Brief for Petitioner — Groppi v. Leslie

bales

SITAR OT Hug

ral ~ Tid,

‘In The _

SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES

October Term, 1970

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’

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JAMES E. GROPPIY,

Petitioner,

Vv. .

JACK LESLIE,

Sheriff of Dane County,

Respondent.

On WRIT oF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES CourT oF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

_BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

WILLIAM M. COFFEY

ROBERT J. LERNER

JOHN DL. MURRAY ,

152 West Wisconsin Avenue

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203

Counsel for Petitioner

MICHAEL J. ZIMMER

STEVEN H. STEINGLASS

PATRICIA D. MCMAHON

Freedom through Equality

152 West Wisconsin Avenue

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203

Of Counsel

.The Gilman Press, inc., Madison, Wisconsin

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-~ INDEX

PAGE

Opinions belOW 020.2... eecececcecceeseseeseesecessosseeseeseeseseteeeeeseeseeee. 2

JUiSGictior once eee ec eceeceeseeseeseeseseecseesserteseesecseeseeeeeeeeeeec. ; 2

Statutes, rules, and regulations involved puusuabwvuenesavearsesceert 2-3

Questions presented ee Gekassavesisabssecesneveuvenmsenss 4

Statement asseiieincindabeuchsnsnuedsnbskevbadexsntnbdantohebssnenewnvessed-iaveqoesevessiaclacb@

Summary of argument 2.00.00... ccecececeeeeeeeeceeeceee, _ 8

ALQUMEN oe ego cece eecceeneeseeesecesesnsenesneesugpevesiseseeseeeoeecicce. 9-26

I. THE WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE DID NOT

HAVE THE POWER TO SUMMARILY PUNISH

FOR CONTEMPT oo. cccecceeececsecssnesessnsstnsetne 9-13

IT. ASSUMING SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWER RE-

SIDES IN LEGISLATIVE BODIES, THE INSTANT

CASE IS NOT, FACTUALLY, AN APPROPRIATE:

-ONE FOR THE EXERCISE OF THIS POWER ....13-19

III. NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

ARE REQUIRED IN THE EXERCISE OF SUM-

MARY CONTEMPT POWER . Ww 20-25

IV. THE CONCLUSIONARY NATURE OF THE LEG? ..

ISLATIVE CONTEMPT RESOLUTION-MAKES IT

CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFECTIVE .......... 25-26

CONCLUSION ooo eee 26

reg oun

Ce ee a

. ii

CITATIONS

——

‘PAGE

Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U. S. (6 Wheat.). 204, 5 L. Ed.

242 (1821) sceececrenneanenntnnenneaty peceteirsanieneexinetniceecs 13, 18

Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41, 79 S. Ct. 539, an

L. Ed. 2d°609 (1959) . peaesnswecsangueceeeae eee 20

Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 45 S. Ct. 390, 69

L. Ed. 767 (1924) Ki dsabattiduks yess wsciseutesshsb escesceweecttiee ca, 8, 9, 25

Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d

150 (C. A. 5, 1961) ence ceccececcecceeceeeeceeceeceeseestecesecseees 22

Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 66 S. Ct. 423, 90

L. Ed. 567 (1946) ooo ccc 24

Ex Parte’ Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 9 S. Ct. 77, 32 L. Ed.

405 (1888)... besssedatcneseeninneenennseeeeeneesceaeseenecBy 20, 25

Galpin v. a 85 U.S. (18 hides 350, — S. Ct. —, 21

L. Ed. 959 (1874) si naestesadinseiediaseagecatcees ater tenestenseenkeeeabeeueans 22

- Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 24, Ed.

2d 287 (1970) ceccecvccscrceeecvecerceesesne stein: 29

Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Company, 221 U.S.

418, 31S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed, 797 (1910) ....................15-16

Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 81 S. Ct. 653, 5

AL. Ed. 2d 670 (1965) once eceeeeeceeceeceeceeseeececesnesneeneseeeseeeee. 21

; i

: PAGE 4

Great Lakes Screw Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 409 F. 2d ;

3875 (C. A. 71969) ooceeccecceecceceeeccecsseeeeeteeeeeeee . 26 :

Grcppi v. Leslie, 436 F. 2d 326 (C. A. 7, 1970) ....... 7 :

Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F. 2d 331 (C. A. 7,1971) 7, 10 |

Groppi v. Leslie, 311 F. 2d 772 (WD. Wis. , 1970) ....6, 11, 12

Hahn v. Burke, 430 F. 2d 100 (C. A. 7 1970) ........... Si. 22 ’

Harris v. United States, 382 U. S. 162, 86 S. Ct. 352, 15

L. Ed. 2d 240( +)... Renn nnneE ene 9, 19

Hill v. United States, 318 U. S.'424, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed.

2d 417. (1968) nec ceccccpeeceeeseetteeeeeeeee 22

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 25 L, Ed.

2d 353 (1970) on cccccceccsesecesesseeeeeseeeeeeeeee 12

In Re Maury, 205 FED 626 (C. A.9 1913)... 21

. 4

In Re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 F

(1948) fn 22, 25 |

Johnson v. Mississippi, — U.S.—, 91S. Ct. —, 29 L. Ea.

2d 423 C197) one eee cecececeeceeeeceneeeeseeceeceeeeeeee. 8, 9-10, 18

Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125, 55 S. Ct. 375, 79

L. Ed. 802 (1934) ...... . .. 17, 18, 23

Levine v. United States, 369 U. Ss. 610, 80 S. Ct. 1038, 4

L. Ed. 2d 989 Se petbieelesaedensssisaeuieceaeseusenus 20

Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 37S. Ct. 448, 61 L. Ed.

