Amicus Curiae Brief — Jefferson v. Hackney

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Supreme Curt of ‘he Unite Sate Gr US

k sED.

Geivbes Term, 1971. 0 iL i972.

No. 70-5064 |

RUTH J. JEFFERSON, et al.,

Appellants,

' VS. .

BURTON G. HACKNEY,.et al., |

es a Appellees. ° -

On Appeal From the United States District Court

for the ——— District of Texas.

‘Brief of the State « of California Amicus Curiae

| in Support of a

EVELLE J. YOUNGER, ~

‘Attorney General of the

State of California,

ELIZABETH PALMER,

Deputy Attorney General, .

~ JEROLD A: PROD, |

. 8 ots ' Deputy Attorney General,

E. ee 600 State Building,

7 Los Angeles, Calif. 90012, __

(213) 620-2954, 2 ,

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

State of California. '

Parker & Son, Inc., Law Printers, Los Angeles. Phone 724-6622

7 ay

Sma LMA EL GEE ERM METAR RS ANS PIRI PONTE LG LT ELIF NES LAE DIOL MENS ELM I

SUBJECT¢INDEX

ie : | —— . . Page

“« Interest of the State of California 0.00... 1

California’s Payment Plan ...........--t.---:---+-e+--0---« a 2

Argument ee eee een ae 5°

oo California arid Other States Will Never Be Able to

More Equitably Apportion Limited Welfare

- Resources in Favor of the Most Needy — |

_.jlents Unless the Decision. Below - Affirmed - 5S

\ ._ + Conclusion ..... Sse ea aaa eee geepes tet eaten eeepoea 7

‘INDEX TO: APPENDICES : j

Appendix A. Opinion of. the ‘Supreme Court of

the State of California -......2....2..2.......--- App. p. 1.

* Appendix B. Welfare and. Institutions Code, Sec-

tion 11452 as Amended ........................ App. p. 17

Appendix C. Welfare and Institutions Code, Sec- »

11450 as Amended .............22.2.2../..2....-.- App. p. 19

| Appendix. D. Welfare and Institutions Code, Sec-

tion 11453 nee ceeeeeeeeeeee .-App. p.-20

‘TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED”. +

. Cases . oe Page

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) -......-- 6

Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) ...... 1,5, 6.

+. Regufations -

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 45, Sec. 233. 20°

(a) (3) (wilt) Soest ereeaten taped ensansees wesecseeseeceneeseseetees 6

Statutes =

California Statutes of 1971, Chap. 578, Sec. 28. 3

California Statutes of 1971, Chap. 578, Sec: 28.5... 2

California Statutes of 1971, Chap. 578, Sec. 29.1. 3 ~

California?Welfare - and Institutions Code, Sec.

EAS) esters eee seeseecie 3

California Welfare and. “Institutions Code, Sec. *

1452 ee cee eee 2

California Welfare and Institutions - Code, Sec.

LE493 ». ccbccccsscsee a re a D.,

: Social ‘Security Act, Sec. 402(a)(8) - A ae ool

Social Security Act, Sec. 402(a)(23) 2... 5

Welfare Reform Act, Sec. 28 0.0... as wee 6

Sn curt a ‘the United Sate,

October Term, 1971

No. 70-5064 —

| RUTH J. JEFFERSON, et al.,

OS | 2 Appellants,

: . : ; . VS. .

- BURTON G. HACKNEY, et al., a |

| : Appellees.

On-Appeal From the United States District Court

for the Northern Districtof Texas.

. as 2 Wo

' Brief of the Statéof California Amicus Curiae

in Support of Appellees. ,

- Interest of the State of California.

On December 6, 1971, the California Supreme ‘Court

decided’ ‘the case of Villa v. Hall, judicially directing © -

that the California State Department of Social Welfare

could compute welfare grants only by deducting non-

exempt outside income directly from the . unadjusted

standard of need. A copy of that opinion is attached

hereto as Appendix A. A petition for rehearing was

- filed by respondents (Hall, state welfare officials), and:

denied January 5, 1972. Respondents plari to appeal to

this Court since the California Supreme Court held

that California’s welfare payment. plan was cohtrary to —

__ this Court’s decision in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 US.

. 397 (1970), and the Social Security Act.

Qe 9)

The sole issue in Villa v. Hall is the method of com-.”

puting welfare grants at a level. lower than the stand--

ard of need. The method used in California varies only

slightly, if ‘at all, from that used in- Texas. The issue in

this case is essentially the same as that in Villa v. Hall,

' to wit, the extent of a state’s ability to control its: wel-

‘fare policies and tera in light of limited re-

sources.

The State of -California enters ‘this case as amicus

- Curiae urging affirmance in support of the argument

and position of Texas, to the end that the states might:

' reserve to themselves the making of some of the de-

“cisions as to how to. apportion limited ‘monies ariong

needy citizens. “D4

California’s Payment Plan \.

California has a- state-supervised coun \ adfaciniecad

Aid:to Families With. ‘Dependent Children program fed-

\ . erally assisted putsuant to provisions of th Social Se-

\curity Act. Eligibility for participation: is. ased on. a

_ standard of nged. The standard. of need,- recently re-

vised upward, is found in California Welfare and In-

stitutions Code section 11452, as amended by the Wel-

fare. Reform Act of 1971; Cal. Stats. of 1971, chap-

ter 578, seetion 28.5, (Attached hereto as Appendix

ian

e ‘

“B.) All. of those considered’ needy according to the

measure - of the standard of need are included_in the

program. This is~so, even though the: Welfare Reform

Act of 1971 provides that-some families only marginal-.

ly needy receivé a zero cash grant. Those marginally

needy families entitled to a zero cash grant

other prograrh benefits, ‘including . mei

stamps, ‘social services, grants. and/or services pertain-

ing to recurring: and non-recurring special needs, and.

__ lated to the WIN (work incentive) program.’ 4. |

Computations of cash grants or money. payments on.

“the other hand are accomplished according to a sepa-

. fate formula. After determining need and eligibility, re-

' Sort is had to a table indicating ‘the maximum extent

to which the st&te “will participate in fulfilling unmet -

needs by way of a cash grant. This table, recently ‘re- |

vised upward, is found in Welfare and Institutiohs’

Code, section 11450(a), as amerided by the Welfare

Reform Act of 1971, Cal. Stats. of 1971, chapter 578,

section 28 (attached hereto in pertinent part as Ap-

- pendix C.)* It pfovides for maximum cash assistance . .

by the state ranging from 92.2 to 84.7 percent of the

standard of need. Both the standard of need. and the

_ table of “maximums” are keyed to the cost of, living

and therefore to each.other. They fluctuate with the cost

of living, and thus the system operates in the same

manner as a ratably reduced standard of need such as

used by Texas and other states. (See Welf. & Inst. Code

§ .11453, added by the Welfare Reform Act of 1971, °°.

Cal. Stats. 1971, ch. 578, § 29.1, attached hereto. in

pertinent part as Appendix D..) He

1The California Supreme Court based its’ decision in Villa v.

Hall in large part on the erroneous assumption that many fam-

standard of .

ilies, although marginally needy by’ measure of the

need and entitled to a zero cash grant, would be deemed in-

| eligible for inclusion in the program. See Appendix“A, pp. 9-11.

This mistaken assumption was the chief basis for the petition for

rehearing, and will “ams of the bases upon which review in this

_ 3This section“is the subject matter of Villa v. Hall. At. this

writing, vit cannot be determined in precisely what manner, if

at all, it will. be imptemented in the immediate future. However,

it répresents the expressed intentions of the California Legislature — |

which it is hoped will be sustained by. the courts. . -—

_” ithe cash sh (a (as opposed to eligibility for inclusion ‘ia

the overall [program ). .

. California’s S * method of giant computation: secliels

. is the same as the Texas method now before this Court

’ with Wo possible differences, one purely technical,

-the other potentially meaningful. . ses

o's Tenas. deducts non-exempt outside income from a

-, figure uniformly pegged at 75 percent of the standard

’ of need. The resulting figures are nowhere set forth in —

“~~ a table corresponding: to the standard of. need. Califor- ~

nia’ deducts income. from a table. which represents 84.7

‘> to 92.2 percent of: the ‘standard Of need.. This- difference -

‘is purely technical. The fact that Texas has not set forth

:.. sits reduced standard of need‘in a table. broken down by. -

' family size makes no practical difference | in the. ap-

;pheaien of the grant computation method.

_In. California; the... fact that ‘the use. of ae above

described method’ of payment computation may result.

ina zero.cash grant: for soine marginally needy families

in no way affects the initial and continuing eligibility of

those families for inclusion’ in the overall benefits of

” » the Aid to Families With ‘Dependent Children program. |

- It-is not clear -to California at ‘the time of. this writing

whether or not the same is true in 1 Texas.

~— |. Nee .*

ay eaten of exempt ingome under section 402(a) (8) of the '

“Social Security Act is the work incentive of $30 plus one-third

Of the balance of the earned income plus —_ related. expenses.

~. s*-ARGUMENT,

California and Other States Will Never Be Able to

| More Equitably Apportion Limited Welfare Re

‘sources in Favor of the’ Most Needy Recipients

-, Unless'the Decision Below Is Affirmed. ,

| Section: 402(a) (23) of the Social Security Act re-

..° quires “that by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the

- * state to determine the needs of individuals will have a

“been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs |

since such amounts. were established, - and any maxi-

mums that the State imposes pale ies will have : been

- proportionally. adjusted.” - | NO

- In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 US. 397 (1970), this 7

_ Court characterized section 402( a) (23) as having “the.

effect of requiring the States to recognize and accept the ‘

responsibility for those additional individuals whose

income falls short of the standard of need as computed.

_ in light of economic realities and to place them among

those eligible for thé case .and training provisions.”

[397 US. at'413.} | .

If: this is ‘a binding construction of section 402(a)

(23), California has complied by including “all families

newly eligible by the measure of its raised. standard

of need in every aspect of the Aid to Families With

' Dependent Children program related to care. and train-

ing, no. matter now small their unmet needs.

However, another purpose of section 402(a) (23) |

recognized by: this Court in Rosado was “to prod the

' ° States to apportion their payments on a more equitable —

- basis.” Ibid. States were also encouraged to abandon .

maximums in favor of ratable reductions by the device

of requiring an upward adjustment of maximums while

‘ allowing a‘ decrease in expéefiditures by adjustment of ©

the ratably reduced percentage of. the standard, of need.

_ Id. at.413-14. California did not choose to abandon its

statutory. table of maximum assistance but ‘rather’ raised

it substantially. Section 28,of the Welfare Reform Act:

has the effect of increasing grants to about 80 poe

‘of its recipients.*

California’s proposed Welfare Reform Act is an ex-

‘ cellent example of a state apportioning ‘its welfare pay-

.” ments on a moregequitable basis. The schedules (Ap-

pendices B and C) are constructed in such a way ‘that

‘total experiditures. for the progtam remain’ constant.

The most neédy majority of recipients receive increased

grants, and new marginally needy families are included

' in the care and training provisions

To defray the increased cost of these f

7 tained in the care and training aspects of the program,

_ but receive reduced cash grants.

California, like Texas and most other states, i is faced :

with a total demand for welfare payments © that its

overburdened fiscal resources prevent. it ‘from meeting —

in full. The states are clearly not obligated to. pay full

needs. ‘Rosado v. Wyman, supra, 397 U.S. at 413;. .

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US. 471, 478-79 (1970).

If full individual payments are precluded by maximiims

or insufficient funds, adjustments may be made accord-

ing to a state-wide formula. 45 C.F.R. §233:20(a)(3)

(viii). Texas’ plan for calculating cash grants, like

|. that of-Califorrfia, has the advantage of allocating the

. largest portion of those resources to those who need —

.. assistance most.

*All recipients with no. - outside income, and all those with

outside income Jess ‘than the difference between the standard of

need and the maximum would receive increased payments.

. g —)]— é .

If the decision below is reversed, it may not be pos-

sible for -California to ever give increased aid to the

_ most needy of her citizens without also giving in-

creased aid to the least needy. In light of fiscal

and budgetary realities, neither California nor any.

other ,state may, under that circumstance, be able to

increase aid to their truly-destitute.

Coiiclusion.

The recognizable inequities in public assistance will

not be remedied but exacerbated by this Court’s re-

versal of the decision below. The executive and legis-

lative branches of the federal and state governments

are studying. these problems. Judicial interference at

this point will serve only to confuse rather than “clari-

fy the traditional responsibility of the legislative branch

of the government. Surely if the “separation of pow- :

ers” doctrine: has any. meaning the state and federal

legislatures should be unimpeded -in their search for —

equitable solutions realistically gauged. to the fiscal

reso 2S available to accomplish this end.

For the foregoing reasons the State of California

‘adopts and joins in the argument of thé State of Texas

for. the affirmance’ of the decision of the three judge

- trial court.

Respectfully submitted, .

EVELLE J. YOUNGER; .

Attorney General.of the

State of California, °

‘ELIZABETH PALMER,

_ Deputy Attorney General, _'

JEROLD A. PROD, a

Deputy Attorney General, .

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

State of California.

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| APPENDIX A. -

Opinion of the Supreme Court of the’

| oa State of California. *

In the Supreme Court of the State of California, in

Bank. | el

Virginia. Villa et al., Petitioners, v. James M. Hall,

as Secretary, etc., et-al., Respondents. Sac. 7907.

Filed: Dec. 6, 1971. — ae

Petitioners in this class action seek to invalidate a

. portion’ of section 28 of the California Welfare Reform

Act of 1971 (Stats. 1971, ch. 578) on-the ground it

is incompatible with the federal Social Security Act.

Because the unimpaired operation of the welfare -pro-

gram is of utmost significance to all the ‘people of this

State (see Welf. &.Inst. Code, § 10000)’ and because

these petitioners would be affected drastically by the

delays of protracted litigation, the matter is appropriate -

for the exercise of our original jurisdiction. (Mooney .

v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 675, and cases cited. )

Petitioners represent a class of individuals receiving’ _

_ aid under the state’s Aid to Families with Dependent .

_ Children (AFDC) program. (Welf.. & Inst. Code,

. §§ 11200-11489.) AFDC is one of four major cate-

gorical assistance programs established by. the Social

1Welfare and Institutions Code section~10000- provides -that

.the statutory purpose is to “provide for protection, care, and °

assistance to the- people of the state in need thereof, and. to

promote the welfare and happiness of all of the people of the

state by providing appropriate aid and services to all of its

needy and distressed:.It is the legislative intent ‘that aid shall

be administered and* services provided promptly, and humanely,.

with due regard for the preservation of family life, and without

discrimination on account of race, national origin or ancestry,

religion, or ‘political .affiliation; and that aid shall be so adminis-

tered and services so provided: as to encourage self-respect, self-

.reliance, and the desire to be a good citizen, useful to society.”

| ee

Becdtity: Act of 1935. The program is based on the

~ concept of “co-operative federalism,” in that it is‘

. financed largely by the federal government on a match-

ing-funds basis but is administered by the individual :

states. States are not required to participate in the pro-

gram, but those which desire to take. advantage of the-

substantial federal resources available must submit an

AFDC plan for approval. by. the Secretary of the De-—

partment of Health, Education. and Welfare (HEW)

(42 U.S.C. §§ 601-604), and: the state plan must con-

-form with the requirements of the Social Security Act:

. and applicable HEW regitations. (King _ v. Smith.

, (1968) 392 US. 309, 316-317.) *

While the states are accorded significant discretion

as to the details of their individual programs, _ there are

. two factors which: under federal law must enter into =

- the determination>: of benefits to be paid. First,

standards ‘of need must be established; i.e., a yardstick ;

for ascertaining. who is eligible for public assistance.

' Second, states must then decide how much assistance

will in fact be given: (Rosado v. Wyman (1970) 397

US. 397, A08; King v. Smith, supra, at - PP: 318-

319.)

The provisions of California’s AFDC program cor- -

responding to the two factors identified in Rosado and

King are found in sections 1!50 and 11452-of the —

~ Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 11452 establishes

“minimum basic standards of adequate care,” i.e., -

standards: of need. Such ‘Standards are ee to in- |

- 2The four major programs are Old Age Assistance (42. U. S.C.

§ 301 et seq.); ‘Aid ‘to Families with Dependent Children (42

U.S.C. § 601 et’ seq.); Aid to the Blind (42 U.S.C. § 1201

- et seq.); and Aid for the Permanently and Totally Disabled ( 42

“Use § 1351 vy

bed)

a, re

sure safe = healthful housing; minimum othinig 1 for

health and decency; adequate food; utilities; certain

household, personal, and miscellaneous -needs; and /es-

sential medical and. dental care not otherwise provided

‘by the public. A monetary schedule for these stan-

dards of need was, until the Welfare Reform Act of

1971, contained in regulations promulgated by the.

