the formula whereby Texas

ee res inate sare stones of

fecipients. Under the Texas system the elderly received

ee eet SR noted of eat tie ied ane

lites:

_ disabled received 95 percent, and those receiving bene-

fits under the Aid to Families With Dependent Children

program received only 75 percent of the standard of

the equal‘ protection of the laws because a larger per.

centage of Blacks and Mexican-Americans participated

in the Aid to Families With Dependent Children pro.

gram than in the other programs.

- Rejecting plaintiffs’ argument and holding that Tex.

ee nny sulla; th

Court held: =

“This Court emphasized only recently, in Dan-

dridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485, 25 L Ea

2d 491, 501, 90 S Ct 1153 (1970), that in ‘the

_ . afea of economics and social welfare, a State does

~ “net violate the Equal Protection Clause merely be-

‘-! ‘cause the classifications made by its laws are im

~. perfect.’-A legislature may address a problem ‘one

“Step at a time,” or even ‘select one phase of one

field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the

’ others.’ Williamson v Lee Optical Co. 348 US 483,

489, 99 L Ed 563, 573, 75 S Ct 461 (1955).

- So long as its judgments are rational, and not in-

*. yiddious, the legislature’s efforts to tackle the prob

"lems of the poor and the needy are not subject to

This ‘acceptaiice “Of appellants’: coititations! We

wider titers qrechcobpmcss etre |

= welfare programs could survive such scrutiny, and

= we do mot find it required by the Fourteenth

_-. “Applying the traditional standard of review un-

oe decision to provide somewhat lower welfare bene-

"= fs for AFDC recipicats is invidious or izrational.

"Since budgetary constraints do not allow the pay-

ment of the full standard of need for all welfare

-"* yecipients, the State may have concluded that the

aged and infirm are the least able of the cate-

gorical grant recipients to bear the hardships of an

-- inadequate standard of living. While different poli-

cy judgments are of course possible, it is not ir-

_. fational for the State to believe that the young

_. ae more adaptable than the sick and elderly, es-

_ pecially because the latter have less hope of im-

Proving their situation in the years remaining to

them. Whether or not one agrees with this state

determination, there is nothing in the Constitu-

tion that forbids it.

ss ¢+ = @

“In conclusion, we re-emphasize what the Court

said in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US, at 487,

25 L Ed 2d at 503:

" ‘We do not decide today that the [state law] _

is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and

economic objectives that [the State] might ideal-

=~ ly espouse, or that a more just and humane sys-

fem. could not be devised. Conflicting claims of

_ and proponents of almost every measure, certainly

a

,~thcluding the one before us. But the intractable

~~ eeonomic, social, and even philosophical problems

¢ presented by public welfare assistance programs

are not the business of this Court. * * *’”

Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-551.

Is New, York Sis Departinent, of Sockal Services 9

Dublino, ... US. .... 93 S.Ct. 2507 (1973), this

Const sbiciol 6 Sots allt Geile Sovalidatice

Work Rules of New York’s Social Welfare Law stating:

_ “It could impair the capacity of the state gover

ment to deal effectively with the critical problem

of mounting welfare costs and the increasing fi

nancial dependency of many of its citizens. * * *

To the extent that the Work Rules embody New

York’s attempt to promote self-reliance and civic _

responsibility, to assure that limited state welfare —

funds be spent on behalf of those genuinely in :

_,. local governments, this Court should not lightly in

.,. terfere. The problems confronting our society in

these areas are severe, and state governments, in

cooperation with the Federal Government, must be

resolution.” 3 |

New York State Department of Social Services

v. Dublino, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 2513 (1973).

See also United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973);

Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).

- The disability insurance provisions of the California

Unemployment Insurance Code meet the standards for

economic and social welfare legislation set forth in Daw

—

“The purposes of the program were two-fold:

First, to reduce to a minimum involuntary unem-

ployment, the suffering caused thereby, and the

resulting decline of purchasing power, and second,

to avoid the necessity for resorting to costly relief

“Employee ,

quired, must be borne entirely by the individual

worker, because, unlike the case of the employer

there is no one to whom the worker can pass the

burden. His contribution is really in the nature of

a gross income tax, as distinguished from what s

merely an excise tax as far as the employer is com

a5 *

Br

ee

private insurance companies protection against loss

‘for the support of a Disability Benefits Program. .

“This cost could be met entirely out of the 1

per cent employee contribution. * * *"™

necessity of the exclusion of maternity benefgs con-

tained in Section 2626 of the Unemployment Insurance

Code. Recognizing the State’s legitimate interest in

maintaining the solvency of its programs, they have

“California Senate Journal, June 23, 1946, at pp. 228-229.

