Jurisdictional Statement — DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire
Supreme Court brief1966
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Subject Index.
Opinion below 1
Jurisdiction 1
Questions presented 3
Statement of the case 3
The questions are substantial 6
Conclusion 11
Appendix A, New Hampshire Revised Statutes
Annotated 12
Chapter 491 12
Chapter 588 12
Appendix B, Opinion of Supreme Court of New
Hampshire 23
Table of Authorities Cited.
CasEs.
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born
v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 380 U.S. 513 8
Bantam Books, Inc., v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 2
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 9
DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire,
368 U.S. 19 4, 8,10
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Commit-
tee, 372 U.S. 539 7,9
Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F. 2d 597 7
Maynard v. De Gregory, 106 N.H.; 209 A. 2d 712 1
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 6
Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33 9
7
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497
Lal
.
ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Shelton v. United States, 327 F. 2d 601
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72
Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 331 F. 2d 64
Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 380 U.S. 503
Watkine v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399
STatTurTEs.
New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, c. 491
New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, ¢. 588,
§ 8-a 2, 3, 4, 7, 10
United States Constitution, First Amendment 3,6,9,11
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment 6, 9, 11
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment
3, 9, 10, 11
28 U.S.C., § 1257 (2) 1
TextBooks, Ere.
1955 Report of the Attorney General
Supreme Court of the United States.
McroseR TERM, 1965.
No.
HUGO DeGREGORY, Appellant,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE, Appellee.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.
Opinion Below.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire rendered on April 30, 1965. It is not
yet reported in the New Hampshire Reports but will be
found in volume 106, New Hampshire Reports, and 209
A. 2d 712. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed
a Superior Court decision which ordered the appellant com-
mitted to jail for one year for civil contempt.
Jurisdiction.
This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S. Code, § 1257
(2), which provides:
‘*Final judgments or decrees rendered by the high-
est court of a State in which a decision could be had,
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
2
‘*(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the
validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States, and the decision is in favor of
its validity.’’
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58.
‘Notice of appeal was filed in the New Hampshire Supreme
Court on May 28, 1965.
From the inception of this proceeding, appellant has
‘raised the constitutional issues argued herein, except for
the issue of unconstitutionality on its face of New Hamp-
shire Revised Statutes Annotated, c. 588, § 8-a. Comment
on that issue will be made hereinafter.
The constitutional issues here presented were raised in
appellant’s answer to the petition filed in the Superior
Court for Merrimack County, New Hampshire (R. 12),
except that, as above noted, the constitutionality on its face
of the statute was not argued.
The issues were argued in a memorandum of law filed in
the Superior Court.
Exception was taken to the judge’s ruling that the Attor-
ney General could properly question DeGregory (R. 139)
and to the introduction of Exhibit 1 in this record (R. 155).
The issues were argued before the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire (R. 31 et seq.) and the New Hampshire
Court ruled adversely to appellant (R. 79).
Said the Court: ‘‘This exercise by the state of its power
adequately to inform itself in order to act and protect its
legitimate and vital interests has not been ‘pressed, in this
instance, to a point where it has come into fatal collision
with the overriding constitutionally protected rights’ of
defendant. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 72, 81.’’
». 3
Questions Presented.
The questions presented in this appeal are as follows:
1. Whether Revised Statutes Annotated, c. 588, § 8-a,
as applied by the Court on the record of this case, violates
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution by authorizing a legislative
committee to summon and question the defendant herein
without any legal showing of foundation, basis in fact or
probable cause for conducting an investigation and for
investigating the defendant.
2. Whether the decision of the Court in this case denied
to defendant his right of privacy and abridged his free-
dom of speech and assembly under the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution as guaranteed to him
by the Fourteenth Amendment to said Constitution by hold-
ing that Revised Statutes Annotated, c. 588, § 8-a, author-
ized the Attorney General to summon and question the
defendant herein without any legal showing of founda-
tion, basis in fact or probable cause for conducting an
investigation or for investigating the defendant.
3. Whether Revised Statutes Annotated, c. 588, § 8-a
(chapter 178, Laws of 1957), violates due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution by permitting a purported legislative com-
mittee, free of legislative control, and unlimited in time,
to be used as a device to bestow wide judicial and legisla-
tive powers upon the Attorney General of the State of New
Hampshire.
Statement of the Case.
This proceeding is brought under New Hampshire Re-
vised Statutes Annotated, c. 588, which is the State Sub-
versive Activities Law. Under section 8-a of that chap-
4
ter the Attorney General is granted authority by the Legis-
lature to conduct an investigation in the field of subversive
activities ‘‘At any time when the attorney general has
information which he deems reasonable or reliable relat-
ing to violations of the provisions of this chapter.’’
