Amicus Brief — Trbovich v. Mine Workers

Supreme Court brief1972

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Text

No. 71-119

Se eR a ne ee ee SS A SSS Si ae

Ou the ¢ Supreme Gout of the Writed Sins

OCTOBER TERM, 1971

-. MIKE TRBOVICH, PETITIONER

v.

Untren Mink Workers or AMERICA, ET Al. ;

°

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI VO THE UNITED

STATES “OURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CIRCUIT ; ; ;

BRIEF FOR THE SECRETARY OF LABOR IN OPPOSITION

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,

Solicitor General,

L. PATRICK GRAY, III,

Assistant Attorney General,

WALTER H. FLEISCHER,

RAYMOND D. BATTOCCHI,

Attorneys,

Department of Fuatice.

- Washington, D.C. 20530...

JETER S. RAY,

. Acting Solicitor of Labor,

GEORGE T. AVERY,

_ Associate Solicitor,

' BEATE BLOCH,

EDWIN. S. HOPSON,

Attorneys, = .

' Department of Labor, .

Washington, D.C. 20216.

Opinions below__----------------__~____-__ 1

OUPISCICHON, 25a pene a |

Question presented__:_-______-_____--_- 2

Statute involved______-_----_-- 2

Statement __-----_--_/____ ese geeeeeenee 3

Argument ~-------------------------e-e-, iG

Conclusion ~__----_-_-___$ 5

CITATIONS

Cases: | ' _

Acuff v. United Papermakers and Paper-

workers, 404 F. 2d 169, certiorari

denied, 394 U.S. 987________- eee il

Alleghany Corporation v. Kirby, 344 F.2d —

‘o71, certrorari granted, 381 U.S. 933, cer-

_ tiorari dismissed, 384 U.S. 28__________ 11

Altman v. Wirtz, 56 LRRM 2651, 50 L.C. |

pS 2) 0 ee rr oeaee 7 )

Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134_______ -_ 17,8 7

DeVito v. Shultz, 72 LRRM 2682_________ 7 :

International Union, U.A.W. v. Scofield,

382 U.S. 205_.-----2--2----_.-___ 11, 12,13

Katrinic v. Wirtz, 62 LRRM 2557, 53 L.C.

5 DF: ee ee 7

Martin v. Kalvar Corp., 411 F. 2d 552____ 11

McArthy v.. Wirtz, 65 LRRM 241, 5d L.C.

711,944 -22___--- 7

II

Cases—Continued _

Morrissey v. Shultz, 74 LRRM 2679, 62. _

L.C. °§10,821_----------- 7

Reynolds v: Marlene Industries, 250° F.

Supp. 722__------2.- 12

Schulta v. United- ee ee of ener, ——

312 F. Supp. 538__-_--------_ 13.

Schultz v. United Steelworkers of Aerie ;

(District 15), 73 LRRM 2940_________ wee QO:

Schultz v. United Steelwoi kers of America

(District 19), 74 LRRM 2222. 9, 14

Stadin v. Union Electric Company, 309 F.

2d 912----- 1

| Stein v. ‘Wirtz, 366 F. 24 188,. certiorari |

denied, 386 U.S. 996_______----_____ 7,8

Wirtz v. Local 12, T.U.O.E., 66 LRRM .

OO we eee ee BB

Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Engineers, 34

F.R.D. 13-2-----2------- 13

Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Engineers, D4 |

LRRM 2577, 48 L.C. 718,569___--______ 7,13

Wirtz v. Eocal 153, Gloss Bottle’ Blowers

Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463__-.-----__________ 7,10

Wirtz v. Local 825, 1.U.0.E., 60 LRRM |

2092 _--------------____ 8

Wirtz v. Local 1377, I.B.E.W.., 288 F.

Supp. 914.----.-_.__-_- 8

Wirtz v. Local Union 125, Laborers’ Inter-

national Union, 389 U.S. 477__---______ 10

Wirtz. v. National Maritime Union, 409 F.

2d. 1M40__..... tg 9,12

III °

‘Statutes: ?

