Petitioners Reply Brief — Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Avins V. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967),

cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968) ..................-...... 2

Democratic National Committee v. FCC, —— US.

App. D.C. ——, —— F.2d (No. 71-1637,

ee a cemesnencncndonsanennen 6

FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134

(1940) 4

FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470

(1940) 4

FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S.

a casecemenioeatbni 4

McIntire v. Wm. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d

597 (8d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779

REET GE SIR ER SO a RO soe 2

United States vy. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.

REESE STAI ne 4

United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.

ica cctmesintnnarecavansnenctiings 4

~ ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS:

Further Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 19260, FCC

12-117, released Feb. 7, 1972 _......-.---c.---cce-cecce-ou--- 4

Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 19260, 30 F.C.C.2d

ta 3

_ CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVI-

SIONS:

U.S. Constitution, First Amendment ....................... Me i

Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934,

a ee, eT A B18 2,5

Public Law 92-225, February 7, 1972 2,5

MISCELLANEOUS:

STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE

(4th ed. 1969) 4

—

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1971,

No. 71-863

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.,

Petitioner,

V.

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF

I

Neither the opposition of the Democratic National Com-

mittee (“DNC’’), respondent in this case, nor the opposi-

tion of Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam Peace

(“BEM’’), respondent in two related cases,’ disputes that

the decision of the court below raises novel and important

1FCC v. BEM and DNC, No. 71-864; Post-Newsweek Stations,

Capital Area, Inc. v. BEM, No. 71-865. Those petitions seek review

of the same court of appeals opinion as is involved here and in

No. 71-866, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. DNC. BEM

has filed its brief opposing certiorari in all cases, including those

in which it is not a respondent.

>... SEER IY OE SS ane Ee EKES

~~

questions.* Indeed, BEM concedes that “major constitu-

tional questions” may lie “imbedded within the court of

appeals’ decision” and “might be appropriate for review

by this Court” if presented in some other context. BEM

Opp. 16. Moreover, neither respondent seriously disputes

that the court of appeals’ decision will undermine the

existing Congressional scheme of regulation.* Both DNC

_and BEM argue, however, that this case is not “ripe”

for review by this Court because the court of appeals

has directed the Commission to implement the decision

through further rulemaking.‘

2

?In addition, DNC admits that there may be an “apparent” con-

flict between the decision below and McIntire v. William Penn

Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327

U.S. 779 (1946), but suggests that this “is certainly not a conflict

that requires resolution by this Court.” DNC Opp. 22. Contrary,

to DNC’s suggestion, the rejection by the Third Circuit in McIntire

of a First Amendment claim of a right to purchase time was an

alternative holding, not dicta. This is confirmed by the Third Cir-

cuit’s subsequent decision in Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d

Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 890 U.S. 920 (1968), which, as we pointed

out in our petition (pp. 18-19), clearty relies on McIntire as a First

Amendment decision. We did not suggest in the petition that the

Avins decision itself is in conflict with the decision of the court

below in this case, but rather that it confirms that the McIntire

decision is in conflict with that decision, and that the authority

of McIntire has not been eroded by the passage of years.

’ As we have pointed out, the Communications Act of 1934 em-

bodies a strong Congressional purpose to leave programming choices

in the hands of licensees as trustees for the public. CBS Petition,

pp. 10-11; App. D. 14-15. In the one area where Congress has

departed from this general policy it has deliberately chosen to

carve out a narrowly circumscribed exception, creating in Section

315 of the Act specific rights in candidates for public office. In a

very recent amendment to Section 315—Public Law 92-225, Febru-

ary 7, 1972—Congress has sought to ensure that candidates for

federal office will be able to purchase a “reasonable” amount of time.

This recent legislation, enacted following the court of appeals’

decision, reflects the continuing Congressional policy not to extend

individual rights to purchase time beyond the political campaign

field.

*DNC Opp. 12-19; BEM Opp. 16-29.

8

It is ironic that DNC and BEM, who sought and ob-

tained a sweeping constitutional decision from the court

of appeals requiring the Commissjen to embark on an en-

tirely new regulatory course, now argue that this Court

should not review this novel constitutional holding until

the Commission has completed rulemaking. Before the

court of appeals, DNC and BEM did not suggest that this

case was not ripe for decision, even though—as they now

emphasize ‘"—the Commission’s fairness doctrine inquiry

had been initiated prior to the court of appeals’ decision.*

DNC and BEM fail to explain how what was apparently

quite ripe for decision by the court of appeals is suddenly

not ripe for review by this Court.’

In fact, the ripeness argument misconceives the na-

ture of the decision below and what is at issue in this

case. The question presented to the court of appeals

and this Court is not whether a Commission rule requir-

ing the sale of advertising time for public issue discussion

would be appropriate or legal, but whether such a rule is

constitutionally compelled. The court of appeals’ holding

on this point is clearly ripe for review. For nothing that

the Commission might do on remand or in its fairness

doctrine inquiry can change or affect that decision; in

Judge McGowan’s apt phrase, the Commission is placed

in a “constitutional straitjacket.” *

5 DNC Opp. 14; BEM Opp. 22-23.

* Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 19260, 80 F.C.C.2d 26, 33 (1971).

Indeed, the argument of BEM and DNC that this case is not

ripe for review by this Court because of the pendency of Commis-

sion rulemaking proceedings should not, if carried to its logical

conclusion, result in a denial of certiorari. Rather, it would sug-

gest that the Court should vacate the judgment of the court of

appeals below (as having been rendered in a case not then ripe

for review), and should remand the case to the Commission to

conduct its fairness doctrine inquiry free of the constitutional

straitjacket imposed by the court of appeals.

* App. A 44. (App. —— references are to the Appendices to the

Petition for Certiorari in this case.)

I OO ee TE eS IE RT NETS ELIE ELS LITTON Py OEE RITE? Stet te

—ay

q

The new notice of inquiry issued by the Commission

in compliance with the court of appeals’ mandate plainly

indicates that the Commission believes that it is bound

by a rigid constitutional requirement and that it is not

free to implement its own conception of the public inter-

est. Acting under the constraints of the decision below,

the Commission’s rulemaking cannot involve the exercise

of administrative discretion and expertise which wou'd be

of assistance to this Court in resolving the difficult con-

stitutional issues presented by this case.

Under the well-settled practice of this Court, the court

of appeals’ remand of the case to the Commission for

further proceedings in no way detracts from the appro-

priateness of review. Remands are characteristic in cases

involving review of agency decisions, including decisions

in the communications field, where this Court has been

at pains to remind the courts of appeals of the limita-

tions of the judicial review function and the necessity

of agency implementation of decisions on review. FCC

v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940). In-

deed, some of this Court’s major decisions in the commu-

nications field have come upon grants of certiorari in

eases in which the court of appeals had remanded the

matter to the Commission for further action. £.g.,

United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192

(1956); FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337

U.S. 265 (1949); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,

309 U.S. 470 (1940).

® Further Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 19260, FCC 72-117,

released Feb. 7, 1972. (

10 Similarly, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to review decisions

of the courts of appeals, this Court has granted certiorari to resolve

an “important and clear-cut issue of law that is fundamental to

the further conduct of the case,” even though presented by a judg-

ment uiring further action to be taken by a district court.

STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 180 (4th ed. 1969).

And this Court has regarded it as particularly significant that the

ruling below decided a serious constitutional question. E.g., United

States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 878, 877 (1945).

5

II

Apart from questions of ripeness, the oppositions of

DNC and BEM rest upon an unduly broad view of what

the Commission held in this case and an unduly narrow

view of the decision of the court below. The Commission

did not, as respondents appear to suggest, bar broad-

casters from presenting editorial advertisements or parti-

san viewpoints and give a “monopoly” of advertising time

to commercial sponsors." In fact, the Commission held

that broadcasters are free to present editoria] advertise-

ments if they believe that to do so would serve the public

interest.” Almost without exception, broadcasters do sell

some time for such advertisements.* Moreover, the Com-

mission emphasized in its decision in this case that broad-

casters are obligated, in carrying out their responsibili-

ties under the fairness doctrine, to present partisan

voices in their news and public affairs broadcasts.“

There has been no showing that broadcasters have not

fulfilled that responsibility.

11 DNC Opp. 6.

22 App: D 18.

**Thus, for example, candidates, their supporters and political

parties have had ample opportunities to purchase time on the

broadcast media during the frequent federal, state and local election

campaigns characteristic of our political system. And Congress

has recently amended Section 315 of the Communications Act,

which provides “equal opportunities” for candidates, to seek to

ensure that candidates for federal office will be able to purchase a

“reasonable” amount of time. Public Law 92-225, Feb. 7, 1972.

As to advertising time, CBS’ policy is to sell such time to candi-

dates, their supporters, political parties and spokesmen on ballot

issues during election campaigns. In addition, CBS sells advertising

time to political parties, outside of election campaign periods, for

expression of views on public issues. See Brief for Intervenor

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., in DNC v. FCC, D.C. Cir. No.

24,537, pp. 3-4.

“App. D 12. As noted in our petition (p. 5), CBS policy with

respect to coverage of public issues provides substantial direct

exposure for partisans and partisan views, on a free basis, as part

of a total professional journalistic effort.

FRAPPR LEAL LILI IOE LN PRES BLE IE NSE ep IC te Te Teed

—y

6

: At #he same time, respondents erroneously picture the

court of appeals’ decision as a narrow one which will not

work a basic change in Commission policy. Thus, DNC’s

suggestion that “the Court below has required the Com-

mission to do nothing more than it had already decided

to do” * ignores the fact that the court of appeals’ deci-

sion has placed the Commission in a constitutional strait-

jacket, requiring it to promulgate rules whether or not

it regards such rules as sound policy or in the public

interest.