State Department of Social Welfare. (State Department

of Social Welfare, Manual ‘of Policies and Procedures:

Eligibility and Assistance Stagdards, §. 44-212.) Under

‘the new act, the amounts are set forth in the Welfare

_ and Institutions Code (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11452,

__as amended by Stats. 1971, ch. 578, § 28.5.) 9)

‘It is well settled, however, that the states are not re-

quired to pay full needs: individual needs may be made

subject to the statewide application of either a per-

centage figure (i.e.,.a “ratable reduction”). or*a flat -

statutory maximum. California has chosen the latter

- method and has established such maximums in section

11450 of the code. Thus under section 11452 as

‘amended a family of two needs $210 a month to secure

_ adequate care, but the amount of aid that will actually

be paid is limited to $190 by the. statutory maximum

provided in section 11450; corresponding figures for a -

family of three are $255 and $235; of four, $314 and

$280; of five, $362 and $320; et cetera..

| Prior to the Ree ne of the Welfafe Reform Act,:

any outside incOme earned by the recipient and not

exempted’ was deducted from the standard of need to

; deterthine the — fe BS ‘of the individual re-

_ SSee Social Security Act, sections 402, ‘subdivision (a) )).

402,. subdivision (a) (8) (42 U.S.C. §§ 602, subd. (a)(7), 602

- subd. (a)(8)); County. of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.

- 3d 730. -

. a

‘cipient.‘ The new law, however, provides that incomes,

_. _ be subtracted not from the standard of need but from,’

the lower statutory maximum.” Petitioners contend. that

the Social Security Act compels income to be deducted

from the standard .of need and not from the statutory

‘maximum, and hence the. new. California statute is to.

that extent incompatible with federal law. .

_ Any analysis of federal law requirements neces-

sarily must begin with the Social Security Act itself.

In ‘section 402, subdivision (a)(7), Congress has ©

specifically recognized that: the income of a recipient

relates to his or her need. “IT ]he State. agency shall,

in determining need, take into consideration any other

. income and. resources of any. child or relative claiming.

aid to families with dependent children . ...” (Italics

added: 42 U.S.C. § 602, subd, (a)(7).). a

The. rationale of this statutory provision appears em-

inently ‘sound. . The first stage in: the two-step process

identified by hte Supreme’ Court in Rosado v. Wyman,

Supra, is to ascertain ‘the general minimum needs of

-- ‘the community. Naturally, those in otherwise. equiva-

4Prior to the new law, section 11450, subdivision (a); read

in part: “For each needy family which includes one or more

needy children qualified for aid . . ., thete shall be paid the

. sums specified in the following table, or so much thereof as is

_ necessary for the adéquate care of the needy family. . . .” ;

‘Pursuant to that statute the Department of Social Welfare

issued Eligibility and Assistance Standard section 44- 315.51,

which provides in part: “[T]he budget deficit is determined

by . . ..[s]ubtractihg the rounded current income :-from the .

rounded total need. The amount of the AFDC monthly payment _

is the budget deficit, or the [statutory maximum], whichever

is less.”

5“(Tjhere shall be paid, notwithstanding minimum este

standards of adequate care established by the department under

Section 11452, an ammount of aid each month which when added

to. his income . . . is equal to the sums specified in the Jstatutory

maximum] table. . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11450, as ‘amended _

by Stats. 1971, ch. ‘578, § 28.)

“ e@

, wroetee repent wr 4

| a

lent categories wil] require greater or, lesser aid de-

pending on the amount of income, if any, which they

earn. If state budgets were designed so that 100 percent

of .need were paid to those on the AFDC ‘program,

there would be no dispute before us: clearly. income

-would be subtracted from the statewide standard in |

order to ascertain an individual’s actual need, and that ©

amount would be paid.* However, Congress chose not .

‘to. rigidly require the states to pay full need, and the

- gocial Security Act specifically recognizes the validity

- of statutory maximums. (See 42 U.S.C. §602, subd.

(a)(23).) Nevertheless, this recognition does-not alter

the fundamental. concept; as exemplitied by section

402, subdivision (a)(7), that income of 2 recipient

relates to his or her need,’ not to a designed statutory.

maximum the only support for which is found in budge-

‘tary limitations® . 7 |

“Published HEW -interpretations. of section 402, sub —

division (a)(7), moreover, bolster the conclusion ‘that

_. ®As of July 1971, HEW figures indicate that 14 states were

paying 100 percent of the standard of need to those without

income or 100 percent of the ‘deficit (standard of need less. in-

come) to those with income. (See “Summary. of Payment

Methods”, July 1971, attachment to amicus curiae brief of HEW,

Whitfield v. King (M.D. Ala.) Civ. No. 3330-N.).

THEW regulations stress that itis income or’ resources ac-

tually available to the recipient that is + ape (45 C.F.R.

§ 233.20; subd. (a)(3)(ii)(c).). The emphasis appears to require

the state to ascertain the amount of aid the recipient in fact

needs for adequate care by subtratting income and/or resources

actually, not supposedly, received, from the standard of need.

Thus child support due, ‘but not actually received, is not con- .

sidered income for this purpose. -

Another provision of the federal act (42 U.S.C. § 602, subd. ~

(a)(8)) compels the conclusion that income is to be subtracted

from need rather than from the. statutory maximum. The ‘pro-

vision allows a recipient to disregard a certain portipn of his or ©

her income in determining actual need. However, this “disregard”

. (This footnote is continued on next page) .

—

income is re be. related to eur “Provision must be

- made that in arriving at .the amount of assistance

needed, the State will compare all income and resources

» found to be available to the individual for his use in

meeting his current needs with the amount arrived at

through the application of the’ State-wide standard.”

| (Fed. Handbook of Pub. Asst., pt. IV, § 3120.)

6 | that the current HEW @ttitude

. Respondents conte

on: the role*of outside income in the computation of

_ AFDC payments .is indicated in the amicus brief the

agency submitted to-the United: States Supreme Court

‘in Jefferson v. Hackney, No. 6553, Oct. Term 1970.”.

. There HEW takes the position that a Texas plan which

subtracts income from a ratably reduced standard (not:

_ a statutory maximum) rather than from the full _stand-.

ard of need does not conflict with federal require-

ments. HEW’s position in‘ Jefferson is not controlling |

. here for. two reasons, in addition to the prevailing rule

of administrative law that the ultimate authority of

statutory interpretation rests in the judiciary. ( Volks-

wagenwerk, etc. y. FM@ (1968) 390 U.S. 261, 272;

1 Davis, Administrative Law. (1958) § 506, pp. 326-_

| irst, the complaint in Jefferson was based on section —

402, subdivision (a)(23), of the det, whereas the cur-

rent challenge is founded in part on section 402, subdi-

vision (a)€7). The former provision requires states to

increase their standards of /need and-any statutory max-

imums to reflect cost of living. rises; it makes no refer-

provision is generally not available to pram persons ‘whose total

income exceeds their need, not merely the statutory maximum.

(See County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 739.)

*As of this writing, the c has. not been decided by the

Supreme Court. However, the p t made: by respondents is not

. the ultimate result but the HEW Dosition. :

ae ae :

ence to the use of income in the ‘determination of pay-

ments: Because the court in Rosado v. Wyman, supra, —

narrowly viewed thé Social Security Amendments of ~

1967, adding section 402, subdivision (a)(23), as not: _

requiring an- overall increase in benefit- levels, HEW

might reasonably conclude that (section alone does not

prohibit any decreases ‘in aid occasioned. by: subtract-

ing income from ‘a. ratable reduction rather than the .

standatd of need.#

Second, Jefferson involves ratablé reductions parm

_ ‘than statutory maximums, Both the Social Security Act

| (see 42 US.C. § 602, subd. (a)(23)) and the

United States Supreme Court in Rosado make crucial

distirictions between maximtms and ratable reductions.

The former is: disfavored; the latter preferred. After

Rosado, states could effectuate downward adjustments

in welfare payments only. by means of ratable reduc-

tions; -they could not achieve the same result by de-°

creasing applicable stdtutory maximums. (397 USS. at .

pp: 413-414.)° Rosado emphasized that one of she

aims of the 1967 amendment was to koala dh the:

10The New York: statute ‘under scrutiny in iat fst |

an individualized computation of a recipient’s standard

_ with a scheme based, in part,.on a flat allowance for certain

needs according to average age. The high court held the new

law inconsistent with section 402, subdivision (a)(23), which, it”

said, “invalidates any: state-.program that substantially alters

the content, of the standard of need in such a way that it is

less than it was prior to the enactment of § 40n(a)(23 unless

a.state can demonstrate that the items bcc Bi ed no

longer constituted part of the reality of existence, for thefmajority

-of welfare recipients.” (397 U.S. at p. 419.) The of the

-new statute’ was not necessarily that it provided for. averag- .

_ ing of certain needs but that “special grants” were ‘eliminated

from the computation of the need standard without a showing

that such grant no longer represented a = of “the — of |

existence” for the recipients. —

_, States. to adopt ratable reduction plans. (Id. ks Thus,

in light of the different ‘treatment afforded. statutory

‘ maximums and- ratable reductions, it ddes- not neces-

* « sarily follow from. HEW Ss position in Jefferson (i.e.,

h—~__ to allay income ‘to be subtracted from. table reduc-

tion

at income may also be deducted\from statu-

tory maxi

| More significantly, Triage j in Rosado dirs con-

- flicts with the HEW: position in Jefferson a us

_ créates considerable doubt as to’ the tenability— of er

spondents’ reliance on that HEW position, In, defining

__ Fatable reduction the court'.in Rosado’ said: “A ‘ratable

o reduction’ represents a fixed. percentage ‘of the stand- .

ard of ‘need that will be paid to all recipients. In the

event that there is some income ‘which is first de-_

ducted, the ratable reduction is applied:to the amount

by which an individual or family falls short of need.”

osa( Italics added) 397 US. at p. 409, fn. 13.)

(ne

“The advantage’ of a single ratable. reduction which applies

to all welfare recipients regardless of their specific needs, is |

that all recipients receive the same percentage of their need.

Comparing ‘the standard of need table-in the Welfare Reform

Act with the “act’s statutory maximum table shows that, before.

income is subtracted, a family of three needy persons will receive ©

* 92.2 percent of the minimum requiréd for its care whilé, a family

with 10 or more will receive only 84.7 percent. (Welf. & Inst. .

Code, §§ 11450, 11452, as amended.) pl

Of equal significanée is the fact that. “subtracting income

_from ratablé ‘reductions does. not violate another principle of

Rosado, namely, that°the states may not obscure the ‘standard

. Of need. (397-U.S. at p. 413.) Under the Texas plan challenged

-. in Jefferson, ‘the standard of need remains crucial because it. is

_ to ‘that figure. which the percentage is applied. Increasing the

- . standard of need ‘increases the amount of aid received, assuming

the ratable reduction percentage is not lowered. Even though °

* income is subtracted from the reduced figure, the standard of. _

need continugs. to be relevant. Subtracting income from the

‘+ statutory maximum relegates the standard of need to a virtually

. irrelevant position: it does not Serpe ag the basis for determining

~~ *

at |

| lit sn

. Both HEW in Jefferson and respondents here char- - .

acterize the quoted | statement of the Supreme. Court as

dictum. Closer ‘analydis, however, reveals that this de-

scfiption of the mechanics of the ratable“reduction Pro- .

cedure was hecessary to the court's interpreta

the 1967 amendment. which requires ‘standards of need

and statutory maximums to. be increased to reflect

cost of living. rises. The petitioner in Rosado argued :

that the amendment compels an increase in the level of i |

benefits actually. paid. The court rejected ‘that conten-

tion, and sat that subsequent to the amendment the —

states could ne ertheless reduce the amount’ of aid by —

lowering the ratable reduction percentage by chang- ~

ing from a statutory maximum. to a relatively low

ratable reduction; only maximums could. not be low-

ered. The court stated, however, that its conclusion

did not render the amendment “a meaningless exercise -

“in ‘bookkeeping.’ ” (397 U.S. at p. 413.) Instead, it

_- discerned two. congressional purposes from. the: new ©

provision, one of which was: “It has thé effect of re-

. quiring the States to recognize.and accept responsibility _

for those additional individuals whose’ income. falls —

short of the standard of need as computed in: light of

economic realities and to place thefi_ among those eli-

, gible for the care ar ining provisions.” (Id.) .

_. Thus, as long ashe standards of need were increased, )

additional individuals would be included in the program, ©

notwithstanding the fact that payments might be reduced —

_ pursuant to ‘lower tlds ndash percentages. How-

ever, the col rt also: recognized inNits_footnote 13 that

an increase ih the number of recipients could be assured

actual need of a recipient, or any other meaningful purpose.

* As long as the maximum remains constant,’ increases in the

sanderd of need would not affect the ein of benefits paid.

aad

_ only if: income was’ to be acted’ from the standard | a

- of need before the ratable“Muction was applied. At

' least according. to. the interpretation in Rosado, the

1967 amendment was not concerned with the i@vel ‘of |

-behefits pajd to , the truly destitute, those. without outside ”

Tesources. The court therefore refused to require an

increase in benefits; instead, it concluded that the in-

*- tent of the amendment was to reach an additional grobp

of recipients, all of _ nal outside income or re~

sources, | | : _ § "yy

The following hypothetical inecipie demonstrates

_ \ethat by subtracting | income, from a= ratably reduced

figure or from a statutory maximum, a state could suc- °

cessfully avoid the court’s interpretation that the

> ad

amendmént was designed to increase. the number of :

people eligible for aid: Assume that prior to: the 1967

amendment the standard of need: for a family of two

_was $200 and tha statutory maximum .was $170 ‘(or

the. ratable reduction for—all’ need levels was 85 per--

cent). The amendment inandated the states to in-|

= crease both the: standard of need and the statutory

maximum. Thus, ‘at the very least, families of two

with outsidé income -of $201 per month would ac-

_ cordingly become’ eligible for aid. Assume, pursuant to

the amendment, that the standard of need- was in-

~ creased, to $250 and ‘the. statutory maximum. t to $200 |

(or that the. state changed its ratable reduction to 80

percent): Under California practice prior to the Wel-

fare Reform Act an individual with outside incdne of

e°

Po.

a. Se ts ee

$201 would a4 an actual need of 3849. ($250 less

$2017 which would. be paid. in full because it was

_ less than the applicable maximum ($200): Under

the procedure adopted by\ the Welfare Reform Act,

a however, an individual earning $201 would stilt be in-

| eligible because when the outside ‘income ($201), is

* subtracted . from the statutory maximum - ($200). no —

“actual n need” remains. ot gk, ae 4

Thus, a state could completely avoid. the Rosado

interpretation of section 402, subdivision -(a) (23), by

raising “its post-amendment maximum only ‘to the level

of its pre-amendment ‘standard of need or by decreasing

’ its ratable reduction accordingly, and then subtracting |

income from the. lower figure. “Such a scheme is incom ~

| ‘sistent. with the. result the Rosado. court said’ (Con.

- gress sought to achieve and would indeed render the.

amendment a “feaningless exercise in bookkeeping.”

In order to insufe the effectuation of the end desired

“by Congress, the court concluded in its footnote 13 .

. that income must be deducted from the standard of —

need and not from the ratably reduced figure (or like-

wise a statutory maximum).”

' The conclusion that the Social Security Act requires

outside income to be subtracted from standards of

>A.

18The court’s conclusion in Rosado was Seceiadk son Sicilads wo

- 402, subdivision (a)(23) of the act. Much of. the discussion by.

, petitioners and respondents here has focused on section 402, -

_ subdivision (a) (7). Our decision, however, is based on both» .

sections, on the holding in Rosado. Vv. Wyman, supra, on section

(This footnote is continued on next page)

> _ Fe j

aN - *_,° : _4 ; . |

—————— — —— : a

—12— e# 4 ®

need rither than. from statutory maximums or ratable-

‘reductions is also founded on a. strong public policy’ of.

| encouraging welfare recipients to beco fe conitantty |

more self-supporting. Yet deducting income from stat . . ca a

tory maximums makes gainful employment significe _ |

ly less* attractive to the recipient. This ‘follows because |

all nonexempt income will be offset directly against the - _~

amount of the ‘grant and not against the standard of

need to determine actual’ need; for every nonexempt

dollar eafned, the amount of aid will therefore be de- y- oa 7

‘creased on@dollar..Since the grant is always. less. ‘than . |

the standard of’ need, in many instances the: system ot

adopted by the Welfare Reform Act will result“in af.