- .+ Labor- Manarement Reporting and Disclo-

sure Act of 19: 59, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.

401 et seg.: |

Section | | A a a a rr 14

Section 401_______ eee 3

Section 401(c)_------e 9

Section 401(e)__--w-- oon 5

Section 402(a)_----_--_e 2, 3,6

Section 402(b)__------- 2, 3, 14

Section 403 -------- 3, 6

‘Miscellaneous:

Rule 24(a) (2), Federal Rules of Civil Pro: ;

cedure’. ae ee 8,10

So

¥n the Supreme Court of the Wied Bits

OCTOBER TERM, 1971 |

No. 71-119 ——

MIKE TRBOVICH, PETITIONER |

Vv.

UniTED MinE WorkERS OF AMERICA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

_ STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

i

BRIEF FOR THE SECRETARY OF LABOR IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 2a—6a) _

_1s reported “at 51 F.R.D. 270. The judgment of the.

court of oynees (Pet. App. la) is not officially re- °

- ported. ,

JU RISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App.

la) was entered on April 27, 1971. The petition for a

writ of certiorari was filed on-July 23, 1971. This

Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

(1).

443-823—71

2

QUESTION PRESENTED |

, Whether a union member has a right to intervene

. inan action brought by the Secretary of Labor under

' Section 402 of the Labor- -Management Reporting and

- Disclosure Act of 1959 to set aside a union election.

: STATUTE INVOLVED

The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure

Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. 401 et sc q., perti-

‘nently provides:

§ 402, 29.U.S.C. 482:

(a) A member of a labor or ganization—

(1) who has exhausted the remedies

available under the constitution and bylaws

of such organization and of any parent

body, or

(2) who has invoked such available reme-

dies without obtaining a final decision

within three calendar months after their

inv ocation,

may file a complaint with the Secretary within

one calendar month thereafter alleging the vio-.

lation of any provision of section 481 of this

title. (including violation of the constitution and

bylaws of the labor organization pertaining. to

the election and removal of.officers). * * *

(b) The Secretary shall investigate such

complaint. and, if he finds probable cause to be-

lieve that a violation of this subchapter has

occurred and has not been remedied, he shall,

within sixty days after the filing of such com-

plaint, bring a civil action against the labor

organization * * *,

3 ‘

§ 403, 29 U.S.C. 483: |

* * ™ The remedy provided by this nibehap:

ter for challenging an election already con-

ducted shall be exclusive.

STATEMENT*

This action was brought by the Secretary of Labor

~ pursuant to Section 402(b) of the Labor-Management

Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 to set aside the .

. election of Internatonal officers held by defendant,

United Mine Workers of America, in 1969. The

challenged election -was held on December 9, 1969. °

The contest for the presidency of the Union became a

subject of national notoriety when the defeated candi-

date, Joseph A. Yablonski, and his wife and daughter

were found murdered in their home, early in January

1970. Thereafter, the present petitioner, who had

been Yablonski’s campaign manager, filed a formal

complaint with the Secretary of Labor concerning

- the conduct of the election.’

After an extensive investigation, the Secretary filed

this action, alleging numerous violations of Section

401 of the Act (see Pet. 9-10) in the conduct of the

election. The Secretary also sought an injunction. to

2The facts stated: herein are not in dispute and, where no

other citations are given, are also stated in the petition.

* Yablonski had invoked his internal remedies by filing a pro-

test with the International Executive Board challenging the

conduct of the election. After the deaths of the Yablonski fam-

ily, the union waived the exhaustion of remedies requirement

of Section 402(a) of the Act so that the Secretary could begin

his investigation without further delay.

4

require the union to maintain adequate financial rec-

ords. A preliminary injunction has been entered, re-

quiring the union to maintain adequate documenta-

tion supporting all disbursements, detailed records of

financial transactions between the International Union

and its districts, and records supporting the reports

required under Title II of the Act. Voluminous in-.

terrogatories and requests for admissions have been

exchanged and answered by the parties, numerous |

depositions have been taken by both parties, and a

- trial is scheduled for September 13, 1971. |

Petitioner-seeks to intervene in this action as the

member of the Union whose complaint triggered the

Secretary’s investigation preceding institution of the

lawsuit, and as chairman of the.Miners for Democracy

(MFD), a dissident group of defendant’s members.

