Amicus Curiae Brief — Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.

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SUBJECT INDEX. *

rete. 6 | Page .

~~ Tnvvenest oF-THE Amict cnnee tip petencenseges steeds «a 4 |

Srarement oF THE CASE ........... ean seer danas as, 3s

ARGUMENTS... 0... 0000. eewseocente oaeentereas vee 5

-Concuusion : i funsesess'’s eerdiereesens \ leedenss aes 1 .

‘ TABLES OF AUTHORITY

te | Taste or Cases -

- Assn. of Dat@ Processing Service (Org. v: Camp, 397 ae

"TS. 150 (1970) 2... ce Qecceveececbecchetecgecs a:

Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U. S. 251 (1946) .. 6.6: 4s

Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. City of At- :

Janta, 208: U:8. 390 (1906) -..:...sis.cssetecweees 5 8

Eisen v. Charlisle & Jacquelin, — F. Supp: —, 1971 ...:

Trade’ Cas: {| 73,563 (S.D.N.Y., Ap ril 7, 1971) -. 3

« Georgia’ v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 US. 439 (1945) r =

"Georgia. v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 US. 930 (1907) 3

- In xg Antibiotic Drugs, — F.Supp. —,-1971 Trade Cas.

“1-73, 481 (8.D.N.Y., February 17,1971) .....:.7.. 3% |

InreM ulfidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, M.D.L. No. 31 I ee

’ (D.D. Calif.), app: pending (9 Cir.) S eeeeas dea 2.

’. Karseal Corp. v: Richfield Ou Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9.

. Cir. 1955) 90600 t0 8506086 0606 sine b:0 Me Sétexens 8.

Keogh v. C. é& N. W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922)°. 6

Knuth v. Erie-Crawford: Dairy atid “ABsn.. 395 P2d a

+490 (3 Cir. 1968) ..c...seceienesceecteeaceeses 6

Padovam v. Bruchhausen, 293 F. 3d 546 (2 hd 1961) . 10.

. Pémnsylvania. v. West Virginia, 262: U.S.:553 (1923) . 8

Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395-U.S. 642 (1969) ...... 8, 10

Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., ©

*" SOAS. GEG COG) 5 5 so ag oce'd 875 bos vinss Seva ve 5.

Radovich ‘v. National Football Teague, 352 US. 445 . ;

CRUE pao ee ee eek ce a cee oes 5,6

% West Virginia v. Chas. "Pfizer ¢ Co., 314 F. Supp. 710

— D.N.Y. om aff’d, 440 F. 2d “ye (2 Che. tom)

«a

: IN THE Soe

| Soe Court of the Anited States

OcToBER TERM, ‘1971: .

» No. 70-49 |

6

°

. : # . bd . . e .

State oF Hawaul, Petttroner,.

ve |

STANDARD Ort. CoMPANY OF CaLiForNiA, UNION Ot.

CoMPANY OF CALIFORNIA#‘SHELL Or. CoMPany and

CHEVRON. AsPHALT — Respondents. — -

¢

‘On Writ of Certiorari to the OL stea States Court of Appeals

———

BRIEF FOR THE STATES OF ALABAMA, ET AL.

“ AS AMICI CURIAE

9:

——— OF THE anya

This brief amici curiae is submitted by the —-

~ Alabama, et ai., pursuant to Rule 42(4) of the Rules of ©

this Court. Amici are thirty-seven states -of the a

United ‘States and the City of New York, New York.

For some years past, amici, in common with most of the

states of thé United States arid many of the principal.

cities of the United States, have been increasingly con-

CI

a te. an

| 2 oS

cerned with the direct‘effect of federal antitrust viola-

tions on their respective budgets, economies and cit-

izens. -Agnict, consistent with their obligations to their

citizens and in full accord with the federal policy of -

vigorous ‘enforcement of the antitrust laws, hive'suc-

eessfully prosecuted: a number of important antitrust

_ vases in recent years.’ Other important antitrust cases

instituted -by amici are now pending in the lower fed- ~

eral courts. Among these are the so-called:‘‘ Air Pollu-

tion’? cases now pending before Judge. Real in the ~

United States District Court for the Central District.

of California pursuant to an order of the Judicial Pane

on Multidistrict Litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1407.2 In that

case, amici seek both treble damages and injunctive

relief * against the major manufacturers of automobiles.