BEM, in its attempt to minimize the significance of

the decision below, states that the court of appeals

“merely suggested that broadcasters must make reason-

able efforts in the selling of advertising time to behave

like the able and benign ‘trustees’ of a highly valuable

public resource that they should be and claim to be.”

Elsewhere, BEM suggests that the court’s holding could

be satisfied by extending to the sale of advertising time

for the discussion of public issues “the same ‘trustee’

standards and approaches already used by broadcasters

in choosing among competing ideas and speakers under

the fairness doctrine.”?7 This reassuring view of the

scope of the decision of the court of appeals bears no

resemblance to what the court actually said or held.

As we showed in our petition, the entire thrust of the

decision below was a rejection of the exercise of journal-

istic discretion by broadcast licensees.* This is evident

28 DNC Opp. 15.

16 BEM Opp. 15.

17 BEM Opp. 24 n.61.

%*CBS Petition, pp. 10-15. Compare a recent decision, also in-

volving DNC, by another panel of the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit, emphasizing the importance of licensee

discretion in administering the fairness doctrine. Democratic

National Committee v. FCC, —— U.S. App. D.C. ——, —— F.2d

—— (No. 71-1637, decided Feb. 2, 1972).

meet « oi

7

from the language of the court’s opinion. Judge Wright

characterized the present regulatory scheme as one in

which “licensees and bureaucrats decide what issues

are ‘important,’ how ‘fully’ to cover them, and the

format, time and style of the coverage.”'® The in-

terests of the First Amendment can be satisfied, the

court held, only if the Commission requires that indi-

vidual members of the public have “initiative and edi-

torial control,” so that “partisans who feel strongly on

particular issues may decide on their own to speak out

and to speak out in their own way.” In sum, the

decision below forces the Commission to deprive licensees

of the responsibility and authority indispensable to the

trustee function. It forces the Commission to create a

vacuum to be filled by the haphazard choices of pur-

chasers of advertising time, who are not publicly account-

able and who have no duty to serve the public interest.

e

* App. A 23.

OL ELIE LOE IL LITE LLL PLIES BERE LOE NII EA SEL Ags aR mag

&

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and in the petition for

certiorari, the writ should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

LLoyD N. CUTLER

J. ROGER WOLLENBERG

TIMOTHY B. Dyk

DANIEL MARCUS

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING

900 - 17th Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20006

Counsel for Columbia

Broadcasting System, Ince.

Of Counsel:

JOHN D. APPEL

RALPH E. GOLDBERG

JOSEPH DEFRANCO

ELEANOR S. APPLEWHAITE

51 West 52 Street

New York, New York 10019

February 11, 1972

PET Sean

-

} 3u the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1971

No. 71-864

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS

Vv,

BUSINESS EXECUTIVES’ MOVE FOR VIETNAM PEACE

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS

Vv.

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

AND THE UNITED STATES

3 We wish to bring two matters to the Court’s atten-

ition.

» 1. On February 7, 1972, the Federal Communica-

ions Commission reopened Part IV of its inquiry

(1)

PEE LETTE ITE ES I TN

i

2

entitled “The Handling of Public Issues Under the

Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards

of the Communications Act” (App. A, infra, pp. 4

to 16). This part of the inquiry, which had been

initiated before the decision of the court of appeals

in this case, see Docket No. 19260, 30 F.C.C, 2d 26,

36 Fed. Reg. 11825,’ had been suspended because of

the Commission’s intention to file a petition for a

writ of certiorari and pending this Court’s decision

on the government’s subsequent motion for a stay of

the judgment of the court of appeals, as respondent

Democratic National Committee pointed out, see Brief

in Opposition, at p. 14 n. 10. In light of the Court’s

denial of a stay on January 24,.1972, the Commis-

sion has resumed Part IV of its inquiry in compli-

ance with the mandate of the court of appeals. Ac-

cordingly, the Commission has asked for ‘comments

which can be of assistance in developing reasonable

guidelines governing the determination by licensees

of which and how many editorial advertisements will

be put on the air” (App. A, infra, p. 7).

2. The newly enacted Campaign Communications

Reform Act, Title I, P.L. 92-225, approved February

7, 1972 (App. B, infra, p. 17), amends the Federal

Communications Act to require broadcast licensees to

allow reasonable access to their facilities by candi-

1 See the government’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at

p. 15 n. 7.

2 The Commission has also asked interested persons to com-

ment on whether there should be a right of access to normal

programming time “and any other matters that they believe

pertinent” (App. A, infra, p. 9).

8

dates for federal elective office. Section 103 (a) (2)

(A) of the Reform Act amends Section 312(a) of the

Communications Act (47 U.S.C. 312 (a)) to read as

follows:

The Commission may revoke any station license

or construction permit—

(7) for willful or repeated failure to allow

reasonable access to or permit purchase of

reasonable amounts of time for the use of a

: broadcasting station by a legally qualified

| candidate for Federal elective Office on be-

half of his candidacy.

Section 103 (a) (2) (B) of the new statute amends

Section 315(a) of the Communications Act (47 U.S.C.

315(a)) by adding the three italicized words to the

following language:

No obligation is imposed under this subsection

upon any licensee to allow the use of its station

by any [political] candidate [emphasis added].

These amendments are, we submit, consistent with

the view set forth in our petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari that determination of public interest require-

ments for the presentation of issues of public import-

ance within the inherent limitations of the broadcast

spectrum is a practical task peculiarly suited to reso-

lution by Congress or by the Commission.

Respectfully submitted.

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,

Solicitor General.

JOHN E. PETTIT,

General Counsel,

Federal Communications Commission.

FEERUARY 1972.

LA EIRP ARON TAT TACT MENA 22S Meme

4

APPENDIX A

Before the

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20554

Docket No. 19260

In the Matter of

The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fair-

ness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards

of the Communications Act,

and

Guidelines for the Acceptance by Broadcast Li-

censees of Editorial Advertising

FURTHER NOTICE OF INQUIRY

Adopted:

February 3, 1972; Released: February 7, 1972

By the Commission:

Commissioner Johnson concurring and issuing a

statement; Commissioner H. Rex Lee absent.

1. This Further Notice concerns Part IV of our

Notice of June 9, 1971, including particularly the

formulation of guidelines for the acceptance by broad-

casters of editorial advertising. This latter facet is

both the issue involved in Business Executives’ Move

for Vietnam Peace v. F. C. C., — U.S. App. D.C. —,

450 F. 2d 642 (1971), and also an important aspect

of the Part IV Inquiry—“access generally to the

broadcast media for the discussion of public issues.”

We have delayed comment on Part IV because, as

5

discussed below, we are seeking further review of the

above decision. However, the discussion makes clear

that we must now move immediately to the considera-

tion of guidelines in the area of editorial advertising.

That being so, there is no reason to delay the filing of

Part IV comments, Indeed, it would be helpful to

have such comments before us when we consider the

other issues in this Inquiry, since the issues are all

inter-related to some degree. That does not mean that

we shall decide all the issues at the same time. Cir-

cumstances appear to require more expeditious reso-

lution of some aspects of the Inquiry than others.

This Notice deals with one such area.

I

2. In Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam

Peace v. F. C. C., supra, the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that

a broadcast licensee may not, as a general policy,

refuse to sell advertising time to groups or individ-

uals wishing to speak on controversial public issues.

While the Court left “undisturbed the licensee’s basic

right to exercise judgment and control in public issue

programming” and “normal programming time,” and

it stated that no particular person or group has an

absolute right to have his (or its) message carried,

it ruled that in the broadcaster’s allocation of adver-

tising time it is not permissible to maintain a “total,

flat ban on editorial advertising.” The Court stated

that

“We hold specifically that a flat ban on paid pub-

lic issue announcements is in violation of the

First Amendment, at least when other sorts of

paid announcements are accepted. We do not

hold, however, that the planned announcements

a a DER OS OER EE LIF IY LITRE IS IE AI AE TS

a

6

of the petitioners or, for that matter, of any

other particular applicant for air time must nec-

essarily be accepted by broadcast licensees.

Rather we confine ourselves to invalidating the

flat ban alone, leaving it up to the licensees and

the Commission to develop and administer rea-

sonable procedures and regulations determining

which and how many ‘editorial advertisements’

will be put on the air.”

3. On January 3, 1972 a petition for a writ of

certiorari was filed on behalf of the Commission in

tne Supreme Court of the United States. No. 71-864,

40 U.S.L.W. 3317 (January 11, 1972). The Supreme

Court has not yet acted on this petition. However,

on January 24, 1972, the Court denied an application

for a stay of mandate. Accordingly, the Commission

is under a mandate to carry out the decision of the

Court of Appeals which instructed the Commission as

follows:

“On remand, the Commission should develop rea-

sonable regulatory guidelines to deal with edi-

torial advertisements. Petitioners should be al-

lowed to reapply for advertising time; and, un-

less their presentations are found to be excluda-

ble under the Commission’s guidelines, their ap-

plications should be accepted. Since the issues on

which BEM and DNC seek to speak are current

and changing, it is essential that regulations be

developed speedily and that the affected broad-

casters pass promptly upon petitioners’ applica-

tions to buy time.”

