Petitioners Reply Brief — Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
Avins V. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968) ..................-...... 2
Democratic National Committee v. FCC, —— US.
App. D.C. ——, —— F.2d (No. 71-1637,
ee a cemesnencncndonsanennen 6
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134
(1940) 4
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470
(1940) 4
FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S.
a casecemenioeatbni 4
McIntire v. Wm. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d
597 (8d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779
REET GE SIR ER SO a RO soe 2
United States vy. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
REESE STAI ne 4
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.
ica cctmesintnnarecavansnenctiings 4
~ ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS:
Further Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 19260, FCC
12-117, released Feb. 7, 1972 _......-.---c.---cce-cecce-ou--- 4
Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 19260, 30 F.C.C.2d
ta 3
_ CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVI-
SIONS:
U.S. Constitution, First Amendment ....................... Me i
Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934,
a ee, eT A B18 2,5
Public Law 92-225, February 7, 1972 2,5
MISCELLANEOUS:
STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
(4th ed. 1969) 4
—
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1971,
No. 71-863
COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.,
Petitioner,
V.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF
I
Neither the opposition of the Democratic National Com-
mittee (“DNC’’), respondent in this case, nor the opposi-
tion of Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam Peace
(“BEM’’), respondent in two related cases,’ disputes that
the decision of the court below raises novel and important
1FCC v. BEM and DNC, No. 71-864; Post-Newsweek Stations,
Capital Area, Inc. v. BEM, No. 71-865. Those petitions seek review
of the same court of appeals opinion as is involved here and in
No. 71-866, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. DNC. BEM
has filed its brief opposing certiorari in all cases, including those
in which it is not a respondent.
>... SEER IY OE SS ane Ee EKES
~~
questions.* Indeed, BEM concedes that “major constitu-
tional questions” may lie “imbedded within the court of
appeals’ decision” and “might be appropriate for review
by this Court” if presented in some other context. BEM
Opp. 16. Moreover, neither respondent seriously disputes
that the court of appeals’ decision will undermine the
existing Congressional scheme of regulation.* Both DNC
_and BEM argue, however, that this case is not “ripe”
for review by this Court because the court of appeals
has directed the Commission to implement the decision
through further rulemaking.‘
2
?In addition, DNC admits that there may be an “apparent” con-
flict between the decision below and McIntire v. William Penn
Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 779 (1946), but suggests that this “is certainly not a conflict
that requires resolution by this Court.” DNC Opp. 22. Contrary,
to DNC’s suggestion, the rejection by the Third Circuit in McIntire
of a First Amendment claim of a right to purchase time was an
alternative holding, not dicta. This is confirmed by the Third Cir-
cuit’s subsequent decision in Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 890 U.S. 920 (1968), which, as we pointed
out in our petition (pp. 18-19), clearty relies on McIntire as a First
Amendment decision. We did not suggest in the petition that the
Avins decision itself is in conflict with the decision of the court
below in this case, but rather that it confirms that the McIntire
decision is in conflict with that decision, and that the authority
of McIntire has not been eroded by the passage of years.
’ As we have pointed out, the Communications Act of 1934 em-
bodies a strong Congressional purpose to leave programming choices
in the hands of licensees as trustees for the public. CBS Petition,
pp. 10-11; App. D. 14-15. In the one area where Congress has
departed from this general policy it has deliberately chosen to
carve out a narrowly circumscribed exception, creating in Section
315 of the Act specific rights in candidates for public office. In a
very recent amendment to Section 315—Public Law 92-225, Febru-
ary 7, 1972—Congress has sought to ensure that candidates for
federal office will be able to purchase a “reasonable” amount of time.
This recent legislation, enacted following the court of appeals’
decision, reflects the continuing Congressional policy not to extend
individual rights to purchase time beyond the political campaign
field.
*DNC Opp. 12-19; BEM Opp. 16-29.
8
It is ironic that DNC and BEM, who sought and ob-
tained a sweeping constitutional decision from the court
of appeals requiring the Commissjen to embark on an en-
tirely new regulatory course, now argue that this Court
should not review this novel constitutional holding until
the Commission has completed rulemaking. Before the
court of appeals, DNC and BEM did not suggest that this
case was not ripe for decision, even though—as they now
emphasize ‘"—the Commission’s fairness doctrine inquiry
had been initiated prior to the court of appeals’ decision.*
DNC and BEM fail to explain how what was apparently
quite ripe for decision by the court of appeals is suddenly
not ripe for review by this Court.’
In fact, the ripeness argument misconceives the na-
ture of the decision below and what is at issue in this
case. The question presented to the court of appeals
and this Court is not whether a Commission rule requir-
ing the sale of advertising time for public issue discussion
would be appropriate or legal, but whether such a rule is
constitutionally compelled. The court of appeals’ holding
on this point is clearly ripe for review. For nothing that
the Commission might do on remand or in its fairness
doctrine inquiry can change or affect that decision; in
Judge McGowan’s apt phrase, the Commission is placed
in a “constitutional straitjacket.” *
5 DNC Opp. 14; BEM Opp. 22-23.
* Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 19260, 80 F.C.C.2d 26, 33 (1971).
Indeed, the argument of BEM and DNC that this case is not
ripe for review by this Court because of the pendency of Commis-
sion rulemaking proceedings should not, if carried to its logical
conclusion, result in a denial of certiorari. Rather, it would sug-
gest that the Court should vacate the judgment of the court of
appeals below (as having been rendered in a case not then ripe
for review), and should remand the case to the Commission to
conduct its fairness doctrine inquiry free of the constitutional
straitjacket imposed by the court of appeals.
* App. A 44. (App. —— references are to the Appendices to the
Petition for Certiorari in this case.)
I OO ee TE eS IE RT NETS ELIE ELS LITTON Py OEE RITE? Stet te
—ay
q
The new notice of inquiry issued by the Commission
in compliance with the court of appeals’ mandate plainly
indicates that the Commission believes that it is bound
by a rigid constitutional requirement and that it is not
free to implement its own conception of the public inter-
est. Acting under the constraints of the decision below,
the Commission’s rulemaking cannot involve the exercise
of administrative discretion and expertise which wou'd be
of assistance to this Court in resolving the difficult con-
stitutional issues presented by this case.
Under the well-settled practice of this Court, the court
of appeals’ remand of the case to the Commission for
further proceedings in no way detracts from the appro-
priateness of review. Remands are characteristic in cases
involving review of agency decisions, including decisions
in the communications field, where this Court has been
at pains to remind the courts of appeals of the limita-
tions of the judicial review function and the necessity
of agency implementation of decisions on review. FCC
v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940). In-
deed, some of this Court’s major decisions in the commu-
nications field have come upon grants of certiorari in
eases in which the court of appeals had remanded the
matter to the Commission for further action. £.g.,
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192
(1956); FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337
U.S. 265 (1949); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470 (1940).
® Further Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 19260, FCC 72-117,
released Feb. 7, 1972. (
10 Similarly, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to review decisions
of the courts of appeals, this Court has granted certiorari to resolve
an “important and clear-cut issue of law that is fundamental to
the further conduct of the case,” even though presented by a judg-
ment uiring further action to be taken by a district court.
STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 180 (4th ed. 1969).
And this Court has regarded it as particularly significant that the
ruling below decided a serious constitutional question. E.g., United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 878, 877 (1945).
5
II
Apart from questions of ripeness, the oppositions of
DNC and BEM rest upon an unduly broad view of what
the Commission held in this case and an unduly narrow
view of the decision of the court below. The Commission
did not, as respondents appear to suggest, bar broad-
casters from presenting editorial advertisements or parti-
san viewpoints and give a “monopoly” of advertising time
to commercial sponsors." In fact, the Commission held
that broadcasters are free to present editoria] advertise-
ments if they believe that to do so would serve the public
interest.” Almost without exception, broadcasters do sell
some time for such advertisements.* Moreover, the Com-
mission emphasized in its decision in this case that broad-
casters are obligated, in carrying out their responsibili-
ties under the fairness doctrine, to present partisan
voices in their news and public affairs broadcasts.“
There has been no showing that broadcasters have not
fulfilled that responsibility.
11 DNC Opp. 6.
22 App: D 18.
**Thus, for example, candidates, their supporters and political
parties have had ample opportunities to purchase time on the
broadcast media during the frequent federal, state and local election
campaigns characteristic of our political system. And Congress
has recently amended Section 315 of the Communications Act,
which provides “equal opportunities” for candidates, to seek to
ensure that candidates for federal office will be able to purchase a
“reasonable” amount of time. Public Law 92-225, Feb. 7, 1972.
As to advertising time, CBS’ policy is to sell such time to candi-
dates, their supporters, political parties and spokesmen on ballot
issues during election campaigns. In addition, CBS sells advertising
time to political parties, outside of election campaign periods, for
expression of views on public issues. See Brief for Intervenor
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., in DNC v. FCC, D.C. Cir. No.
24,537, pp. 3-4.
“App. D 12. As noted in our petition (p. 5), CBS policy with
respect to coverage of public issues provides substantial direct
exposure for partisans and partisan views, on a free basis, as part
of a total professional journalistic effort.
FRAPPR LEAL LILI IOE LN PRES BLE IE NSE ep IC te Te Teed
—y
6
: At #he same time, respondents erroneously picture the
court of appeals’ decision as a narrow one which will not
work a basic change in Commission policy. Thus, DNC’s
suggestion that “the Court below has required the Com-
mission to do nothing more than it had already decided
to do” * ignores the fact that the court of appeals’ deci-
sion has placed the Commission in a constitutional strait-
jacket, requiring it to promulgate rules whether or not
it regards such rules as sound policy or in the public
interest.