881 (1916) oe 17,18

iv

: PAGE

Mayberry v. Peniejlvanie 400 U. S, 455, 91 S. Ct. 499,

27 L, Ed. 2d 532 (1971) woe 8,10, 12

McCarley v. eandets, 309 F. Supp. 8 (M. D. Ala. 1970) .... 22

Panico v. United States, 375 U. S. 29, 84 S Et. 19, 11

L. Ed. 2d 1 (1963) ooo eee eee 20 -

Parmalee Transportation Co. v. , ae 292 F. 2d 806

{C. A. 7 1961) 200. Paseees tage picvetews tase sdeeeeeee ease 25

Powell v. Alabama. 287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed.

158 (1932) oo... lessen ese irra pace laueneennaen cigs evceeueceaeeeioace 22

Sacher v. United States, 343 US. 1, 24, 72 S. Ct. 451,

96 L. Ed. 717, 731-732 25:3 0 eee er ee 19, 20

Sherbert Vv. Verner. 374 U. S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10

L. Ed. 2d 1965 (1963) oo eee 22

Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U. S. 551,

76S. Ct. 637, 100 L. Ed. 692 (1956) nee. Z2

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S. Ct. 330, 78

L. Ed. 674 (1983) ooo ecco ceeceeeeee eee 22

State ex rel. Attorney General v. Circulit Court, 11 Wis.

Os L/S ee ..... 10

State ex rel. Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis. 2d 282, 171 N. W.

2d 192 (1969) 00. oe segeseransecseceuee nae 6,12, 15, 24

State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court, 11 Wis. 2d 560,

105 N. W. 2d 876 (1960) oo 24

2 OES AP PR Nt BN DE ei

Vv

PAGE

Tauber v. Gordon, 350 F. 2d 843 (C. A. 3 1965) ow... 25

The King v. Benn and Church, 6 T. R. 198 (1795) _....... 22

Toledo Newspaper Company v. United States, 247 U. S.

402, 38 S. Ct. 560, 62 L. Ed. 1186 (1918) ow. 19

United States v. Green, 356 U. S. 165, 78 S. Ct. 632, 2

wL. Ed. 2d 672 (1958) ooo. eeccccecceecceoeeeeeeeeeee 17, 19

United States v. Galante, 278 F. 2d 72,.(C. A. 2, 1962) ....8, 21

United States v. U.S. District Court, 9 Cr. L. 2045 (C. A.”

CHE: 5) en ns 21

Widger v. United States, 244 F. 2d 103 (C. A. 5 1957) ....20, 25

STATUTES:

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 42 ..... 20, 21, 25.

Wisconsin Statutes, Section 13.26 — use 3,5

| Wisconsin Statutes, Section 13.27... 3, 5,6

MISCELLANEOUS:

Goldfarb, The Contempt Power, (1963) ; eee 9,12;16,23 -

8 Moore’s Federal Practice- -Cipes, Criminal Rules, Sec-

thor 42.04 (2) neces eccceccnecsneeseneeseeeteteseeeeeee eee 21

Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Rule 49, Sec-

tion 702 ool. eeieseeeseceeencegenciess, —— 13, 16, 17, 21

At lena hel Gott > TE Pye

RFRA ENOL ER INIT

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In The

SUPREME COURT of the UNITED SIAIES |

October Term, 1970

No. 1549

JAMES E. GROPPI,

Petitioner,

v. ;

JACK LESLIE, |

Sheriff of Dane County,

Respondent.

ON WRiT oF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES Court oF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

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OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion ‘of the United States Court of Appeals on

re-hearing en banc is reported at 436 F. 2d 331 (1971), and

printed in the Appendix, pp. 70a-79a. The opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals is reported at 436 F. 2d 326

(1970), and’ printed in the Appendix, pp. 80a-88a. The

opinion of the United States District Court, Western Dis- -

trict of Wisconsin is printed at 311 F. Supp. 772, (1970),

and printed in the Appendix, pp. 91a-108a.

J URISDICTION

The -judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit after re- -hearing en banc was en-

tered on January 6, 1971. The Petition for a Writ of Cer-

tiorari was filed on April 6, 1971, and granted on June 7,

1971. —U.S.—, —S. Ct. —, 29 L. Ed. 2d 679 (1971). The

jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S. C. Section 1254

(1).

_ CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article IV, Sec. 8, Wisconsin Constitution

Rules; contempts; expulsion

Each house may determine the rules of its own pro-

ceedings, punish for contempt and disorderly behavior, and

with concurrence of two-thirds of all. members elected,

expel a member, but no member shall be expelled a second

time for the same cause. (Wis. Stats. 1967, p. 35).

3

STATUTES INVOLVED

Sec. 13.26 Wisconsin Statutes

Contempt

(1) Each house may punish as a contempt, by im-

prisonment, a breach of its privileges or the privileges of

its members; but only for one or more of = following

offenses:

* *

(b) Disorderly conduct in the immediate view of the

house and directly tending to interrupt its. proceedings.

* *¢ &

(2) The term of imprisonment a house May impose _

under this section shall not extend beyond the same session

of the legislature. (Chp. 13, Wis. Stats., 1967, p. 202).

Sec. 13.27 Wisconsin Statutes

Punishment for Contempt

(1) Whenever either house of the ‘legislature orders

the imprisonment of any person for contempt under s. 13.26

such person shall be.committed to the Dane County jail,

and the jailer shall receive such person and detain him

in close confinement for the term specified in the order of

imprisonment, unless he is sooner discharged by the order

' of such house or by due course of law.

(2) Any person who is adjudged guilty of any con-

tempt of the legislature or either house thereof shall be

_ deemed guilty also of a misdemeanot, and after the ad-

journment of such legislature, may be prosecuted there-

for in Dane County, and may be fined not more than $200

or imprisoned not more than one year in the county jail.

(Wis. Stats. 1967, p. 202).