4. The purpose of this Notice is to solicit the views

of all interested parties on the nature and content of

appropriate procedures and guidelines to be adopted

7

by the Commission in furtherance of the Court’s man-

date. We welcome all comments which can be of as-

sistance in developing reasonable guidelines govern-

ing the determination by licensees of which and how

many editorial advertisements will be put on the air.

As a general approach, suggested guidelines or pro-

cedures should so far as possible be designed to avoid

frequent recourse to individual requests for Commis-

sion rulings in particular situations. In particular,

we urge parties filing comments to address the follow-

ing areas:

a. May a licensee limit the time available for

editorial advertisements and, if so, on what basis?

b. What regulation may the licensee make as to

the placement of editorial advertisements?

c. May a licensee prevent domination by a few

groups or a few viewpoints and, if so, by what

means?

d. May a licensee reject a proferred advertise-

ment on the ground that the particular view-

point has been sufficiently expressed, short of

finding undue dominance?

e. May a licensee reject a proferred advertise-

ment on standards of taste and suitability for

access to the home?

f. May a licensee reject a proffered advertise-

ment on the ground that its subject matter is of

little or no significance or interest to the commu-

nity?

g. Are any restrictions on content permissible

short of a finding that the material is outside the

protection of the First Amendment?

LR ITR a SLIIR FE MERE INE FE GE PTOI LE LIES IME ERPS TNs oe epg

—7

8

h. Should the Commission’s Cullman doctrine '

be applicable to editorial and controversial issue

advertisements which the licensee would not have

aired in the first place except for the required

sale of editorial advertising time?

i. What is the relationship generally of editorial

advertising to the licensee’s responsibilities under

the fairness doctrine to make available a reason-

able opportunity for the presentation of conflict-

ing views on controversial issues of public im-

portance? In this connection consideration should

be given to the decision of the Supreme Court in

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 US.

367 (1969).

5. We are issuing this Further Notice of Inquiry

rather than issuing guidelines without calling for

comments because we believe that we need the views

of those who would be confronted with the day-to-day

practicalities of applying the guidelines, We are al-

lowing a reasonable time for the submission of com-

ments commensurate with the importance of the is-

sues. However, prompt Commission action is required,

and we intend to expedite our consideration. of this

matter. No extensions of time for comments are con-

templated.

II

6. The discussion in I has dealt with access for

editorial advertising. The other aspect of the Inquiry

in Part IV is the matter of the right of access to

programming time. We have set forth our view that

1See Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963),

which held that a licensee cannot avoid his fairness respon-

sibilities simply because of his inability to obtain sponsorship

for the presentation of a viewpoint.

9

the ruling in Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam

Peace v. F.C.C., supra, does not extend to program-

ming time. See Committee of One Million, October

22, 1971, FCC 71-1096. We have also set forth in

Part IV issues which would be generally pertinent

here (see para. 19, Notice of Inquiry of June 9,

1971). We shall not repeat that discussion here. Par-

ties are invited to comment on those issues and any

other matters that they believe pertinent.

III

7. Accordingly, pursuant to applicable procedures

set forth in Section 1.415 of the Commission’s Rules

and Regulations, 47 CFR 1.415 (1972), interested

parties may file comments on or before March 8, 1972,

and reply comments on or before March 23, 1972, a

schedule to which we intend to adhere (see para. 5,

supra). In accordance with the provisions of Section

1.419 of the Rules, 47 CFR 1.419 (1972), an original

and 14 copies of all comments and replies shall be

furnished the Commission. All relevant and timely

comments and reply comments will be considered by

the Commission before final action is taken in this

proceeding. In reaching its decision, the Commission

may also take into account other relevant informa-

tion before it, in addition to the specific comments

invited by this Notice.

8. Because of the importance of the matters in this

Docket, we believe that some form of oral presenta-

tions will be helpful. If it is determined to have such

presentations cover the issues in Part I of this Fur-

ther Notice, we shall make this the first order of

business at the oral proceedings and shall schedule

such proceedings promptly after receipt of the reply

comments. Finally, the authority for this Further

OT SOM ONE RGR LT Bete LEED ENE AION RS I PORES PORLERY ERA

——y

10

Notice is that stated in para, 24 of the Notice of In-

quiry, June 9, 1971.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION *

BEN F. WAPLE

Secretary

BEM Notice of Inquiry

[Notice of Inquiry on guidelines governing the

purchase of time for editorial advertising in re-

sponse to the mandate of the Court of Appeals

in Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam Peace

v. F.C.C., 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ]

Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Nicholas

Johnson

I concur in the Commission’s decision to put out a

Notice of Inquiry as to what regulations or guide-

lines the FCC should promulgate regarding the pur-

chase of airtime for “editorial advertisements,” Cer-

tainly a decision of this magnitude should not be

made without some opportunity for comment from

broadcasters and citizens alike.

I. The Questions

The Commission poses nine questions to which it

asks interested parties to address themselves. Since

the comments of interested parties need not be limited

to the particular questions posed by the Commission,

I shall not object by way of dissent to any of the

* See attached statement of Commissioner Johnson.

11

particular questions. However, I do question the wis-

dom of some of these questions, for I believe that it

would be unconstitutional for the Commission to an-

swer them in the affirmative.

In discussing the limitations that may be placed on

the purchase of advertising time in BEM the Court

stated:

The content of the idea which the excluded

speakers seek to promote is—emphatically—not

permitted as a distinguishing factor in itself, In-

deed, the existence of an exclusionary discrimi-

nation apparently based on the content of ideas

presents an additional, or greatly heightened,

prima facie constitutional violation. Both free

speech and equal protection principles condemn

any discrimination among speakers which is

based on what they intend to say. If the First

Amendment prohibits anything at all, it must be

a censorial discrimination among ideas, (Em-

phasis in original. )’

And the Court went on to say:

It is well established in First Amendment law

governing access to forums that “reasonable regu-

lations” may be promulgated and enforced to

limit the exercise of free speech. At the least,

there may be regulations determining the time,

place and manner of speech.’

Then the Court proceeded to state a few of the pos-

sible “traffic” regulations that may be promulgated

by the Commission: a limit on the total amount of

1 Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam Peace v. F.C.C..,

450 F. 2d 642, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

?Id., 663.

a da le le a te Sy a +N TTS Raa Retr err tee

12

editorial advertisement time available; limitations on

the right of placement in the time period of the ad-

vertiser’s choice; a limit on the amount of time avail-

able to a particular group or adherents of a particu-

lar viewpoint; limitations on the amount of free time

available to those unable to pay.’

Some of the questions posed may raise constitu-

tional objections:

(e) May a licensee reject a proffered advertise-

ment on standards of taste and suitability for

access to the home?

(f) May a licensee reject a proffered advertise-

ment on the ground that its subject matter is of

little or no significance or interest to the commu-

nity?

Affirmative answers to these two questions would

transcend the “time, place and manner” limitations

which the Court authorized the Commission to enact.

The only reason I concur and do not dissent to this

Notice of Inquiry is that the mere posing of these

questions does not bind the Commission to adopting

an affirmative answer to these questions. Moreover,

interested citizens and broadcasters should have the

opportunity to comment on the whole range of ques-

tions raised by the BEM decision, and I would like to

have the benefit of those comments.

II. Interim Procedures

The question remains, what do we do in the mean-

_ time? What is our proper response to those petitions

which might be filed between now and the promulga-

tion of our regulations? BEM is now the law of the

land. This is implicit in the fact that the Commission

*Id., 663-665.

13

now asks for comments and prepares to issue guide-

lines, even before the United States Supreme Court

acts on the pending petition for certiorari. This is

so, of course, because after the decision of the Court

of Appeals some six months ago (August 3, 1971),

the Commission’s petition for rehearing was denied

by the Court (October 4, 1971), our motion for a stay

of mandate was denied by the Court (October 22,

1971), and our motion for a stay of mandate was

denied by the Supreme Court (January 24, 1972).

Since BEM is now the law of the land, we must

rule on whatever petitions that are filed according to

the law of BEM: there can be no flat ban on “edi-

torial advertisements.” I have absolutely no idea

whether any such petitions are going to be filed in

the next 45 days or so, But it is clear that if any

are filed, it will not be appropriate for the Commis-

sion to act as it did last August 6, in the Communi-

cations Workers of America case.‘ On the day after

the BEM decision, CWA was turned down by NBC

and CBS owned-and-operated stations in their re-

quest to buy time for “editorial advertisements.” In

that. opinion, to which I dissented, the Commission

stated that it had not yet had time to promulgate the

regulations suggested by the Court of Appeals, The

same excuse is not open to the Commission now. In

the six months since BEM, even while appealing the

BEM case to the Supreme Court, the Commission

surely could have adopted regulations to go into effect

whenever the BEM case became the law of the land.

Now we are faced with that very situation. BEM

is the law, and there are no regulations, How should

we act?

*Communications Workers of America, Request for De-

claratory Ruling, 31 F.C.C.2d 841 (1971).

..... RATTAN RS Me PA PE REY MU REAT RTO Cy taromanem as ge ATP Dag cen

14

BEM said that it was unconstitutional for a li-

censee to enact a flat ban on editorial advertising.

The Court’s opinion shows that the presumption clear-

ly has to be in favor of the petitioner, not the licensee,

in such a dispute:

It being established that there is a strong and

specific First Amendment interest in editorial ad-

vertising and that the policies discriminatorily

barring such expression work a prima facie vio-

lation of constitutional principles, we must con-

sider the countervailing considerations raised by

the Commission and the broadcaster-intervenors.