BEM, in its attempt to minimize the significance of
the decision below, states that the court of appeals
“merely suggested that broadcasters must make reason-
able efforts in the selling of advertising time to behave
like the able and benign ‘trustees’ of a highly valuable
public resource that they should be and claim to be.”
Elsewhere, BEM suggests that the court’s holding could
be satisfied by extending to the sale of advertising time
for the discussion of public issues “the same ‘trustee’
standards and approaches already used by broadcasters
in choosing among competing ideas and speakers under
the fairness doctrine.”?7 This reassuring view of the
scope of the decision of the court of appeals bears no
resemblance to what the court actually said or held.
As we showed in our petition, the entire thrust of the
decision below was a rejection of the exercise of journal-
istic discretion by broadcast licensees.* This is evident
28 DNC Opp. 15.
16 BEM Opp. 15.
17 BEM Opp. 24 n.61.
%*CBS Petition, pp. 10-15. Compare a recent decision, also in-
volving DNC, by another panel of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, emphasizing the importance of licensee
discretion in administering the fairness doctrine. Democratic
National Committee v. FCC, —— U.S. App. D.C. ——, —— F.2d
—— (No. 71-1637, decided Feb. 2, 1972).
meet « oi
7
from the language of the court’s opinion. Judge Wright
characterized the present regulatory scheme as one in
which “licensees and bureaucrats decide what issues
are ‘important,’ how ‘fully’ to cover them, and the
format, time and style of the coverage.”'® The in-
terests of the First Amendment can be satisfied, the
court held, only if the Commission requires that indi-
vidual members of the public have “initiative and edi-
torial control,” so that “partisans who feel strongly on
particular issues may decide on their own to speak out
and to speak out in their own way.” In sum, the
decision below forces the Commission to deprive licensees
of the responsibility and authority indispensable to the
trustee function. It forces the Commission to create a
vacuum to be filled by the haphazard choices of pur-
chasers of advertising time, who are not publicly account-
able and who have no duty to serve the public interest.
e
* App. A 23.
OL ELIE LOE IL LITE LLL PLIES BERE LOE NII EA SEL Ags aR mag
&
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in the petition for
certiorari, the writ should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
LLoyD N. CUTLER
J. ROGER WOLLENBERG
TIMOTHY B. Dyk
DANIEL MARCUS
WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
900 - 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
Counsel for Columbia
Broadcasting System, Ince.
Of Counsel:
JOHN D. APPEL
RALPH E. GOLDBERG
JOSEPH DEFRANCO
ELEANOR S. APPLEWHAITE
51 West 52 Street
New York, New York 10019
February 11, 1972
PET Sean
-
} 3u the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1971
No. 71-864
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS
Vv,
BUSINESS EXECUTIVES’ MOVE FOR VIETNAM PEACE
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS
Vv.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
AND THE UNITED STATES
3 We wish to bring two matters to the Court’s atten-
ition.
» 1. On February 7, 1972, the Federal Communica-
ions Commission reopened Part IV of its inquiry
(1)
PEE LETTE ITE ES I TN
i
2
entitled “The Handling of Public Issues Under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards
of the Communications Act” (App. A, infra, pp. 4
to 16). This part of the inquiry, which had been
initiated before the decision of the court of appeals
in this case, see Docket No. 19260, 30 F.C.C, 2d 26,
36 Fed. Reg. 11825,’ had been suspended because of
the Commission’s intention to file a petition for a
writ of certiorari and pending this Court’s decision
on the government’s subsequent motion for a stay of
the judgment of the court of appeals, as respondent
Democratic National Committee pointed out, see Brief
in Opposition, at p. 14 n. 10. In light of the Court’s
denial of a stay on January 24,.1972, the Commis-
sion has resumed Part IV of its inquiry in compli-
ance with the mandate of the court of appeals. Ac-
cordingly, the Commission has asked for ‘comments
which can be of assistance in developing reasonable
guidelines governing the determination by licensees
of which and how many editorial advertisements will
be put on the air” (App. A, infra, p. 7).
2. The newly enacted Campaign Communications
Reform Act, Title I, P.L. 92-225, approved February
7, 1972 (App. B, infra, p. 17), amends the Federal
Communications Act to require broadcast licensees to
allow reasonable access to their facilities by candi-
1 See the government’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at
p. 15 n. 7.
2 The Commission has also asked interested persons to com-
ment on whether there should be a right of access to normal
programming time “and any other matters that they believe
pertinent” (App. A, infra, p. 9).
8
dates for federal elective office. Section 103 (a) (2)
(A) of the Reform Act amends Section 312(a) of the
Communications Act (47 U.S.C. 312 (a)) to read as
follows:
The Commission may revoke any station license
or construction permit—
(7) for willful or repeated failure to allow
reasonable access to or permit purchase of
reasonable amounts of time for the use of a
: broadcasting station by a legally qualified
| candidate for Federal elective Office on be-
half of his candidacy.
Section 103 (a) (2) (B) of the new statute amends
Section 315(a) of the Communications Act (47 U.S.C.
315(a)) by adding the three italicized words to the
following language:
No obligation is imposed under this subsection
upon any licensee to allow the use of its station
by any [political] candidate [emphasis added].
These amendments are, we submit, consistent with
the view set forth in our petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari that determination of public interest require-
ments for the presentation of issues of public import-
ance within the inherent limitations of the broadcast
spectrum is a practical task peculiarly suited to reso-
lution by Congress or by the Commission.
Respectfully submitted.
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,
Solicitor General.
JOHN E. PETTIT,
General Counsel,
Federal Communications Commission.
FEERUARY 1972.
LA EIRP ARON TAT TACT MENA 22S Meme
4
APPENDIX A
Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554
Docket No. 19260
In the Matter of
The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fair-
ness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards
of the Communications Act,
and
Guidelines for the Acceptance by Broadcast Li-
censees of Editorial Advertising
FURTHER NOTICE OF INQUIRY
Adopted:
February 3, 1972; Released: February 7, 1972
By the Commission:
Commissioner Johnson concurring and issuing a
statement; Commissioner H. Rex Lee absent.
1. This Further Notice concerns Part IV of our
Notice of June 9, 1971, including particularly the
formulation of guidelines for the acceptance by broad-
casters of editorial advertising. This latter facet is
both the issue involved in Business Executives’ Move
for Vietnam Peace v. F. C. C., — U.S. App. D.C. —,
450 F. 2d 642 (1971), and also an important aspect
of the Part IV Inquiry—“access generally to the
broadcast media for the discussion of public issues.”
We have delayed comment on Part IV because, as
5
discussed below, we are seeking further review of the
above decision. However, the discussion makes clear
that we must now move immediately to the considera-
tion of guidelines in the area of editorial advertising.
That being so, there is no reason to delay the filing of
Part IV comments, Indeed, it would be helpful to
have such comments before us when we consider the
other issues in this Inquiry, since the issues are all
inter-related to some degree. That does not mean that
we shall decide all the issues at the same time. Cir-
cumstances appear to require more expeditious reso-
lution of some aspects of the Inquiry than others.
This Notice deals with one such area.
I
2. In Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam
Peace v. F. C. C., supra, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
a broadcast licensee may not, as a general policy,
refuse to sell advertising time to groups or individ-
uals wishing to speak on controversial public issues.
While the Court left “undisturbed the licensee’s basic
right to exercise judgment and control in public issue
programming” and “normal programming time,” and
it stated that no particular person or group has an
absolute right to have his (or its) message carried,
it ruled that in the broadcaster’s allocation of adver-
tising time it is not permissible to maintain a “total,
flat ban on editorial advertising.” The Court stated
that
“We hold specifically that a flat ban on paid pub-
lic issue announcements is in violation of the
First Amendment, at least when other sorts of
paid announcements are accepted. We do not
hold, however, that the planned announcements
a a DER OS OER EE LIF IY LITRE IS IE AI AE TS
a
6
of the petitioners or, for that matter, of any
other particular applicant for air time must nec-
essarily be accepted by broadcast licensees.
Rather we confine ourselves to invalidating the
flat ban alone, leaving it up to the licensees and
the Commission to develop and administer rea-
sonable procedures and regulations determining
which and how many ‘editorial advertisements’
will be put on the air.”
3. On January 3, 1972 a petition for a writ of
certiorari was filed on behalf of the Commission in
tne Supreme Court of the United States. No. 71-864,
40 U.S.L.W. 3317 (January 11, 1972). The Supreme
Court has not yet acted on this petition. However,
on January 24, 1972, the Court denied an application
for a stay of mandate. Accordingly, the Commission
is under a mandate to carry out the decision of the
Court of Appeals which instructed the Commission as
follows:
“On remand, the Commission should develop rea-
sonable regulatory guidelines to deal with edi-
torial advertisements. Petitioners should be al-
lowed to reapply for advertising time; and, un-
less their presentations are found to be excluda-
ble under the Commission’s guidelines, their ap-
plications should be accepted. Since the issues on
which BEM and DNC seek to speak are current
and changing, it is essential that regulations be
developed speedily and that the affected broad-
casters pass promptly upon petitioners’ applica-
tions to buy time.”