‘‘ArrorNEY GENERAL. At any time when the attorney
general has information which he deems reasonable or
reliable relating to violations of the provisions of this
chapter he shall make full and complete investiga-
tion thereof and shall report to the general court the
results of this investigation, together with his recom-
mendations, if any, for legislation. In any investiga-
tion hereunder the attorney general or any duly author-
ized member of his staff is authorized to require by
subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses
and the production of such correspondence, books,
papers and documents and to administer such oaths,
and to take such testimony and to make such expendi-
tures within the funds provided as he deems advisable.
The provisions of section 7 of this chapter shill be
inapplicable to the investigation provided for herein
and the attorney general is hereby authorized to make
public such information received by him, testimony
given before him, and matters handled by him as he
deems fit to effectuate the purposes hereof.’’
The previous proceeding which was decided in this Court
in DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 368
U.S. 19, was terminated when DeGregory appeared in the
Superior Court of New Hampshire, answered in the nega-
tive the question: ‘‘Are you presently a member of the
Communist Party?’’ and thereupon was purged of con-
tempt (R. 107). Within a few days the Attorney General
started the present proceeding by causing a subpoena to
5
be served on DeGregory. A hearing was held before the
Attorney General on November 22, 1963. At that time the
Attorney General posed a number of questions to DeGreg-
ory and early in the proceeding the witness made the
following statement:
‘*T would like to state, Mr. Gall, that I am not now
a member of the Communist Party and have not been
at any time since the authority you have cited, RSA
588 :8-a: that I have no knowledge of any Communist
activities in New Hampshire during this period or of
any violations of RSA 588 during this period of six
and one-half years. In fact, I am not even aware of
the existence of a Communist Party in the state of
New Hampshire at any time the authority you have
cited, Section 8-a, has been on the statute books, and
in view of the foregoing I do not understand what I
have to face here today.’’ (R. 91.)
Thereafter the Attorney General continued to pose
questions and DeGregory raised objections and declined to
answer them (R. 91-97). The Attorney General thereupon
brought a petition in the Superior Court, pursuant to New
Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, c. 491, and De-
Gregory filed an answer thereto, raising the constitutional
objections now relied upon (R. 12). A hearing was held
in the Superior Court on May 20, 1964. At that hearing
DeGregory again repeated the sworn statement which he
had previously made in the hearing before the Attorney
General and declined to answer a series of questions which
are set forth in the record of the Superior Court (R. 143,
et seq.). The Court entered an order finding DeGregory
in contempt and ordering him committed to a jail for one
year or until he might purge himself, and meanwhile re-
leased him on his own recognizance (R. 169). As stated
6
previously, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed
the decision of the lower Court and ruled that the statute on
the record of the case did not contravene the New Hamp-
shire or United States Constitutions (R. 75-82).
The Questions are Substantial.
The first and second questions involve passing on the
constitutionality of the statute as applied by the New
Hampshire Court on the record in this case. Due process
of law, the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech
and freedom to be silent, and the Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable search are involved.
Two kinds of foundation or probable cause must be con-
sidered and will be touched on successively.
The first is the kind of foundation the Attorney General
must have to institute an investigation.
As stated in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438:
‘The decisions of this Court have consistently held that
only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a sub-
ject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate can
justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.”’
The Attorney General was heard to argue that he really
does not need any foundation at all, except some kind of
unspecified probable cause (R. pp. 131, 133), and he further
pointed out that the Legislature had indicated a continuing
interest in the subject of subversive activities and cited New
Hampshire Laws of 1961 and 1963, each of which merely
provided for annual appropriations of $2,000 (R. p. 67).
It was stated in the Courts below, and not denied, that
the Attorney General has made no written report to the
Legislature since the report of 1955 on which he and the
New Hampshire Court relied in this case as the justification
of investigation (R. p. 25).
7
This Court needs no reminder that, in balancing First
Amendment rights of an individual against the urgent
necessity of the self-preservation of the state, it must be
ascertained that there is such urgency as to warrant limit-
ing the individual’s rights.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234.
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178.
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Com-
mittee, 372 U.S. 539.
Shelton v. United States, 327 F. 2d 601 (C.A.
D.C.).
Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F. 2d 597 (C.A. 4).
Having in mind the law as laid down in these cases, it
is submitted that no requisite legislative purpose is found
in the record of this case. When DeGregory made the
sworn statement already quoted, he said: ‘‘I don’t under-
stand what I have to face here today.’’ At that point the
burden was on the Attorney General to state the legislative
purposes of the investigation and the grounds which per-
mitted him at that time to pursue it.
‘*. , . it must be up to the State to make some at least
plausible disclosure of its lawmaking interest so that the
relevance of its inquiries to it may be tested.’’ Brennan,
J., dissenting, in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 105.
We are dealing here with a state investigating commit-
tee whose powers are circumscribed. Pennsylvania v. Nel-
son, 350 U.S. 497. The passing of the 1957 Act (Revised
Statutes Annotated, c. 588, § 8-a) presumably implied
findings of urgency by the Legislature, but such findings
cannot continue forever without some further showing that
the need which brought about the original statute still con-
tinues.