~ individual’s need not being met even after adding both

exempt and nonexempt income to the AFDC payment.

Such recipients will be forced to exist ‘below the bare |

minimum nécessary for adequate care,’ even though, Og

_ they have: commenced, by obtaining employment, to —

_break free from the debilitating—“welfare” “syndrome.”

_ .The practice. thus conflicts with the stated federal policy

to provide incentives to obtain and maintain an em-—

| ployment status. (See 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

~ News, pp. 2994-2995; County of Aiameda v. _Carleson

(1971) supra, 5 Cal.3d 730, 741-742.) or - . fo

—— a

We conc clude_that-sectien- 41450;-as "amended by

~~ gection 28 of the Welfare Reform -Act, is inconsistent .

- 402, subdivision (aX(8), and on considerations . ‘of employment -

incentive. Thus we disagrée with the position of HEW, ‘expressed

its amicus brief filed in Whitfield v. King (M.D. ‘Ala.) supra,

Gy No- 3330, that section 402, sidhilietalon (a)(7), does not, -

‘at least i in part, compel the result we reach teday.

EYELID EIA PO LLL LEI LEE LLG LIE LEB LLNERE LLDPE

ae ;

—13— *

with the Social Secirrity Act insofar as’ it requires in-

come to be deducted from statutory maximums and.

not from | standards of need. . While manifestly the

a ". states are not required to ‘participate in the federal \ =

AFDC program, as long as they accept federal funds.

for ‘this purpose they must comply. with federal law

inthe administration of their programs. - (King v.

- Smith, supra; Rosado v. Wyman, ‘supra; County of

Alameda v. Carleson (1971) supra, 5 Cal.3d at p.

739.) The acceptance of federal, funds* pursuant to-a

state program not in compliance with the Social. Se-

7 curity Act and - the regulations promulgated there-

under would violate federal law in an area in which it

is supreme. (U.S. Const., art. VI, § 3; see Rosado Vv.

| Wyiman (1970) supra’ 397 U.S. 397,- 428 (Rouglas,

4 Fy concurring ) [“The. wrong alleged is the State’s fail- _

2 + ure to comply with with, federal_requirements in its use of.

ot federal funds, not HEW’s failure to withhold funds

from the State.”].) - oar

.. We thus turn to the remedy to be afforded petition-

ers. In re Bell (1942) 19. Cal. 2d 488, 498, declared

that California law requires an. unconstitutional por-

tion of a statute.be severed and “the remainder [to] ;

—.——~‘stand if it is complete in itself and would have been,

adopted by the legislative body had the latter foreseen

the partial ‘invalidation of the statute.” (Cf. In re

Blaney (1947). 30 Cal.2d 643, 655.) We need. not.

.14We do not reach petitioners’ contention that section 11450

as amended denies aid to a number of eligible recipients whereas.

federal. law requires some amount of aid to all thos@-eligible.

(But see Dandridge v. Williams (1970) 397 U.S. 471, 481.) __

2 2 ;

4. - y ange ot . 9D SLID TONES ORTOP ELE Oe ma eke hes

| —

"speculate as to: what action the "Legislature might have

- taken had it foreseen the decision which. we ‘reach:

" today. In section 41° of: the new law the ‘Legislature , .

has — provided for severance as any provision ..

of this act... is held invalid. ” (Stats. 1971, ch. 578, .

(841).

In Bell we undertook to sever one section of a | county

anti-picketing ordinance and several words from -anoth-

er section. (19 Cal.2d at P. 497-498.) Section 11450

of the Welfare and Institutions ; Code is, likewise “me-

chanically severable” ‘within the meaning of Bell so °

that it conforms to federal law. This can be accom-

plished as an administrative. matter without affecting

the other policy determinations made by the Legislature

in its amendments to section 11450 by deleting the fol- .

- lowing provision from subdivision (a) of that section:

“when added: to his incomé, exclusive, of ‘any amounts”

_ considered exempt as income or paid pursuant to uly

: ‘division (4) of this section or Section 11453. 1,

~~ _In view of our interpretation of the mandate. of 18

€ al law, section 11450, subdivision (a), ‘with the’ fore-

oe going ‘deletion, can readily be interpreted as _ requiring

income. to be subtracted from an individual’s standard

" of need; the statutory maximum becomes relevant only

after that mathematical process is completed. If, how-

, ‘ever, the exact formula for determining aid. to those |

- with outside income needs clarification’ in addition to

_ that contained in section 11450 aes interpreted herein,

respondent | Carleson 16 directed to issue regulations pur-

suant to -. statutory authority under wae, and Initi-

‘= ; . Per

perigee r cpg ES cae aaa dake pa Gee ae pa « PRL ory 7

. : . -

' . P

. “ ‘ .

. 7 . s - ” : - 7 o | *

Fs ; . “=

sé oo. 15 : ao

P Canal ;

- tutions Code section 10600 in order 4 167 Secure full com:

pliance with federal law. _ ea 7 ‘ 9

Our order of September 30, 1971, stayed the opera-

tion a of section 28 of the Welfare Reform Act insofar <

_ as it amended section 11450,: subdivision (a). Prior to. -

. . that order - -section *28 -was to ‘become operative on

October 1, 1971, the date on which the remainder of _

the act went into effect. By invalidating only a. portion

* of section 28, we gave deference to the legislative deter-

~ mination, evidenced by section 41 of the act, that |

valid provisions of the act should be unaffected by any

invalid provisions.’ . . | ea 8

fo With - this legislative ‘mandate in “mind, we accord- |

/ - ingly hold that the adjusted payments to be ‘made

pursuant to: section 28, as interpreted herein, shall be

retroactive: ‘to October 1, 1971. This conclusion fully:

effectuates the. severance policy. embodied in ‘section

41, since the ehtire act will. then be operative from

; October 1 with the exception of the. provision , wwhich--

we have severed ‘here. Respondent Carleson should .

therefore forthwith adopt . a plan pursuant to which |

-. those who received improper payments on and after -

October 1 will be paid the adjusted amount to which’

we ‘now hold they are entitled. (Cf. Welf. = Inst. Code,

-18Section 10600 provides: “It is heteby declafed. that provision

' for public social servicés in this tode is a matter of statewide

concern, The department is .hereby designated as the single

state agency with full power to supervise every phase of the —

administration of the public social services for which grants-in-

‘aid are received from the United \States government or ‘made

by the state in order to secure full compliance with the applica-

ble rovisions of ‘State: and federal laws.” (See also & 10604, |

10606.)

“3

- . 11004, “subd. (g)5: as amended. i Stats. 1971, ch.

| 578, § 20.3. ye .

_ Our order staying operation of section Gh iS vacated.

-. Leta peremptory writ of mandate issue as. 6. prayed.

: | - _ MOSK, | ree

: WE CONCUR: . vs oe “ny ,

—). WRIGHT,.C.J. 0 oe oe ae

_ |. PETERS, J. | ; ne + % 2.

TOBRINER, J. ae Pe )

_. BURKE,J. — a

_ SULLIVAN, J. oo OS

3 . ) iat —17-— | >

‘ ’ ‘gs a. APPENDIX B_

Sec. 28.5. Section 11452 of the Welfare and Institu-

a tions Code'i is amended to read:

ae 11452. Minimum basic standards of ndegninte care

: shall be distributed to the counties and ‘shall be binding ,

upon them. Such: standards are hereby determined on

the basis of the schedule set forth in this section, as

| ‘adjusted: for cost-of-living increases or decreases. pur-

- suant to Section. uses, which schedule is- designed to

- insure: an

(1) Site healthful housing.

~ (2) . clothing ak healthy and decoy.

—_—_

¢ '

ad . +

(3) > Lewis at adequate © food badeit : meeting —

7 recommended. dietary en Re:

— Search Council.

(4). Utilities, . Bere

{2).. Other items including household operation, . ed- . |

: ‘peation ” and incidentals, retreation, personal ‘needs,

_ and insurance. te wet ee ee oO ’

(6) > Allowance ‘for “essential medical, dental, or

other remedial care to the extent not otherwise pro-

". vided at public expense.

1) - Other recurring special needs.

ee gee. ot eS aes

quate care is as follows: -

The schedule of minimum basic standards of ade 2 |

Number of needy’ oe ‘Minimum 3 *

persons in the . . basic standards == ~~

‘. same family og _ ss @f adequate care \ -

okey Caries ae eeseepstsenceeceessensens $125 0° Sv

BD, ssaniiceins paseucevanya desesanssaanssovevasesestens 210 6s.

nT ET vecieegserstien 255,

Bh fe 314

- Sea ee OY ae 362.

Fe Lee een en ee ee . 449

OD cgcs sesihe rag nencenneneeseversevecnetyesnswtouaes 496

DF cca cnces pwn nso ped oe eta sepenesenicevioemnacyins 543

FO ect cag eens ee cae ee ese neenicesegas 590

plus five dollars ($5) for ‘each additional needy

person.

The department shall establish rules: and revulaiions

assuring the uniform -application statewide of- the pro-

visions of this section.

APPENDIX Cc.

Sec. 28. Section 11450 of the Welfard 3 and Institu-

-.- tions Code is amended to read:

11456. (a) ‘For each needy family which een

one ‘or more needy. children’ qualified for ‘aid under this

chapter, except as provided in Section 11403, there

~. shall be paid, notwithstanding minimum basic stand- |

, ards of adequate care established by the department y

“under: Section 11452, an amount of aid each month

which when added to his, income, exclusivé of any

- amounts considered exempt as: income or paid | pur-

suant: to. subdivision (d) of this. section or Section.

_ 11453.1, is equal to the. sums specified in the follow-

ing table, as adjusted. for cost-of-living increases or has

creases. pursuant to Section 114 3: | :

- “Number of

eligible needy . *

persons in a “J. . Maximum .

‘ the same home, aid .

| rn © oo ccoceacecceceaseeceeseseecieees siaatpuaeenes Riaces $1 15

OD rasa cen euraaen gett eee sc rceceecee gent ounce sea seeceee! acescen . 190

Banari ysteipp ee aes ti 235

ee, eT eee Dea eoeenecyeensobeeennews . 280.

Lee Fe vectegpeeatgeestseewessseteed :...+320

a rr Eee neE ee <n 360

OD eeenetetneaeweus ess cgnteevstecesesecendeeesteeeoneeeeenee 395

Bo ocasecage cen ckadenvbavenvanunpanateneeesseeeeeanctenesmenerssnene 430

“9 Gee eects dc snn gs bonnet satawnnessoceetanenen 465

jt” ab, 0. a eee see ~ 500

‘APPENDIX D. |

ee! 29.1. Section 11453 is added to the Welfare. ;

and Institution Code, to read:

- 11453. The amounts set. forth in Section 1142 and. *

subdivision (a) of Section, 11450 shall be adjusted an-

-nually by the department to reflect any increases or

decreases inthe cost of living occurring .after April 1,

1972, sq that’ the first such adjustment becomes ef-

fective July 1, 1973. The average of the separate

indices of the cost of living for: Los Angeles and San

- Francisco, as published by the United States Bureau. of

Labor ‘Stites, shall be used as the basis for deter-

mining the changes i in the cost of living. .

Par

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JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY _ 535

- Syllabus

JEFFERSON ET AL. v. “HACKNEY. COMMISSIONER”

OF PUBLIC’ "WELFARE, ETAL, =

| APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT. COURT FOR THE

’ NORTHERN ‘DISTRICT OF -TEXAS o~

. : se :

No. 70-5064. “Argecd February 22, 1972—Deci a-May .30, 1972

. Appellants, pie nee ore Families With Dependent Childten

. (AFDC), challenge the system whereby Texas, in order to allocate

its xed-Poo of welfare money among persons with acknowledged

Affirmed.

need, applies a percentage reduction factor to arrive at a reduced

standard of need, the factor being lower for AFDC thai for other

categorical assistance programs. Appellants assert that the State’s

- method of applying this factor to recipients with outside income

contravenes § 402 (a)(23) of the Sacial Security Act, which re-

* quired. adjustment,’ by July-1, 1969, of “amounts used . ... to

determine the needs of individuals” to reflect increases in living

costs, because this method does not increase the welfare rolls to

“the same extent as would an _ alternative procedure used by some

other States. “They also make an equal protection claim on the

grounds that the distinction between:the aid programs is not ra~ |

tional and that the Texas system racially discriminates against the

proportionately larger number of minority groups in AFDC than

_in ‘the other programs. H eld:

: The Texas scheme does not contravene § 402 (a) (23). of the ~ =

Social Security Act, which does not require use of. a. computation

procedure that maximizes. individual cad for subsidiafy . ben- *

efits. Pp. 539-545.

2. The challenged system does not violate the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 545-551.

(a) ‘The fact that there are more members of minority groups

_ in the AFDC program than in other categories does ‘not indicate

. Tacial discrimination, absent any proof of racial motivation in the

Texas scheme. There was no such proof here. Pp. 547-549. . _

(b) Texas’ decision to provide. somewhat lower welfare benefits

for AFDC recipients than for the aged and infirm who are in other °

categories is not invidious or irtational, and there is no constitu-

« tional or statutory requirement that relief categories be treated

exactly alike. Pp. 549-551.

| procedures.

53. © . OCTOBER TERM, 1971,

Opinien of the Court. ee 406.U-S.

REHNQuIsT, J., delivered the’ opinion of the Court, in which .

Burcer, C..J., and Wurre, Birackmun, and* Powe tL, JJ., joined.

Srewart, J., filed a statement joining in Part III of thé’ Court’s

opinion, post, p. 551. Dovetas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in

which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 551. MarsHatu, J., filed a

dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, and in Part I of

which STEWART, : aes, post, B. 558.

Steven J. Cole anaued the cause for appellants. ‘With

- - him on, the briefs were Henry A. Freedman, Ed J. Polk, —

‘ Edward V. ‘Sparer, cand Carl Rachlin.

Pat Bailey, Assistant Attorney - General of Texas, :

‘ _ argued the cause ‘for appellees. With him on the-brief

were Crawford £. Martin, Attorney General, Nola White,

First AssistantAttorney General, Alfred Walker, Execu-

. .. tive Assistamt Attorney: General, and. J. C. Davis, Assist-

- ant Attorney General.

Evelle J. Younger, Attorney Generel and Elizabeth.

Palmer and Jerold A, Prod, Deputy Attorneys General, —

filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae

: urging affirmance. |

‘Solicitor General Griswold! by invitation. of the Court;

. filed a memorandum for the United States as amicus ©

curiae.: ° = ‘ ~ 2 <

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the

Court... = : :

Appellants in this case. challenge certain computation

procedures that the State of Texas. uses in its federally

assisted welfare program. Believing that neither the

Constitution nor.the federal welfare statute prohibits the

State from adopting these policies; we affirm. the judg- .

meritof the three-judge court below CPHOMENE the state

Appellants are Texas recipients of Aid to Families With

Dependent Children (AFDC). They ‘brought two class

JEFFERSON v. _ HACKNEY

585 Opinion of the Court

actions, which were consolidated j in the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking in-

junctive arid’ declaratory relief against state welfare of-

- ficials. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to

- 28 U, S. C> § 2281. - / _

-The Texas State Creeks cascentions a cejling on the

amount the State can spend on welfare assistance grants,

In order to allocate this fixed pool of welfare money

among the numerous individuals with acknowledged need, -

the State has adopted a system of percentage grants.

‘Under this system, the State first computes the monetary |

needs of individuals eligible.for relief under each | the

_ federally aided categorical assistance programs.? Then,

singe the constitutional ceiling on welfare is:insafficient

‘to bring each recipient up to this full standard of need,

the State applies.a percentage reduction factor * in order . |

to arrive at.a reduced standard of need i in each category

that the State can guarantee..

Appellants challenge the constitutionality of applying

_& lower percentage reduction factor | ‘to AFDC than to |

1 Originally, the Texas. Constitution prohi ited all ‘welfare pro-.

grams. -Section 51 of Art. III of the Constitution provided that

the legislature “shall have no power to make any.grant or authorize

the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, asso-

‘ciation of individuals, . municipal or other corpotations Whatso-

' ever 4...” However, begfnning in 1933, exceptions to this rule

were added to. the: state constitutidén in § 51-a, which now. allows

participation in‘ the federal welfare programs, but limits state

financing to the sum of $80,000,000. The legislature cannot exceed

‘this welfare: budget Without a state co itutional amendment.

