Opinion — James v. Strange

13. «OCTOBER TERM, 1971

a on _ Opinion of the Court —_ 407 U.S.

oualn garnishment proceedings to ‘impose tremendous

~ hardships - on wage ‘earners with families to support. ue

' Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S: 337, 340.

(1969).*" Kansas has likewise perceived the’ burden to

a debtor and his family when wages. may be subject

_to wholesale garnishment. ~ Consequently, under its. ~

vode of -civil procedure, the,zmaximum which can be |

garnished is the lesser Of 25% of a debtor’s weekly

7 disposable earnings ‘or the amount by which those earn-

_ ings exceed 30 times the- federal minimum. hourly wage.

No’oné creditor may isstie more than one: garnishment

during any one month, and no employer may discharge

. an _employee because his earnings have been garnished

; for. a single indebtedness. *® For Kansas to deny pro-

tections such as’ these to. the once crimirially accused

is to risk denying him the means needed to keep him-

self and his family afloat. © :

The indigent’s predicament under this statute odmes

into sharper focus when compared with that of one*who |

has_hired counsel in his defense. ‘Should the latter _

‘prove unable to. pay anda judgment be obtained against

him, his-obligation would become enforceable under the. .

relevant provisions of the Kansas Code of Civil Proce-

—— 4

17 The Court in * Sniadach held that Wiseoosin'e. prejudgment wage -

garnishment, procedure, as a taking of property without notice

and prior hearing, viglated the Due. Process Chanee of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

8. Kan. Stat. Ang§§ 60-2310 (b) and 60-2311 ie. 1971). See-

tion 60-2310 also provides further debtor protection from wage

_ Sarnistiment ao time of disabling personal sickness and from pro-

7 collecting agencies, See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2310-(c) and

(d) (Supp. 1971). See-also Bennett, the 1970 Kansas Legislature

ih Review, 39 J. B. AK. 107, 178 (1970), which points out that

‘+ the State’s s restrictions on garnishments have been made to conform

* ¢o Tit. III of.the federal Consumer Credit: Protection Act, 82 Stat.

163. Kansas, however, provided” significant wage exemptions from

— _— the federal Act was passed.

A

JAMES v. STRANGE | 187

128 | Opinion, of the Court

dure. But, unlike the indigent under the recoupment

statute, the code’s exemptions would protect this judg-

ment debtor. : | ny “2,

It may be argued that an indigent accused, for-whom:

‘the State has provided counsel, is in a different’ tlass

. with respect to ‘collection of his‘ indebtedness’ than a -?

judgment creditor whose obligation arose from a private

_ transaction.” But other Kansas statutes providing for

recoupment of public assistance to indigents do not in-

clude the severe provisions imposed on indigent defend-

ants in this case. Kansas has enacted, as have many

other States, laws for state recovery of public welfare .

assistance when paid to an ineligible 7ecipient.” Yet

~~ Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-719b (1964); § 69-2006 (Supp. 1971).

~ + Section 39-719 deals mainly with the recovery of assistanice from an

‘ineligiblé recipient. Yet, even when the welfare recipient is deemed

to ‘have defrauded the State, he stilt escapes the immediate interest ac-

cumulations and denial of exemptions imposed on indigent defendants:

Ҥ 39-719b. Duty of recipient to report changes; action by board;

recovery of assistance obtained by ineligible recipient. If at any

time" during the continuance of assistance to any person, the recipient

thereof becomes, possessed” of any property or income in excess of

the amount ascertained at the time of granting assistance, it shall

"be the duty of the recipient to notify the county board of social

‘+ welfaré immediately of the receipt or possession of such property.

_ oF income and said county board may, after investigation, cancel the

_ assistance: in accordance with the circumstances.