The sweeping, and we believe clearly wrong, opinion

of the Ninth Circuit in this case may cast doubt on

amict’s efforts to obtain effective redress for the eco-

nomic consequences of antitrust violations, and, we

submit, clearly runs afoul of the Congressional policies

, which underlie’the federal antitrust statutes. Amici

agree with petitioner, the State of Hawaii, that its com-

plaint stated'a claim upon which relief can be gragted

and-that the Court of Appeals erroneously directed dis-

‘missal of its complaint. Moreover, amici contend that

regardless of the result in this particular case, the Court

1E.g.,. West Virginia-v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710. -

(8.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d., 440 F.2d 1079 (2 Cir. 1971).

2In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air iiaraiela! M.D.L. No. 31 (C.D.

Calif.), app. pending (9 Cir.). .

8 Among other relief, amici are: seeking mandatory —e °

relief to require the Air Pollution - defendants install in their

automobiles effective emission devices which, according to the al-

. legations of the complaint, defendants unlawfully conspired and

agreed not to develop or install.

og!

below seriously misconceived the remedies available to

on

states and other governmental bodies under the federal —

antitrust laws.

° _ STATEMENT OF /THE CASE

The State of Hawaii has presented a full statement

_ Of the case. For the broader overview which amici _

take, the relevant facts can be succinctly stated.

The State of Hawaii filed a complaint if an appro- |

priate district court charging defendants with con-

spiring to fix and maintain ‘unreasonably high prices

for gasoline fuel, petroleum products and asphalt in*

the State of Hawaii. . On its own behalf,* Hawaii sought

tive relief. ©

In the first count of its complaint, Hawaii sought .

treble damages for the direct purchases of gasoline and

asphalt which it had made. As to that; the parties and

- 4In Count III of its complaint, Hawaii sought damages as

a-Rule 23 class representative on behalf of all of its citizens. The

‘ District Judge held that such a suit was ‘“unmanageable’’ and

' declined to permit the case to proceed’ as a class action. - The

interlocutory certification whieh the District Court issued pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and the interlocutory appeal which

the Court of Appeals permitted, was limited to Count II of

Hawaii’s complaint. The Court of Appeals expressly declined to —

rule on the propriety of the trial court’s class action ruling. 431

F.2d at 1283 n.3, 1285 n.6. Accordingly, amici do not here :

pursue the class action issues. Instead, we merely note that cases

decided since the District Court’s class action ruling in this case.

_ cast considerable doubt on the ‘‘manageability’’ conclusion. Eg.

In re Antibiotic Drugs, 1971 Trade Cas. {73,481 (S.D.N.Y.,

Feb. 17,,1971) ; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 1971 Trade Cas.

{73,563 (S.D.N.Y.; April 7, 1971). Rale 23(c)(1) provides that

elass action orders ‘‘may be altered or amendéd before decision

_ on the merits,’’ and we assume that .the District Judge will give

' careful consideration to a renewed class action motion in light of

the intervening authorities. . a

Ca

'. ‘two separate but related kinds pf damages and injunc-

64

thé courts below are agreed that Hawaii stated a claim

upon which relief could be granted, and that, accord- ©

ingly, a trial must be held at which defendants’ lia-

ey will be adjudicated. That count is not 3 an issue

The second count of Hawaii's Geopiint. sought |

damages for injuries to the ‘‘economy and. prosperity

of the State of Hawaii.”’. Hawaii’s complaint was spe-

_ cific.en this score.. It alleged, inter alia, that:as a direct

and proximate result ofthe defendants’ antitrust vio-

lations ‘‘revenues of [Hawaii’s] citizens have been

wrongfully extracted from [Hawaii’s economy] ”’; that

Hawaii’s ‘‘economy has been held in a state of arrested

development” due, in part, to the curtailment of “man-

ufacturing, shipping and commerce”’ in the State of .—

Hawaii; and that the resulting high costs‘of manufac-

turing precluded Hawaii’s ability to compete with the

Judge, in a careful opinion, concluded that this branch

of Hawaii’s complaint stated:a claim upon which relief

- could be granted.’ Qn intérlocutory appeal, however,

’ . the Court of Appeals disagreed and held. that damage

to a state’s s economy by virtue of antitrust viglations

_ is not ‘‘an injury to the business or preperty of the

state or its people” and that, even if it were, the ‘‘at-

5In her third amended complaint, Hawaii had attempted to

plead a claim as parens patriae to~recover damages on behalf of

her citizens, but the trial court dismissed with leave to amend,

. holding that a parens patriae claim had not been properly pleaded.

The pleading now before this Court does not seek such recovery.