We would like to emphasize the difference of this pro-
ceeding and the previous proceeding between the same
8
parties, DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire,
368 U.S. 19. In the previous case only one question was —
involved: ‘‘Are you presently a member of the Communist
Party?’’ There was no doubt by the very tense of the
question, ‘‘Are you presently ... ,’’ that at least the At-
torney General was attempting to inquire about events and
facts then current.
Compare this proceeding, where DeGregory, by his sworn
statement, covered the present and the past back to the
date of the passage of the statute in 1957. The continued
insistence on questioning him, and the refusal to place any
dates on what period the questions related to, make it plain
that now the Attorney General is not seeking current in-
formation, but inquiring into events of long ago (R. 91-98).
The New Hampshire Court made it ¢: ystal clear that it
relied solely on the 1955 report of the Attorney General
(R. Ex. 1) as the basis for the current investigation (R.
77). At the time of its introduction in evidence (May,
1964) this report was over nine years old and most of its
contents related to events even older. How !oug can an
investigator justify going over and over evidence so old?
Where is that threat to the state which alone can consti-
tutionally justify the obvious impingement on First Amend-
ment rights?
The New Hampshire Court stated that the nature of
the Communist Party is such that it can be the subject
of constant scrutiny; but first it must be shown to exist
in New Hampshire, and the only evidence in the record is
negative, namely DeGregory’s sworn statement (R. 91).
The Attorney General’s presentation has the same qual-
ity of staleness, the same lack of connection with the
present day noted by this Court in Veterans of Abraham
Lincoln Brigade v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
380 U.S. 503, and American Committee for Protection of
Foreign Born v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 380
U.S. 513.
9
The New Hampshire Supreme Court cited Nelson v.
Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, as justifying a scrutiny of the distant
past (R. 79). Counsel for DeGregory discussed that case
before the Superior Court (R. 119, 120), and pointed out
that in that case an inquiry into events of the past was
upheid oniy because it was ancillary to the investigation
of current information.
As stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals in
Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 331 F. 2d 64, 67: ‘*This
statute is cast in the present tense. It is not designed to
produce historical treatises.’’
It is submitted, therefore, that the state has not suc-
cessfully carried its burden of showing any legislative
purpose in this investigation, and that therefore the ques-
tioning of DeGregory was in violation of his First Amend-
ment rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
Turning to the other branch of foundation, probable cause
or nexus, assume that this Court holds that the Attorney
General on the record of this case had the right to make an
investigation of subversive activities; he then had the
burden of showing some basis, some probable cause for
summoning appellant DeGregory to testify.
Whether appellant’s right rests on a ‘‘right of privacy’”’
under the First Amendment or other constitutional clauses,
or on his right not to be subjected to unreasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment, this Court has repeatedly
made clear that the government, federal or state, cannot
engage in ‘‘indiscriminate dragnet procedures,’’ a phrase
used in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134, and
in Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 412.
Put in another way, the Court in Gibson v. Florida Legis-
lative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, at 557 stated:
‘**... an adequate foundation for inquiry must be laid
10
before proceeding in such a manner as will substantially
intrude upon and severely curtail or inhibit constitutionally
protected activities or seriously interfere with similarly
protected associational rights.’’
The probable cause relied on by appellee was once again
the 1955 Report of the Attorney General (Ex. 1). There
was also reference made to ‘‘documented sworn testimony
to the effect that Hugo DeGregory had been for a long time
active within the Communist Party within this state’’ (R.
87).
However, on repeated challenge, appellee never put a date
on this alleged testimony, and never produced it (R. 87,
115, 117, 123, 133, 135, 137).
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in its opinion, relied
solely on the 1955 Report (R. 77, 79), and cited pages
204-206 of the Report. The most recent references to De-
Gregory in those pages were dated in 1953 and 1954, and in
fact did not themselves relate to violations of Revised
Statutes Annotated, c. 588.
Couple these stale and tenuous citations with the un-
contradicted statement under oath by appellant (R. 143)
and it becomes perfectly clear that appellee had nothing
even faintly approaching probable cause or reason to be-
lieve that DeGregory had any information that the Attorney
General could legitimately seek.
We have already cited authorities to show that, lacking
such a nexus or foundation, the summoning and questioning
of appellant was in violation of his rights as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the notice of appeal the issue of unconstitutionality
on its face of New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated,
c. 588, 4 8-a, was raised. This question was not argued
below because the New Hampshire Court was bound by the
previous case of DeGregory v. Attorney General of New
Hampshire, 368 U.S. 19.
11
It is open to this Court, if it so desires, to reconsider the
law. The question is submitted without argument by ap-
pellant.
Conclusion.
