Opposition Brief — Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.

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of proposed Article IX-A of the 1870 Illinois Constitution

Since that was the result reached by the Illinois Supreme

Court, we, therefore, appear here to argue that the deci.

sion of the Illinois Supreme Court was: (a) correct, (b)

based upon long-standing prior rulings of this Court, (0)

adequate to dispose of the issues raised, and (d) sony

from a public policy standpoint. This brief will take up (in

order) the arguments raised in the three petitions for ,

writ of certiorari and the one jurisdictional statement {,

which it is addressed.

OPINIONS BELOW

This entire litigation arises out of the meaning anj

effect of an amendment to the 1870 Illinois Constitutin

which was initiated by Senate Joint Resolution #30 of

the Illinois General Assembly passed June 30, 1969, sub

mitted to referendum of the electorate of that state o

November 3, 1970 and declared ratified on November 3,

1970. The language of that clause, called Article IX-A, is

as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitn.

tion, the taxation of personal property by valuation js

prohibited as to individuals.

The majority, and dissenting opinions, of the Lllinois

Supreme Court found different legal results emanating

from the language of Article IX-A. The majority opinion,

written by Mr. Justice Schaefer found the language to be

violative of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amend.

ment to the United States Constitution in that:

“The new article classifies personal property for the

purpose of imposing a property tax by valuation,

upon a basis that does not depend upon any of the

characteristics of the property that is taxed, or upon

:

;

,

:

‘

on

the use to which it is put, but solely upon the owner-

ship of the property.”

Mr. Justice Schaefer and the majority thus find that

a property tax imposed only upon the property hel a by

corporations is unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Davis in his

dissenting opinion agrees that the intent of Article LX-A

was to impose a personal property tax payable only by

corporations. He then goes on to say?

“Here the question for determination is whether,

absent the requirement of a state constitution that

corporate and individual personal properties be taxed

the same, the equal protection clause of the 14th

Amendment permits them to be taxed differently? I be-

lieve that it does!”

The full opinions of the Illinois Supreme Court, the

trial courts and the texts of statutes and constitutional

provisions involved are to be found in the three petitions

to which this brief is a response,

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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A Wer

OF CERTIORARI BY ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERA

oa BEHALF OF A STATE OFFICER — DOCKET no,

-685.

* * *

THE FINDING OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME Coun?

THAT CORPORATIONS MAY NOT CO

ALLY BE SINGLED OUT FOR AD VALOREM PR.

SONAL PROPERTY TAXATION IS NEITHER NOVE,

NOR ERRONEOUS AND IS NOT, ALONG WITH TH

RULES OF OONSTRUCTION OF ILLINOIS Lay

WHICH EXPOSES THAT INFIRMITY, A PROPR

SUBJECT FOR A GRANT OF REVIEW UNDER Om.

TIORARI JURISDICTION.

On page 27 of Illinois Attorney General William J.

Scott’s petition, the following statement is to be found:

“It is submitted that the issues in this case are: (1)

Was the majority of the Illinois Supreme Court cor.

rect when it held that any distinction between ip.

dividuals and corporations with the imposition of a/

valorem personal property taxes was an invidious and

unreasonable distinction; (2) Was Justice Davis cor.

rect in his dissent when he held that it was reasonabk

to distinguish between all individually owned persoml

property as against all corporately owned persoml

property; or (3) Was Judge Donovan”® in error when

he ruled that it is reasonable to exempt from th

ad valorem personal property taxes “the persoml

property owned by individuals and used for their per.

sonal enjoyment and that of their families” and had

to continue the tax upon the property of individuals,

partnerships and corporations which is used for bus-

ness and profit-making purposes.”

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* Trial judge in case #71-691.

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PRahhray

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The Attorney General, argues that his proposed Issues

No. 1 and No. 2 are within the permissable ambit of cer-

tiorari jurisdiction. The substance of those two issues is,

of course, whether a personal property tax collectable

only from the property owned by corporations is consti-

tutional. These respondents submit that certiorari should

not be granted to consider a point so well established in

law. Rule 19 of the United States Supreme Court sets out

the type of case which the Court might desire to review on

certiorari :

“(b) Where a state court has decided a Federal ques-

tion of substance not theretofore determined by

this court, or has decided it in a way probably

not in accord with applicable decisions of this

5 eee

A consideration of the opinion of the Illinois Supreme

Court and of the case law upon which that opinion relies

will show ‘that the criteria of Rule 19 have not been met

in the Attorney Generals’ petition or in the other petitions.

The majority opinion in finding Article [X-A unconstitu-

tional relies entirely upon the rule of the equal protection

clause of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

Mr. Justice Schaefer writes:

“Tt cannot rationally be said that the prohibition pro-

motes any policy other than a desire to free one set of

property owners from the burden of a tax imposed

upon another set. All of the arguments in favor of

the abolition of the Personal Property Tax upon the

property owned by natural persons apply with equal

force in favor of the abolition of that tax upon the

property owned by others.”

Since Mr. Justice Schaefer and the majority can find no

distinction between the personal property owned by an

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individual and personal property owned by a corporation,

the court concludes that the constitutional amendmey;

which attempted to bring about such a result must fal] ~

Federal constitutional grounds.

In the Illinois Supreme Court, petitioner Lake Shon

correctly contended most strongly that it and other Illinois

corporations could not be discriminated against by a per.

sonal property tax which applied only to corporate ownei

property. While the Maynard petitioners disagree with

Lake Shore on a number of issues (See Argument Nl),

we are of one mind on the clarity and settled nature of the

main constitutional issue at bar. The brief of Lake Shor

Auto Parts Co. in the Illinois Supreme Court containg

an excellent discussion of the applicable case law in this

area. We, therefore, set out pages 18 to 26 of that brie

with Lake Shore’s permission and our compliments:

“For nearly ninety years it has been settled doctrine

that an ad valorem property tax may not be imposed

which discriminates against property owners solely by

reason of the fact that they are corporations. Sucha

classification is per se unreasonable, and constitutes a

deprivation of the equal protection of the laws guaran

teed by the 14th Amendment to the United States Con.

stitution.