PP aM AE eT Ry

SEINE IAT NRE BOE NRE Mi KS OPM

Pet alain

PEERS NEN RTT IE NL LIME Bate PEE mes

OR Le TT

QUESTIONS PRESENTED |

1. Whether a legislative body can, consistent with due

procéss.of law, two days after alleged contemptuous con-

duct, ex parte imprison a person under its contempt power

without. giving the person any notice of the charge against

him or any opportunity whatsoever to appear before the ©

legislative body and respond to the charge.

2. Whether consistent with due process: of law a per-

son can be found in contempt of a legislative body when the

legislative contempt resolution sets forth mere conclusions

and fails to set forth any underlying facts or circumstances

‘which constituted the alleged contemptuous behavior.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On October 1, 1969, the Assembly, one of two houses

of the State of Wisconsin Legislature, passed the following

resolution:

Citing James E. Groppi for contempt of the Assembly

and directing his commitment to the Dane County Jail.

In that James E. Groppi léd a gathering of people

on September 29, 1969, which by its presence on the

. floor of the Assembly during a meeting of the 1969

Regular Session of the Wisconsin Legislature in vio-

lation of Assembly Rule 10, prevented the Assembly

‘from conducting public. business and performing its

constitutional duty; now therefore be it

Resolved by the Assembly, That the Assembly finds

that the above cited action by. James E. Groppi con-

stituted “disorderly conduct in the immediate view of

the House and directly tending to interrupt its pro-

ceedings” and is an offense punishable as a contempt

under Section 13.26(1)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes,

and Article 4, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution

_ and*therefore:

*(1) Finds James E. Groppi guilty of contempt of

the Assembly; and

(2) In accordance with Section 13.26 and 13.27 of

the Wisconsin Statutes orders the imprisonment of

James E. Groppi for a period of six months or for the

duration of the 1969 Regular Session, whichever is

briefer in-the Dane County Jail and directs the Sheriff

of Dane County to seize said person and: deliver him

to the jailer of the Dane County J ail; and be it furthe:

Resolved, That the Assembly directs a copy of this

resolution to be transmitted to Dane County District

6

Attorney for further action by him under Section 13.27

(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes; and be it further

Resolved, That the Attorney General is respectfully .

requested to represent the Assembly in any litigation

arising therefrom. |

Subsequently a copy of the Resolution was served on

Groppi and he was imprisoned in the Dane County Jail.

Groppi was never served with a copy of the Resolution

prior to his imprisonment and was afforded no specification

of the charge against him, no notice and no hearing. The

Circuit Court for Dane County dismissed’ Groppi’s applica-

tion for » Writ’ of Habeas Corpus as did the Wisconsin Su-

preme Court.. State ex rel. Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis..2d 282,

171 N. W. 2d 192 (1969).

After the Dane County Circuit Court denied Groppi’s

petition, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in

_the United States District Court for the Western District

of Wisconsin pursuant to Sec. 1254, T. 28, U.S. C. Groppi

was admitted to bail by the District Court after the Wis- va

consin Supreme Court denied his petition. At that time-he

had served ten days of the sentence imposed by the Asse" |

bly under the Resolution. __ ,

On April 8, 1970, the District Court held the Assembly

could not s rily impose a jail sentence for legislative

contempt without first providing Groppi with some “mini-

mal opportunity” to appear and to respond to the charge.

Accordingly, the Court granted the Writ of Habeas Corpus

and ordered that Groppi be released from any further cus-

tody or restraint pursuant to the Resolution. Groppi v.

Leslie, 311 F. Supp. 772 (W. D. Wis. 1970).

Ped

1

-*

7

X.Y : y ° .

On October 28, 1970, the United States Court of Appeals

Ae

:

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SEE NLT ee |

for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment-of the Dis- .

_ trict Court and directed that an order be entered denying

Groppi’s petitign fer habeas. corpus and granting the Re-

spondent Sheriff’s motion to dismiss. Groppi v. Leslie, 436.

F. 2d 326 (1970). Subsequently, the Court of Appeals

granted Groppi’s’ petition for a rehearing en banc and in

a four to three decision affirmed the Court’s decision of

October.28, 1970. Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F. 2d 331 (1971).

Prior to the passage of the cantempt resolution by the

Wisconsin Assembly, the Attorney General for the State of

Wisconsin ‘had: obtained a. temporary restraining order in

the Circuit Court for Dang County enjoining Groppi from

entering the Capitol Building which housed the Assembly.

Subsequently, on October 17, 1969, the Circuit Court for

Dane County vacated the temporary restraining order and

denied the Attorney General permanent relief finding that.

there was no evidence that there would be’ any further

_ disturbances of the Wisconsin Assembly by Groppi. .

; 2

In addition to the penalties’ i

resolution, Groppi was charged w

by the District Attorney for Dane: unty, Wisconsin for

his role in the incidént mentioned in\the contempt resolu-

sed in the contempt

disorderly conduct —

tion. A jury trial-was held in the Co ty Gaurt for Dane .

County, Wisconsin, on that charge and the petitioner was:

discharged by the Court after the jury was unable to reach

a verdict. ~ :

>

WE TETNOM >) FORE REIT EE TRIN iI Ne

*

ok

APARNA oS FURR Te UNTO TST REMERON eRe lea A

ERP Re ”

Na oe Hh)

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8

' SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

e

.

The decision of the Court below has for the first time

in the history of jurisprudence held that a legislative body »

can’imprison an individual for six months without giving ;

him any notice of the charge against him or any, oppor-

tunity to respond thereto. Even a Court exereising its

summary contempt power could not imprison an individual

in the way the Wisconsin Assembly imprisoned petitioner

herein. United States v. Galante, 278 F. 2d 72, 78 (C. A. .

2, 1962) (Judge Friendly dissenting). The political and

_ physical differences between a court and a legislative body

are strong reasons to not extend the summary contempt

power of the judiciary to legislative bodies. The two day

delay between the alleged contemptuous incident and the

finding of contempt by the legislature was such as to deny

the legislature the right to imprison petitioner without no-

tice or any hearing. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S.