?Old Age Assistance (OAA), 42-U. S. C. §30I et seg.; Aid to

Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 42 U. S. ©. § 601

. et seg.; Aid to the Blind\(AB), 42 U.S. C. § 1201 et seq.; Aid for

the Permanently and Totally

et seq.

8,At the present time these factors are: GAA—100%: AB—95% ; <1

APTD—95%; and AFDC—75%.~ At the time this suit was insti- <

tuted the AFDC percentage was 50%, but it was raised to 75%

followitig a recent amendment of § 51-a. See n. 1, supra.

Disabled (APTD), 42-U. 8. G,§ 1351 ;

* o e . Z ‘ a)

os .. ‘ - a

588 S ERORN TE 9 | .

7 - Opinion of. the, Cope 406 0.8

the lias categorical asajstance programs. They claim a

- violation ‘of. equal. protection because the proportion of

AFDC recipients who are black or Mexican-American is

_higher than the proportion. of the aged, blind, or disabled

_ welfare recipients who fall within these minority groups.

pans ose claim that the distinction between the pro-

grams is not rationally related to the purposes of the

Social Security Aet, and violates.the Fourteenth Amend- .

ment for that reason as well. In their original complaint,

- appellants also argued that any percentage-reduction sys-

tem violated § 402 (a) (23) of the Social Security Act of -

1935, as amended, 81 Stat. 898, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (23),

which” required each State to make certain cost-of-living |

adjustments to its standard of need. — Ly |

The three-judge court rejected appellants’ -constitu- . :

“tiorial arguments, finding that the Texas ‘system is neither -

racially discriminatory. nor unconstitutionally arbitrary.

- The court did, however, accept’ the statutory claim that

Texas’ percentage reductions.in ‘the AFDC ‘program uae

late the congressional command of» § 402 (a) (23).

F. Supp. 1332 (ND Tex. 1969). 1,

“Subsequent to that: -judgment, this Court decided Ro-

- sado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970). - Rosado held that,

although § 402 (a)(23) required States to make: cost-of-

__ living adjustments in their standard-of-need calculations,

it did not prohibit use: of percentage-reduction systems .

_ , that limited the amount of welfare assistance actually

* paid.’ 397 U. S., at'413. This Court then vacated and.

remanded the- first Jefferson judgment for further pro-

Po ceedings consistent with Rosado, 397 U. S. 821 (1970).

On remand, the District Court entered: a nev judg- ©

_ ment, denying all relief. Then, in a motion to amend thé.

judgment, appéllants raised a new statutory claim. They

argued ‘for the first, time that although a _percentage-re-

duction ‘system ‘may. be consistent with the statute, the

2 : Scene o; : bee “

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¢g

> . . s% id . .

. ° . ° . “a ° 7 . ’ . ee e

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_ JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY = = ——_—3339

535 Opinion of the Court :

sndcifie procedures’ that: Texas, uses for computing that

- reduction violate the congressional enactment. '-The Dis-

trict: Court rejected this argument and denied without.

opinion appellants’ motion to amend the judgment. - -This

. appeal under 28 U. S.. C. -§ 1253 then followed, and we

~ noted probable jurisdiction. 404.U. S. 820 (1971).-

een ee Naas

Appellants’ stat ry argument relftes to the method

the State uges to compute the’ petgentage reduc-

tok when the acaleas also has some outside igeome. -

. Texas, , like many other States, first applies the percent-

age reduction factor to the recipient’ s' standard of need, .

thus arriving at a reduced standard ‘of need that the

State can guarantee for each recipient within the\présent

_ budgetary | restraints. After computing this reduced

exempt ° income in order to arrive at the level of benefitg

that the recipient needs in order to. reach his reduced

standard of ‘nella. : This is the ‘amolint, of welfare the .

‘recipient is given:

Under an alternative system ‘used by other States, the

order. of: computation is reversed. First, the outside in-

to determine the recipient’s “unmet need.” Then, the

percentage reduction fagtor is applied to the unmet need,”

- in order to determine the welfare benefits payable. .

The two systems of accounting for outside income yield

| somewhat different results." Under the Texas system, all

* . °

6 a ’

- statidard of need, the State then ‘subtracts any non- —

: comgewis subtracted from the standard of need, in order -

3 : Ninetess of ‘the 26 States: that use a® percentage rection a

system follow the Texas procedure of accounting for outside income.

See Memorandum for: the United States as Amicus Curiae 5-16.

5 A certain portion of earned income must be exempted as a work

incentive. ‘See 42 U. S7C. § 602 (a¥(8):.

. Asnaming two identical. families, cack ‘i a ‘standgrd of need

O& i

ttle able of,

Ne tlt ae i lta etn esa a a te epg ee

6 ‘

ne GS Batra Sates SS Mac ic bE Nyt a ate

YA AE 4

540 } + OCTOBER TERM, ‘lot

Opinion of the Court’ te 406 U.S.

welfare recipients with the same needs have the same

_ amount of money available each month, whether or not

they have outside income. Since the outside income is

applied dollar for dollar to the reduced standard.-of. need,

which the welfare department would otherwise pay in

full, it does not result in a net improvement. in the fi-

nancial position of the recipient.’ Under the alternative

system, on-the other hand, any welfare recipient who

also has outside income is in a better financiql position

“because of it.. The reason is that the percentage reduc-

tion factor there is applied | to the “unmet need,” after the

‘income has been.subtracted. Thus, in effect, the income-

earning recipient is able to “keep” all his income, while

he receives only 4 percentage of the reniainder of his

standard ‘of need. PO,

of $200, and outside, nonexempt income ™ $100, the two sosteene

would produce these results:

Texas System - ” Albernative Sistem

-$ 200 (need) , & $ 200 (need)

. x 15 (% reduction factor). —100 (outside income)

$ 150 (reduced need) $ 100 (uskenet need)

+100 (outside income) A xX .75 (% reduction factor)

- $50 (benefits payable) - sf “5 (benefits payable) .

_™ Assuming two families with identical standards, of need, but

only one with outside income, the alterfative system leaves more

money in the hands of the family with outside income:

Outside Income ; *No Outside Income

$ 200 (need) . $ 200 (need) » ;

_ 100 (outside, income) — 0 (outside income) - \

100 (unmet need) $ 200 (unmet, need)

~« X .75'(% reduction factor) X .75 (% reduction factor) —

—_——— 2 —— < :

$ 75 (benefits payable) | *$ 150 (benefits payable) ;

TOTAL INCOME (outside TOTAL INCOME (outside

income plus- benefits pay- income plus benefits pay-

able) = $175 a able) = $150

MCG RR 19) Les) Sy Tae”

fh AI VR + f

c JEFFERSON vv. HACKNEY,

Opinion of the Court

’

Each of the ies ens has certain advantescs. Ap-—

pellants note that under the alternative system there is

a financial incentiye for welfare recipients to obtain out- .

side i income. The Texas computation method eliminates.

any such financial incentive, so long a as the outside in-

come remains less than the recipient’s reduced staridard

of need. However, since Texas’ pool of available wel-

fare funds is fixed, any increase in-benefits paid to the

working poor would have to be offset by. reductions else-

where. Thus, if Texas were to switch to the alternative

system of recognizing outside income, it would be forced

to lower its percentage reduction factor,.in order to keep

down its welfare budget. Lowering the percentage would

‘State has been unwilling to do.this.

. ~ Striking the proper balance between these competing ..

policy considerations is, of course, not the function of this _:

Court. “There is no question that States have consider- —

able latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since

each State is free to set its own standard of need and to

determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds —

it devotes to the program.” King v. Smith, 392 U.S.

309, 318-319 (1968) (footnotes omitted).° So long as

the State’s actions are not in violation of any specific pro-

yision of. the Constitution or the Social Security Act,

appellants’ policy arguments must be’ addressed to a dif-

ferent forum.

* Under the Texas system, once the income rises above the

reduced standard of need the individual no longer receives any cash _

assistance. He then would have a financial incentive, since his

indome would be rising above the maximum he could expect from

the welfare system. , an

“For a general'review of the statutory scheme, see Rosado v.

W yman, 397 U. S. 397, 407-412 (1970).

Qe.

result in Jess money for those who need the welfare ben- .

efits the most—those with no outside income—and the

PATE eee mT

SONORAN NY Sapa PIA “HOUR —_

1 oe

542 -. OCTOBER TERM, 1971

° Onin of the Court 406 U.S.

Appellants, assert, however, that ihe: Texas computa-

tion procedures are contrary: to § 402 (a) (23):

ad “(a) A State plan for aid and services | to needy.

. farnilies with children must

(98) provide that by July 1, 1969, ‘the amounts

~ used by the State to determine the needs of in-

dividuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully.

changes in living costs since such amounts were

established, and any maximums that thaState im-

poses on the amount of aid paid to families will have

been proportionately adjusted.”

Recognizing thet this statutory language, by its terms, :

hardly provides\much support for their theory)\appellants

seek to rely on what: they perceive to hayé been the

broad congressional purpose in enacting the’ provision. *,

In Rosado v. Wyman, supra, the Court reviewed the

“history of this section and rejected the argument that it

had worked any radical shift in the AFDC program. /d.,

ate414 and n.17. AFDC has long been referred to as a

“scheme of cooperative federalism,” King v. Smith, 392

U..S., at 316,°and the Rosado Court dismissed as ©

“adventuresome” any interp{tation. of § 402 (a) (23)

that would deprive the States of. their traditional dis-

cretion to set the levels of payments. 397 U.S., ‘at 414-

415 and n. 17. Instead, the statute was meant to require

the States to, make cost-of-livin adjustments to their .

standards of need, thereby serving “two broad purposes” :

“Fj irst, to, require States to face up realistically: to

‘g the magnitude of the public assistance requirement —

and lay bare the extent to which their programs fall

short of. fubfilling actual need; second, to prod the

States to apportion their payments on a more, equi-

%- table basis.”’. /d., at 412-413.

AOR YTS

JEFFERSON v. sacra t Bag

535 Opinion of the Court

’ Texas has complied with these two requirements. Ef-

fective May 1, 1969, the standard of need for AFDC re- _

cipients was raised 11%. to reflect the rise in the cost. of

living, and the State ‘shifted from a maximum-grant

system to its present percentage-reduction system. In

this way, the State has fairly recognized and exposed the

' precise level of unmet need, and by using a percentage-

reduction system it has attempted to apportion: the

'State’s limited benefits more equitably.

Although Texas has thus responded to‘the “two broad

purposes” of § 402 (a) (23), appellants argue that Con-

gress also intended that statute to increase the total -

number of recipients of AFDC, so that more peopte would

" qualify for the subsidia ry benefits that are dependent -

on receipt.of “AFDC cash. assistance. °°. The Texas com-

putation procedures aré thought objectionable since they

_ do not increase the welfare rolls to quite the same extent

as would the alternative method of recognizing outside

income. ~~

We do not agree that Congress intended § 402 (a) (23)

to invalidate any state computation procedures that do

not absolutely maximize individual eligibility for subsidi-

ary benefits. The cost- -of-living increase that Congress

mandated would, ‘of coprrse, generally tend to’ increase «

eligibility,” but there is nothing i in the legislative history

_ 7° Certain care-and-training provisions of thé Social Security ‘Act

‘ are available only to those who receive money payments undar the

categorical assistance programs. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 602 (a) (14),

_ (15); 42 U.S.C. §§ 602 (a) (19), 632; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) (10).

Under the Texas computatién procedures, those whose income ex-

‘ceeds their reduced standard of need receive no cash benefits and.’

thus do not gualify for these subsidiary benefits, although they do

have “unmet need” qualifying them for aid: under the alternative

computation procedure.

11 The Court in Rosado recognized this as one of several effects

attributable to § 402 (a) (23). 397 U. S., at 413. Sée also id, at

Pt ttt aa oieemals

a. al

a OCTOBER TERM, 1971

Opinion of the Court 406 U.8.

indicating that this. was part of the statutory: purpose.

Indéed, at the same time Congress enacted § 402 (a) (23)

_ it included another sectign designed to induce States to

reduce the number of viduals eligible for the AFDC |

_ prograni.? . Thus, what little legislative history there is

on the point, see Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S., at 409-412,

tends to undercut’ appellants’ theory. See Lampton v.

Bonin, 304 F. Supp. 1384, 1391-1392 (ED La. 1969)

(Cassibry, J., dissenting). . See generally Note, 58 Geo.

L. J. 591 (1970). | =

Appellants also argue that the Texas system should be

held invalid because the alternative computation method

results in greater. work incentives for welfare recipients.”

The history and purpose of the Social Security Act

do indicate Congress’ desire to help those on welfare

become self-sustaining. Indeed, Congress has specifi- °

cally mandated certain work incentives in § 402 (a) (8).

There is no dispute here, however, about Texas’ com-

pliance with these very detailed provisions for work in- .

centives. - Neither. their.inclusion in the Act nor-the -

- % language used by- Congress in other’ sections of the Act

> supports the inference that Congress mandated ‘the

States ‘to change their. income- computation procedures

in other, completely unmentioned areas. - a,

Nor are appellants aided by their reference to Social

- Security Act’ § 402 (a)(10), 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(10),

which provides that AFDC benefits must. “be mae?

409 n. 13. The Ceurt did not, however, hold that each one of

.these effects was intended by Congress. In fact, the Rosado holding ©

as to the “two broad purposes” of Congress was. stated above, and

the Texas system is perfectly consistent with it. The Court men;

tioned widened eligibility simply as one of several possible effects

that might follow from the statute as so construed.

12 Act of Jan.°2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, Tit. II, § 208, ‘81 ;

Stat. 894, repealed 83 Stat. 45. - .

"13 See n. 7, supra.

JEFFERSON « v. HACKNEY » (545

535 @ * Opinion of the. Court “

with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.”

That section was enacted at a time when persons whom

the State had determined to be eligible for the payment

of benefits were placed on waiting lists, because of the

shortage of state funds. The. statute. was intended. to

prevent the States from denying benefits, even, tem

rarily, to a person who has been found fully qualified for

aid. See H. R. Rep. No. 1300 , 8istCong., lst Sess., 48,

148- (1949); 95 Cong. “Rec. 13934 «(remarks of | ‘Rep. _

Forand). Section 402 (a) (10) also prohibits a State

from creating certain exceptions to standards specifically

enunciated in. the federal Act. See, e. g., Townsend v.

Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971). It doés not, however, en-

act by implication a generalized federal: criterion to

which States must adhere in their computation of stand-

ards of need, income, and benefits.** Such an interpreta-

tion would be an intrusidn into an area in which Congress |

has. given the States broad discretion? and we cannot -

accept: appellants’ invitation to change this longstanding

statutory scheme simply for pelicy consideration reasons

of which we are not, the arbiter

Til

We turn, then, to appellants’ claim that the Texas sys-

tem of percentage reductions violates the Fourteenth

Amendment. Appellants believe that once the State has

computed a standard of. need for each recipient, it.is

arbitrary and discriminatory to provide only 75% of

that standard to AFDC recipients, while paying 100% of

recognized need to the aged, and 95% to the disabled

and the blind. They apne that if the State BaOptS a

14 Appellants’ reliance on f guage from Dandridge v. Williams,

397 U. S. 471, 480-481 (1970), is misplaced. The ‘Court there

explicitly failed’ to reach the Stafe’s argument that thep purpose of

/ § 602 (a) (1Q) was primarily to prevent the use of waiting lists. /d,,

at 481 n.- B .

| a lcci TAS gy nC eRe

ena alt aa as a

pasate inital W eats

Ah Re oP

- Social Security Act have certain common elements, the

the ‘Equal Protection Clause merely because the classi-

-. may address.a problem “one step at a time,’ or even

‘neglecting the others.” Williamson v.:Lee Optical Co.,

. « .

ar inal Sk Pi seh pissadcciaitnd td Bimindela bate tie be iLudin’

)

“ state plan independent of the plans under the other titles. In

for the first time.enabled States‘ to combine their plans, but only

oe.

NON

546 OCTOBER TERM, 1971

. .. Opinion of the Court. ~ 406 U.S.

percentage-reduction system, it must apply the - same

percentage to each of its welfare programs. . |

This claim was properly rejected by the court below.

__-It_is-clear_from. the statutory framework that, although

‘the four categories of public seumaice found 3 in the —--

States were intended by Congress.to keep’ their AFDC -

plans separate from plans under the- other. titles of the

Act.*®. A-State is free to participate in one, several, or

all of. the categorical assistance programs, as it chooses.

It is true that each of the programs is intended to assist.

the needy, but it does not follow that there is only one ~

constitutionally permissible way for the State to ap-

proach this important goal.