- As pleaded by Hawaii, as sustained by Judge Pence, and as

treated by -the Ninth Circuit, Connt II of the fourth amended

complaint seeks. damages only for injuries to Hawaii’s economy,

‘thus stating a claim in the precise terms defined by this Court in

Georgia v. Pennsylsvania R.R, Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).

_. products manufactured in other states. The District —

+ 5

tenuated injuries dfleged by Hawaii are far outside the

area of directness contemplated by the Clayton Act”’

(431 F.2d at 1285),

ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals committed two fundamental

errors. First, it failed tg recognize that” damage to

a state’s economy may indeed constitute damage

the state's business or property. Second, it held that;

without regard to the facts of a particular case, dam-

age to the economy. is always too remote to be com-

pensible under the federal antitrust laws,: -,

_Ever since Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works —

v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), it has been

_ Clear that ‘a governmental body, such as a city, county

_ or state, can be injured in either its ‘‘business”’ er its

‘‘property”’ by a federal antitrust violator. Count II

of Hawaii’s complaint, which the Court of Appeals im-

» The whole purpose of modern federal procedure is

to decide cases on their merits, not on the basis of

paper pleadings. Thus, to “‘state a claim upon which

relief can be granted under [§ 1 of the Sherman Act]

. allegations adequate to show. a violation and, in a

private treble damage action, that plaintiff was dam-

aged thereby are all that the law requires.’’ Radiant

Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S.

656, 660 (1961) (emphasis supplied) ; Radovich v. Na-

tional Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-454 (1957); -

Knuth v.Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Assn., 395 F. 2d |

420, 423 (3 Cir. 1968). If at trial Hawaii can prove .

. . the fact that its economy was damaged by the defend-

- ants’ antitrust idlations, there is 09 -reason way it

‘

@

co 7

4 c

S properly dismissed, pleads injury to both Hawaii’s —

“business”? and its “property.” 7 7

6

-eannof recover. And it is settled+antitrust law that

once the fact of damage is shown, uncertainty ds to

the amount of damage does ‘not preclude recovery.

_ Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. -251 (1946).

i irene ee

As the district judge'so rightly recognized, the chal-

lenge to Count IT of Hawaii’s complaint is not even a

debatable one. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 324.

USS. 439 (1945), decided the issue in Hawaii’s favor.

The Court of Appeals thought Georgia inapplicable ~ |

because it dealt only with injunctive relief under § 16

of the Clayton Act, rather than,an action for damages

' . under § 4 of that Act (431 F. 2d 1284-1285). Not so.

rN, Oke

In Georgia, this Court squarely held that the state |

was a ‘‘ ‘person’ entitled to enforce the civil sanctions

_ of the antitrust laws,”’ both as “‘parens patriae as well

as proprietor,” 324 U.S. 452, the claim for damages

failing only because of Keogh v.C.&N.W. Ry. Co., 260

US. 156 (1922). Keogh laid down the rule: that rates

set by the ICC could not be the subject of treble-damage

claims. Georgia, supra, 324 U.S. at 453. Asthis Court |

said: [W]e find no indication that, when Congress __

_ fashioned thosé civil [antitrust] remedies, it-restricted

the states to suits‘to protect their proprietary interests.

_. Suits by- state, parens patriae, have long been recgg-

-, nized. The no apparent reason why those suits

should be ex¢luded from the purview of the antitrust

acts.” Georgia, supra, 324 U.S. at 447. Thus, as Mr..

- Justice Douglas’s opinion makes crystaf clear, save for

the rule of Keogh, Georgia’s complaint stated a proper

claim for treble damages. ‘The only difference between

Georgia and this ¢ase is that Hawaii’s complaint, un-

encumbered by Keogh considerations, states a.claim for

treble damages which ee could ‘not sustain solely

becayse ‘ef Keogh..

_—_.

Ne

On mean,

The Ninth Circuit held that the Clayton Act estab-

_lishes a right to seek inj junctive relief but no right to

seek damages for the same injury irrespective of

whether damages ‘could be established and quantified. -

- This conclusion attributes to. Congres n unstated de-

sign at. odds with recognized princi of law. The

. basie temedy for injury to a protected interest is nor-

mally money damages. And the availability of any

remedy presupposes a right to relief and presupposes

_ the fact of damage. The Ninth Circuit decision’ con-

cedes that Hawaii may seek an injunction, thereby

- recognizing this right to relief (431 F.2d. 1284-1285)

but deniés Hawaii a chance to prove that the basic

- remedy of damages is appropriate. If Hawaii has a

right to relief, and there is no dispute that it does, then |

it has a right to any relief which proves to be ap-

‘propriate. By denying Hawaii the right to prove dam-

ages, the Ninth Circuit has implied that Hawaii has

no protected interest, whith is at variance with the

Nifth -Circuit’s:own decision and with this Court’s

holding i in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.

