Opinion — New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino

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| SUPREME COURT. OF THE UNITED STATES

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL

-» SERVICES er au. v. DUBLINO er At.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

“No, 72-792. Argued April 17-18, 1973—Decided June 21, 1973*

The 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act included the Fed-

~ eral Work Incentive Program (WIN), designed to help individuals

on welfare become wage-earning members of society. The States

- were required to incorporate this program into their Aid to

Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program, to provide

that certain “employable” individuals, as a condition for receiving

aid, shall register for manpower services, training, and employment.

“Tn 1971 New York enacted provisions of its Social Welfare Law

commonly referred to as the New York Work Rules, which similarly

“Tequired cooperation by employable individuais to continue to

Teceive assistance. Appellees, New York public assistance recip-

ients subject to the Work Rules, challenge those Rules as having

been pre-empted by the WIN provisions of the Social Security

Act. The three-judge District Court ruled that “for those in the

AFDC program, WIN pre-empts the New York Work Rules.”

Held:

_ 1. The WIN provisions of the Social Security Act do not pre-

‘empt the New York Work Rules of the New York Social Welfare

Law. Pp. 7-17.

ssid (a) There is no substantial evidence that Congress intended,

_ @ither expressly or impliedly, to pre-empt state work programs.

More is required than the apparent comprehensiveness of the WIN

legidlation to show “the “clear manifestation of [congressional ]

intention” that must exist before a federal statute is held “to

-_

"Together with No. 72-802, Onondaga County Department of

Gras Services et al. v. Dublino et al. also on appeal from the same

hg x I

« NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLIN

‘supersede the éxpreise” of state action. Schwarts vy. Texas, 344

U. 8. 199, 202-203. Pp. 7-12.

(c) Where Gootiliniate ‘state’'and federal efforts exist within

complementary administrative framework in the pursuit of com.

mon purposes, as here, the case for federal pre-emption is not

. for consideration. Pp. 16-17.

348 F. Supp. 290, reversed and remanded.

Powst, J.; delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Busam,

C, J., and Dovaas, Srewarr, Wurrs, Biackmun, and Rexnount,

JJ.,. joined, MarsHaun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which

Brannan, J., joined.

On Appeals from the

United States District

Court for the Western

District of New York.

72-802 v.

Dolores Dublino et al.

[June 21, 1973]

Mr. Justice Powe. delivered the opinion of the

Court.

*The basic provisions of the Work Rules at the time this action

was brought are set forth in § 131 of the New York Social Services

(52A McKinney's Cons. Laws Ԥ 131 (4)):

assistance or care shall be given to an employable person

) 2 NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLIN

: the New York Welfare Program. Their sim, as «.

plained by the Governor, is to encourage “the young

and able-bodied, temporarily in need of assistance through

who has not registered with the nearest local employment ageney

¢ the department of labor or has refused to accept employment iq

which he is able to engage.

“A person shall be deemed to have refused to accept such em.

ployment if he:

“a. Fails to obtain and file with the social services district x

least once in every two-week period a new certificate from th

appropriate local employment office of the state department of labor

stating that such employment office has no order for an opening i

part-time, full-time, temporary or permanent employment in which

the applicant is able to engage, or

“b, wilfully fails to report fo- an interview at an employment office

with respect to employment when requested to do so by such office, o

“e. wilfully fails to report to such office the result of a referral to

employment, or

“d. wilfully fails to report for employment. Such wilful failure

or refusal as above listed shall be reported immediately to the social

services district by such employment office.

“For the purposes of this subdivision and subdivision five,

person shall be deemed employable if such person is not rendered

unable to work by: illness or significant and substantial incapacits-

tion, either mental or physical, to the extent and of such duration

that such illness or incapacitation prevents such person from perfom-

ing services; advanced age; full-time attendance at school in the

case of minor, in accordance with provisions of this chapter; full

time, satisfactory participation in an approved program of voe-

tional training or rehabilitation; the need of such person to provide

full-time care for other members of such person’s household who ar

wholly incapacitated, or who are children, and for whom required

care is not otherwise reasonably available, notwithstanding diligest

efforts by such person to obtain others to provide such care. A per-

son assigned to and participating in a public works project under the

provisions of section one hundred sixty-four or three hundred fifty-k

of this chapter shall be deemed to be employable but not employed.