It is submitted, therefore, that, as a matter of due process
of law-and of First and Fourth Amendment rights as ap-
plied by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the decision of the New Hampshire Court
was plainy wrong. On the record of this case we urge
that appellant cannot constitutionally be ordered to jail
for refusal to answer the Attorney General’s questions, and
that the decision of the Court below should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
HOWARD S. WHITESIDE,
Attorney for Huco DeGrecory, Appellant.
[Appendices follow.]
12
Appendix A.
New Hampsuire Revisep Sratures ANNOTATED.
Cuapter 491.
Section 19. Prririon. Whenever any official or board
is given the power to summon witnesses and take testimony,
but has not the power to punish for contempt, and any
witness refuses to obey such summons either as to his
appearance or as to the production of things specified in
the summons, or refuses to testify or to answer any ques-
tions, a petition for an order to compel him to testify or
his compliance with the summons may be filed in the
Superior Court or with some justice thereof.
Section 20. Procepure. Upon such petition the Court
or justice shall have authority to proceed in the matter as
though the original proceeding had been in the court and
may make orders and impose penalties accordingly.
Cuapter 588.
SuBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES.
588:1 Derinitions. For the purpose of this chapter
‘‘organization’’ means an organization, corporation, com-
pany, partnership, association, trust, foundation, fund,
club, society, committee, political party, or any group of
persons, whether or not incorporated, permanently or
temporarily associated together for joint action or ad-
vancement of views on any subject or subjects.
‘‘Subversive organization’? means any organization
which engages in or advocates, abets, advises, or teaches, or
a purpose of which is to engage in or advocate, abet, advise,
or teach activities intended to overthrow, destroy or alter,
or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of,
13
the constitutional form of government of the United States,
or of the state of New Hampshire, or of any political subdi- -
vision of either of them, by force, or violence.
‘‘Foreign subversive organization’? means any organi-
zation directed, dominated or controlled directly or indi-
rectly by a foreign government which engages in or advo-
cates, abets, advises, or teaches, or a purpose of which is
to engage in or to advocate, abet, advise, or teach, activities
intended to overthrow, destroy, or alter, or to assist in the
overthrow, destruction or alteration of the constitutional
form of government of, the United States, or of the state
of New Hampshire, or of any political subdivision of either
of them, and to establish in place thereof any form of
government the direction and control of which is to be
vested in, or exercised by or under, the domination or con-
trol of any foreign government, organization, or individual;
but does not and shall not be construed to mean an organi-
zation the bona fide purpose of which is to promote world
peace by alliances or unions with other governments or
world federations, unions or governments to be effected
through constitutional means.
‘Foreign government’’ means the government of any
country or nation other than the government of the United
States of America or one of the states thereof.
‘Subversive person’? means any person who commits,
attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates,
abets, advises or teaches, by any means any person to
commit, attempt to commit or aid in the commission of
any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist
in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the consti-
tutional form of the government of the United States, or of
the state of New Hampshire, or any political subdivision of
either of them, by force, or violence, or who is a member
of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organi-
zation.
14
SEDITION.
588:2 Ferxonies. It shall be a felony for any person
knowingly and wilfully to
(a) commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commis-
sion of any act intended to overthrow, destroy, or alter,
or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of
the constitutional form of the government of the United
States, or of the state of New Hampshire, or any political
subdivision of either of them, by force or violence; or
(b) advocate, abet, advise or teach by any means any
person to commit, attempt to commit, or assist in the com-
mission of any such act under such circumstances as to con-
stitute a clear and present danger to the security of the
United States, or of the state of New Hampshire or of
any political subdivision of either of them; or
(c) conspire with one or more persons to commit any
such act; or
(d) assist in the formation or participate in the man-
agement or to contribute to the support of any subversive
organization or foreign subversive organization knowing
said organization to be a subversive organization or a
foreign subversive organization; or
(e) destroy any books, records or files, or secrete any
funds in this state of a subversive organization or a foreign
subversive organization, knowing said organization to be
such.
Any person who shall be convicted by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction of violating any of the provisions of
this section shall be fined not more than twenty thousand
dollars, or imprisoned for not more than twenty years, or
both, at the discretion of the court.
588:3 Prenaury. It shall be a felony for any person after
August 1, 1951 to become, or after November 1, 1951 to
remain a member of a subversive organization or a foreign
15
subversive organization knowing said organization to be a
subversive organization or foreign subversive organization.
Any person who shall be convicted by a court of competent
jurisdiction of violating this section shall be fined not more
than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than
five years, or both, at the discretion of the court.