The Court of Appeals rested its decision on an alter- |

native ground. Assuming that. the alleged injury to

Hawaii’s economy constituted an injury to the state’s

“business”? or “property,” the court held as a matter

of law that “‘such injury is indirect and. consequential’? |

_ and hence not compensable under ‘the antitrust laws ©

(431 F.2d at 1285-1286). In the.first place, the court

_ erred in approaching the problem as a matter of law

and in failing to distinguish between a situation where, ;

as a matter of fact, the injury impacts indirectly on

the state and a situatipn—air pollution is a good | ex-

ample—where, as a matter of fact, the injury impacts

directly upon the state. Georgia ¥ vy. Tennessee cone

g>

Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). In air and water pollution

.. cases and in water and natural gas diversion casés as

- well, this Court has made clear that injury to the state,

as quasi-sovereign, is separate and apart from the re-

lated injury to the state’s inhabitants. E.g., Tennessee

: Copper Co., supra, 206 US. at 337; Pennsylvania v.

West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592: (1923). Whether,

and to what extent, a’ state is.able to quantify its

~” damages in no way affects’ the - directness of the jf-

jury ‘‘to it in ‘its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that

eapacity the state has an interest independent of and

behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and.

air within its domain.” Tennessee Copper Co., supra;

cf. Assn. of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397

U.S: 150, 153-154 (1970).

More importantly, the Court of Appeals misconceived

the directness requirement of the antitrust laws. Here,

as in Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969),.

the Court of Appeals relied on its decision in Karseal

Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9 Cir. 1955).

And here, as in Perkins, (395 U.S. at 649-650), that re-

liance was misplaced. As in Perkins, Hawaii ‘‘was di- . °

rectly injured and was clearly entitled to bring this

_ suit [and] * * * to present evidence of all of [its] losses

to the jury.’’ 395 USS. at 650.

The ruling below that damages to the economy are

incidental or remote results from the Ninth Circuit’s

skepticism about a. state’s economy as anything other

than an abstraction. This Court did not view Georgia’s

- economy as an abstraction in 1945. Since then there

have been significant advances in techniques for meas-

uring economies. ‘‘Gross National Product’”’ has be-

come a household phrase, and many states how annually

measure their “‘gross state product.’’ Economists have

‘2

3

developed models ‘for measuring the effects upon local

economies from infusions or extractions of given s

of money from those economies. In short, a state’s

en is shaceptible of articulation and measure-

ment. : , |

Hawaii’ s unique geographic situation affords a clear

éxample of ‘an .obviously valid “damage ‘to the

econgmy’’ suit. Tourism, the Court can judicially note,

is ome of Hawaii’s main industries. Because Hawaii

is separgted from the mainland by 2500 miles of ocean,

the only way tourists: can. visit Hawaii is by use of

public portation. If all transportation companies —

serving Hawaii tnlawfully conspired | to fix the price of

transportation at such an unreasonably high price that

Hawaii could prove that one of its main industries was

destroyed, no\one, we submit, could seriously challenge

Hawaii’s ability to sue for treble dgmages under’ the

federal antitrust acts. Hawaii’s lain from such a

hypothetical case might include such very obvious fac-

tors as loss of. airport and hotel tax revenues to less’

obvious but equally clear factors as the less of a-sub-

stantial number of. its businesses which were dependent

upon tourism: The overall effect on Hawaii’s economy

would, of course, be the subject of proof at a trial, and

on that issue Hawaii would: béar the burden. -But

surely in such a case, Hawaii would wot be deprived

of its day in court because thé daniages which it had

alleged were damages to its economy.