“Every employable recipient of public assistance or person who #

deemed not to be employable by reason of full-time satisfactory par

ticipation in an approved program of vocational training or rehabil-

YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO 3

no-fault of their own, to achieve the education and the

skills, the motivation and the determination that will

make it possible for them to become increasingly self-

sufficient, independent citizens who can contribute to and

share in the responsibility for their families and our

‘To achieve this, the Work Rules establish a presump-

tion that certain recipients of public assistance are em-

ployable* and require those recipients to report every

two weeks to pick up their assistance checks in person;

to file every two weeks certificate from the appro-

priate public employment office stating that no suitable

employment opportunities are available; to report for

requested employment interviews; to report to the public

employment office the result of a referral for employ-

ment; and not to fail willfully to report for suitable

employment, when available. In addition to establish-

ing @ system of referral for employment in the private |

sector of the economy, the Work Rules permit the es”.

tablishment of public works projects in New York’s

sovial service districts.‘ Failure of “employable” persons

tation shall receive his public assistance grants and allowances in

person from the division of employment of the state department of

labor, in accordance with regulations of the department.”

*Special Message to the New York State Legislature, March 20,

1971 (Brief for Appellants, p. 9).

Tar he statutory definition of persons deemed “employable” see

2. 1, supra.

*Bee n. 1, supra. These provisions for employment of recipients

in public works projects have not been implemented, as the HEW

Regional Commissioner indicated that such projects would not be

approved for federal aid. Appellant’s Brief, p. 138.

4 NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO —

to participate in the operation of the Work Rules result,

in ‘8 loss of assistance,’

Like the: Work Rules, the federal Work Incentive.

Program (WIN) is designed to help individuals on wel-

fare “acquire a sense of dignity, self-worth, and cop.

fidence which will flow from being recognized as a wage.

earning member of society .... . ,” 42 U. S.C. A. § 630,

The program was enacted as part of the 1967 amend.

ments to the Social Security Act,‘ whereby States wer

required to incorporate the Work Incentive Program

“, . + the Laws of 1971 place a renewed and expanded emphasis o

restoring all employable recipients of public assistance to emply-

ment in the regular econdiny. Accordingly, all unemployed en-

or receiving public assistance are not

742 U. 8. C. A. § 602 (a):

Ҥ 602, State plans for aid and services to needy families with

children; contents; approval by Secretary

“(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with

children must se

[Footnote 7 continued on p. 5]

: NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO 5

must’ include “such ‘health, vocational rehabilitation,

counseling, child care, and other such supportive serv-

ices as are necessary to enable such individuals to

t consists

“(i © child’ who is under age 16 or attending school full time:

““Gi) & person who is ill, incapacitated,.or of advanced age;

“(ii) @ person ‘so remote from a work incentive project that his

this paragraph ).”

*States are penalized ‘by a reduction in assistance if they fail to

oattify to the Secretary of Labor at least 15% of the average number

of those registered each year. 42 U. 8. C. $603 (c).

6 NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO

In the court below, appellees, New York public as

sistance recipients subject to the Work Rules, chal-

lenged those Rules as violative of several provisions of

the Constitution and as having been pre-empted by the

WIN provisions of the Federal Social Security Act. The

three-judge District Court rejected all but the last con-

348 F. Supp. 290 (1972). On this point, it

“for those in the AFDC program, WIN pre-

New York Work Rules. Jd., at 297.° As

affected the continued operation

York rules but raised serious doubts as to

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*The District Court and the parties in this case have used the

word “pre-emption” in a rather special sense. This is not a case

involving arguable federal pre-emption of a wholly independent

state program dealing with the same or a similar problem. Cf, e. 9,

aan Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. 8. 440, 446 (1950).

