Amicus Curiae Brief — Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd.

on presented

te peroived

bet of the United States

nt

mer t: :

sion 207 of the Social Security Act bars

Ffespondent from obtaining the retroac-

a “federal disability insurance benefits

: i to the beneficiary and deposited in a

& account

. foduction and summary

7 The equitable considerations upon

» which the Supreme Court of New Jer-

sey relied do not justify permitting the

= State to obtain the federal disability in-

; surance benefits paid to Wilkes

- Section 207 covers federal benefits that

> have been deposited in a bank account

» after payment

| Section 204 of the Act, which permits

| the Secretary to recover overpayments

> of benefits, does not support the State’s

| attachment of the federal payments in

. this case

Mee

| CITATIONS

Cases:

: Page

Beers v. Federal Security Administrator,

172 F. 2d 34 __ 7, 18

Bemowski’s Guardianship, In re, 3 Wis.

2d. 138, 88 N.W. 2d. 22 16

~ Century Indemnity Co. v. Mead, 121 Vt. -

434, 159 A. 2d 325 7, 18

Department of Public Welfare v. Sevcik,

18 Ill. 2d 449,164 N.E.2d10 sssi(iéisg

District of Columbia v. Reilly, 249 F. 2d

524 ae

Ewing v. Gardner, 185 F. 2d 781, re-

versed on other grounds, 341 U.S. 321_ 7, 18

Ferarazza’s Estate, In re, 219 Cal. 668,

28 P. 2d 670 : 16

Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 15

Lewis’ Estate, In re, 287 Mich., 179, 283

N.W. 21 16

Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. of

Florida, 284 U.S. 498 1

Ponath v. Hedrick, 22 Wis. 2d 382, 126

N.W. 2d. 28 7

Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., 370 U.S.

159 14, 15

Savoid v. District of Columbia, 288 F. 2d

851 16

Texas Baptist Children’s Home of Round

Rock v. Corbitt, 321 S.W. 2d. 610 eed 1

Statutes:

Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26

U.S.C.:

Section 6881 (a) if. 6

Cases—Continued

i Section 6334

Section 7421 (a)

Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq.:

Section 204, 42 U.S.C. 404

Section 207, 42 U.S.C. 407 ..

10, 11, 12, 18,

Section 223, 42 U.S.C. 423

Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620,

625, Section 208

Social Security Amendments Act of 1956,

P.L. 880, 70 Stat. 807

88 U.S.C. 3101

Miscellaneous:

A.L.I. Restatement, Trusts, Section 157

(b)

102 Cong., Rec., 13037

H. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess

H. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.__.

S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess._:

S. Rep. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.__

¥

Ju the Supreme Court of the Huited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1972

No. 71-5656

DORIS PHILPOTT, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

EssEX COUNTY WELFARE BOARD

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey

is reported at 59 N.J. 75, 279 A.2d 806 (Pet. App.

A). The opinion of the Appellate Division is reported

at 109 N.J. Super. 48, 262 A.2d 227. The opinion

of the trial court is reported at 104 N.J. Super. 280,

249 A.2d 639.

JURISDICTION . “

. The judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jer-

sey was entered on July 12, 1971. On October 6,

(1)

2

1971, Mr. Justice Brennan extended the time for

filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to Novemn-

ber 8, 1971. The petition was filed on November

1, 1971, and was granted on May 15, 1972. The

jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C, 1257(8).

a’ QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Section 207 of the Social Sécurity Act,

which prohibits attachment of federal old-age, sur-

vivors, and disability insurance benefits, bars a state

from attaching federal disability insurance benefits

retroactively paid to a beneficiary and deposited by

his trustee in a bank account containing no other

funds.

STATUTE INVOLVED

Section 207 of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat.

624, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 407, provides in relevant

part:

* * * [N]one of the moneys paid or payable or

rights existing under this subchapter [relating

to old-age, survivors, and disability insurance]

shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, -

garnishment, or other legal process * * *,

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

Section 223 of the Social Security Act provides

for payments of federal disability insurance benefits

to alleviate the financial burdens of permanent and

total disabilities. Section 207 of the Act protects

against frustration of the purpose of these payments

8

by-ensuring that the benefits paid will remain avail-

able to the disabled beneficiary. The United States

has a substantial interest in this case, since its out-

come will affect the extent to which the beneficiaries

of federal disability insurance will have the full use

of payments made under the Act.

STATEMENT

“The State of New Jersey has established a pro-

gram of financial assistance for persons who are

permanently and totally disabled, based upon need.

Under this program, the level of benefits is fixed by

first determining the amount needed by the benefi-

dary reasonably to maintain himself and then sub-

tracting from that amount the beneficiary’s actual

income from other sources (Pet. App. A, 5). As a

condition of receiving assistance, a beneficiary is

required to execute an agreement to reimburse the

county welfare board, which administers the pro-

gram, for all payments received thereunder (Pet.

App. A, 6). The purpose of this agreement is “to °

enable the board to obtain reimbursement * * * out

of subsequently discovered or acquired real and per-

sonal property of the recipient” (ibid.). |

Petitioner Wilkes applied to respondent county wel-

fare board for assistance under this program in 1966,

aid he executed the required agreement (Pet. 3).

After determining Wilkes’ monthly maintenance

feeds to be $108 and finding that he had no other

ieome, respondent fixed his monthly benefits at that

‘aMount and began making assistance payments no

a

later than January 1, 1967 (Pet. App. A, 5). The

payments would have been less if Wilkes was re

ceiving federal disability insurance benefits under

the Social Security Act, and respondent advised

Wilkes to apply to the Social Security Administro-

tion for such benefits (Pet. 3).

' Th August 1968, Wilkes was awarded retroactive

federal disability insurance benefits under Section

223 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C, 428, from

May 1966 through June or July 1968 (Pet. App.

A, 7). These benefits were calculated on the basis

of $69.60 per month for 20 months and $78.70

per month for 6 months, for a total of $1864.20

(ibid.). A check for that amount was issued to

Wilkes (Pet. 4). Petitioner Philpott, acting as trustee

for Wilkes, deposited the check in a bank account

(Pet. App. A, 2). The amount of the check con-

stituted the entire balance in the account (ibid:):

Respondent immediately brought suit to reach the

bank account under the agreement to reimburse

(ibid.). .The trial court held that respondent was

barred by Section 207 of the Social Security Act,

42 U.S.C. 407, from recovering any amount from

the account (Pet. App. A, 3), and the Appa

Division affirmed (ibid.).

The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed, hold-

ing that Section'207 does not bar attachment of the

federal payment by respondent under the circum-

stances of this case. The court stated that the fund

attached did not represent current benefits necessary

for Wilkes’ current support, that the monthly pay-

5

ments which had been made by respondent would

have been reduced on account of the federal benefits

had they been received concurrently, and therefore

that “[t]he equities are all with [respondent]” (Pet.

App. A, 11). The court further reasoned that the

rationale of Section 204 of the Act, 42 U.S.C, 404,

which permits recovery by the federal government

in.cases Of overpayment, should be extended to per-

mit recovery by respondent here, because the fed-

eral government contributes one-half of the funds for

assistance under the state program and will be en-

titled to one-half of any state recovery in this suit

(Pet, App. A, 9-10, 11-12). The court also stated

that similar state claims had been honored under

the federal veterans’ benefits laws (Pet. App. A,

18-14).

Since respondent did not claim a right to the en-

tire federal payment but only to the amount by

Which its own payments would have been reduced

had the federal benefits been’ received currently

rather than retroactively (Pet. App. A, 2, n. 2), and

because the stipulated facts were ambiguous as to

when respondent actually began making assistance

payments (Pet. App. A, 3, n. 3), the court remanded

the case for a determination of ‘the period of overlap

and the precise amount of respondent’s claim (Pet.

App. A, 14). =

6

ARGUMENT

SECTION 207 OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY Act

BARS THE RESPONDENT FROM OBTAINING THE

RETROACTIVE FEDERAL DISABILITY INSUR.