588 :3-a Evipence or MempersHip or Participation. In
determining membership or participation in a subversive
organization or a foreign subversive organization as defined
in this chapter, or knowledge of the purpose or objective
of such organization, the jury, under instructions from
the court, may consider evidence, if presented, as to
whether the accused person to his knowledge:
(1) Has been listed as a member in any book or any
of the lists, records, correspondence, or any other
document of the organization;
(2) Has made financial contribution to the organiza-
tion in dues, assessments, loans, or in any other
form;
(3) Has made himself subject to the discipline of the
organization in any form whatsoever;
(4) Has executed orders, plans, or directives of any
kind of the organization;
(5) Has acted as an agent, courier, messenger, corre-
spondent, organizer, or in any other capacity in
behalf of the organization;
(6) Has conferred with officers or other members of
the organization in behalf of any plan or enterprise
of the organization;
(7) Has been accepted as an officer or member of the
organization or as one to be called upon for services
by other officers or members of the organization ;
(8) Has written, spoken or in any other way communi-
cated by signal, semaphore, sign or in any other form
16
of communication orders, directives, or plan of the
organization ;
(9) Has prepared documents, pampblets, leaflets, books
or any other type of publication in behalf of the
objectives and purposes of the organization ;
(10) Has mailed, shipped, circulated, distributed, deliv-
ered, or in any other way sent or delivered to others
materials cr propaganda of any kind in behalf of
the organization ;
(11) Has advised, counseled or in any other way im-
parted information, suggestions, recommendations
to officers or members of the organization or to any-
one else in behalf of the objectives of the organiza-
tion ;
(12) Has indicated by word, action, conduct, writing
or in any other way a willingness to carry out in any
manner and to any degree the plans, designs, ob-
jectives, or purposes of the organization;
(13) Has in any other way participated in the activi,
ties, planning, actions, objectives, or purposes of the
organization ;
(14) The enumeration of the above subjects of evidence
on membership or participation in a subversive
organization or a foreign subversive organization
as above defined, shall not limit the inquiry into
and consideration of any other subject of evidence
on membership and participation as herein stated.
588 :3-b Construction or Provision. Nothing in the pre-
ceding section shall be construed to limit the supervisory
power of the court over the admission and exclusion of
evidence or over the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole.
588:4 Barrep From Orrice. Any person who shall be
convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of violating
any of the provisions of sections 2 and 3 of this chapter,
17
in addition to all other penalties therein provided, shall
from theate of such conviction be barred from:
(a) holding any office, elective or appointive, or any other
position of profit or trust in or employment by the govern-
ment of the state of New Hampshire or of any agency
thereof or of any county, municipal corporation or other
political subdivision of said state;
(b) filing or standing for election to any public office in
the state of New Hampshire.
588:5 DissoLuTion or Orcanizations. It shall be unlaw-
ful for any subversive organization or foreign subversive
organization to exist or function in the state of New Hamp-
shire and any organization which by a court of competent
jurisdiction is found to have violated the provisions of this
section shall be dissolved, and if it be a corporation organ-
ized and existing under the laws of the state of New Hamp-
shire, a finding by a court of competent jurisdiction that
it has violated the provisions of this section shall constitute
legal cause for forfeiture of its charter and its charter shall
be forfeited, and all funds, books, records and files of every
kind and all other property of any organization fuund to
have violated the provisions of this section shall be seized
by and for the state of New Hampshire, the funds to be
deposited in the state treasury and the books, records, files
and other property to be turned over to the attorney general
of New Hampshire.
588:6 Assistance Furnisuep. For the collection of any
evidence and information referred to in this chapter, the
attorney general is hereby directed to call upon the super-
intendent of the state police, and county and municipal
police authorities of the state to furnish him such assistance
as may from time to time be required. Such police author-
ities are directed to furnish information and assistance as
may be from time to time so requested. The attorney gen-
eral may testify before any grand jury as to matters re-
18
ferred to in this chapter as to which he may have informa-
tion.
588:7 Recorps. The attorney general shall maintain
complete records of all information received by him and
all matters handled by him under the requirements of this
chapter. Such records as may reflect on the loyalty of any
resident of this state shall not be made public nor divulged
to any person except with the permission of the attorney
general to effectuate the purposes thereof.
588:8 Granp Jury Inquires. The superior court, when
in its discretion it appears apppropriate, or when informed
by the attorney general that there is information or evi-
dence of the character described in section 2 of this chapter
to be considered by the grand jury, shall charge the grand
jury to inquire into violations of this chapter for the pur-
pose of proper action.
588 :8-a Arrorney GeneRAL. At any time when the attor-
ney general has information which he deems reasonable or
reliable relating to violations of the provisions of this chap-
ter he shall make full and complete investigation thereof
and shall report to the general court the results of this in-
vestigation, together with his recommendations, if any, for
legislation. In any investigation hereunder the attorney
general or any duly authorized member of his staff is
authorized to require by subpoena or otherwise the attend-
ance of such witnesses and the production of such corre-
spondence, books, papers and documents and to administer
such oaths, and to take such testimony and to make snch
expenditures within the funds provided as he deems advis-
able. The provisions of section 7 of this chapter shall be
inapplicable to the investigation provided for herein and
the attorney general is hereby authorized to make public
such information received by him, testimony given before
him, and matters handled by him as he deems fit to effectu-
ate the purposes hereof.