AFDC is a federal statutory program, of which the WIN program

is a part. The State Work Rules also were promulgated as part

of the implementation of AFDC, and are therefore not wholly in-

dependent of the federal program. With this caveat, however, we

11 We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction to

the hearing on the merits. We now conclude that the constitutional

questions raised by appellees were not so insubstantial as to deprive

the three-judge District Court of jurisdiction.

As to appellees’ due process claim, the court below directed the

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" WEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO 7

eo I

“The holding of the court below affects the Work Rules

only insofar as they apply to AFDC recipients. 345

F.Supp., at 297, 300, and n. 5. New York’s Home Relief

program, for example—a general state assistance plan

for which there is no federal reimbursement or sup-

port “remains untouched by the Court’s pre-emption

pruling. As to AFDC participants, however, the decision

below would render the Work Rules inoperative and hold

WIN “the exclusive manner of applying the carrot and

stick” in efforts to place such recipients in gainful em-

ployment. 348 F. Supp., at 300.*

This is @ sweeping step that strikes at the core of

state prerogative under the AFDC

Gpients of their hearing rights, 348 F. Supp., at 299. The State

stipulates that this has been done. Tr. of Oral Arg., pp. 19-20.

The only issue which we address on this appeal is whether the state

in whole or in part by federal law.

AFDC program is jointly financed by the States and Federal

Government. Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 473.

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to do so, and thus contribute to the

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to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not

lightly to be presumed.” Schwartz v. Texas, 344

U. S, 199, 202-203 (1952).

See also Engineers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 382

U. 8. 423, 429 (1966); Huron Portland Cement Co. v.

City of Detroit, 362 U. 8S. 440, 446 (1959); Miniz v.

Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346, 350 (1933); Savage v. Jones,

1, 533 (1912)

benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the pro-

gram.” King v. Smith, supra, at 318-319; Dandridge v.

WW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES ». DUBLINO 9

Williams, supra, at 478; Jefferson v. Hackney, supra, at

541. Moreover, at the time of the passage of the federal

work incentive program in 1967, 21 States already had

initiated welfare work requirements as a condition of

AFDC eligibility.* If Congress had intended to pre-

empt state plans and efforts in such an important dimen-

sion of the AFDC program as employment referrals for

those on assistance, such intentions would in all likeli-

hood have been expressed in direct and unambiguous

language. No such expression exists, however, either in

the federal statute or in the committee reports."*

Appellees argue, nonetheless, that Congress intended

to pre-empt state work programs because of the compre-

hensive nature of the WIN legislation, its legislative his-

tory," and the alleged conflicts between certain sections

of the state and federal laws." We do not agree. We

reject, to begin with, the contention that pre-emption

is to be inferred merely from the comprehensive character

of the federal work incentive provisions, 42 U. §. C.

$602 (a)(19), § 630 et seg. The subjects of modern

social and regulatory legislation often by their very

nature require intricate and complex responses from the

“See Brief for the United States as amicus curiae, p. 12. The

information was derived from a survey of state plans conducted by

the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

“No express intention to eliminate co-existing state work pro-

grams appears either at the time of the original 1967 enactment of

the WIN program, see 8. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., at 26,

145-157; H. R. Rep. No, 1030, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., at 58-59, or at

"weir 1971 amendments, n. 6, supra.

porti of & pre-eniptive intent, 348 F. Supp., at 297, but no

"In view of our remand, Part III, infra, we do not reach the issue

of specific alleged conflicts. In sum, however, they are not. sufficient

to indicate ive intent, especially in light of the impressive

_—

10 NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO

Congress, but without Congress necessarily intending its

enactment as the exclusive means of meeting the prob.

lem, cf. Askew v. American Waterways, — U. 8. —

(1978). Given the complexity of the matter addressed

by Congress in the federal work incentive program, s

detailed statutory scheme was both likely and appro.

priate, completely apart from any questions of pre

emptive intent. This would be especially the case when

the federal work incentive provisions had to be sufi-

ciently comprehensive to authorize and govern programs

in States which had no welfare work requirements of

their own as well as cooperatively in States with such

requirements.