In order to justify the policy at issue, they must

show some very substantial harm that would -be

caused by acceptance of editorial advertising—a

sort of harm great enough to override the First

Amendment interests at stake and a sort of harm

not already involved in the acceptance of com-

mercial and “noncontroversial” advertising. Only

such a showing could convince us that the ban on

editorial advertisements is supported by sufficient

countervailing values and is not based solely on.

the content of the ideas conveyed.*

Thus, in the absence of any regulations, the burden

is on the broadcaster, not the citizen. The broadcaster

must explain to the FCC why he cannot accept the

citizen’s money and put the editorial advertisement

on the air: he must make a showing of “some very

substantial harm that would be caused by acceptance

of editorial advertising.”

Since the Court of Appeals went out of its way to

state that “[s]ince the issues on which BEM and

DNC seek to speak are current and changing, it is

essential that regulations be developed speedily and

5 B.E.M. Vv. F.C.C., supra at 662.

_—

that the affected broadcasters pass promptly upon pe-

titioners’ applications to buy time,’”* I do not think

that this Commission has any alternative but to issue

an interim rule, pending the outcome of this Notice of

Inquiry, that all requests for the purchase of time for

editorial advertisements must be accepted by the

broadcasters, absent showing of “some very substan-

tial harm.”

I do not honestly know what this Commission is

prepared to do if, in fact, such a petition is filed be-

tween now and the time the regulations are promul-

gated. As with any matter of free speech, time is of

the essence. Certainly this is the cardinal principle

underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in The New

York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971), where

the Supreme Court once again affirmed the age-old

presumption against any form of prior restraint. In-

asmuch as the Commission affords no guidance on

this issue whatsoever, I simply must assume that the

Commission intended by its silence on the issue to

adopt the interim rule of law implicit in the Court’s

opinion in BEM: absent a showing of “some very

substantial harm that would be caused by acceptance

of editorial advertising,” the broadcaster is required

by the First Amendment to accept the request for

paid access for the airing of editorial advertising.’

15

*Id., 665.

"I do not consider it necessary to discuss in detail what

sort of showing would be appropriate under the “very sub-

stantial harm” test. I must state that I find it hard to believe

that the placement of a few editorial advertisements into

any broadcaster’s schedule—accompanied, of course, by good

money—would do anything but enrich the broadcaster. I

know of few cases in which broadcasters have been unable

to find the airtime to squeeze just one more spot on the air,

~~ EARLE TE I SETAE rs ae

16

Accordingly, I concur.

especially when the order is accompanied by payment. Is that

not the hallmark of our commercial broadcasting system?

On the other hand, there is the question as to effect of

editorial advertising on the broadcaster’s fairness obligations.

For the purposes of argument, I shall pose three distinct

examples in order to assess this question.

The first case is that of a citizen who seeks to buy time for

an issue that everyone agrees is not controversial and thus

not subject to the Fairness Doctrine. These spots are by

definition non-controversial and should go on the air without

question, since they do not give rise to the obligation to pre-

sent the other side of a controversial issue, and thus no reve-

nue loss to the broadcaster can result under Cullman. 40

F.C.C. 576 (1963).

The second situation is if the issue being discussed by the

editorial spots has already been heavily covered by the broad-

caster, and the coverage has already been adequately balanced.

Such an instance might be Vietnam, the subject of BEM’s

spots. No Cullman problems would arise since it is unlikely

that any overall imbalance would result from the acceptance

of a few more minutes of time for or against the war.

The third situation is that in which a controversial issue

not previously covered by the broadcaster is discussed in the

spots. Here, the inclusion of airtime on one side of the con-

troversy will not create any »bligations that do not already

exist on the part of the broadcaster: He always has had the

obligation under the Fairness Doctrine to cover the con-

troversy at his own expense. Thus, he cannot really object to

the particular form (editorial spots) in which the controversy

has first been broached on his station—especially when it was

produced at no cost to him.

17

APPENDIX B

AN ACT

To promote fair practices in the conduct of election

campaigns for Federal political Offices,

and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repre-

sentatives of the United States of America in Con-

gress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the

“Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971”.

TITLE I—CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS

SHORT TITLE

SEC. 101. This title may be cited as the “Cam-

paign Communications Reform Act”.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 102. For purposes of this title:

(1) The term “communications media” means

broadcasting stations, newspapers, magazines,

outdoor advertising facilities, and telephones;

but, with respect to telephones, spending or an

expenditure shall be deemed to be spending or an

expenditure for the use of communications me-

dia only if such spending or expenditure is for

the costs of telephones, paid telephonists, and

automatic telephone equipment, used by a can-

didate for Federal elective office to communicate

with potential voters (excluding any costs of

telephones incurred by a volunteer for use of

telephones by him).

18

(2) The term “broadcasting station” has the

same meaning as such term has under section

315(f) of the Communications Act of 1934.

(3) The term ‘Federal elective office’? means

the office of President of the United States, or

of Senator or Representative in, or Resident

Commissioner or Delegate to, the Congress of

the United States (and for purposes of section

103(b) such term includes the office of Vice

President).

(4) The term “legally qualified candidate”

means any person who (A) meets the qualifica-

tions prescribed by the applicable laws to hold

the Federal elective office for which he is a can-

didate, and (B) is eligible under applicable State

law to be voted for by the electorate directly or

by means of delegates or electors.

(5) The term “voting age population” means

resident population, eighteen years of age and

older.

(6) The term “State” includes the District of

Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

MEDIA RATE AND RELATED REQUIREMENTS

SEc. 108. (a)(1) Section 315(b) of the Commu-

nications Act of 1934 is amended to read as follows:

“(b) The charges made for the use of any broad-

casting station by any person who is a legally quali-

fied candidate for any public office in connection with

his campaign for nomination for election, or election,

to such office shall not exceed—

“(1) during the forty-five days preceding the

date of a primary or primary runoff election and

during the sixty days preceding the date of a

general or special election in which such person

19

is a candidate, the lowest unit charge of the

station for the same class and amount of time

for the same period; and

“(2) at any other time, the charges made for

comparable use of such station by other users

thereof.”

(2) (A) Section 312(a) of such Act is amended by

striking “or” at the end of clause (5), striking the

period at the end of clause (6) and inserting in lieu

thereof a semicolon and “or”, and adding at the end

of such section 312(a) the following new paragraph:

“(7) for willful or repeated failure to allow

reasonable access to or to permit purchase of

reasonable amounts of time for the use of a

broadcasting station by a legally qualified can-

didate for Federal elective office on behalf of

his candidacy.”

(B) The second sentence of section 315(a) of such

Act is amended by inserting “under this subsection”

after “No obligation is imposed”.

(b) To the extent that any person sells space in

any newspaper or magazine to a legally qualified

candidate for Federal elective office, or nomination

thereto, in connection with such candidate’s campaign

for nomination for, or election to, such office, the

charges made for the use of such Space in connection

with his campaign shall not exceed the charges made

for comparable use of such space for other purposes.

LIMITATIONS OF EXPENDITURES FOR USE OF

COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

SEC. 104. (a)(1) Subject to paragraph (4), no

legally qualified candidate in an election (other than

a primary or primary runoff election) for a Federal

elective office may—

PERE FORELEG LIP SIL LAY AE TRE LEN aK Ay ae EEN iy nats pags

—ay

(A) spend for the use of communications

media on behalf of his candidacy in such elec-

tion a total amount in excess of the greater of—

20

(i) 10 cents multiplied by the voting age

population (as certified under paragraph

(5)) of the geographical area in which the

election for such office is held, or

(ii) $50,000, or

(B) spend for the use of broadcast stations

on behalf of his candidacy in such election a

total amount in excess of 60 per centum of the

amount determined under subparagraph (A)

with respect to such election.

(2) No legally qualified candidate in a primary

election for nomination to a Federal elective office,

other than President, may spend—

(A) for the use of communications media, or

(B) for the use of broadcast stations,

on behalf of his candidacy in such election a total

amount in excess of the amounts determined under

paragraph (1) (A) or (B), respectively, with re-

spect to the general election for such office. For pur-

poses of this subsection a primary runoff election

shall be treated as a separate primary election.

(3)(A) No person who is a candidate for presi-

dential nomination may spend—

(i) for the use in a State of communications

media, or

(ii) for the use in a State of broadcast sta-

tions,

on behalf of his candidacy for presidential nomina- |

tion a total amount in excess of the amounts which

21

would have been determined under paragraph (1)

(A) or (B), respectively, had he been a candidate

for election for the office of Senator from such State

(or for the office of Delegate or Resident Commis-

sioner in the case of the District of Columbia or the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico).

(B) For purposes of this paragraph (3), a person

is a candidate for presidential nomination if he makes

(or any other person makes on his behalf) an ex-

penditure for the use of any communications medium

on behalf of his candidacy for any political party’s

nomination for election to the office of President. He

shall be considered to be such a candidate during the

period—

(i) beginning on the date on which he (or

such other person) first makes such an expendi-

ture (or, if later, January 1 of the year in which

the election for the office of President is held),

and

(ii) ending on the date on which such politi-

cal party nominates a candidate for the office

of President.

For purposes of this title and of section 315 of the

Communications Act of 1934, a candidate for presi-

dential nomination shall be considered a legally quali-

fied candidate for public office.

(C) The Comptroller General shall prescribe regu-

lations under which any expenditure by a candidate

for presidential nomination for the use in two or

more States of a communications medium shall be

attributed to such candidate’s expenditure limitation

in each such State, based on the number of persons in

such State who can reasonably be expected to be

reached by such communications medium.