4. The purpose of this Notice is to solicit the views
of all interested parties on the nature and content of
appropriate procedures and guidelines to be adopted
7
by the Commission in furtherance of the Court’s man-
date. We welcome all comments which can be of as-
sistance in developing reasonable guidelines govern-
ing the determination by licensees of which and how
many editorial advertisements will be put on the air.
As a general approach, suggested guidelines or pro-
cedures should so far as possible be designed to avoid
frequent recourse to individual requests for Commis-
sion rulings in particular situations. In particular,
we urge parties filing comments to address the follow-
ing areas:
a. May a licensee limit the time available for
editorial advertisements and, if so, on what basis?
b. What regulation may the licensee make as to
the placement of editorial advertisements?
c. May a licensee prevent domination by a few
groups or a few viewpoints and, if so, by what
means?
d. May a licensee reject a proferred advertise-
ment on the ground that the particular view-
point has been sufficiently expressed, short of
finding undue dominance?
e. May a licensee reject a proferred advertise-
ment on standards of taste and suitability for
access to the home?
f. May a licensee reject a proffered advertise-
ment on the ground that its subject matter is of
little or no significance or interest to the commu-
nity?
g. Are any restrictions on content permissible
short of a finding that the material is outside the
protection of the First Amendment?
LR ITR a SLIIR FE MERE INE FE GE PTOI LE LIES IME ERPS TNs oe epg
—7
8
h. Should the Commission’s Cullman doctrine '
be applicable to editorial and controversial issue
advertisements which the licensee would not have
aired in the first place except for the required
sale of editorial advertising time?
i. What is the relationship generally of editorial
advertising to the licensee’s responsibilities under
the fairness doctrine to make available a reason-
able opportunity for the presentation of conflict-
ing views on controversial issues of public im-
portance? In this connection consideration should
be given to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 US.
367 (1969).
5. We are issuing this Further Notice of Inquiry
rather than issuing guidelines without calling for
comments because we believe that we need the views
of those who would be confronted with the day-to-day
practicalities of applying the guidelines, We are al-
lowing a reasonable time for the submission of com-
ments commensurate with the importance of the is-
sues. However, prompt Commission action is required,
and we intend to expedite our consideration. of this
matter. No extensions of time for comments are con-
templated.
II
6. The discussion in I has dealt with access for
editorial advertising. The other aspect of the Inquiry
in Part IV is the matter of the right of access to
programming time. We have set forth our view that
1See Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963),
which held that a licensee cannot avoid his fairness respon-
sibilities simply because of his inability to obtain sponsorship
for the presentation of a viewpoint.
9
the ruling in Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam
Peace v. F.C.C., supra, does not extend to program-
ming time. See Committee of One Million, October
22, 1971, FCC 71-1096. We have also set forth in
Part IV issues which would be generally pertinent
here (see para. 19, Notice of Inquiry of June 9,
1971). We shall not repeat that discussion here. Par-
ties are invited to comment on those issues and any
other matters that they believe pertinent.
III
7. Accordingly, pursuant to applicable procedures
set forth in Section 1.415 of the Commission’s Rules
and Regulations, 47 CFR 1.415 (1972), interested
parties may file comments on or before March 8, 1972,
and reply comments on or before March 23, 1972, a
schedule to which we intend to adhere (see para. 5,
supra). In accordance with the provisions of Section
1.419 of the Rules, 47 CFR 1.419 (1972), an original
and 14 copies of all comments and replies shall be
furnished the Commission. All relevant and timely
comments and reply comments will be considered by
the Commission before final action is taken in this
proceeding. In reaching its decision, the Commission
may also take into account other relevant informa-
tion before it, in addition to the specific comments
invited by this Notice.
8. Because of the importance of the matters in this
Docket, we believe that some form of oral presenta-
tions will be helpful. If it is determined to have such
presentations cover the issues in Part I of this Fur-
ther Notice, we shall make this the first order of
business at the oral proceedings and shall schedule
such proceedings promptly after receipt of the reply
comments. Finally, the authority for this Further
OT SOM ONE RGR LT Bete LEED ENE AION RS I PORES PORLERY ERA
——y
10
Notice is that stated in para, 24 of the Notice of In-
quiry, June 9, 1971.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION *
BEN F. WAPLE
Secretary
BEM Notice of Inquiry
[Notice of Inquiry on guidelines governing the
purchase of time for editorial advertising in re-
sponse to the mandate of the Court of Appeals
in Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam Peace
v. F.C.C., 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ]
Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Nicholas
Johnson
I concur in the Commission’s decision to put out a
Notice of Inquiry as to what regulations or guide-
lines the FCC should promulgate regarding the pur-
chase of airtime for “editorial advertisements,” Cer-
tainly a decision of this magnitude should not be
made without some opportunity for comment from
broadcasters and citizens alike.
I. The Questions
The Commission poses nine questions to which it
asks interested parties to address themselves. Since
the comments of interested parties need not be limited
to the particular questions posed by the Commission,
I shall not object by way of dissent to any of the
* See attached statement of Commissioner Johnson.
11
particular questions. However, I do question the wis-
dom of some of these questions, for I believe that it
would be unconstitutional for the Commission to an-
swer them in the affirmative.
In discussing the limitations that may be placed on
the purchase of advertising time in BEM the Court
stated:
The content of the idea which the excluded
speakers seek to promote is—emphatically—not
permitted as a distinguishing factor in itself, In-
deed, the existence of an exclusionary discrimi-
nation apparently based on the content of ideas
presents an additional, or greatly heightened,
prima facie constitutional violation. Both free
speech and equal protection principles condemn
any discrimination among speakers which is
based on what they intend to say. If the First
Amendment prohibits anything at all, it must be
a censorial discrimination among ideas, (Em-
phasis in original. )’
And the Court went on to say:
It is well established in First Amendment law
governing access to forums that “reasonable regu-
lations” may be promulgated and enforced to
limit the exercise of free speech. At the least,
there may be regulations determining the time,
place and manner of speech.’
Then the Court proceeded to state a few of the pos-
sible “traffic” regulations that may be promulgated
by the Commission: a limit on the total amount of
1 Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam Peace v. F.C.C..,
450 F. 2d 642, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
?Id., 663.
a da le le a te Sy a +N TTS Raa Retr err tee
12
editorial advertisement time available; limitations on
the right of placement in the time period of the ad-
vertiser’s choice; a limit on the amount of time avail-
able to a particular group or adherents of a particu-
lar viewpoint; limitations on the amount of free time
available to those unable to pay.’
Some of the questions posed may raise constitu-
tional objections:
(e) May a licensee reject a proffered advertise-
ment on standards of taste and suitability for
access to the home?
(f) May a licensee reject a proffered advertise-
ment on the ground that its subject matter is of
little or no significance or interest to the commu-
nity?
Affirmative answers to these two questions would
transcend the “time, place and manner” limitations
which the Court authorized the Commission to enact.
The only reason I concur and do not dissent to this
Notice of Inquiry is that the mere posing of these
questions does not bind the Commission to adopting
an affirmative answer to these questions. Moreover,
interested citizens and broadcasters should have the
opportunity to comment on the whole range of ques-
tions raised by the BEM decision, and I would like to
have the benefit of those comments.
II. Interim Procedures
The question remains, what do we do in the mean-
_ time? What is our proper response to those petitions
which might be filed between now and the promulga-
tion of our regulations? BEM is now the law of the
land. This is implicit in the fact that the Commission
*Id., 663-665.
13
now asks for comments and prepares to issue guide-
lines, even before the United States Supreme Court
acts on the pending petition for certiorari. This is
so, of course, because after the decision of the Court
of Appeals some six months ago (August 3, 1971),
the Commission’s petition for rehearing was denied
by the Court (October 4, 1971), our motion for a stay
of mandate was denied by the Court (October 22,
1971), and our motion for a stay of mandate was
denied by the Supreme Court (January 24, 1972).
Since BEM is now the law of the land, we must
rule on whatever petitions that are filed according to
the law of BEM: there can be no flat ban on “edi-
torial advertisements.” I have absolutely no idea
whether any such petitions are going to be filed in
the next 45 days or so, But it is clear that if any
are filed, it will not be appropriate for the Commis-
sion to act as it did last August 6, in the Communi-
cations Workers of America case.‘ On the day after
the BEM decision, CWA was turned down by NBC
and CBS owned-and-operated stations in their re-
quest to buy time for “editorial advertisements.” In
that. opinion, to which I dissented, the Commission
stated that it had not yet had time to promulgate the
regulations suggested by the Court of Appeals, The
same excuse is not open to the Commission now. In
the six months since BEM, even while appealing the
BEM case to the Supreme Court, the Commission
surely could have adopted regulations to go into effect
whenever the BEM case became the law of the land.
Now we are faced with that very situation. BEM
is the law, and there are no regulations, How should
we act?
*Communications Workers of America, Request for De-
claratory Ruling, 31 F.C.C.2d 841 (1971).
..... RATTAN RS Me PA PE REY MU REAT RTO Cy taromanem as ge ATP Dag cen
14
BEM said that it was unconstitutional for a li-
censee to enact a flat ban on editorial advertising.
The Court’s opinion shows that the presumption clear-
ly has to be in favor of the petitioner, not the licensee,
in such a dispute:
It being established that there is a strong and
specific First Amendment interest in editorial ad-
vertising and that the policies discriminatorily
barring such expression work a prima facie vio-
lation of constitutional principles, we must con-
sider the countervailing considerations raised by
the Commission and the broadcaster-intervenors.