Appellees also rely, as did the District Court, on the

legislative history as supporting the view that “the

WIN legislation is addressed to all AFDC recipients,

leaving no employable recipients to be subject to state

work rules.” Brief, p. 29. The court below pointed to

no specific legislative history as supportive of its con-

clusion. Appellees do cite fragmentary statements which

we find unpersuasive. Reliance is placed, for example,

on a statement in the report of the House Ways and

Means Committee on the WIN legislation as follows:

“Under your committee's bill, States would be re

quired to develop a program for each appropriate

relative and dependent. child which would assure,

to the maximum extent possible, that each individ-

ual would enter the labor force, in order to become

self-sufficient. To accomplish this, the states would

have to assure that each adult in the family, and

each child over age 16 who is not attending school

is given, when appropriate, employment counselling,

testing and job training.” (Emphasis supplied by

appellees.) H: R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., Ist

Sess., at 16 (1967). e

% Other citations to similar effect appear in Appellee’s Brief, pp.

29-30.

} YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO 11

At best, this statement is ambiguous as to a possible

congressional intention to supersede all state work pro-

grams,” “Appropriateness,” as used in the Committee

Report, may well mean “appropriateness” solely within

ew York and Senator Long of Louisiana, Chairman of the

e Committee which considered the WIN program prior to ap-

by the Senate:

Buckley: Was it ever the intention of Congress at that time

the provisions of the WIN statutes preempt the field of em-

training for ADC recipients?

Long: I did not have that in mind....

: . , . So far as the distinguished chairman is con-

ever the intention of at least this body to have a

in the field?

never our intention to prevent a State from

do something for their money if they were

Rec, 8. 18492, Oct. 17, 1972,

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“Mi Carey: ly specific question for the chairman has to do

ler this interpretation, New York and other States could operate

own. programs as supplementary to the Federal WIN program.

does

New York, on the matter, so long as the State

12 NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO

the scope and confines of the WIN program. Further.

more, the language employed by Congress in enacting

the WIN program must be considered in conjunction with

its operational scope and level of funding, which, as

will be shown, is quite limited with respect to the total

number of employable AFDC recipients, Part II, infra,

~ TA sum, our attention has been directed to no relevant

argument which supports, except in the most peripheral

way, the view that Congress intended, either expressly

or impliedly, to pre-empt state work programs. Far

more would be required to show the “clear manifestation

of [congressional] intention” which must exist before

a federal statute is held “to supersede the exercise” of

state action.. Schwartz v. Texas, supra, 202-203.

II

Persuasive affirmative reasons exist in this case which

also strongly negate the view that Cdéngress intended,

by the enactment of the WIN legislation, to terminate

all existing state work programs and foreclose additional

state cooperative programs in the future. We note, first,

that the WIN program itself was not designed on its

face to be all embracing. Federal work incentive pro-

grams were to be established only in States and political

subdivisions

“in which he [the Secretary of Labor] determines

there is a significant number of individuals who have

attained age 16 and are receiving aid to families

with dependent children. In other political sub-

divisions, he shall. use his best efforts to provide

such programs either within such subdivisions or

through the provision of transportation for such per-

sons to political subdivisions of the State in which

such programs are established.” 42 U. S. 0,4

§ 632 (a). Sed

NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES »v. DUBLINO 13

the:federal statute probably would be limited in scope

tion of WIN in only 14 of New York’s 64 social service

districts, though these 14 districts do service approxi-

Even in. the districts where WIN does operate, its

reach is limited. In New York, according to federal esti-

mates, there are 150,000 WIN registrants for the current

tants, of whom the majority will not receive full job

_- taining and placement assistance.** In fiscal 1971, New

York asserts that “17,511 individuals were referred for

participation in the WIN program, but the Federal Gov-

“The WIN guidelines, issued by the United States Department

of » Provide, according to appellants, for establishment of WIN

‘progr only in those areas where there are at least 1,100 potential

WIN referees, Brief, p. 37. ‘

See Appellant's Brief, pp. 37-38. 42 U. 8, C. § 602 (a) (19)