This Court emphasized cnly recently; i in Dandridge ~

Williams, 397 U. S. #44 485 (1970), that in “the area of.

economics dnd social. welfare, a State does. not violate

fications made by its laws are imperfect.” A legislature

“select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there,

348 U. S..483, 489 (1955). -So long as its judgments are

rational, -and not invidious, the legislature’s efforts to

tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not .

subject to a constitutional straitjacket. The very com-

plexity of the eee suggests that there will be more

15 Each dinedical assistance program is embodied in a separate

title of the Social Security Act, see n. 2, supra, and_ requires a

1962, however, Congress enactedi42 U. S. C. §§ 1381-1385, which

for the non-AFDC programs. Thus, while Congress has now enabled

States to adopt a common. plan for the other programs, it considered .

AFDC sufficiently different so as to require an independent plan.

| °. «JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY ae,

535 Opinion of thé Court |

; than | one constitutionally permissible method of ‘solving

thent. — : 7

The standard of judicial: review is not slewl because

‘of appellants’ ‘unproved ‘allegations of racial discrimina-

* tion. The three-judge court found that the “payment —

by Texas of a lesser percentage of unmet needs to the

recipients of the AFDC than to the recipients of other —

welfare programs is not the result of racial or ethnic

prejudice and is not violative of the federal Civil Rights

Act or the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend-.-

‘ ment.” The. District Court obviously gave careful con- °

sideration to this issue, and we are cited by its opinion

to a number of subsidiary facts to support its principal

finding quoted above. There has never been a reduc-

tion in the amount of money appropriated by the Jegis-

lature to the AFDC program, and between 1943 and

the date of the opinion below _there:had been five in-

creases in the amopmt-of money appropriated by ‘the

| legislature for the program, two of them having occurred

since 1959.° The overall percentage increase in appro-

priation. for the programs between 1943 and the.time

of the District Court’s hearing in this case was 410%

for AFDOF as opposed to 211% for OAA and ae

for AB. The court further concluded:

“The depositions’ of Welfare officials conclusively

éstablish that the defendants did not know the

racial make-up of the various welfare assistance ,

categories prior to or at.the time when the orders

here under attack were issued.”

Appellants. in. their -brief in effect abandop: any + effort 7

16 Since the original opinion ‘below, ‘there has been an additional

_ increase. Following a constitutional amendment, see n. 3, supra,

the appropriation has risen from 1 150,00 to $23, 100,000.

53° ~~ OCTOBER TERM, 1971

Opinion of the Court — 406 U.S,

to show that these findings of fact. were clearly errone- —

ous, and we hold they were not. |

Appellants are thus left with their naked statistical

argument: that there i is a larger pereentage of Negroes

and Mexican-Americans in AFDC than in the other

progranis;”” and that the AFDC is funded at.75% whereas

the other, programs are funded at 957% and 100% of

recognized need. As the statistics cited- in .the footnote

Aemonstrate, the number of minority members in all

_ categories is substantial.” The basic outlines’ of eligi-.

bility for the various categorical] granjg are established

by Congress, not by the States; given the heterogeneity

of the Nation’s population, it would be only an infre-

quent coincidence that the racial composition of each °

-grant class was identical to that of the. others. “The

acceptance of appellants’ constitutional theor® would

render suspect each difference in treatment among the

"grant classes, however lacking in racial motivation __

and however otherwise rational the treatment ° might -

be. Few legislative efforts to deal with the difficult.

‘problems posed by current welfare programs could sur-

oN Percentage of Negroes Percentage of ‘Number of .

Program - Year. and Mezican-Americans White-Anglos Recipients

OAA — 1969 39.8 602.

- 1968 : 38.7 61.3 — 230,000

| 1967 ws 70 63.0

~APTD 1969 46.9 53.1

: 1968 ° 456 . 544 4,213

‘1967 4620 53.8. oO

.AB 1969 557 4430.0 | :

3968 + gag 45.1 ee? |

AFDC 19699 © 870 ~~ 130 7

. 1968 SAG 2. \ * 15.1 136,000.

196% | 80 © 14.0

JEFFERSON ». HACKNEY = 9

° 535, ~S ; Opinion of the Court’ | -e.

vive wack — and we do not. find it required by

the Fourteenth Amendment."

Applying the traditional standard of-review under that

, amendment, we cannot say that Texas’ decision to,pro-_

vide somewhat lower welfare benefits for AFDC re-

cipients is. invidious. or irrational. Since budgetary

constraints donot allow the payment of-the full stand-

ard of. need for ‘all welfare. recipients, the State may

eave. concluded that the aged and infirm gre: the least

able of the categorical grant recipients to beat the hard> -

ent \policy judgments . are of course possible, it is. hot

irrational for the State to believe that the young are

more adaptable than the sick and elderly, especially —

because the latter have less hope of improving their

situation in the years remaining to them. Whether or

not one agrees with this state determination, there is

nothing in the Constitution that forbids ‘it.’® ey

Similarly, we. eannot ‘accept the Seument in Mr. ,

, ct of an inadequate ‘standard of. living. While differ-

18In James v. : Valieira, 402 U.'8. 137° (1971), it was “contended |

that a California- referendum requirement violated the Fourteenth. ©

‘Amendment because it imposed-a mandatory referendum in, the case

of an ofdinance authorizing low income housing, while referenda

with respect to other. types of ordinances had to be initiated by the

ac of private individuals: ° The Court responded: ~~ -

» * “But of course a lawmaking procedure that ‘disadvantages’ a par-.

ticular group does not always deny equal .protection. Under any

‘such holding, presumably a State wouJd not be able to require

referendums on any subject unless referendums were required on -

all, because they weuld always disadvantage some group. And this*.

Court would be reqtjred to. analyze governmental structures to de- :

termine whether a gubernatorial, veto provision or a filibuster rule

is likely: to. ‘disadvantage’ any of the diverse and shifting groups

that make up the American people.” Id., vat 142. : y

19 Just as the State’s actions here do-not violate the Fourteenth

Amendment, we punuce that they do not violate Title VI of =

_ OCTOBER TERM, 1971

oan, Opinion of the Court _ "4060.8,

- JUSTICE Mekngreats s dissent that the Social Sécu-

rity Act itself requires equal pertentages for -each.

- categorical . assjstance program. The dissent corttedes -

_ that a State might simply refuse to participate in.the .:

, AFDC . program, while continuing to ‘receive federal -

money for the other categorical programs. ‘See post,

/ ’at.577. Nevertheless, it is argued that Congress intended.

to prohibit any middle ‘ground—once the : State « does |

participate .in a program it must do so on.the same

basis as it, participates.in every other program. Such

an all-or-nothing policy judgment may well be. defen-:

sible, and the dissenters may be correct. that nothing in :

') - the statute expressly ‘rejects it. But neither. does any-

thing in the statute approve or require it.”

| Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200d et seq. ‘The Civil Rights

; 7 Act prohibits discrimination in federally financed programs. . We

have, however, ypheld the findings of nondiscriminatory purpose

f ” in the percentage reductions used by Texas, and’ have concluded —

_ . . that the variation in percentages is rationally related to.the purposes

of the separate wefare programs. The Court’s decision in Griggs v.

Duke Power €Co,, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), is therefore. inapposite. . In

_ Griggs, the employment tests haying racially dischiminatory“effects |

_ were found not-to be job-related, and for that re4son were impermis-

. sible under the specific language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. .

Ps Since the Texas procedure challenged here is related to the purposes

of the welfare programs, it is not proscribed by Title VI simply: be-

. cause of variances in the racial composition of the different cate-.

7 gorjcal programs. v ‘

+ 20Mr. Justice MarsHAv’s dissent cites the 1950 amendments to

‘the Social Security Act as support for its novel statutory theory that:

States_must: provide equal aid levels in each welfare ‘category. The

1950 amendments included’ “a tevised method of determining the «

Federal: share of assistance costs,” 95-Cong. Rec. 13932, 80 that the

Federal Gavernment would. pay a substantially equal, percentage’ of

» matching funds to state plans in each of the categorical - -assistance

‘programs. | See S. Doe. No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 101. . But this

revision of the grant-in-aid formula ‘in § 403 of the. Act was not ac-

- companied by any corresponding amendment of § 402, the section, of

- the Act: dealing with congressional: limitations on state AFDC

’

. '*

- JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY oo 551

585 ss ‘Dovepas,. J., dissenting of

In conclusion, we re-emphasize whiat: the Court said

in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487:

an. “We do not decide today ‘that the [state law} is

that it best fulfills the relevant social and eco-

objectives.that [the State] might ideally

; or that.a@ more just and humane system

, coul&hot be devised. Conflicting claims of morality .

and intelligence are raised by opponents and propo-

nents of ost every measure, certainly including

-. the one before us. But the intractable economic,

social, and even philosophical problems presented by

public welfaréassistance programs are not the busi-

ness of this Court.‘ ... [T]he Constitution does

not empower this Court. to second-guess state offic -

». ¢ials charged with the difficult responsibility of allo- ~

".. eating limited public welfare funds one the myriad

‘of potential recipients.” :

A firmed.

Mr. fuerics Smewane joins in Part III of the Court’ s

‘“ opinion. ¢@

. ee 4c

Mr: Justice DouG.as, with whom Mr. Justice BREN-

NAN. eqncurs, dissenting. | °

__I would ‘read ‘the Act more generously ne does the

Court. It is stipulated that 87% of those redeiving

AFDC aid are. Blacks pr Chicanos. I: would therefore

programs. Indeed, ciponents. of the 1950 aieincleeiits Aplicitly

recognized and endorsed the longstanding policy that thé Federal °°

Government sets only © minimum AFDC standards, ‘while Jeavi ‘ing

‘the States “wide discretion both in determining policies and in

setting ‘standards of need.” §.,Doc. No. 208, supra, at 101. The

enactment of a modified’ graht-in-aid formula hardly suggests Con-°

gress’ intent to engage in “extensive alteration of the basie under-

lying structure of+an established program.” Rosado v. ‘Wyman,

397 U. &,.at 414 n. 17. 5 |

.s th Nhe a |

~——

552 OCTOBER TERM, 1971

pomuas, J., dissenting 2 «| - 406:U.S.

read the et against the background of rank discrimina-

tion against the Blacks and the Chicanos and in light

- of the fact.that Chicanos in Texas fare even-more poorly |

than the: Blacks. _See L. Grebler, J. Moore, & R. Guz-

. _ man, The Mexican-American People, pts. 2 and 3 (1970) ;

J. Burma; Mexican-Americans in the United States

"143-199 (1970) ; Schwartz, State Discrimination Against

Mexicaf- ‘Aliens, 38 Geo. Wash.. L. Rev. 1091 (1970);

U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Mexican

American (1968); U. S.,Commission. on Civil Rights,

Mexican Americans and the Administration of Justice

‘in the Southwest (1970). .In Rosado v. Wyman, 397

_U. 8. 397, 413, we said that i in administering such’a pro-

gram a State “may . not obscure the actual standard of

‘need.” Texas does precisely that by- manipulating a

mathematical formula. .

In "Rosado, we described how some States establish

upper limits or maximums of aid, while others, like :

Texas, “curtail the payments of benefits by a system.

of ‘ratable reductions’ whereby all ‘recipients will receive ©

a fixed percentage of the standard of need.” Jd., at 409.

oa in footnote 13 we described what that meant: “A

ble redugtion’ represents a fixed percentage of the |

; stand of need that will be paid to all recipients. In

the event ‘that, there i is some income thats first deducted,

the ratable eo es to the amount by whith:

the individual or fami come falls short of need. : a id,

at 409 n. 13 (emphasis added).

If Texas first deducted outside i income and then made

its ratable reduction, the welfaré recipient would receive *

a somewhat more generous payment, as the opinion of

the Court illustrates in footnote 6 of its opinion. Not

only does the Texas system avoid this generous approach, —

‘but it also impermissibly constricts the standard of need

in conflict with Rosado, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. |

JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY 553 ,

535 ‘ _Doveras, J., dissenting = | .&

471,-and T@nsend v. Swank, 404 U. 8. 282. Under

_Texas’ method of computation, a family—otherwise eligi-

ble for AFDC’ benefits but with nonexempt income 3

greater than the level of benefits “and less than the

standard of need—is denied: both “AFDC. cash benefits

and other noncash benefits such as medicaid.’ It seems

inconceivable that Congress could have intended that .

noneash benefits be denied those with incomes less than

the standard of need solely because that income was

earned rather than from categorical: assistance. Yet

this is precisely the result sanctioned by the Court

today because eligibility for these programs is tied to

the receipt of eam pettente

. ee |

SO STONERS Rep Oy mare ny

PV Geren

5 7

1 The Court’s stk owietanient that “[t]he’ Texas computation

method eliminates any .°. . financial incentive [for welfare recipi-

ents to obtain outside income], so long as .the[ir] outside income a

remains less than the[ir] . . . reduced. standard of. need,” ante, at &

541, understates the effect of the Texas system on the Tecipients.

The Texas system not only fails ‘to provide an incentive for those

‘ on’ the welfare rolls to break the cycle of poverty by obtaining 5

. employment, but—in certain -cases—it also penalizes those. who'- - |

seek employment. The family with nonexempt income equal ‘to za

Texas’ level of benefits stands in much the same cash position as the | :

- AFDC recipient,- but solely - Because that family: has earned that :

_ last marginal . dollar that makes it no longer eligible for categorical .

assistance it also is denied. medical assistance, social services, and.

training. The Solicitor Genéral tells us that the value of the med- —

- ical services alone is worth $50-$60 per. month to the average Texas

AFDC: family. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus ~ i

Curiae 7.5. 2 . :

2 Eligibility for - family eo elopnient.- services is ‘keyed to the a.

“revei[pt], [of] aid to families with depefident, children,” 42 U.S.C. °

§ 602 (a) (14); so, too, with employment assistance, id., at § 602 (a)

(15) (A). (“receivi ing aid under the plan”) ; protection against child’s £.

-““ “neglect or abuse, id, at § 602 (a) (16) (“receiv ing aid”); plans to > ,

establish paternity and secure support, id., at § 602'(a) (17) (A) (0) § t

_ (ii) (“receiving aid,” “receiving such aid”); work incentiv pro-

grams, id., at _§ 602. (a)419) (A) (i) (“receivi ing aid to fami les with —

“pe ety

;

Cin pace tae ea

ee ee

854 OCTOBER TERM, 1971

Dovetas, F., dissenting . _ 406 U.S.

One of the stated purposes of the AFDC program is

“to help such parents or relatives [of needy depéndent

—¥

‘children] to. attain or retain capability for the maximum

“~ self-support and personal independence.” 42 U.S.C.

. §601 (enYphasis added). - The Senate Finance. Commit-

tee has stated, “A key element in any program for work. _

and training for assistance recipients is an incentive for

people to take employment.” S. Rep. No. 744, 90th ©

Cong., Ist Sess., 157 (1967) (emphasis added). The ma-

jority acknowledges that “[t]he history and purpose of —

the Social Security Act . : . indicate Congress’ desire to

help those on Welfare becdiie self-sustaining.” Ante, at

544. But it nonetheless i ignores the explicit congressional

policy i in favor. of work incentives and upholds a system

’ which provides penalties and disincentives for those who

seek empioyrient,- 3.

tecendent children”) ; aa medical amuinga plans, id., at § 1396a

| (a) (10) (“individuals receiving aid or assistance”).

Would Congress have tied needy families’ eligibility for these

"programs to the receipt of cash benefits had ‘it foreseen that this

_ Court would disregard the statutory mandate “that aid to families

with dependent children shall be furnished with ‘reasonable prompt- .

ness to all. eligible individuals’? 42 U.S. C. § 602 (a) (10).

3 Thé. rationale which the Court. uses ‘to. reach this result. is at odds

with time-honored rules of statutory interpretation. First, the Court

gives but: a grudging ‘interpretation to the recital in § 401-of the |

Act, 42 U! S. C. § 601, that one of Congress’ purposes was to’ en-

courage welfare recipients to become self-supporting. The Court

“in effect. disregards the rule that recitals embody “the general pur-

poses which . . . Congress undertook to achieve.” Carter v. Carter

Coal Co., 298.U. S. 238; 297. . And see Coosaw Mining Co. v. South

‘Carolina, 144 U.-8. 550, 563; United States v. Fisher, 2 Granch 358,

886, Second, the Court attributes té& Congress the purpose of pro-

viding work incentives, e..g., 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(8), while at the

same time ‘allowing the imposition of penalties and disincentives for

obtaining employment. The Court departs from the principle that

“ijn the -exposition of statutes,” various sections of the same act |

“are: suppdsed to have the same object,” Kohisaat v. Murphy, 96 |

Sesto

PERLE ob hee tee - ‘

MARE AM OD Coe a! cei teeta

JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY - e 6555

535 ; : — J., i 7 7 -_

The California Supreme Court in ‘Villa v. Hall, 6 Cal.