455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1971); Johnson v. Mis-

sissippi, — U. S. —, 91 S. Ct. —, 29 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1971).

The conclusionary nafttre of the contempt resolution makes

it constitutionaJly deficient since it fails to state the under-

lying facts and makes it impossible to obtain any meaning-

ful review of the contempt finding. Cooke v. United States,

~ 267 U. S. 517, 45 S. Ct. 390, 69 L. Ed. 767 (1924); Ex Parte

Terrhy, 128 U. S. 289, 9 S. Ct..77, 32 L. Ed.'405 (1888). |

| 9

I. THE WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE DID NOT HAVE

THE POWER TO SUMMARILY PUNISH FOR CON-

TEMPT.

The contempt powers of courts and legislatures have ©

a common source in the divine right of the monarchy which

exercised absolute and unchallenged authority. The legis-

lative power of contempt emerged at a time when the House ©

of Commons performed judicial as well as legislative func-

tions. See Goldfarb, The Contempt Power, 25-36 (1963) .!

In addition, the exercise of contempt power has been justi-

fied as inherent within a legislative body because the power

is necessary to ‘protect its authority. While these historical

factors establish the existence of a contempt power gn the

part of the legislative body, they do not answer the question .

of the proper procedural requirements so that the legis-

lative contempt power is exercised in accord with due proc-

ess. The summary powers of courts have ‘been limited to

those situations where the misconduct was actually ob-

served by the Court and where immediate punishment was

necessary to restore order and maintain the. dignity and

-authority of the court. Cooke»v. United States, 267 U. S.,

517, 45 S. Ct. 390, 69 L. Ed. 767; Harris v. United States,

382 U. S. 162, 86 S. Ct. 352,15 L. Ed. 2d 240. Because of

the dangers inherent in the summary contempt power, this

Court has construed the power as an exception to the nor- -

mal requirements of due process and have refused to extend

it. Johnson'v. Mississippi, — U. S. —, 91 S. Ct: —, 29 L. Ed.

a

1The author, however, challenges the need for either judicial or legis-

lative contempt powers since Latin American and European govern-

mental systems exist, and survive, without such power. He also ques-

tions the consistency ‘of contempt power with our present philosophical

concept’ that sovreignty resides in the people. Further, he questions

whether legislative contempt power is justified today when legislatures

no longer exercise judicial powers.

10.

2d 423 (1971); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S. 455,

91S. Ct. 499, 27 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1971); In Re Oliver, 333 U.S.

257, 68 S. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948). The summary con-

_ tempt power has been described as “pérhaps nearest akin to

despotic power of any power existing under our form of

Government.” State ex rel. Attorney General v. Circuit

Court, 97 Wis. 1, 8 (1897). Good reasons exist for not ex-

tending that power to legislatures.

First, courts differ significantly from legislatures. It is

the business of judges to decide particular cases. As Judge

Stevens stated in his dissenting opinion on the rehearing

en banc in this matter, |

Without reflecting adversely on the importance and

‘dignity of the legislative function, it must be recog-

nized that legislators are more responsive to the tem-

porary moods of the body politic than are judges.

Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F. 2d 331-at p. 335, App. p. 75a-76a.

In Johnson v. Mississippi, supra, it was held that a judge

“was so enmeshed in matters involving” a defendant -“‘as

to make it.most appropriate for another judge to sit. Trial

before an ‘unbiased judge’ is essential to due process.” ©

— U.S. —,'91 S. Ct. —, 29 L. Ed. 2d 423, 427. In the in-

stant case, the Assembly certainly cannot be viewed as

an “unbiased judge”. The demonstrators who entered the

Assembly chamber did so to protest the legislative action

of the Assembly with regard to welfare cut-backs. The

responsiveness of legislators. to external pressures, cou-

pled with the fact of a direct attack upon their actions,

clearly so enmeshed the members of the Assembly as to

make detached and unbiased judgment impossible.

Second, the physical contours of most legislative cham-

1}

bers, along with the nature of legislative ‘sessions, and the

absence of transcribed recerds -of legislative. proceedirigs,

make it reasonable to believe that, the room:for error in

perception and evaluation of the alleged contumacious con-

duct is far greater before a legislative body. than before a

Court in the restricted area in which a Court may make a

summary contempt finding, and review of any action taken

is much more difficult. In the instant case, as Judge Doyle ©

of the District Court pointed out, a question arises whether

“all of the essential elements of the misconduct occurred

under the eye of the members of the assembly.” (App. p.

99a). There is no indication in the resolution as to how

many members of the Assembly that voted for the Reso-

lution were in fact present two days earlier and observed

the alleged contemptuous conduct. If the conduct was not

| observed by those voting, the parallel to a court’s summary

powers is destroyed. The absence of any record as to who

viewed the tonduct makes the review of a conviction for

summary legislative contempt unavailable or of such limited: -

scope as to be futile. And yet, without judicial review there

can be no check on the caprice or arbitrariness of the legis-

lative body. If review is limited to a determination of the

technical adequacy of the contempt resolution, such review

is éssentially worthless. If the reviewing court is to go

beyond the resolution and look to the underlying facts, it

is impossible to see how the court can make any factual

determination. ‘Groppi v. Leslie, 311 F. Supp. 772 (W. D.

Wis. 1970, (App. p. 91a.)

’ As an example of*this problem, the facts given by the

Wisconsin Supreme Court in its, denial of petitioner’s re-

quest for habeas corpus relief was based on-a review of the

wenn Qe. ais

12

facts as described by the news media.? The Wisconsin Su-

preme Court denied petitioner’s motion for rehearing—a

rehearing requested in order s@larify the procedure for

judicial review of the legislative action. The denial of the

petition for rehearing was made without any opinion by

the Wisconsin Supreme Court. (App. p. 65a.)