14 NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO

ernment allowed only 9,600 opportunities for enroll-

ment.” * California claims “over 122,000 employable

AFDC recipients” last year, but only 18,000 available

WIN slote.*

It is evident that WIN is a partial program which

stops short of providing adequate job and training op-

portunities for large numbers of state AFDC recipients.

It would be incongruous for Congress on the one hand

to promote work opportunities for AFDC recipients and

on the other to prevent States from undertaking supple-

mentary efforts toward this very same end. We cannot

interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated pur-

poses. The significance of state supplementation is illus-

trated by the experience in New York, where the Work

Rules have aided the objectives of federal work incen-

tives: from July 1 through September 30, 1971, the first

months of the Work Rules’ operation, the State Em-

ployment Service claimed job placements for approxi-

mately 9,376 recipients.”

Moreover, the Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare, the agency of Government responsible for ad-

*8 Appellant's Brief; p. 38, 17.

2 Brief for California as amicus curiae, p. 3.

28 Appellant’s Brief, p. 15; appendix, p. 192. Appellants claim

further that from January to June 1972, “there were 2,657 job

placements under the WIN program,” and 5,323 placements under

the Work Rules. Brief, p. 18. These figures must be qualified,

however, with the observation that many of the job placements are

temporary; many of those placed under the Work Rules may have

been recipients of forms of assistance other than AFDC (while the

number of WIN placements counts only AFDC recipients) ; and that

single recipients may have been referred or placed—and thus sta-

tistically tabulated—on more than one occasion. See Appellee’s

Brief, pp. 33-36. None of these observations, however, obscures the

basic fact that the Work Rules materially contribute toward attain-

ment of the objective of the WIN program in restoring employable

AFDC recipients as wage-earning members of society! See #2

U.8.C. A. §630.

NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO 15

ments. Pursuant to such’ approval, New York has re-

ceived federal grants in aid for the operation of its

AFDC plan, including its work provisions.*” In inter-

preting this statute, we must be mindful that “the

construction of a statute by those charged with its exe-

cution should be followed unless there are compelling

indi¢ations that it is wrong... .” Red Lion Broad-

casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) ; Dandridge

v. Williams, supra, at 481-482. In this case, such indi-

cations are wholly absent.

New York, furthermore, has attempted to operate the

Work Rules in such & manner as to avoid friction and

overlap with the WIN program. Officials from both

the State Department of Labor and a local Social Service

Department testified below that every AFDC recipient

appropriate for a WIN Program was first referred there,

that no person was to be referred to the state program

hy Participating in a WIN program, and that only

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”

,

one.

In this context, the dissenting opinion’s reliance on

Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. 8. 282 (1971), Carleson vy.

Remillard, 406 U. 8. 598 (1972), and King v. Smith,

supra, is misplaced. In those cases it was clear that

state law excluded people from AFDC benefits whom

the Social Security Act expressly provided would be

eligible. “The Court found no room either in the Act's

language or legi ve history to warrant the States’

additional eligibility requirements. Here, by contrast,

the Act allows for complementary state work incentive

programs and procedures incident thereto—even if they

become conditions for continued assistance. Such pro-

grams and procedures are not necessarily invalid, any

more than other supplementary regulations promulgated

within the legitimate sphere of state administration. See

Wyman v. James, 400 U. S. 309 (1971); Snell v. Wyman,

281 F, Supp. 853; aff'd, 393 U. 8. 323 (1969). See also

Dandridge v. Williams, supra; Jefferson v. Hackney,

supra.