Petitioner seeks to add to the Secretary’s complaint

two additional charges of alleged violation of the Act:

(1) the continued maintenance of what petitioner ealls

“bogus” local unions, composed entirely or primarily

of retired members; and (2) the action of defendant’s

president, Anthony: Boyle, as trustee of the United

Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement

Fund, six months before the election, in voting for

an increase in the amount of the monthly pension paid

_ to. retired bituminous coal miners. As petitioner’s mo-

tion for intervention shows (see exhibit C3 attached

to petitioner’s motion for intervention), each of these

charges was carefully considered by the Department

a

of Labor before it was decided that they should not be

included in the suit.’

Petitioner’s proposed complaint and intervention

includes prayers for additional relief steaming from

the two charges discussed above,‘ and also seeks the

‘In brief. the Secretary decided with respect to the first

charge that the International Union ‘had consistently — inter-

preted the; constitutional provision relied on by the petitioner

as precluding the formation of local unions having fewer than

ten active members. but not as requiring a local union to be dis-

banded if at any time thereafter it had fewer than ten active

members: that this mterpretation was not unreasonable; and

that“even if the maintenance of local unions composed primarily

of retired members were improper, the result of the election

could not have beén affected thereby, since retired members con-

cededly had the right to vote, and it made no difference whether

these votes were cast through pensioner locals or at polling

facilities established by other local unions. With respect to the |

charge concerning the pension increase, the Secretary con-

cluded that Boyle was only one of three trustees of the Welfare

_ and Retirement Fund. and that the evidence did not warrant a

charge of improper collusion with the employer trustee: that”

‘ Boyle’s. action in voting for the increase, was consistent with his, A

previously announced position in favor of such an increase, an

with numerous resolutions introduced at the last United Mine

Workers convention in favor of such an increase: that the tim-

ing of the increase resulted as much from the fact that this was

his first opportunity to take action with respect.‘to pensions

is from the fact that an election campaign was in progress;

that if action to provide increased or additional benefits for

‘union members were subject to challenge because it took place

during an election campaign, collective barggining could be.

“wrought to a virtual standstill when an election was imminent:

and that this was not the type of “interference” aes

by Section 401(e). .

* Petitioner seeks an order directing the defendant to dis-

band all local unions which it contends exist in violation of

443-823—71-—-2

6

appointment of a board of monitors to oversee all of

defendant’s financial affairs, and the establishment of

rules, either by the court or by a court-appointed

panel, for the conduct of a new election.’

ARGUMENT

There is no reason for this Court to review the de-

cision below, which is clearly correct, is supported by

the language of the Act and its legislative history,

and is in accord with the decisions of the only other

court of appeals and all the district courts which have

- considered the question.

1. The Act provides that the exclusive remedy for

the enforcement of Title TV is an action by the See-

retary of Labor (29 U.S.C.-483). Upon receipt of a

-member’s complaint filed in accordance with the pro-

visions of Section 402(a), the Secretary is to conduct

“an investigation and to file a civil action only if he

finds, probable cause to believe that a violation of the

Title has occurred’ in the conduct of a union elec.

tion.® * ;

the union’s constitution, and to tran$fer their members to other

local unions; he also seeks publication of a ruling to the effect

that President Boyle breacied his fiduciary duty to the union

members by voting to increase pensions in order to further his

own campaign.

> Petitioner also seeks reasoflable attorneys’ fees and costs.

° Petitioner incorrectly refers to such finding as a “quasi-

judicial” determination (Pet. 5, 35). The finding is not made

pursuant to any formal administrative proceeding, and does not

result in any directive or order; it leads only to the filing of

a.complaint with a court, which makes its own findings of fact.

conclusions of law and judgment on the basis of the evidence

presented to it.

eee Gees

. 7 e—, .