Third, most foreign legislative bodies function without

this power and American legislatures have ‘functioned to

_ date without this summary power. See Goldfarb, The Con-

tempt Power, 25736 (1963). Nothing prevents the removal

from the legislature of persons obstructing the legislative

activity. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 25

L. Ed. 2d 353 (1970); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S.

455, 91S. Ct. 499, 27 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1971), (concurring opin-

ion, Mr. Chief Justice Burger). Many other laws, including

disorderiy conduct and unlawful assembly, were and are

available if the legislature determines that following due

process is too burdensome. In the instant case, petitioner

in addition to being cited for contempt was also charged

with disorderly conduct in the County Court for Dane

County, Wisconsin.* The fact that our legislatures, national

and State, have survived and prospered to date without

the power to imprison for contempt without notice and hear- °

ing is reason enough not to extend such a grave and dan-

_gerous power to them. The reasoning that in this age of

“the politics of confrontation” such a power is necessary .

2The Wisconsin court held the action of the legislature was reviewable,

State ex rel. Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis. 2d 282, 171 N. W. 2d 192,

197 (1969), a surprising holding in light of earlier decisions. ‘See Judge

a ap Groppi.v. Leslie, 311 F. Supp. 772, 779, n. 9, (W. D.

is. 1970).

8A jury trial was held in the County Court for Dane County, Wiscon-

sin, on the charge that petitioner was in violation of the disorderly

conduct statute of the State of Wisconsin. At the trial the petitioner

was discharged after the jury was unable to reach a verdict.

BPW AR ii Tid et Ry die BEEING

13

to preserve the orderly processes of government exhibits

a failure to recognize that our Constitutionat form of Gov-

ernment was intended to survive and has, in fact, survived

perilous and tense times. The framers of the Constitution |

- drafted.it to guarantee that no man, despite the political

climate of the country, would be subjected to imprisonment

without an opportunity to know and respond to the charges

against him. Father Groppi does not ask that this Court

be “unmindful of recent relatively unprecedented illegal

-. disruptions of the proceedings in courts in our country”. _

(Judge Pell, App. p. 83a). But, Father Groppi does ask that .

he be-accorded the same procedural rights that others who

have allegedly been involved in such disruptions have been

granted, by courts, namely, notice and an opportunity to re-

spond. Being mindful of these disruptions does not mean or |

require a neglect of those rights promised each citizen by

the Constitution.

II. ASSUMING ‘SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWER RE-

SIDES IN LEGISLATIVE BODIES, THE INSTANT

CASE IS NOT, FACTUALLY, AN APPROPRIATE

ONE .FOR THE EXERCISE OF THIS POWER.’

In Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 5 L. Ed.

242 (1821), the foundation for recognition of legislative’con-

tempt power in the United States, the contempt authority

was limited to “the least possible power adequate to the end

proposed”. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 5 L. Ed. 242. This max-

im has often been cited and repeated in dealing with legisla-

tive contempts. See Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure,

_ Rule 42, Section 702, pp. 146-154. The important question in . -

" light of this limitation becomes what end the Wisconsin As-

. ‘

REPRE HS WE ONES BOY MEY

14

sembly was seeking in citing Father Groppi for contempt.

The Assembly Resolution is couched in terms that indicate

plainly the body was seeking to punish a past offense. Father

Groppi, according to the Resolution, was to be punished for

having. invaded the Assembly’s Chambers two days earlier. .

_ The fact that the Assembly sought to punish past conduct, as

opposed to present or threatened conduct, destroys any jus-

tifiable reason for the use of summary proceedings, for the

desired end could have been obtained by use of Wisconsin’s

criminal laws and procedure. |

At the time of the Resolution’s passage, the alleged ob-

struction or disruption of the Assembly had ceased. The

_ throng had left the legislative chamber, and there is no

indication anywhere in the record that a recurrence of any

disruptive conduct was imminent or even threatened. The

Attorney General had obtained a temporary restraining

_ order to forestall a recurrence. In light of these facts, the

actions of the Assembly, in summarily dealing with Father

Groppi, evidence an inappropriate exercise of summary _

power even if such a power is found to reside in the

Assembly. |

The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in- denying Father

Groppi habeas corpus relief, distinguished between judicial _

and legislative contempt. Contrasting. the legislative power

of contempt with that of the courts, the Supreme Court

said:

=

Under the judicial contempt power, a contemnor is im-

prisoned, not to prevent him from continuing to ‘inter-

fere with the judicial function of the court in the future

but to punish him for having completed a contemptuous

act in the presence of the court. This is punishment

necessary to maintain the dignity, decorum, and respect

‘\

Ib.

for the Court.. This objective admittedly is also found

in punishment for some crimes. In tontrast, the legis-

lative power of contempt, restricted as it is to prevent

the contemnor from interfering with the functions of

the legislature, is more in the nature of what is known

as civil contempt. Its function is not to punish for a past

deed but to prevent threatened conduct which inter- <

feres with the proper function of the legislative body.

State ex rel. Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis. 2d 282 at 296, 171

N: W. 2d 192 (1969). _(Emphasis supplied ) (App. p. 121-

22a).

The wording of the Assembly Resolution being such that

it deals only with past conduct, the exercise of contempt

power ih the instant case flies in the face of what the Wis-

_consin Supreme Court defined as the function’ of legisla-

tive contempt power. According to the Wisconsin Court,

legislative .contempt power is a deterrent and is not in-

tended as a means of punishment. Both the District Court

(App. p. 91a) and the three judge panel of the Seventh Cir-

cuit (App. p. 80a) rejected this characterization and saw

the contempt sentence as a criminal contempt—a punish-

ment. According to these federal courts the proper char-

_ acterization of the power is that expressed in Gompers v.

Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55

L. Ed. 797 (1910).

. for criminal. contempt the sentence is punitive, to

vindicate the authority of the court... . 221 U.S. 418,

(444,

But imprisonment for civil contempt is ordered where

the defendant has refused to do an affirmative act re-

quired by the provisions of an order which, either in

form or substance, was mandatory in its character. Im-

prisonment in such cases is not inflicted as a punish-

ALTA AION - Cpl CI AMT LOLITA Ss he

, a La

m™% 16

y %\ | -

_ ment, but is intehded to be remedial by coercing the

defendant to do what he had refused todo. 221 U. S.

418, ios

-

See ales: Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Rule 42,

Section 704, pp. "146/154. Father Groppi had not been or-

dered to do anything; he had not refused to do anything;

_ he could not free himself by any action on his own part;

he did not have the key to his own cell. The action on the

part of the Assembly clearly, then, cited Father Groppi

for criminal contempt, a citation the Wisconsin Court

claimed the Assembly was powerless to pass. The- Wisconsin

Court’s claim that the imprisonment was intended as a

detetrent is without any rational support.

The idea of summary .contempt arose, and is gen-

erally supported as a creature of necessity. According to

a large body of.authority, courts must on occasion, when

provoked by unseemly conduct, retaliate in order to vin-

dicate the dignity of the tribunal. The majestical func-

tioning of the courts must not be slowed or stopped by

obstructive or disruptive behavior. Hence, it is argued the

courts must, of necessity, possess a contempt power. The.

State contends that such.a power is even more essential to .

a legislative body, despite the fact that contempt powers

are associated with government in the whole of the Western .

world only in common law countries. See Goldfarb, The

Contempt Power, p. 2, Columbia University saat (1963).

Stark necessity isan impressive and often conipelling

thing, but unfortunately it has. all too often been

claimed loosely and without warrant in the law, as

elsewhere, to justify that which in truth is unjusti-

fiable. United States v. Green, 356 U. S. 165, 213, 78

S. Ct. 632, 2 L. Ed. 2d 672, 705 (1958).

‘

‘

RP Si hl LOE Is CRG: ies Bes

17

Father Groppi was not engaged in any allegedly’ disruptive

acts at the time the Resolution was passed. He had volun-

tarily left the Assembly Chambers two days earlier. He

posed no immediate or future threat to the Assembly’s func-

tioning. See Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Rule

42, Section 707, pp. 164-168.. Police, sheriffs, and National

-Guardsmen were all available and actively guarding the

Capitol building subsequent to Father’ Groppi’s | departure

from the Chambers. The Assembly by its Resolution, as

shown above, intended only to punish a past act. Jurney v. :

MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125, 55 S. Ct. 375, 79 L. Ed. 802

(1934), stands for the proposition that once a contemptuous |

act occurs within the immediate view of a legislative body,

jurisdiction attaches and the subsequent removal of the ob-

struction does not necessarily destroy that jurisdiction.

. Where the offending act was of a nature to obstruct

the legislative process, the fact that the obstruction has

since been removed, or that its removal has become

148.

However, in Jurney, citing Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S.

521, 37 S. Ct. 448, 61 L. Ed. 881 (1916), it was said that

the character of the offense was the only jurisdictional test

to eas applied by a reviewing court while ,

_ the continuance of the. obstruction, or the likelihood

of its repetition, are considerations for the discretion of

. the legislators i in meting out the punishment. 294°U. S.

125, 149.

ed

impossible is without legal Semone 294 U. S. 125, ©

OEE

18

%

The Court in Marshall (supra) described the appro-

priate test and limits more fully.

... when an act is of such a character as to subject it

to be dealt with as a contempt . . ., we are of the opinion

that jurisdiction is acquired by Congress to act on the

subject, and therefore there necessarily results from

this power the right, in the use of legitimate and fair

discretion, how far from the nature and character of the

act there is necessity for repression to prevent imme-

diate recurrence; that is to say, the continued existence

of the interference or obstruction to the exercise of the

legislative power. And of course in such case, as in

every other, unless there be manifest an absolute dis-

regard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary

power coming within the reach of constitutional limi-

tations, the exercise of the authority is not subject to

judicial interference. 243 U.S. 521,545.

Marshall was a case involving a contempt proceeding where-

in the defendant was to be tried by the Senate, that is, sum-

mary contempt was not even an issue. In the present case,

the Wisconsin Assembly sought to punish Father Groppi

on the basis of an ex parte summary proceeding. The As-

, sembly’s action cannot be termed “the use of legitimate and

fair discretion” in the Marshall or Jurney sense even as to:

regular contempt proceedings, much less summary ones.

As stated above, the contempt power is one subject easily

to abuse and one to be limited to the least exercise possible ;

to achieve the necessary ends. Anderson v. Dunn, (supra).

A.court, today, could not, two days after a contemptuous

act, summarily sentence a defendant ex parte. Johnson v.

Mississippi, — U. S. —, 92 S. Ct. —, 29 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1971).

Therefore, the legitimate use of discretion dictates that the

Assembly ia seeking to punish Father Groppi should have

19

relied upon the traditional criminal procedures of our so-

ciety. The dignity of the Assembly relied upon proven prac-

tices rather than reverting to Star Chamber practices in

_ ordering punishment ex parte. As Mr. J ustice Holmes said

for himself and Mr. Justice Brandeis:

When there is no need for immediate action contempts

are like any other breach of law and should be dealt -

with as the law deals with the other illegal acts. To-

ledo Newspaper Co. v. United ‘States, (dissent), 247

U.S. 402, 425-426, 38 S. Ct. 560, 62 L. Ed. 1186, 1196

(1918).

Reason and fairness demand even in panehing con-

tempt, procedural safeguards within which the needs

for the effective administration of justice can be amply

satisfied while at the same time the reach of so drastic

a power is kept within limits that will minimize abuse.

Sacher v. United States, (dissent), 343 U. S. 1, 24, 72

S. Ct. 451, 96 L. Ed. 717, 731-732 (1951).

There was no need for expediency in the instant case. There

was no need to exercise any contempt power, much less

summary powers ex parte. There was no reason to deny

Father. Groppi all the traditional procedural incidents of

the criminal justice system of Wisconsin. See Harris v.