“Any assistance paid ‘shall-be recoverable by the county board as.

a debt due to the state and the county in proportion to the amount

_ of the assistance paid by eacti, respectively: If during the life or on -

the death of any person receiving assistance, it is found that the —

recipient was possessed of income or property in excess of the amount

reported or ascertained at the time of ‘granting assistance, and if it

’ be shown that such assistance was obtained by an ineligible-fecipient,

the total amount of the assistarice may be recovered’ by the state —

_department of social welfare as a fourth class claim from the estate

of the recipient or in an action brought against the recipient. while

living.” 7 : ; . °

.

e

B80 OCTOBER TERM, 1971

- the Kansas welfare recipient, unlike the indigent defend-

ant, is not denied the customary éxemptions.” .-

We recognize, of course, that the State’s claim to

reimbursement may take ‘precedence, under appropriate |

circumstances, over the claims ‘of private creditors and |

that enforcement procedures with respect to judgments |

need not be’ identical." This does not mean, however,

that a State may’ impose unduly harsh or: discriminatory

terms merely because ‘the obligation is to the public

treasury rather than to a ee creditor. .The State :

* There appears to be 3 . further discrinalbation against the indi-

gent defendant as contrasted. with the delinquent welfare recipient.

The recoupment statute applicable to. indigent defendants provides

for the accumulation of 6% annual interest from the date expendi-

tures are made for counsel or other legal defense costs. Kan. Stat.

Ann. § 22-4513 (Supp. 1971). The interest build-up for the indigent

defendant would not be insubstantial. “ In the five years before the

; judgment became dormant, interest ‘ac@umulations could lift ap-

pellee’s. $500 - debt’ to ‘almost $670. If the dormant judgment is

revived within the statutorily prescribed two years, the principal -

and interest might total over $750. _ (The interest presumably would

run while the judgment was ‘dormant. since “[a] dormant judgment

may be revived and have the same force and effect as if it had not

become dormant . - Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2404 (Supp. 1971). .

' Kansas also has a a pew providing that all judgments shall bear

8% ‘terest from the day on which they are rendered. Kan. Stat.

Ann. § 16-204 (Supp. 1971) (recently amended from 6%). Presum-—

ably this statute would cover the “debts” of welfare recipients once

they are reduced to judgment. The debt of the indigent defendant,

however, runs from the date the assistance i is granted, while any in-

terest on:the debt of a welfare recipient would presumably run from |

the date of judgment.

‘41 For example, Kansas does not extend its exemptions with respect.

to wage garnishment to any debt due for any state or ‘federal tax,

* Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2310 (e)(3) (Supp. 1971). This type of public

debt, however, differs from the instant case in representing a wrong-

ful withholding from the State of a tax on assets in the actual

posséssion ‘of the taxpayer and not, as here, a debt contracted under

circumstances of indigency:. | .

x oe —_

Opinion of the Court a "407 U.S.

‘ JAMES ». STRANGE 5. 139

128 , Opinion of the Court

itself in the statute before us analogizes the judgment

lien against the indigent defendant to other “judg-

ments under the code of civil procedure.” But the

statute then strips the indigent defendant: of the very

exemptions designed ‘primarily to benefit debtors - low :

‘and marginal incomes,

The Kansas statute provides for peooupment whether

the indigent defendant is acquitted or found guilty. If

acquitted, the indigent finds himself obligated to. repay

the State for 4 service the need for which resulted from

the State’s prosecution. It is difficult to seé. why such

a defendant, adjudged to be inriocent of the, State’s

charge, should be ‘denied basic exemptions accorded all.

other judgment debtors. The indigent defendant who

_ is found’guilty is uniquely disadvantaged in terms of the -

practical operation of the statute. A criminal convic- ~

tion usually limits employment opportunities. This is

especially true where a prison sentence has been served.

It is in the interest of society and the State that such

a defendant, upon satisfaction of the criminal penal-

ties imposed, be afforded a reasonable opportunity of

employmeft, rehabilitation and return to useful citizen-

ship. There is limited incentive to seek legitimate em- |

ployment’ when, after serving a sentence during which

interest has accumulated on the indebtedness for legal .

services, the indigent knows that his wages will be gar-

nished without ‘the benefit of any of the customary

exemptions. ‘.

Appellee in this case has. now married, works for a

modest wage, and has recently become a father.: To

deprive him of all protection of his wages and intimate

personalty discourages the search for self-sufficiency

_ which might make of the criminally accused a contrib-

uting citizen. Not only does this treatment not accord

with the tréatment of indigent recipients of public wel-

?