Rhode 7

burden ity benefits place on such a

a a

women over $652,000 in tenet dex the pr

“more than double the p weckenes a

~ cases from Rhode Boece flemptuety the

— Sr yg on yc ga

Te ae atin oa cond of meh,”

|

|

FE

:

upheld that section as creating a classification reasop-

ably designed to achieve the objectives of the legisle

tion. In Clark v. California Employment Stabilization

Commission, 166 Cal.App.2d 326, 332 P.2d 716

(1958), the court discussed the legislature’s reasons

coverage:

...“The exclusionary provisions in question are

part .of a legislative program conferring unem

ployment compensation disability benefits upon a

defined group of employees. Persons sustaining

disability caused by pregnancy, by the terms of

the statute, are not within this group. * * *

Whether such disability benefits should be e-

tended to pregnant women is a matter solely for

legislative determination, and is not within th

' scope of judicial decision.

s*2 38

“Without doubt, the rate of employee contribe

tions is related directly to the demand made upon

the Fund, which, in turn, is affected by the a

tent of the coverage provided. It is a matter of

common knowledge that illness or injury arising

from pregnancy is classified and excluded from

the coverage provided by private contracts of

health and accident insurance, in order to effect

a premium rate lower than is required in the ab

_ sence of such an exclusion. It is reasonable to

sume that the inclusion of illness or injury caused

by pregnancy within the coverage provided ly

the statute would increase substantially the &

mands upon the Fund and require a like increse

: . i ~~ —45—

aes

“a5

en Anse tote contiens.

-. tablishing them is a matter for the Legislature, as

ste tes detecutontion. reapectiog tho: sclatinn

merits of inclusion or exclusion in comparison

~~ with the incident contribution rate. It was proper-

~~ Jy within the sphere of legislative action to deter-

~~ mine whether the objects of the statute in ques-

by tion would be served best by including a disability

_ majority of employees a burden disproportionate

_. to contemplated benefits, in order to favor the

group. These reasons indicate that the class ex-

cluded was not arbitrarily selected, and that the

purpose of the exclusion was germane to the leg-

‘tative object

“Moreover, to award disability compensation to

women employees on account of illness caused by

pregnancy, in effect, constituted a maternity bene-

fit plan for a limited group, ic., women em-

ployees. The purpose of the unemployment dis-

ability program is to afford relief to employees

sustaining loss of wages on account of illness,

__ and not to confer maternity benefits. * * *”

Clark v. California Employment Stabilization

Commission, 166 Cal._App.2d 326, 329-332,

332 P.2d 716, 719.

Accord, Rentzer v. California Unemployment Insurance

Appeals Board, 32 CalApp.3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr.

36 (1973).

~ California’s disability insurance program is only one

Itt of the State's comprehensive social welfare plan

: eo =

Workmen’s compensation insurance,” unemploymet

insurance,” aid to the elderly,” aid to the blind”

and aid to families with dependent children” ar

some of the other means whereby California seeks to

alleviate certain misfortunes which may befall its reg.

dents. Each such program is designed and intended to

assist only persons suffering certain narrowly defined

hardships. California’s disability insurance program %

intended solely to compensate in part for disability aris-

img from sickness or injury. Neither California nor

any other state has the financial resources to alleviate

each and. every type of hardship experienced by is

residents. Accordingly, California has not undertakes

to provide maternity benefits under any of its social

welfare programs. This decision is based on a rational,

conditions which may befall California residents.

| The exclusion of maternity benefits from California's

disability insurance program is one manner in which

the California Legislature has attempted to meet is

~~ California Labor Code §§ 3201 et seq. (West, 1971).

7*California Insurance Code §§ 100 ef mg

(West, 1972).

California Welfare and Institutions. .Cade $§ 12000 @

seq. (West, 1972).

" einen Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 12500 4

seq. (West, 1972). a3

bs ai 7 —47—

jo bility of “allocating limited public welfare funds

Se nied sf poomtiel recipicann” It has taken

; step at a time”; it has selected “une plaso'ef one

is rationally based and does not involve in-

idious discrimination. It therefore meets the standards

‘gt forth in. Dandridge, Jefferson and Dublino for \leg-

“fiittion within the area of economics and social wel

"The classification contained in Sections 2626 and

‘2262 of the Code is reasonable, nonarbitrary, and

bears a substantial relation to the legitimate governmen-

tal purpose of maintaining the fiscal integrity of the

@isability insurance program. Therefore, the classifica-

tion satisfies the Reed test and does not deny the equal

‘protection of the laws. Similarly, while advancing le

gitimate state interests, the exclusion of maternity bene-

fits satisfies the LaFleur standard because it does not

neediessly, arbitrarily or capriciously impinge on con-

stitutionally protected liberties. Nor does it create any

irebuttable presumptions which unduly penalize wom-

en who decide to bear children. Sections 2626 and

2626.2 of the Code merely express California’s decision

not to pay maternity benefits under an insurance pro-

‘those sections do not deny due process of law. Accord-

ingly, the exclusion of maternity benefits contained in

‘Sections 2626 and 2626.2 of the California Unemploy-

‘Meat Insurance Code is a valid classification and is

‘tot Violative of the Constitution of the United States. -

—43—

Conclusion.

The cases of Appellees Aiello, Armendariz and J

vacated and remanded for consideration of the #

ness issue. 4

The District Court reached its decision in t

Sr ee c

pregnancy is not a sickness or injury. Fei 2

ee oe ee ere ene

and the disabilities which California’s disabil

ence ‘piégram’ twee designed’ 10’ alleviate; “6%

Court erroneously ruled that maternity benefits m

paid under that program: The Associations and

cision in Appellee Jaramillo’s case be reversed. 4

Dated: February 8, 1974.

Respectfully submitted,

Wirarp Z. Carr, Jr.,

Attorney for Merchants and Mai

turers Association, et al,

James C. RoBERTS,

Gipson, Dunn & CRUTCHER,

Of Counsel.