So here. If Hawaii can prove as a fact that the A ‘ 7

legally high prices which the defendants charged for

their gasoline and asphalt product: injured its econ-

‘omy by, for example, retarding or restricting ‘‘manu-

facturing, shipping and commerce’’:as it has alleged

it. can prove, ileal haye been damaged. by the

a

10

defendants’ titel viglations and ‘entitled 0 recover

under the statute. Cf. Perkins v. Standard Ou Co. gs has

California, 395 U.S. 642 (1969). |

- As we view it, this case, like the hypothetical, and

indeed all cases where public bodies alleged direct in-

jury to their ‘respective economies by ‘virtue of anti- .

trust violations, is a. causation ease. At this stage of

. the proceedings, the measure of Hawaii’s ‘damages is

not at issue. Perhaps the proof will show that, Hawaii

... is entitled to damages/ because it has been deprived of

“tax revenues. Perhaps the evidence will support some

‘ other theory of damages. But it is the fact that Hawaii -

has beén damaged that creates its legal right to recover. _

And that fact eantiot be established save at trial. The -

district’ judge correctly ruled that Hawaii was entitled .

- to its day in court. The Court of Appeals, reviewing

paper pleadings, not a trial record, ‘held that Hawaii’s . .

damage “‘is indirect and consequential to.a degree and att

in a sense far beyond that usually. discussed in this »

connection” (431 F.2d at 1285), pointing to Hawaii’s’ .».

‘alleged inability to “articulate a more precise theory

_ ,or measure of such damages” (431 F.2d at 1285). Even

after full pretrial discovery, litigants are not: nec-.

essarily required to “articulate a more. precise theory,”’

as Judge Charles. Clark tnade clear in Padovani v.

- Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2,€ir. 1961). A fortiori,

such ‘‘thitory pleading?’. cannot justify dismissal of”

Hawaii’ ’s — before: pretrial dinnerncy has taken’

_ place. +

We submit that before this Court fixes the nib and :

. bounds of ‘‘injury.to the economy’? antitrust: suits, it © a

a ._ ought to have the benefit of a fall trial record and the

_ findings, either of a jury ora judge. At-this stage

. "- of the case, we submit that fount II of Hawaii's com-

. @ . >

y

ape ides, ah 2 -

plaint idee a claim whichif proved at trial, entitles

“Hawaii to relief. | ; gh ge

| - 7 Sy | vn CONCLUSION " : | : 2 ss

“By reason of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court .

.". of Appeals should ke revérsed and the case should. be

‘remanded to the district court with directions to pro-

* 9

. "o ‘ ‘ _

WILLIAM T: BAXLEY,

. ceed to trial on Count II of Hawaii’s complaint. . - |

os: Respectfully submitted, *

; nf

. W. LAIRD eT BLER, JR.

\. ’ Attorney General ae Attorney General

Ue + State of Alab / wat of Delaware ote

. Btate Adminkatration Bldg. Po 3g 7 of Justice | 7

: Montgomery, Alabama 36104 lic Building ot

Attorney for the ‘Wilalagton, Delaware 19710 ; .

State of Alabama . ‘Attorney for the :

”

“GARY K. NELSON

Attorney General

i? °° State of Arizona oy

°. State Capitol Building

State of Delaware

ROBERT L, SHEVIN

Attorney General —

State of Florida

¢

Phoenix, Arizona 85007 State Capitol 2,2 .

Atterney for the : bie og tor the” 32304 a

State Ariac orney jOr ey *,

» *: rae ~ State of Florida

' RAY THORNTON

: 2, ‘State of Arkansas ~ “Attorney General ~

aa Justice Building :_ State of Idaho.

nee Little Rock, Arkansas 72207 - Office of the Attorney General

: ey ‘.Attorney forthe Boise, Idaho 83707 -—

~ ae Btate of Arkansas | Attorney for the

oo. State of ‘Idaho ;

DUKE W. DUNBAR . ee

Att General WILLIAM J. SCOTT. a7 ee “4

Attorney General

104 State Capitol - pa State of Illinois. ~«

Denver, Colorado 80203 =»). 160 North LaSalle Street

Attorney for the Geis-w Chicago, Illinois 60601

: Attorney for the

State ‘of Colorado

*ROBERT K. KILLIAN.

Attorney General :

_* State of Connectiout °

State of en:

RICHARD C. ‘TURNER. : .

Attorney General _”

State Office State of.Iowa a:

30 Trinity Street , State Capitol Bldg.

Hartford, Connecticut Des Moines, Iowa 50319

' Attorney for the Attorney "for the -

Mate of Iowa .