ANCE BENEFITS PAID TO THE BENEFICIARY

AND DEPOSITED IN A BANK ACCOUNT.

a! Introduction and Summary

This case presents a difficult question of statutory

interpretation. On its face, Section 207 of the Social

Security Act appears to bar the State of New Jersey

from obtaining the federal disability insurance paid

retroactively to Wilkes. The language is sweeping

and unqualified: “none of the moneys paid or pay-

able under this subchapter shall be subject to execv-

tion, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal

process.” * The amount paid to Wilkes as retroactive

benefits was “moneys paid * * * under this sub

chapter,” and the suit the state brought to reach

this money in the bank account was an attempt to

“subject [it] to * * * levy, attachment * * * or other

1 There is only one exception to the sweeping exemption of

Section 207, and that arises under another statutory provision.

Section 6331(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26

U.S.C. 6831 (a), sakes subject to levy for federal tax liability

“all property and rights to property” of the person liable for

the tax. Section 6384 of the Code, 26 U.S.C. 6334, limits ex-

emptions from the levy to eight specific categories and pro-

vides that no other property or rights to property shall be

exempt “[n]Jotwithstanding any other law of the United

States.” Both the Treasury Department and the Department

of Health, Education, and Welfare recognize, accordingly, that

err ey under the ,

ata: cri ea

7

legal process.” The statute, therefore, appears to bar

the state’s attempt to obtain this money.’

The law, however, frequently has declined to give

broad and unqualified language and principles their

full sweep when to do so would produce unfair or

unjust results. Even such words as “none” and “no”

donot always mean what they say.* And in the case of

* Except for the court below in the present case, we know of

no state court of last resort that has permitted attachment of

gocial security benefits either paid or payable.

The case most in point, Century Indemnity Co. v. Mead, 121

Vt. 434, 159 A. 2d 325, held that Section 207 bars attachment

by @ judgment creditor not only of future social security

payments but also of a bank account in which past social

security payments had been deposited. Ponath v. Hedrick,

22 Wis. 2d 382, 126 N.W. 2d 28, held that under state law

social security benefits are not includable as income in deter-

mining an individual’s ability to pay for the support of a de-

pendent relative; the court also held, however, that Section

207 did not preclude treating such benefits as income. The

Texas Court of Civil Appeals, an intermediate appellate court,

‘telied upon dicta in the two federal cases that have considered

the Section (Beers v. Federal Security Administrator, 172

F. 2d 84 (C.A. 2), and Ewing v. Gardner, 185 F. 2d 781

6), reversed on other grounds, 341 U.S. 321, both dis-

tussed in footnote 6, infra, P. 18) in permitting a credi-

tor to reach accumulated survivors insurance benefits held by

aguardian of minor children. Texas Baptist Children’s Home

of Round Rock v. Corbitt, 8321 S.W. 2d 610.

‘Eg., Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Company of Flori-

da, 284 U.S. 498 (interpreting the predecessor of section 7421

@f the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,.26 U.S.C. 7421(a),

_ provided flatly that “[nJo suit for the purpose of re-

ned in any court,” as nevertheless being subject to

n in cases of “extraordinary and! exceptional cir-

sak &)

9?

wt COCs

spendthrift trusts, whose very purpose is to protect

a beneficiary against his own improvidence by pre

venting his creditors from reaching rights under the

trust, creditors who supply necessaries to the bene

ficiary have been permitted to recover therefor from

the trust. See A.L.I. Restatement, Trusts, Section

157(b). Thus this Court should not assume that

Congress imposed an absolute bar upon the attach-

ment of retroactively paid social security moneys

in any circumstance, merely because of the sweeping

language of Section 207, if that result does not com-

port with the proper effectuation of the purposes

and policies of the Social Security Act.