United States, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S. Ct. 352, 15 L. Ed. 2d 240

(1965).

Respect and obedience in this country are not engen-

dered and’ rightly not—by arbitrary and autocratic

procedures, In the end such methods only yield real

contempt for all the courts and law. United States v.

Green, (dissent), 356 U. S. 165, 78 S. Ct. 632, 2 L. Ed.

2d 672, 707 (1958).

Ee ahh eee

e feild Ss SEN dt Dy, jab

ait oh BISA cite 8 se inane

Bisse’ Mieataete. BRS sen ii Ee PSG METI Ei tha

»

20

IIl. NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

ARE REQUIRED IN THE EXERCISE OF SUMMARY ~

CONTEMPT POWER.

Except for Ex Parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 9 S. Ct. 77,

32 L. Ed. 405 (1888) and Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S.

1, 72 S. Ct. 451, 96 L. Ed. 717 (1952), the many contempt

cases, legislative and judicial, reported in our jurisprudence

include none where the contemnor was given neither notice

nor any opportunity to be heard prior to the finding of con-

tempt and the pronouncement of sentence. In Terry how-

ever, the Court expressly withheld ruling on whether. a

Court could cite a person for contempt and order his im- .

prisonment without any notice or hearing at a date sub-

sequent to the alleged act, of contempt. In Sacher the trial

court made its finding of contempt and pronounced sentence

without affording the contemnors any opportunity to be

heard but did allow the contemnors the opportunity to be

heard affér sentence had been pronounced. Subsequent de-

cisions upholding summary contempt convictions have

stressed the fact that the trial court in each instance allowed

the defendants to be heard prior to imposition of sentence.

Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41, 79 S. Ct. 539, 3 L. Ed.

2d 609 (1959); Levine v. United States, 369 U. S. 610, 80

| S. Ct. 1038; 4 L. Ed. 2d 989 (1960).

In Panico v. United States, 375 U. S. 29, 84 S. Ct. 19,

11 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1963), this Court overturned a finding of

contempt in a summary proceeding under Rule 42(a), Fed-

eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, holding that the record

therein requitfed a hearing to determine Panico’s mental

responsibility for his conduct. Similarly, in_Widger v. |

United States, 244 F. 2d 103 (C. A. 5, 1957), the Fifth Circuit

21.

Court of Appeals ruled the trial court there should have

held a hearing on a contemnor’s motion to vacate a judg-

ment and sentence pursuant to the summary contempt pro-

visions of Rule 42(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

when the motion to vacate challenged the factual basis for

the contempt finding. The Court of. Appeals emphasized the

lack of notice of the contempt charge to the contemnor and

his non-representation by counsel.

In a case involving summary contempt under Rule 42

(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Judge Friéndly,

dissenting in part, stated that “summary” means “only that

certain usual procedural requirements may be dispensed

- with, not the basic rights can be sacrificed”. United States’

v. Galante, 278 F. 2d 72, 78 (C. A. 2, 1962). The majority in

Galante, while not approving the lack of an opportunity

to respond, found no.reversible error since there had been

no request to becheard and no indication the trial court

would have denied the contemnor a right to be heard. 278

F. 2d at p. 76. Judge Friendly’s dissent in Galante has been

commented upon favorably in 8 Moore’s Federal Practice-

Cipes, Criminal Rules, Section 42.04(2), p. 42-21, (Matthew

Bender, 1970), and Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure:

- Criminal, Section 708, pp. 169-171, West Publishing Com-

pany, 1969). In addition, the right of allocution has long

been recognized in cases of judicial summary contempt. In

re Maury, 205 Fed. 626 (C. A. 9, 1913). | |

Our system of government is premised on the belief that

the citizen must be protected against the exercise of abso-

lute power by the Government. United States v. U. S. Dis-

trict. Court, 9 Cr L. 2045 (C. A. 6, 1971).. It is contrary to the’

American system to allow a person to be imprisoned without

giving him an opportunity to respond to the charges against

ee

. PE NOE

MJ *

ARES Sh TLE GAO ENA SO Ge IR ge IRAN Et,

22

him. Hill v. United States, 318 U. S. 424, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7

L. Ed. 2d 417 (1968); Green v. United States, 365 U. S. 301,

81S. Ct, 653, 5 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1965); In Re Oliver, 333 U. S.

257, 68 S. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948); Powell v. Alabama,

287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932); Snyder v.

' Massachusetts, 291.U. S. 97, 54 S. Ct. 330,°78 L. Ed. 674

(1933) ; Galpin v. Page, 85 U. S. (18 Wall) 350, — S. Ct. —,

21 L. Ed. 959 (1874).

‘Before any governmental body may act to deprive a

citizen of his liberty, he is entitled to a minimal opportunity

to be heard. This principal has been stated in many areas

involving the interrelationship between the Government .

and the citizen. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 90 S. Ct.

1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970) (termination of welfare bene-

fits); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, |

10 L. Ed. 2d 1965 (1963) (disqualifying from unemployment

compensation); Slochower .v. Board of Higher Education,

350 U.S. 551, 76 S. Ct. 637, 100 L. Ed. 692 (1956) (discharge

from public. employment) ; Dixon v. Alabama State Board

of Education, 294 F. 2d 150 (C. A.5 1961) (suspension from

public school); Hahn v: Burke, 430 F. 2d 100:(C. A. 7 1970)

(probation revocation); McCarley v. Sanders, 309 F. Supp.

8 (M. D. Ala. 1970) (expulsion of a member from the

legislature).