“A leading writer states this rule in the following

language :

‘Classification for exemption purposes may hk

based on the use to which property is devoted, as

well as the nature of the property; but property

cannot be exempted merely because of its owner.

ship where the same kind of property owned by

others is taxed . . . Instead of classifying property

for the purpose of exemption either by its charac

teristics or by its uses, the legislature cannot

‘classify the owners of property according to some

characteristic possessed by them, or connected

aE a. a

ar,

[Continuation of quoted matter]

with their conduct, and thereupon base an exemp-

tion of the property of such persons, regard-

less of the characteristics possessed by it and

of the uses to which it is put.’ 1 Cooley on Taxa-

tion (4th ed.) 280, p. 594.

“Another author has stated ‘that there would very

probably be no dissent’ from the proposition that

the United States Supreme Court is prepared to guar-

antee to all corporations equality with individuals in

respect to all property taxation. Sholley, Corporate

Taxpayers and the Equal Protection Clause, 31 Ill.

LR. 463, 589 (1937).

“The doctrine, insofar as it is relevant to the case

at bar, had its origin in two decisions of the 9th Fed-

eral Circuit Court in the California Railroad Tax cases:

San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 13 Fed.

722 (1882), app. dism. per. stip., 116 U.S. 138; and

Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 18 Fed.

385 (1883), aff’d. on other grounds, 118 U.S. 394.

“The history and background of these famous cases

has been detailed elsewhere.(*) The litigation arose

out of a provision of the California Constitution which

required that the value of any outstanding mortgage

be deducted from the assessed value of real estate,

except as to railroads and other quasi-public corpora-

tions. The chief opinion in each of the cases was writ-

ten by Justice Field, an Associate Justice of the United

States Supreme Court assigned to the circuit. In each

ease, also, there is a concurring opinion by Justice

Sawyer.

(*) See, Sholley, op. cit. supra, 31 Til. L. R. 463 at 469-74

(1937) ; McLaughlin, The Court, The Corporation, and

Mr. Conkling, 46 Am. Hist. Rev. 45, 52 (1940); and

see the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas, and

the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Wheel-

be) Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576, 574

_—

[Continuation of quoted matter]

“Justice Field first undertook to meet the argument

that the constitutional provision did nothing more thy,

impose a ‘reasonable classification’, stating (13 Fed,

at p. 737-8):

‘It is not classifying property to provide that th

property of certain parties . . . shall be assesgej

at its value after deducting the mortgage: ani

that the property of other parties . . . shall

taxed at its full value without any deduction, Tha

is not providing for a different rate of taxation

for different kinds of property, but for

taxation according to the character of the owner’

(emphasis added)

“See also Justice Field’s subsequent opinion in the

Santa Clara case (18 Fed., at p. 408), restating the

basis for rejecting the ‘reasonable classification’

contention, and Justice Sawyer’s concurring opinion

in that same case (18 Fed. at p. 432).

“To the argument that even if the assessment could

not be sustained as a property tax, it ought to be sus.

tained as a franchise tax,—i.e., a ‘condition of the

continued existence of the railroad corporation’

Justice Field presented two answers (13 Fed. at D

754) :

1) The California constitutional provision in ques

tion, and the statute thereunder, were not intended a

a franchise tax or a condition for the continuation of

the franchise;

2) The right of the state to exclude the corporation

altogether does not mean that the state may, as a con-

dition for continued permission to do business, require

the corporation to waive and forego the rights other-

wise guaranteed to it by the United States Constitu-

tion:

“What the state may do, even with the creations of its

own will, it mist do in subordination to the inhibi-

tions of the federal constitution.”

wine BE sees

[Continuation of quoted matter]

“Despite the lack of a definitive Supreme Court de-

cision, the Califorma Railroad Tax cases immediately

- became accepted as the law of the land.

“In Walker v. Northern Pacific Ry., 47 Fed. 681, 686

(C.C.N.D. 1891), an act of the North Dakota territorial

legislature which placed real estate owned by the

Northern Pacific Railroad in a more favorable tax

status than that of other real estate was held to be

violative of the equal protection clause of the United

States Constitution.

“The holding of the California Railroad Taz cases

has been followed on many occasions :

Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sanders County, 214

Pac. 596, 599 (Mont., 1923);

State ex rel Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Duncan,

219 Pac. 638, 640 (Mont., 1923);

Gamble-Robinson Fruit Co. v. Thoreson, 204 N.W.

861, 864-5 (N.D. 1925) ;

d Northwestern Improvement Co. v. State, 220 N.W.

, & 436, 439-40 (N.D. 1928).

e “In those few states wherein income taxes have

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been held to be taxes on property, it necessarily fol-

lows that an income tax applicable only to corporations

is an unreasonable classification,—not only under the

. & state constitution, but under the equal protection clause

7: - of the 14th Amendment as well:

f Redfield v. Fisher, 292 Pac. 813 (Ore. 1930), reh.

den. sub nom. Redfield v. Norblad, 295 Pac. 461

1 (1931), cert. den. 284 U.S. 617 (1931) ;

- & Aberdeen S. & L. Ass’n. v. Chase, 289 Pac. 536,

2 541 (Wash., 1930), op. on reh., sub nom. Wash-

. & ington Mutual Savings Bank v. Chase, 290 Pac.

5 697 (1930).

E “Tt was not until 1928, in Quaker City Cab Co. v.

1 § Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, that the Supreme-Conrt of

the United States was squarely faced with an equal

protection challenge to a state tax, not deemed an )

ion

[Continuation of quoted matter]

excise tax, which directly discriminated against cor.

porations.

“In the Quaker City Cab Co. case, the United State,

Supreme Court, relying on The California Railroa

Taz cases, held unconstitutional, as a violation of th

equal protection clause a statute of Pennsylvania whid,

imposed a tax on the gross receipts of incorporata

taxi-cab companies (both domestic and foreign) whi,

wholly exempting the receipts of unincorporated tay.

cab businesses.