The legislative history of Section 207 provides no

guidance in the resolution of this problem. The sub-

stance of the present language of Section 207 has

been in the Social. Security Act since it was first

enacted in 1935. The Committee reports on this pro

vision merely paraphrase the language of the statute

itself. H. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., Ist Sess., 21;

S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., Ist Sess., 32. Similarly,

when Congress reenacted this provision in the Social

Security Amendments of 1939, the Committees stated

that the provision “provides that a right to payment

under this title shall not be transferable or assignable -

nor shall any moneys paid or payable be subject to

execution or other legal process.” H. Rep. No. 728,

‘ BNE A poonsaage against attachment was originally ‘con-

Polo asa ala ha iamad na 49

‘

76th Cong., 1st Sess, 45; S. Rep. No. 734, 76th

Cong., Ist Sess., 53.

-Sinee the provision protected against the attach-

ment of “moneys paid * * * under this title,” it auto-

matically covered new social security programs as they

were enacted, without the necessity of explicit Con-

gressional action. Thus, when the program of federal

disability insurance was established by the Social

Security Amendments Act of 1956, P.L. 880, 70 Stat.

807, payments thereunder also came under the pro-

tection of Section 207.

A fair reading of this history, we believe, suggests

that in Section 207 Congress endeavored to protect

social security beneficiaries from having their pay-

ments subjected to creditors’ claims, but that it did

not indicate any views with respect to whether par-

ticular exceptional circumstances might justify ex-

ceptions to this broad provision. Congress did not

intend creditors to be able to satisfy their claims

out of social security benefits. The purpose of \the

federal disability insurance program was to provide

benefits to individuals who are seriously disabled and

unable to work, and to their dependents, and thereby

to alleviate the financial burdens of disability, includ-

ing “the heavy weight of increased medical and hos-

pital bills, nursing services and drugs, the loss of

[the disabled individual’s] regular income, and the

continued financial responsibility for the support of

his wife and the education and care of his children.”

102 spew Rec. 18037 (1956). The provision in Sec-

tion 207 that “none of the moneys paid * * * shall

10

subject to * * * legal process” guards against frustra-

tion of this basic purpose by insuring that moneys

designed for these vital purposes are used for those

objectives and not diverted to meet the claims of

creditors. Accordingly, if exceptions are to be created

to the sweeping language of Section 207, they must

be tonsistent with the foregoing purpose.

Assuming that Section 207 may admit of excep

tions in special circumstances, the question in this

case is whether the circumstances under which the

State of New Jersey provided Wilkes with necessary

support during the period when he was not receiving

federal disability insurance payments entitles the

State to. reach those payments when retroactively

made. Although the question is not free from diff-

culty, it is our conclusion that Section 207 bars the

State from obtaining the money. It is our argument

that the equitable considerations upon which the State

relies are not sufficiently compelling to justify an

exception here; that the fact that the moneys have

been deposited in a bank account does not warrant

a different result; and that Section 204 of the Act,

which permits the Secretary to recover overpayment

‘of benefits and on which the Supreme Court of New

Jersey apparently relied, does not support the State’s

attachment of the federal payments. We discuss each

of these points in turn.

11

A. The Equitable Considerations Upon Which the

Supreme Court of New Jersey Relied Do Not Justi-

fy Permitting the State to Obtain the Federal Dis-

ability Insurance Benefits Paid to Wilkes.

In holding that the respondent Board could reach

the federal disability insurance payments made to

Wilkes, the Supreme Court of New Jersey pointed

out-that the Board had provided Wilkes with neces-

sary funds for his support during the period when

he was not receiving federal payments; that, as shown

by the subsequent retroactive award of the payments,

he was entitled'to them during that period; that if

Wilkes had currently received the federal payments

to which he was entitled, the State’s payments to

him would have been smaller; and that the retroactive

federal payment was not necessary for Wilkes’ cur-

rent support.’ Although these are appealing consider-

ations, We do not believe that they are sufficient to

fit within any justifiable exception to the unqualified

language of Section 207, particularly in favor of a

State.