(4)(A) For purposes of subparagraph (B):

>. eA ce NOME NOES T TN VIS te AS OEY WIA I Se aw SR RTIIY FLERE YS NG a re Trea ee nerrm eee

22

(i) The term “price index” means the average

over a calendar year of the Consumer Price In-

dex (all items—United States city average) pub-

lished monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

(ii) The term “base period” means the calen-

dar year 1970.

(B) At the beginning of each calendar year (com-

mencing in 1972), as there becomes available neces-

sary data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of

the Department of Labor, the Secretary of Labor

shall certify to the Comptroller General and publish

in the Federal Register the per centum difference

between the price index for the 12 months preceding

the beginning of such calendar year and the price

index for the base period. Each amount determined

under paragraph (1)(A)(i) and (ii) shall be in-

creased by such per centum difference. Each amount

so increased shall be the amount in effect for such

calendar year.

(5) Within 60 days after the date of enactment

of this Act, and during the first week of January in

1973 and every subsequent year, the Secretary of

Commerce shall certify to the Comptroller General

and publish in the Federal Register an estimate of

the voting age population of each State and congres-

sional district for the last calendar year ending be-

fore the date of certification.

(6) Amounts spent for the use of communications

media on behalf of any legally qualified candidate

for Federal elective office (or for nomination to such

office) shall, for the purposes of this subsection, be

deemed to have been spent by such candidate.

Amounts spent for the use of communications media

by or on behalf of any legally qualified candidate

for the office of Vice President of the United States

23

shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to

have been spent by the candidate for the office of

President of the United States with whom he is run-

ning.

(7) For purposes of this section and section 315

(c) of the Communications Act of 1934—

(A) spending and charges for the use of com-

munications media include not only the direct

charges of the media but also agents’ commis-

sions allowed the agent by the media, and

(B).any expenditure for the use of any com-

munications medium by or on behalf of the can-

didacy of a candidate for Federal elective office

(or nomination thereto) shall be charged against

the expenditure limitation under this subsection

applicable to the election in which such medium

is used.

(b) No person may make any charge for the use

by or on behalf of any legally qualified candidate for

Federal elective office (or for nomination to such

office) of any newspaper, magazine, or outdoor ad-

vertising facility, unless such candidate (or a person

specifically authorized by such candidate in writing

to do so) certifies in writing to the person making

such charge that the payment of such charge will not

violate paragraph (1), (2), or (38) of subsection (a),

whichever is applicable.

(c) Section 315 of the Communications Act of

1934 is amended by redesignating subsection (c) as

subsection (g) and by inserting after subsection (b)

the following new subsections:

“(c) No station licensee may make any charge

for the use of such station by or on behalf of any

legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office

LS LOE OINA ARLE I ILO I LEE NE Toh SEN LELS GORA a there, td

~

24

(or for nomination to such office) unless such candi-

date (or a person specifically authorized by such

candidate in writing to do so) certifies to such li-

censee in writing that the payment of such charge

will not violate any limitation specified in paragraph

(1), (2), or (3) of section 104(a) of the Campaign

Communications Reform Act, whichever paragraph

is applicable.

“(d) If a State by law and expressly—

“(1) has provided that a primary or other

election for any office of such State or of a politi-

cal subdivision thereof is subject to this subsec-

tion,

(2) has specified a limitation upon total ex-

penditures for the use of broadcasting stations

on behalf of the candidacy of each legally quali-

fied candidate in such election,

“(3) has provided in any such law an un-

equivocal expression of intent to be bound by

the provisions of this subsection, and

“(4) has stipulated that the amount of such

limitation shall not exceed the amount which

would be determined for such election under sec-

tion 104(a)(1)(B) or 104(a)(2)(B) (which-

ever is applicable) of the Campaign Communi-

cations Reform Act had such election been an

election for a Federal elective office or nomina-

tion thereto;

then no station licensee may make any charge for

the use of such station by or on behalf of any legally

qualified candidate in such election unless such can-

didate (or a person specifically authorized by such

candidate in writing to do so) certifies to such li-

censee in writing that the payment of such charge

will not violate such State limitation.

25

“(e) Whoever willfully and knowingly violates the

provisions of subsection (c) or (d) of this section

shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $5,000 or

imprisonment for a period not to exceed five years,

or both. The provisions of sections 501 through 503

of this Act shall not apply to violations of either

such subsection.

“(f)(1) For the purposes of this section:

“(A) The term ‘broadcasting station’ includes

a community antenna television system.

“(B) The terms ‘licensee’ and ‘station licen-

see’ when used with respect to a community an-

tenna television system, means the operator of

such system.

“(C) The term ‘Federal elective office’ means

the office of President of the United States, or

of Senator or Representative in, or Resident

Commissioner or Delegate to, the Congress of the

United States.

“(2) For purposes of subsections (c) and (d), the

term ‘legally qualified candidate’ means any person

who (A) meets the qualifications prescribed by the

applicable laws to hold the office for which he is a

candidate and (B) is eligible under applicable State

law to be voted for by the electorate directly or by

means of delegates or electors.”

REGULATIONS

Sec. 105. The Comptroller General shall prescribe

such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate

to carry out sections 102, 103(b), 104(a), and 104

(b) of this Act.

\

PU LEAL LION LOL, EOLA PE IOS Ss Retr stage NAT eats tee oe I

26

PENALTIES

Sec. 106. Whoever willfully and knowingly vio-

lates any provision of section 103(b), 104(a), or 104

(b) or any regulation under section 105 shall be

punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or by

imprisonment of not more than five years, or both.

TITLE II—CRIMINAL CODE AMENDMENTS

SEC. 201. Section 591 of title 18, United States

Code, is amended to read as follows:

§ 591. Definitions

“When used in sections 597, 599, 600, 602, 608,

610, and 611 of this title—

“(a) ‘election’ means (1) a general, special,

primary, or runoff election, (2) a convention or

caucus of a political party held to nominate a

candidate, (3) a primary election held for the

selection of delegates to a national nominating

convention of a political party, (4) a primary

election held for the expression of a preference

for the nomination of persons for election to the

office of President, and (5) the election of dele-

gates to a constitutional convention for propos-

ing amendments to the Constitution of the

United States;

“(b) ‘candidate’ means an individual who

seeks nomination for election, or election, to

Federal office, whether or not such individual is

elected, and, for purposes of this paragraph, an

individual shall be deemed to seek nomination

for election, or election, to Federal office, if he

has (1) taken the action necessary under the

law of a State to qualify himself for nomination

for election, or election, or (2) received contri-

Be Bein

ee dais toe

~ ta mi

_—_

butions or made expenditures, or has given his

consent for any other person to receive contribu-

tions or make expenditures, with a view to bring-

ing about his nomination for election, or election,

to such office;

“(¢c) ‘Federal office’ means the office of Presi-

dent or Vice President of the United States, or

Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or

Resident Commissioner to, the Congress of the

United States;

“(d) ‘political committee’ means any individ-

ual, committee, association, or organization

which accepts contributions or makes expendi-

tures during a calendar year in an aggregate

amount exceeding $1,000;

“(e) ‘contribution’ means—

27

“(1) a gift, subscription, loan, advance,

or deposit of money or anything of value

(except a loan of money by a national or

State bank made in accordance with the

applicable banking laws and regulations and

in the ordinary course of business), made for

the purpose of influencing the nomination

for election, or election, of any person to

Federal office, for the purpose of influencing

the results of a primary held for the selec-

tion of delegates to a national nominating

convention of a political party or for the

expression of a preference for the nomina-

tion of persons for election to the office of

President, or for the purpose of influencing

the election of delegates to a constitutional

convention for proposing amendments to the

Constitution of the United States;

a_i A Ra SAE REP AULT agree ato tener tone

28

“(2) a contract, promise, or agreement,

express or implied, whether or not legally

enforceable, to make a contribution for such

purposes;

“(3) a transfer of funds between politi-

cal committees;

“(4) the payment, by any person other

than a candidate or political committee, of

compensation for the personal services of

another person which are rendered to such

candidate or political committee without

charge for any such purpose; and

“(5) notwithstanding the foregoing mean-

ings of ‘contribution’, the word shall not be

construed to include services provided with-

out compensation by individuals volunteer-

ing a portion or all of their time on behalf

of a candidate or political committee;

“(f) ‘expenditure’ means—

“(1) a purchase, payment, distribution,

loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or

anything of value (except a loan of money

by a national or State bank made in accord-

ance with the applicable banking laws and

regulations and in the ordinary course of

business), made for the purpose of influ-

encing the nomination for election, or elec-

tion, of any person to Federal office, for the

purpose of influencing the result of a pri-

mary held for the selection of delegates to

a national nominating convention of a po-

litical party or for the expression of a pref-

erence for the nomination of persons for

election to the office of President, or for the

purpose of influencing the election of dele-

29

gates to a constitutional convention for pro-

posing amendments to the Constitution of

the United States;

“(2) a contract, promise, or agreement,

express or implied, whether or not legally

enforceable, to make any expenditure; and

“(3) a transfer of funds between politi-

cal committees;

“(g) ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ mean an individ-

ual, partnership, committee, association, corpo-

ration, or any other organization or group of

persons; and

“(h) ‘State’ means each State of the United

States, the District of Columbia, the Common-

wealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or pos-

session of the United States.”’.