“Although a tax on business receipts is not ordi

thought of as a property tax, the Supreme Cour

stated (p. 402):

‘Here the tax is one that can be laid upon rn

ceipts belonging to a natural person quite ag ep.

veniently as upon those of a corporation. It ig not

peculiarly applicable to corporations, as are taxe

on their capital stock or franchises. . . . The char.

acter of the owner is the sole fact on which the dis

tinction and discrimination are made to depend

The tax is tmposed merely because the owner is 4

corporation. . . . It follows that the section faik

to meet the requirement that a classification, t

be consistent with the equal protection clause, must

be based on a real and substantial difference hay.

ing a reasonable relation to the subject of th

legislation.’ (emphasis added).

“Three dissenting justices took sharp issue with the

majority’s view that ‘the tax is imposed merely be

cause the owner is a corporation’. They viewed the

tax in question as an excise tax, so that ‘ownership,

as such, had nothing at all to do with it.

“The ‘character of the owner’, of course, has no

bearing whatsoever in the case of a true excise tax

By definition, ownership is irrelevant. The tax is im-

posed upon the exercise of some act or privilege. (See

Annotation, What is a Property Tax as Distinguished

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nin tis

[Continuation of quoted matter]

From Excise, License and Other Taxes, 103 A.L.R. 18).

In Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 US. 124, 137 (1929),

the Supreme Court recognized that an excise or privi-

lege tax may be imposed ‘upon the exercise of one

of the numerous rights of property, but each is clearly

distinguishable from a tax which falls upon the owner

merely because he ts owner, regardless of the use or

disposition made of his property.’ (emphasis added).

“Presumably, each of the dissenting justices in

Quaker City Cab would have joined the majority in

condemning a true property tax which discriminated

against corporations solely on the basis of ownership.

In any event, there can be no doubt that the Quaker

City Cab case stands for the proposition that the equal

protection clause prohibits discriminatory taxation

against corporations based solely on the ownership of

property. : ;

“The Quaker City.Cab case has been followed in

many subsequent cases, in both state and federal

courts, e.g. :

Garysburg Mfg. Co. v. Pender County, 42 Fed.

94 500, 506 (E.D.N.C. 1930), rev’d. on other

grounds, 50 Fed. 2d 732 (4th Cir. 1931) ;

Mount Hope Cemetery Co. v. Pleasant, 32 Pac.

2d 500, 503 (Kan. 1934) ;

State v. Hunt, 9 N.E.2d 676, 681-2 (Ohio, 1937) ;

H. Rouw Co. v. Texas Citrus Comm’n., 247 S.W.

2d 231, 234 (Tex. 1952).

“Tn all of the cases thus far considered, the discrimi-

nation held unconstitutional was directed against cor-

porations as such, and in favor of natural persons.

Also relevant to the problem at hand is a long and well-

established line of cases in the United States Supreme

Court which have laid down the rule that a property

tax may not, under the 14th Amendment, serve as the

basis for discriminating against foreign corporations

and in favor of domestic corporations. See Wheeling

Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571-2 (1949),

ek, ee

[Continuation of quoted matter]

and WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro, 393 qs

117, 119 (1968).

“Both the Cook County defendants and defends

Lehnhausen rely almost exclusively upon extengiy,

quotations from the case of Thorpe v. Mahin, 43 1113;

36 (1969), wherein this Court, in the course of uphold.

ing the corporate-individual rate discrimination unde

the Illinois Income Tax Act, indicated the broad Beope

of classification which is permissible under the equal

protection clause of the United States Constitution,

“The language of Thorpe v. Mahin, however, mu

be read in the light of the Court’s preliminary holding

-(43 Ill. 2d at p. 42) that:

‘We hold that the tax in question is not a prop

erty or

“The Brine Soi of that holding was not only t

free the income tax from the constrants of the mi.

formity clause of the Illinois Constitution (a matter

with which we are not concerned in the instant case),

but it also served as an essential prerequisite to this

Court’s ruling on the equal protection argument, This

is demonstrated by this Court’s strong reliance, i

Thorpe v. Mahin, upon the leading case of Flint 1,

Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911), in which the

United States Supreme Court upheld a federal tx

exclusively on corporations and measured by net in

come.

“The result in Flint v. Stone Tracy depended, in the

first instance, upon the Court’s characterization of the

tax as an excise, rather than a tax on property, and

the holding on this point was preceded by an elaborate

and enlightened discussion of the problem (220 US.

at 145-147, 150-152).

“Although the equal protection clause of the 14h

Amendment was not directly involved in Flint v. Stow

Tracy, the Supreme Court did repeatedly go ont of its

way to observe that the criteria for reasonable class-

fication of an excise tax under the 14th Amendmat

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are comparable to the criteria under Article I, 4 8,

Clause 1, of the United States Constitution—the pro-

vision involved in Flint v. Stone Tracy, See, 220 U.S.,

at pp. 158 and 161.

“Flint v. Stone Tracy thus stands for two propo-

sitions :

(1) That a tax on businesses, measured by net

income, is an excise tax and not a property tax.

Hence it need not be apportioned among the sev-

eral states, and it may be ‘reasonably classified’.

(2) That it is reasonable to classify the excise

so as to impose it only on corporations for the

privilege of doing business in corporate form,

while at the same time exempting unincorporated

businesses and individuals.

“Similarly, Thorpe v. Mahin stands for two propo-

sitions :

(1) That a tax measured by income is not a

property tax.

(2) That it is reasonable (under both the state

constitution and the equal protection clause of

the federal constitution) to classify the tax by

imposing it only on corporations for the privilege

of doing business in corporate form,’ while at the

same time exempting unincorporated businesses

and individuals, or taxing them at a lesser rate

or on a different base.

“Neither case offers any support to defendants’ ap-

parent contention that a property tax may be classified

solely on the basis of the ownership of the property.”

(End of quoted material.)

The only important case cited by the Attorney General

and not discussed in the Lake Shore brief is Allied Stores

of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959). In that case

Ohio passed a statute exempting from ad valorem taxa-

tion “merchandise or agricultural products belonging to a

non-resident .. . if held in a storage warehouse for storage

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only”. The plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, sued the tar

commissioner of the state alleging that the statute denied

equal protection of the laws to residents of Ohio. Ty

Supreme Court found that the exemption was constitn.

tional. The Illinois Attorney General attempts to use the

Allied case to indicate that the same wide latitude Which

exists in income tax classification carries over to ad valoren

taxation. While the Court does invite state inventiveness

in tax classifications, the facts of the Allied case and the

opinions of the Supreme Court are not helpful to the peti.

tioner’s argument. In Allied, the classification did Dot

create an exemption based upon a corporate-individnsl

dicotomy. The distinction was not upon ownership but

upon residence coupled with a state policy. The majority

opinion discussed in detail the possible public policy reg.

sons which might have motivated the Ohio legislature jp

passing the law.