Under the New Jersey statute, the State had no

choice but to provide financial disability assistance

when, upon the filing of Wilkes’ application for as-

sistance in 1966, the State determined that he was

*There is nothing in the record that, supports the latter

statement. The record does not show Wilkes’ medical expenses

or general financial condition. The retroactive payment may

have been necessary to meet his current living expenses, in

or in part, ean we needs arising \from ‘his \

5 iy i ity. | |

Prey t

\\

12

disabled and had no other income. In these circum.

stances, it was required to pay him an amount equal

to his need. Although the State required Wilkes to

execute a reimbursement agreement, its purpose was

“to enable the Board to obtain reimbursement * * *

out of subsequently discovered or acquired real and

personal property of the recipient” (Pet. App. A, 6).

The Board, therefore, was not volunteering any

funds or services as an act of mercy or aid to help

Wilkes, but was performing its statutory responsi-

bilities to aid all disabled indigents without regard

to future recoupment. Thus, no unfairness would

result if the State were not permitted to reach

Wilkes’ benefits. The result of denying the State that

right is to place it in the same position with respect

to Wilkes as it occupies with respect to what prob

ably are the great majority of the recipients of State

disability aid, from whom the State is unable to ob

tain reimbursement. The fact that Wilkes executed

a formal reimbursement agreement should not make

any difference; despite that agreement, we think that

the State should be in no better position than an

ordinary creditor, and Section 207 precludes credi-

tors generally from obtaining social security pay-

ments.

Indeed, any hardship the State might be thought

to suffer from this result is substantially diminished

by the fact that a portion of any recovery it might

obtain would inure to the benefit of the federal gov-

ernment. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey recog-

nized, since the federal government provides one-half

18

ef the funds for assistance under the New Jersey

program of disability relief, “the state, upon recovery

of any amount by way of reimbursement, must ac-

count to the federal government for the latter’s share

in the same proportion as it was contributed” (Pet.

App. A, 10).

B. Section 207 Covers Federal Benefits That Have Been

Deposited in a Bank Account After Payment.

The fact that the moneys paid to Wilkes have been

deposited in a bank account does not remove the

moneys from the protection of Section 207. That sec-

tion bars attachment of a bank account constituting

the proceeds of a check made in payment of disability °

insurance benefits. Century Indemnity Co. v. Mead,

supra. The statute expressly covers “moneys paid” *

and it prohibits “execution, levy, [and] attachment,”

legal processes which, unlike garnishment, relate to

assests in hand rather than to rights to future pay-

ments, Furthermore, protection of social security |

benefits deposited in bank accounts is necessary for

Despite this language, two courts of appeals have ex-

pressed, in dicta, the belief that the section covers only future

payments. Beers v. Federal Security Administrator, 172 F. 2d

%4.(C.A. 2); Ewing v. Gardner, 185 F. 2d 781 (C.A. 6), re-

4

yersed on other grounds, 341 U.S. 321. Those cases involved

forts by personal representatives of deceased beneficiaries

to recover the unpaid benefits which were accrued at the date .

of death; Section 207 was inapplicable because the property

law and

attachment,

‘were not being subject to “execution,

er | legal ‘heidet ager,

| j i

j | ] | :

iad

fe a}

Aas re

ed > >

Zz

if

14

full effectuation of the Congressional intent that pay.

ments be insulated from creditors and remain ayail-

able to beneficiaries.

This Court has reached the-same conclusion in a

series of cases involving veterans’ benefits exemption

statutes. In Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., 370 US.

159, the Court summarized (at 160-161) its deci-

sions:

Since 1873 it has been the policy of the Con-

gress to exempt veterans’ benefits from creditor

actions as well as from taxation. In 1933 in

Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354, the Court

* * * held that the exemption spent its force when

the benefit funds “lost the quality of moneys”

and were converted into “permanent invest-

ments.” This distinction was adopted by the Con-

gress when the [World War Veterans’ Act of

1924] was amended * * * to provide, inter alia,

that such payments shall be exempt “either be

fore or after receipt by the beneficiary” but that

the exemption shall not “extend to any property

purchased in part or wholly out of such pay-

ments.” Thereafter in Lawrence v. Shaw, 300

U.S. 245 (1987), the Court held that bank cred-

its derived from veterans” benefits were within

the exemption, the test being whether as so de-

posited the benefits remained subject to demand

and use as the needs of the veteran for support

and maintenance required. It was noted that the

allowance of interest on such deposits would not

destroy the exemption. [Footnotes omitted.]