As this Court has repeatedly confirmed, the statu-

tory scheme expresses the plain congressional intent

to entrust enforcement of Title IV to the expertise

and discretion of the Secretary of Labor. Calhoon v.

Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140; Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass

Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 389 U.S. 463, 471-473; Wirtz v.

Local Union 125, Laborers’ International, Union, 389

U.S, 477, 482-483. Petitioner seeks, through his inter- .

vention, to substitute his judgment for that of the

Secretary.

Petitioner does not, and could not, content that the

Acthestows upon him any right to institute a Sepa-

rate action under Title IV. See Calhoon v Harvey, 379 —

U.S. 134. However, his proposed complaint ini inter-

vention seeks to jnten ‘ject into the present case allega-

tions of violations’ with respect.to which the Secretary

has not made a finding of probable cause ‘—allegations

which he claims a right to bring before the court only

hecause of the fortuitous circumstance that the Seere-

tary has filed a suit charging other violations.

The only other court of appeals decision directly in

point is Stein v. Wirtz, 366 F. 2d 188 (C.A. 10). cer-

tiorari denied, 386 U.S. 996. Indeed, Stein’s claim to

The courts have consistently dismissed actions instituted to

compel the Secretary to file suit under Title IV where he has

not made the statutory finding of probable cause. MecArthy v.

Wirtz. 65 LRRM 2411,.55 L.C. 11,944 (E.D. Missouri): Mor-

rissey V. Shulte, 74 LRRM 2679, 62 L.C. 910,821 (S.D.N.Y.):

Altman v. Wirtz, 56 LRRM 2651; 50 L.C . 719,211 (D.D.C _

Natrinic wx, Wirtz, 62 LRRM 2557. 53 L ce 11,289 (D.DAC.

Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Engineers, 54 LRRM 2577. 8

L.C. © 18.569 (S.D.X.Y.): DeVito v. Shultz. 72 LRRM 2682

(D.D.C.).

-

f

f

&

&

z

fe

3

é

&

8

an interest in the subject of the litigation was far

more direct than that of the proposed intervenor in this

case. The Stein case was brought to set aside a union

election for a single office, and the only vialation al-

leged was .the union’s denial of Stein’s right to be a

candidate for that office. Several months before the

union’s next regular election, the Secretary entered

into a stipulation for settlement of the case on the

-basis of the union’s agreement to permit Stein to be

'-. a candidate in that forthcoming election. Stein, dissat-

isfied with the. settlement, sought to intervene. The

court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of

his motion, saying (7d. at 189) :

~The Act confers upon the Secretary of Labor

the exclusive right to bring civil actions against

labor organizations for violations of members’

rights in union elections and election pro-

cedures. 29 U.S.C. §§ 482(b), 483; Calhoon v.

Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 85 S. Ct. 292, 13 L. Ed.

2d 190. There being no way for appellant to

prosecute this type of action by original suit,

he eannot be permitted to do so by intervention,

for Rule 24(a)(2) cannot be construed to ex:

tend federal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 82:

Bantel v. McGrath, 10 Cir., 215 F. 2d 297.

The Stein case (which was decided after the 1966

amendment to Rule 24(a)(2)) is in aeceord with nu-

merous district court decisions denying the right of

union members to intervene m Tithe [VO actions.

Waite v. Local 825, 1.0.0.E.. 60 URRM 2092 (D. NJ.):

Wirtz v. Local 1377, 1.B.PW., 288 F. Supp. 914. (N.D. Ohio):

Wirtz +. Local 12. 1.U OF. 66 LRRM 2080 (CLD. Cal.) :

a oe ‘

See also Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 409 F.

2d 1340 (C.A.-2). .