Unlike the Ohio’ case, no economic benefit to particular

select groups or particular industries was to be brought

about by Illinois Article IX-A. In the present case the

only motivation which has been or could be suggested for

the passage of Article IX-A is that the corporate tar.

payer is a lucrative and easy target for taxation. The

language previously quoted from Mr. Justice Schaefer's

opinion is the best proof that the Illinois Supreme Court

sought but was unable to find any legitimate policy motive

underlying the admitted discrimination:

“It cannot rationally be said that the prohibition pro-

motes any policy other than a desire to free one set of

property owners from the burden of a tax imposed

upon another set.”

a) en

The argument of the Maynard respondents is not limited

to the fact that no public policy justification for the cor-

rate discrimination was presented to nor found to exist

by the Illinois Supreme Court. At this late date there is

no acceptable public policy justification for the course urged

by the Illinois Attorney General. Any attempt to strip

corporations of the constitutional protections emanating

from the Quaker City Cab case must be made in the face

of the practical results of such a decision. Courts have

agreed that corporations can be compelled to pay fran-

chise taxes and higher rate income taxes for engaging in

the same businesses as non-corporate entities. Corpora-

tions have, however, for 90 years, been free of arbitrary

classification in ad valorem taxation. Corporate decisions

and state taxation systems and policies have been made

upon this firm and basic assumption of constitutional law.

To upset such law would be to make corporations non-

persons for the purposes of the United States Constitu-

tion and effectively end the equal protection guarantee in

the field of corporate taxation. Such a startling change of

American law should hardly be the end result of one

small piece of bad draftsmanship by the Illinois General

Assembly.

As the third ground for review, the Attorney General

presents an approach suggested by the trial court judge

in the Shapiro case. In Shapiro, Judge Donovan thought

to avoid all constitutional issues by so interpreting Article

IX-A as to free it from any constitutional infirmity. At

page A-39 of the Attorney General’s petition, a clause of

Judge Donovan’s order is set out as follows:

“That Article IX-A is free of the ambiguity and un-

certainty of intendment charged by the plaintiffs,

and that its intendment is clearly declared to prohibit

the taxation of personal property by valuation ex-

—18—”"

clusively as to natural persons, where that p

is used, by them, for the personal enjoyment - then.

selves and their families.”

The argument that Article [X-A prohibits the taxatip

of the non-business personal property of natural pe.

sons is an attractive one. In the Maynard respondeny

brief and oral arguments before the [Illinois Suprey

Court, we presented that position to the court ag »

alternative argument. The alternative. argument reg

purely upon an appeal to rules of statutory interpretation

concerning the meaning of the word “individuals”, §yq

an interpretation, had it been adopted, would have pe.

mitted the court to avoid any constitutional issues. Despit

the fact that this approach was suggested by the Maynari

plaintiffs, the State’s Attorney of Cook County, and th

Attorney General of the State of Illinois, both the majority

and. dissenting opinion of the Illinois Supreme Cour,

rejected that tactfully limited interpretation of the phn»

“as to individuals”. Both Mr. Justice Davis and

Justice Schaefer felt that the only valid issue in this cax

related to the validity of Article IX-A in light of the equi

protection clause. The majority opinion specifically dis

cussed and rejected the proffered interpretation of stat

law which would have avoided constitutional infirmity.

It has been the oft-stated opinion of the United State

Supreme Court that it is bound by judgments of State

Supreme Courts on questions of state law. Henry v. Missi.

sippt, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) ; Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 US

207 (1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 34 US

94 (1952); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). Thu,

the United States Supreme Court has bound itself to a —

cept a State Supreme Court’s construction of a State Co-

stitutional provision or statute. Cramp v. Board of Public _

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Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); First National Bank v.

Ayers, 160 U.S. 660 (1896). Petitioner’s third stated issue

flies in the face of this established principle of Federal

law. 7

In the case at bar, the Illinois Supreme Court has con-

sidered and unanimously rejected the contentions stated

by the Illinois Attorney General as Issues No. 1, 2, and 3.

By its own decisions, the United States Supreme Court

should not grant certiorari to reconsider either a matter

of long-standing Federal law or a state statutory inter-

pretation previously disposed of by the highest court of

the state.

sie GR sai

II.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A Wry

OF CERTIORARI BY STATE’S ATTORNEY OF (Cox

COUNTY ON BEHALF OF COUNTY OFFICERS.

DOCKET NO. 71-691. ‘

* 7

THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION OF 1970, EFFE.

TIVE JULY 1, 1971, MADE NO CHANGE IN THE on,

TERIA GOVERNING DECISION OF THIS CASE. TH

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT DID NOT IGNORE (2

OVERLOOK THE NEW ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

BUT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE Basi

FEDERAL QUESTION, INVOLVING VIOLATION 7

THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, REMAINED Uy.

AFFECTED BY THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

The petition for writ of certiorari, filed by Edward J,

Barrett, County Clerk of Cook County, et al., is devoted

almost completely to arguments concerning the adoption

of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 which became effe.

tive several days prior to the rendition of the opinion

and judgment herein sought to be reviewed. Without ex.

plaining how the new Constitution remedied the invidiow

discrimination implicit in Article IX-A of the 1870 Co.

stitution and violative of the equal protection clans,

petitioners charge that the Illinois Supreme Court ignored

the new constitution, which in their view introduced a new

dimension in this case. In developing this theme, they

present a number of unsupported and irrelevant variations.