The Court held in Porter that 88 U.S.C. 3101, which

provides that veterans’ “payments * * * shall be ex

empt from the claim shall not be li-

15

able to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any

Jegal or equitable process whatever, either before or

after receipt by the beneficiary,” bars attachment by

a creditor of benefits deposited in a savings and loan

association on behalf of a veteran, on the ground that

the deposit retained the “quality of moneys” and did

not constitute a “permanent investment.”

The same principle is also appropriate here: the

protection extended by Section 207 to “moneys paid”

should remain in force as long as the payment re-

tains the “quality of moneys” and is not converted into

a “permanent investment.” Under this standard, this

case is governed by Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245,

which held that the immunity afforded veterans’ bene-

fits continued after their deposit in a bank account.

Here, as in both Lawrence and Porter, the funds on

deposit were readily withdrawable and retained the

quality of money; there is no evidence that these

funds, by their mere deposit, had been transformed

into a permanent investment.’

“In reaching a contrary result, the court below cited

a separate line of veterans’ benefit cases, dealing with

the issue whether a State which has provided care

and maintenance of an incompetent veteran is a

} “creditor” for purposes of 38 U.S.C. 3101. These de-

cisions generally stand for the aces that in-

“The court in Lawrence noted (at 350) that “deposits in

bank may be made under a special agreement by which the

‘ot assume the character of investments and would lose

y accordingly [but no] such agreement is shown

here " has been no showing o ee

mt in t

case either.

|

16

sofar as a State’s claim relates to amounts expended

before the appointment of a committee of an incon.

petent veteran, the State is a “creditor” and there.

fore may not recover from benefits subsequently paid

to the committee, but that the State is not a “creditor”

as to subsistence charges paid after appointment of

the committee and may therefore recover such

amounts from the committee. See, e. g., Savoid v. Dis.

trict of Columbia, 288 F.2d 851 (C.A. D.C.) ; Dis

trict of Columbia v. Reilly, 249 F.2d 524 (CA.

D.C.) ; Department of Public Welfare v. Sevcik, 18

Ill. 2d 449, 164 N.E. 2d 10; In re Bemowski’s Guari-

ianship, 3 Wis. 2d. 133, 88 N.W. 2d 22; In re Lewis’

Estate, 287 Mich. 179, 283 N.W. 21; In re Feraraz

za’s Estate, 219 Cal. 668, 28 P. 2d 670.

Those decisions seem irrelevant to the issue in this

case. Unlike 38 U.S.C. 3101, the statutory provision

involved here (Section 207) does not refer to “claim

of creditors” but rather interposes a broad bar against

the use of any legal process to reach social security

benefits. The construction of “creditor” relied upon

in the veterans” benefit cases, itself somewhat strained,

therefore would not justify an —— to Section

207: f

As petitioners suggest (Pet. 6, n. 2), the veterans’ bene-

fits cases involve the use current funds for the current

support of an incompetent; those funds would have been used

by the veteran himself or his committee for his care and

maintenance if it had not been provided by the State. Those

Gines, at Ges feceually Siatingulehable from the case Bees

whee the Byes 3 ee Poti amo, me

—— as

17

C. Section 204 of the Act, Which Permits the Secretary

to Recover Overpayments of Benefits, Does Not

Support the State’s Attachment of the Federal

Payments in This Case.

The court below apparently relied in part upon

Section 204 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 404, which permits

the Secretary to recover overpayments of old-age,

survivors, or disability insurance benefits. This re-

liance is not warranted. There has been no overpay-

ment of federal disability insurance benefits here;

and the Secretary is not seeking recovery, directly

or indirectly, of. any such benefits. The pecuniary in-

terest of the United States in the outcome of this

cage, resulting from the State’s duty to remit to the

United States its aliquot share of any recovery from

beneficiaries (see pp. 12-13, supra), is not within the

ambit of Section 204. That Section is limited to

federal payments to beneficiaries and does not apply

to federal contributions to state assistance programs.