19
Loyatry.
588:9 EmpLoymMent. No subversive person, as defined
in this chapter, shall be eligible for employment in, or
appointment to any office, or any position of trust or profit
in the government of, or in the administration of the busi-
ness of this state, or of any county, municipality, or other
political subdivision, of this state.
588:10 Written SrateMEeNts Requirrep. Every person
and every board, commission, council, department, court or
other agency of the state of New Hampshire, or any politi-
cal subdivision thereof, who or which appoints or employs
or supervises in any manner the appointment or employ-
ment of public officials or employees shall establish by
rules, regulations or otherwise, procedures designed to as-
certain before any person, including teachers, and other
employees of any public educational institution in this
state, is appointed or employed, that he or she as the case
may be, is not a subversive person, and that there are no
reasonable grounds to believe such persons are subversive
persons. In the event such reasonable grounds exist, he or
she as the case may be, shall not be appointed or employed.
In securing any facts necessary to ascertain the informa-
tion herein required, the applicant shall be required to sign
a written statement containing answers to such inquiries
as may be material, which statement shall contain notice
that it.is subject to the penalties of perjury.
588:11 Exceptions. The inquiries prescribed in section
10 other than the written statement to be executed by an
applicant for employment, shall not be required as a pre-
requisite to the employment of any persons in the classifica-
tion of laborers in any case in which the employing author-
ity shall in his or its discretion determine and by rule or
regulation specify the reasons why, the nature of the work
to be performed is such that employment of persons as to
whom there may be reasonable grounds to believe that they
20
are subversive persons as defined in this chapter will not
be dangerous to the health of the citizens or the security
of the government of the United States, the state of New
Hampshire or any political subdivision thereof.
588:12 Present Empioyers. Every person, who on
August 1, 1951 shall be in the employ of the state of New
Hampshire or of any political subdivision thereof, other
than those now holding elective office shall be required on or
before October 1, 1951 to make a written statement which
shall contain notice that it is subject to the penalties of
perjury, that he or she is not a subversive person as de-
fined in this chapter, namely, any person who commits, at-
tempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates,
abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to com-
mit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act
intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist in the
overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional
form of the government of the United States, or of the state
of New Hampshire, or any political subdivision of either
of them, by force, or violence; or who is a member of a
subversive organization or a foreign subversive organiza-
tion, as more fully defined in this chapter. Such statement
shall be prepared and execution required by every person
and every board, commission, council, department, court,
or other agency of the State of New Hampshire or any
political subdivision thereof responsible for the supervision
of employees under its jurisdiction. Any such person fail-
ing or refusing to execute such a statement or who admits
he is a subversive person as defined in this chapter shall
immediately be discharged.
588:13 Discuarce or PersonneL; Hearine. Reasonable
grounds on all the evidence to believe that any person is
a subversive person, as defined in this chapter shall be
cause for discharge from any appointive office or other
position of profit or trust in the government of or in the
21
administration of the business of this state, or of any
county, municipality or other political subdivision of this
state, or any agency thereof. The personnel commission
shall, by appropriate rules or regulations, prescribe that
persons charged with being subversive persons, as defined
in this chapter, shall be accorded notice and opportunity
to be heard, in accordance with the procedures prescribed
by law for discharges for other reasons. Every person
and every board, commission, council, department, or other
agency of the state of New Hampshire or any political sub-
division thereof having responsibility for the appointment,
employment or supervision of public employees not cov-
ered by the state classified service shall establish rules or
procedures similar to those required herein for classified
services for a hearing for any person charged with being
a subversive person, as defined in this chapter after notice
and opportunity to be heard. Every employing authority
discharging any person pursuant to any provision of this
chapter shall promptly report to the attorney general the
fact of and the circumstances surrounding such discharge.
A person discharged under the provisions of this section
shall have the right within thirty days thereafter to appeal
to the superior court of the county where such person may
reside for a determination by such court (with the aid of
a jury if the appellant so elects) as to whether or not the
discharge appealed from was justified under the provisions
of this act. The court shall speedily hear and determine
such appeals, and from the judgment of the court, there
shall be a further appeal to the supreme court of New
Hampshire as in civil cases.
588:14 Deciarations or Canpipates. No person shall
become a candidate for election to, nor qualify for, any
public office under the election laws of this state unless he
or she shall file with the declaration of candidacy, or prior
to qualifying, an affidavit that he or she is not a subversive
22
person as defined in this chapter. No declaration of
candidacy shall be received for filing by any town or city
clerk or by the secretary of state unless accompanied by
the affidavit aforesaid and there shall not be entered upon
any ballot or voting machine at any election the name of
the person who has failed or refused to make the affidavits
aforesaid.