For example, in “Questions Presented” they gratuitously

demand to know how “the highest court of the state ca

ignore the existence of the new state constitution . . . and

cireumscribe the extent of its examination in determining

the public policy of the state ...?” They ask how the cout

could ignore the context in which Article [X-A of the prior

constitution was adopted, claiming the constitutional

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amendment which was held invalid was “the first step of

the program provided in the new constitution for the event-

yal abolishment of the personal property tax.” They

strongly imply that either by oversight (Pet. p. 39) or by

deliberate design (Pet. p. 5) the Illinois Supreme Court

ignored its own precedents and failed to apply the law

existing at the time of decision in favor of the law exist-

ing at the time the case arose. Petitioners even go 80

far as to argue that by failing to mention the new con-

stitution of 1970 in its opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court

“eaused to be born... a substantial federal question im-

pelling this court’s consideration . . .” (Pet. p. 5).

We take issue with these arguments of the petitioners,

The contention that the Illinois Supreme Court ignored or

overlooked the advent of the Illinois Constitution of 1970

is totally unsupportable in point of fact. The petitioners’

arguments that the Constitution of 1970 requires valida-

tion of Article IX-A are likewise without merit in point

of law.

To argue that the Illinois Supreme Court would ignore

or overlook such an important development in the su-

preme law of the state as the taking effect of a new con-

stitution is scarcely plausible on its face. The facts are

totally the other way. Both in the briefs and in the oral

arguments presented to that Court, the new constitution

was the subject of serious and repeated references by

counsel for the several parties. The leave granted to

these respondents (as petitioners in Maynard No. 44308)

to file as a matter of original jurisdiction their petition

for declaratory judgment, was in response to their petition

which recited the importance of considering the new con-

stitution, as well as the old, in deciding the issues of the

case and contained their offer to make such a presentation

to the Court. One of the respondents’ attorneys who par-

ee

ticipated in the arguments before the Illinois Suprem

Court, served as President of the Sixth Illinois Constity

tional Convention, the body which drafted the new em.

stitution. Clearly the court was aware of the new om,

stitution and its provisions relating to personal property

taxation.

It should be obvious that there is no rational basis for

concluding, as petitioners have done, that, bécanse th

court failed to mention the new Constitution in its opinim

it either ignored or overlooked the document. It isvévident

from the opinion that the court viewed the basic Feder

constitutional question, i.e., the violation of the equal pn

tection clause, as unaffected by the emergence of th

Illinois Constitution of 1970.

Petitioners would justify the invidious discrimination

implicit in the constitutional amendment by urging upm

this court that there is a public policy in Illipois which

looks to ultimate abolishment of all ad valorem~persoml

property taxation. That such a policy exists is clear;

that such a policy cannot justify violation of the equl

protection clause is equally clear. Petitioners assert (ani

petitioner Lake Shore Auto Parts, Inc. (Pet. p. 7) make

a similar argument) that Article [X-A was the initial

step in a program of the new Constitution to end all such

taxation by 1979. These interpretations are at the best

but half truths, and petitioners are totally in error if they

mean to assert that the new Constitution mandates immed-

ate abolishment of individual personal property taxes.

To the contrary, the new document carries forward only

such individual exemptions as shall ultimately be defined

and held valid by the courts. That, of course, is whit

the present case is all about and hence petitioners beg the

question by their circuitous argument.

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The Constitutional amendment, which is at issue in this

case, was proposed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 30

enacted by the Illinois General Assembly following the

call of the Constitutional Convention and prior to its con-

vening. The amendment was required to be voted on at

the general election of November 3, 1970, which occurred

prior to the referendum on the new constitution.

Thus, throughout its deliberations, the Convention was

faced with a drafting dilemma. It was necessary for it

either to structure any revenue article of a new constitu-

tion with concern for the meaning, application and legal

effect of the pending Constitutional amendment—matters

which were anything but clear; or it could proceed to draft

new provisions without concern for the pending proposi-

tion—a course publicly unacceptable. The difficulty was

also compounded by the doubts which existed concerning

the interpretation of the word “individuals” as used in

the amendment and doubts. concerning the constitutionality

of particular interpretations under the equal protection

clause. A measure of the uncertainty felt by many dele-

gates to the Convention was aptly expressed in floor debate

by Stanley C. Johnson, a member of the Revenue Com-

mittee, who stated:

“Mr. President, the amendment in November is clouded

with so much uncertainty as to its application that

we will be years, we fear, trying to figure out what

it really means. There have been opinions registered

that it will not apply to joint tenants, that it will

not apply to trusts, that it will not apply to partner-

ships. Certainly it will not apply to corporations. So

that it may eventually boil down to what it applies

_to is whether or not the property is used in the pro-

duction of income or not.” (June 25, 1970, Transcript

Vol. 74, p. 11)

—%—

Professor Dawn Clark Netsch, who served ag Vig

Chairman of the Revenue Committee (referring to gy

tion 5(b) of Article IX of the Constitution of 1970, here,

after quoted) wrote in the November, 1970 issue of ty

Chicago Bar Record, p. 114:

“The coverage of this subsection depends, in tum,

on the coverage of the proposed November amen

ment abolishing the tax ‘as to individuals’. Pregy,

ably, the courts will have settled these questions by the

time the personal property tax is finally eliminaty

in 1979. If the courts should decide—possibly to ayoij

equal protection issues—that an individual engaged iy

a retail grocery business as a sale proprietorship js

not relieved of paying the personal property tax pu:

suant to the November referendum because his cop.

petitor down the street, who is incorporated, is no

relieved, that business individual would be picked

up by subsection (c) and relieved of the tax in th

second phase-out. He would then be liable for a shar

of the replacement tax.”

In this context of timing problems and uncertainties a:

to meaning and legality the Convention drafted a consti.

tutional program, subsequently approved by the voter,

which provided for legislative phasing-out of all ad valoren

personal property taxation by 1979, with safe-guards to

avoid disasterous results to the public schools and mmic.

pal services. The program did not mandate the immediate

exemption of individuals from personal property taxation

as suggested by petitioners. It merely provided for the

recognition of such abolition of individual personal prop

erty taxation, if any, as the courts would determine to

have occurred under the preceding constitution as amended

by Article IX-A.