3d 227, 490. P. 2d 1148, struck down the system this

Court approves today, where California used a statutory

_ maximum of payments rather than:a ratable reduction.

The California Supreme Court quite properly said that

what the State was attempting was inconsistent, with.

Rosado. Moreover it. had an additional reason: =

“The conclusion that the Social Security Act re- .

quires ‘outside income to be subtracted from stand-

~ ards of need rather than from statutory maximums:

or ratable reductions is also founded on a strong

public policy of encouraging welfare recipients to -

become constantly more self-supporting. Yet de-

- ducting. income from statutory maximums makes

gainful employment significantly less attractive .to

the recipient. This follows. because all nonexempt

income will be offset. directly against the amount of

the grant and not against the standard of need to

determine actual need; for every nonexempt. dollar

earned, the amount of aid will therefore-be decreased

one dollar. Since. the grant is always less than the

_ Standard of need, in many instances the. system

adopted’ by the Welfare Reform Act will result in

~ an individual’s need not being met even after adding

both exempt and nonexempt income to the AFDC

payment. Such recipients will be forced to exist

below the bare minimum necessary for adequate .

care, even though they have commence , by obtain-

ing employment, to break free from the debilitating

‘ ‘welfare syndrome. The practice thus conflicts with

U. S. 153, 159-160, and holds ‘instead that Cugion was working

at cross-purposes in different subsectiohs of § 402, 42 U.S. C. § 602.

Fiffally,‘by giving the Social Security Act a miserly interpretation,

the Court disregards -the canon that ‘remedial legislation, such . as.

the Social Security Act, is to be interpreted liberally to effectuate

its purposes. E. g., Peyton v. Rawe, 391 U. S. 54, 65.

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556° OCTOBER TERM, 1971

Doveras, J., dissenting * 406 U.S.

bd 4

the stated federal policy to provide incentives to.

obtain and maintain an employment status.” /d.,

- at 235-236, 490 P. 2d, at 1153-1154.

. Moreover, Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, calls for .

"a reversal in the present case. It is conceded that plain-

tiff Maria T. Davilla and 2,470 other families are denied

aid in Texas by reason of its new formula, see 304 F.-

Supp. 1332, 1343, despite the fact that their income is

below: the standard of need and that of those receiving ~

AFDC aid only 75% of their needs ‘is met.‘ : =

Under § 402 (a)(10) of the Social Security Act (which

| governs AFDC) “aid to families with dependent chil-

‘dren shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to

all eligible “individuals.” 42 U. S. C. $602 (a)(10).

* In Townsend children 18 through | 20 years of age

who attended high school or vocational training were

eligible for -AFDC.benefits but such children. in college -

were not eligible. We held that “a state eligibility stand-

ard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under |

federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act —

and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.” *

404 U, S.,-at 286.

*The percentages of ieell that will be met by Texas ones the

various heads are as follows:

Old Age Assistance...7.............05: ieesendet ees 100%

Aid 06 Ghee TRO. 6.500 ccc ces cceccencensacvecsscucs<d 95%

Aid to the Permanently and Totaly Disabled. ..... 2... 95%

Aid to Families with Dependent Children...... stew aaas 75%

When this action was instituted, Texas’ AFDC percentage leyel of

benefits was only 50% of the standard of need. During the course ;

of this litigation, Texas increased the AFDC level of benefits to

75% of need.

“ §To the same effect is our eent decision in Engelman v. Amos,

- 404 U.S. 23 (1971), aff’g sub nom. X v. McCorkle, 333 F. Supp. 1109

(NJ 1970). There, relying on ‘Rosado’ v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, the

‘District Court: held inconsistent with the Social Security Act—and

thus unconstitutional’ under the Supremacy —- state provision

. 3 - 4

a e +

JEFFERSON v: HACKNEY 357

Dovctas, J., dissenting

What Texas does here is to exclude. large numbers of

' AFDC beneficiaries by application” of a state eligibility

test that is narrower than the one we approved in Rosado.

‘While a State has some discretion in its use of federal |

' funds, it may not manipulate: by its‘6wn formula groups

of “needy” claimants. The decision to participate or not

_in the federal program ‘is left to the States. Townsend

v. Swank, supra, at 290-29]. When, as here, federal

and. state funds are in short supply, the problem is not

to lop’ off some categories of those in “need” but to

design a way of managing the system of “need” so as

-. not to raise equal protection questions.© Jd., at 291.

which denied AFDC cash payments and ancillary beriefits to those

whose nonexempt-income was less than the standard of need estab-

lished by the State. We unanimously ‘affirmed that. decision. To be

‘sure, Engelman dealt: wtih federal: provisions different from those

_ presently in issue (42 U.S. C. § 602 (a) (8) (A) (ii) ; 45 CFR § 233.20

(a) (3) (ii)), but that does not distinguish the case. Rather, -it

merely emphasizes that which—up until today—was the broad scheme

of the Social Security Act: those whosé nonexempt inconfé was below

’ the standard of need established by the State and who met the other *

nonfinancial criteria for eligibility were to receive benefits. See 42

U.S. C. § 602 (a) (10).

6 To be. sure, “[t}here is no question that States have considerable

latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is

free to set its own standard of need and to -determine the level

of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program.”

King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-319 (footnotes omitted). Ac-

commodation of a State’s limited financial -resources, however, is to

be made in setting the level of benefits and not by gerrymandering

the standard of need. Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 413. Here,

the “reduced standard of need” which the majority recognizes to be

the consequence of the Texas ‘computation procedures, ante, at 543

_-n. 10, violates § 402 (a) (23) of ‘the Sotial Security Act, 42. U.S. C.

_ § 602 (a)(23), and our decision ‘in Rosado. Section 402 (a) (23)

_ mandated an upward revision of the standard of need, and the

“reduced: standard of need” Texas applies to certain of its needy

violates this requirement.

me ae * ‘ ‘ -

se LAA LARA MPs ARAMA IR i Sa i sa he AE AB UE A

558 _ OCTOBER TERM, 1971

. MassHae, J., dissenting 406 U.S.

Section 402 (a) (10) of the Social Security Act provides 7 .

‘that AFDC shall be furnished with reasonable prompt-

ness to all eligible individuals. . The e House Report., in» |

commenting on it said: Ye a

- “Shortage of funds in aid ‘to dependent children

has sometimes, as in old-age assistance, resulted in |

a decision not to take more applications or to keep ©

eligible families on waiting lists until enough recipi-

ents could be removed from the assistance rolls to

make a place for them... . (This difference - in

treatment accorded to eligible people results in un-

due hardship on needy persons and is inappropriate

in a program financed from Federal funds.” -H. R.

Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,, 48 (1949).

As the Court said in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.,

at 481, “So long as some aid is provided to all eligible

fgmilies and all eligible children, the statute itself is not

violated.” It.is violated here because nearly 2,500 fam-

ilies that satisfy the requirements of “need” are denied

‘ any relief.’

Mr. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom Mr. Justice

BRENNAN joins, and with whom Mr. JUSTICE STEWART

joins as to Part I only, dissenting. .

- Appellants, recipients of ‘Aid to Families With Depend-

ent Children (AFDC) in Texas, brought this action to —

challenge two distinct aspects of the Texas AFDC pro-

gram, First, appellants ohaltenge the manner in which

‘? 45 CFR § 233. 10 (a) (1) (ii) provides: ,

“The groups selected for inclusion in the plan and the cligibil y

- - eonditions imposed must not exclude individuals or groups on ‘an

arbitrary or unreasonable basis, and must not result in inequitable

treatment of individuals or groups in the light of the provisions and.

" Purposes of the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act.”

* . : ; °

JEFFERSON. ». HACKNEY ” 559

535 . - Marsuat, J, | dissenting

Texas arrives at the amount it will pay to persons who

are needy. Second, they urge that Texas acts illegally |

in providing more money for persons receiving aid under

other social welfare legislation than for persons receiving

AFDC aid. The ‘Court rejects both claims. I dissent:

Before proceeding to explain why I disagree with the

Court, I would like to ‘illustrate what the disputes in this

case are all about. If a State is unable or. unwilling

- to establish a level of AFDC payments to meet all.the

reeds of all recipients, federal law permits the State to

use a percentage reduction factor as a method of reduc-

ing payments in a somewhat equitable manner. Texas

has adofted a system in which the percentage reduction :

factor is applied against the standard of need before out-

side income is deducted. Appellants contend that fed-

_ eral law requires the State to deduct outside income before

‘the percentage reduction factor is applied. “While de- «

scribing the differences between the two alternatives.

is a Herculean task, the figures themselves are not diffi-

cult: to comprehend. Footnote ‘6 of the Court’s opin-

ion, for: example, demonstrates: that’ the Texas system

provides less aid to a family with outside income than

the alternative system. It is also immediately obvious .

that under. the Texas system, as soon as the family’s

income reaches $150, it no longer receives anything from

the State, whereas under the alternative, a family earning ©

-the same $150 would continue to receive some state 7

funds. ° Hence, the Texas method of computation con-

_ tracts ‘the sland of families eligible to receive state aid.

Appellants contend that the characteristics of the Texas

~ System are inconsistent with federal legislation and that

only the alternative system comports with the intent of _

Congress. T agree.

Appellants. also claim that the percentage eedustion

factor employed by Texas is illegal, irrespective of the

Ren rte eee nr aa

seek

wetet

FEyre eee hee Seer pene nc! Pe ee

566 OCTOBER TERM, 1971

MaprsHatt, J., dissenting 406 U.S.

ry e

method of computing payments, because it is lower than .

the factor used in other social welfare programs that

have participants with identical’ standards of need. I

also agree with appellants on this point, but for slightly

different reasons from those they. have urged:

A. In considering the question whether Texas’ method

of computing eligibility for AFDC payments. comports

. Cardozo: “When [federal] money | is spent to promote

with the federal statute, 42 U: S. C. § 601 et seq., it is

important to keep in mind the words of Mr. Justice

the general welfare, the concept of welfare or the oppo-

site is shaped by Congress, not the states.” Helvering -

v. Davis; 301 U.S. 619; 645 (1937). Mr. Justice-Harlan

| reiterated this point in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397,

422-423. (1970), when he stated that irrespective of the

policies that a State might wish to. pursue by utilizing

AFDC mcney in one way or another, the ultimate ques-

tion to be answered in each case is whether the action

of the State comporté with _the requirements . of. federal

law.

The Court concludes in the instant - case that there

is no general congressional. policy widlated by Texas’

choice between. the alternative methods of applying a

percentage-reduction factor to its determined standard

-of need, and also that. no specific statutory provision

prohibits Texas frém choosing one alternative rather

than the other. ‘In concluding that the legislative his- -

tory is inconclusive and that “what little legislative |

history there is on the point . . tends to undercut appel- —

lants’ theory,” the Court has’ in my opinion, taken only ~

a superficial look into the. history of the statute and

has ignored the intent of Congress in various sections of

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_ JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY. 561

535 MarsHatt, J., ‘dissenting

the AFDC legislation as ‘interpreted by this Court in

prior cases. /

@ B, 1 begin by ecnaidering the iinpact of § 402 (a) (23)

of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended, 81 Stat. .

898, 42 U.'S. C. § 602 (a) (23), on appellants pequmient.

That section provides that

.“{a) A State plan for aid and services to needy

families “a een must *

“(28) provide ital by auly: 1, 1969, the amounts

used by the State to determine the needs of individ-

uals will have been“adjusted to reflect fully ehanges

in living costs since such amounts. were established,

and | a maximums that the- State imposes on. the

_ amount of aid paid to families will have been pro-

, portionately adjusted.”

‘Consideration of this section must, of course, begin

with Rosado. v. Wyman, supra, where we’ examined the

derivation of. this section in great—detail.

The. relevant facts in Rosadp are concisely. ‘stated in

"5397 U. S., at 416. New York State had changed its =

AFDC program so that it no longer determined need

on an . individualized basis, but instead substituted a

system fixing maximum family ‘allowances based on

the number of individuals per family. The result was.

a drastic reduction in overall payments. New York

State welfare recipients brought the suit in Rosado; °

-claiming that by changing | its AFDC system from an

individualized-grant program to a maximum-grant pFo-

gram, New York had violated § 402 (a) (23)...

Despite our recognition that “(t]he background of

| § 402 (a) (23) reveals little except that we have before

‘us a child born of the silent union of legislative com-

promise,’ i‘ 307 U. S., at 412, we ned to eich

Oa : . ’

1 tai cst ig AE dilate ais (~ Otis Ldned ch LVN al ic th Naat uaa

; °

562° OCTOBER TERM, 1971 —

MarsHALL, J., dissenting . §§ 406U.S.

what Congress had in mind in aging the section to the .

_ pre-existing AFDC legislation. “We concluded. that two -

general purposes could be aScribed to the section:

“First, to require States to face up realistically

to‘the magnitude of the public assistance require-

. ment and lay bare the extent to which. their pro-

grams fall short of fulfilling actual ineed ; second;

to prod ‘the States to apportion their payments on

- _@ more equitable basis.” 397 U. S., at 412-413..

These conclusions led us to reject the holding of the :

District Court, 304 F. Supp. 1354, 1377, that Congress’

intended to prevent any reduction whatever in AFDC

payments, and to reject the argument. of the welfare |

recipients that if payments could be reduced § 402 (a)

(23) -would be \meaningless. We decided that “a State —

may, after eonputing its standard of need; pare down -

payments to ‘ommnodate budgetary ‘realities by re-

‘ducing the percent of benefits paid or switching ‘to a

percent reduction system, but it may not obscure the

actual standard of need.” .397-U..S., at 413 (emphasis

. in original). Far from emasculating the statute, our

reading recognized that the statute had at least three -

specific salutary effects, and that these were the effects

that Congress intended in enacting the legislation? |

- “Tt has the effect of requiring the States to recog-

nize and ‘accept the responsibility for those’ addi-

tional individuals. whose income ‘falls short of the

; .standard of need as computed in light of economic

realities and to. ‘place them among ‘those eligible

for the care and training provisions. Secondly,

while it leaves the States free to effect downward

adjustments in the level of benefits paid, it accom-

_plishes within that’ framework the goal, however

modest, of foreing a State to accept the political

, JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY 583

635 " " Seiaita, J., dissenting

consequence of such a cutback and bringing to light

tha true extent to which actual assistance falls short

of dhe’ ‘minimum acceptable. ‘Lastly, by imposing

on those States that desire to maintain. ‘maximums’

the requirement of an appropriate adjustment, Con-.

gress has introduced an incentive to abandon a flat

‘maximum’ system, thereby encouraging’ those States -

_ desirous of containing their welfare budget to shift

toa _Percentage system that will: more equitably -

: apportion those funds in fact allocated for welfare

and also more accurately ean the rea] measure of

public assistance being given.” IJd., at 413-414.

' Thus, it is clear that we based our decisién in Rosado,

‘ a decision that intetpreted § 402 (a) (23) to permit a

decrease in actual AFDC payments, largely on the con-

clusion that Congress wanted, not to bar decreases, but

to accomplish. other objectives’ The fact is that the

Court ‘today undermines each of those objectives .and

destroys the premise on which Rosado was decided. _

One specific congressional goal we saw in § 402 (a) (23)

was that-“[r]ecalculation of need may serve to render eli-

gible for benefits families which may appear under unad- .

.justed standards marginally to’ have- attained self-suffi- -

ciency, ‘but which in fact are unable to subsist at. the

present cost of living.” Memorandum for the United _

States: as Amicus Curiae in: Rosado ¥. Wyman 8. In

other words, we read the section as expressing Con-

gress’ willingness to permit réductions in actual pay-

ments in return for the addition of more families to the

,rolls of AFDC recipients... Accord, Lampton v. Bonin,

304. F. Supp. 1384 (ED La. 1969), vacated and remanded | |

‘for reconsideration in light of Rosado, 397° U. S. 663

(1970); Alvarado v. “Schmidt, 317 F. Supp. 1027 (WD

Wis. 1970). As I have pointed out above, the Texas

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" “OCTOBER TERM, 1971

ny Maw 3 dissenting oe 406 U.S.

"system limits the number of AFDC recipients | end elim-

°.inates marginal cases. This is directly contrary to. the

_intent of Congress as we saw it in Rosado.