S

140 OCTOBER TERM, 1971

. Opinion of the Court | 407 U:S. .

’ .fare or with that of other civil judgment debtors,”? but

the Kansas statute also appears to be alone among re-

coupment laws applicable to indigent defendants -in

‘expressly denying them the: benefit of basic debtor

exemptions.”* . ;

Til

In Rinaldi Vv. Y eager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), the Court

considered a situation comparable in some respects to

the case at hand. Rinaldi involved a New Jersey statute

which required only those indigent defendants who were

sentenced to confinenient in state institutions to reim-

burse the State the costs of a transcript on appeal. In

Rinaldi, as here, a broad ground of decision was urged,

Namely, that the statute unduly burdened an indigent’ S

right to appeal. The Court found; however, a different

basis for decision, holding that “[t]o fasten a financial

burden only upon those unsuccessful appellants who are

confined in state institutions . . . is to make an. invidious

discrimination” in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause. I/d., at 309.

Rinaldi affirmed that the Equal Protection Clause “im- .

poses a requirement of some rationality in the nature of

the class singled out.” -Jd., at 308-309. This require-

ment is lacking: where, as in the instant case, the State.

has subjected indigent defendants to such discriminatory

conditions of repayment. This case, to -be sure, differs

from Rinaldi in that here all indigent defendants are

treated alike. But: to impose these harsh congitions on .

a’class of debtors who were provided counsel as required

_ 22 : The statutes of various other States, e. g., Alaska, South Caro-

lina, and West Virginia, provide, as does Kansas, for recovery against

indigent defendants in the same manner as on other judgments.

Uniike Kansas, however, these States do not expressly subject indi-

gents to conditions to which other civil judgment debtors are not

liable. See n. 8, supra, for citations. _

23 See n. 8, supra, for citations. .§ . :

o

_ JAMES v.STRANGE 14

‘128°. Opinion of the Court

_by the Constitution:i is to practice, no Jess than in Rinaldi,

a discrimination ‘ ‘which. the Equal Protection Clause

proscribes.

The Court posumied 1 in, Rinaldi, ‘oeguendo, “that a en

islature could validly provide for replenishing a county

‘treasury from the pockets of those who have directly

benefited from county expenditures.” Jd., at.309. « We

note here also that the state interests represented by

recoupment laws may prove important ones. " Recoup-

ment proceedings may protect the State from fraudu-

lent concealment of assets and false assertions of

indigency. Many States, moreover, face expanding

criminal dockets, and this Court has required appointed

counsel for indigents in widening ‘classes of. cases ** and

stages of prosecution.*> Such trends have heightened

the burden on public revenues, and recoupment laws

reflect legislative efforts to recover some .of the added

. costs. Finally, federal dominance of the Nation’s major’

"revenue sources has encouraged State and local govern-

ments to seek new methods of conserving public funds;

~ not°only through the recoupment of indigents’ counsel

fees but of other forms of public assistance as well.

Pts e thus recognize that state-recoupment. statutes may

ken legitimate state interests. But these interests

are not thwarted by requiring more even treatment of

indigent criminal defendants with other classes of debtors —

‘to whom the statute ‘itself repeatedly makes reference.

State recoupment laws, notwithstanding the state In-

terests they may serve, need: not blight in such. dis-

criminatory fashion the hopes of indigents — self-

24 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S, 335 (1963) Douglas v. Cali-

fornia, 372 U. S. 353 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamiin, ante, p. 25.

5 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970); Mempa v. Rhay, 389

U. S. 128 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 ee

Miranda v. Anzona, 384 U. - 436 (1966).

".

-_

142 OCTOBER TERM, 197i

‘Opinion of the Court - 407 U.S.

" sufficiency ‘and self-respect. The statute before us

embodies elements of punitiveness and_ discrimination

which violate the rights of citizens to dine treatment

under the. law. a | Saal

~~

~The judgment of the sourk ieiow is affirmed.