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The program is set forth in Article IX, Section 5 of

the 1970 Constitution, reading as follows:

“Section 5. PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXATION

(a) The General Assembly by law may classify

personal property for purposes of taxation by valua-

tion, abolish such taxes on any or all classes and au-

thorize the levy of taxes in lieu of the taxation of per-

sonal property by valuation.

(b) Any ad valorem personal property tax abol-

ished on or before the effective date of this Constitu-

tion shall not be reinstated.

(c) On or before January 1, 1979, the General

Assembly by law shall abolish all ad valorem per-

sonal property taxes and concurrently therewith and

thereafter shall“replace all revenue lost by units of

local government and school districts as a result of

the abolition of ad valorem personal property taxes

subsequent to January 2, 1971. Such revenue shall

be replaced by imposing statewide taxes, other than

ad valorem taxes on real estate, solely on those classes

relieved of the burden of paying ad valorem personal

property taxes because of the abolition of such taxes

subsequent to January 2, 1971. If any taxes imposed

for such replacement purposes are taxes on or meas-

by income, such replacement taxes shall not be

considered for purposes of the limitations of one tax

and the ratio of 8 to 5 set forth in Section 3(a) of

this Article.”

(Underscoring supplied)

In view of the clear and unambiguous language of Sec-

tion 5(¢e), it is futile for petitioners to argue that the Illi-

nois Supreme Court erred in failing to apply the law exist-

ing at the time of its decision and to argue that it departed

from its own rule concerning applicable law stated in

Illinois Chiropractic Society v. Giello, 18 Ill. 2nd 306 (1960).

The duty of the court under the new constitution was to

po, NO

determine whether any ad valorem personal property ty,

tion had been abolished “on or before the effective daty’

of the new constitution. By necessity, this require thy

testing of Article IX-A under the standards p |

under the preceding Illinois Constitution of 1870 and priys

pally under the Federal Constitution. To argue, ag pel

tioners do, that the omission in the opinion of any refer.

ence to the new state constitution, in and of itself deprive

them of due process and equal protection of the lays i

consequence of which this Honorable Court should ay

supervise and “set aright” the highest court of Tilinoig

is at once irresponsible and fatuous.

Even if the drafters of the new Illinois Constitnti,

had sought to incorporate Article IX-A into the continuing

fundamental law of the state, which petitioners erroneoush

contend was the case, it is obvious that such an incorpo.

tion could not validate a phrase repugnant to the 144

Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The Cook Comh

State’s Attorney is really arguing that even if Artic

IX-A creates an unconstitutional exemption, that defed

will be cured in the course of 8 cyears as everyone k

comes exempt. No cases or theories can be cited to support

such an ephemeral and transitory view of equal protectin

As was shown in Argument I, if Article IX-A taxes qr.

porate personal property and exempts all else it is uncon

stitutional irrespective of any trappings of rationale or

good intention with which petitioners may seek to clothe it

The basic question remains unaffected by the new Lllimis

Constitution. That question is whether or not the creatin

of a given classification of property taxpayers finds it

justification in more than a desire to free one class fron

taxation while imposing a property tax upon another.

Certainly any future classification adopted by the [lino

General Assembly pursuant to Article IX, Section 5(a)

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of the new Constitution will be similarly. tested under

Federal standards. If, as in the case of Article IX-A of

the 1870 Constitution, it should be found to discriminate

jnvidiously it will likewise violate the requirement of equal

protection of the laws of the 14th Amendment and be with-

out force or effect.

This basic fact cannot be sidestepped by the reiteration

of vague and amorphous appeals to “public policy”, (Pet.

_4) incantations concerning the “exquisite, juridical inti-

macy” (Pet. p. 3) of old and new constitutions, unwarranted

charges of judicial oversight or neglect and similar argu-

ments designed to ignore the fundamental issue. We sub-

mit that the Barrett petitioners have failed to present

to this Honorable Court any valid reason for issuance of

the Writ of Certiorari.

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ITI.

MOTION TO DISMISS AND BRIEF IN OPPOsIny

TO PETITION OF LAKE SHORE AUTO PARTS (0,

DOCKET NO. 71-674.

* * *

WHERE A LITIGANT CONCEDES THAT ITS

OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY HAS BEEN OORRER

ED BY THE DECISION OF A STATE

COURT AND BENEFIT HAS THEREBY Bgy

BROUGHT TO THE LITIGANTS CLASS, A FURTER

APPEAL SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED ON THE 8013

GROUND THAT A FINANCIALLY MORE BOUNTIT,

RESULT IS SOUGHT.

In case No. 71-674, the Lake Shore Auto Parts

seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of this court either by

appeal or by certiorari. The supposed right to appeal

emanates from 28 U.S.C. Section(2) which reads as follows:

“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest

court of a state in which a decision could be had, may

be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: .._

(2) by appeal, where is drawn in question the validity

of a statute of any state on the ground of its being

repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of th

United State, and the decision is in favor of its val.

dity.”

This Court may wonder why all other parties to th

consolidated cases appear to be arguing the questions of

constitutionality of Article IX-A of the Illinois Constit.

tion while Lake Shore Auto Parts is arguing the invalidity

of a statute, i.e., the Illinois Revenue Act. In order to a.

swer that question, the options of advocacy open to Lake

Shore prior to filing their litigation must be considered.

Lake Shore Auto Parts Company is an \Illitlois Corpo-

ration. In the trial court its case was brought as a clas

action on behalf of all corporations in the state. Lak

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Shore most effectively represents its class when it suc-

weds in bringing about a total abolition of personal

property taxes for corporations. This result would not

be accomplished if Lake Shore attacked the constitutionality

of Article IX-A. If Article IX-A is unconstitutional, then

the prior provisions of Illinois law will continue in force

mti] changed, Under the existing revenue act, corpora-

tions, business entities and individuals (however that term

be defined) would continue to be subject to personal prop-

erty taxation. (Chapter 120, Section 499, Illinois ‘Revised

Statutes (1969).) Such is the result brou ‘about by the

decision of the Illinois Supreme Court. The optimum re-

sult for a litigating corporation would be not the sharing

of taxation but the abolition of the tax for corporations

and, ironically, for everyone else as well. The Lake Shore

Auto Parts Company has congémencted its argument in the

trial court, in the Illinois upreme Court, and in this

court with that goal in mind.