In order to justify the policy at issue, they must
show some very substantial harm that would -be
caused by acceptance of editorial advertising—a
sort of harm great enough to override the First
Amendment interests at stake and a sort of harm
not already involved in the acceptance of com-
mercial and “noncontroversial” advertising. Only
such a showing could convince us that the ban on
editorial advertisements is supported by sufficient
countervailing values and is not based solely on.
the content of the ideas conveyed.*
Thus, in the absence of any regulations, the burden
is on the broadcaster, not the citizen. The broadcaster
must explain to the FCC why he cannot accept the
citizen’s money and put the editorial advertisement
on the air: he must make a showing of “some very
substantial harm that would be caused by acceptance
of editorial advertising.”
Since the Court of Appeals went out of its way to
state that “[s]ince the issues on which BEM and
DNC seek to speak are current and changing, it is
essential that regulations be developed speedily and
5 B.E.M. Vv. F.C.C., supra at 662.
_—
that the affected broadcasters pass promptly upon pe-
titioners’ applications to buy time,’”* I do not think
that this Commission has any alternative but to issue
an interim rule, pending the outcome of this Notice of
Inquiry, that all requests for the purchase of time for
editorial advertisements must be accepted by the
broadcasters, absent showing of “some very substan-
tial harm.”
I do not honestly know what this Commission is
prepared to do if, in fact, such a petition is filed be-
tween now and the time the regulations are promul-
gated. As with any matter of free speech, time is of
the essence. Certainly this is the cardinal principle
underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in The New
York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971), where
the Supreme Court once again affirmed the age-old
presumption against any form of prior restraint. In-
asmuch as the Commission affords no guidance on
this issue whatsoever, I simply must assume that the
Commission intended by its silence on the issue to
adopt the interim rule of law implicit in the Court’s
opinion in BEM: absent a showing of “some very
substantial harm that would be caused by acceptance
of editorial advertising,” the broadcaster is required
by the First Amendment to accept the request for
paid access for the airing of editorial advertising.’
15
*Id., 665.
"I do not consider it necessary to discuss in detail what
sort of showing would be appropriate under the “very sub-
stantial harm” test. I must state that I find it hard to believe
that the placement of a few editorial advertisements into
any broadcaster’s schedule—accompanied, of course, by good
money—would do anything but enrich the broadcaster. I
know of few cases in which broadcasters have been unable
to find the airtime to squeeze just one more spot on the air,
~~ EARLE TE I SETAE rs ae
16
Accordingly, I concur.
especially when the order is accompanied by payment. Is that
not the hallmark of our commercial broadcasting system?
On the other hand, there is the question as to effect of
editorial advertising on the broadcaster’s fairness obligations.
For the purposes of argument, I shall pose three distinct
examples in order to assess this question.
The first case is that of a citizen who seeks to buy time for
an issue that everyone agrees is not controversial and thus
not subject to the Fairness Doctrine. These spots are by
definition non-controversial and should go on the air without
question, since they do not give rise to the obligation to pre-
sent the other side of a controversial issue, and thus no reve-
nue loss to the broadcaster can result under Cullman. 40
F.C.C. 576 (1963).
The second situation is if the issue being discussed by the
editorial spots has already been heavily covered by the broad-
caster, and the coverage has already been adequately balanced.
Such an instance might be Vietnam, the subject of BEM’s
spots. No Cullman problems would arise since it is unlikely
that any overall imbalance would result from the acceptance
of a few more minutes of time for or against the war.
The third situation is that in which a controversial issue
not previously covered by the broadcaster is discussed in the
spots. Here, the inclusion of airtime on one side of the con-
troversy will not create any »bligations that do not already
exist on the part of the broadcaster: He always has had the
obligation under the Fairness Doctrine to cover the con-
troversy at his own expense. Thus, he cannot really object to
the particular form (editorial spots) in which the controversy
has first been broached on his station—especially when it was
produced at no cost to him.
17
APPENDIX B
AN ACT
To promote fair practices in the conduct of election
campaigns for Federal political Offices,
and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives of the United States of America in Con-
gress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the
“Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971”.
TITLE I—CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS
SHORT TITLE
SEC. 101. This title may be cited as the “Cam-
paign Communications Reform Act”.
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 102. For purposes of this title:
(1) The term “communications media” means
broadcasting stations, newspapers, magazines,
outdoor advertising facilities, and telephones;
but, with respect to telephones, spending or an
expenditure shall be deemed to be spending or an
expenditure for the use of communications me-
dia only if such spending or expenditure is for
the costs of telephones, paid telephonists, and
automatic telephone equipment, used by a can-
didate for Federal elective office to communicate
with potential voters (excluding any costs of
telephones incurred by a volunteer for use of
telephones by him).
18
(2) The term “broadcasting station” has the
same meaning as such term has under section
315(f) of the Communications Act of 1934.
(3) The term ‘Federal elective office’? means
the office of President of the United States, or
of Senator or Representative in, or Resident
Commissioner or Delegate to, the Congress of
the United States (and for purposes of section
103(b) such term includes the office of Vice
President).
(4) The term “legally qualified candidate”
means any person who (A) meets the qualifica-
tions prescribed by the applicable laws to hold
the Federal elective office for which he is a can-
didate, and (B) is eligible under applicable State
law to be voted for by the electorate directly or
by means of delegates or electors.
(5) The term “voting age population” means
resident population, eighteen years of age and
older.
(6) The term “State” includes the District of
Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
MEDIA RATE AND RELATED REQUIREMENTS
SEc. 108. (a)(1) Section 315(b) of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 is amended to read as follows:
“(b) The charges made for the use of any broad-
casting station by any person who is a legally quali-
fied candidate for any public office in connection with
his campaign for nomination for election, or election,
to such office shall not exceed—
“(1) during the forty-five days preceding the
date of a primary or primary runoff election and
during the sixty days preceding the date of a
general or special election in which such person
19
is a candidate, the lowest unit charge of the
station for the same class and amount of time
for the same period; and
“(2) at any other time, the charges made for
comparable use of such station by other users
thereof.”
(2) (A) Section 312(a) of such Act is amended by
striking “or” at the end of clause (5), striking the
period at the end of clause (6) and inserting in lieu
thereof a semicolon and “or”, and adding at the end
of such section 312(a) the following new paragraph:
“(7) for willful or repeated failure to allow
reasonable access to or to permit purchase of
reasonable amounts of time for the use of a
broadcasting station by a legally qualified can-
didate for Federal elective office on behalf of
his candidacy.”
(B) The second sentence of section 315(a) of such
Act is amended by inserting “under this subsection”
after “No obligation is imposed”.
(b) To the extent that any person sells space in
any newspaper or magazine to a legally qualified
candidate for Federal elective office, or nomination
thereto, in connection with such candidate’s campaign
for nomination for, or election to, such office, the
charges made for the use of such Space in connection
with his campaign shall not exceed the charges made
for comparable use of such space for other purposes.
LIMITATIONS OF EXPENDITURES FOR USE OF
COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA
SEC. 104. (a)(1) Subject to paragraph (4), no
legally qualified candidate in an election (other than
a primary or primary runoff election) for a Federal
elective office may—
PERE FORELEG LIP SIL LAY AE TRE LEN aK Ay ae EEN iy nats pags
—ay
(A) spend for the use of communications
media on behalf of his candidacy in such elec-
tion a total amount in excess of the greater of—
20
(i) 10 cents multiplied by the voting age
population (as certified under paragraph
(5)) of the geographical area in which the
election for such office is held, or
(ii) $50,000, or
(B) spend for the use of broadcast stations
on behalf of his candidacy in such election a
total amount in excess of 60 per centum of the
amount determined under subparagraph (A)
with respect to such election.
(2) No legally qualified candidate in a primary
election for nomination to a Federal elective office,
other than President, may spend—
(A) for the use of communications media, or
(B) for the use of broadcast stations,
on behalf of his candidacy in such election a total
amount in excess of the amounts determined under
paragraph (1) (A) or (B), respectively, with re-
spect to the general election for such office. For pur-
poses of this subsection a primary runoff election
shall be treated as a separate primary election.
(3)(A) No person who is a candidate for presi-
dential nomination may spend—
(i) for the use in a State of communications
media, or
(ii) for the use in a State of broadcast sta-
tions,
on behalf of his candidacy for presidential nomina- |
tion a total amount in excess of the amounts which
21
would have been determined under paragraph (1)
(A) or (B), respectively, had he been a candidate
for election for the office of Senator from such State
(or for the office of Delegate or Resident Commis-
sioner in the case of the District of Columbia or the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico).
(B) For purposes of this paragraph (3), a person
is a candidate for presidential nomination if he makes
(or any other person makes on his behalf) an ex-
penditure for the use of any communications medium
on behalf of his candidacy for any political party’s
nomination for election to the office of President. He
shall be considered to be such a candidate during the
period—
(i) beginning on the date on which he (or
such other person) first makes such an expendi-
ture (or, if later, January 1 of the year in which
the election for the office of President is held),
and
(ii) ending on the date on which such politi-
cal party nominates a candidate for the office
of President.
For purposes of this title and of section 315 of the
Communications Act of 1934, a candidate for presi-
dential nomination shall be considered a legally quali-
fied candidate for public office.