SEc. 202. Section 600 of title 18, United States

Code, is amended to read as follows:

“$600. Promise of employment or other benefit for

political activity

“Whoever, directly or indirectly, promises any em-

ployment, position, compensation, contract, appoint-

ment, or other benefit, provided for or made possible

in whole or in part by any Act of Congress, or any

special consideration in obtaining any such benefit,

to any person as consideration, favor, or reward for

any political activity or for the support of or opposi-

tion to any candidate or any political party in con-

nection with any general or special election to any

political office, or in connection with any primary

election or political convention or caucus held to se-

lect candidates for any political office, shall be fined

not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than

one year, or both.”.

WOE LY, | ONCE ARR ARR Rey

80

SEc. 208. Section 608 of title 18, United States

Code, is amended to read as follows:

“$608. Limitations on contributions and expendi-

tures

“(a)(1) No candidate may make expenditures

from his personal funds, or the personal funds of his

immediate family, in connection with his campaign

for nomination for election, or election, to Federal

office in excess of —

“(A) $50,000, in the case of a candidate for

the office of President or Vice President;

“(B) $35,000, in the case of a candidate for

the office of Senator; or

“(C) $25,000, in the case of a candidate for

the office of Representative, or Delegate or Resi-

dent Commissioner to the Congress.

“(2) For purposes of this subsection, nmediate

family’ means a candidate’s spouse, and any child,

parent, grandparent, brother, or sister of the candi-

date, and the spouses of such persons,

“(b) No candidate or political committee shall

knowingly accept any contribution or authorize any

expenditure in violation of the provisions of this sec-

tion.

“(ce) Violation of the provisions of this section is

punishable by a fine not to exceed $1,000, imprison-

ment for not to exceed one year, or both.”.

SEc. 204. Section 609 of title 18, United States

Code, is repealed.

SEC. 205. Section 610 of title 18, United States

Code, relating to contributions or expenditures by

national banks, corporations, or labor organizations,

is amended by adding at the end thereof the follow-

ing paragraph:

31

“As used in this section, the phrase ‘contribution

or expenditure’ shall include any direct or indirect

payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift

of money, or any services, or anything of value (ex-

cept a loan of money by a national or State bank

made in accordance with the applicable banking laws

and regulations and in the ordinary course of busi-

ness) to any candidate, campaign committee, or po-

litical party or organization, in connection with any

election to any of the offices referred to in this sec-

tion; but shall not include communications by a cor-

poration to its stockholders and their families or by

a labor organization to its members and their fami-

lies on any subject; nonpartisan registration and get-

out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its

stockholders and their families, or by a labor organ-

ization aimed at its members and their families; the

establishment, administration, and solicitation of con- -

tributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized

for political purposes by a corporation or labor or-

ganization: Provided, That it shall be unlawful for

such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure

by utilizing money or anything of value secured by

physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals,

or the threat of force, job discrimination, or financial

reprisal; or by dues, fees, or other monies required

as a condition of membership in a labor organization

or as a condition of employment, or by monies ob-

tained in any commercial transaction.”.

SEC. 206. Section 611 of title 18, United States

Code, is amended to read as follows:

“$611. Contributions by Government contractors

“Whoever—

“(a) entering into any contract with the

United States or any department or agency

eee EH ASE RD SUS LER DH DANTON TERA TRE

82

thereof either for the rendition of personal serv-

ices or furnishing any material, supplies, or

equipment to the United States or any depart-

ment or agency thereof or for selling any land

or building to the United States or any depart-

ment or agency thereof, if payment for the per-

formance of such contract or payment for such

material, supplies, equipment, land, or building

is to be made in whole or in part from funds

appropriated by the Congress, at any time be-

tween the commencement of negotiations for and

the later of (1) the completion of performance

under, or (2) the termination of negotiations

for, such contract or furnishing of material, sup-

plies, equipment, land or buildings, directly or

indirectly makes any contribution of money or

other thing of value, or promises expressly or

impliedly to make any such contribution, to any

political party, committee, or candidate for pub-

lic office or to any person for any political pur-

pose or use; or

“(b) knowingly solicits any such contribution

from any such person for any such purpose dur-

ing any such period;

shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned

not more than five years, or both.”.

Sec. 207. The table of sections for chapter 29 of

title 18, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) striking out the item relating to section

608 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

“608. Limitations on contributions and ex-

penditures.” ;

(2) striking out the item relating to section

609 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

“609. Repealed.”

33

(3) striking out the item relating to section

611 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

“611. Contributions by Government. con-

tractors.”’.

TITLE III—DISCLOSURE OF FEDERAL

CAMPAIGN FUNDS

DEFINITIONS

SEc. 301. When used in this title—

(a) “election” means (1) a general, special,

primary, or runoff election, (2) a convention or

caucus of a political party held to nominate a

candidate, (3) a primary election held for the se-

lection of delegates to a national nominating

convention of a political party, (4) a primary

election held for the expression of a preference

for the nomination of persons for election to the

office of President, and (5) the election of dele-

gates to a constitutional convention for propos-

ing amendments to the Constitution of the United

States;

(b) “candidate” means an individual who

seeks nomination for election, or election, to Fed-

eral office, whether or not such individual is

elected, and, for purposes of this paragraph, an

individual shall be deemed to seek nomination for

election, or election, if he has (1) taken the ac-

tion necessary under the law of a State to qualify

himself for nomination for election, or election,

to Federal office, or (2) received contributions or

made expenditures, or has given his consent for

any other person to receive contributions or make

expenditures, with a view to bringing about his

nomination for election, or election, to such office ;

7 _

(c) ‘Federal office’ means the office of Presi-

dent or Vice President of the United States; or

of Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or

Resident Commissioner to, the Congress of the

United States;

(d) “political committee” means any commit-

tee, association, or organization which accepts

contributions or makes expenditures during a cal-

endar year in an aggregate amount exceeding

$1,000;

(e) “contribution” means—

(1) a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or

deposit of money or anything of value, made

for the purpose of influencing the nomina-

tion for election, or election, of any person

to Federal office or as a presidential or vice-

presidential elector, or for the purpose of

influencing the result of a primary held for

the selection of delegates to a national nomi-

nating convention of a political party or for

the expression of a preference for the nomi-

nation of persons for election to the office of

President, or for the purpose of influencing

the election of delegates to a constitutional

convention for proposing amendments to the

Constitution of the United States;

(2) a contract, promise, or agreement,

whether or not legally enforceable, to make

a contribution for any such purpose;

(3) a transfer of funds between political

committees ;

(4) the payment, by any person other than

a candidate or political committee, of com-

pensation for the personal services of an-

other person which are rendered to such can-

_

didate or committee without charge for any

such purpose; and

(5) notwithstanding the foregoing mean-

ings of “contribution”, the word shall not be

construed to include services provided with-

out compensation by individuals volunteer-

ing a portion or all of their time on behalf

of a candidate or political committee;

35

(f) “expenditure” means—

(1) a purchase, payment, distribution,

loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or

anything of value, made for the purpose of

influencing the nomination for ‘election, or

election, of any person to Federal office, or

as a presidential and vice-presidential elec-

tor, or for the purpose of influencing the

result of a primary held for the selection. of

delegates to a national nominating conven-

tion of a political party or for the expression

of a preference for the nomination of per-

sons for election to the office of President, or

for the purpose of influencing the election of

delegates to a constitutional convention for

proposing amendments to the Constitution

of the United States;

(2) a contract, promise, or agreement,

whether or not legally enforceable, to make

an expenditure, and

(3) a transfer of funds between political

committees;

(g) “supervisory officer” means the Secretary

of the Senate with respect to candidates for Sen-

ator; the Clerk of the House of Representatives

with respect to candidates for Representative in,

or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the

ee EPEAT

_,

Congress of the United States; and the Comp-

troller General of the United States in any other

case;

(h) “person” means an individual, partner-

ship, committee, association, corporation, labor

organization, and any other organization or group

of persons; and

(i) “State” means each State of the United

States, the District of Columbia, the Common-

wealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or pos-

session of the United States.

36

ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL COMMITTEES

Sec. 302. (a) Every political committee shall have

a chairman and a treasurer. No contribution and no

expenditure shall be accepted or made by or on be-

half of a political committee at a time when there is

a vacancy in the office of chairman or treasurer there-

of. No expenditure shall be made for or on behalf of

a political committee without the authorization of its

chairman or treasurer, or their designated agents.

(b) Every person who receives a contribution in

excess of $10 for a political committee shall, on de-

mand of the treasurer, and in any event within five

days after receipt of such contribution, render to the

treasurer a detailed account thereof, including the

amount, the name and address (occupation and the

principal place of business, if any) of the person

making such contribution, and the date on which re-

ceived. All funds of a political committee shall be seg-

regated from, and may not be commingled with, any

personal funds of officers, members, or associates of

such committee.

(c) It shall be the duty of the treasurer of a po-

litical committee to keep a detailed and exact account

of—

37

(1) all contributions made to or for such com-

mittee;

(2) the full name and mailing address (occu-

pation and the principal place of business, if

any) of every person making a contribution in

excess of $10, and the date and amount thereof :

(3) all expenditures made by or on behalf of

such committee; and

(4) the full name and mailing address (occu-

pation and the principal place of business, if

any) of.every person to whom any expenditure

is made, the date and amount thereof and the

name and address of, and office sought by, each

candidate on whose behalf such expenditure was

made,

(d) It shall be the duty of the treasurer to obtain

and keep a receipted bill, stating the particulars, for

every expenditure made by or on behalf of a political

committee in excess of $100 in amount, and for any

such expenditure in a lesser amount, if the aggregate

amount of such expenditures to the same person dur-

ing a calendar year exceeds $100. The treasurer shall

preserve all receipted bills and accounts required to

be kept by this section for periods of time to be deter-

mined by the supervisory officer.