The complaint of Lake Shore Auto Parts Company in

the trial court did not allege the unconstitutionality of Ar-

tide IX-A; instead, Lake Shore was scrupulously careful

to limit its constitutional attack to a prior existing reve-

nue statute rather than to the constitutional amendment.

Its argument can be paraphrased as follows:

The Revenue Act of the State of Illinois (Chapter

120, Section 482, et seq., Illinois Revised Statutes,

1969) provided prior to the passage of Article IX-A

for ad valorem personal property taxation of all real

and personal property in the State with certaim ex-

ceptions. The effect of the passage and approval of

Article IX-A was to amend the Revenue Act so as

to repeal the personal property tax for all but corpora-

tions. Once this amendment by implication was ac-

complished, it is the personal property tax statute

which must itself be swept away as a violation of the

14th Amendment because of its discrimination agatmst

pares “Neneh

corporations. The new amendment to the TUimois co,

stitution is thus ignored and allowed to stand, n,

result of this theory of interpretation is that the Ij.

nots Revenue Act, as it relates to personal property

is, in its entirety, declared unconstitutional, —

Since the Revenue Act is the only statutory enactment

of the state regarding the establishment of a pe

property tax, the result of such a judicial finding wonld

an immediate abolition of ad valorem personal Property

. for all taxpayers in the state.

At the trial court level, Lake Shore was able to achieve

the amazing result of the judicial abolition of an estab.

lished and important tax by averting the view of the court

from the question of the constitutionality of Article I-A

itself. The Maynard respondents submit that since Artice

TX-A so defines individuals as to exclude only corporation

from the scope of its exemption, that it is irretri

unconstitutional. We as respondents, likewise, submit thst

the Illinois Revenue Act (which has been constitutional for

30 years) has not suddenly become unconstitutional,

Section 499 of the Illinois Revenue Act (Chapter 12),

Illinois Revised Statutes, 1969) has, since 1939, define

the personal and real property of this state which is mb

ject to taxation. Sections 500 through 500.23 of the Ad

define property put to certain uses as exempt from

such taxes. It would need little argument to show that ifs

particular exemption adopted by statute were unconstit.

tional it would be the exemption rather than the entire ta

which would fall. An exemption, for example, of all per.

sonal property owned by United States Congressmen woul

undoubtedly fall before a constitutional attack. Such a

attack, however, would leave the general personal property

tax enabling section unaffected and in full force. This cas

differs from that situation in only one respect. The exemp-

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tion is contained not in the Revenue Act but in the Consti-

tutional amendment, Article IX-A. That difference, how-

ever, can hardly justify the effect of the Lake Shore trial

court’s ruling which was to uphold the enactment that

created the invidious distinction and to strike down the

nt that did not. Such a strange ruling could only

be the result of the trial court’s misconception that as be-

tween a valid and constitutional statute and a constitutional

amendment that creates an invidious classification, the

statate must fall to save the constitutional amendment.

Such is not the law. _

In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), an amend-

ment to the California Constitution would have repealed

prior “open housing” statutes. This Court affirmed the

judgment of the California Supreme Court which ruled

! the constitutional amendment to be unconstitutional and

| the prior statutes to remain in effect. In reaching its

decisions, the California Court looked to several factors:

A state enactment cannot be construed for purposes

of constitutional analysis without concern for its im-

mediate objective (In re Petraeus (1939) 12 Cal. 2d

579, 583, 86 P.2d 343; see Griffin v. County School

Board, 377 U.S. 218, 231, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d

256), and for its ultimate effect (Jackson v. Pasadena

City School Dist. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 876, 880, 31 Cal.

Rptr. 606, 382 P.2d 878; Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960)

364 U.S. 339, 341-343, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110;

Avery v. State of Georgia (1953) 345 U.S. 559, 562,

73 §.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed. 1244; Near v. State of Minnesota

(1931) 283 U.S. 697, 708-709, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed.

1357). To determine the validity of the enactment in

this respect it must be viewed in light of its historical

context and the conditions existing prior to its enact-

ment. (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equalization

(1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672; Evans v. Selma

Union High School Dist. (1924) 193 Cal. 54, 57-58, 222

a Ws

P. 801, 31 A.L.R. 1121; see Snowden v. Hughes (1944)

321 U.S. 1, 8-9, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497.)

[Mulkey v. Reitman, 50 Cal. Rep. 881, 884]

The Supreme Court of the United States Specifically «,

dorsed this method of interpretation and announced thy.

“Judgments such as these we have frequently undertake,

ourselves.” [citing cases] (387 U.S. at 373)

The Rettman case involved racial discrimination whik

the case at bar involves economic discrimination. Ip ty

Rettman case the Court looked to the entire state of th

law. Both the constitutional amendment and the stain

had to be construed together to test whether a constitution)

result would be reached. When the two enactments read ty.

gether lead to unconstitutionality, the enactment most n.

sponsible for that result was ruled to be void. Thns this

- Court rejected the argument that the constitutional amend

ment there in question was valid while the underly

statutes must fall. The effect of the California constity

tional amendment was to sanction racial discrimination,

Likewise, in the case at bar, it is the constitutional ameni.

ment and not the (revenue) statute which effects a violation

of thé equal protection clause.

Article [X-A must be viewed together with other pert.

nent provisions of Illinois law. If, as the Lake Shore tral

court ruled, Article TX-A causes the Revenue Act to be

constitutional, it will abolish all personal property taxes in

the state. Such a result would not be consistent with the

intent of the Legislature in proposing the amendiient nor

consistent with the intent of the people in approving the

amendment. Both the Legislature and the people conten-

plated that some class or classes would continue to pay pt:

sonal property taxes even after the effective date of Article

TX-A. Whatever the Legislature and the people had in

mind, it can at least be said that they anticipated a limited

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tax exemption and not a total tax abolition. In Village of

Glencoe V. Hurford, 317 Ill. 203, 148 N.E. 69, the Illinois

Supreme Court said:

“When the literal enforcement of a statute would

result in great injustice and lead to consequences which

the legislature could not have contemplated, the courts

are bound to presume that such consequences were not

intended and will adopt a construction which it may be

reasonable to presume was contemplated by the Legis-

lature.” (at 220)

That Court has also said:

“Tf a statute admits of two constructions, one of which

renders the enactment reasonable and salutory while

the other renders it mischievous, if not absurd, the lat-

ter construction should be avoided.”