Tit

We thus reverse the holding below that the federal

work incentive program pre-empts the New York Work

Rules. Our ruling establishes the validity of a state

work program as one means of helping AFDC recipients

return to gainful employment. We do not resolve, how-

ever, the question of whether some particular sections of

the Work Rules might contravene the specific provisions

of the Federal Social Security Act.

This last question we remand to the court below.

That court did not have the opportunity to consider

Dept. of Social Services, appendix, pp. 226, 234. See algo Appellant's

Brief, p. 17, and Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 7.

i

' NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO 17

the issue of specific conflict between the state and fed-

eral programs, free from its misapprehension that the

Work Rules had been entirely pre-empted. Further, the

New York Legislature amended the Work Rules in 1972

to provide, among other things, for exemption of per-

sons engaged in full-time training and vocational re-

habilitation programs from the reporting and check pick-

up requirements (Chapter 683, N. Y. Laws of 1972),

for monthly rather than semi-monthly payments of shel-

ter allowances (id., c. 685) and, most significantly, for a

definition of an “employable” AFDC recipient which

is claimed by New York to be identical to that now used

under WIN (id., c. 941). Inasmuch as the court below

did not have the opportunity to consider the 1972 amend-

ments as they related to the issue of potential state-

federal conflict, the remand should afford it.

We deem it unnecessary at the present time to intimate

any view on whether or to what extent particular pro-

visions of the Work Rules may contravene the pur-

poses or provisions of the WIN program. Such a deter-

mination should be made initially by the court below,

consistent with the principles set forth in this opinion.”*

The judgment of the three-judge District Court is re-

versed and the case remanded for further proceedings in

accord with this opinion.

™ In considering the question of possible conflict between the state

and federal work programs, the court below will take into account

tion,” as to the AFDC program, Jefferson v. Hackney, supra, at 545;

see also Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 478; King v. Smith, supra,

at 318-319, and “so long as the State’s actions are not in violation

fits, to merit judicial rather than cooperative federal-state resolu-

tion, should be of substance and not merely trivial or insubstantial.

But if there is » conflict of substance i i

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 72-792 anp 72-802

New York State Department

of Social Services et al.,

Appellants,

72-792 v. On Appeals from the

Dolores Dublino et al. United States District

Co , Court for the Western

Sey are a District of New York.

et al., Appellants,

72-802 v.

Dolores Dublino et al. |

[June 21, 1973]

Mr. Justice MarsHau, with whom Mr. Justice

BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

Because the Court today ignores a fundamental rule

for interpreting the Social Security Act, I must respect-

fully dissent. As we said in Townsend v. Swank, 404

309 (1968) ; Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. 8. 598, 600

(1972). The New York Work Rules fall squarely within

eo

| this statement; they clearly exclude persons eligible for

*Appellants state that the Work Rules do not “constitute an

additional condition of eligibility for public assistance.” Reply

2 NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO

ards, it is irrelevant to a determination of eligibility that

a recipent has or has not filed every two weeks a cer-

tificate from the local employment office that no suitable

employment opportunities are available, yet under the

Work Rules, a recipient who fails to file such a certificate

is “deemed” to have refused to accept suitable employ-

ment, and so is not eligible for assistance. N. Y. Social

Services Law § 131 (4)(a) (McKinney 1971).* Thus,

according to the rules of interpretation we have hereto-

fore followed, the proper inquiry is whether the Social

Security Act or its legislative history clearly show con-

gressional authorization for state employment require-

ments other than those involved in the federal Work

Incentive Program.’

Brief for Appellants New York State Departments, at 9. The

* The federal conditions of eligibility relating to registration for

employment are found at 42 U.S. C. $602 (a)(19) (Supp. I, 1971).

* The United States, as amicus curiae, argues that the rule stated

in Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. 8. 282 (1971), does not fairly

characterize the course of our interpretation of the Social Security

mac asencsi wg ten lpn ad cnt Eh Gag oes bi tage

is at least offset by the summary affirmance in Carleson v. Taylor,

404 U. 8. pena Nyy Meyers, 404 U. 8; 803 (1971), and

v.

" NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO 3

~The answer is that neither the Act nor its legislative

history show such an authorization. The only relevant

work-related conditions of eligibility in the Act are found

at 42 U. 8. C. § 602 (a)(19) (Supp. I, 1971). In addi-

find an independent state policy in Townsend as a narrowing of the

class of eligible persons: the State might have a policy of mini-

mising subsidies to persons with a clear prospect of future income

well above the poverty level, by denying assistance to persons

attending four-year colleges while granting it to those attending

vocational training schools. Such a system of subsidies would almost

certainly be held constitutional under the Due Process Clause, and

the position of the United States. seems to be that States may impose

4 NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO

the local employment office every two weeks. “Deem-

ing” is a familiar legal device to evade applicable require-

ments by saying that they have been satisfied when they

have not in fact been satisfied. But the federal require.

ment, which the State may not alter without clear con-

gressional authorization,’ requires an actual refusal to

participate in a WIN Program or to accept employment,

not a refusal to participate in some other program or 4

fictitious refusal of employment.*

The legislative history-of the Social Security Act con-

with respect to work requirements, it focused on actual

refusals to accept employment or to participate in cer-

tain special programs clearly authorized by Congres.

At no time has Congress authorized States to adopt other

work-referral programs or to make refusal to participate

in such programs a condition of eligibility, even under

the guise of “deeming” such a refusal a refusal to accept

employment.

At its inception, the program of aid to dependent chil-

dren was designed to lessen somewhat the burden of

supporting such children. The program provided a

sistance to children who had been deprived of parental

support by reason of the absence of a parent. 49 Stat.

629 (1935). Assistance was provided to supply the needs

of such children, thus “releas[ing the parent] from the

® Appellants argze that “the provision of section 602 (a) (10) that

aid be furnished ‘to all eligible individuals’ when read within the

ae walneal aie eas aes, a | ‘eligible’ under

State requirements, not Federal ” Reply Brief for Appellants New

that the New York Work Rules, takén as a whole, aré not necessary

to do that.

"NEW YORK DEPT. OF s0crAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO 5

wage-earning role.” H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., Ist

Sess., at 30 (1935). See also H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th

Cong, Ist Seas., at 10 (1985). Thus, the program’s pur-

poses were in many ways inconsistent with a require-

ment. Yet, in operation, the original pfogram failed

to provide sufficient inducement for the parent to remain

at home, since the amount of assistance was measured

solely by the’ child’s needs. In order further to relieve

U.8.C. § 606 (b)(1).

"In 196 Congress required States to adopt plans to provide social

te wtrengthen family life. Pub. L. 84-880, 70 Stat. 807 oan

6 NEW. YORK DEPT, OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO

Work and Training Programs” of work on public projects,

Pub. L, 87-543, 76 Stat. 172; 186 (1962), repealed by

Pub. L. 90-248; 82 Stat. 802 (1968). Refusal to accept

a work assignment on such # project without good cause

would be-a ground for denial of public assistance. See

H. R. Rep. No, 1414, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., at 15 (1962).

When Congress established the Work Incentive Pro-

Seal re et ratent Re-

cipients of public a could be required only to

accept bona fide of employment or placement in

specified. programs. There is no indication whatsoever

in the legislative history that Congress intended to per-

mit States to deny assistance because potential recipients

had refused to participate in programs not supervised by

the Secretary of Labor, as WIN Programs are. The ps-

rameters of the WIN Program were designed to accom-

modate Congress’. dual interests. in guaranteeing the in-

tegrity of the family and in maximizing the potential for

employment of recipients of public assistance. Without

careful federal supervision, of the sort contemplated by

the delegation to the Secretary of Labor to establish test-

ing and counseling services and to require that States

designed employability plans, 81 Stat. 885, state work

programs might upset the accommodation that Congress

sought, The Work Incentive Program. was thus a care-

fully coordinated system, whose individual parte fit into

an integrated whole. It is hardly surprising that Con-

gress did not expressly or impliedly authorize States to

develop independent work programs, since the WIN Pro-

gram represented Congress’ recognition that such pro-

grams had to be kept under careful scrutiny if the variety

of goals Congress sought to promote were to be achieved.