588:15 Fause Srarements. Every written statement
made pursuant to this chapter by an applicant for appoint-
ment or employment, or by any employee shall be deemed
to have been made under oath if it contains a declaration
preceding the signature of the maker to the effect that it
is made under the penalties of perjury. Any person who
makes a material misstatement of fact (a) in any such
written statement, or (b) in any affidavit made pursuant to
the provisions of this chapter, or (c) under oath in any
hearing conducted by any agency of the state, or of any
of its political subdivisions, pursuant to this chapter, or
(d) in any written statement by an applicant for appoint-
ment or employment or by an employee in any state aid in-
stitution of learning in‘this state, intended to determine
whether or not such applicant or employee is a subversive
person as defined in this chapter, which statement contains
notice that it is subject to the penalties of perjury shall be
subject to the penalties of perjury prescribed in chapter
587, RSA.
588:16 Tirie. This chapter may be cited as the ‘‘Sub-
versive Activities Act of 1951.’’
23
\
Appendix B.
Opinion or Supreme Court or New HampsuHire.
Merrimack,
No. 5298.
Wituiam Maynarp, Arrorney GeneraL
v.
Hueco De Gregory
Argued January 5, 1965.
Decided April 30, 1965.
Petition under RSA 491:19, 20 to compel the defendant
to answer certain questions asked him in a legislative in-
vestigation of subversive activities by the Attorney Gen-
eral pursuant to the provisions of RSA 588:8-a (supp).
When directed by the Trial Court (Loughlin, J.) to an-
swer the propounded questions, defendant refused. He in-
formed the Court he was not invoking his privilege against
self incrimination. The Court adjudged him in contempt
and ordered him committed to jail for a period of one year
or until he purged himself of contempt. However, he was
released on his own recognizance pending this appeal.
William Maynard, Attorney General, R. Peter Shapiro,
Assistant Attorney General, and Joseph F. Gall, Special
Assistant to the Attorney General (Messrs. Shapiro and
Gall orally) for the Attorney General.
Lawrence J. Walsh and Howard S. Whiteside (of Massa-
chusetts) (Mr. Whiteside orally), for the defendant.
Lampron, J. The first issue raised by the defendant is
whether under the circumstances of this case the Attorney
General has power under RSA 588:8-a (supp) to question
him and whether the Superior Court has power to commit
him for his refusal to answer the questions asked.
24
RSA 588:8-c (supp) reads in part as follows: ‘‘At any
time when the Attorney General has information which he
deems reasonable or reliable relating to violations of the
provisions of this chapter he shall make full and complete
investigation thereof and shall report to the Genéyal Court
the results of this investigation, together with his recom-
mendations, if any, for legislation.’’ 4
We held in Wyman v. De Gregory, 103 N.H. 214, 216, 217,
that this ‘‘statute does not require that there must be a
violation of law before the legislative investigation can be
set in motion. It only requires that there be reasonable
and reliable information ‘relating’ to violations of the pro-
visions of RSA Ch. 588”’ relating to subversive activities.
This judgment was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court. De Gregory v. Attorney General of New Hamp-
shire, 368 U.S. 19. That Court, as recently as March,
1963, reaffirmed the broad inherent power of a Legislature
to conduct investigations ‘‘concerning the administration
of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes.”’ Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Com., 372 U.S. 539, 545. See Annot. 3 L. Ed. 2d 1647, 1650.
The defendant argues, however, that the Attorney Gen-
eral did not comply with RSA 588:8-a (supp) in that he
failed to show (1) that he ‘‘bas information which he deems
reasonable or reliable relating to violations of the provisions
of’’ RSA ch. 588, aud (2) that he has reasonable cause
to believe that the defendant has evidence pertinent to the
subject under investigation.
It has long been recognized that the tenets of the Com-
munist Party include the overthrow of government by
force and violence. Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 50;
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 128. That the
State of New Hampshire has an interest in the preservation
of its government against the menace of Communist sub-
version is firmly established. Nelson v. Wyman, supra;
25
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Com., 372 U.S.
539, 547. Furthermore our Legislature has manifested a
continuing concern to be kept informed by its investigating
committee, the Attorney General, as to the need of ‘‘further
legislation in the field of subversive activities.’’ Wyman
vy. De Gregory, 103 N.H. 214, 217; RSA 588:8-a (supp) ;
Laws 1961, 224:1 (p. 311) and 225:1 (p. 402); Laws 1963,
198:1 (p. 201) and 199:1 (p. 298).
In the present proceeding instituted in 1963 the Attorney
General introduced in evidence a report to the Legislature,
made by a prior Attorney General, showing the existence
of a Communist Party and Communist influence in New
Hampshire and the probable continuance of such activities
in our state. Report of the Attorney General to New
Hampshire General Court (January 5, 1955). In prior
proceedings beginning in February 1960, the Attorney
General attempted to obtain information from the defend-
aut, which he is still seeking in the present proceedings.