(C) The Comptroller General shall prescribe regu-
lations under which any expenditure by a candidate
for presidential nomination for the use in two or
more States of a communications medium shall be
attributed to such candidate’s expenditure limitation
in each such State, based on the number of persons in
such State who can reasonably be expected to be
reached by such communications medium.
(4)(A) For purposes of subparagraph (B):
>. eA ce NOME NOES T TN VIS te AS OEY WIA I Se aw SR RTIIY FLERE YS NG a re Trea ee nerrm eee
22
(i) The term “price index” means the average
over a calendar year of the Consumer Price In-
dex (all items—United States city average) pub-
lished monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(ii) The term “base period” means the calen-
dar year 1970.
(B) At the beginning of each calendar year (com-
mencing in 1972), as there becomes available neces-
sary data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of
the Department of Labor, the Secretary of Labor
shall certify to the Comptroller General and publish
in the Federal Register the per centum difference
between the price index for the 12 months preceding
the beginning of such calendar year and the price
index for the base period. Each amount determined
under paragraph (1)(A)(i) and (ii) shall be in-
creased by such per centum difference. Each amount
so increased shall be the amount in effect for such
calendar year.
(5) Within 60 days after the date of enactment
of this Act, and during the first week of January in
1973 and every subsequent year, the Secretary of
Commerce shall certify to the Comptroller General
and publish in the Federal Register an estimate of
the voting age population of each State and congres-
sional district for the last calendar year ending be-
fore the date of certification.
(6) Amounts spent for the use of communications
media on behalf of any legally qualified candidate
for Federal elective office (or for nomination to such
office) shall, for the purposes of this subsection, be
deemed to have been spent by such candidate.
Amounts spent for the use of communications media
by or on behalf of any legally qualified candidate
for the office of Vice President of the United States
23
shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to
have been spent by the candidate for the office of
President of the United States with whom he is run-
ning.
(7) For purposes of this section and section 315
(c) of the Communications Act of 1934—
(A) spending and charges for the use of com-
munications media include not only the direct
charges of the media but also agents’ commis-
sions allowed the agent by the media, and
(B).any expenditure for the use of any com-
munications medium by or on behalf of the can-
didacy of a candidate for Federal elective office
(or nomination thereto) shall be charged against
the expenditure limitation under this subsection
applicable to the election in which such medium
is used.
(b) No person may make any charge for the use
by or on behalf of any legally qualified candidate for
Federal elective office (or for nomination to such
office) of any newspaper, magazine, or outdoor ad-
vertising facility, unless such candidate (or a person
specifically authorized by such candidate in writing
to do so) certifies in writing to the person making
such charge that the payment of such charge will not
violate paragraph (1), (2), or (38) of subsection (a),
whichever is applicable.
(c) Section 315 of the Communications Act of
1934 is amended by redesignating subsection (c) as
subsection (g) and by inserting after subsection (b)
the following new subsections:
“(c) No station licensee may make any charge
for the use of such station by or on behalf of any
legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office
LS LOE OINA ARLE I ILO I LEE NE Toh SEN LELS GORA a there, td
~
24
(or for nomination to such office) unless such candi-
date (or a person specifically authorized by such
candidate in writing to do so) certifies to such li-
censee in writing that the payment of such charge
will not violate any limitation specified in paragraph
(1), (2), or (3) of section 104(a) of the Campaign
Communications Reform Act, whichever paragraph
is applicable.
“(d) If a State by law and expressly—
“(1) has provided that a primary or other
election for any office of such State or of a politi-
cal subdivision thereof is subject to this subsec-
tion,
(2) has specified a limitation upon total ex-
penditures for the use of broadcasting stations
on behalf of the candidacy of each legally quali-
fied candidate in such election,
“(3) has provided in any such law an un-
equivocal expression of intent to be bound by
the provisions of this subsection, and
“(4) has stipulated that the amount of such
limitation shall not exceed the amount which
would be determined for such election under sec-
tion 104(a)(1)(B) or 104(a)(2)(B) (which-
ever is applicable) of the Campaign Communi-
cations Reform Act had such election been an
election for a Federal elective office or nomina-
tion thereto;
then no station licensee may make any charge for
the use of such station by or on behalf of any legally
qualified candidate in such election unless such can-
didate (or a person specifically authorized by such
candidate in writing to do so) certifies to such li-
censee in writing that the payment of such charge
will not violate such State limitation.
25
“(e) Whoever willfully and knowingly violates the
provisions of subsection (c) or (d) of this section
shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $5,000 or
imprisonment for a period not to exceed five years,
or both. The provisions of sections 501 through 503
of this Act shall not apply to violations of either
such subsection.
“(f)(1) For the purposes of this section:
“(A) The term ‘broadcasting station’ includes
a community antenna television system.
“(B) The terms ‘licensee’ and ‘station licen-
see’ when used with respect to a community an-
tenna television system, means the operator of
such system.
“(C) The term ‘Federal elective office’ means
the office of President of the United States, or
of Senator or Representative in, or Resident
Commissioner or Delegate to, the Congress of the
United States.
“(2) For purposes of subsections (c) and (d), the
term ‘legally qualified candidate’ means any person
who (A) meets the qualifications prescribed by the
applicable laws to hold the office for which he is a
candidate and (B) is eligible under applicable State
law to be voted for by the electorate directly or by
means of delegates or electors.”
REGULATIONS
Sec. 105. The Comptroller General shall prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate
to carry out sections 102, 103(b), 104(a), and 104
(b) of this Act.
\
PU LEAL LION LOL, EOLA PE IOS Ss Retr stage NAT eats tee oe I
26
PENALTIES
Sec. 106. Whoever willfully and knowingly vio-
lates any provision of section 103(b), 104(a), or 104
(b) or any regulation under section 105 shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or by
imprisonment of not more than five years, or both.
TITLE II—CRIMINAL CODE AMENDMENTS
SEC. 201. Section 591 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
§ 591. Definitions
“When used in sections 597, 599, 600, 602, 608,
610, and 611 of this title—
“(a) ‘election’ means (1) a general, special,
primary, or runoff election, (2) a convention or
caucus of a political party held to nominate a
candidate, (3) a primary election held for the
selection of delegates to a national nominating
convention of a political party, (4) a primary
election held for the expression of a preference
for the nomination of persons for election to the
office of President, and (5) the election of dele-
gates to a constitutional convention for propos-
ing amendments to the Constitution of the
United States;
“(b) ‘candidate’ means an individual who
seeks nomination for election, or election, to
Federal office, whether or not such individual is
elected, and, for purposes of this paragraph, an
individual shall be deemed to seek nomination
for election, or election, to Federal office, if he
has (1) taken the action necessary under the
law of a State to qualify himself for nomination
for election, or election, or (2) received contri-
Be Bein
ee dais toe
~ ta mi
_—_
butions or made expenditures, or has given his
consent for any other person to receive contribu-
tions or make expenditures, with a view to bring-
ing about his nomination for election, or election,
to such office;
“(¢c) ‘Federal office’ means the office of Presi-
dent or Vice President of the United States, or
Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to, the Congress of the
United States;
“(d) ‘political committee’ means any individ-
ual, committee, association, or organization
which accepts contributions or makes expendi-
tures during a calendar year in an aggregate
amount exceeding $1,000;
“(e) ‘contribution’ means—
27
“(1) a gift, subscription, loan, advance,
or deposit of money or anything of value
(except a loan of money by a national or
State bank made in accordance with the
applicable banking laws and regulations and
in the ordinary course of business), made for
the purpose of influencing the nomination
for election, or election, of any person to
Federal office, for the purpose of influencing
the results of a primary held for the selec-
tion of delegates to a national nominating
convention of a political party or for the
expression of a preference for the nomina-
tion of persons for election to the office of
President, or for the purpose of influencing
the election of delegates to a constitutional
convention for proposing amendments to the
Constitution of the United States;
a_i A Ra SAE REP AULT agree ato tener tone
28
“(2) a contract, promise, or agreement,
express or implied, whether or not legally
enforceable, to make a contribution for such
purposes;
“(3) a transfer of funds between politi-
cal committees;
“(4) the payment, by any person other
than a candidate or political committee, of
compensation for the personal services of
another person which are rendered to such
candidate or political committee without
charge for any such purpose; and
“(5) notwithstanding the foregoing mean-
ings of ‘contribution’, the word shall not be
construed to include services provided with-
out compensation by individuals volunteer-
ing a portion or all of their time on behalf
of a candidate or political committee;
“(f) ‘expenditure’ means—
“(1) a purchase, payment, distribution,
loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or
anything of value (except a loan of money
by a national or State bank made in accord-
ance with the applicable banking laws and
regulations and in the ordinary course of
business), made for the purpose of influ-
encing the nomination for election, or elec-
tion, of any person to Federal office, for the
purpose of influencing the result of a pri-
mary held for the selection of delegates to
a national nominating convention of a po-
litical party or for the expression of a pref-
erence for the nomination of persons for
election to the office of President, or for the
purpose of influencing the election of dele-
29
gates to a constitutional convention for pro-
posing amendments to the Constitution of
the United States;
“(2) a contract, promise, or agreement,
express or implied, whether or not legally
enforceable, to make any expenditure; and
“(3) a transfer of funds between politi-
cal committees;
“(g) ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ mean an individ-
ual, partnership, committee, association, corpo-
ration, or any other organization or group of
persons; and
“(h) ‘State’ means each State of the United
States, the District of Columbia, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or pos-
session of the United States.”’.