A second. legislative aim that we saw_in the section

was to farce States to realize the political consequences

of reducing welfare payments. It must be clear that .

a the Texas system—of administering “AFDC payments

effectively. undermines this aim by enabling the State -

- to maintain a constant percentage reduction’ factor .so

that the system on its face appears to contain no reduc-

tions in payments. Welfaré reductions are surrepti- —

Pm tiously accomplished ‘by eliminating those persons who

have marginal income from eligibility for AFDC pay-

~~ ments. While the congressional intent may not be

», totally emasculated by this bis sore iteis certainly not

well served.“ ~~

The ‘third and_ ‘final purpose: that we fourid’ rer

‘Congress had specifically in mind in enacting § 402 (a)

_ (23) was to provide an incentive. to States to abandon .

‘a flat “maximum” system. Even though Texas does —

- not now use such a system, the Court’s approval of the

-- system that Texas does use will effectively remove the

’ incentive from the statute. A State that: uses a flat

maximum system “was required by § 402 (a)(23) to

adjust the maximums upward to reflect.a rise in the cost

- of living. - Since a State that uses a percentage reduction

system may avoid the strains cost-of-living adjustments

place dn ‘the budget: simply by lowering ‘the percentage.

that it chooses to pay, the statute encouraged abandon-

'. ment.of flat m ums in favor of the more equitable .

percentage reductions. The Court: undermines the in- .

' -eentive by offering States a way. to circumvent the cost-

of-living adjustments ‘under the flat maximum system,

In order to maintain the maximums without increasing

~ expenditures, States could, under the Court’s opinion, be-

_ gin to use. the maximum to determine AFDC eligibility

“A

XX.

JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY

535 a Mansniuz, J., dissenting

nae than the Standard of need. The result of this

approach would be to reduce the number of persons —

.eligible for, assistance and to reduce the grants bf anyone

with any outside income. Rather than serve as an in-

" centive to States to change to a percentage reduction .

. system, as Congress intended, § 402 (a) (23) may now be. |

a powerful incentive to States to = or revert to

. ‘maximum grants..

The .manner in which the incintive tha Rosado saw

in § 402 (a) (23) is stifled can be ‘illustrat -by, another ;

look at the family having an income. of $100 and a need

of $200. Footnote 6 of the Court’s opinion demonstrates:

that under the Texas percentage-reduction systema, even

. if the family had no.income, the maximum amount of.

aid that the family could obtain would be $150. Let

us assume. that Texas maintained a maximum grant sys-

.tem and that prior to the enactment of § 402 (a) (28),

the maximum’ grant. for a family. with $200 need was :

$100. We assumed in Rosado that the +e following com- \ -

| putation would be — .

PHONE 5 nen ised ees cnccccnsviccde, $200

*neome Seecaaen re ere .° $100

Unmet re $100

Maximum Grant er ee oe een $100

Total Family Funds: Seeee oo, eosts .... $200

_ Section. 402 (a) (23) required an increase in:the standard .

of need and the level of maximum grants to reflect the

rise in the cost of living. Assuming that a 20% in- .

cresse was mandated by the rise in living ‘costs, it is

obvious that if the number of families remained stable

and if- "income were stable, the costs of AFDC to thé

“State would increase by 20%. There was an incentive

7 _to change to a ——ee system. to avoid this.

- baa as wr rane

566 . OCTOBER TERM, 1971:

-MansHaun, J., dissenting ~ «406 U.S.

* change to the following system in order to reflect: the

rise in the cost. of living: »

To state it more. simply, th maximum grant is ‘simi-

lar to, and designed to serve he same purposes as, the

percentagé-reduction factor. If the percentage-reduc-

tion factor can be applied to need before income is sub- _

tracted, it is impossible to see why income could not be

set off against maximum. grants. True, Texas did not

choose this alternative, but it is available under today’s

decision. A State can, by changing the manner in which

- it sets off income, ‘absorb an increase in maximums and

end up paying less. . Where is the incentive now to adopt

° percentage-reduetion systems? =F ro ,

This illustration is much more thdn mere speculation

as to what might happen under today’s decision. The

Sllustration represents .what at least one State—Cali-

fornia—has already done, or tried. to do. Only very re-

‘cently; the California Supreme Court struck down the

State’s AFDC scheme for noncompliance with the federal

statute. Villa v. Hall, 6 Cal. 3d 227: 490 P. 2d 1148

(1971).

The California Supreme Court, having _— referred.

to the District Court opinion in the instant case as sup-—

port for California’s system, took the position that

neither the California nor the Texas system | could

stand in: light. of Rosado. 1 agree. Indeed, the United -

States in its Memorandum as Amicus Curiae in this case —

(p. 5) concedes ‘that if Rosado represents “a binding

d..

JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY 567

535 . MARSHALL, J, dissenting .

constructién of the Act, appellants are thus entitled to

prevail.” The government proceeds ‘to argue that the

“ question presented here was not before us in Rosado.

Ibid. I must agree with .appellants that: the’ Govern-

ment’s argumentds disingenuous, at best. See Brief for

Appellants 80. , Lhe °question of what -§ 402(a) (23)

means was most certainly before us in Rosado. It was,

in fact, all that was before us. In that case we rejected |

_ the broad construction that the District Court had given

‘ the. section, but ‘we endeavored as best we could to ex-

_ tract some meaning from its muddled history. The |

United States seeks here to have. us do what we ex-

plicitly said we would not do i in Rosado: i. e., interpret

the section in such a way that it is nothing more than

a! meaningless exercise in ‘bookkeeping.’” 397 U. S. at

413.~ If we were not making a “binding construction” .

of the statute in Rosado, it is impossible for me to ascer-

tain what we were doing. Hence, I agree with the |

Government that appellants are entitled to prevail. -

‘ .Surprisingly enough, the ‘Court makes even shorter

shrift of Rosado than does the Government. In a foot-

note, the Court states that widened eligibility and. the

other effects that Rosado ‘said were intended by Con-

gress when it enacted § 402 (a) (23) were merely possible

effects of the statute, not necessary ones:’ I submit that

-this cavalier treatment of Rosado is completely unwar-_

ranted. Rosado was not an easy case.’ The absence of

a clear legislative history forced us to examine the

“muted strains” of the congressional voice and to strug-

gle to “discern the mage in the cacophony of political

| understanding.” 397 U. S., at_ 412. Unlike the Court

in this case, which simply looks to see if the legislative |

history is distorted enough to be ignored, the Court. in

Rosado caréfully- scrutinized every aspect of the history

in order to perceive the congressional intent.. That was

a difficult task, but not an impossible one. ' The balance

‘

FI Le AICS

OCTOBER TERM, 1971 7

* MarsHALw,. J., dentin 406 U.S.

)

Gey

that we saw Congress striking in reducing: payments

' while increasing eligibility has already been described.

We relied on this balance to decide Rosado. We were ~

not merely speculating as to. the intent of Congress; we

were holding that there was a specific intent that was

_-binding in that case. That decision, in my-view, is also

binding ltre. This is my. first a with the

majority.

_° that I believe is relevant is § 402 (a) (8) of the Social Se-

curity Act, as aniended, 81 Stat. -881, 42 U. S. C. § 602

~ (a)(8), which was added to the AFDC statute along with

§ 402 (a)(23) in 1968. The purpose of this section:is to

encourage AFDC recipients to seek private employment |

No: 544, 90th Cong., 1st t Sess. (1967) ; S. Rep. No. 744,

90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).. To accomplish this objective

the statute provides that all of the earned income of

each dependent child receiving AFDC aid who is a full-

or part-time student, and a portion of the earned income °

of certain. other relatives, ‘will be disregarded in the °

State’s determination of need. We only recently had .

occasion to consider the effect of this provision in Engel-

man v. Amos, 404 U. 8. 23 (1971). 8

In Engelman we considered a New Jersey. scheme for

administering AFDC funds: that established income

ceilings for families. When the families’ incomes ex-

ceeded the ceilings they no longer were eligible for AFDC

‘aid. The District Court analogized Engelman to

: Rosado v. Wyman, supra, and determined that the

. + State’s system was inconsistent with the federal Act.

| 333 F. Supp. 1109. The. District Court recognized that

the 1968 amendments to the AFDC legislation were de-

signed to increase eligibility for ‘AFDC aid, not to de-

crease it. Because the District Court viewed: § 402 (a)

(8) as requiring a "State to disregard certain kinds of

te Se PES IRR EPI PNT NIE LNW METEOR NA AN

. . ° .

‘ ° : e

eee I EN PTL Le ON Oe Sa HN eae

’ e r .

‘

Pistiteeiseriininccn snc aabihiia H i Pin GN sede

JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY 569

535 MARSHALL, -J., dissenting

income in determining | eligibility for, aid, the. District

Court struck down the New Jersey scheme, in effect.

holding that New Jersey could not evade the income

disregard. by: imposing an income ceiling not contem-

plated by Congress. -Families that exceeded the State’s

_income ceilings were still entitled to AFDC aid so long

as their income, excluding income covered by § 402 (a)

(8), did not exceed the. State’s standard of need. The

effect of the decision was to increase the class of persons

eligible for. AFDC aid... We affirmed the decision with-

uut even he&ring argument.

Both “the New Jersey and the Texas provisions . . .

_ appear to have been animated by the same desire... .”

Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae 11.

Both seek to limit the number of AFDC recipients, and

both violate the federal statute. Indeed, the very purpose

of § 402 (a)(8)—to encourage people to work by permit-

ting them to continue to draw AFDC funds—shows that — |

- Congress wanted as many. needy people as possible to

be part of the program.

The Texas scheme certainly does not vila: § 402 (a)

(8) in the way that the New Jersey scheme did, for as

- far as we: know, Texas excludes income as “required by

the statute when computing eligibility. But, as the

opinion of the Court indicates, the Texas system has a -

__ faud not found in New Jersey: 7. é., Texas discourages.

recipients from earning outside income. * This is why

_I believe that Texas violates the spirit: of the federal.

statute.

It might be argued that Congress only sought to eh-

courage certain AFDC recipients to earn income and

only in a certain amount—the persons and amounts spec-

ified in § 402 (a) (8). This argument. might be’ per-

suasive but. for one fact—Congress never had any idea .

that a State would attempt to employ a system such, as

that used by Texas. Nowhere in the legislative mao

a a

EP Oe eee

570 OCTOBER TERM, 1971

‘MarsHALt, J., dissenting . °406 U.S.

is there any mention of such a system. See, e. 9 House

Committée on Ways and Means, Section-By-Seetion

Analysis of H. R. 5710, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (Coram

Print 1967). Congress was, in fact, informed by HEW

-that a differént standard from: that used by Texas _

was requited. See Hearings on H. R. 12080 be-

=, - fore the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong,.,

' Ist Sess., pt. 1,° pp. 255-265 (testimony. of’ Wilbur.

~.Cohen). Until very recently every indication by HEW

was that the Texas system would be urilawful. In light

of the state. of ignorance in which Congress found itself,

. | it is not surprising that there is no specific rejection of

the Texas system in the 1968 amendments. But § 402

(a) (8) and everything in “the legislative history certainly

indicate that Congress had a strong desire to encourage

AFDC recipients to work. Because-the Texas program.

is inconsistent ‘with this desire, I believe it is illegal.

This is the second reason for my disagreement with

‘the Court.

D. Another section of the statute that must be exam- *

"ined is § 402 (a)(10) of the Social Security Act, 64 Stat.

550, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(10), which re- -

quires that a state AFDC plan shall -

“provide ’. _ .. that all individuals wishing to make

application for aid to families with dependent chil-

_ dren shall:have opportunity to do so, and that aid

to families with dependent children shall be fur-.

nished with reasonable: promptness to all eligible

individuals.” .

_ The Court states that the primary purpose of this sec-’

tion was to outlaw the’use of waiting lists as a means

_ of minimizing a State’s welfare. expenditures. There is

clearly support for this view, as the Court noted in

| Dandridge v. Wiliams, 397 U. S. 471,481 n. 12 (1970).

°°

en ed ee ¥

- JEFFERSON »v. HACKNEY 7 a

535 “Mansur, J., dissenting _

Before the Court in Dandridge was the question whether:

maximum-grant limitations were inconsistent with the

federal statute. The Court upheld the maximums, but .

said in the course of so doing: “So jong as some in is +

dren,

| This

provided to all eligible families and all eligible chil

the statute itself is not violated.” IJd.,; at 481.

is plainly dictum, byt.I believe that it is well-consid-

- ered dictum that should be followed in this case. |

- It must be remembered that Dandridge and Rosado

were decided on the same day. Thus, the Court assumed

in Dandridge that the 1968 amendments’ to thé AFDC

_ legislat?on expanded the list of eligible recipients in the

manner suggested in Rosado. The Court was also aware

m Dandridge that § 402 (a)(7) of the Social Security

Act, as amended, 53 Stat. 1379, 42 U. S..G. § 602 (a) (7), |

had been part of the AFDC statute since 1939. That

“except as. may be otherwise provided: rin § 402 (a)

(8), discussed, supra] : .-. the State agency shall, in

determining need, take into consideration any other

income and resources of any child or relative claim-. . -

ing aid to families with dependent children . .-. .”

The Court assumed, therefore, that i in offering aid a State

would first set a standard of rieed and then examine the

income levels of applicants for aid. Anyone whose in-

come was less than the standard o a hanes would be eligible

for assistance, or so the Court assumed. Dandridge, of

course, established that the aid that might be forthcom-

ing did not. have to equal need and that large families

could get proportionately less aid than. small families.

Just as in Rosado, the Gourt in Dandridge viewed thé

intent of. Congress to be to aid as many needy people ..

as possible, rather than to offer as much ‘aid -as possible .

to a lesser number of people. In light of this, I believe.

w VET RIG Te ee >

, .

NONE IN NENT

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sat Seman a ae a

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sca cdhllili i ei NNAIM AD pill a alas K stein rane Horecnny oem Ay I BRIE

872 _ OCTOBER TERM, 1971

MarRsHALL, J., dissenting’ - ; 406 U.S.

that today’s decision violates the spirit of conn’ as

. _ well as the holding of -Rosado.

Moreover, ‘in my view, § 402 (a}(7Z) tells the ‘States .

“how ‘to compute eligibility, and that section does not

allow for the Texas scheme. Despite the position of

the Government in this case, I find support for my

reading of § 402 (a) (7) in HEW’s own regulations, espe- *.

_ cially 45 ‘CFR §§ 233.20 (a) (2), 233.20 (a) (3) (ii), which.

indicate to me that income is to’ be subtracted from

the standard‘of need before any determination is made

as to -how much aid the State will give.

. Because I believe the Texas system violates “g 402 (a)

7), it seems to me that eligible persons are being denied

‘aid in violation of § 402 (a)(10), which requires 1 that aid a

be furnished to all eligible persons promptly: For me,

_, this case is no different from King v. Smith, 392_U.-S.

309 (1968) (striking down substitute-father regulation). |

-or Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971) (striking

down restriction on receipt of aid by college students).

.The state procedure denies eligible persons aid; and, re-

gardless of the State’s. purposes, the procedure cannot

-stand in conflict with the federal ‘statute.

I disagree with the Court a third time.

-E..The last portion ef the federal statute that. I be-

lieve should -be considered is that portion dealing with”

the social services that are available to AFDC recipients.

See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. §§ 602 (a) (14), (15) (assistance in

family planning atid child-welfare services; assistance

in-entering the work force and reducing the incidence of.

' births out of wedlock); 42 U..S. C. §§ 602 (a)(19), 632 _

(employment training programs) ; 42 U.S. C. § 1396a (a)”

(10) (medical assistance): Congress keyed all of these

provisions: to persons or familie& that were receiving aid.

By limiting the number of such ‘persons and families.

receiving vm Texas has also limited the valjability of

| >

_ JEFFERSON, ». HACKNEY -

‘MansHaut, J., dissenting

“these social services. At least one other court has con-

oe that — oo ie er:

. Congress’s major concern. was the provision of

aes counseling and rehabilitation services, work

‘ incentives, and family planning programs to reduce

out-of-wedlock births, for all persons in the family, -

in order to promote self-support and child develop-: -

ment and to strengthen family life... By making

those with marginal incomés-eligible for AFDC: by

raising the standard of need, more persons would

be eligible for such services, which Congré&s con-

sidered vital to cut down in the long run the numbers

- dependent on welfare. ” -(Citation omitted.) Lantp-.

ton v. Bonin, 304 F. Supp., at 1389.