We hold that given the nature of the Communist move-
ment and its mode of operation the above report could
constitute information which the Attorney General could
deem reasonable or reliable relating to violations of RSA
ch. 588 and the proper basis for his present investigation:
of subversive activities on behalf of the Legislature. Wy-
man Vv. De Gregory, 103 N.H. 214, 217; De Gregory v. Attor-
ney General of New Hampshire, 368 U.S. 19; Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Com., 372 U.S. 539, 547.
It was also stated in the above report that the then
Attorney General had reliable information concerning de-
fendant’s participation in the Communist Party as an offi-
cer, a presiding officer at conferences in New Hampshire,
and in numerous other party activities. (pp. 204-206). When
questioned by the Attorney General on November 22, 1963,
and also in the Superior Court in the hearing which is the
basis of this appeal, the defendant made the following state-
26
ment: ‘‘I am not now a member of the Communist Party
and have not been at any time since the authority you have
cited, RSA 588 :8-a; that I have no knowledge of any Com-
munist. activities in New Hampshire during this period or
of any violations of RSA 588 during this period of six and
one-half years.’’ Even if taken at its face value, this state-
ment does not render otherwise proper and pertinent in-
formation regarding his prior contacts and involvements
with the Communist Party and its members in this State
beyond the legitimate interest and jurisdiction of the
Attorney General acting as the investigating committee of
the Legislature. Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 39; Uphaus
v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 78.
We hold, as we did in Wyman v. De Gregory, 103 N.H.
214, 217, that the Attorney General had reasonable and
reliable information relating to violations of RSA ch. 588
which provided a valid and relevant basis for the investiga-
tion of the defendant. We hold further that the Superior
Couri could properly hold the defendant in contempt under
RSA 491:19, 20 for his refusal to answer whether he was
ever a member, a paid member, or an officer of the Com-
munist Party; if he ever had access to or control of mem-
bership or financial records of the Party in New Hamp-
shire or attended Party meetings; the extent of control
of the Party activities in this state exerted by a Party unit
in Boston of which he is alleged to have been an officer; if
he attended Party meetings in New Hampshire where ad-
vocacy of the overthrow of the Government took place or
persons conspired to so do; also questions as to his knowl-
edge about the books, records or files of the Party in this
state and about his contributions to its support. Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 US.
109; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399; Braden v.
United States, 365 U.S. 431.
Defendant’s last contention is that if RSA 588:8-a
(supp) is held to empower the Attorney General in the
27
circumstances of this case, to require defendant to answer
questions, this statute is in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This is for the reason, in the words of his
brief, ‘‘that the danger to the State, which must be present
to warrant action under a statute like c. 588, s. 8A has not
been shown to exist at any time during plaintiff’s current
attempts to question defendant or in fact for years prior
thereto.”’
As we have stated previously in this opinion the investi-
gation of Communist Party activities in this state is within
the power of our Legislature and the authority granted to
its investigating committee, the Attorney General. Be-
cause of the nature of the Communist Party it is a proper
and permissible subject of constant scrutiny by the Legisla-
ture. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Com.,
372 U.S. 539, 547. A defendant’s own past or present mem-
bership in the Party is within the purview of such an inves-
tigation. Id. The nexus between the defendant and sub-
versive activities disclosed by the report offered in evidence
by the Attorney General and properly admitted by the
Court, furnished adequate justification for his present in-
terrogation of the defendant. The decisions in No. 44
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v.
Subversive Activities Control Board [380 U.S. 503], 33
L. W. 4836, and No. 65 Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Bri-
gade v. Subversive Activities Control Board [380 U.S. 513],
33 L. W. 4339 (decided April 26, 1965) are not apposite
to the situation existing in this case. This exercise by
the State of its power adequately to inform itself in order
to act and protect its legitimate and vital interests has
not been ‘‘pressed, in this instance, to a point where it
has come into fatal collision with the overriding constitu-
tionally protected rights’’ of the defendant. Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 81.
Exceptions overruled.
28
Duncan, J., concurred in the result; the others concurred,
Duncan, J., concurring: The 1957 statute, under which
this proceeding was instituted in 1963, directs the Attorney
General to make an investigation of ‘‘violations’’ of the
‘‘Subversive Activities Act of 1951,’’ or of ‘‘information
. . relating to’’ such violations. RSA 588:8-a (supp),
Section 8-a and my views concerning it have not changed
since it was under consideration four years ago in a prior
proceeding against this defendant. See Wyman v. De-
Gregory, 103 N.H. 214, 218-219. ‘ihe foundation for the
most recent order that the defendant answer questions pro-
pounded by the Attorney General is once again the report
made by Attorney General Wyman to the Legislatw2 in
1955. However, I am bound to accept as decided law the
interpretation placed upon 4 8-a, supra, by a majority of
this court in Wyman . DeGregory, supra, since affirmed by
DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 368
U.S. 19, and therefore concur in the order entered today.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.