SEc. 202. Section 600 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
“$600. Promise of employment or other benefit for
political activity
“Whoever, directly or indirectly, promises any em-
ployment, position, compensation, contract, appoint-
ment, or other benefit, provided for or made possible
in whole or in part by any Act of Congress, or any
special consideration in obtaining any such benefit,
to any person as consideration, favor, or reward for
any political activity or for the support of or opposi-
tion to any candidate or any political party in con-
nection with any general or special election to any
political office, or in connection with any primary
election or political convention or caucus held to se-
lect candidates for any political office, shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both.”.
WOE LY, | ONCE ARR ARR Rey
80
SEc. 208. Section 608 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
“$608. Limitations on contributions and expendi-
tures
“(a)(1) No candidate may make expenditures
from his personal funds, or the personal funds of his
immediate family, in connection with his campaign
for nomination for election, or election, to Federal
office in excess of —
“(A) $50,000, in the case of a candidate for
the office of President or Vice President;
“(B) $35,000, in the case of a candidate for
the office of Senator; or
“(C) $25,000, in the case of a candidate for
the office of Representative, or Delegate or Resi-
dent Commissioner to the Congress.
“(2) For purposes of this subsection, nmediate
family’ means a candidate’s spouse, and any child,
parent, grandparent, brother, or sister of the candi-
date, and the spouses of such persons,
“(b) No candidate or political committee shall
knowingly accept any contribution or authorize any
expenditure in violation of the provisions of this sec-
tion.
“(ce) Violation of the provisions of this section is
punishable by a fine not to exceed $1,000, imprison-
ment for not to exceed one year, or both.”.
SEc. 204. Section 609 of title 18, United States
Code, is repealed.
SEC. 205. Section 610 of title 18, United States
Code, relating to contributions or expenditures by
national banks, corporations, or labor organizations,
is amended by adding at the end thereof the follow-
ing paragraph:
31
“As used in this section, the phrase ‘contribution
or expenditure’ shall include any direct or indirect
payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift
of money, or any services, or anything of value (ex-
cept a loan of money by a national or State bank
made in accordance with the applicable banking laws
and regulations and in the ordinary course of busi-
ness) to any candidate, campaign committee, or po-
litical party or organization, in connection with any
election to any of the offices referred to in this sec-
tion; but shall not include communications by a cor-
poration to its stockholders and their families or by
a labor organization to its members and their fami-
lies on any subject; nonpartisan registration and get-
out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its
stockholders and their families, or by a labor organ-
ization aimed at its members and their families; the
establishment, administration, and solicitation of con- -
tributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized
for political purposes by a corporation or labor or-
ganization: Provided, That it shall be unlawful for
such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure
by utilizing money or anything of value secured by
physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals,
or the threat of force, job discrimination, or financial
reprisal; or by dues, fees, or other monies required
as a condition of membership in a labor organization
or as a condition of employment, or by monies ob-
tained in any commercial transaction.”.
SEC. 206. Section 611 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
“$611. Contributions by Government contractors
“Whoever—
“(a) entering into any contract with the
United States or any department or agency
eee EH ASE RD SUS LER DH DANTON TERA TRE
82
thereof either for the rendition of personal serv-
ices or furnishing any material, supplies, or
equipment to the United States or any depart-
ment or agency thereof or for selling any land
or building to the United States or any depart-
ment or agency thereof, if payment for the per-
formance of such contract or payment for such
material, supplies, equipment, land, or building
is to be made in whole or in part from funds
appropriated by the Congress, at any time be-
tween the commencement of negotiations for and
the later of (1) the completion of performance
under, or (2) the termination of negotiations
for, such contract or furnishing of material, sup-
plies, equipment, land or buildings, directly or
indirectly makes any contribution of money or
other thing of value, or promises expressly or
impliedly to make any such contribution, to any
political party, committee, or candidate for pub-
lic office or to any person for any political pur-
pose or use; or
“(b) knowingly solicits any such contribution
from any such person for any such purpose dur-
ing any such period;
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.”.
Sec. 207. The table of sections for chapter 29 of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by—
(1) striking out the item relating to section
608 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
“608. Limitations on contributions and ex-
penditures.” ;
(2) striking out the item relating to section
609 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
“609. Repealed.”
33
(3) striking out the item relating to section
611 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
“611. Contributions by Government. con-
tractors.”’.
TITLE III—DISCLOSURE OF FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN FUNDS
DEFINITIONS
SEc. 301. When used in this title—
(a) “election” means (1) a general, special,
primary, or runoff election, (2) a convention or
caucus of a political party held to nominate a
candidate, (3) a primary election held for the se-
lection of delegates to a national nominating
convention of a political party, (4) a primary
election held for the expression of a preference
for the nomination of persons for election to the
office of President, and (5) the election of dele-
gates to a constitutional convention for propos-
ing amendments to the Constitution of the United
States;
(b) “candidate” means an individual who
seeks nomination for election, or election, to Fed-
eral office, whether or not such individual is
elected, and, for purposes of this paragraph, an
individual shall be deemed to seek nomination for
election, or election, if he has (1) taken the ac-
tion necessary under the law of a State to qualify
himself for nomination for election, or election,
to Federal office, or (2) received contributions or
made expenditures, or has given his consent for
any other person to receive contributions or make
expenditures, with a view to bringing about his
nomination for election, or election, to such office ;
7 _
(c) ‘Federal office’ means the office of Presi-
dent or Vice President of the United States; or
of Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to, the Congress of the
United States;
(d) “political committee” means any commit-
tee, association, or organization which accepts
contributions or makes expenditures during a cal-
endar year in an aggregate amount exceeding
$1,000;
(e) “contribution” means—
(1) a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or
deposit of money or anything of value, made
for the purpose of influencing the nomina-
tion for election, or election, of any person
to Federal office or as a presidential or vice-
presidential elector, or for the purpose of
influencing the result of a primary held for
the selection of delegates to a national nomi-
nating convention of a political party or for
the expression of a preference for the nomi-
nation of persons for election to the office of
President, or for the purpose of influencing
the election of delegates to a constitutional
convention for proposing amendments to the
Constitution of the United States;
(2) a contract, promise, or agreement,
whether or not legally enforceable, to make
a contribution for any such purpose;
(3) a transfer of funds between political
committees ;
(4) the payment, by any person other than
a candidate or political committee, of com-
pensation for the personal services of an-
other person which are rendered to such can-
_
didate or committee without charge for any
such purpose; and
(5) notwithstanding the foregoing mean-
ings of “contribution”, the word shall not be
construed to include services provided with-
out compensation by individuals volunteer-
ing a portion or all of their time on behalf
of a candidate or political committee;
35
(f) “expenditure” means—
(1) a purchase, payment, distribution,
loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or
anything of value, made for the purpose of
influencing the nomination for ‘election, or
election, of any person to Federal office, or
as a presidential and vice-presidential elec-
tor, or for the purpose of influencing the
result of a primary held for the selection. of
delegates to a national nominating conven-
tion of a political party or for the expression
of a preference for the nomination of per-
sons for election to the office of President, or
for the purpose of influencing the election of
delegates to a constitutional convention for
proposing amendments to the Constitution
of the United States;
(2) a contract, promise, or agreement,
whether or not legally enforceable, to make
an expenditure, and
(3) a transfer of funds between political
committees;
(g) “supervisory officer” means the Secretary
of the Senate with respect to candidates for Sen-
ator; the Clerk of the House of Representatives
with respect to candidates for Representative in,
or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the
ee EPEAT
_,
Congress of the United States; and the Comp-
troller General of the United States in any other
case;
(h) “person” means an individual, partner-
ship, committee, association, corporation, labor
organization, and any other organization or group
of persons; and
(i) “State” means each State of the United
States, the District of Columbia, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or pos-
session of the United States.
36
ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL COMMITTEES
Sec. 302. (a) Every political committee shall have
a chairman and a treasurer. No contribution and no
expenditure shall be accepted or made by or on be-
half of a political committee at a time when there is
a vacancy in the office of chairman or treasurer there-
of. No expenditure shall be made for or on behalf of
a political committee without the authorization of its
chairman or treasurer, or their designated agents.
(b) Every person who receives a contribution in
excess of $10 for a political committee shall, on de-
mand of the treasurer, and in any event within five
days after receipt of such contribution, render to the
treasurer a detailed account thereof, including the
amount, the name and address (occupation and the
principal place of business, if any) of the person
making such contribution, and the date on which re-
ceived. All funds of a political committee shall be seg-
regated from, and may not be commingled with, any
personal funds of officers, members, or associates of
such committee.
(c) It shall be the duty of the treasurer of a po-
litical committee to keep a detailed and exact account
of—
37
(1) all contributions made to or for such com-
mittee;
(2) the full name and mailing address (occu-
pation and the principal place of business, if
any) of every person making a contribution in
excess of $10, and the date and amount thereof :
(3) all expenditures made by or on behalf of
such committee; and
(4) the full name and mailing address (occu-
pation and the principal place of business, if
any) of.every person to whom any expenditure
is made, the date and amount thereof and the
name and address of, and office sought by, each
candidate on whose behalf such expenditure was
made,
(d) It shall be the duty of the treasurer to obtain
and keep a receipted bill, stating the particulars, for
every expenditure made by or on behalf of a political
committee in excess of $100 in amount, and for any
such expenditure in a lesser amount, if the aggregate
amount of such expenditures to the same person dur-
ing a calendar year exceeds $100. The treasurer shall
preserve all receipted bills and accounts required to
be kept by this section for periods of time to be deter-
mined by the supervisory officer.