18

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

Supreme Court of New Jersey should be reversed

Respectfully submitted.

&.

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,

Solicitor General.

DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN,

Deputy Solicitor General.

KEITH A. JONES,

Assistant to the Solicitor General.

‘WILMOT R. HASTINGS,

General Counsel,

EDWIN YOURMAN,

Assistant General Counsel,

ARTHUR ABRAHAM,

Deputy Assistant General Counsel,

Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

AucGustT 1972.

i

6. 6. covanmment paimtine orrics; 1972 a72ese 636

‘ y %*

AUG 15 1972

Srene Court of the United.States

OCTOBER TERM, 1972 ~-

No. 71-5656

DORIS PHILPOTT and WILLIAM WILKES,

Petitioners,

Vv.

ESSEX COUNTY WELFARE BOARD,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

ROBERT CURTIS

Newark Legal Services Project

449 Central Avenue

Newark, New Jersey 07107

YGEORGE CHARLES BRUNO

New Hampshire-Legal Assistance

88 Hanover Street

Manchester, New Hampshire 03101

Counsel for Petitioners

Washington, 0.C. e THIEL PRESS e (202) 393-0625

L The Plain and eS

US.C. §407 Prohibits Any Execution, Levy,

Attachment, Gamishment, or Other Legal

Process Upon Any Social Security Benefits by

Any Hostile Claimants .......................

Il.. There Is No Exception to the Absolute and

~~ fits Under §407 Pou sb eine fee HES bt 0.00.55 0 0s

LR EIS Sa se ae A 5 oe

ks i wan an eek senandeeciaccace cs

CITATIONS

U.S. Constitution

PE. Ge SSE ON. SL URES SS ee

Cases \

Emex County Welfare Board v. Philpott, 59 NJ. -: a

279 A.2d 806(1971) ............ rssh hie sg eee 2.7,

Eesex County Welfare Board v. Philpott; 104 NJ.

Butx County Welfare Board v. Philpott, 109 NJ.

Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949) .................

- Super. 280, 249 A.2d 639 (County Ct. 1969). +. .2,4, 5,7,

Super. 48, 262 A.24 227 (1970) 528 Ce 2,4,5,7

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amen Gog 40 LW. 4923 (One June 29,

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8g Riders

< (1945) -eeee eee we ew eenaves nee : eee |

| Eitan . Sultan, 394 US, 323 (1947) ae eS: MW

Sola Electric Co.'y . Tefferwon Electric Co., 317 US.

Fey.

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- DCRR. $404970 Guly, 1968)

e “i

Bald, Devid-C., “Welfare As A Loan: The Recovery

“(OF Public Assistance In The United States,” 24

Later From Wabur Coben To Paul Aken, Dated

: Fane 22,1972.

DORIS PHILPOTT and WILLIAM WILKES,

tes Petitioners,

ey 3

ORs

pe tieter; 9 - v.

~ ESSEX COUNTY WELFARE BOARD, «

Re! ee Respondent.

f-Doria Philpott and Willesh Wilkes reapect:

py for rit agunst the judgment and opinion of

» Court of New Jersey entered on July. 12,

) the judgment of the New-Jersey Appel-

vision .and allowing attachment ee

Soe cial Security benefits,

sdgme: at a Dees Court of Now Seat

ed on Suly 12, 1971. Mr. Justice Brenian

tition for a writ of certiorari to November §,

ss” petition was filed prior to that date. A

| Sits granted: dyes Gert on May

ort’ + jurisdiction is ieiehed: under 28 USE,

AEN 88 5. RTT AS REIS AES:

pope un onigeam eter Om USC. §407, 0

ee eee tan

aagqpdaetitd ae

wi a

» however, “moneys paid by county welfare

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ist.

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ee U.S.C