We suggested’ the same thing in Rosado,.397 u. S., at

. 413. While the Court recognizes that the Texas system

deprives persons with an “unmet need” of an opportunity

' to utilize these services (n.-10) and thus relegates these

persons to perpetual dependence on welfare, the realiza-

tion is apparently a source of no concern. But it was a

_ source of tremendous concern to Congress. The value of

medical assistance alone to an average Texas AFDC fam-

ily -is in the range of .$50-$60 per month.. Memoran-

dum for the. United States as Amicus Curiae 7 n. 5.

Since needy families are i more needy by Texas’

_ system, their ability- to @scape'the confines of the welfare

rolls is substantially impaired: At thie same time, the

goals of Congress as described in the’ preceding quota-

tion are also impaired. There is no reason, nor any .

justification, for reading the statute this way.

Since‘I believe that. Congress intended that as many —

needy persons ag possible be permitted to avail them-

selves of the various services provided or improved in the

1968 amendments, I again disagree with .the conclusions

of the Court.

ee ee

2S i i 4

ih Spe nie Babi i PAN Aine prudent geen

574° | +. OCTOBER TERM, 1971: Jf

‘MarsHALL, J., dissenting , _, 4060.8.

F. In concluding. my analysis of this aspect of Texas’

percentage-reduction system, I-add one final note. Thus

far I have confin rv oga to examining fhe specific

provisions of the A legislation. In. attempting to

focus on each section individually in order to. determine

its role in the statutory scheme, something of the general

flavor of the overall legislation is undoubtedly lost. That

flavor, it seems to me, is to’assist needy families to main-

tain strong. family bonds and to assist needy individuals

to realize.their potential as unique human beings by pro-

‘viding them with the basic necessities of life, along with

incentives and training to encourage them to work to

help themselves. The Texas system negates the salutary

‘aspects -of ‘the legislation by deterring. the needy from

. working, by depriving the needy of social services, and

_ by excluding some needy from any AFDC. aid. whatso-

ever. There is no conceivable reason to permit Texas to’

subvert the. aims of Congress 3 in this way. |

sie also challenge ‘the percentage-reduction

figure, itself. It is agreed that Texas has established

an identical standard. of need for the four’ social welfare. ;

progr that it administers—Old Age Assistance (OAA),

Aid 4o the Blind (AB), Aid for the Permanently and

Totally Disabled (APTD), and AFDC; But Texas pro-

' vides 100% of recognized need to the aged and 95% to

the disabled and the blind, while it provides ortly 75% to

AFDC recipients. It is this disparity to which appel-

lants also object:

A. Appellants base their primary attack on the Four-

feenth Amendment; they argue that the percentage dis-

ctions between the other welfare programs and AFDC

reflect a racially discriminatory motive on the’ part of

Texas officials. Thus, they argue that there is a vjola-

tion of the Equal Protection Clause. I believe that it |

JEFFERSON 9. HACKNEY: ~*~ \575 -

535 MarsHALL, J., dissenting _

_ 18 unnecessary to reack’ the: constitutidnal. issue that

appellants raise, and, ‘therefore, I offer. no opinion on its |

ultimate merits. I do wish to make it clear, however,

'. that I do not subscribe in any way. to.the manner in-

< which thte Court treats the issue. ee ee

If I were to face this question, ’I would-certainly have

‘

more-difficulty with it than either the District Court had |

~ . er than this Court seems to have. The record contains

_ numerous statements by state officials to the effect that.

“AFDC ‘is funded ata lower level than the other pro-

grams because it is not ‘@ politically popular’ program.

There is also evidence of a stigma that seemingly attaches -

to AFDC recipients and no others. This Court noted

in King v, Smith, 392 U.S,, at 322, that AFDC recipients

were often frowned upon by the community. The evi-

" dence also shows that 87% of the AFDC recipients in

Texas are either Negro or Mexican-American: Yet, both

_ the District Court and this Court have little difficulty,

in concluding that the fact that: AFDC is politically

-unpopular and,-the fact that AFDC recipiegts are dis-

favored by the State and its citizens, ha¥e nothing |

whatsoever to. do with the racial makeup of the pro-

gram. This conclusion is neither so apparent, nor so

correct in my view. - 2 ae

Moreover, ‘because I find that each one of the State’s .

reasons for treating AFDC differently from th e other pro-

_ - grams dissolves under close scrutiny, as is demanstrated,

- infra, I am not at all certain who should the burden

of proof on the question of racial discrimMation.. Nor .

am I sure that the “traditional” standard of review would

govern the case as the Court holds. In Dandridge v.

Williams, supra, on which the Court relies for thé prop- .

osition. that strict scrutiny of the State’s action is not

_ ‘Tequired, the Court never faced a question of possible

“racial discrimination. .Percentages themselves are cer-°

tainly not conclusive, but at some point a showing that.

Faget So LEE

376 | OCTOBER TERM, a

; Mjpanat, J, inetne or 406 U.S.:

ate. action 7 a Mwranating impa / on the lives of. .

~Ininority racial groups’ must be relevan E “

eg when ‘reasons backwards to conclude that. be-”

". cause appellants have not proved_racial discrimination,

a less strict standard of review is —o

In my view, the first question that

- _ what is the standard of review: and the ncaa q estion .

_the. standard. It gees almost too plain for argument .

“that the standard of review determines in large measure’

whether or not something has been proved. Whitcomb

v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124,. 149 (1971); —- ip

Lightfoot, 364. U. 8. 339 ( 1960). ;

« These are all complex problems, and I do not propose

to resolve any of them here: It is sufficient for.me to ~~

note that I‘ believe that the constitutional issue .raised

by appellants need not be reached, and that in choosing .

to reach it, the Court has so greatly. oversimplified the >

= issue as to distort. it. |

_. BeAppellants also: challenge the. distinction bitwesn

4° programs ‘under Title VI of the. 1964 ‘Civil Rights Act,

42 U8. C. § 2000d:

“No person in ‘the United Sta: “Chall, on the

ground of race, color, or national-ori . be sub-.

jected to. ‘discrimination under ary ‘program or

_ activity. receiving Federal financial assistance.”

Only last- Term in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S.

deem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that

. operate as. ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority-; groups.”

424 (1971), we had occasion to strike down under Title

VE of the 1964 Act, 42 U. S. C. $2000e, employment .

practices that had a particularly harsh impact on ‘one

_ minority racial group and that*cduld not be justified by

- businkss necessity. We indicated in that case that “good .

- . intent or absence of digeriminatory intent does not re-

- _ in one, several, or all of the pro

bet

JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY = 57

535 | ¢ MarsHaut; J., dissenting 5 a:

Id., at 432. We said, in. fact, that “ongresa directed |

the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment —

practices, not’simply -the motivation.” bid. {emphasis

in original). That decision .even placed the burden on >

the employer “of showing that any ‘giyen requirement

must have a manifest relationship to the employment an

question.” bid. -

used in Title VI cases... This is-a question of first im-

pression in this Court, and I do not think we have to -

reach it in this case. - I include this section only to nmake

- plain that I do. not necessarily reject the argument made

by. appellants; I simply do not reach it.- :

. _ C. This brings me to what I believe disposes of the

question presented : the disparity between the variousa \\

social welfare: programs is not permissible under the fed»

_ eral statutory framework. %

. The four social welfare programs offered by’ Texas are

funded in part by the Federal Government. Each pro- a

_ gram is governed by.a separate statute: OAA,42'U.S.C,

' $301 et seg.; AFDC, 42 U. S: C. $601 et seg.; AB, 42

U.S. C. § 1901 et seg.; APTD, 42 U.S. C. § 1351 et seq. .

No State is compelled to participate in ahy-program, and

- any State that wants to participate can choose to do. sO

_ There is no. doubt that States are fr to choose hether | |

or not to participate in these programs, and. it %¢_also'

clear that each State has gonsiderable fréedom to allo--

. Cate what it wants to one or more programs by-estab-.

~ lishing different standards of need to compute eligibility

' forsaid. King v. Smith, 392 U. es at 318-319. It.

also true, however, that the basic aims of the four

grams are identical: Indeed, when Congress first enacted

-_ pecgrame in 1935, it viewed them all as necessary to:

- :

o . . et QEM

. — ™ "oe ' ar

Bi aera Soe ep E -- $

“, . >

+ _— cat oe

‘OCTQBER TERM, 1931.

Ma , J. dissenting ~~ | 406 U. S|

provide ‘aid to families unable to obtain income from

private employment. The beneficiaries of: fhe various

‘programs shared the basic characteristics of need and.

_ > dependence. H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.,.

» 3. While the programs as they now exist go well beyond —

’ merely furnishing financial. assistance as they did orig-

inally, they still maintain similar goals. | a

Moreover, all four _ programs were . ‘simultaneously

. amendes | in 1956 to provide. for social and rehabilitative

. services to enable all. needy individuals to attain? the

maximym economic and personal independence of which

they were capable. Each program now requires a State,

to describe, in its plan for each social welfare program it .

administers, the services it offers to accomplish this ob-

jective. Seé 42 U.S. C. §§ 3Q2 (a) (11); 602 (a)(14);~

1202 (a) (12); 1352 (a) (11).

Congress has giveri the States authority to set different -

standards of need for different programs. But where,

' as here, the State concludes:that the standard of need is —

the same fer recipients of. aid under the four distinct

statutes, it is my opinion that Congress required that the

State treat all recipients equally with respect to actual

aid. In other words, as I read the federal statutes, they

are designed to accomplish the same objectives, albeit .

for persons disadvantaged by different circumstances.

States clearly have the freedom to make a bona fide

determination that blind persons have a graater need than

“ dependent: children, that adults have a higher standard —

of need than children, that the aged have,more need {Kan

the blind, ‘and sO forth.

But, in this. case Sie seacihoy dashed -de-

termination of neéd, and it determined that the need of

all recipients was equal. In this circumstance, I find

nothing in the federal statute to enable a State to favor

oneagroup of ‘recipients by\satisfying more of its need,

« .

_*® b .

a. Pe ee eg

JEFFERSON vHACKNEY 9-579

535 Mansiss, - disseating ie ene

while. at ie same time denying. an equally. ‘great need

of another group: The. purposes and objectives of the

statutes are the same, those éligible for aid are suffering

‘ equally, and Congress intended that. once a State. chose —

- to participate in the programs similarly —_— persons

would be treated similarly.

Everything in this record indicates that the recipients

of the various forms jof aid .are identically: situated. Al- -

though the District, ‘Court accepted the State’s conten- «

tions that there are/differences between AFDC and other -

recipients which warranted different treatment under the: -

federal statutes, I find Gch of ‘the reasons offered totally

-. unpersuasive. ~

First, Texas argues that, AFDC children can be em-

ployed, whereas recipients of other, benefits. cannot be.

Assuming arguendo that’ this ‘is true, it is an argument .

that falls of its own weight. Whatever incomé the

children earn is subtracted from need, or ‘it is excluded

Y from consideration. under § 402% a) (8) to encourage self- ,

tion of payments, or it is excluded in order that a specific

legislative ggal may be furthered. Thus, income is irrele-

vant in any explanation of the differences between the

- pereentage reductions applied to the various programs:

If should also be noted that a recipient’s income is also .

taken into consideration in programs other than AFDC.

See 42 U. 8..C. ‘8§ 302. (9)(10)4); ae (a) (8); 1352

(a) (8).°

\ Second, the State maintains that AFDC families can

secure help from legally responsible relatives niore easily

than recipients under other programs.’ Assuming again —

_ .for purposes of discussion that’ this. is true, it should be

plain that any support from any relatives is subtracted

_ from the State’s grant. . Moréover, appellants properly

point out. that t recipients of aid in now- AFDC Programs

*®

~——3

OCTOBER TERM, 197i

“ %

MarsHALL, J., dissenting“ .-* . 406U.S.

=“ nae @ source of aid ‘unavailable to AFD

“ cipients—the federal old age insurance, 42 U. S. $201.

et seq. ‘Thus, there is no substance % this argument..

_ Third, Texas points to the likelihood of future employ- -

-ment: for AFDC. recipients, ‘a likelihood that it says is

“nonexistent for older persons ‘and others who receive aid.

_ Federal law provides that a State may only consider in- —

come that: is currently. available in allocating funds.

45 CFR § 233.20 (a) (3) (ii). This contention is there- _

_ fore @rrelevant. ee

\ The State makes nity two other arvunierite. One has -

‘already been rejected.. Texas urges that the purpgses of

the federal programs differ, but the history belies. this.

contention. “The other is that the numbers. of AFDC

7 recipients is rising and this program should therefore bear

lem with this argument i is that one fundamental purpose

of AFDC.-aid. is to enable people to escape the welfare

H rolls. But, under the ‘Texas system, the aid is presently

insufficient, people are unable to escape from-dependency,

and the rolls-become larger. Had Texas not funded

AFDC at a lower level-than other | programs, it is possible

‘that the number of recipients would not have grown so

on which it ‘cannot rely to penalize AFDC recipients.

| Furthermore, there is nothing in the federal legislation

. to indicate that aid is to be reduced in a program ‘merely

because the number of ber of beneki@jaries-of that program in-

| -ereases at 4 tore rapid rapid rate than in other programs. On

_ the contrary, Congress ‘has indicated that increased eli-. -

Slit for AFDC is desirable, see 42 U: S. C. § 602 (a)

(23); Rosado 'v. Wyman, supra. It. would be extreme

|. jrony.if AFDC recipients were penalized by a State be-

cause their numbers grew in accordance with congres-".

‘sional ‘intent. . is oe

" JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY - eee eS

535. _ . , Marsuan, J,, dissenting -

The sibel that I. draw from the. ieee: is that

Congress intended equal treatment for all persons ‘simi-

‘larly situated.. Congress geft to the States the deter-

“ mination of who was similarly situated by permitting _

' States to determine levels of ‘need. Since Texas has

. decided that AFDC ‘recipients have precisely the ;same

. need as recipients of other social welfare benefits, it is

my opinion, that the federal: legislation requires —_

, treatment for all.

‘This conclusion finds support i in ‘the legislative Duaory

. of the 1950 amendments to the social welfare legislation.

_ In those amendments Congress made clear its intent to

put AFDC recipients on a&“par hone recipients of other |

- welfare aid. .

“Today niore tisdin 1.1 milliof children. under 18 :

“years of age are receiving aid to dependent children -

_ through ‘the Std¥e-Federal program bec: because one or .

¢ both of their parents,are dead;absent frot from the home,

|: _.er-ineapacitated. - These children, regardless of ‘the

| .Statein which they now live, will someday find their

place in the productive activities of the Nation and,

- should the necessity arise, will take part in defending

, our Nation. Many of these children will be seriously

handicapped as adults because in childhood they are

hot receiving proper and sufficient. food, clothing,

medical attention, and the other bare necessities of

: | cat tite “The national interest requires that the Fed-

_.. eral Government, provide for dependent children

at least on a par with its contributions toward the -

‘ * support of the needy aged and.blind.” S. Doe. No.

. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.; 105 (emphasis added)..

Congress recognized that’ “families with dependent chil- |

dren need as much in assistance payments as do aged

and blind Persons.” Id., at 106. It concluded. thats

oe i. Doe Paes ter inaa 1971 |

* Manentin, J,, dissenting : 406 U. S. |

‘sound optional poliey was “for the States ~ genie

“payments for aid to dependent children comparable to

° | those for the needy aged and blind.” Ibid, Itisevident .

| that Congress rejected the notion that where AFDC re-

4 cipients had the same need as other welfare beneficiaries, °

4 they should get:less. money. As Senator Bentori said on

the floor of the Senate: . ‘ ate

= i “There ‘seems no reasonable basis for rn? ‘in--

“equitable treatment of mmothers-anid- of children by

the Federal Government. : |

Prise seo redial know that it costs as dials

_4 .--3f not more to rear children in health, ‘decency, and

- self-respect than to.maintain an adult: It is surely

no less important ta: make this investment: in our’

. future. citizens ‘than it “is. to provide decently for

4 those who have retired. eo” 96 Cong. ‘Rec. 8813- |

In the 1956 ‘ghendrieits Corigress rearanal: the federal’

funding of AFDC so that its beneficiaries would receive

treatment: equivalent to that received’ by beneficiaries of

_ the other federal-state social welfare ‘legislation. Where -

‘the needs of the people receiving aid under the various -

' programs differed, Congress recognized that the anYéant ~

of aid forthcoming should also differ.’ But where need ~

was determined by the State to be equal for all recipients, -

Congress intended that all should receive an equal amount

- of aid. S. Doc: No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.,.108. There

. is absolutely no indication in any subsequent | congres-

sional action that ‘the intent of Congress has changed. ~*~

Avcordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the

. _ Distriet Court-and remand. the case for formulation of

relief consistent with this opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.