[Karlson v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 436, 443]

‘The Lake Shore interpretation of Article TX-A would, in

the most offhanded the unconscious of ways, entirely repeal

an important tax utilized by almost every public body in

Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court, by ruling that Article

IX-A alone was violative of the 14th Amendment, con-

timed the validity of the Illinois Revenue Act as it existed

prior to November 1970. The public bodies of Illinois thus

will continue to receive adequate funding, and the Legisla-

tive (and ultimately the people of this state) will be free

to more clearly define their desires by statutory or consti-

tutional action under “phasing out” provisions provided in

Section 5 of ‘Article LX of the new Illinois Constitution.

Lake Shore seeks to invoke the Appellate jurisdiction of

this court by the intriguing argument that its attack upon

the constitutionality of the revenue act was rejected by

the Illinois Supreme Court. The Lake Shore petitioner ad-

mits (at page 11 of its brief to this Court) the following:

oa ead

“It is true that the result reached by the Tlinois egg,

does eliminate the unconstitutional iminas

which would otherwise exist as a consequence of i,

interaction between Article [X-A and the revenne gq!

The petitioner’s objection, however, is that the Tilinoig

preme Court has chosen the wrong act to declare umq,

stitutional. Where by its own admission the unconsti,,

tionality complained of has ceased and no new uneoni,

tutionality has thereby been created, the appellant sureh

has no recourse to the appellate jurisdiction of this Coy,

under Section 1257(2) in order to achieve still great

economic benefit for the class it seeks to represent,

In his petition for certiorari, the Lake Shore brief i,

troduces the inventive, though transplanted, concept i

“chilling” into a civil litigation involving taxation (La

Shore brief p. 10). The basic argument is that Lake Shon

began this litigation to free itself from a tax from whid

others were unconstitutionally exempt. Lake Shore cmp

plains that for all its trouble, it ended up by having th

tax restored. Lake Shore and other potential attackers i

economic discrimination are thus, we are told, chilled fron

commencing or proceeding with such publicly import

and valuable litigation. The argument falters on a numer

of grounds:

(1) No cases cited by, Lake Shore to support the om.

cept of economic chilling come remotely near the case

bar. All fourteen cases cited* exemplify the two decaie

*? Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952): teachen’

loyalty oath invalidated; freedom of association (lst) and

due process (14th); concurring, Frankfurter, Jr. referred

to the oath as an “unwarranted inhibition upon the fre

spirit of teachers” and of its “tendency to chill . . . fre

play of the spirit.” [p. 195]. ? Shelton v. Tucker, 36408

479 (1960): teachers’ organization membership affiderit

invalidated; freedom of association (1st) and due proces

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old concept that certain freedoms and civil liberties can be

chilled by governmental enactments which restrict the right

. statute requiring racial identifications on ballots,

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penalizing those who chose to assert them.

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to expression of these freedoms. The cases principally iy

volve the limitation of First Amendment freedomg by stap

or local laws. The only chilling effect suggested by te

Lake Shore petitioner is that it didn’t get exactly why;

sought in its lawsuit. If such a right to fully snocegi

litigation were constitutional, the day of glory won),

upon us.

(2) In truth, the decision of the Illinois Supreme (gy

does have a chilling effect upon Lake Shore, but such eff,

is hardly of constitutional significance. That chill rely

only to class action damages and legal fees. As has ha

noted, the Lake Shore case was filed by a single small ayy

parts corporation on behalf of all corporations in the sty)

If Lake Shore could have succeeded in the Illinois Suprey

Court in having its trial court decision sustained, oye

$250,000,000.00 in taxes would have been instantly aby.

ished. The class action damages and attorneys fees to

awarded in such a triumph would surely have warmed ¢liat

and attorney alike. In that sense, and only in that sen

did the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion chill the lab

Shore_petitioner.

(3) If the Lake Shore petitioner were truly interests

in itself and its class being placed on a constitution

equality with all other Illinois taxpayers, it would applaui

the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court. The Illini

Supreme Court removed the exemption from “individusk’

and placed all such taxpayers back in the taxpaying pool.

The tax burden is thus shared once again by corporation

and individuals. The corporations of the state and lak

Shore itself therefore benefited financially by the broadend

tax base. The prayer of the Lake Shore Auto Parts (

for constitutional equality was granted by Mr. Justi

Schaefer’s opinion. That the prayer was not answer

more bountifully should hardly concern this court.

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The Maynard respondents submit the arguments put

forward by Lake Shore are not sufficient to cause this

Court to either note probable jurisdiction or issue its writ

of certiorari.

CONCLUSION

In a well litigated and vigorously contested lawsuit the

Illinois Supreme Court found that the Constitution of the

United States would not be bent so as to make corpora-

the only payers of the Illinois ad valorem personal

rty tax. The Court, perhaps realizing that corpora-

tions can hardly defend themselves at the polls against in-

yidious discrimination, rejected the attempts of legislators

to bestow such a singular burden upon them. The Illinois

Supreme Court relied upon established precedents of this

Honorable Court in reaching its politically unpopular but

tions

‘legally correct and just result. This Court need hardly

hear the case to restate the point that the equal protection

danse of the 14th Amendment does not shift with pre-

vailing political winds. Therefore the motion to dismiss

should be granted and the petitions for writ of certiorari

denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Aycet, Sroxesirer & Guink Witwer, Moran & BuRLAGE

+ Léois ANCEL SaMvuEL W. WITWER

| ASrewart H. DiaMonp 141 W. Jackson Boulevard

; 111 W. Washington Street Chicago, Illinois 60604

; Chicago, Illinois 60602 427-8750

782-7606

Attorneys for Respondents

Evorse L. Maynarp, Proviso Township High School

District #209, Bellwood Grade School District #88, Cicero

Grade School District #99, and River Grove Grade School

District #85-14, all in Cook County, Illinois.