2. Petitioner’s discussion of the legislative history _

draws an unrealistic and unfounded distinction be-

tween the Secretary's exclusive right to initiate -Title -

IV litigation and his. claimed right of intervention

once such litigation has begun. In fact, the legislative.

history contains no indication that Congress intended

anyone but the Secretary to control the conduct of

Title IV litigation. Congress gave individual member's

the exclusive right to seek.enforcement of their Title

I rights through the courts, and gave them the right

to pursue remedies under Title III either individually

or through the Secretary. Under Title IV, Congress

reserved to individual members certain pre-election

rights of individual action (Section 401(c); see Pet.

pp. 7-8), but deliberately, and aftery thorough

consideration, made a suit by the Seer etary the exclu-

sive means: for the enforcement of post-election Title

IV rights. The only “legislative history’’ cited: by

petitioner which explicitly suggests that the Secre-

tary’s exclusive enforcement rights do not preclude

individual intervention in Title IV litigation is the

_ legislative afterthought of one of the sponsors of the.

Act, made in the context of a highly charged political

atmosphere some twelve years after the passage of the

Act (Pet. 29).

3. Even apart from the preclusion of petitioner’ S

intervention by the statutory scheme of hr

Shultz v. United Steelworkers of America (Distr see 18), 73

LRRM 2940 (W.D. Pa.); Shultz v. United Steelworkers of

America (District 19), 74 LRRM 2222 (W.D. -Pa).

SS a

4, . .

.

~ | 10

has not made out a case for intervention as of right

under Rule 24(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P.* Petitioner’s

claimed interest in the outcome of the litigation is no

greater than that of any other member of the defend-

ant union who might desire to become a candidate i ina

new election ordered by the. court as a result of this.

- action. It is the function of the Secretary under the

Act to represent the rights of all. members of the

union in the electoral, process, and to assure them the

free exercise of the rights guaranteed in Title IV. To

to the extent that petitioner claims a special interest

as the leader of a particular faction within the union,

‘his rights are not protected by Title IV. -As this Court

has said, the Act was not designed “merely to protect

the right’ of a union member to run for a particular

office in a particular selection. * ™ * Congiess em-

phatically asserted a vital public interest in assuring

free and democratic union elections that transcends.

- the Harrower interest of the complaining union mem-

ber.” Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n,

supra, 389 U.S. at 475; see Wirtz v. Local Union 125,

Laborers’ International: Union, supra, 389 U.S. at 483.

Petitioner has not only failed to show a legally

cognizable interest in the subject of the litigation

apart from the interest represented by the Secretary,

he has also failed to establish that the Secretary’s

representation of his interest as, a union member is

inadequate. Under Rule 24(a) (2), an applicant. whose

* While petitioner repeatedly refers to the Secretary’s alleged

concession that petitioner satisfies all conditions for interven-

tion of right under Rule 24(a) (2), the Secretary is unaware of

any such concession.

1]

“interest is adequately represented by existing par-

ties’? has no right to intervene. Petitioner has demoft-

strated only a difference of opinion concerning the .

~ best method of handling the litigation, and this is not

a sufficient showing of inadequacy of representation.

Stadin v. Union Electric Company, 309 F. 2d 912, 919 ©

(C.A. 8); Alleghany Corporation v. Kirby, 344 F.2d

O71, 573 (C.A. 2), certiorari granted, 381 U.S. 933,

certiorari dismissed, 384 U.S. 28; Acuff v. United

| Papermakers-and Paperworkers, 404° F.2d 169, 171-

172 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 394 U.S. 987; Martin -

Vv. Kalvar Corp., 411 F.2d 552, 553 (C.A. 5).

4. International Union, U.A.W. v. Scofield, 382 U.S.

205, does not support petitioner’s claim for interven-

tion. In Scofield, this Court held that the successful

party in a proceeding before the National Labor Re-

lations Board could intervene to protect his victory

in an appeal to the court of appeals by the unsuccess-

ful party. The situation there was quite different from

that presently before the court. Under the National .