(e) Any political committee which solicits or re-

ceives contributions or makes expenditures on behalf

of any candidate that is not authorized in writing by

such candidate to do so shall include a notice on the

face or front page of all literature and advertisements

published in connection with such candidate’s cam-

paign by such committee or on its behalf stating that

the committee is not authorized by such candidate and

that such candidate is not responsible for the activi-

ties of such committee.

(f) (1) Any political committee shall include on the

38

face or front page of all literature and advertisements

soliciting funds the following notice:

“A copy of our report filed with the appropriate

supervisory officer is (or will be) available for pur-

chase from the Superintendent of Documents, United

States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

- 20402.”.

(2)(A) The supervisory officer shall compile and

furnish to the Public Printer, not later than the last

day of March of each year, an annual report for each

political committee which has filed a report with him

under this title during the period from March 10 of

the preceding calendar year through January 31 of

the year in which such annual report is made avail-

able to the Public Printer. Each such annual report

shall contain—

(i) a copy of the statement of organization of

the political committee required under section

303, together with any amendments thereto; and

(ii) a copy of each report filed by such com-

mittee under section 304 from March 10 of the

preceding year through January 31 of the year

in which the annual report is so furnished to the

Public Printer.

(B) The Public Printer shall make copies of such

annual reports available for sale to the public by the

Superintendent of Documents as soon as practicable

after they are received from the supervisory officer.

REGISTRATION. OF POLITICAL COMMITTEES;

STATEMENTS

Sec. 303. (a) Each political committee which an-

ticipates receiving contributions or making expendi-

tures during the calendar year in an aggregate

ee ee a

89

amount exceeding $1,000 shall file with the supervis-

ory officer a statement of organization, within ten

days after its organization or, if later, ten days after

the date on which it has information which causes the

committee to anticipate it will receive contributions

or make expenditures in excess of $1,000. Each such

committee in existence at the date of enactment of

this Act shall file a statement of organization with

the supervisory officer at such time as he prescribes.

(b) The statement of organization shall include—

(1) the name and address of the committee ;

(2) the names, addresses, and relationships of

affiliated or connected organizations;

(3) the area, scope, or jurisdiction of the com-

mittee; 7

(4) the name, address, and position of the cus-

todian of books and accounts;

(5) the name, address, and position of other

principal officers, including officers and members

of the finance committee, if any;

(6) the name, address, office sought, and party

affiliation of (A) each candidate whom the com-

mittee is supporting, and ( B) any other individ-

ual, if any, whom the committee is supporting

for nomination for election, or election, to any

public office whatever; or, if the committee is

supporting the entire ticket of any party, the

name of the party;

(7) a statement whether the committee is a

continuing one;

(8) the disposition of residual funds which

will be made in the event of dissolution ;

(9) a listing of all banks, safety deposit boxes,

or other repositories used;

(10) a statement of the reports required to be

filed by the committee with State or local officers,

40

and, if so, the names, addresses, and positions of

_/such persons; and

*“ (11) such other information as shall be re-

quired by the supervisory officer.

(c) Any change in information previously submit-

ted in a statement of organization shall be reported

to the supervisory officer within a ten-day period fol-

lowing the change.

(d) Any committee which, after having filed one

or more statements of organization, disbands or de-

termines it will no longer receive contributions or

make expenditures during the calendar year in an

aggregate amount exceeding $1,000 shall so notify

the supervisory officer.

REPORTS By POLITICAL COMMITTEES AND

CANDIDATES

Sec. 304. (a) Each treasurer of a political com-

mittee supporting a candidate or candidates for elec-

tion to Federal office, and each candidate_for election

to such office, shall file with the appropriate supervis-

ory officer reports of receipts and expenditures on

forms to be prescribed or approved by him. Such re-

ports shall be filed on the tenth day of March, June,

and September, in each year, and on the fifteenth and

fifth days next preceding the date on which an elec-

tion is held, and also by the thirty-first day of Janu-

ary. Such reports shall be complete as of such date as

the supervisory officer may prescribe, which shall not

be less than five days before the date of filing, except

that any contribution of $5,000 or more received after

the last report is filed prior to the election shall be re-

ported within forty-eight hours after its receipt.

(b) Each report under this section shall disclose—

\

\

41

(1) the amount of cash on hand at the begin-

ning of the reporting period;

(2) the full name and mailing address (occu-

pation and the principal place of business, if any)

of each person who has made one or more con-

tributions to or for such committee or candidate

(including the purchase of tickets for events such

as dinners, luncheons, rallies, and similar fund-

raising events) within the calendar year in an

aggregate amount or value in excess of $100,

together with the amount and date of such con-

tributions;

(3) the total sum of individual contributions

made to or for such committee or candidate dur-

ing the reporting period and not reported under

paragraph (2) ;

(4) the name and address of each political

committee or candidate from which the reporting

committee or the candidate received, or to which

that committee or candidate made, any transfer

of funds, together with the amounts and dates of

all transfers;

| (5) each loan to or from any person within

) the calendar year in an aggregate amount or

: value in excess of $100, together with the full

names and mailing addresses (occupations and

the principal places of business, if any) of the

lender and endorsers, if any, and the date and

amount of such loans;

(6) the total amount of proceeds from (A) the

sale of tickets to each dinner, luncheon, rally, and

other fundraising event; (B) mass collections

made at such events; and (C) sales of items such

as political campaign pins, buttons, badges, flags,

emblems, hats, banners, literature, and similar

materials;

>... ai iia i nn

OO

42

(7) each contribution, rebate, refund, or other

receipt in excess of $100 not otherwise listed un-

der paragraphs (2) through (6);

(8) the total sum of all receipts by or for such

committee or candidate during the reporting pe-

riod;

(9) the full name and mailing address (occu-

pation and the principal place of business, if

any) of each person to whom expenditures have

been made by such committee or on behalf of

such committee or candidate within the calendar

year in an aggregate amount or value in excess

of $100, the amount, date, and purpose of each

such expenditure and the name and address of,

and office sought by, each candidate on whose be-

half such expenditure was made;

(10) the full name and mailing address (oc-

cupation and the principal place of business, if

any) of each person to whom an expenditure for

. personal services, salaries, and reimbursed ex-

penses in excess of $100 has been made, and

which is not otherwise reported, including the

amount, date, and purpose of such expenditure;

(11) the total sum of expenditures made by

such committee or candidate during the calendar

year;

(12) the amount and nature of debts and obli-

gations owed by or to the committee, in such

form as the supervisory officer may prescribe and

a continuous reporting of their debts and obliga-

tions after the election at suich periods as the

supervisory officer may require until such debts

and obligations are extinguished; and

- (18) such other information as shall be re-

quired by the supervisory officer.

43

(c) The reports required to be filed by subsection

(a) shall be cumulative during the calendar year to

which they relate, but where there has been no change

in an item reported in a previous report during such

year, only the amount need be carried forward. If no

contributions or expenditures have been accepted or

expended during a calendar year, the treasurer of the

political committee or candidate shall file a statement

to that effect.

REPORTS BY OTHERS THAN POLITICAL COMMITTEES

Sec. 305. Every person (other than a political

committee or candidate) who makes -contributions or

expenditures, other than by contribution to a political

committee or candidate, in an aggregate amount in

excess of $100 within a calendar year shall file with

the supervisory officer a statement containing the in-

formation required by section 304. Statements re-

quired by this section shall be filed on the dates on

which reports by political committees are filed, but

need not be cumulative.

_ FORMAL REQUIREMENTS RESPECTING REPORTS

AND STATEMENTS

SEc. 306. (a) A report or statement required by

this title to be filed by a treasurer of a political com-

mittee, a candidate, or by any other person, shall be

verified by the oath or affirmation of the person fil-

ing such report or statement, taken before any officer

authorized to administer oaths.

(b) A copy of a report or statement shall be pre-

served by the person filing it for a period, of time to

be designated by the supervisory officer in 2 published

regulation.

SALARIES

44

(c) The supervisory officer may, by published reg-

ulation of general applicability, relieve any category

of political committees of the obligation to comply

with section 304 if such committee (1) primarily

supports persons seeking State or local office, and

does not substantially support candidates, and (2)

does not operate in more than one State or on a state-

wide basis.

(d) The supervisory officer shall, by published reg-

ulations of general applicability, prescribe the man-

ner in which contributions and expenditures in the

nature of debts and other contracts, agreements, and

promises to make contributions or expenditures shall

be reported. Such regulations shall provide that they

be reported in separate schedules. In determining

aggregate amounts of contributions and expenditures,

amounts reported as provided in such regulations

shall not be considered until actual payment is made.

REPORTS ON CONVENTION FINANCING.

Sec. 307. Each committee or other organization

which—

(1) represents a State, or a political subdivi-

sion thereof, or any group of persons, in dealing

with officials of a national political party with

respect to matters involving a convention held

in such State or political subdivision to nominate

a candidate for the office of President or Vice

President, or

(2) represents a national political party in

making arrangements for the convention of such

party held to nominate a candidate for the office

of President or Vice President,

shall, within sixty days following the end of the con-

vention (but not later than twenty days prior to the

wn

date on which presidential and vice-presidential elec-

tors are chosen), file with the Comptroller General

of the United States a full and complete financial

statement, in such form and detail as he may pre-

scribe, of the sources from which it derived its funds,

and the purposes for which such funds were expended.