(e) Any political committee which solicits or re-
ceives contributions or makes expenditures on behalf
of any candidate that is not authorized in writing by
such candidate to do so shall include a notice on the
face or front page of all literature and advertisements
published in connection with such candidate’s cam-
paign by such committee or on its behalf stating that
the committee is not authorized by such candidate and
that such candidate is not responsible for the activi-
ties of such committee.
(f) (1) Any political committee shall include on the
38
face or front page of all literature and advertisements
soliciting funds the following notice:
“A copy of our report filed with the appropriate
supervisory officer is (or will be) available for pur-
chase from the Superintendent of Documents, United
States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
- 20402.”.
(2)(A) The supervisory officer shall compile and
furnish to the Public Printer, not later than the last
day of March of each year, an annual report for each
political committee which has filed a report with him
under this title during the period from March 10 of
the preceding calendar year through January 31 of
the year in which such annual report is made avail-
able to the Public Printer. Each such annual report
shall contain—
(i) a copy of the statement of organization of
the political committee required under section
303, together with any amendments thereto; and
(ii) a copy of each report filed by such com-
mittee under section 304 from March 10 of the
preceding year through January 31 of the year
in which the annual report is so furnished to the
Public Printer.
(B) The Public Printer shall make copies of such
annual reports available for sale to the public by the
Superintendent of Documents as soon as practicable
after they are received from the supervisory officer.
REGISTRATION. OF POLITICAL COMMITTEES;
STATEMENTS
Sec. 303. (a) Each political committee which an-
ticipates receiving contributions or making expendi-
tures during the calendar year in an aggregate
ee ee a
89
amount exceeding $1,000 shall file with the supervis-
ory officer a statement of organization, within ten
days after its organization or, if later, ten days after
the date on which it has information which causes the
committee to anticipate it will receive contributions
or make expenditures in excess of $1,000. Each such
committee in existence at the date of enactment of
this Act shall file a statement of organization with
the supervisory officer at such time as he prescribes.
(b) The statement of organization shall include—
(1) the name and address of the committee ;
(2) the names, addresses, and relationships of
affiliated or connected organizations;
(3) the area, scope, or jurisdiction of the com-
mittee; 7
(4) the name, address, and position of the cus-
todian of books and accounts;
(5) the name, address, and position of other
principal officers, including officers and members
of the finance committee, if any;
(6) the name, address, office sought, and party
affiliation of (A) each candidate whom the com-
mittee is supporting, and ( B) any other individ-
ual, if any, whom the committee is supporting
for nomination for election, or election, to any
public office whatever; or, if the committee is
supporting the entire ticket of any party, the
name of the party;
(7) a statement whether the committee is a
continuing one;
(8) the disposition of residual funds which
will be made in the event of dissolution ;
(9) a listing of all banks, safety deposit boxes,
or other repositories used;
(10) a statement of the reports required to be
filed by the committee with State or local officers,
40
and, if so, the names, addresses, and positions of
_/such persons; and
*“ (11) such other information as shall be re-
quired by the supervisory officer.
(c) Any change in information previously submit-
ted in a statement of organization shall be reported
to the supervisory officer within a ten-day period fol-
lowing the change.
(d) Any committee which, after having filed one
or more statements of organization, disbands or de-
termines it will no longer receive contributions or
make expenditures during the calendar year in an
aggregate amount exceeding $1,000 shall so notify
the supervisory officer.
REPORTS By POLITICAL COMMITTEES AND
CANDIDATES
Sec. 304. (a) Each treasurer of a political com-
mittee supporting a candidate or candidates for elec-
tion to Federal office, and each candidate_for election
to such office, shall file with the appropriate supervis-
ory officer reports of receipts and expenditures on
forms to be prescribed or approved by him. Such re-
ports shall be filed on the tenth day of March, June,
and September, in each year, and on the fifteenth and
fifth days next preceding the date on which an elec-
tion is held, and also by the thirty-first day of Janu-
ary. Such reports shall be complete as of such date as
the supervisory officer may prescribe, which shall not
be less than five days before the date of filing, except
that any contribution of $5,000 or more received after
the last report is filed prior to the election shall be re-
ported within forty-eight hours after its receipt.
(b) Each report under this section shall disclose—
\
\
41
(1) the amount of cash on hand at the begin-
ning of the reporting period;
(2) the full name and mailing address (occu-
pation and the principal place of business, if any)
of each person who has made one or more con-
tributions to or for such committee or candidate
(including the purchase of tickets for events such
as dinners, luncheons, rallies, and similar fund-
raising events) within the calendar year in an
aggregate amount or value in excess of $100,
together with the amount and date of such con-
tributions;
(3) the total sum of individual contributions
made to or for such committee or candidate dur-
ing the reporting period and not reported under
paragraph (2) ;
(4) the name and address of each political
committee or candidate from which the reporting
committee or the candidate received, or to which
that committee or candidate made, any transfer
of funds, together with the amounts and dates of
all transfers;
| (5) each loan to or from any person within
) the calendar year in an aggregate amount or
: value in excess of $100, together with the full
names and mailing addresses (occupations and
the principal places of business, if any) of the
lender and endorsers, if any, and the date and
amount of such loans;
(6) the total amount of proceeds from (A) the
sale of tickets to each dinner, luncheon, rally, and
other fundraising event; (B) mass collections
made at such events; and (C) sales of items such
as political campaign pins, buttons, badges, flags,
emblems, hats, banners, literature, and similar
materials;
>... ai iia i nn
OO
42
(7) each contribution, rebate, refund, or other
receipt in excess of $100 not otherwise listed un-
der paragraphs (2) through (6);
(8) the total sum of all receipts by or for such
committee or candidate during the reporting pe-
riod;
(9) the full name and mailing address (occu-
pation and the principal place of business, if
any) of each person to whom expenditures have
been made by such committee or on behalf of
such committee or candidate within the calendar
year in an aggregate amount or value in excess
of $100, the amount, date, and purpose of each
such expenditure and the name and address of,
and office sought by, each candidate on whose be-
half such expenditure was made;
(10) the full name and mailing address (oc-
cupation and the principal place of business, if
any) of each person to whom an expenditure for
. personal services, salaries, and reimbursed ex-
penses in excess of $100 has been made, and
which is not otherwise reported, including the
amount, date, and purpose of such expenditure;
(11) the total sum of expenditures made by
such committee or candidate during the calendar
year;
(12) the amount and nature of debts and obli-
gations owed by or to the committee, in such
form as the supervisory officer may prescribe and
a continuous reporting of their debts and obliga-
tions after the election at suich periods as the
supervisory officer may require until such debts
and obligations are extinguished; and
- (18) such other information as shall be re-
quired by the supervisory officer.
43
(c) The reports required to be filed by subsection
(a) shall be cumulative during the calendar year to
which they relate, but where there has been no change
in an item reported in a previous report during such
year, only the amount need be carried forward. If no
contributions or expenditures have been accepted or
expended during a calendar year, the treasurer of the
political committee or candidate shall file a statement
to that effect.
REPORTS BY OTHERS THAN POLITICAL COMMITTEES
Sec. 305. Every person (other than a political
committee or candidate) who makes -contributions or
expenditures, other than by contribution to a political
committee or candidate, in an aggregate amount in
excess of $100 within a calendar year shall file with
the supervisory officer a statement containing the in-
formation required by section 304. Statements re-
quired by this section shall be filed on the dates on
which reports by political committees are filed, but
need not be cumulative.
_ FORMAL REQUIREMENTS RESPECTING REPORTS
AND STATEMENTS
SEc. 306. (a) A report or statement required by
this title to be filed by a treasurer of a political com-
mittee, a candidate, or by any other person, shall be
verified by the oath or affirmation of the person fil-
ing such report or statement, taken before any officer
authorized to administer oaths.
(b) A copy of a report or statement shall be pre-
served by the person filing it for a period, of time to
be designated by the supervisory officer in 2 published
regulation.
SALARIES
44
(c) The supervisory officer may, by published reg-
ulation of general applicability, relieve any category
of political committees of the obligation to comply
with section 304 if such committee (1) primarily
supports persons seeking State or local office, and
does not substantially support candidates, and (2)
does not operate in more than one State or on a state-
wide basis.
(d) The supervisory officer shall, by published reg-
ulations of general applicability, prescribe the man-
ner in which contributions and expenditures in the
nature of debts and other contracts, agreements, and
promises to make contributions or expenditures shall
be reported. Such regulations shall provide that they
be reported in separate schedules. In determining
aggregate amounts of contributions and expenditures,
amounts reported as provided in such regulations
shall not be considered until actual payment is made.
REPORTS ON CONVENTION FINANCING.
Sec. 307. Each committee or other organization
which—
(1) represents a State, or a political subdivi-
sion thereof, or any group of persons, in dealing
with officials of a national political party with
respect to matters involving a convention held
in such State or political subdivision to nominate
a candidate for the office of President or Vice
President, or
(2) represents a national political party in
making arrangements for the convention of such
party held to nominate a candidate for the office
of President or Vice President,
shall, within sixty days following the end of the con-
vention (but not later than twenty days prior to the
wn
date on which presidential and vice-presidential elec-
tors are chosen), file with the Comptroller General
of the United States a full and complete financial
statement, in such form and detail as he may pre-
scribe, of the sources from which it derived its funds,
and the purposes for which such funds were expended.