Labor Relations Act, as this Court noted in Scofield, -

Congress has established a system in which (7d. at

219) : a a

_ * * * When the General Counsel issues a com-

plaint and the proceeding reaches the adjudica-

tive stage, the course the hearing will take is in the

agency’s control, but the charging: party is ac-

corded formal recognition: he participates in

the hearings as a “party”; he may call wit-

nesses and cross-examine others, may file excep-

tions to any order of the trial examiner, and

42

| may file a petition for reconsideration to a Board

order * * *. Of course, if the Board dismissés

the complaint, he can obtain review as a person

' aggrieved * * *,— :

_ In Scofield, this Court held that to allow a party.

which had already participated in ‘the fact-finding

procedure to prdtect his’ victory on appeal was justi-

fied by the intent of Congress in passing the National

Labor Relations Act, and that the intervention would

not “impair effective discharge” of the Board's du-

- ties (382 U.S. at 215) -and would save judicial time

and energy. by preventing a second appeal by the

charging party if the Board’s decision were reversed,

(id. at-212). a, |

By contrast, under the present Act, there is nothing

analogous to an agency adjudicative hearing with the

“charging party” as a statutorily recognized party.

See Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, supra; Rey-

nolds v. Marlene Industries, 250-8. Supp. 722 (S.D.

N.Y.). Hence, there is no applicability here of this |

Court’s concern in Scofield that the successful party in

the initial preceedings before the Board could be ad-

versely affected in subsequent proceedings before the

Board -and yeviewing court by the stare decisis effect

of the decisipn on the first review. |

Moreover, in Scofield, the Court pointed out. that

- intervention could not impede or delay resolution of

the issues, since the record .was completed before the

' Board prior to the permitted intervention. Here, the

Stee

i

an

13

. record will not be complete until: after the. trial,- and

the trial itself would inevitably be delayed and pro-

tracted by the additional issues which petitioner seeks

to interject. 2 * =

In National Labor Relations Board proceedings, as

the Court further pointed out in Scofield, the un-

successful party has a statutory right to initiate and |

participate in review proceedings, and it would be

anomalous to deny the successful party the same °

privilege. Under the present Act,.there is no “un-

successful party.” The complaining union member has

no right to judicial review of the Secretary’s deter-

mination that there is no probable cause to ‘believe

that violations occurred which warrant the institu-

tion of suit to set the election aside; and the union

cannot dispute the Secretary’s finding that there is

such probable cause, but must defend on the’ basis of

the evidence presented to the court.“ The judicial pro-

ceeding is entirely de novo,‘and is not a proceeding

, for review of an administrative determination. And,

as previously discussed, Congress, for good reasons,

a .

p

_ 7° See cases cited in note 6, supra. -

Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Engineers, 34 F.R.D. 13, 14 |

_ (S.D. N.Y.). Petitioner asserts there is “no question” concerning

a union officer's: right to intervene as a party defendant in a

Title IV suit (Pet. 35), citing the only judicial decision uphold-

ing such right, Shultz v. United Steelworkers of America, 312

F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Pa.). The Secretary in that case opposed

14

conferred on the Secretary the right. to institute such

judicial proceedings to enforce the Act, and deliberately

withheld that right from individual complainants.

Do. We do not discuss in detail petitioner’s conten-

tions with respect to the prayer for injunctive relief

against defendant’s: recordkeeping violations. Pe-

titioner does not seek to: Justify separately his pro-

posed intervention on this count, and the same prin-

_eiples apply. This count is founded on Section 210

of the Act (29 U.S.C. 440), which like Section 402 (h)

(29 U.S.C. 482 (b)), provides for an action by the

Secretary, and not by an individual union member.

the officer's intervention, and has appealed from the decision,

Significantly, in the very same case, the same district judge de-

nied a motion to intervene by the complaining member, Shu/tz

v. United Steelworkers of Amercia, 74 LRRM 2299 (W.D. Pa.).

The decision distinguished between the complainant, who had

only the right in common with all other union members to seek

the contested office, and the incumbent officer, who stood to lose

his job if the election were set aside. _

&

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15

CONCLUSION

The, petition for a. writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted. 3

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,

Solicitex, General.

A _ L. Patrick Gray, ITI,

_ Assistant Attorney General.

WALTER H. FLEISCHER,’

RayMonD D. Batroccut,

Attorneys.

JETER S. Ray,

Acting Solieitor of Labor,

GEORGE T. AVERY,

Associate Solicitor,

BeEaTE Buocu,

EpwIn S. Hopson,

Attorneys, |

Department of Labor.

SEPTEMBER 1971.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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