45

DUTIES OF THE SUPERVISORY OFFICER

Sec. 308. (a) It shall be the duty of the super-

visory officer—

(1) to develop and furnish to the person re-

quired by the provisions of this Act prescribed

forms for the making of the reports and state-

ments required to be filed with him under this

title;

(2) to prepare, publish, and furnish to the

person required to file such reports and state-

ments a manual setting forth recommended uni-

form methods of bookkeeping and reporting;

(3) to develop a filing, coding, and cross-in-

dexing system consonant with the purposes of

this title;

(4) to make the reports and statements filed

with him available for public inspection and

copying, commencing as soon as practicable but

not later than the end of the second day follow-

ing the day during which it was received, and

to permit copying of any such report or state-

ment by hand or by duplicating machine, as re-

quested by any person, at the expense of such

| person: Provided, That any information copied

from such reports and statements shall not be

sold or utilized by any person for the purpose of

soliciting contributions or for any commercial

purpose ;

46

(5) to preserve such reports and statements

for a period of ten years from date of receipt,

except that reports and statements relating sole-

ly to candidates for the House of Representatives

shall be preserved for only five years from the

date of receipt;

(6) to compile and maintain a current list of

all statements or parts of statements pertaining

to each candidate;

(7) to prepare and publish an annual report

including compilations of (A) total reported con-

tributions and expenditures for all candidates,

political committees, and other persons during

the year; (B) total amounts expended accord-

ing to such categories as he shall determine and

broken down into candidate, party, and nonparty

expenditures on the National, State, and local

levels; (C) total amounts expended for influ-

encing nominations and elections stated sepa-

rately; (D) total amounts contributed accord-

ing to such categories of amounts as he shall

determine and broken down into contributions

on the national, State, and local levels for candi-

dates and political committees; and (E) aggre

gate amounts contributed by any contributor

shown to have contributed in excess of $100;

(8) to prepare and publish from time to time

special reports comparing the various totals and

categories of contributions and expenditures

made with respect to preceding elections;

(9) to prepare and publish such other reports

as he may deem appropriate;

(10) to assure wide dissemination of statis-

tics, summaries, and reports prepared under this

title;

47

(11) to make from time to time audits and

field investigations with respect to reports and

statements filed under the provisions of this title,

and with respect to alleged failures to file any

report or statement required under the provisions

of this title;

(12) to report apparent violations of law to

the appropriate law enforcement authorities;

and

(13) to prescribe suitable rules and regula-

tions to carry out the provisions of this title.

(b) The supervisory officer shall encourage, and

cooperate with, the election officials in the several

States to develop procedures which will eliminate the

necessity of multiple filings by permitting the filing

of copies of Federal reports to satisfy the State re-

quirements.

(c) It shall be the duty of the Comptroller Gen-

eral to serve as a national clearinghouse for infor-

mation in respect to the administration of elections.

In carrying out his duties under this subsection, the

Comptroller General shall enter into contracts for the

- purpose of conducting independent studies of the ad-

ministration of elections. Such studies shall include,

but shall not be limited to, studies of—

(1) the method of selection of, and the type

of duties assigned to, officials and personnel

working on boards of elections;

(2) practices relating to the registration of

voters; and

(3) voting and counting methods.

Studies made under this subsection shall be published

by the Comptroller General and copies thereof shall

be made available to the general public upon the pay-

ment of the cost thereof. Nothing in this subsection

48

shall be construed to authorize the Comptroller Gen-

eral to require the inclusion of any comment or rec-

ommendation of the Comptroller General in any such

study.

(d)(1) Any person who believes a violation of this

title has occurred may file a complaint with the su-

pervisory officer. If the supervisory officer determines

there is substantial reason to believe such a violation

has occurred, he shall expeditiously make an investi-

gation, which shall also include an investigation of

reports and statements filed by the complainant if he

is a candidate, of the matter complained of. When-

ever in the judgment of the supervisory officer, after

affording due notice and an opportunity for a hear-

ing, any person has engaged or is about to engage

in any acts or practices which constitute or will con-

stitute a violation of any provision of this title or

any regulation or order issued thereunder, the Attor-

ney General on behalf of the United States shall in-

stitute a civil action for relief, including a permanent

or temporary injunction, restraining order, or any

other appropriate order in the district court of the

United States for the district in which the person is

found, resides, or transacts business. Upon a proper

showing that such person has engaged or is about to

engage in such acts or practices, a permanent or tem-

porary injunction, restraining order, or other order

shall be granted without bond by such court.

(2) In any action brought under paragraph (1)

of this subsection, subpenas for witnesses who are re-

quired to attend a United States district court may

run into any other district.

(3) Any party aggrieved by an order granted un-

der paragraph (1) of this subsection may, at any

time within sixty days after the date of entry there-

of, file a petition with the United States court of

49

appeals for the circuit in which such person is found,

resides, or transacts business, for judicial review of

such order.

(4) The judgment of the court of appeals affirm-

ing or setting aside, in whole or in part, any such

order of the district court shall be final, subject to

review by the Supreme Court of the United States

upon certiorari or certification as provided in section

1254 of title 28, United States Code.

(5) Any action brought under this subsection shall

be advanced on the docket of the court in which filed,

and put ahead of all other actions (other than other

actions brought under this subsection).

STATEMENTS FILED WITH STATE OFFICERS

Sec. 309. (a) A copy of each statement required

to be filed with a supervisory officer by this title shall

be filed with the Secretary of State (or, if there is

no office of Secretary of State, the equivalent State

officer) of the appropriate State. For purposes of

this subsection, the term “appropriate State” means—

(1) for reports relating to expenditures and

contributions in connection with the campaign

for nomination for election, or election, of a can-

didate to the office of President or Vice Presi-

dent of the United States, each State in which

an expenditure is made by him or on his behalf,

and

(2) for reports relating to expenditures and

contributions in connection with the campaign

for nomination for election, or election, of a can-

didate to the office of Senator or Representative

in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the

Congress of the United States, the State in which

he seeks election.

50

(b) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State,

or the equivalent State officer, under subsection (a)—

(1) to receive and maintain in an orderly

manner all reports and statements required by

this title to be filed with him;

(2) to preserve such reports and statements

for a period of ten years from date of receipt,

except that reports and statements relating sole-

ly to candidates for the House of Representatives

shall be preserved for only five years from the

date of receipt;

(3) to make the reports and statements filed

with him available for public inspection and copy-

ing during regular office hours, commencing as

soon as practicable but not later than the end

of the day during which it was received, and to

permit copying of any such report or statement

by hand or by duplicating machine, requested

by any person, at the expense of such person;

and

(4) to compile and maintain a current list of

all statements or parts of statements pertaining

to each candidate.

PROHIBITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS

IN NAME OF ANOTHER

Sec. 310. No person shall make a contribution in

the name of another person, and no person shall

knowingly accept a contribution made by one person

in the name of another person.

PENALTY FOR VIOLATIONS

Sec. 311. (a) Any person who violates any of the

provisions of this title shall be fined not more than

$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

wn

(b) In case of any conviction under this title,

where the punishment inflicted does not include im-

prisonment, such conviction shall be deemed a mis-

demeanor conviction only.

51

TITLE IV—GENERAL PROVISIONS

EXTENSION OF CREDIT BY REGULATED INDUSTRIES

Sec. 401. The Civil Aeronautics Board, the Fed-

eral Communications Commission, and the Interstate

Commerce Commission shall each promulgate, within

ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act,

its own regulations with respect to the extension of

credit, without security, by any person regulated by

' guch Board or Commission to any candidate for Fed-

eral office (as such term is defined in section 301(c)

of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971), or

to any person on behalf of such a candidate, for goods

furnished or services rendered in connection with the

campaign of such candidate for nomination for elec-

tion, or election, to such office.

PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF CERTAIN FEDERAL

FUNDS FOR ELECTION ACTIVITIES

Sec. 402. No part of any funds appropriated to

carry out the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 shall

be used to finance, directly or indirectly, any activity

designed to influence the outcome of any election to

Federal office, or any voter registration activity, or to

pay the salary of any officer or employee of the Office

of Economic Opportunity who, in his official capacity

as such an officer or employee, engages in any such

activity. As used in this section, the term “election”

has the same meaning given such term by section 301

52

(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,

and the term “Federal office” has the same meaning

given such term by section 301(c) of such Act.

EFFECT ON STATE LAW

aD

Sec. 403. (a) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed

to invalidate or make inapplicable any provision of

any State law, except where compliance with such

provision of law would result in a violation of a pro-

vision of this Act.

(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), no provision

of State law shall be construed to prohibit any person

from taking any action authorized by this Act or from

making any expenditure (as such term is defined in

section 301(f) of this Act) which he could lawfully

make under this Act.

PARTIAL INVALIDITY

Sec. 404. If any provision of this Act, or the ap-

plication thereof to any person or circumstance, is

held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act

and the application of such provision to other persons

and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

REPEALING CLAUSE

Sec. 405. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925

(2 U.S.C. 241- 256), is repealed.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Sec. 406. Except as provided for in section 401 of

this Act, the provisions of this Act shall become ef-

53

fective on December 31, 1971, or sixty days after the

date of enactment of this Act, whichever is later.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.

WG. &. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFice; 1972 486770 482

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petitioners Reply Brief — Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee · 412 U.S. 94 | Frix