45
DUTIES OF THE SUPERVISORY OFFICER
Sec. 308. (a) It shall be the duty of the super-
visory officer—
(1) to develop and furnish to the person re-
quired by the provisions of this Act prescribed
forms for the making of the reports and state-
ments required to be filed with him under this
title;
(2) to prepare, publish, and furnish to the
person required to file such reports and state-
ments a manual setting forth recommended uni-
form methods of bookkeeping and reporting;
(3) to develop a filing, coding, and cross-in-
dexing system consonant with the purposes of
this title;
(4) to make the reports and statements filed
with him available for public inspection and
copying, commencing as soon as practicable but
not later than the end of the second day follow-
ing the day during which it was received, and
to permit copying of any such report or state-
ment by hand or by duplicating machine, as re-
quested by any person, at the expense of such
| person: Provided, That any information copied
from such reports and statements shall not be
sold or utilized by any person for the purpose of
soliciting contributions or for any commercial
purpose ;
46
(5) to preserve such reports and statements
for a period of ten years from date of receipt,
except that reports and statements relating sole-
ly to candidates for the House of Representatives
shall be preserved for only five years from the
date of receipt;
(6) to compile and maintain a current list of
all statements or parts of statements pertaining
to each candidate;
(7) to prepare and publish an annual report
including compilations of (A) total reported con-
tributions and expenditures for all candidates,
political committees, and other persons during
the year; (B) total amounts expended accord-
ing to such categories as he shall determine and
broken down into candidate, party, and nonparty
expenditures on the National, State, and local
levels; (C) total amounts expended for influ-
encing nominations and elections stated sepa-
rately; (D) total amounts contributed accord-
ing to such categories of amounts as he shall
determine and broken down into contributions
on the national, State, and local levels for candi-
dates and political committees; and (E) aggre
gate amounts contributed by any contributor
shown to have contributed in excess of $100;
(8) to prepare and publish from time to time
special reports comparing the various totals and
categories of contributions and expenditures
made with respect to preceding elections;
(9) to prepare and publish such other reports
as he may deem appropriate;
(10) to assure wide dissemination of statis-
tics, summaries, and reports prepared under this
title;
47
(11) to make from time to time audits and
field investigations with respect to reports and
statements filed under the provisions of this title,
and with respect to alleged failures to file any
report or statement required under the provisions
of this title;
(12) to report apparent violations of law to
the appropriate law enforcement authorities;
and
(13) to prescribe suitable rules and regula-
tions to carry out the provisions of this title.
(b) The supervisory officer shall encourage, and
cooperate with, the election officials in the several
States to develop procedures which will eliminate the
necessity of multiple filings by permitting the filing
of copies of Federal reports to satisfy the State re-
quirements.
(c) It shall be the duty of the Comptroller Gen-
eral to serve as a national clearinghouse for infor-
mation in respect to the administration of elections.
In carrying out his duties under this subsection, the
Comptroller General shall enter into contracts for the
- purpose of conducting independent studies of the ad-
ministration of elections. Such studies shall include,
but shall not be limited to, studies of—
(1) the method of selection of, and the type
of duties assigned to, officials and personnel
working on boards of elections;
(2) practices relating to the registration of
voters; and
(3) voting and counting methods.
Studies made under this subsection shall be published
by the Comptroller General and copies thereof shall
be made available to the general public upon the pay-
ment of the cost thereof. Nothing in this subsection
48
shall be construed to authorize the Comptroller Gen-
eral to require the inclusion of any comment or rec-
ommendation of the Comptroller General in any such
study.
(d)(1) Any person who believes a violation of this
title has occurred may file a complaint with the su-
pervisory officer. If the supervisory officer determines
there is substantial reason to believe such a violation
has occurred, he shall expeditiously make an investi-
gation, which shall also include an investigation of
reports and statements filed by the complainant if he
is a candidate, of the matter complained of. When-
ever in the judgment of the supervisory officer, after
affording due notice and an opportunity for a hear-
ing, any person has engaged or is about to engage
in any acts or practices which constitute or will con-
stitute a violation of any provision of this title or
any regulation or order issued thereunder, the Attor-
ney General on behalf of the United States shall in-
stitute a civil action for relief, including a permanent
or temporary injunction, restraining order, or any
other appropriate order in the district court of the
United States for the district in which the person is
found, resides, or transacts business. Upon a proper
showing that such person has engaged or is about to
engage in such acts or practices, a permanent or tem-
porary injunction, restraining order, or other order
shall be granted without bond by such court.
(2) In any action brought under paragraph (1)
of this subsection, subpenas for witnesses who are re-
quired to attend a United States district court may
run into any other district.
(3) Any party aggrieved by an order granted un-
der paragraph (1) of this subsection may, at any
time within sixty days after the date of entry there-
of, file a petition with the United States court of
49
appeals for the circuit in which such person is found,
resides, or transacts business, for judicial review of
such order.
(4) The judgment of the court of appeals affirm-
ing or setting aside, in whole or in part, any such
order of the district court shall be final, subject to
review by the Supreme Court of the United States
upon certiorari or certification as provided in section
1254 of title 28, United States Code.
(5) Any action brought under this subsection shall
be advanced on the docket of the court in which filed,
and put ahead of all other actions (other than other
actions brought under this subsection).
STATEMENTS FILED WITH STATE OFFICERS
Sec. 309. (a) A copy of each statement required
to be filed with a supervisory officer by this title shall
be filed with the Secretary of State (or, if there is
no office of Secretary of State, the equivalent State
officer) of the appropriate State. For purposes of
this subsection, the term “appropriate State” means—
(1) for reports relating to expenditures and
contributions in connection with the campaign
for nomination for election, or election, of a can-
didate to the office of President or Vice Presi-
dent of the United States, each State in which
an expenditure is made by him or on his behalf,
and
(2) for reports relating to expenditures and
contributions in connection with the campaign
for nomination for election, or election, of a can-
didate to the office of Senator or Representative
in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the
Congress of the United States, the State in which
he seeks election.
50
(b) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State,
or the equivalent State officer, under subsection (a)—
(1) to receive and maintain in an orderly
manner all reports and statements required by
this title to be filed with him;
(2) to preserve such reports and statements
for a period of ten years from date of receipt,
except that reports and statements relating sole-
ly to candidates for the House of Representatives
shall be preserved for only five years from the
date of receipt;
(3) to make the reports and statements filed
with him available for public inspection and copy-
ing during regular office hours, commencing as
soon as practicable but not later than the end
of the day during which it was received, and to
permit copying of any such report or statement
by hand or by duplicating machine, requested
by any person, at the expense of such person;
and
(4) to compile and maintain a current list of
all statements or parts of statements pertaining
to each candidate.
PROHIBITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS
IN NAME OF ANOTHER
Sec. 310. No person shall make a contribution in
the name of another person, and no person shall
knowingly accept a contribution made by one person
in the name of another person.
PENALTY FOR VIOLATIONS
Sec. 311. (a) Any person who violates any of the
provisions of this title shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
wn
(b) In case of any conviction under this title,
where the punishment inflicted does not include im-
prisonment, such conviction shall be deemed a mis-
demeanor conviction only.
51
TITLE IV—GENERAL PROVISIONS
EXTENSION OF CREDIT BY REGULATED INDUSTRIES
Sec. 401. The Civil Aeronautics Board, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission, and the Interstate
Commerce Commission shall each promulgate, within
ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act,
its own regulations with respect to the extension of
credit, without security, by any person regulated by
' guch Board or Commission to any candidate for Fed-
eral office (as such term is defined in section 301(c)
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971), or
to any person on behalf of such a candidate, for goods
furnished or services rendered in connection with the
campaign of such candidate for nomination for elec-
tion, or election, to such office.
PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF CERTAIN FEDERAL
FUNDS FOR ELECTION ACTIVITIES
Sec. 402. No part of any funds appropriated to
carry out the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 shall
be used to finance, directly or indirectly, any activity
designed to influence the outcome of any election to
Federal office, or any voter registration activity, or to
pay the salary of any officer or employee of the Office
of Economic Opportunity who, in his official capacity
as such an officer or employee, engages in any such
activity. As used in this section, the term “election”
has the same meaning given such term by section 301
52
(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
and the term “Federal office” has the same meaning
given such term by section 301(c) of such Act.
EFFECT ON STATE LAW
aD
Sec. 403. (a) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed
to invalidate or make inapplicable any provision of
any State law, except where compliance with such
provision of law would result in a violation of a pro-
vision of this Act.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), no provision
of State law shall be construed to prohibit any person
from taking any action authorized by this Act or from
making any expenditure (as such term is defined in
section 301(f) of this Act) which he could lawfully
make under this Act.
PARTIAL INVALIDITY
Sec. 404. If any provision of this Act, or the ap-
plication thereof to any person or circumstance, is
held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act
and the application of such provision to other persons
and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
REPEALING CLAUSE
Sec. 405. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925
(2 U.S.C. 241- 256), is repealed.
EFFECTIVE DATE
Sec. 406. Except as provided for in section 401 of
this Act, the provisions of this Act shall become ef-
53
fective on December 31, 1971, or sixty days after the
date of enactment of this Act, whichever is later.
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.
WG. &. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFice; 1972 486770 482
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