The procedures followed by the Wisconsin Assembly

in citing Father Groppi for contempt and impbsing sentence

violated the ancient maxim that “no man shall be punished

before he has had an opportunity of being heard”, The King

uv. Benn and Church, 6 T. R. 198 (1795) (Lord Kenyon, Chief

Judge). Without any prior notice to petitioner and without

giving him or his counsel any opportunity. to be present or

to be heard the Assembly cited him for contempt, fcund him

23

guilty of an offense which had allegedly been committed two

days earlier and sentenced him to imprisonment. Prior to

the passage of the contempt resolution by the Wisconsin

Assembly the Wisconsin Attorney General had obtained a

temporary injunction from the Circuit Court for Dane Coun-

ty, Wisconsin, enjoining Father Groppi from any further

disruptions of the Wisconsin Assembly. On October 47,

1969, the Circuit Court vacated the temporary injunction

holding that the State had made no showing of any likeli-

hood that the petitioner herein would commit any. act to

interfere with the processes of the Government of the State

of Wisconsin. (App. pp. 6la-64a)

While it has long been held that legislative bodies have

contempt powers, Jurney v. MacCracken, 294° U. S. 125, 55

S. Ct. 375, 79 L. Ed. 802 (1935), there is no other reported

instance in-which a legislative body exercised its contempt

power without according the person charged the minimal

requirements of due process, that is notice of the charge

against him and an opportunity to answer the charge. In.

the exercise of its contempt power Congress has always

met the minimal due process standards of notice and an

opportunity to defend. Goldfarb, The Contempt Power,

163 (1963). Consistent with this tradition, the District

Court herein envisioned a hearing before | the Assembly in

which the petitioner would have been~requ itred, to show

cause why he should not be punished for his. conduct. 311

F.. Supp. at 780. (App. p. 9la.) No protracted trial bringing

the legislative process in Wisconsin to a halt was contem-

plated by the District Court or requested by petitioner.

herein.

In justification of its position that petitioner was not

entitled to the minimal right to appear before the legis-

wee ;

Rote att

PPE eared

Kirin

Gi NA HOD Ak stl Bate cath SS

24

lative body in response to the charge, the Court cf Appeals

stated that petitioner’s rights would be protected by the

judicial review of the contempt resolution. 436 F. 2d at

331. (App. p. 86a.) In its opinion denying, habeas corpus re-

lief, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had indicated that such

judicial review was available to the petitioner., State ex rel.

‘Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis. 2d 282, 171 N. W. 2d 192 (1969)

(App. p. 109a).

Since earlier Wisconsin case law had indicated to peti-

tioner that he was not entitled to any hearing on the

_ Merits of a contempt citation, State ex rel. Reynolds v.

County Court, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 105 N. W. 2d 876 (1960),

the petitioner moved the Wisconsin Supreme Court for a

rehearing of its decision denying habeas corpus relief in

‘order to clarify the right to judicial review. The petition

for rehearing was denied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court

without opinion. (App. p. 65a). .

Assuming full judicial review of the factual basis of-the

legislative contempt resolution was available to petitioner,

such post-conviction protection camnot be equated with the

minimal protection that the petitioner requested prior to

his imprisonment, especially where the State courts are_

denying petitioner bail pending such review. Mr. Justice

Murphy so noted in his concurring - opinion in Estep v..

United States, 327 U. S. 114, 66 S. Ct. 423, 90 L. Ed. 567

(1946):

There is something basically wrong and unjust about.

a juridical system that sanctions the imprisonment of

a man without ever according him the opportunity to

claim that the charge made against him is illegal. I-

am not yet willing to conclude that we have such a

system in this nation:

25

Similarly, Tustice Frankfurter dissenting i in In Re

Oliver stated:

But an opportunity to meet a charge of criminal con-

tempt must be a fair opportunity. It-would not be fair

if in the Court in which the accused can contest for

the first time the validity of the charge against him

he comes handicapped with a finding against him which

he did not have an adequate ceporemty of resisting.

333 U.S. at p. 284-85.

IV. THE CONCLUSIONARY NATURE OF THE LEGIS-

LATIVE CONTEMPT RESOLUTION MAKES IT

CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFECTIVE.

Not only was petitioner denied notice of the charge

against him and an opportunity to respond thereto, but

the Assembly’s contempt resolution merely cited a legal

conclusion without any statement of the underlying facts

supporting that conclusion. Such.a statement of the under-

lying facts is constitutionally required in order to sustain

a finding and ‘sentence of summary contempt. Ex Parte

Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 9 S. Ct. 77, 32 L. Ed. 405 (1888);

Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S..517, 45 S. Ct. 390, 69

L. Ed. 767 (1924).

This constitutional requirement has been codified in

Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and

in eases decided thereunder. Tauber v. Gordon, 350 F. 2d

843 (C. A. 3 1965); Widger v. United States, 244 F. 2d 103

(cm 5 1957); Parmelee Transportation Co. v. Keeshin,

292 | 806 (C. A. 7 1961).

The failure to state the uhderlying - supporting

the contempt resolution compounds the difficulties already

ee

He ae

26

cited herein for petitioner to obtain a meaningful judicial.

review of the contempt order, i.e. the question as to the

availability of any judicial review amd the lack of any

transcript of the proceedings in the legislature. See Great

Lakes Screw Corp.-v. N. L. R. B:, 409 F. 2d 375. (C. A. 7,

1969).

_ CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted

that the judgment of the Court below should be reversed

and the cause remanded to the-District Court for the entry

of an order granting the Petition for Habeas Corpus and -

- releasing petitioner from any furthér custody or réstraint

pursuant to the Resolution adopted by the Assembly of the

State of Wisconsin on October 1, 1969.

‘ WILLIAM M. COFFEY

ROBERT J. LERNER

- JOHN D. MURRAY

152 West Wisconsin Avenue

_ Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203

ea’ e

Counsel for Petitioner

MICHAEL J. ZIMMER

STEVEN H. STEINGLASS

PATRICIA D. MCMAHON

Freedom through Equality

152 West Wisconsin Avenue

ilwaukee, Wisco ‘aa 53203 _

“Of Counsel