"The original proposal for a Work Incentive Program would have

permitted a State to operate Community Work and Training Pro-

grams only if a federal WIN Program were not. dperated in the

"NEW YORK: DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO 7

I believe that the Court seriously misconceives the pur-

poses of the federal programs of public assistance, in its

apparent belief that Congress had the sole purpose of

promoting work opportunities, a purpose that preclud-

ing additional state programs would negate. Ante, pp.

: Congress has consistently indicated its desire

» § 204 (a).

State. H. R. 5710, 90th Cong., Ist Sess.

:

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;

:

i

f

RHE

~~

8 NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO

sional authorization for making participation in state work

a condition of eligibility for public assistance.’

programs

in Townsend serves a

useful purpose: It informs legislators that, if they wish

to alter the accommodations previously arrived at in an

The policy of clear statement *°

Act of major importance, they must indicate clearly that

wish, since what may appear to be minor changes of nar-

row scope may in fact have ramifications throughout the

administration of the Act. “A policy of clear statement

insures that Congress will consider those ramifications,"

but only if it is regularly adhered to.

MENGES FAVES

Sarai ip

r Tina aunte ijt Pe

PEE T TL pce aes LF

ee sas! La} AF ies

TRAE aul!

Hug Hill lil: at ELIT |

as] i i te : 3 a 3

alabitiiag falli

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"(NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES ». DUBLINO 9

_ Finally, it is particularly appropriate to require clear

: of authorization to impose additional condi-

tions of eligibility for public assistance. Myths abound

in area. It is widely yet erroneously believed, for

example, that recipients of public assistance have little

desire to become self-supporting. See, e. g., L. Goodwin,

Do the Poor Want to Work?, 5, 51-52, 112 (1972). Be-

cause the recipients of public assistance generally lack sub-

stantial political influence, state legislators may find it

expedient to accede to pressures generated by miscon-

ceptions. In order to lessen the possibility that erroneous

beliefs will lead state legislators to single out politically

unpopular recipients of assistance for harsh treatment,

Congress must clearly authorize States to impose condi-

tions of eligibility different from the federal standards.

As we observed in King v. Smith, 392 U. 8. 309, 318-319

(1968), this rule leaves the States with “considerable lati-

tude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State

is free to set its own standard of need and to determine

the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to

the program.” The Court today quotes this observation

but misses its import. The States have latitude to ad-

the more generally accepted proposition that such exchanges, par-

ticularly when sponsors of a bill or committee chairmen are in-

relevant to a determination of the purpose Congress

jeve in enacting the bill. United States v. St. Paul,

- R. Co., 247 U. 8. 310, 318: (1918). For legislators know

i history is made, and they ought to be aware of the

.of floor exchanges. If they disagree with the inter-

ati placed on the bill in such exchanges, they may offer amend-

or vote against it. Thus, Congress, in enacting a statute,

i be taken to have endorsed the interpretations offered in

: None of this is true of post-enactment floor ex-

which have no bearing on pending legislation and to which

& disinterested legislator might well pay scant attention. If Sen-

ator Buckley or Representative Carey wished to have a congressional

‘expression of intent on the issue of pre-emption, they were not barred

from introducing legislation.

oH

fs

vy

23

B.

10 NEW YORK DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. DUBLINO

just benefits inthe two ways mentioned, but not by

: : ditional. siti of. eligibility. When

lators cannot single.out especially unpopular groups for

~~ For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the

That the possibility of treatment that is so discriminatory as

to be unconstitutional is not insubstantial is shown by ‘the Court's

brief discussion of the jurisdiction of the District Court, avite, n. 11.