Y 424 : 12

rN :

VERN MILLER ; JOHN 0, DANFORTH

Att General Attorney General

State of Kansas State of Missourt

Office of the Attorney General ' State Capitol

State Capitol Building Supreme Court Building _

Topeka, Kansas 66612 Jofferson City, Missouri 65101

ttorney for the - . _ ' Attorney for the — “a

State of Kansas. State of Missouri

oe | s ROBERT L. WOODAHL

JOHN B,. BRECKINRIDGE - Attorney General

. Btate of arabe . , — of entane.

entucky t

Office of the Attorney General . Helena en 59601

Frankfort, -Kentucky 40601 Attorney ‘for the

— NState of “Rentuck ; State of Montana

\ ROBERT LIST oe

\. JACK P. F. GREMILLION Attorney General

x Attorney General _, State of Nevada .

\ State of Louisiana | Office of the Attorney General

\ x . State Capitol Building Supreme Court Building

‘Baton Rouge, Louisiana _ Carson City, Nevada 89701

Attorney for the _ * ~~. Attorney for the

State of Lowisiana . ~ State. of Nevada

seek WIN . | WARREN B, RUDMAN

i a

e _ State o ew Hampshtre

oun Howe Office of the Attorney General

‘ : Concord, New Hampshire

Augusta, Maine 04330

Attorney for. the ; Attorney for the -

State of Maing ees State of New Hampshire

- a ‘ . GEORGE F. KUGLER, JR.

ROBERT H. QUINN ~*~ _* 4 Attorney General ,

Attorney General Ny State of New Jersey

State of Massachusetts ~

. +, _ Department of-Law and

Department of the — Pablic Safety

ory, cenerel ™.. State Bag Annex

State _ ton, New Jersey 08625

Boston, Masapehanti 02133 Forney ple

Ahr tag New Jersey

State of Massachusetts

ne = DAVID L. NORVEED..,_

/ FRANK J. KELLEY ; Attorney General .

. Attorney General: 5, State of New Mezioo .

; pre Racery ey of Attorney Senne Py gee Testioe

’ x -

‘Eansing, Michigan . 48913 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

Attorney for the _. Attorney for the

State of Michigan State of New Mexico

WARREN SPANNAUS li. I LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ

Attorney General Po orney

State of Minnesota : State of New York

State Capitol . : 80 Centre Street a,

_ St. Paul, Minnesota 55101 . « New York,’New York 10013

: :4 Attorney for the Attorney for the

State ef Minnesota State of New York.

H I. JOHANNESON | e

torney General

State of North Dakota

State Capitol

inleaaree North Dakota 58501

Attorney for the

State of North Dakota

WILLIAM J. BROWN - :

Attorney General

State of Ohio 6

State House Ajinex

Columbus, Ohio 48215

Attorney for the

State of Ohio

LARRY DERRYBERRY

Attorney General

State of Oklahoma .

112 State Capitol

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105

Attorney for the

State of Oklahoma ,

RICHARD J. ISRAEL

Attorney General

State of Rhode Island

and Providence Plantations

Providence County Courthouse

Providence, Rhode Island 02903

. Attorney for the

State of Rhode Island and

Providence Plantations

GORDON MYDLAND .

Attorney General

State of South. Dakota

State Capitol © .

Pierre, South Dakota 57501

Attorney for the ~

State of South Dakota

DAVID M. PACK

Attorney General

State of Tennessee °

Supreme Court Building

Nashville, Tennessee 37219

Attorney for the -

State of Tennessee

CRAWFORD C. MARTIN

Attorney General

State of Texas .

Supreme Court Building

‘Austin, Texas 78711

Attorney for the

State of Texas

13

VERNON B. ROMNEY

Attorney General

State of Utah _

State Capitol © ‘

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for the

State of Utah — °

JAMES M. JEFFORDS 7

Attorney General ,

State of Vermont :

The Pavilion Building

. Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Attorney for the

State of Vermont

ANDREW P. MILLER ~

Attorney General

. State of Virginia

_ Supreme Court—Library Building

Richmond, Virginia 23219

, Attorney for the

State of Virginia

SLADE GORTON -

Attorney General S

State of Washington

Temple of Justice

Olympia, Washington 98501

Attorney for the .

State of Washington —

CHAUNCY H. BROWNING, IR.

Attorney General

State of West Virginia

State Capitol ~ :

Charleston, West Virginia 25305

Attorney for the

: State of West Virginia

:°

ROBERT W. WARREN

Attorney General

. GEORGE F. SIEKER

Assistant Attorney General

State of Wisconsin

Department of Justice

n, Wisconsin 53702 .

Attorneys for the

‘State of Wisconsin .

J. LEE RANKIN .

Corporation Counsel

City of New York

Municipal. Buildi

New York, New York 10007

~ Attorney for the

. City of New York

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